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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD ~

Event: Bruce Butterworth, former Director for Policy and Planning (ACS-1) at the FAA

Type of event: Interview

Date: September 29, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan

Team Number: 7

Location: GSA Commission Office

Participants - Non-Commission: Bruce Butterworth

Participants - Commission: John Raidt, Bill Johnstone, and Lisa Sullivan

Background

(Unc) From 1975-1980, Bruce Butterworth worked for the House Committee on
Government Operations, Majority Staff (Congressman Burton). He moved to the
Department of Transportation where, following the crash of Pan Am 103 in December of
1988, he acted as a liaison to the FAA for the Office of the Secretary (Secretary Jim
Burnley). In 1991 he became Director for Security Policy and Planning (ACP-l) at the
FAA. In July 1995, he was promoted to Director of Security Operations (ACO-l). He
remained in that post until September 2000. At that time, he left the FAA and took a job
as the head of security for the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC. He was in this
role on 9111/01. This past year he moved to the NASA Goddard Flight Center as the
Deputy Director for Planning and Development and Applied Engineering and the
Technology Directorate.

(Unc) The only contact he had with aviation security after leaving the FAA was in
obtaining assistance on the updating of security checkpoints for the Holocaust Museum.
Butterworth obtained from the FAA TIP-ready x-ray machines built for airport
checkpoints which were then deployed at the Museum. The FAA had extra machines on
hand because, according to Butterworth, airports were unwilling to install them. A
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated September 11,2001 signed by Mike
Canavan of the FAA and Butterworth formalized the transaction of the machines.

Job Description

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(Unc) As Director of FAA Security Policy and Planning, Butterworth outlined four 'main
job functions:
1. Formal and informal rulemaking: This encompassed implementation of the Pan
Am 103 Commission recommendations (p.L. 101-604). Butterworth thought the
more significant of the two functions was the informal rulemaking under the Air
Carrier and Airport Standard Security Programs because it did not take as long
and the rules were narrower in focus. Changes to the air carrier standards
program were easier to implement than changes in formal security rules.
Because the air carrier standards program was sensitive security information and
stayed within FAA, the rulemaking moved faster because DOT and OMB were
not "rattling around in the process."
2. Oversight of Research and Development (R and D): He targeted funding each
year. Rand D generally received an allocation of $36 million a year.
3. Physical security of FAA assets.
4. Contingency planning: ACP's fourth function was to devise plans in response to
credible and specific intelligence is received regarding a threat to an airport, for
instance. This included the issuance of Aviation Security (AVSEC) alert levels.

(Unc) Butterworth also acted as the informal liaison to Capitol Hill, given his prior work
experience on the House side. '

(Unc) The Policy office, which decided what policies should be pursued, had 32-42 staff,
while the Operations office, which implemented policy, had approximately 1,000 staff,
mostly field agents.

Security Directives - Rulemaking

(Unc) ACS-l would sign off on Security Directives once the three divisions (Intelligence,
Policy, and Operations) conferred on the content that went out to the air carriers and
airports. The FAA Administrator was kept informed, but generally did not participate in
the issuance of the directives. It was Paul Busick's responsibility to keep the Office of
the Secretary informed of FAA policy changes. Butterworth said that Busick took a
strong position on enforcement of security regulations for the civil aviation system.
Butterworth reported that he "almost lost his job" because of it.

(Unc) Carriers always wanted to see intelligence reports for themselves; to determine if
they were real. Butterworth said that changes to aviation security policies under normal
conditions (rather than in response to a crisis) face rulemaking difficulties, usually as a
result of cost-benefit analysis. Other constraints on the process he attributed to
interactions between "senior level people," who wanted to "make sure the rule is good,
and at the same time protects the industry'S interests. For example, it took the FAA four
years (approximately 1993-1996) to pass a rule protecting SSI from public disclosure.
This is one instance in which cost-benefit analysis was not a factor.

Butterworth recognized the need for the FBI and the CTS to beef-up their assessments of
the threat in order to move the industry.

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• FAA Leadership

(Unc) Butterworth characterized the position of ACS-l as, the "president in charge of
going to jail," implying FAA leadership intuited that a mistake or an accident was bound
to occur, and the position that would take the blame for it between the FAA and the DOT
would be ACS-I.

(Unc) As for FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Butterworth described her as "a distance
person," as though she "didn't want her fingerprints on anything that was going on at
FAA" with respect to security. Butterworth stated that watching her testimony at the 9-
11 Commission hearing in May 2003 angered him.

(Unc) In contrast, he said that her predecessor Administrator Hinson (early 1990s) was a
good decision-maker is crises, but Butterworth considered him "very skeptical" about
increasing security measures. Industry applied pressure on the FAA directly through the
Administrator's office. He never saw the calls happen. Butterworth fought hard to
improve cargo screening measures; to prevent them from being rolled back. Butterworth
said that Administrator Hinson was not one-hundred percent in favor of enforcing cargo
security measures because he was not fully convinced about the information used to
support the new measures. He loosened restraints.

• (Unc) In response to crises, Butterworth said "ACS is a completely different

organization." They act as a team, working al1 hours of the night. ACS was the primary
link between with the National Security Council's NSG (he listed these names as people
ACS liaised with during crisis-mode: Dick Clarke, Dan Benjamin, Steve Simon, and then .
later Roger Pressy. "Actionable intelligence" initiated such an emergency response.

Bojinka Plot

''{sS.D The classic example he used was the Manila Plot ("Bojinka"). Inthat instance,
Butterworth thought that Civil Aviation Security "did a really good job." He referred to
United Airlines as "the best of the carriers" with respect to security and reported that
"Greenwald from United said at the time, "if they are lying to us," (meaning FAA) "then
we'll get them," implying that Greenwald was going to trust the FAA's reports this time.

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'tSSI) Butterworth called security procedures at the airports "messy." He thought that
was because airline Security Directors were "isolated" and did not know how to interact
with the airlines, or their vulnerabilities. Butterworth thought that primarily, "Airlines
hired security directors to deal with internal theft, such as ticket fraud and stealing."

Congressional Oversight

(Unc) According to Butterworth, only two Members of Congress, Congressman Oberstar

and Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), took "the right" position on aviation security one-
hundred percent of the time. Congressman Mica fought the "vehicle bomb measure" at
Orlando airport. Former Congressman Duncan, as Chairman of the Aviation
Subcommittee, is reported to have told the air carriersl industry stakeholders, "You all let
me know what you want to have rolled back," in terms of regulation.

(Unc) The industry would exercise its influence by getting Members of Congress to
submit "veiled" questions to the FAA on security measures. There was no congressional
pressure put on the stakeholders to increase security. It is Butterworth's opinion that

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Congress pressured the FAA (in the form of inquiry) to "roll back" the regulations. He
said that the occasional question from a Hill staffer was often "veiled," They were not
going to come out and say they were opposed to increasing safety of civil aviation, but it
was clear they opposed increased spending on the measures.

(Unc) When asked to elaborate, he said that there was no Member of Congress on the
"far right" of the regulatory issue. As a FAA policy-maker, he said, "You were the right.
You had to create it." Even the victims' groups were largely ineffective such as from Pan
Am 103. As for the effectiveness of interested union representation, he said that the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) was the most active on security issues. The Flight
Attendants Association was not very effective.

New Special Assessments Testing (the "Red Team")

(Unc) Butterworth instituted a program in 1995 of realistic testing of security measures.

The 1996 FAA Reauthorization Act, included language for realistic testing of the system;
Flynn and Butterworth got Sam Whitehorn (a staff member on the Senate Commerce
Committee) to put the language in the legislation. Butterworth requested the Special
Assessments Division (often referred to as the "Red Team") to mirror current threats with
calibration of the x-ray machines in mind. Prior to the program he instituted the test
methods used to assess the securit s stems "were ridiculous.'
,--~_~ ~ __ ~ ........ ....I The tests"

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conducted were poor assessments of how well the system would perform shouldanactual
terrorist attempt to get an lED aboard a flight. Administrative law judg~.had·-said that

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ruling dated back to 1990-91 and heavily influenced FA..(\'s regular testing Butterworth
indicated that, because of the ALJ ruling, it would be difficult for the FAA to seek a civil
fine if the test that the screener failed was not clear-cut. ...
This

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teS) He said he had to fight very hard to sustain what he called a "robust" testing
program. He noted that Flynn, whom "he respected enormously," hap concerns about the
program Butterworth was trying to sustain. According to Butterworth, one could never
tell with Flynn whether it was him or his sup.eriors who were putting limits on him. AT A
rigorously fought it. Butterworth said he had to "walk it up slowly." Butterworth felt

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that the regular testing/enforcement system "embraced" the partnership ~oncept between
the FAA and industry, but that it didn't do well enough in distinguishing "partnership from
co-optation. ",

~S) Failure to meet the FAA standards should not necessitate firing personnel. Small
fines did not effectively address the failures, either. For this reason, Butterworth devised
a Performance Based Enforcement (1995-2000) policy. It was based on tW9 premises:
the need to have testing results reflective across thy system, and that the air carriers face
the same testing protocols. The enforcement policy hinged on FAA's actions toward the
worst performers because many others in the system would base their compliance on
what happened to this group. He said that they openly considered closing checkpoints
that performed poorly and showed no improvement. Butterworth thought this wa'~ a good
approach (Ort Steele agreed), but it was never implemented. "

(eS) At one point, FAA leadership under Acting-Administrator Linda Daschle senta
letter to the industry on selectee-onl ba match testin results inson refused to send
the letter under his Administration).
The letter from the FAA basically sa..l.....,.to-,,-e-c-a-rr-}-er-s-:
!'P'w--e-a-re-c-o-n-s"'1
,..e-r
..m-g-a--nu-m-yoo-er
....of
options including revocation of your operating certificate as an air carrier." In
Butterworth's view, she was the only Administrator he served under who threatened to
get "tough" with the industry, and this particular letter represented the only occasion he
was aware of where FAA leadership threatened de-certification as a result of security

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failings .

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• tss) The response from the air carriers was mixed. Crandall's (American Airlines)
response was "acerbic." United was particularly embarrassed by their results. The FAA
had no "will" left to follow through on the threat to pull certificates. There was no fall
out.

FAA receptivity to Red Team findings:

(e"S) Butterworth revealed that he had personal conflicts with Ken Mead, Inspector
General of DOT. However, Butterworth thought that his testimony on Red Team
assessments at the Commission's May 2003 hearing was good. He indicated that the
charge that leadership "covered-up" the Red Team results was ludicrous. The Red Team
results were provided to the industry. Irish Flynn and Ort Steele deserve credit for the
continuous flow of information about performance to the industry; far more than the
administration before them. The Red Teams customarily briefed the field agents
following a test on their performance so that the x-ray machines could be recalibrated and
their weaknesses addressed. Butterworth implied that it was the air carriers and other
stakeholders that reluctantly accepted the information provided by the testing. They did
not want to know.

• ECS) Because the performance problems were so fundamental to the system, Butterworth
felt that the issuance of a rule or any other "dramatic" action on the part of FAA would
not remedy the problems. There was no dramatic action that could be taken, not with the
limited power that the FAA had at its disposal.

~S) Butterworth viewed potential threats to CAS in several groups: The first group
refers to the professional terrorist with financial backing, possibly state-sponsored. In
Butterworth's words, "All civil aviation security can do is to get this hijacker to pause for
a minute. It is impossible to design against these people. One can't shake down
everyone at the airports. It's not workable." This also applies to suicide hijackers, which
the system pre-9-11 certainly was not prepared to handle. In Butterworth's former
position, all one can do is, "Pray to God that your intelligence services are going to pick
them up."

(&S) He characterized the second group as the "deadly and dumb people," whose intent is
not suicide and who want to remain anonymous as they attempt to beat the system.
Operating under the presumption of non-suicide, the system attempted to deal with this
group by closing off all avenues for the criminal to maintain anonymity.

'(6S) The third group were "the nutcases;" individuals that try to walk onto a plane with a
38-caliber gun or a ticking briefcase, for instance. He indicated that the security system

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had better be able to stop this group .

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• cBs) Why was the FAA so close-minded to the thought of suicide hijackers? Butterworth
had no answer to that. He said that the entire security system was based on non-suicide.

Industry Influence - Dual Mandate

(e'S) In terms of industry influence, there was no question in Butterworth's mind that the
stakeholders could get rid of anyone they wanted at FAA at anytime. Butterworth told
the Commission that the FAA went "after him" for coming down too hard on the
stakeholders. In the spring of 1998, he almost lost his job over it. Congressman Oberstar
wrote a Jetter on Butterworth's behalf to ensure that he keep his job at the FAA.
Butterworth believed that he was targeted because his policy directives were costing the
industry too much money. For example, the industry fought his testing program "tooth
and nail."

(C§) Butterworth sought to move up to become Deputy Associate Administrator at FAA.

Jane Garvey put a security director from Northwest Airlines on the search panel for the
position. Busick and Klickenburg were also on the panel. According to Butterworth,
Garvey "went to the industry and asked who they couldn't get along with."

(SS) At the time, Northwest owed $2 million in fines to the FAA. Butterworth saw this
as a clear conflict of interest. Because of thatl 9/11 Personal Privacy land

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"performance gaps" in the system, he withdrew filS name tor conslderatlOn tor promotion
at that time. In Butterworth's opinion, "it was a story worthy of the Washington Post
front page." This was a clear example of the contradictory, counterproductive nature of
the "Dual Mandate". Oberstar was horrified that a strong director of operations was
being targeted and industry was having a side. Flynn's strong support and Oberstar's
intervention let him keep his job.

(Unc) In summarizing his evaluation of the civil aviation security system during the time
he served, Butterworth indicated that he didn't think a 'jury of his peers" would believe
they had done everything it would have been prudent and responsible to do.

Public Disclosure of Air Carrier Test Results

(BS) He also shared with the Commission an instance in which the regulated industry
exerted undue influence over the FAA. There was a presumption that after a certain
period of time was given to an air carrier to fix security failures the information would be
made public. He was working on a settlement agreement with Continental Airlines on
fines for security failures. FAA had to have a press release with Continental announcing
that it had agreed to pay x number of dollars for security violations. The negotiations on
that deal went all the way to the Administrator, and he is not sure if it was ever resolved.

Questions from the 9/11 families:

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t€S) Butterworth was asked the 9/11 family question with respect to the lowering of
fines. Butterworth said they were lowered as a result of the negotiation settlement

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between FAA and the air carrier. The two lawyers would hash it out, and ultimately fines
were lowered. Fines were lowered' as a result of the negotiation settlement. Two things
the carriers care about: Where the airline was in relation to the rest of the pack (United
was always way ahead), and deflecting negative publicity. The longer it took to resolve
the issue the colder the trail got on the evidence of the carrier/screener malfeasance which
made throwing the book at them difficult. As far as publicity in terms of security
performance, policy on Public Disclosure is in the SSI rule. After a certain number of
years, it is no longer security information. Butterworth indicated that he had wanted to
create "mega-fines" for poor performers, but this was never done.

(6S) Butterworth did not recall the 1992 special analysis prepared by the FAA stating
that small knives are the most frequently used weapon in hijackings, nor did he know the
origin of the 4-inch blade rule. '

Intelligence

{S-SI) Butterworth indicated that aviation looked "juicy" to the attackers because of the
reported low level of security performance. Butterworth was "blown away" after 9-11 to
learn of the high level of activity and the sheer number of terrorist groups operating
inside the United States prior to 9-11. Such revelations called into question, in his mind,
the United States' commitment to identifying and tracking such groups domestically. He
said that while at the FAA, he operated under the assumption that the Bureau would "pick
them up; that they had enough tracks out there."

~I) Butterworth recalled taking several steps to get the Administration to focus on
tracking terrorists and improving intelligence gathering. In 1996, the Baseline Security
Working Group was established in response to a NIE statement that listed group
identities and locations of terrorists, and that specified a terrorist threat to civil aviation.
(Butterworth recalled that initially the Administration wouldn't agree to set up a BWG,
but that Butterworth contacted Rep. Oberstar, who wrote to Leon Panetta, and this led to
the removal of Administration objections.) There was an obvious need to improve
intelligence reporting to the FAA. Butterworth cited the same examples mentioned by
Flynn in his interview with the Commission, including the briefing of the staff of the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee on threats to aviation security.

~S) Butterworth recalled that FAA Administrator Hinson went to'CIA Director John
Deutch to express concern about intelligence and the growing threat and that his concerns
were dismissed by Deutch. He also recalled FBI agent John O'Neill's testimony to the
Senate Intelligence Committee wherein he was unwilling to corroborate FAA claims
about credible threats to civil aviation.

168) Butterworth was asked how the FAA was able to assess whether the FBI had done a
thorough job of following up on aviation related cases, and that the agency was 'being
duly diligent. It was Butterworth's opinion that "if you screw with the Bureau they won't
tell you anything;" that individuals suspected of terrorist activity were turned over to the
FBI; and that it was not the FAA's place to follow up with the Bureau in such cases.

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• These presumptions directly affected the quality of the FAA's working relationship with
the FBI, and how it processed "intelligence" received from the FBI. The attitude, was,
"take what you can get," from the Bureau. FAA did ask FBI to beef up its assessments in
order to make security presentations to industry more credible.

"?f;S) In Butterworth'sview, part of the intelligence flow problem was on the FAA side,
which didn't necessarily wish to receive information that would cause problems for the
industry. FAA Security was often concerned about preventing roll-backs of existing
security measures, and perhaps hoped that the information on increasing threats was not
"real. "

1CS) Butterworth admitted that more could have been done on the part of FAA as a
regulator of the industry to "beef up" civil aviation security. In hindsight, he thinks they
could have pushed for more intelligence, come down harder on checkpoints and enforced
searches of selectee-only carry-on baggage. The rule only required that a selectee's
checked bags were screened.

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• CAPPS

(Unc) Butterworth had the impression that it was a good security measure. Many steps
were taken to pass the political, civil liberties test. Airlines were in favor of CAPPS at
that time.

Miscellaneous

'tss.D Butterworth said that there were three incidents of people with terrorist affiliations
working at airports. The information was given to the FBI but he doesn't know how it '
was pursued. He indicated that Claudio Manno would know what happened in these
cases.
Recommendations

(Unc) Butterworth said there is no clear set of solutions to the problems plaguing the
system. More specifically:
• To address the vulnerabilities associated with the passengers, their checked bags,
and their carry-ons, Butterworth suggested setting up two processes: one for high
risk and one for low risk passengers. Trying to treat every passenger with the
same diligence overburdens the system, and inevitably, the system will prove
ineffective in stopping the people it is designed to stop. The system needs to
"have a selectee-base and screen the hell out of them."
.($.1) Butterworth supports more aggressive performance testing of the system.
He believes TSA is not doing as good a job as FAA did or assessing its own

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performance .
deterrence v~iue

He supports more applied R&D for detection equipment.

Butterworth recommended that cargo should go on all-cargo flights. Take it off
the passenger airlines, and subsidize the industry.
• He believes TSA needs to show a willingness to take a strong position on
certification issues. A lack of willingness to do so undercuts the system, giving
poor-performing stakeholders an advantage.
• He supports maintain the original quality of the Federal Air Marshal force at the
higher current deployment level.
• In Butterworth's view, the flow of performance information should include staff
of congressional offices, as well as the insurers of the airlines. If they are made
'privy to such information, the regulators won't need to threaten public disclosure.
Insurance premiums will go up if they are aware that the carrier has low
performance results, and thus economic factors can be brought to bear on
improving security.
• Butterworth said the fundamental problems within the civil aviation system are
rooted in the lack of intelligence. He also thought that the FAA officials were too
beholden to the industry. There should be a prohibition on seeking a job with an

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air carrier for 4-5 years after leaving FAA.

(Unc) In conclusion, Butterworth indicated his belief that the current system is "corrupt."
To achieve aviation security, one does need a "working coalition" with industry, but the
federal regulators "need to remember who you are, and FAA forgot." Butterworth
worries that TSA could fall into the same trap. Also, Congress needs to be told about
security problems, and listen more attentively to the problems in aviation security. He
believes that the 2001 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) made an
important contribution by removing the primacy of cost-benefit analysis in aviation
security rule-making .

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