145

OEKSANDER POTEKHIN

Chapter 6
The NATO-Ukraine Partnership:
Problems, Achievements and Perspectives




Ukraine Facing Eastern Enlargement

The accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO in
the spring of 1999 has significantly changed the security policy
environment in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe. This process of
NATO eastern enlargement has already affected Ukraines interna-
tional position positively. Firstly, it has led the Russian Federation to
certain, though inconsistent, steps towards a normalization of relations
(the Basic Treaty signed and ratified by Russias Federation Council
and the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet activated a dialogue on
various levels between political forces in both countries). Secondly, it
enhances the settlement of disputable issues with Rumania. Thirdly it
has inspired the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue and manifested the existence
of mutual interests of both countries. Finally, it has urged the Russian
Federation to a new consideration of its own interests.

The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine

Naturally, the mid- and long-term consequences of NATO enlargement
cannot be foreseen. But it seems obvious that the framework for the
development of the NATO-Ukraine relationship is set by the Charter
on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine (henceforth
called the Charter). According to the Charter this relationship is to be
based on the principle of invisibility of security comprising all OSCE
member-states, i.e. the understanding that one countrys security
depends upon the security of other countries. The Charter pledges that
NATO members will support Ukraine in its efforts to safeguard its
146
sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and inviolability
of frontiers, promote its democratic development and economic
prosperity which are described as key-factors of stability and security
in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond and facilitate Ukraines
integration within all-European and Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO
welcomes the fact that Ukraine received security assurances from all
the nuclear-armed states.
Russia, too, signed a treaty with NATO in 1997, the Founding Act on
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. But the Founding Act
and the Charter are essentially different principally in the attitude
towards NATO by the two post-Soviet countries. The differences result
not only from the fact that Russia claims to be an influential Great
power and thus more important than Ukraine but also from entirely
different approaches by the two countries to the process of NATO
enlargement. In contrast to Russia, which has demonstratively adopted
a parliamentary resolution against NATO expansion soon after
signing the Founding Act, claiming that the enlargement process is a
threat to Russian security, Ukraine considers the enlargement to be
beneficiary to its own security.
While Russia and NATO declare that they will refrain from consid-
ering each other as adversaries, the treaty with Ukraine emphasizes
NATOs positive role in promoting peace and stability in Eastern and
Central Europe. Not surprisingly, the provision that every state enjoys
a freedom of choice regarding its security alignment is expressed in the
Charter but not in the Founding Act. While the Charter foresees joint
military maneuvers on the territory of Ukraine, NATO maneuvers
within the territory of the Russian Federation can scarcely be imagined.
Under the Charter both parties will consult each other on arms export
and proliferation of weapon technologies, especially on exports to
countries ruled by dictatorial regimes. For Russia this issue is rather
irksome Moscows leadership seems to regard NATO enlargement as
an attempt to oust Russia from the international armaments market.
Similar differences concern NATOs role in the implementation of
military reforms, where NATO pledges support to Ukraine in order to
enhance its civil control over the military. This subject is not addressed
in the Founding Act. On the other hand, the Charter contains no
147
statement on strategic disarmament since Ukraine, as opposed to
Russia, dismantled its strategic weapons in the summer of 1996.
Fundamental differences between the Charter and the Founding Act
concern the joint consultative bodies, i.e. the NATO-Russia Permanent
Joint Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission. In contrast to the
NATO-Russia Council which is envisaged as a permanent functioning
body, the NATO-Ukraine Commission can hardly be described as a
capable and influential body. Nevertheless, the Ukraine-NATO Charter
ranks rather high among members of the Ukrainian foreign policy elite.
Experts think that the Charter will contribute to improving the already
existing relations between NATO and Ukraine. The difference between
the Charter and the Founding Act is described as resembling the
differences between a partnership agreement and a non-aggression
treaty.
In many dimensions the Charter is of a symbolic nature. Its significance
lies in the fact that it demonstrates the importance that Europe and
NATO attach to Ukraines security, independence and sovereignty. For
most Ukrainian politicians and commentators the Charters paramount
significance is that of recognizing Ukraine as a state belonging to
Central and Eastern Europe.
Domestic disputes regarding Ukraines place in Europe, the future
European security architecture, or the nature of relations with the CIS
relate to Ukraines official status as a non-bloc country. The president
and government of Ukraine question the compliance of this funda-
mental conception with the national interests, but they express them-
selves moderately and cautiously in view of a possible reaction by
Russia. Ukraines relationship with the Western Alliance is still being
considered in the light of Russias actions in the international arena.
Taking this into account, the priority task of Ukrainian diplomacy and
foreign policy is to emphasize the importance of a direct relationship
with Ukraine for all relevant international structures.
NATO enlargement should be considered by Ukrainian decision makers
not as an end in itself but an aspect of internal transformation, which
will determine the Alliances role in an all-European security system
and its capacity to cope with some of the new generation security
148
threats. Certain problems of instability are of non-military origin and
cannot be resolved by military means. There is an increased demand for
utilizing peace-making measures and for reliable means of enforcing
and maintaining peace. NATO is still better accommodated to military
rather than civil operations and has no other effective means.
Another potential problem is caused by the probability that NATO will
close the door after the first wave of enlargement, creating tensions
rather than a stimulus for integration and establishing a new line of
division in Europe. At the same time, expanding and transforming the
Alliance to another kind of OSCE would sharply diminish its
effectiveness. However, even with additional functions of collective
security NATO might not decide to invite new members. The Alliance
can choose the form of existence that would entwine all European
states by a system of reciprocal agreements and commitments.
Already, as a result of NATOs measures to settle the Bosnia crisis
NATO has developed mechanisms and established structures which
provide broad possibilities for non-members to take part in NATO
operations under a UN or OSCE mandate (IFOR/SFOR, Combined
Joint Task Forces, PfP, and others). For example, the Stabilization
Force (SFOR) involved twenty countries, including Ukraine. In this
context, the Charter can be regarded as an official international rec-
ognition and approval of Ukraines determination to take part in such
operations, including military action. Under any scenario, until military
force remains the only reliable guarantor of international security,
Ukraine is interested in the existence of NATO, in preserving Atlantic
solidarity and in the American presence in Europe. Another aspect of
inclination to NATO is the unpredictability of Russian foreign policy.

149
Parameters and trends of Ukraine-NATO relations

Since 1997, two basic alternative foreign-policy orientations prevail
among Ukrainian foreign and security policy decision makers.
1
One of
them calls for Ukraines accession to NATO, the other opts for a neu-
tral and/or non-aligned status of the country. During the last two years
the pro-NATO orientation became slightly more popular (46 to 51
percent of the interviewed decision makers) and rose to a remarkable
69 percent by the end of 1998.
2
The State Program of Ukraine-NATO
Cooperation, put into force in late 1998 (see below) is estimated to be
one of the most significant documents, yielding a highly positive effect
on Ukraines international security.
The following aspects of relations with NATO were described to be the
most significant: firstly, meeting the preconditions for future NATO
membership; secondly, providing additional security guarantees to
Ukraine, thirdly, attracting direct assistance in implementing military
reform; fourthly, policy coordination with regard to NATO
enlargement. Other aspects included arms and warfare technology
trade, joint development of military policy (including policies to
maintain Ukraines military-industrial complex (MIC)), and partici-
pation in peace creation operations or joint exercises.
The idea of granting Ukraine additional security guarantees seems to be
another illusion dating from Kravchuks presidency, caused by a
misunderstanding of the 1949 Washington Treaty (which does not
provide for an interim, associated membership to the Alliance) and the

1 This section is based on interpretations of expert polls prepared by the Center
for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine. The quarterly poll entitled
Monitoring Ukraines Foreign and Security Policy comprises assessments and
estimations of relevant MFA officials, researchers of state institutes, Verkhovna
Rada deputies, Armed Forces officers, Ministry of Defense representatives, as
well as leading journalists. Further information on methodology, results and
subscription conditions of Monitoring Ukraines Foreign and Security Policy is
available at http://www.public.ua.net/~potekhin/ucpccrs/ucpccrs.htm.
2 Interestingly, the process of Ukraines Western integration in general was per-
ceived to have slowed down.
150
logic of NATOs nature as a defense alliance. One should agree with
the importance of direct assistance in military reform for Ukraine, but
this kind of cooperation is bound to face opposition by the executive
structures of Ukraine, which are still unable to launch the processes of
submission of the armed forces and other military structures to civil
control.
It is significant that such aspects of cooperation as participation in
peace-making operations and joint exercises were estimated as minor
ones by an overwhelming majority of experts, explained by the con-
viction that NATO would allegedly derive greater profit from them
than Ukraine. At the same time, any participation in joint operations
and exercises will not compensate the feeling of inferiority and loss of
potential profit in case the Ukrainian MIC fails to be recognized by
NATO authorities as a junior partner. Unless cooperation in this
branch of military sphere is based on equality, the leftist political forces
will conduct a successful anti-NATO agitation blaming the NATO
countries at least for unfair and expansionist intentions.



The State Program for Cooperation with NATO

The State Program for Ukraine-NATO Cooperation for the years
1999-2001 (further referred to as State Program) was put into force in
November 1998.
3
It provides for the implementation of the Ukraine-
NATO Charter. The significance of the State Program is shown by the
fact that it was immediately rejected and attacked by most leftist forces
in the Verkhovna Rada, who claimed that the presidents decree was
unconstitutional. Objectively, the State Program was prepared and
adopted in accordance with the presidents constitutional competence
and obligations. It is based on the provisions of the Main Directions of

3 Put into force by presidential decree 1209/98, dated 4 November 1998, and
presented to NATO by Volodymyr Horbulin, head of the Ukrainian Inter-
Agency Commission on NATO on 26 November 1998.
151
Ukraines Foreign Policy, the military doctrine of Ukraine and the
Concept of Ukraines National Security, both of which had been
approved by the Verkhovna Rada.
4
The reason for the strong reaction
of the leftists to the State Program is that its successful implementation
would mean the establishment of a system of multidimensional, mutual
dependence of Ukraine and NATO, and would thus render pointless a
continuing discussion about Ukraines geopolitical priorities. A
complete implementation of the State Program will raise the relations
between the partners to a level of cooperation higher than with any
other non-member state, at least with regard to cooperation in advanced
technology or space exploration spheres.
The State Program describes the full-scale integration with Euro-
Atlantic security structures as Ukraines strategic goal. This rules out
all options of security alignment within the CIS framework or in the
form of a union of three Slavic states. Moreover, among all the
existing security structures on the European continent, Ukraine con-
siders NATO the most effective structure because of the sizable
contribution of this organization to safeguarding peace, stability and
the overall climate of confidence in Euro-Atlantic space, to the creation
of a new architecture of security in Europe, to deepening the pro??cess
of disarmament, control over armaments and non-proliferation of mass-
destruction weapons.
5

Owing to the general perception of NATO by Kyiv, Ukraine is com-
mitted to take an active part in the work of the EAPC and in the Part-
nership for Peace Program. Developing its cooperation with NATO,
Ukraine aims at guaranteeing its independence, democracy and ter-
ritorial integrity, strengthening external guarantees of national security,
withstanding any emergence of new threats to stability and security in
the region of Central and Eastern Europe, of which it is an inalienable
part, and using the experience and assistance of Alliance member

4 Constitution of Ukraine, art. 106. The two documents containing the guiding
principles were adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in 1993 and 1977.
5 State Program, General Provisions.
152
countries in building their own Armed Forces.
6
The Program
envisages a crisis consultation mechanism to be developed jointly with
NATO in the case of a threat to Ukraines territorial integrity,
sovereignty or security.
7

An Inter-Agency Commission on Ukraines Cooperation with NATO,
to be established by the National Security and Defense Council of
Ukraine and headed by the latters secretary, Volodymyr Horbulin, will
coordinate Ukraines relations with the Alliance, while the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine will draft guidelines and recommendations
and prepare the agendas of the 16 plus 1 sessions and committee
meetings in Brussels and Kyiv, as well as Ukraines activities within
the EAPC. As provided for in the Charter, the President of Ukraine
holds regular consultations with the NATO Secretary General and
participates in NAC or EAPC summits and other higher level meetings.
The minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine meets his Western
colleagues at EAPC summits and, at least twice a year, at the NAC
meetings and the subsequent Ukraine-NATO Commission meetings.
Besides the political consultations performed mainly by the president,
the State Program raises the issue of regional cooperation between
Ukraine and NATO.
8
The experience of Central Eastern European
countries in preparing their NATO membership is certainly very im-
portant for Ukraine. Besides bilateral and multilateral cooperation with
the old and new member states as well as potential new applicants
(Rumania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Baltic states), sub-regional cooperation
between NATO and GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan, Moldova) is discussed.


6 Ibid.
7 The following activities are described: high-level consultations; direct telephone
communications between the President of Ukraine and the NATO Secretary
General; providing the NATO liaison office in Kyiv with the status of an
authorized body to deal with crisis situations.
8 Ibid., section 2, paragraph 7.
153
A broad range of security cooperation

The State Program departs from the principle of mutual openness in the
field of military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. Kyiv relies
on the Alliance while safeguarding Ukraines national security against
external military challenges and threats and reforming the countrys
military structures, especially the Armed Forces and the military-
industrial complex. NATO has a say with regard to Ukraines defense
cooperation with its direct neighbors. Ukraine participates in peace-
building, conflict prevention and conflict management activities
planned and implemented by NATO.
Hence, the State Program aims to enhance the compatibility and
interoperability of Ukrainian administration bodies and units of Armed
Forces with the NATO United Armed Forces. As an example, units of
the Armed Forces and the Ministries on Emergency Situations and
Protection of the Population Against the Consequences of the
Chernobyl Catastrophe, as well as representatives of the state military
administration, should be trained jointly to qualify for participating in
NATO search/rescue and disaster relief operations. Participating in the
Combined Joint Task Force, Ukraine shows its determination to
contribute to NATO-led peacekeeping forces and its will to receive
training. Also, the State Program suggests that joint NATO-Ukrainian
exercises are increased and Ukraines military infrastructure, in
particular the Lviv (Javoriv) and Shyrokyi Lan training grounds and air
testing ranges of Ukraines Ministry of Defense, is more widely used
by NATO members forces.
9

Military-political issues are dealt with by the minister for defense of
Ukraine, most often on the level of EAPC and the Ukraine-NATO
Commission (twice a year), as well as bilaterally.
10
The minister for
defense also participates in the NATO Defense Planning Committee
and Nuclear Planning Group at ministerial level. Ukraine, supporting
the Alliances efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass-

9 State Program, section 4.2.
10 Ibid., section 4.1.
154
destruction, pledges to contribute to non-proliferation and arms control
and to observe the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The cooperation in the field of civil-military relations is coordinated by
the Council of National Security and Defense, the cabinet of ministers
and the ministry of foreign affairs of Ukraine. In addition, the
representatives of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Constitutional
Court of Ukraine, judicial authorities, social and non-governmental
institutions, mass media, and independent experts will take part in a
step-by-step implementation of a system of democratic control and civil
administration of the Armed Forces and other military units. The
measures include information and transparency related to the defense
budget and state spending. The Military Reform Joint Working Group,
established under the aegis of the NATO political-military steering
committee, plays an important role in this field.
11

Unifying procedures and product standards in the field of military
technology is described as another aspect of interoperability, which,
among others, implies cooperation with the NATO Logistics Direc-
torate to consider the partial introduction of the NATO codification
system and standards on military material development, production and
testing.
12

Research and development related to military technologies is a priority
field of cooperation identified by the State Program. The aim of this
aspect of cooperation is to enhance joint production with companies of
NATO member states, to attract private investments from Alliance
members and raise the demand for Ukrainian goods and services in the
field of armaments and military material.
13
Accordingly, Ukraine is to
participate in sessions of the NATO Science Committee, where issues
of high technologies and disarmament are discussed, results of
scientific-technical research in the field of armaments are exchanged
and the international armaments market is assessed.

11 Ibid., sections 3 and 4.2.
12 Ibid., section 12.
13 Among the most important activities are: training, repair and design.
155
Science and technologies is another field of cooperation discussed in
the State Program, including the exchange of scientific research results
in the fields of disarmament, ecological security, advanced technologies
and computerization; as well as participation in scientific programs and
projects which are implemented under the NATO aegis. The Ministry
of Science and Technologies of Ukraine cooperates with NATO in this
regard by participating in PfP Program measures, in preparation and
fulfillment of the relevant part of the IPP and the Working plan of
Charter Implementation, in the establishment of direct links with the
NATO Directorate on Science Issues and by conducting joint measures
with NATO in order to exchange experience. The Ministry of Science
and Technologies is also expected to resolve issues of the
institutionalization of relations with NATO by preparing a
memorandum on mutual understanding between the Ministry of Science
and Technologies of Ukraine and the NATO Directorate on Science
Issues. Ukraine also seeks broad involvement in the NATO Program
Science for Stability.
14
The State Program declares the National Space
Agency of Ukraine to be responsible for joint projects with NATO
member states concerning the space industry and technologies.
15

Additionally, the National Institute of Strategic Studies (NISS) has
been asked to coordinate cooperation in scientific research on military-
political issues, aimed at developing the principles of an all-European
security architecture. Cooperation should be established by direct
contacts of the NISS with the NATO Science Directorate and NATO
Office of Information and Press, as well as with scientific-research
institutions of NATO member states and partner countries for holding
joint scientific research projects. These projects include, among others,
a study of experience gained in carrying out military reform in Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Rumania and Slovakia.
16


14 Ibid., sections 4.1, 5, and 9.
15 Ibid., section 13.
16 Ibid., section 4.1.
156
Cooperation regarding information support in the military field is to be
implemented by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
17
The latter is
charged by the State Program to study the interaction of military lead-
ership and the media, with American assistance to enhance the per-
formance of the Partnership for Peace Information Management
System (PIMS) in Ukraine, and to open an information office of
Ukraines Armed Forces within the Coordination Center of Partnership
in Mons, Belgium. Jointly with the NATO Information and
Documentation Center in Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense is to foster
television programs and media publications covering the participation
of Ukrainian military units in NATO actions and providing information
about NATO transformation processes as well as the process of
Ukraines military reform.
18

In terms of practical relevance, issues such as the fight against organ-
ized crime and terrorism and the prevention of illegal arms transfers,
dual use technologies, radioactive and drug substances are of great
importance for Ukraine-NATO cooperation.
19
The State Program en-
visages close joint action against organized crime on an inter-agency
basis among Ukrainian institutions, NATOs Special Committee and
institutions of partner countries.
Cooperation in the field of civil emergency planning and environmental
protection is discussed extensively in the State Program. Emergency
planning cooperation aims primarily at drawing on NATO members
experience and financial and technological resources to improve the
performance of the Ukrainian Ministry of Emergency and related
formations and units of the Armed Forces and Ministry of the Interior.
20


17 Ibid., section 4.3.
18 Prepare together with the MFA of Ukraine and the National Institute of
Strategic Studies the publication of a White Book about NATO-Ukraine
relations; create an educational program about NATO for officer personnel of
Ukraines Armed Forces.
19 Ibid., section 8.
20 Ibid., sections 7 and 10
157
Ukraine-NATO Relations and Domestic Politics

According to the above-mentioned representative group of experts
interviewed by the Monitoring Ukraines Foreign and Security Policy
polls,
21
Verkhovna Rada deputies of rightist orientation are the most
outspoken supporters of Ukraines Western integration and cooperation
with NATO. Apart from financial and banking leaders, some
businessmen, the general staff of the Ministry of Defense as well as the
centrists within the Verkhovna Rada were identified as adherents to a
Western-oriented approach. The significance of this group was
estimated as roughly 11 percent in December 1997 and 8 percent in
September 1998. Army officers and heads of military educational
institutions were not regarded by the interviewed experts as expressing
great concern about integration with NATO.
Since 1996, president Kuchmas administration has been proclaiming
hesitantly the aim of Ukraines future complete integration into
European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Consequently, the executive
authority has been urging the European Union to recognize Ukraine as
an associate member but was turned down by Brussels for the time
being. Moreover, the aggravation of the economic crisis since 1998 led
to a further estrangement between Ukraine and those Central European
states regarded as potential candidates for EU membership. Insisting on
Ukraines further integration into Europe without appropriate measures
to adjust the economic and social conditions is likely to cause a further
disorientation of society and Ukraines foreign partners. In this regard,
the claim to NATO membership resembles a postponed demand.
While a full-fledged membership is beyond political realities at present,
the conviction has been growing that an enhanced cooperation with
NATO is an unconditional imperative.


21 See above, footnote 1.
158
Perceptions by the Ukrainian population

The attitude of Ukraines population towards NATO can be assessed
by comparing the results of two polls conducted in January 1997 and
March 1998 by SOCIS-Gallup.
22
Changes and shifts of opinions are
explained by the dynamics of Ukraines foreign relations and aspects of
domestic politics.
23
As a first result, the polls suggest that the section of
the population that is well informed about NATO has grown from 9 to
13.5 percent while the number of citizens indifferent to the Alliance has
decreased from 16 to 8 percent.
This led to a further divergence in the estimation of the Alliance. On the
one hand, an increase in positive approaches to NATO was registered.
The number of those estimating it as a defense alliance has grown
(from 27 to 32 percent). On the other hand, the share of those
appraising the Alliance as a peace-making organization decreased
(from 17 to 11 percent), and the share of those perceiving an aggressive
military bloc in it increased (from 16 to 22 percent). Fewer respondents
than before failed to give their own estimation of NATOs character
(39 percent in 1997, 34 percent in the following year). However, one
third of the polled have no clear standpoint. The social-demographic
distribution of the polled suggests that the higher the educational and
professional level and the lower the age of the respondents the more
positive their attitude towards NATO. As far as regional differences
are concerned, the perception of NATO as an aggressive bloc prevails
in the eastern region and Crimea. In most of the other regions,
including the west and south-west, just about a half of the respondents
consider NATO to be a defense alliance. In southern Ukraine, NATO
tends to be considered a peace-building organization.

22 Both polls comprised 1200 respondents in all the regions of Ukraine.
23 Between January 1997 and March 1998, besides the adoption of the Charter, the
most important events for Ukraines international security relations were the
participation in the NATO-led marine maneuvers Sea Breeze, the
establishment of Ukraines mission to NATO, and a certain normalization of
Ukrainian-Russian relations, leading to the signing of the bilateral Grand
Treaty.
159
The perception of NATOs character coincides with the populations
attitude to relations between Ukraine and NATO. Thus, the number of
realists who expect Ukraine to join NATO sometime in the future
increased from 19 to 25 percent, while those who wanted Ukraine to do
it as soon as possible decreased from 19 to 14 percent. As a whole, the
pro-NATO potential, according to answers given to direct questions,
makes up almost 40 percent of the polled. The number of convinced
NATO opponents increased slightly from 21 to 26 percent. Besides, the
number of those having no clear standpoint in this issue decreased to 35
percent (from 42 percent in 1997). Allowing the respondents to choose
among several variants of geopolitical orientation led to a certain
decline of pro-NATO sentiments (in favor of a non-aligned status). 34
percent of the respondents have agreed (and 24 percent have disagreed)
with the statement that Ukraine would become a truly European state
if effective international security guaranties were granted. Altogether,
supporters of close ties with the Alliance constitute slightly more than
30 percent of Ukraines population. As described above, this
percentage is twice as high within the countrys political elite.
24

The strengthening of Ukraines international status during the period
between the two polls is felt by the population. Thus, in 1997 only 36
percent of the respondents expressed the certainty that during the
following five years Ukraine would not encounter any threat of attack
from a foreign state. In 1998 this optimistic expectation was shared by
53 percent of the interviewed. In this context, the estimation of confi-
dence in NATO as a potential protector for Ukraine is interesting: 34
percent of the population expect NATO to defend Ukraine if it were a
member of the Alliance (30 percent in 1997), while 13 percent (12
percent in 1997) count on this protection in any case, i.e. even if
Ukraine preserves its current non-aligned status. In both years, more
than 30 percent of the polled declared they were unable to imagine
NATOs reaction to a conflict around Ukraine, showing a considerable
reserve towards acknowledging the Alliance as the most important
security provider.

24 The question Should Ukraine access NATO? was answered positively by pre-
cisely one third of the respondents
160
A growing number of respondents are afraid of Ukraines being
trapped in a cordon sanitaire status between NATO and the CIS
military-political alliance.
25
51 percent of respondents in the 1998 poll
fear that president Kuchmas pro-NATO orientation undermines the
stability of relations with Russia (40 percent in 1997). One half of the
population regards Ukraines relations with either NATO or Russia in
terms of a zero sum game.
26

NATOs eastern enlargement, too, is faced with growing consciousness
by the Ukrainian population. Only 7-8 percent were indifferent towards
this process in 1999 (the percentage was twice as high in the previous
year). In early 1998, 25 percent of the respondents felt that NATO
enlargement had negative effects on European security, while 20
percent suggested the opposite. Accordingly, 25 percent regard the
enlargement as a process harmful to Ukraines security, and 17 percent
expect positive effects for the countrys external security. The ongoing
process of NATO enlargement has led to a radicalization of its
perception by the Ukrainian population. Thus, the support of Russias
resistance to the enlargement has grown from 24 percent in 1997 to 36
percent in 1998. The accession to NATO of Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary was greeted as positive by 22 percent of the
respondents in 1998 (14 percent in 1997) and condemned by 20 percent
(10 percent in the previous year).
The perceived implication of the October 1999 presidential elections on
Ukraines security situation was assessed by a special poll in early
1999. 40 percent of the population have declared that their voting in the
presidential elections will depend on a candidates foreign policy
orientation.
27
The most popular program would be a well-balanced
development of Ukraines relations both with Russia and the West. The

25 26 percent of the respondents in 1997, 36 percent in 1998.
26 This does not mean that the other half can be described as supporters of a
cooperative security approach. Only 15 percent (10 percent in 1997) consider
closer ties with NATO not dangerous to Ukrainian-Russian relations.
27 SOCIS Gallup poll of February 1999: How will your vote be affected by the
presidential candidates foreign policy orientation? Strong significance: 40 per-
cent. No significance: 28 percent.
161
influence of the pro-Russian line has turned out to be rather essential
whilst one third of the respondents manifested their desire for a
renewed USSR. The lowest percentage of supporters had the candidate
advocating Ukraines membership in NATO.
28


The position assumed by the Verkhovna Rada

In view of NATOs air strikes against Yugoslavia, the Verkhovna
Rada adopted a resolution on Ukraines relations with the Alliance,
demanding the president to express his categorical opposition to NATO
aggression and plans to carry out land operations in Yugoslavia. Of
318 deputies registered, 226 the required minimum voted for
adopting the resolution, while 42 members of the parliament voted
against.
The resolution calls on the Parliamentary Committees, the cabinet of
ministers and all state bodies to safeguard the national interests of
Ukraine as expressed by provisions of the Constitution, the Declara-
tion on State Sovereignty and the law on the Main Directions of
Ukraines Foreign Policy, i.e to respect the non-aligned status of the
country, to refrain from joining military and political alliances. The
Verkhovna Rada regards the decision of NATOs leadership to expand
the Alliances range of action beyond the territory of its member-states
and the fact that NATO is doing so without a mandate by the UN
Security Council as extremely dangerous. In view of the aggressive
nature of NATOs new doctrine, the resolution requires that the State

28 Question: How will your decision to vote for a presidential candidate be
affected if he adheres to close economic and political union with Russia?:
positively: 71 percent, negatively: 15 percent, does not affect: 10 percent. ... to
the accession to a restored Soviet state?: positively: 35 percent, negatively: 37
percent, does not affect: 16 percent. ... to a wide-scale economic integration
with the West?: positively: 58 percent, negatively: 14 percent, does not affect: 17
percent. ... to balanced relations both with Russia and the West?: positively: 79
percent, negatively: 4 percent, does not affect: 9 percent. ... to independent
foreign policy, non-bloc status of Ukraine?: positively: 41 percent, negatively:
19 percent, does not affect: 22 percent. ... to an immediate accession to NATO?:
positively: 22 percent, negatively: 34 percent, does not affect: 18 percent.
162
Program (see above) be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada for
consideration. In addition, the parliament wishes to reconsider all legal
acts establishing the basis of Ukraines cooperation with international
organizations. The president has also been charged with fostering
Ukrainian peace-building efforts aimed at resolving the Balkan crisis,
and with proposing a UN-sponsored peace conference to be held in
Kyiv.
The cabinet of ministers is charged with speeding up the drafting of as
yet uninstituted laws on basic principles of national security, especially
relating to the structure, strength and functions of Ukraines Armed
Forces and the conditions of cooperation with the Armed Forces of
foreign countries. In this context, the resolution reminds the Ministry of
Defense of the fact that joint military exercises with units of others
states armed forces represent a violation of the Constitution. The
Parliament has also demanded a strict observance of Article 85 of the
Constitution as regards mandatory parliamentary approval of decisions
concerning the admission of units of foreign armed forces to the
territory of Ukraine.
To secure the countrys security, the government has been instructed to
take immediate measures to stop the dismantling of strategic aircraft
systems and silos. Additionally, the ministries of finance, economy and
transport are called upon to assess the damages of NATOs action
against Yugoslavia caused to Ukraine, especially related to a decrease
in the volume of maritime and river transport.
As opposed to a more radical earlier draft (which did not get the sup-
port of a Verkhovna Rada majority), the resolution falls short of sus-
pending the State Program implementation or urging the president to
dismiss the ideologists of the pro-NATO course, i.e. foreign minister
Tarasiuk and National Security and Defense Council Secretary
Horbulin. On his part, the former has described the Verkhovna Rada
resolution which is not a national law as non-binding and insists
that operational decisions in the field of foreign policies are the pre-
rogative of the executive branch.
Will Ukraine Become a NATO Member?

163
As is well known, the question of Ukraines possible future accession
to the Alliance is interlocked with the problem of Ukrainian-Russian
and Russia-NATO relations. Even the harshest critics of NATO
enlargement would probably agree to Ukraines membership if a worst
case scenario in bilateral relations with Russia was to become a
reality. On the other hand, the Russian politicians who oppose the
ratification of the friendship treaty with Ukraine have pointed out that
if disputable issues for example the status of Sevastopol remain
unsettled, they would prevent Ukraine from becoming a NATO mem-
ber. Certainly, the international community has no interest in Ukraine
becoming another Belarus. However, it is unlikely that the USA will
encourage an immediate application of Ukraine to be included into the
next round of enlargement. The state of bilateral relations and the level
of political dialogue give no grounds for believing that the American
leadership will welcome such a step in the short term and Western
European countries are even more reluctant. Generally speaking, after
the first stage of eastern enlargement, the Alliance seems to be reluctant
to accept new members in the near future.
Long-term policies to ease the path to NATO membership will have to
focus on the following objectives: firstly, to raise Ukraines political
and strategic significance despite economic difficulties and the political
crisis, secondly, to draw on lobbying by new NATO members,
especially Poland, and to exploit possible differences between the USA
and its European partners, France in particular. Thirdly, restructuring
Ukraines economy, especially the diversification of its foreign
economic ties, is required in order to diminish the vulnerability of
pressure by the Russian Federation. It would be naive to think that
refraining from close relations with NATO could change the nature of
Russian-Ukrainian relations for the better and could lead to concessions
by Russia in economic and other fields. On the other hand, renouncing
an application for membership could prove to be a bargaining token to
request additional assistance from Western partners, mainly in the
military and technical fields.
Other issues of practical relevance include the question of who will
cover the NATO expansion financially. Most of the newly admitted
NATO members expect their future military expenditure to be less than
164
the cost of the inevitable armed forces modernization in case of non-
accession. This argument concerns Ukraine as well. Armaments,
technical equipment and ammunition in the Armed Forces of Ukraine
are outdated and require modernization.
In addition, tangible changes in political, economic, social, financial,
military and technical fields are required from new members, who are
thus facing the double challenge of investing in defense improvements
as well as in economic and social reforms in order to approach the next
important goal membership in the European Union. At the same time
if the EU implements its plans regarding a more active foreign and
military policy by, inter alia, restructuring the Western European
Union the new members might become involved in a closer
cooperation with WEU, which would counterbalance an exclusive
orientation at NATO.
NATO takes a considerable risk in admitting Central and Eastern
European countries which have historically reciprocal claims to one
another. Although a key condition for applicant countries was and is
the demand to settle disputable issues with neighboring states there is
no guarantee against a future deterioration in bilateral relations. NATO
has no experience of successful settlement of conflicts between its
members, as the example of Turkey and Greece shows.
Regardless of the limited likelihood of becoming a member of the
Alliance in the near future, simultaneously with implementing the
cooperation goals stated in the Charter, Ukraine should consider and
prepare an application for NATO membership. It should define for
itself the preferred terms and conditions of accession. Today this step
seems to be rather remote. Former US presidential security advisor
Brzezinski has been quoted as saying that in the future there will be no
need for Ukraine to be a formal NATO member, whereas at the present
moment membership is simply impossible. Nevertheless, in the case of
a sharp change in the international security situation, joining NATO
could become a necessity for Ukraine. Preparations for this potential
step should be taken in advance by studying and generalizing the
experience of new NATO members, by developing a broad cooperation
in the military and political fields with these countries, especially with
Poland, by implementing cooperation programs with NATO in the
165
Partnership for Peace framework or within the Science for Peace
program.
To conclude, some of the positive consequences of Ukraines possible
NATO membership shall be named: firstly, the formal unification with
Greater Europe would irreversibly symbolize the status of a modern
democratic country and grant effective security assurances. Ukraine
would overcome the dangerous status of a buffer state between NATO
and Russia, guaranteeing its independence against any possible internal
development within the Russian Federation. A formal guarantee against
territorial claims for example, from Rumania will contribute to
enhancing Ukraines sovereignty and inviolability of frontiers. Also, the
extension of NATOs nuclear umbrella to the territory of Ukraine
has important implications for the global non-proliferation regime.
Secondly, closer and more productive relations with Poland, Hungary
and other neighboring countries would contribute to an irreversible
integration within Central and Eastern Europe, leading to an enhanced
cooperation with the West in the field of direct investments and market
reform assistance. The modernization of Ukraines defense industry
would provide for an acceleration of the Armed Forces reform. Thirdly
if an official decision to join the Alliance was supported by the
majority of Ukraines population in a national referendum the
security alignment will foster a decrease in influence of leftist political
forces.




Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy
Volume 2, Peter Lang, Bern 1999.

Between Russia and the West:
Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine

edited by
Kurt R. Spillmann, Andreas Wenger and Derek Mller


























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Internati onal Relati ons and Securi ty Network

A publi c servi ce run by the
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