PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

MANUAL

PIPELINE LEAK DETECTION

PTS 31.40.60.11 SEPTEMBER 2002

2010 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS) All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright owner.

PREFACE

PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication, of PETRONAS OPUs/Divisions. They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design, construction, operation and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where appropriate they are based on, or reference is made to, national and international standards and codes of practice. The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied by PETRONAS' OPUs in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas processing plants, chemical plants, marketing facilities or any other such facility, and thereby to achieve maximum technical and economic benefit from standardisation. The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and decision to implement. This is of particular importance where PTS may not cover every requirement or diversity of condition at each locality. The system of PTS is expected to be sufficiently flexible to allow individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in PTS to their own environment and requirements. When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use PTS they shall be solely responsible for the quality of work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In particular, for those requirements not specifically covered, the Principal will expect them to follow those design and engineering practices which will achieve the same level of integrity as reflected in the PTS. If in doubt, the Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without detracting from his own responsibility, consult the Principal or its technical advisor. The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users : 1) 2) 3) PETRONAS and its affiliates. Other parties who are authorised to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual arrangements. Contractors/subcontractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers under a contract with users referred to under 1) and 2) which requires that tenders for projects, materials supplied or - generally - work performed on behalf of the said users comply with the relevant standards.

Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with users, PETRONAS disclaims any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage (including injury or death) suffered by any company or person whomsoever as a result of or in connection with the use, application or implementation of any PTS, combination of PTS or any part thereof. The benefit of this disclaimer shall inure in all respects to PETRONAS and/or any company affiliated to PETRONAS that may issue PTS or require the use of PTS. Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual arrangements, PTS shall not, without the prior written consent of PETRONAS, be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever and the PTS shall be used exclusively for the purpose they have been provided to the user. They shall be returned after use, including any copies which shall only be made by users with the express prior written consent of PETRONAS. The copyright of PTS vests in PETRONAS. Users shall arrange for PTS to be held in safe custody and PETRONAS may at any time require information satisfactory to PETRONAS in order to ascertain how users implement this requirement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 2. 3. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4. 4.1 4.2 4.3 5. 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 6. 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 7. 8. INTRODUCTION SCOPE DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS DEFINITIONS ABBREVIATIONS CROSS-REFERENCES SUMMARY OF CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS EDITION REQUIREMENT FOR LEAK DETECTION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR LEAK DETECTION SENSITIVITY RELIABILITY ACCURACY LEAK LOCATION CAPABILITY ROBUSTNESS COST SELECTION OF A LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM PRIMARY FUNCTIONALITY SECONDARY FUNCTIONALITY ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONALITY IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITY PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION INSTRUMENTATION FACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTING DATA SAMPLING RATE ALARMS OPERATOR DISPLAYS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS REMOTE MAINTENANCE LEAK SENSITIVITY / TUNING TRAINING DOCUMENTATION LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES GENERAL BALANCING OF MASS OR VOLUME INPUT VERSUS OUTPUT PRESSURE AND/OR FLOW ANALYSIS DYNAMIC MODELS MONITORING OF CHARACTERISTIC SIGNALS GENERATED BY A LEAK OFF-LINE LEAK DETECTION REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDICES APPENDIX 1 SUMMARY OF THE CAPABILITIES AND APPLICATION OF LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES

1. 1.1

INTRODUCTION SCOPE This PTS specifies requirements and gives recommendations for the application of Leak Detection Systems and gives an overview of available pipeline leak detection techniques and their effectiveness for pipeline applications. This PTS is primarily aimed at continuous on-line leak detection systems. Discrete off-line systems are only briefly discussed. This PTS provides guidance on the following: - when to specify a leak detection system; - how to specify performance parameters; - what system to select; - how to implement a system. This PTS is a revision of the previous publication of the same number and title, dated September 1994. A summary of changes from the previous edition is given in (1.6). Although applicable to onsite lines, this PTS is intended for use with long, cross-country or subsea transportation pipelines that are outside facility battery limits.

1.2

DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS Unless otherwise authorised by PETRONAS, the distribution of this PTS is confined to companies forming part of PETRONAS or managed by a Group company, and to Contractors nominated by. This PTS is intended for use by all Functions in the Group that are involved in the design and operation of pipelines, but in particular for use during the conceptual design phase when the requirement for a leak detection system is being decided. If national and/or local regulations exist in which some of the requirements may be more stringent than in this PTS, the Contractor shall determine by careful scrutiny which of the requirements are the more stringent and which combination of requirements will be acceptable as regards safety, environmental, economic and legal aspects. In all cases the Contractor shall inform the Principal of any deviation from the requirements of this PTS which is considered to be necessary in order to comply with national and/or local regulations. The Principal may then negotiate with the Authorities concerned with the object of obtaining agreement to follow this PTS as closely as possible.

1.3 1.3.1

DEFINITIONS General definitions The Contractor is the party that carries out all or part of the design, engineering, procurement, construction, commissioning or management of a project or operation of a facility. The Principal may undertake all or part of the duties of the Contractor. The Manufacturer/Supplier is the party that manufactures or supplies equipment and services to perform the duties specified by the Contractor. The Principal is the party that initiates the project and ultimately pays for its design and construction. The Principal will generally specify the technical requirements. The Principal may also include an agent or consultant authorised to act for, and on behalf of, the Principal. The word shall indicates a requirement. The word should indicates a recommendation.

1.3.2

Specific definitions Fluid - substances that are transported through a pipeline in liquid and/or gaseous phase. Hard liquid - a liquid with a vapour pressure below the prevailing atmospheric pressure, e.g., gas oil. Leak - an uncontrolled fluid release from a pipeline. Pipeline - a system of pipes and other components used for the transportation of fluids, between (but excluding) plants. A pipeline extends from pig trap to pig trap (including the pig traps and associated pipework and valves), or, if no pig trap is fitted, to the first isolation valve within the plant boundaries or a more inward valve if so nominated. Pipeline section - the user-selected subdivision of a pipeline. Soft liquid - a liquid with a vapour pressure above the prevailing atmospheric pressure, e.g., ethylene, NGL, LPG, etc.

1.4

ABBREVIATIONS ALARP DCS FAT ISDN LBV LDS MAOP OPC PC PSTN SCADA SPLD As Low as Reasonably Practicable Distributed Control System Factory Acceptance Testing Integrated Service Digital Network Line Block Valve Leak Detection System Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure OLE (Object Linked Editing) for Process Control Personal Computer Public Subscriber Telephone Network Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Statistical Pipeline Leak Detection

1.5

CROSS-REFERENCES Where cross-references to other parts of this PTS are made, the referenced section number is shown in brackets. Other documents referenced in this PTS are listed in (7). Bibliography references are listed in (8).

1.6

SUMMARY OF CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS EDITION The previous edition of this PTS was dated September 1994. This edition is a major revision, with changes in all sections. The previous PTS described the use of a risk approach, which proved to be difficult to apply for specifying a Leak Detection System (LDS). In addition, guidance was needed in the selection and implementation of the leak detection method, making use of lessons learned. A number of LDSs have been unsuccessful in the past because of the wrong methodology, e.g., dynamic model based systems which are notoriously unreliable and expensive, and/or because insufficient attention was paid to system reliability and operator interface. Suppliers with reliable and relatively cheap systems have entered the market and application of these systems is seen as good practice.

2.

REQUIREMENT FOR LEAK DETECTION Group and public awareness of safety and environmental issues puts increasing emphasis on the potential consequences of a pipeline leak for human safety and pollution of the environment. Proper pipeline management should ensure technical integrity of a pipeline in order to prevent failures and fluid releases and to limit the consequences if a leak occurs. An LDS reduces the consequences of failure by enabling fast emergency response. These consequences comprise economic consequences, safety consequences, environmental consequences and the more intangible socio-political consequences. Pipeline leaks can result in bad publicity and penalties, both of which can be reduced by having a proper pipeline integrity management and emergency response system in place including an LDS. Other measures should be in place to prevent and monitor degradation of the pipeline that in the end may lead to failure, and to consequently reduce the probability of a leak to as low as is reasonably practicable (the ALARP principle). Most authorities do not specify an LDS for pipelines as part of the pipeline management system. However, most countries have some form of legislation and regulations regarding pipeline safety, and installing an LDS may help to obtain appropriate authorisations. In recent years, governments have tended to move from specific rules to performance-based regulations. The risk management concept has now been introduced in both Europe and the USA. Because an LDS may help pipeline operators reduce the loss of containment and hence risks, it should be considered as part of the risk management programme. As a consequence of the above, an LDS for a new pipeline should be specified in the following cases: If leak detection is required by applicable mandatory legalisation. All mandatory legislation and local codes shall be complied with in full, concessions notwithstanding. If the requirements of said legislation and codes are less than those that could be provided by use of SCADA based leak detection, then the latter should be provided as long as the former are still satisfied. (SCADA based leak detection means leak detection methods using pipeline data provided by SCADA or DCS systems). If a single phase pipeline is provided with remote monitoring and control using telemetry/SCADA facilities. Most pipelines, especially those with high potential consequences resulting from a pipeline failure (leak event), should be provided with telemetry/SCADA to provide operational monitoring and control. If telemetry/SCADA facilities are available, a SCADA based LDS should also be provided. The LDS may be fully integrated with the SCADA or stand-alone with appropriate real time communications with the SCADA system. If leak detection is required as an outcome of a Quantitative Risk Assessment, hence if it would significantly reduce the failure risk. The safety consequence of a pipeline leak is directly related to population density, product toxicity, volatility and explosiveness. In general, the safety consequence is reduced to the greatest extent for volatile and toxic products such as LPG, NGL, mogas, ethylene, ethylene oxide and gas with a high hydrogen sulfide content. Important features enabling an LDS to limit the safety consequences are fast response time, high reliability (low false alarm rate) and robustness. The environmental consequence of a pipeline leak is directly related to the environment itself, the persistence and density of the product, and the potential leak volume. Generally important features enabling an LDS to limit the environmental consequences are high localisation accuracy and high sensitivity.

In all other cases, an LDS should only be specified on an exception basis.

3. 3.1

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR LEAK DETECTION SENSITIVITY Sensitivity is defined as a composite measure of the size of leak that a system is capable of detecting, and the time required for the system to issue an alarm in the event that a leak of that size should occur. Some LDSs have a wide variation in the response time as a function of leak size; for others the response time is relatively independent of leak size. Leak detection performance is usually defined in terms of detecting a particular leak flow rate within a specified minimum period of time. Adjustments made to improve sensitivity can have a negative effect on other aspects of performance. For example, if the minimum leak detectable is set too low with a specified time period, then false alarms will occur more frequently. Sensitivity is generally insufficient to detect corrosion pinhole leaks.

3.2

RELIABILITY Reliability is defined as a measure of an LDSs ability to make accurate decisions about the possible existence of a leak in the pipeline. Reliability is directly related to the probability of declaring a leak incorrectly, i.e., if none has occurred. A system is considered to be unreliable if it tends to declare leaks incorrectly. Reliability pertains only to the functionality of the leak detection software without regard to SCADA system performance, availability of the pipeline instrumentation and communication equipment, or any other factor beyond the control of the LDS vendor. Such factors involve a separate category of performance, namely robustness. System reliability is directly affected by factors such as instrument reliability/drift in signals, etc. Model based systems require periodic tuning to ensure the best results. Poor telemetry performance and inaccurate or malfunctioning instrumentation will result in degraded system performance with the likelihood of false alarms, whatever LDS technique is employed. Many systems make automated adjustments to decision thresholds and other parameters in order to reduce the likelihood of generating alarms during defined operating conditions. When such adjustments are made, a corresponding penalty is normally incurred in some other aspect of performance. For example, decisions based on a higher alarm threshold might make a system less sensitive to changes by normal pipeline transients, but this performance gain is achieved at the expense of longer response time and the risk of greater fluid loss if a leak should occur.

3.3

ACCURACY In addition to detecting and announcing a leak, some software-based LDSs can provide estimates of leak flow rate or total volume/mass lost and leak location. Different techniques can provide different estimates with varying accuracy. For example, mass balance or compensated mass balance methods can provide an estimate of leak rate but not of leak location. A compensated method generally provides more accurate leak rate estimates.

3.4

LEAK LOCATION CAPABILITY The quicker the location of a leak is identified, the sooner remedial action can be taken. Some LDSs are able to locate a leak. Accuracy of leak localisation is normally dependent on the leak size.

3.5

ROBUSTNESS Robustness is defined as a measure of the LDSs ability to continue to function and provide useful information, even under changing conditions of pipeline operation, or in conditions where data is lost or suspect. A system is considered to be robust if it continues to function under such less than ideal conditions. The distinction between reliability and robustness is significant. Reliability is a measure of performance within a specified operational envelope. Robustness is a measure of the effective size of the operational envelope as the following examples illustrate: System I: This system employs a sensitive leak detection algorithm and is normally very sensitive, but will frequently generate false alarms during certain normal pipeline operations. The designers of System I have sacrificed a degree of reliability in order to maintain a high level of sensitivity. Nuisance alarms are not conducive to good operation and tend to dull the awareness of operations personnel. Therefore this system is normally not recommended. System II: This system employs an alternative algorithm which is somewhat less sensitive than that of System I, but generates only a fraction of the false alarms. The designers of System II have chosen to sacrifice a degree of sensitivity in order to achieve a high level of reliability. System III: This system employs the same sensitive leak detection algorithm as System I, but inhibits leak detection during pipeline operations that can cause it to generate false alarms. The designers of System III have sacrificed a degree of robustness in order to achieve higher levels of reliability and sensitivity. System IV: This system normally employs the same sensitive leak detection algorithm as System I, but switches to the less sensitive algorithm of System II when it senses conditions that generate false alarms. System IV represents an attempt to selectively trade sensitivity in order to achieve a more reliable and robust system.

3.6

COST Cost is an important parameter of an LDS. The cost includes capital expenditure and ongoing operating costs. When an LDS is selected, it is necessary to estimate the total life cycle cost including the following items: initial project cost of the leak detection software; cost of instrumentation, e.g., additional pressure or density meters and SCADA system; cost of continuous support for tuning and troubleshooting in case of false alarms; cost of personnel for maintaining the instrumentation and leak detection system; cost of training operations and maintenance personnel.

4. 4.1

SELECTION OF A LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM PRIMARY FUNCTIONALITY The primary functionality is to detect the occurrence and/or presence of a leak. Unless there are substantial reasons for doing otherwise, the selected LDS shall be a real-time, corrected mass or volume balance system, see (6). The LDS can be totally integrated within the SCADA system, or the leak detection application can utilise a stand-alone platform and communicate via OPC or similar protocol with the SCADA system. To preserve operators confidence in the system and ensure reliable operation of the plant facilities, the LDS should not produce nuisance/false leak alarms. Reliability and robustness shall be the essential performance factors, with sensitivity and accuracy having a secondary role.

4.2

SECONDARY FUNCTIONALITY Depending upon requirements (which should be evaluated by cost benefit analysis), the LDS may have one or more of the following functionalities in addition to the primary functionality of leak detection. Leak location Leak location identification is particularly useful where the location of a leak would be difficult or expensive to determine by normal procedures. Leak location identification is even more useful on longer pipelines where there are a number of pipeline sections that can be shut in with isolation valves. Shutting the whole network down may be highly undesirable. Static leak detection The LDS should ideally accommodate Static Leak Detection if this is an operational condition of the pipeline, i.e., when the pipeline is shut in under a level of line pack. Static leak detection is not possible with a slack line (when the pipeline pressure is below the vapour pressure of the product in the pipeline). Positioning of pipeline pressure and temperature instrumentation should be confirmed with the Supplier. Batch tracking For multi-product operation, or for pipelines transporting different compositions of the same fluid, batch tracking is a useful tool. Operator training Some leak detection systems have a simulation capability whereby operators can be trained.

4.3

ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONALITY With a SCADA based LDS, additional and/or localised systems may be applied to enhance performance. These may be of particular use in environmentally sensitive areas, e.g., river crossings, aquifer areas, etc. Smart sectioning line break valves (LBVs) may be used in association with the SCADA based LDS to detect major and full-bore rupture leaks. Smart LBVs shall provide automatic section shutdown and containment to mitigate the consequences of such leaks.

5. 5.1

IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITY The LDS should be designed and engineered in association with the SCADA system. Ideally the supply of the LDS and the SCADA system should be a single responsibility. Typically the SCADA system Supplier should be responsible for supplying the LDS as this will provide seamless factory acceptance testing, installation and commissioning. Depending upon the contract philosophy, the choice of LDS type and Manufacturer may be selected by the responsible Supplier. However, regardless of the method used, the Principal should be fully involved in the process and should be the approving authority in order to ensure that the system will meet the performance specification.

5.2

PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION Some form of performance guarantee should be identified and incentivised, based on performance monitoring against key targets. The LDS Supplier should provide base performance indicators as defined in (3), ideally prior to order placement, but otherwise a Leak Sensitivity Study should be carried out to formulate an agreed contractual performance. If possible, a milestone payment should be linked to the validation of sensitivity and location accuracy performance by simulating a real physical leak. Ideally the leak should not be simulated close to an instrumented point on the pipeline. Performance based on a guaranteed minimum of false alarms shall be combined with the detection time for various leak sizes to dissuade the Supplier from desensitising the sytem. As a minimum, a performance test period of 60 days shall be employed for system acceptance testing purposes. During this period the system shall operate without generating false alarms of failures.

5.3

INSTRUMENTATION The accuracy, repeatability and positioning of the instrumentation required for the operation of the LDS should be reviewed with the LDS Manufacturer. For maximum performance, instrumented measurements should be made as accurate and repeatable as possible. This requirement may be relaxed if a lower LDS performance is acceptable. Analogue to digital conversions implemented as part of the SCADA/Telemetry should be 12-bit as a minimum. Temperature measurement should be conducted sub-surface, or appropriate insulation should be provided to mitigate any heat-up by the sun.

5.4

FACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTING Testing should be rigorous and witnessed by the Principal or its authorised representative. Pre FAT testing should be conducted and proof submitted thereof by the Supplier before witnessed FAT is arranged. A full FAT procedure shall be issued (together with SCADA FAT if the systems are combined) and approved prior to commencement of FAT.

5.5

DATA SAMPLING RATE The sampling rate for the pipeline measurements collected by the SCADA/Telemetry shall be compatible with the requirements of the LDS.

5.6

ALARMS Any alarms generated by the LDS and handed over to the SCADA system should be considered as advisory only. Automatic control actions, e.g., shutdowns, etc., should not be generated by the declaration of a leak alarm by the LDS unless LBVs are used. Manual

intervention by the operator, in conjunction with the appropriate operating procedure, should be the normal response to a leak alarm. 5.7 OPERATOR DISPLAYS Data shall be presented in the form of displays, easily interpreted by the operator. Displays should comprise pipeline ingress (and egress) pressure and flow trends, imbalance trends, inventory trends and pressure vs. distance displays. Such displays will assist the Operator if a leak alarm is issued by the LDS. The operator shall not, therefore, be presented with masses of tabulated data that can easily become incomprehensible, if not totally ignored. Displays may either reside on the SCADA system, or on the LDS if a stand-alone system is employed. Common symbols and practices shall be employed across the SCADA and LDS operator interface. 5.8 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Consistent start-up/shutdown procedures greatly enhance leak detectability during transients. Operational procedures shall be formulated that the pipeline operator is required to comply with in the event of a pipeline leak. Blind trials should be conducted at least once a year to check the response of operators and associated procedures. 5.9 REMOTE MAINTENANCE Most LDS tuning and maintenance operations can now be performed remotely with a corresponding reduction in cost. A dial-up modem (PSTN or ISDN) or similar communication equipment should be supplied to allow remote diagnostics of the LDS. Security should be implemented to prevent unauthorised access to equipment and associated business and process networks. 5.10 LEAK SENSITIVITY / TUNING The cost of tuning (which can be a prolonged process, particularly for dynamic model LSDs) should be integrated into the costs of installation, testing and commissioning. 5.11 TRAINING Training courses with different content and duration are required for engineers and operators. Operator training should be finalised during the commissioning phase of the pipeline. Course notes are essential and should be reviewed and approved. 5.12 DOCUMENTATION In conjunction with the SCADA Functional Design Specification, the following documentation shall also be provided as a minimum for the LDS: Basis of design and operation, the system performance document; Factory Acceptance Test procedures; Site Acceptance Test procedures; LDS Tuning procedures; Operations and Maintenance manual(s).

All documentation should be submitted for review, comment, and approval.

6. 6.1

LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES GENERAL Leak detection techniques are based on either continuous or intermittent measurements of specific parameters. Intermittent leak detection methods are often able to detect smaller leak rates than continuous leak detection techniques can. Some continuous techniques can only detect transient pipeline conditions during the onset of a leak, and will not be able to identify the presence of a leak at a later time. For some intermittent techniques, fluid transportation through the pipeline needs to be interrupted. With intermittent techniques, the detection time of a leak will be completely dependent on the frequency of inspection. Generally, LDSs work in single-phase pipelines only. Techniques for detection of leaks in liquid lines generally perform better than those for gas pipelines. LDS performance is limited in two-phase pipelines. The conflicting balance of sensitivity to leaks and false alarms will determine the sensitivity setting of the LDS. Large leaks can normally be detected more rapidly than small ones. To maintain the user's confidence in the system and the effectiveness of the operators response, avoiding false alarms should have a higher priority than attempting to shorten the leak detection time or reducing the minimum detectable leak rate. The performance of pipeline leak detection techniques is dependent on fluid type, operating pressure including fluctuations, batch or continuous operation, pipeline length and size, metering accuracy and repeatability, etc. The technique to be adopted should be determined by detailed evaluation. Generally, the corrected mass or volume balance method or the SPLD method should be used. It may be necessary to deploy more than one leak detection technique in order to achieve the overall leak detection performance that is required. LDSs are categorised into the following groups according to their inherent principle of leak detection: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Balancing of pipeline mass or volume input versus output; Pressure and/or flow analysis; Dynamic Models; Monitoring of characteristic signals generated by a leak; Off-line leak detection.

A summary of the capabilities and application of the various leak detection techniques follows. Additional information may be found in report SIEP 97-5527. 6.2 6.2.1 BALANCING OF MASS OR VOLUME INPUT VERSUS OUTPUT General These LDSs rely on the fact that in a leak-free pipeline the fluid mass or volume flow into the pipeline equals the flow out. Using this flow balance principle, the flow-in and flow-out measurements are continuously monitored for any variations over a time interval. Volume flow readings should be corrected for pressure and temperature variations to reference conditions, i.e., 1 bar (abs) and 0 C or 15 C. To eliminate the effect of flow variations during normal operation, the flow readings should be statistically processed or totalled over discrete time periods. 6.2.2 Mass or Volume Balance The uncorrected mass or volume balance method can be applied only under steady state operations, as it does not allow for changes in the pipeline inventory, i.e., line pack variation. Its accuracy depends largely on the accuracy of the flowmeters and on the steadiness of operations.

6.2.3

Corrected Mass or Volume Balance In addition to inlet and outlet flow measurement, the corrected flow balance method uses a correction factor for any changes in the pipeline inventory. Pressure and, if necessary, temperature measurements at intervals along the pipeline are used for calculating the correction factor. The ability to detect small leaks depends upon the number and accuracy of measurements along the length of the pipeline. An alternative method is dynamic simulation (6.4), which is a model-assisted balance method. A real time computer model calculates the inventory of the pipeline and the line pack variations of the pipeline under steady state and transient operating conditions. It will correct not only for pressure and temperature effects, but also for changes in fluid properties, such as where different batches of fluids are present in the pipeline at the same time. A difference between the flow balance predicted by the model and that actually measured indicates the presence of a leak. Also, unexpected flow and/or pressure trends are used as indicators of the occurrence of a leak. The dynamic simulation method is similar to the corrected flow balance system. The main difference is that the dynamic simulation method calculates the pipeline inventory whereas the corrected mass balance method interpolates between the measurements along the pipeline. The latter is simpler although its accuracy is slightly lower than that of the dynamic simulation method. The sensitivity of these methods is generally good. Their disadvantage is that they are poorly able to locate the leak.

6.2.4

Statistical Pipeline Leak Detection Shell has developed a Statistical Pipeline Leak Detection (SPLD) system, which is also a form of the corrected flow balance system. The system does not need complicated modelling of the pipeline inventory. It continuously calculates the statistical probabilities of a leak based on fluid flow and pressure measured at the inlet and outlet of a pipeline. Depending on the control and operation of a pipeline, the statistical technique is used to identify changes in the relationship between the pipeline pressure and flow that always occur when there is a leak. The SPLD system works as a statistical filter, which is applied to a pipeline input/output balance and which decides between a leak-free and a leakpresent hypothesis. Major advantages of this system are its simplicity and robustness compared with other software based techniques. The SPLD is capable of discriminating between fluctuations due to operational variations of the pipeline and the actual occurrence of a leak; it is thus very reliable for leak detection. This high reliability is achieved by statistically processing the corrected flow balance and analysing the pressure and flow simultaneously. The SPLD system can also give a good indication of the leak location. The SPLD system has been put into practice satisfactorily both inside and outside the Group.

6.3 6.3.1

PRESSURE AND/OR FLOW ANALYSIS General The operation of a pipeline can be characterised by the flow of the fluid and the pressure gradient along the pipeline. Pressure drop and flow along a pipeline are related to the flow resistance of the pipeline. A leak will alter the pressure drop profile of a pipeline and therefore affect the 'normal' pressure and flow relationships. Detection of such alterations can be used to indicate the occurrence of a leak.

6.3.2

Low Pressure Monitoring If a large leak occurs, particularly in the upstream part of a pipeline, the inlet pressure will drop. A lower than expected inlet pressure indicates the presence of a leak. Detection of low pressure may be connected to an automatic shut-down system; smart LBVs are such an example. To avoid false alarms the system is usually set so that only major leaks can be detected.

6.3.3

Change in Pressure/Flow A leak will result in an increase in flow upstream and a decrease in flow downstream of the leak. Consequently, the pressure gradient will increase upstream and decrease downstream of the leak. The occurrence of a discontinuity in the pressure gradient, which is calculated from the pressure readings along the pipeline, is an indication of a large leak. The rate of change of pressure and flow readings can also be monitored and used to detect sudden changes that indicate the occurrence of a leak. The combined pressure decrease/flow increase method, commonly referred to as pressure point analysis, uses the fact that a leak in an operational pipeline will cause an increase in the flow and a decrease in the pressure upstream of the leak. The simultaneous occurrence of both is an indication of a leak. It is a relatively inexpensive solution and not model based. However, pressure decline is not unique to a leak event, and false alarms may be common on transient lines.

6.4

DYNAMIC MODELS The dynamic model method uses equations of state to mathematically emulate the fluid flow within the pipeline. Usually it has to solve three partial differential equations on-line: conservation of mass, momentum and energy. Deviation between modelled variables and measured pipeline variables is theoretically indicative of a leak condition. This method, however, has historically proved difficult to successfully implement for online applications. This is due to the complexity of the modelling variables and calculations required. Typically problems of tuning and a high false alarm rate have prevented the successful implementation of a reliable system of this type. Dynamic models have proved to be of high initial cost with a high cost of ownership with no great improvement of sensitivity over that of SPLD.

6.5 6.5.1

MONITORING OF CHARACTERISTIC SIGNALS GENERATED BY A LEAK Wave Alert A suddenly occurring leak will cause a sudden pressure drop at the leak location in the pipeline. This sudden pressure drop will create a pressure wave travelling at sonic velocity both upstream and downstream from the leak. This pressure wave is an indication of the occurrence of a leak. The response time of this negative pressure wave technique is very short because it responds to waves that travel at sonic velocities (in crude oil, approximately 1000 m/s). When the wave is detected both upstream and downstream of the leak, the location of the leak may be calculated from the time difference of detection by the nearest sensors on either side of the leak location. The system will only respond to an instantaneously occurring leak of measurable size. In practice the sensitivity can be poor because the alarm thresholds are often set high to avoid false alarms triggered by pressure transients generated by upstream or downstream processing plant or other noise producing installations, such as pump or compressor stations. A system that is less sensitive to pipeline noise than the negative pressure wave system uses dual transducers, which filter out noise signals. The system is made directional, i.e., it detects signals originating from either the upstream or the downstream direction of the pipeline. This is achieved by installing the two transducers at an appropriate distance from each other and using an electronic signal subtracting system. Leak detection based on negative pressure wave techniques will only detect the initiation of a leak and not its presence. If the pressure wave created at the moment of leak initiation is not detected, the leak will not be noticed.

6.5.2

Acoustic Techniques Acoustic transmitters and receivers are installed on a liquid pipeline at specific distances. The correlation between the signals transmitted and received is calculated to determine if a leak exists and its possible location. This method is based on the fact that the acoustic

properties will be changed due to the presence of an opening in the pipeline. The distance between the transmitter and receiver is very short, usually a few hundred metres only. 6.5.3 Hydrocarbon-sensing Cables Hydrocarbon-sensing cables can be laid along the pipeline. Electrical properties of the cable change when hydrocarbons come in contact with the cable. Contact with water does not affect the properties of the cable. 6.5.4 Other Development A prototype system for the measurement of methane in seawater has been developed. The device, which is mounted on a remotely operated vehicle, extracts dissolved gas from a continuous flow of water and determines the methane content using infrared absorption techniques. 6.6 6.6.1 OFF-LINE LEAK DETECTION Pipeline Patrolling A pipeline patrolling program should be in place as a method of leak detection whether an on-line system is available or not. The frequency of this inspection should be based on the criticality of the pipeline. A record of this inspection should be maintained throughout the life of the pipeline. 6.6.2 Static Pressure Test The pressure in a blocked-in pressurised pipeline will drop when there is a leak. For a static pressure leak test the pipeline (or a section of it) is pressurised with the transported hydrocarbon fluid to the MAOP. If pressurising to a higher level is required, the leak test shall be done with water for safety and environmental reasons. After pressurising, the block valves are closed and the pressure and temperature are monitored for a specified period of time (24 hours minimum). A differential static pressure test can be carried out if block valves are equipped with differential pressure transducers. Differences in the rate of pressure drop in two adjacent sections that cannot be explained by temperature effects, inaccuracy of readings, or valve leakage is an indication of a leak. There are uncertainties about the advantages and disadvantages of pressure testing existing pipelines for condition monitoring purposes at pressures higher than the MAOP. Pressure testing above the MAOP is primarily done for strength testing in order to avoid a pipeline rupture; see PTS 31.40.40.38 The advantage of pressure testing at high pressures for leak detection is that an existing leak is detected more easily. Also, long defects, which have almost broken the surface, can be opened, resulting in a leak that is also detected. The disadvantage is the risk that existing defects might be enlarged and/or activated to grow, possibly leading to failures during normal pipeline operations following the pressure test. A tracer can be added to the pressurising fluid to assist the detection of small leaks. The leak is detected by patrolling the pipeline with a detector that is sensitive to the tracer, or by visual observation of a visible tracer. 6.6.3 Leak Detection Pig Liquid escaping under pressure through a small opening produces sonic noise. An ultrasonic leak detection pig, which is equipped with hydrophones and data recording, can detect and locate the presence of a leak. A very small leak, down to 10 l/hr, can be detected and fairly accurately located with this technique. Being intermittently operated, the response time will depend on the frequency of running the ultrasonic leak detection pig.

6.6.4

Sniffer Tube A hydrocarbon-permeable tube (sniffer tube) can be laid in close proximity along the pipeline. Small leaks of hydrocarbons from the pipeline that have permeated into the tube will be detected when the tube is periodically purged into a gas analyser.

6.6.5

Remote Sensing of Hydrocarbon Emissions Remote sensing of hydrocarbon emissions, e.g., using an infrared technique from an aircraft, is becoming commercially available. Particularly for gas and multi-phase pipelines, this offers a powerful alternative to ground based patrolling techniques.

6.6.6

Acoustic Techniques The sound that is generated when liquid is forced through a small opening during pressure testing can be detected by acoustic monitoring. For pipelines transporting hard liquids, leak detection by an acoustic reflectometry method is feasible. The technique is based on the phenomenon that a pressure wave travelling through a pipeline is reflected at the position of a leak, due to a local change of acoustic properties. For lines that are used intermittently, this technique can be used during downtime when the level of disturbing noise is low.

7.

REFERENCES In this PTS, reference is made to the following publications:

NOTE: Unless specifically designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together with any amendments/supplements/revisions thereto.

PETRONAS STANDARDS Index to PTS publications and standard specifications Hydrostatic pressure testing of new pipelines PTS 00.00.05.05 PTS 31.40.40.38

8.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTE: The following documents are for information only and do not form an integral part of this PTS:

Jansen, H J M., Pipeline Leak Detection; State of the Art Review as of May 1997. September 1997.

SIEP 97-5527

APPENDIX 1
LEAK DETECTION METHOD Low Pressure

SUMMARY OF THE CAPABILITIES AND APPLICATION OF LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES

LEAK TYPE MODE OF OPERATION any RESPONSE TIME LEAK LOCATION CAPABILITY ROBUSTNESS RELIABILITY COST REMARKS

gas: full bore ruptures liquid: major leaks gas: major leak liquid: large leaks

seconds to minutes

good

poor

low

high thresholds required to avoid false alarms

Change in pressure / flow

steady state

seconds to minutes

Wave alert

Mass or volume balance Corrected mass or volume balance Statistical pipeline leak detection (SPLD) Dynamic simulation model Acoustic techniques Static pressure test

gas: medium to large leaks liquid: small to medium leaks gas and liquid: medium to large leaks gas and liquid: small, medium and large leaks gas and liquid: small, medium and large leaks gas and liquid: small, medium and large leaks liquids: large leaks (online), small to medium leaks (shut-in) hard liquids: small leaks soft liquids: medium leaks gas: large leaks all fluids, including multiphase: small leaks

steady and transient state steady state steady and transient state steady and transient state, shut in steady and transient state, shut in steady state

seconds to minutes

minutes to hours minutes to hours

Offshore: None Onshore: Between block valves if pressure readings available within 1 km, depending on transducer spacing none Offshore: None Onshore: Between block valves at best within 5 % of distance between pressure meters at best within 10 % of pipeline length within 1 km

good

poor

low

good

poor

medium

detects only the onset of a leak

good good

poor medium

low medium

minutes to hours

good

good

medium

low probability of false alarm high false alarm rate

minutes to hours

poor

poor

high

during shut in

depends on monitoring frequency hours to days

good

medium

high

hard liquids only

none, between block valves within 100 m for hydrocarbon sensing cables 5 % - 25 % of flow 1 % - 5 % of flow

good

poor

low

Sniffer tube, hydrocarbon sensing-cables

any

hours

good

good

high

capabilities depend on length and temperature effects short lines only

Full bore rupture: Major leak: Large leak:

100 % of flow 50 % - 100 % of flow 25 % - 50 % of flow

Medium leak: Small leak: