Answers To Bar Examination Questions in Civil Law (2006)

CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics (Year 1990-2006)
ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS

IN
CIVIL LAW
ARRANGED BY TOPIC
(1990
2006)
First Edition Edit!d "nd Arr"n#!d $%&
July 26, 2005
Atty. Janette Laggui-Icao and Atty. Alex Andrew P. Icao

(Silliman University College of Law) Latest Edition Edited and Arranged by:
ROMUA'(O ') SE*ERIS II

Silliman University College of Law
Fro+ t,! ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS $% t,! U- 'AW .OM-'EX / -,i0i11in! Asso2i"tion o3 '"4 S2,oo0s
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!"WA"#
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RI)I!$( S *R"ES+RE,ERE!"ES of this
material-. It is primarily intended for all those who desire to have a deeper understandin. of the issues touched by the Philippine 'ar E/aminations and its trend. It is specially intended for law students from the provinces who, very often, are recipients of deliberately distorted notes from other unscrupulous law schools and students. Share to others this work and you will be richly rewarded by )od in heaven. It is also very .ood karma.
0e would like to seek the indul.ence of the reader for some 'ar 1uestions which are improperly classified under a topic and for some topics which are improperly or
i.norantly phrased, for the authors are 2ust 'ar Reviewees who have prepared this work while reviewin. for the 'ar E/ams under time constraints and within their limited knowled.e of the law. 0e would like to seek the reader3s indul.ence for a lot of
typo.raphical errors in this work.
The Authors
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$able o% Contents
&E'E"AL P"I'CIPLE(......................................................................................................................10 Civil law vs. Common Law (1997).............................................................................................................. 10 Effect of Obiter & Dissenting Opinion; C Decisions (199!)...............................................................................10 Effectivit" of Laws (199#)........................................................................................................................10 E$%it" follows t&e Law ('##()...................................................................................................................10 )gnorance of t&e Law vs. *ista+e of ,act (199-).............................................................................................11 )nferior Co%rts Decisions (199!)................................................................................................................11 .re/%0icial 1%estions (1997)....................................................................................................................11 PE"(!'(...........................................................................................................................................11 C&ange of 2ame; 3n0er 45 9#!6 ('##-)......................................................................................................11 Deat&; Effects; im%ltaneo%s Deat& (1996)...................................................................................................12 Deat&; Effects; im%ltaneo%s Deat& (1999)...................................................................................................12 Deat&; Effects; im%ltaneo%s Deat& ('###)...................................................................................................12 7%ri0ical Capacit" vs. Capacit" to 5ct (199-)................................................................................................ 12 7%ri0ical Capacit"; 2at%ral .ersons (1999)...................................................................................................13 8aiver of 4ig&ts ('##!).......................................................................................................................... 13 C!' LIC$ ! LAW(..........................................................................................................................13 5ppilicable Laws; laws governing contracts (199').........................................................................................13 5pplicable Laws; 5rts 19: 1- & 17 (1996)..................................................................................................... 13 5pplicable Laws; 5rts 19: 1-: 17 ('##')....................................................................................................... 14 5pplicable Laws; Capacit" to 5ct (1996)......................................................................................................14 5pplicable Laws; Capacit" to ;%" Lan0 (1999).............................................................................................. 15 5pplicable Laws; Capacit" to Contract (1999)............................................................................................... 15 5pplicable Laws; capacit" to s%ccee0 (1991)................................................................................................15 5pplicable Laws; contracts contrar" to p%blic polic" (199-).............................................................................. 15 5pplicable Laws; Contracts of Carriage (1999).............................................................................................. 16 5pplicable Laws; Labor Contracts (1991).....................................................................................................16 5pplicable Laws; laws governing marriages (199').........................................................................................17 5pplicable Laws; laws governing marriages ('##().........................................................................................17 5pplicable Laws; ale of 4eal .ropert" (1999)............................................................................................17 5pplicable Laws; %ccession; )ntestate & <estamentar" ('##1)..........................................................................18 5pplicable Laws; %cession of 5liens (1999)................................................................................................18 5pplicable Laws; 8ills e=ec%te0 abroa0 (199()............................................................................................. 18 Definition; Cognovit; ;orrowing tat%te; C&aracteri>ation (199!)........................................................................18 Definition; for%m non?conveniens; long?arm stat%te (199!)............................................................................... 19 Divorce; effect of 0ivorce grante0 to former ,ilipinos; 4envoi Doctrine (1997) ........................................................ 19 Domiciliar" t&eor" vs. 2ationalit" <&eor" ('##!)............................................................................................ 19 ,or%m 2on Conveniens & Le= Loci Contract%s ('##')..................................................................................... 19 2ationalit" <&eor" ('##!)........................................................................................................................20 2at%rali>ation ('##()............................................................................................................................. 20 <&eor"; significant relations&ips t&eor" (199!)..............................................................................................20 <orts; .rescriptive .erio0 ('##!)...............................................................................................................21 A#!P$I!'......................................................................................................................................... 21 50option; 3se of %rname of &er 2at%ral *ot&er ('##-)...................................................................................21 )nter?Co%ntr" 50option; ,ormalities ('##9)...................................................................................................21 .arental 5%t&orit"; 4escission of 50option (199!)...................................................................................... 21 1%alification of 50opter ('##9)................................................................................................................. 22 1%alification of 50opter; 5pplicable Law ('##1).............................................................................................22 1%alifications of 50opter ('###)................................................................................................................22 1%alifications of 50opter ('##()................................................................................................................23 %ccessional 4ig&ts of 50opte0 C&il0 ('##!)................................................................................................23 A)IL* C!#E....................................................................................................................................23 Emancipation (199()............................................................................................................................ 23 ,amil" Co0e; 4etroactive 5pplication; @este0 4ig&ts ('###)..............................................................................24
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*arriage; Bro%n0s; Declaration of 2%llit"C 5nn%lmentC Legal eparationC eparation of .ropert" ('##() ..................28 *arriage; Bro%n0s; 2%llit"; 5nn%lment; Legal eparation (1997)........................................................................ 29 *arriage; Legal eparation; Declaration of 2%llit" ('##')..................................................................................29 *arriage; Legal eparation; Bro%n0s; .rescriptive .erio0 (199!)........................................................................29 *arriage; Legal eparation; *%t%al g%ilt ('##-)............................................................................................. 29 *arriage; 2on?;igamo%s *arriages ('##-)...................................................................................................30 *arriage; .ropert" 4elations; @oi0 *arriages (1991).......................................................................................30 *arriage; .s"c&ological )ncapacit" (199-).................................................................................................30 *arriage; .s"c&ological )ncapacit" ('##-).................................................................................................31 *arriage; .s"c&ological )ncapacit" ('##-).................................................................................................31 *arriage; 4e$%isites (1999)................................................................................................................... 31 *arriage; 4e$%isites (1999)................................................................................................................... 32 *arriage; 4e$%isites; *arriage License (199-).............................................................................................. 32 *arriage; 4e$%isites; *arriage License ('##').............................................................................................. 33 *arriage; 4e$%isites; olemni>ing Officers (199!)..........................................................................................33 *arriage; 4e$%isites; @oi0 *arriage (199().................................................................................................. 33 *arriage; @oi0 *arriages ('##!)................................................................................................................34 *arriage; @oi0 *arriages ('##-)................................................................................................................34 *arriage; @oi0 *arriages; .s"c&ological )ncapacit" ('##')............................................................................... 35 .arental 5%t&orit"; C&il0 %n0er 7 "ears of age ('##-)......................................................................................35 .arental 5%t&orit"; pecial .arental 5%t&orit"; Liabilit" of <eac&ers ('##() ............................................................35 .arental 5%t&orit"; %bstit%te vs. pecial ('##!)............................................................................................35 .aternit" & ,iliation (1999)...................................................................................................................... 36 .aternit" & ,iliation; 5rtificial )nsemination; ,ormalities ('##-).......................................................................... 36 .aternit" & ,iliation; Common?Law 3nion ('##!)........................................................................................ 36 .aternit" & ,iliation; .roofs; Limitations; 50opte0 C&il0 (1999)......................................................................36 .aternit" & ,iliation; 4ecognition of illegitimate C&il0 ('##9) .............................................................................37 .aternit" & ,iliation; 4ig&ts of Legitimate C&il0ren (199#) ................................................................................ 37 .res%mptive Legitime (1999)....................................................................................................................38 .ropert" 4elations; 5bsol%te Comm%nit" (199!) ............................................................................................38 .ropert" 4elations; 5nte 2%ptial 5greement (1999)........................................................................................ 39 .ropert" 4elations; Con/%gal .artners&ip of Bains (1996).................................................................................39 .ropert" 4elations; *arriage ettlement; Con/%gal .artners&ip of Bains ('##9) ...................................................... 39 .ropert" 4elations; *arriage ettlements (1991)............................................................................................40 .ropert" 4elations; *arriage ettlements (1999)............................................................................................40 .ropert" 4elations; Obligations; ;enefit of t&e ,amil" ('###).........................................................................41 .ropert" 4elations; 3nions wit&o%t *arriage (199')........................................................................................41 .ropert" 4elations; 3nions wit&o%t *arriage (1997)........................................................................................41 .ropert" 4elations; 3nions wit&o%t *arriage ('###)........................................................................................42 (+CCE((I!'.....................................................................................................................................42 5mo%nt of %ccessional 4ig&ts ('##!)........................................................................................................42 ;arrier between illegitimate & legitimate relatives (199()..................................................................................42 ;arrier between illegitimate & legitimate relatives (199-)..................................................................................43 Collation (199()....................................................................................................................................43 Disin&eritance vs. .reterition (199()...........................................................................................................43 Disin&eritance; )neffective (1999).............................................................................................................. 43 Disin&eritance; )neffective; .reterition ('###)................................................................................................44
,amil" Aome; Dwelling Ao%se (199!)..........................................................................................................24 ,amil"; Constit%tional *an0ates; Divorce (1991)............................................................................................24 *arriage; 5nn%lment; Effects; 4e$%isites ;efore 4emarriage (199#) ....................................................................24 *arriage; 5nn%lment; Bro%n0s (1991)........................................................................................................ 25 *arriage; 5nn%lment; 7%0icial Declaration (199()...........................................................................................25 *arriage; 5nn%lment; Legal eparation; .rescription of 5ctions (199-) ................................................................25 *arriage; 5nn%lment; .roper .art" (199#)................................................................................................... 26 *arriage; 5nn%lment; .roper .art" (1999)................................................................................................... 26 *arriage; Divorce Decree; @oi0 *arriages (199')........................................................................................... 26 *arriage; Divorce Decrees; ,iliation of C&il0ren ('##9)....................................................................................26 *arriage; Divorce Decrees; ,ilipino po%ses becoming 5lien (199-) ................................................................... 27 *arriage; Divorce Decrees; ,ilipino po%ses becoming 5lien (1999) ................................................................... 27 *arriage; Donations b" 4eason of *arriage; Effect of Declaration of 2%llit" (199-) .................................................. 28
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Legitime (1997)................................................................................................................................... 47 Legitime; Comp%lsor" Aeirs ('##()............................................................................................................47 Legitime; Comp%lsor" Aeirs vs. econ0ar" Comp%lsor" Aeirs ('##9)...................................................................48 .reterition ('##1)..................................................................................................................................48 .reterition; Comp%lsor" Aeir (1999)........................................................................................................... 48 .rocee0ings; )ntestate .rocee0ings; 7%ris0iction ('##!).................................................................................. 48 %ccession; Deat&; .res%mptive Legitime (1991)...........................................................................................49 8ills; Co0icil; )nstit%tion of Aeirs; %bstit%tion of Aeirs ('##')...........................................................................49 8ills; ,ormalities (199#)......................................................................................................................... 50 8ills; Aolograp&ic 8ills; )nsertions & Cancellations (199-)...............................................................................50 8ills; Aolograp&ic 8ills; 8itnesses (199!)...................................................................................................50 8ills; 7oint 8ills ('###).......................................................................................................................... 50 8ills; .robate; )ntrinsic @ali0it" (199#)........................................................................................................51 8ills; .robate; 2otarial an0 Aolograp&ic 8ills (1997)......................................................................................51 8ills; 4evocation of 8ills; Depen0ent 4elative 4evocation ('##().......................................................................51 8ills; <estamentar" Disposition ('##-)....................................................................................................... 52 8ills; <estamentar" )ntent (199-).............................................................................................................. 52 #!'A$I!'.........................................................................................................................................52 Donation vs. ale ('##().........................................................................................................................52 Donations; Con0ition; Capacit" to %e (199-)............................................................................................... 52 Donations; Con0itions; 4evocation (1991)................................................................................................... 53 Donations; Effect; illegal & immoral con0itions (1997)..................................................................................... 53 Donations; ,ormalities; *ortis Ca%sa (199#).................................................................................................54 Donations; ,ormalities; *ortis Ca%sa (1996).................................................................................................54 Donations; )nter @ivos; 5cceptance (199()...................................................................................................54 Donations; .erfection (1996)....................................................................................................................54 Donations; 4e$%isites; )mmovable .ropert".................................................................................................55 Donations; 3nregistere0; Effects; 2on?Compliance; 4esol%tor" Con0ition ('##-) ....................................................55 Donations; @ali0it"; Effectivit"; for 3nborn C&il0 (1999)............................................................................... 55 Donations; wit& 4esol%tor" Con0ition ('##()................................................................................................56 P"!PE"$*.........................................................................................................................................56 5ccretion; 5ll%vion ('##1).......................................................................................................................56 5ccretion; 5v%lsion ('##()...................................................................................................................... 56 ;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& (199')...................................................................................................................... 57 ;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& vs. ;a0 ,ait& (1999)..................................................................................................... 57 ;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& vs. ;a0 ,ait& ('###)..................................................................................................... 57 ;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& vs. ;a0 ,ait&; 5ccession ('###)....................................................................................... 58 ;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& vs. ;a0 ,ait&; .res%mption ('##1).................................................................................... 58 C&attel *ortgage vs. .le0ge (1999)............................................................................................................58 C&attel *ortgage; )mmovables (199!).........................................................................................................59 C&attel *ortgage; )mmovables ('##().........................................................................................................59 C&attel *ortgage; .ossession (199()......................................................................................................... 60 C&attel *ortgage; .reference of Cre0itors (1999)........................................................................................... 60 Easement vs. 3s%fr%ct (1999)...................................................................................................................60 Easement; Effects; Discontin%o%s Easements; .ermissive 3se ('##9) ................................................................. 61 Easement; 2%isance; 5batement ('##')...................................................................................................... 61 Easements; Classification (1996)............................................................................................................ 62 Easements; 4ig&t of 8a" (199()............................................................................................................... 62 Easements; 4ig&t of 8a" ('###)............................................................................................................... 62 Easements; 4ig&t of 8a"; )nseparabilit" ('##1)............................................................................................. 62
Aeirs; )ntestate Aeirs; 4eserva <roncal (1999)...............................................................................................44 Aeirs; )ntestate Aeirs; &ares ('##().......................................................................................................... 45 )ntestate %ccession (199').....................................................................................................................45 )ntestate %ccession (1997).....................................................................................................................45 )ntestate %ccession (1996).....................................................................................................................46 )ntestate %ccession (1996).....................................................................................................................46 )ntestate %ccession (1999).....................................................................................................................46 )ntestate %ccession ('###).....................................................................................................................46 )ntestate %ccession; 4eserva <roncal (1999)...............................................................................................47
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3s%fr%ct (1997)................................................................................................................................... 69 LA'# $"A'( E" , #EE#(...............................................................................................................69 5c$%isition of Lan0s; Citi>ens&ip 4e$%irement ('##()..................................................................................... 69 50verse Claims; 2otice of Lev" (1996)........................................................................................................69 5nnotation of Lis .en0ens; 8&en .roper ('##1)............................................................................................ 70 ,ores&ore Lan0s ('###)..........................................................................................................................70 ,orger"; )nnocent .%rc&aser; Aol0er in ;a0 ,ait& ('##9) ..................................................................................70 ,orger"; )nnocent .%rc&aser; *irror .rinciple (1991)................................................................................... 71 ,ra%0; .roc%rement of .atent; Effect ('###)................................................................................................. 71 Aomestea0 .atents; @oi0 ale (1999)......................................................................................................... 71 )nnocent .%rc&aser for @al%e ('##1)...........................................................................................................72 *irror .rinciple (199#)........................................................................................................................... 72 *irror .rinciple; ,orger"; )nnocent .%rc&aser (1999)...................................................................................... 73 2otice of Lis .en0ens (1999)................................................................................................................... 73 2otice of Lis .en0ens; <ransferee .en0ente Lite ('##')...................................................................................73 .rescription & Lac&es; Elements of Lac&es ('###)......................................................................................... 74 .rescription & Lac&es; )n0efeasibilit" 4%le of <orrens <itle ('##')...................................................................... 74 .rescription (199#)............................................................................................................................... 75 .rescription; 4eal 4ig&ts (199')................................................................................................................75 .rimar" Entr" ;oo+; 5c$%isitive .rescription; Lac&es (1996).........................................................................76 4eclamation of ,ores&ore Lan0s; Limitations ('###).......................................................................................76 4egistration; Dee0 of *ortgage (199!)........................................................................................................77 4eme0ies; 7%0icial Confirmation; )mperfect <itle (199()...................................................................................77 4eme0ies; 7%0icial 4econstit%tion of <itle (199-)...........................................................................................77 4eme0ies; .roce0%re; Cons%lta (199!)....................................................................................................... 77 4eme0ies; 4econve"ance vs. 4eopening of a Decree; .rescriptive .erio0 ('##() ...............................................78 4eme0ies; 4econve"ance; Elements (1999)................................................................................................. 78 4eme0ies; 4econve"ance; .rescriptive .erio0 (1997)..................................................................................... 79 4eme0ies; 4eopening of a Decree; Elements (199')....................................................................................... 79 <orrens "stem vs. 4ecor0ing of Evi0ence of <itle (199!) .................................................................................80 3nregistere0 Lan0 (1991)........................................................................................................................80 C!'$"AC$(......................................................................................................................................80 Consens%al vs. 4eal Contracts; Ein0s of 4eal Contracts (1996)......................................................................... 80 Consi0eration; @ali0it" ('###).................................................................................................................. 80 Contract of Option; Elements ('##9)...........................................................................................................81 )ne=istent Contracts vs. 5nn%llable Contracts ('##!)...................................................................................... 81 2at%re of Contracts; Obligatoriness (1991)...................................................................................................81 2at%re of Contracts; .rivit" of Contract (199-).............................................................................................. 82
Easements; 4ig&t of 8a"; 4e$%isites (199-).................................................................................................63 E/ectment %it vs. Cancellation of <itle ('##9)...............................................................................................63 E/ectment %it; Commo0at%m ('##-)..........................................................................................................63 E=tra?7%0icial .artition; ,ra%0 (199#)..........................................................................................................63 Ai00en <reas%re (1999).......................................................................................................................... 64 Ai00en <reas%res (1997).........................................................................................................................64 *ortgage; .act%m Commissori%m (1999).................................................................................................... 64 *ortgage; .act%m Commissori%m ('##1).................................................................................................... 65 *ortgage; 4ig&t of 4e0emption vs. E$%it" of 4e0emption (1999)........................................................................65 2%isance; ,amil" Ao%se; 2ot 2%isance per se ('##-)...................................................................................... 65 2%isance; .%blic 2%isance vs. .rivate 2%isance ('##9)................................................................................... 65 Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip (199')..............................................................................................................66 Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; .rescription ('###)............................................................................................. 66 Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; .rescription ('##')............................................................................................. 67 Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; 4e0emption (199()............................................................................................. 67 Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; 4e0emption ('###)............................................................................................. 67 Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; 4e0emption ('##')............................................................................................. 67 .ossession (1996)................................................................................................................................ 68 .ropert"; 4eal vs. .ersonal .ropert" (1999)................................................................................................. 68 .ropert"; 4eal vs. .ersonal .ropert" (1997)................................................................................................. 68 ower; Boo0 ,ait&D ;a0 ,ait& ('###).......................................................................................................... 69
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!-LI&A$I!'(....................................................................................................................................83 5leator" Contracts; Bambling ('##!)..........................................................................................................83 Con0itional Obligations ('###)................................................................................................................. 83 Con0itional Obligations ('##()................................................................................................................. 83 Con0itional Obligations; .romise (1997)..................................................................................................... 84 Con0itional Obligations; 4esol%tor" Con0ition (1999)..................................................................................... 84 E=ting%is&ment; 5ssignment of 4ig&ts ('##1)...............................................................................................84 E=ting%is&ment; Ca%se of 5ction ('##!)......................................................................................................85 E=ting%is&ment; Compensation ('##')........................................................................................................85 E=ting%is&ment; Compensation vs. .a"ment (1996)........................................................................................85 E=ting%is&ment; CompensationD et?Off; ;an+s (1996)................................................................................. 85 E=ting%is&ment; Con0onation ('###)..........................................................................................................85 E=ting%is&ment; E=traor0inar" )nflation or Deflation ('##1)...............................................................................86 E=ting%is&ment; Loss (199!)..................................................................................................................86 E=ting%is&ment; Loss; )mpossible ervice (199().......................................................................................... 86 E=ting%is&ment; 2ovation (199!).............................................................................................................. 87 E=ting%is&ment; .a"ment (1999).............................................................................................................87 Liabilit"; Lease; 7oint Liabilit" ('##1)..........................................................................................................87 Liabilit"; oli0ar" Liabilit" (1996).............................................................................................................. 87 Liabilit"; oli0ar" Obligation (199')........................................................................................................... 88 Liabilit"; oli0ar" Obligation; *%t%al B%arant" ('##() ..................................................................................... 88 Loss of t&e t&ing 0%e; ,orce *a/e%re ('###) ................................................................................................. 88 2on?.a"ment of 5morti>ations; %b0ivision ;%"er; 8&en /%stifie0 ('##9) .............................................................89 .erio0; %spensive .erio0 (1991)..............................................................................................................89 $"+($................................................................................................................................................89 E=press <r%st; .rescription (1997).............................................................................................................89 )mplie0 <r%st (1996).............................................................................................................................. 90 <r%st; )mplie0 4es%lting <r%st (1999)..........................................................................................................91 (ALE(................................................................................................................................................91 5ssignment of Cre0it vs. %brogation (199()................................................................................................ 91 Con0itional ale vs. 5bsol%te ale (1997).................................................................................................... 91 Contract of ale vs. 5genc" to ell (1999)....................................................................................................91 Contract of ale; *arital Comm%nit" .ropert"; ,ormalities ('##-)....................................................................... 91 Contract to ell ('##1)........................................................................................................................... 92 Contract to ell vs. Contract of ale (1997).................................................................................................. 92 Contract to ell; 5cceptance; 4ig&t of ,irst 4ef%sal (1991)............................................................................... 92 Do%ble ales ('##1).............................................................................................................................. 92 Do%ble ales ('##!).............................................................................................................................. 93 E$%itable *ortgage (1991)......................................................................................................................93 E$%itable *ortgage vs. ale ('##9)............................................................................................................ 93 )mmovable .ropert"; 4escission of Contract ('##()........................................................................................94 *ace0a Law ('###)............................................................................................................................... 94 *ace0a Law; 4ecto Law (1999).................................................................................................................95 Option Contract ('##')...........................................................................................................................95 Option Contract; Earnest *one" (199().................................................................................................... 95 .erfecte0 ale; 5cceptance of Earnest *one" ('##')...................................................................................... 95 4e0emption; Legal; ,ormalities ('##1)........................................................................................................96 4e0emption; Legal; ,ormalities ('##')........................................................................................................96 4ig&t of ,irst 4ef%sal; Lessee; Effect (199-)................................................................................................. 96 4ig&t of ,irst 4ef%sal; Lessee; Effect (1996)................................................................................................. 97 4ig&t of 4ep%rc&ase (199()..................................................................................................................... 97 <ransfer of Owners&ip; 2on?.a"ment of t&e .rice (1991) ..................................................................................97 <ransfer of Owners&ip; 4is+ of Loss (199#)..................................................................................................97 LEA(E................................................................................................................................................97 E=ting%is&ment; <otal Distr%ction; Lease0 .ropert" (199()...............................................................................97 )mplie0 2ew Lease (1999)....................................................................................................................... 98 Lease of 4%ral Lan0s ('###).................................................................................................................... 98
2at%re of Contracts; 4elativit" of Contracts ('##')......................................................................................... 82 4escission of Contracts; .roper .art" (199-)................................................................................................82
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Leasee & Lessor; 4ig&ts an0 Obligations (199#)............................................................................................98 Leasee; Deat& <&ereof; Effects (1997).........................................................................................................98 Option to ;%"; E=pire0 ('##1).................................................................................................................. 98 %blease; Dela" in .a"ment of 4entals (199!)...............................................................................................99 %blease; %blessee; Liabilit" (1999)........................................................................................................100 %blease; %blessee; Liabilit" ('###)........................................................................................................100 %blease; @ali0it"; 5ssignment of %blease (199#)....................................................................................... 100
%blease vs. 5ssignment of Lease; 4escission of Contract ('##9)..................................................................99
C!))!' CA""IE"(....................................................................................................................... 100 E=traor0inar" Diligence ('###)................................................................................................................100 A&E'C*...........................................................................................................................................101 5genc" ('##()....................................................................................................................................101 5genc" vs. ale ('###)......................................................................................................................... 101 5genc"; co%ple0 wit& an interest ('##1).................................................................................................... 101 5genc"; B%arantee Commission ('##!).....................................................................................................101 5genc"; 4eal Estate *ortgage ('##!)........................................................................................................101 5ppointment of %b?5gent (1999)............................................................................................................102 Beneral 5genc" vs. pecial 5genc" (199').................................................................................................102 .owers of t&e 5gent (199!)....................................................................................................................102 <ermination; Effect of Deat& of 5gent (1997)...............................................................................................103 PA"$'E"(.IP................................................................................................................................. 103 Composition of .artners&ips; po%ses; Corporations (199!)...........................................................................103 Conve"ance of a .artnerFs &are Dissol%tion (1996)......................................................................................103 Dissol%tion of .artners&ip (1999)............................................................................................................ 103 Dissol%tion of .artners&ip; <ermination (199()............................................................................................ 104 Effect of Deat& of .artner (1997)..............................................................................................................104 Obligations of a .artner (199')................................................................................................................104 Obligations of a .artner; )n0%strial .artner ('##1)........................................................................................ 104 C!))!#A$+) , )+$++)......................................................................................................................104 Commo0at%m (199()........................................................................................................................... 104 Commo0at%m ('##9)........................................................................................................................... 105 Commo0at%m vs. 3s%fr%ct (1996)............................................................................................................105 *%t%%m vs. Commo0at%m ('##!)............................................................................................................ 106 *%t%%m; )nterests ('##1)...................................................................................................................... 106 *%t%%m; )nterests ('##')...................................................................................................................... 106 *%t%%m; )nterests ('##!)...................................................................................................................... 106 #EP!(I$...........................................................................................................................................107 Compensation; ;an+ Loan (1997)............................................................................................................107 Deposit; E=c&ange (199')......................................................................................................................107 (+"E$*............................................................................................................................................107 4ecover" of Deficienc" (1997)................................................................................................................ 107 A'$IC."E(I(...................................................................................................................................107 5ntic&resis (1999)...............................................................................................................................107 PLE#&E........................................................................................................................................... 108 .le0ge (199!).................................................................................................................................... 108 .le0ge ('##!).................................................................................................................................... 108 .le0ge; *ortgage; 5ntic&resis (199-)....................................................................................................... 108 /+A(I-C!'$"AC$...........................................................................................................................108 1%asi?Contracts; 2egotiori%m Bestio (199')...............................................................................................109 1%asi?Contracts; 2egotiori%m Bestio (199()...............................................................................................109 1%asi?Contracts; 2egotiori%m Bestio (1999)...............................................................................................109 1%asi?Contracts; ol%tio )n0ebiti ('##!).................................................................................................... 110 $!"$( , #A)A&E(.........................................................................................................................110 Collapse of tr%ct%res; Last Clear C&ance (199#)......................................................................................... 110 Damages (199!)................................................................................................................................. 111 Damages arising from Deat& of 3nborn C&il0 (1991)..................................................................................... 111 Damages arising from Deat& of 3nborn C&il0 ('##()..................................................................................... 111 Deat& )n0emnit" (199!).........................................................................................................................111
Page 8 of 119
I'$ELLEC$+AL P"!PE"$*.............................................................................................................118 )ntellect%al Creation ('##!).................................................................................................................... 118
Defense; D%e Diligence in election ('##().................................................................................................112 ,iling of eparate Civil 5ction; 2ee0 for 4eservation ('##()............................................................................ 112 ,ort%ito%s Event; *ec&anical Defects ('##')...............................................................................................112 Liabilit"; 5irline Compan"; 2on?.erformance of an Obligation ('##!) .................................................................112 Liabilit"; 5irline Compan"; 2on?.erformance of an Obligation ('##9) .................................................................113 Liabilit"; Emplo"er; Damage ca%se0 b" Emplo"ees (1997).............................................................................. 113 Liabilit"; owner w&o was in t&e ve&icle (199-)............................................................................................. 114 Liabilit"; owner w&o was in t&e ve&icle (1996)............................................................................................. 114 Liabilit"; owner w&o was in t&e ve&icle ('##')............................................................................................. 114 *oral Damages & 5tt" ,ees ('##')...........................................................................................................114 *oral Damages; 2on?4ecover" <&ereof ('##-)............................................................................................ 115 1%asi?Delict (199')..............................................................................................................................115 1%asi?Delict ('##9)..............................................................................................................................115 1%asi?Delict; 5cts contrar" to morals (199-)...............................................................................................115 1%asi?Delict; *ismanagement of DepositorFs 5cco%nt ('##-)...........................................................................116 @icario%s Liabilit" (1991).......................................................................................................................116 @icario%s Liabilit" ('##1).......................................................................................................................117 @icario%s Liabilit" ('##').......................................................................................................................117 @icario%s Liabilit" ('##!).......................................................................................................................117 @icario%s Liabilit" ('##-).......................................................................................................................117 @icario%s Liabilit"; .%blic 3tilit" ('###)..................................................................................................... 118
Page 9 of 119
SCRA 40 [1986]).
(Arsenal v IAC, 143
&E'E"AL P"I'CIPLE(
Civil law vs. Common Law (1997) How would you compare the Civil Law system in its governance and trend with that of the Common Law system?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
relies on e7uity. Civil Law anchors itself on the letter of the law. 8he civilists are for the /udge6proof law even as the Common Law s /udge6made law. Civil Law /udges are merely supposed to apply laws and not interpret them. Effect of Obiter & Dissenting Opinion; C Decisions (199!) 5. (hat are the !inding effects of an o!iter dictum and a dissenting opinion? 9. How can a decision of the #upreme Court !e set aside?
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE"(:
As regards "governance": Governance in Civil Law is codal, statutory and written law. t is additionally derived from case law. Common law is !asically derived from case law. As regards "trend": Civil law is now tending to rely more and more on decisions of the courts e"plaining the laws. Common law is now codifying laws more and more. #o they are now merging towards similar systems.
Additional Answers:
5. 'one. %!iter dictum and opinions are not necessary to the determination of a case. 8hey are not !inding and
$. C%&&%' LA( refers to the traditional part of the law as distinct from legislation) it refers to the universal part of law as distinct from particular local customs *+ncyclopedia Americana, ,ol. -.. %n the other hand, C , L LA( is understood to !e that !ranch of law governing the relationship of persons in respect of their personal and private interests as distinguished from !oth pu!lic and international laws. n common law countries, the traditional responsi!ility has for the most part !een with the /udges) in civil law countries, the tas0 is primarily reposed on the lawma0ers. Contemporary practices, however, so indicate a trend towards centrali1ing that function to professional groups that may indeed, see the gradual assimilation in time of !oth systems. 2,itug, Civil. Law and 3urisprudence, p. 44. 5. n Civil Law, the statutes theoretically ta0e precedence over court decisions interpreting them) while in Common Law, the court decisions resolving specific cases are regarded as law rather than the statutes themselves which are, at the start, merely em!odiments of case law. Civil Law is code law or written law, while Common Law is case law. Civil Law adopts the deductive method 6 from the general to the particular, while the Common Law uses the inductive approach 6 from the particular to the general. Common Law
cannot have the force of official precedents. t is as if the Court were turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral su!/ects: a dissenting opinion affirms or overrules a claim, right or o!ligation. t neither disposes nor awards anything it merely e"presses the view of the dissenter. *Civil Code, :aras; 9. A decision of a division of the #upreme Court may!e set aside !y the #upreme Court sitting en !anc, a #upreme Court decision may !e set aside !y a contrary ruling of the #upreme Court itself or !y a corrective legislative act of Congress, although said laws cannot adversely affect those favored prior to the #upreme Court decision. 2Civil Code, :aras.. Effectivit" of Laws (199#) After a devastating storm causing widespread destruction in four Central Lu1on provinces, the e"ecutive and legislative !ranches of the government agreed to enact a special law appropriating :$ !illion for purposes of relief and reha!ilitation for the provinces. n view of the urgent nature of the legislative enactment, it is provided in its effectivity clause that it shall ta0e effect upon approval and after completion of pu!lication in the %fficial Ga1ette and a newspaper of general circulation in the :hilippines. 8he law was passed !y the Congress on 3uly $, $<<=. signed into law !y the :resident on 3uly 9, $<<=, and pu!lished in such newspaper of general circulation on 3uly -, $<<= and in the %fficial Ga1ette on 3uly $=, $<<=. *a. As to the pu!lication of said legislative enactment, is there sufficient o!servance or compliance with the re7uirements for a valid pu!lication? +"plain your answer. *!. (hen did the law ta0e effect? +"plain your answer. *c. Can the e"ecutive !ranch start releasing and dis!ursing funds appropriated !y the said law the day following its approval? +"plain your answer.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
approved !y Congress on 3uly $, $<<= and approved !y the :resident on 3uly 9, $<<=. 8he other re7uisites for its effectivity were not yet complete at the time. E$%it" follows t&e Law ('##() t is said that ?e7uity follows the law@ (hat do you understand !y this phrase, and what are its !asic implications? AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
?+7uity Collows the law@ means that courts e"ercising e7uity /urisdiction are !ound !y rules of law and have no ar!itrary discretion to disregard them.
+7uity is applied only in the a!sence of
:age 10 of
$$<
*a. >es, there is sufficient compliance. 8he law itself prescri!es the re7uisites of pu!lication for its effectivity, and all re7uisites have !een complied with. *Article 5, Civil Code. *!. 8he law ta0es effect upon compliance with all the conditions for effectivity, and the last condition was complied with on 3uly $=, $<<=. Hence, the" law !ecame effective on that date. *c. 'o. t was not yet effective when it was
CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics (Year 1990-2006) !ut never against statutory law. (Toyota Motor $. 8he civil action involves an issue similar or intimately !"l. # CA
$16 SCRA $36 [199$]).
)gnorance of t&e Law vs. *ista+e of ,act (199-) s there any difference in their legal effect !etween ignorance of the law and ignorance or mista0e of fact?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
related to the issue raised in the criminal action, and 5. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
*c.
>es, there is a difference. (hile ignorance of the law is not an e"cuse for not complying with it, ignorance of fact eliminates criminal intent as long as there is no negligence *Art, 'CC.. n addition, mista0e on a dou!tful or difficult
7uestion of law may !e the !asis of good faith *Art. A5G.
8he criminal case must !e suspended. 8hus, in a criminal
Conse7uences
case for damages to oneDs property, a civil action that involves the ownership of said property should first !e
resolved *Ee Leon vs. &a!anag. 9F :hil. 5=5.
'CC.. &ista0e of fact may, furthermore, vitiate consent in a

contract and ma0e it voida!le *Art. $9<=. 'CC..
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
PE"(!'(
C&ange of .ame; /n0er 12 9#!3 ('##-) Hir"thoussous delos #antos filed a petition for change of
>es. ignorance of the law differs in legal effect from gnorance or mista0e of fact. 8he former does not e"cuse a party from the legal conse7uences of his conduct while the
latter does constitute an e"cuse and is a legal defense.
name with the %ffice of the Civil Iegistrar of &andaluyong

City under the administrative proceeding provided in
)nferior Co%rts Decisions (199!) Are decisions of the Court of Appeals considered laws?
Iepu!lic Act 'o. <=JF. He alleged that his first name sounds ridiculous and is e"tremely difficult to spell and
pronounce. After complying with the re7uirements of the
law, the Civil Iegistrar granted his petition and changed his
first name Hir"thoussous to "3esus." His full name now
a. serve as precedents for inferior courts on points of law not covered !y any #upreme Court decision, and a ruling of the Court of Appeals may !ecome a (M"ran%a doctrine. vs..
$.
I&'er"al (( !"l. 1066).
'o, !ut decisions of the Court of Appeals may
reads "3esus delos #antos." 3esus delos #antos moved to General #antos City to wor0 in a multi6national company. 8here, he fell in love and married
!. 'o. Eecisions of the Court of Appeals merely have persuasive, and therefore no mandatory effect. However, a conclusion or pronouncement which covers a point of law still undecided may still serve as /udicial guide and it is
possi!le that the same may!e raised to the status of
&ary Grace delos #antos. #he re7uested him to have his
first name changed !ecause his new name "3esus delos #antos" is the same name as that of her father who
a!andoned her family and !ecame a notorious drug lord.
doctrine. f after it has !een su!/ected to test in the cruci!le of analysis, the #upreme Court should find that it has merits
change his first name to "Io!erto." He claimed that the
#he wanted to forget him. Hence, 3esus filed another petition with the %ffice of the Local Civil Iegistrar to change is warranted !ecause it will eradicate all vestiges of the infamy of &ary GraceDs father.
and 7ualities sufficient for its consideration as a rule of /urisprudence *Civil Code, :aras.. 4re5%0icial 6%estions (1997)
)"ll t!e 'et"t"on *or +!an,e o* na&e o* -es.s %elos Santos to Ro/erto %elos Santos .n%er Re'./l"+ A+t 0o. 9048 'ros'er1 23'la"n. (104)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n the conte"t that the term is used in Civil Law, state the
*a. concept, *!. re7uisites and *c. conse7uences of a pre/udicial 7uestion.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, under the law, 3esus may only change his name once. n addition, the petition for change
of name may !e denied on the following grounds: 3esus is neither ridiculous, nor tainted *$. with dishonor
*a. Concept
A pre/udicial 7uestion is one which must !e decided first
!efore a criminal action may !e instituted or may proceed
!ecause a decision therein is vital to the /udgment in the criminal case. n the case of eo'le vs. A%elo
Ara,on (56 7930, 8e/. 1(, 1974), the #upreme Court
the use of the registered first name or nic0name of the petitioner. *9. 8he petition involves the same entry in the same docu6 under this %rder 2Iules and Iegulations mplementing
IA <=JF;.
*5. 8here is no confusion to !e avoided or created with
nor e"tremely difficult to write or pronounce.
ment, which was previously corrected or changed
defined it as one
which arises in a case, the resolution of which 7uestion is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said case and the
cogni1ance of which pertains to another tri!unal *:aras, ,ol. $, Civil. Code Annotation, $<F< ed. p, $<J..
)!at entr"es "n t!e C"v"l Re,"stry &ay /e +!an,e% or

+orre+te% 9"t!o.t a :.%"+"al or%er1 ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*!. Ie7uisites $. 8he pre/udicial 7uestion must !e determinative of the 5. 3urisdiction to try said 7uestion must
another tri!unal.
A##I$I!'AL A'(WE":
case !efore the court.
errors and first or nic0 names may !e changed or corrected without a /udicial order under IA <=JF.
%nly clerical or typographical
!e lodged in
Clerical or typographical errors refer to mista0es committed in the performance of clerical wor0 in writing, copying, transcri!ing or typing an entry in the civil register. 8he
mista0e is harmless and innocuous, such as errors in
Page 11 of 119
spelling, visi!le to the eyes or o!vious to the understanding, and can !e corrected or changed only !y reference to other e"isting records. :rovided, however, that no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or se" of
the petitioner.
a!solute community amounting to $ &illion :esos.
His
wife, will, therefore, inherit %.5A &illion :esos and his

parents will inherit =.5A &illion :esos.
(hen &rs. Cru1 died, she was succeeded !y her parents as

her intestate heirs. 8hey will inherit all of her estate community and her =.5A &illion inheritance from her
consisting of her =.A &illion half share in the a!solute

Deat&; Effects; im%ltaneo%s Deat& (1993)
3aime, who is GA, and his son, (illy, who is 5A, died in a
hus!and, or a total of =.-A= &illion :esos. n sum, the parents of &r. Cru1 will inherit 5A=,=== :esos while the parents of &rs. Cru1 will inherit -A=,=== :esos. *!. a!sence of proof as to the time of death of each of the spouses, it is presumed they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other is deemed to have ta0en place. 8herefore, each of them is deemed to have an estate valued at :A==,===,==, or one6half of their con/ugal property of
:$ million. 8his !eing a case of succession, in the
plane crash. 8here is no proof as to who died first. 3aimeDs

only surviving heir is his wife, 3ulia, who is also (illyDs
mother. (illyDs surviving heirs are his mother, 3ulia and his
wife, (ilma.
$.
n the settlement of 3aimeDs estate, can (ilma
successfully claim that her late hus!and, (illy had a
hereditary share since he was much younger than his father

and, therefore, should !e presumed to have survived longer? 29B;
5. #uppose 3aime had a life insurance policy with his wife, 3ulia, and his son, (illy, as the Can !eneficiaries. (ilma successfully claim that one6half of the proceeds should
!elong to (illyDs estate? K5B3
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
entire :$ &illion in e7ual shares, of :A==,===.== per set of parents.

Deat&; Effects; im%ltaneo%s Deat& ('###)
8heir respective parents will thus inherit the
$. 'o, (ilma cannot successfully claim that (illy had a hereditary share in his fatherDs estate. Lnder Art. J9, Civil
Code, two persons "who are called to succeed each other" are presumed to have died at the same time, in the a!sence
of proof as to which of them died first. 8his presumption of simultaneous death applies in cases involving the 7uestion
!. Cristy and her late hus!and Luis had two children, Iose and :atric0, %ne summer, her mother6in6law, aged -=, too0 the two children, then aged $= and $5, with her on a !oat
trip to Ce!u. Lnfortunately, the vessel san0 en route, and the !odies of the three were never found. 'one of the
of succession as !etween the two who died, who in this case

are mutual heirs, !eing father and son.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
5. >et, (ilma can invo0e the presumption of survivorship
and claim that one6half of the proceeds should !elong to
survivors ever saw them on the water. %n the settlement of her mother6in6lawDs estate, Cristy files a claim for a share of her estate on the ground that the same was inherited !y her children from their grandmother in representation of their father, and she inherited the same from them. (ill her
action prosper? *5B.
(illyDs estate, under #ec. 9 *//. par. A Iule $9$, Iules of Court, as the dispute does not involve succession. Lnder
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
this presumption, the person !etween the ages of $A and G= years is deemed to have survived one whose age was over G= at the time of their deaths. 8he estate of (illy endowed with /uridical personality stands in place and stead of (illy,
as !eneficiary.
'o, her action will not prosper. #ince there was no proof as to who died first, all the three are deemed to have died at the same time and there was no transmission of rights from one to another, applying Article J9 of the 'ew Civil Code.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
'o, her action will not prosper. Lnder Article J9 of the
'ew Civil Code, inasmuch as there is no proof as to who

Deat&; Effects; im%ltaneo%s Deat& (1999) &r. and &rs. Cru1, who are childless, met with a serious died first, all the three are presumed to have died at the same time and there could !e no transmission of rights
motor vehicle accident with &r. Cru1 at the wheel and &rs. Cru1 seated !eside him, resulting in the instant death of &r. Cru1. &rs. Cru1 was still alive when help came !ut she also died on the way to the hospital. 8he couple ac7uired properties worth %ne &illion *:$ ,===,===.==. :esos during
their marriage, which are !eing claimed !y the parents of
!oth spouses in e7ual shares. s the claim of !oth sets of
among them. Her children not having inherited from their grandmother. Cristy has no right to share in her mother6in6 lawDs estate. #he cannot share in her own right as she is not a legal heir of her mother6in6law. 8he survivorship provision of Iule $9$ of the Iules of Court does not apply
to the pro!lem. t applies only to those cases where the
issue involved is not succession.

7%ri0ical Capacit" vs. Capacit" to 2ct (199-) Eistinguish /uridical capacity from capacity to act,
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
parents valid and why? *9B.
Cru1 were already dead when help came, so that no6!ody
*!. #uppose in the preceding 7uestion, !oth &r. and &rs.
could say who died ahead of the other, would your answer
!e the same to the 7uestion as to who are entitled to the
properties of the deceased couple? *5B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a. 'o, the claim of !oth parents is not valid. (hen &r.
Cru1 died, he was succeeded !y his wife and his parents as

his intestate heirs who will share his estate e7ually.
estate was =.A &illion pesos which is his half share in the
3LI E CAL CA:AC 8> is the fitness to !e the su!/ect of legal relations while CA:AC 8> 8% AC8 is the power or to do acts with legal effect. 8he former is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death while the latter is merely ac7uired and may !e lost even !efore death *Art. 9-, 'CC..
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE"0
His
Page 12 of 119
3uridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act: *a. the former is passive while the latter is active, *!. the former is inherent in a person while the latter is merely ac7uired, *c. the former is lost only through death while the latter may !e lost through death or restricted !y causes other than death,
and d. the former can e"ist without capacity to act while
conditions detrimental to the moral well6 !eing of their

children acting in the movies is in violation of the Camily Code and La!or laws. 8hus, the waiver is invalid and not
!inding.
8he Child La!or Law is a mandatory and prohi!itory law
the latter cannot e"ist without /uridical capacity.

7%ri0ical Capacit"; .at%ral 4ersons (1999)
and the rights of the child cannot !e waived as it is contrary to law and pu!lic policy.
+lated that her sister who had !een married for five years was pregnant for the first time, Alma donated :$==,===.== to the un!orn child. Lnfortunately, the !a!y died one hour
C!' LIC$ ! LAW(
after delivery. &ay Alma recover the :$==.===.== that she had donated to said !a!y !efore it was !orn considering
that the !a!y died? #tated otherwise, is the donation valid

and !inding? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he donation is valid and !inding, !eing an act favora!le to the un!orn child, !ut only if the !a!y had an intra6uterine life of not less than seven months and pro6vided there was due acceptance of the donation !y the proper person representing said child. f the child had less than seven months of intra6uterine life, it is not deemed !orn since it died less than 5J hours following its delivery, in which ease the donation never !ecame effective since the donee never
!ecame a person, !irth !eing determinative of personality.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
2ppilicable Laws; laws governing contracts (199') 4 and > entered into a contract in Australia, where!y it was agreed that 4 would !uild a commercial !uilding for > in the :hilippines, and in payment for the construction, > will
transfer and convey his cattle ranch located in the Lnited #tates in favor of 4.
(hat law would govern: a. 8he validity of the contract? !. 8he performance of the contract? c. 8he consideration of the contract?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a. 8he validity of the contract will !e governed !y the ma0ing of the contract in this case.
Australian law, !ecause the validity refers to the element of

*%ptional Addendum:"... unless the parties agreed to !e !ound !y another law".M
+ven if the !a!y had an intra6uterine life of more than seven months and the donation was properly accepted, it would !e void for not having conformed with the proper
form. n order to !e valid, the donation and acceptance of personal property e"ceeding five thousand pesos should !e
in writing. *Article -JF, par. 9.
law of the *!. :hilippines where the contract is to !e performed. *c. 8he consideration will !e governed !y the law of the
8he performance will !e governed !y the
8aiver of 1ig&ts ('##!)

N. E%', an American !usinessman, secured parental
Lnited #tates where the ranch is located.
*%ptional Addendum: n the foregoing cases, when the
consent for the employment of five minors to play certain
roles in two movies he was producing at home in &a0ati.
foreign law would apply, the a!sence of proof of that foreign law would render :hilippine law applica!le
8hey wor0ed at odd hours of the day and night, !ut always accompanied !y parents or other adults. 8he producer paid
the children talent fees at rates !etter than adult wages.
under the "eclectic theory"..
2pplicable Laws; 2rts 19: 1- & 17 (1993)

3uan is a Cilipino citi1en residing in 8o0yo, 3apan. #tate
Nut a social wor0er, E+N, reported to %#(E that these children often missed going to 8hey school. sometimes dran0 wine, aside from !eing e"posed n to drugs. some
scenes, they were filmed na0ed or in revealing costumes. n his defense, E%' contended all these were part of artistic freedom and cultural 'on of creativity. e the parents complained, said E%'. He also said they signed a contract
containing a waiver of their right to file any complaint in
what laws govern: $. His capacity to contract marriage in 3apan, 2 $B; 5. His successional rights as regards his deceased Cilipino fatherDs property in 8e"as, L.#.A. 2$B; 9. 8he e"trinsic last will and validity of the testament
which 3uan e"ecuted while so/ourning in #wit1erland.
25B; J. 8he intrinsic validity of said will. *$B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
any office or tri!unal concerning the wor0ing conditions of

their children acting in the movies.
s the waiver valid and !inding? (hy or why not? *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
+"plain.
3uanD capac contra marriag is $. s ity ct to e governed !y :hilippine i.e., the Camily Code law 6 6pursuant to Art.
$A, Civil Code, which provides that our laws relating to, among others, legal capacity of persons are !inding upon
8he waiver is not valid. Although the contracting parties may esta!lish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
citi1ens of the :hilippines even though living a!road.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
conditions as they may deem convenient, they may not do so if such are contrary to law, morals, good customs, pu!lic order, or pu!lic policy *Article $9=G, Civil Code.. 8he parentsD waiver to file a complaint concerning the wor0ing
5.
Ny way of e"ception to the general rule of le" rei sitae
prescri!ed !y the first paragraph of Art. $G. Civil Code, a personDs successional rights are governed !y the national law of the decedent *5nd par.. Art. $G.. #ince 3uanDs deceased
Page 13 of 119
CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics (Year 19902006) father was a Cilipino citi1en, :hilippine law governs
3uanDs successional rights.

A'!$.E" A'(WE":
5. 3uanDs successional rights are governed !y :hilippine law, pursuant to Article $=9< and the second paragraph of Article $G, !oth of the Civil Code. Article $=9<, Civil Code, provides that capacity to succeed shall !e governed !y the
"law of the nation" of the decedent, i.e.. his national law. Article $G provides in paragraph two that the amount of successional rights, order of succession, and intrinsic validity of testamentary succession shall !e governed !y the
*5.. (ith respect to Celipe the divorce is valid, !ut with respect to Celisa it is not. 8he divorce will not capacitate Celisa to remarry !ecause she and Celipe were !oth Cilipinos at the time of their marriage. However, in E%3 %pinion
'o. $9J series of $<<9, Celisa is allowed to remarry !ecause the in/ustice sought to !e corrected !y Article 5G also
o!tains in her case.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
N.
8he foreigner who e"ecutes his will in the

8he Law of the country of which he is a
:hilippines may o!served the formalities descri!ed in:
"national law" of the decedent who is identified as a Cilipino

in the present pro!lem.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. citi1en under Article F$- of the 'ew Civil Code, or
8he e"trinsic validity of 3uanDs will is 9. governed !y *a. #wiss law, it !eing the law where the will was made *Art. $-.
$st par. Civil Code., or *!. :hilippine law, !y implication from the provisions of Art. F$G, Civil Code, which allows
even an alien who is a!road to ma0e a will in conformity
5. the place of e"ecution under Article $- of the 'ew Civil Code.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
the law of the :hilippines !eing the law of
:hilippine law will not govern the intrinsic C. validity of the will. Article $G of the 'ew Civil Code provides that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall !e
governed !y the 'ational Law of the person whose
with our Civil Code.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
succession is under consideration. California law will govern 8he intrinsic validity of his will is J. governed !y :hilippine law, it !eing his national law. *Art. $G, Civil
Code. the intrinsic validity of the will.
2pplicable Laws; Capacit" to 2ct (1993)
2pplicable Laws; 2rts 19: 1-: 17 ('##') Celipe and Celisa, !oth Cilipino citi1ens, were married in
&alolos, Nulacan on 3une $, $<A=. n $<G= Celipe went to the Lnited #tates, !ecoming a L.#. citi1en in $<-A. n $<F= they o!tained a divorce from Celisa, who was duly notified of the proceedings. 8he divorce decree !ecame final under
California Law. Coming !ac0 to the :hilippines in $<F5,
Crancis Al!ert, a citi1en and resident of 'ew 3ersey, L.#.A., under whose law he was still a minor, !eing only 5= years of age, was hired !y ANC Corporation of &anila to serve for two years as its chief computer programmer. Nut after serving for only four months, he resigned to /oin 4>H
Corporation, which offering more enticed him !y
advantageous terms. His first employer sues him in &anila for damages arising from the !reach of his contract of
Celipe married #agundina, a Cilipino Citi1en. n 5==$, Cilipe, then domiciled in Los Angeles, California, died, leaving one child !y Celisa, and another one !y #agundina. He left a will which he left his estate to #agundina and his two children
and nothing to Celisa. #agundina files a petition for the pro!ate of CelipeOs will.
Celisa 7uestions the intrinsic validity of the will, arguing that her marriage to Celipe su!sisted despite the divorce o!tained !y Celipe !ecause said divorce is not recogni1ed in
employment. He sets up his minority as a defense and as0s for annulment of the contract on that ground. 8he plaintiff disputes this !y alleging that since the contract was e"ecuted in the :hilippines under whose law the age of ma/ority is $F years, he was no longer a minor at the time of perfection of the contract. (ill the suit prosper? $. 29B;
5. #uppose 4>H Corporation is impleaded as a co6 defendant, what would !e the !asis of its lia!ility, if any?
the :hilippines. Cor this reason, she claims that the properties and that #agundina has no successional rights. A. the divorce secured !y Celipe in California s recogni1a!le and valid in the :hilippines? How does it affect CelipeOs marriage to Celisa? +"plain. *5B.. N. (hat law governs the formalities of the will? +"plain. C. (ill :hilippine law govern the intrinsic validity will? +"plain. *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
25B;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. 8he suit will not prosper under Article $A, Civil Code, 'ew 3ersey law governs Crancis Al!ertDs capacity to act,
!eing his personal law from the standpoint of !oth his nationality and his domicile. He was, therefore, a minor at
the time he entered into the contract.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
*$B.
of the
$. 8he suit will not prosper. Neing a L.#. national, Al!ertDs capacity to enter into a contract is determined !y the law of the #tate of which he is a national, under which he to still a
minor. 8his is in connection with Article $A of the Civil Code which em!odies the said nationality principle of le" patriae. (hile this principle intended to apply to Cilipino
*$.. 8he divorce secured !y Celipe in A. California is recogni1a!le and valid in the :hilippines !ecause he was no
longer a Cilipino at that time he secured it, Aliens may o!tain divorces a!road which may !e recogni1ed in the :hilippines provided that they are valid according to their national law *,an Eorn ,. Iomillo, 3r., $9< #CIA $9< 2$<FA;) Puita v. Court of Appeals, 9== #CIA J=G 2$<<F;) Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 9JA #CIA A<A 25===; ..
citi1ens under that provision, the #upreme Court in Iecto v.
Harden is of the view that the status or capacity of foreigners is to !e determined on the !asis of the same
provision or principle, i.e., !y L.#. law in the present pro!lem.
Page 14 of 119
persons is governed !y the law of his nationality, capacity
:laintiffs argument does not hold true, !ecause status or
capacity is not determined !y le" loci contractus !ut !y le"

patriae.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
concerning transactions involving property is an e"ception.

Lnder Article $G of the 'CC the capacity of persons in transactions involving title to property is governed !y the
$ Article $- of the Civil Code provides that the . forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other pu!lic instruments shall !e governed !y the laws of the country in
which they are e"ecuted.
law of the where the property is #inc country situated. e the property is in the :hilippines, :hilippine law governs the
capacity of the seller.
#ince the contract of employment was e"ecuted in &anila, :hilippine law should govern. Neing over $F years old and
no longer a minor according to :hilippine Law, Crancis Al!ert can !e sued. 8hus, the suit of ANC Corporation against him for damages will prosper.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
2pplicable Laws; capacit" to s%ccee0 (1991) 3aco!, a #wiss national, married Lourdes, a Cilipina, in Nerne, #wit1erland. 8hree years later, the couple decided to
reside in the :hilippines. 3aco! su!se7uently ac7uired
5 4>H Corporation, having enticed Crancis . Al!ert to !rea0 his contract with the plaintiff, may !e held lia!le for
damages under Art. $9$J, Civil Code.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
several properties in the :hilippines with the money he inherited from his parents. Corty years later. 3aco! died intestate, and is survived !y several legitimate children and duly recogni1ed illegitimate daughter 3ane, all residing in the :hilippines. *a. illegitimate children to inherit, can 3ane, who is a recogni1ed illegitimate :hilippine law?
#uppose that #wiss law does not allow
5. 8he !asis of lia!ility of 4>H Corporation would !e

Article 5F of the Civil Code which states that:
child properti 3aco unde , inherit part of the es of ! r *!. Assuming that 3aco! e"ecuted a will leaving certain
"Lnfair competition in agricultural, commercial, or industrial enterprises or in la!or through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other un/ust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise
to a right of action !y the person who there!y suffers
properties to 3ane as her legitime in accordance with the law of succession in the :hilippines, will such testamentary disposition !e valid?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
damage ."
A. >es. As stated in the pro!lem. #wiss law does not allow the property of 3aco! under :hilippine law.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
illegitimate children to inherit Hence, 3ane cannot inherit
5. 'o lia!ility arises. 8he statement of the pro!lem does not in any way suggest intent, malice, or even 0nowledge, on the
!etween Al!ert and ANC Corporation.
part of 4>H Corporation as to the contractual relations
N. 8he testamentary disposition will not !e valid if it would valid. Lnless the #wiss law is proved, it would !e presumed to !e the same as that of :hilippine law under the Doctrine of
contravene #will law) otherwise, the disposition would !e
2pplicable Laws; Capacit" to ;%" Lan0 (1999)
9. (hat law governs the capacity of the Cilipino to !uy the
land? +"plain your answer and give its legal !asis.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Processual Presumption.
:hilippine law governs the capacity of the Cilipino to !uy
the land. n addition to the principle of le" rei sitae given
a!ove. Article $A of the 'CC specifically provides that :hilippine laws relating to legal capacity of persons are
!inding upon citi1ens of the :hilippines no matter where they are.
2pplicable Laws; contracts contrar" to p%blic polic" (199-) Alma was hired as a domestic helper in Hong0ong !y the Eragon #ervices, Ltd., through its local agent. #he e"ecuted a standard employment contract designed !y the :hilippine %verseas (or0ers Administration *:%+A. for overseas year at a salary of L#Q$,===.== a month. t was su!mitted to and approved !y the :%+A. However, when she arrived in Hong0ong, she was as0ed to sign another contract !y Eragon #ervices, Ltd. which reduced her salary to only L#QG==.== a month. Having no other choice, Alma signed the contract !ut when she returned to the :hilippines, she demanded payment of the salary differential of L#QJ==.== a month. Noth Eragon #ervices, Ltd. and its local agent claimed that the second contract is valid under the laws of Hong0ong, and therefore !inding on Alma. s their claim correct? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Cilipino wor0ers. t provided for her employment for one
2pplicable Laws; Capacit" to Contract (1999)
5. (hat law governs the capacity of the 3apanese to sell the

land? +"plain your answer and give its legal !asis.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
3apanese law governs the capacity of the 3apanese to sell the land !eing his personal law on the !asis of an interpretation
of Art. $A, 'CC.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE"(0
a. #ince capacity to contract is governed !y the personal
law of an individual, the 3apanese sellerDs capacity should !e governed either !y his national law *3apanese law. or !y the law of his domicile, depending upon whether 3apan follows the nationality or domiciliary theory of personal law for its
citi1ens.
!. :hilippine law governs the capacity of the 3apanese owner in selling the land. (hile as a general rule capacity of
8heir claim is not correct. A contract is the law !etween the parties !ut the law can disregard the contract if it is contrary to pu!lic policy. 8he provisions of the $<FConstitution on the protection of la!or and on social /ustice *#ec. $=. Art . application of Hong0ong law in this case is in violation of
em!ody a pu!lic policy of the :hilippines. #ince the
Page 15 of 119
CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics (Year 1990-2006) Co.rt o* A''eals (;.R 0o. 104$37, 0ov. that pu!lic policy, the application shall !e 10, 1993) the disregarded !y
our Courts. *Cadalin v. :%+A. 59F #CIA -G5.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE"(0
a. 8heir claim is not correct. Assuming that the second
#upreme Court applied :hilippine law in recovery of damages for !reach of contract of carriage for the reason
contract is !inding under Hong0ong law, such second contract is invalid under :hilippine law which recogni1es as valid only the first contract. #ince the case is !eing litigated
that it is the law of the place where the contract was e"ecuted.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
in the :hilippines, the :hilippine Court as the forum will not enforce any foreign claim o!no"ious to the forumDs
f the violation of the contract was attended with !ad faith, there is a ground to recover moral damages. Nut since there was a federal regulation which was the !asis of the act
complained of, the airline cannot !e in !ad faith. Hence,
pu!lic policy.
8here is a strong pu!lic policy enshrined in our Constitution on the protection of 8herefor e, la!or. the second contract shall !e disregarded and the first
contract will !e enforced. (Ca%al"n v. <2A, $38 SCRA (6$).
only actual damages can !e recovered. 8he same is true with regards to e"emplary damages. 2pplicable Laws; Labor Contracts (1991)
!. 'o, their claim is not correct. 8he second contract e"ecuted in Hong0ong, parta0es of the nature of a waiver
A. 8he 3apan Air Lines *3AL., a foreigner corporation
that is contrary to :hilippine law and the pu!lic policy governing Cilipino overseas Art. wor0ers. $-, provides that our prohi!itive laws concerning persons, their acts, or their property or which have for their o!/ect pu!lic order, pu!lic policy and good customs shall not !e rendered ineffective !y laws or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Nesides, AlmaDs consent to the second contract was vitiated !y undue influence, !eing virtually helpless and under financial distress in a foreign country, as indicated !y
the given fact that she signed !ecause she had no choice. 8herefore, the defendants claim that the contract is valid under Hong0ong law should !e re/ected since under the DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION a
licensed to do !usiness in the :hilippines, e"ecuted in &anila a contract of employment with &aritess Guapa
under which the latter was hired as a stewardess on the aircraft flying the &anila63apan6&anila route. 8he contrast specifically provides that *$. the duration of the contract shall !e two *5. years, *5. notwithstanding the a!ove
duration, 3AL may terminate the agreement at any time !y giving her notice in writing ten *$=. days in advance, and *9.
the contract shall !e construed as governed under and !y
the laws of 3apan and only the court in 8o0yo, 3apan shall have the /urisdiction to consider any matter arising from or relating to the contract.
3AL dismissed &aritess on the fourth month of her employment without giving her due notice. &aritess then
foreign law is deemed similar or identical to :hilippine law
in the a!sence of proof to the contrary, and such is not mentioned in the pro!lem as having !een adduced. 2pplicable Laws; Contracts of Carriage (1999)
filed a complaint with the La!or Ar!iter for reinstatement, !ac0wages and damages. 8he lawyer of 3AL contends that neither the La!or Ar!iter nor any other agency or court in
%n F Eecem!er $<<$ ,anessa purchased from the &anila

office of +uro6Aire an airline tic0et for its Clight 'o. -$=
from Eallas to Chicago on $G 3anuary $<<5. Her flight reservation was confirmed. %n her scheduled departure ,anessa chec0ed in on time at the Eallas airport. However,
at the chec06in counter she discovered that she was
the :hilippines has /urisdiction over the case in view of the a!ove provision *9. of the contract which &aritess voluntarily signed. 8he contract is the law !etween her and
3AL.
Eecide the issue. N. (here under a #tateDs own conflicts rule that domestic former nevertheless refuse to apply the latter? f so, under what circumstance?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
waitlisted with some other passengers !ecause of intentional

over!oo0ing, a +uro6Aire policy and practice. +uro6Alre
law of another #tate should apply, may the courts of the
admitted that ,anessa was not advised of such policy when she purchased her plane tic0et. ,anessa was only a!le to fly two days later !y ta0ing another airline.
,anessa sued +uro6Aire in &anila for !reach of contract and damages. +uro6Aire claimed that it cannot !e held lia!le
A, La!or Legislations are generally intended as e"pressions

of pu!lic policy on employer6employee relations. 8he
for damages !ecause its practice of over!oo0ing passengers was allowed !y the L.#. Code of Cederal Iegulations.
contract therefore, !etween 3apan Air Lines *3AL. and &aritess may apply only to the e"tent that its provisions are not inconsistent with :hilippine la!or laws intended
particularly to protect employees.
,anessa on the other hand contended that assuming that the L.#. Code of Cederal Iegulations allowed ntentional over!oo0ing, the airline company cannot invo0e the L.#. Code on the ground that the tic0et was purchased in &anila, hence, :hilippine law should apply, under which ,anessa can recover damages for !reach of contract of carriage. Eecide. Eiscuss fully.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Lnder the circumstances, the dismissal of &aritess without complying with :hilippine La!or law would !e invalid and any stipulation in the contract to the contrary is considered void. #ince the law of the forum in this case is the :hilippine law the issues should6!e resolved in accordance with :hilippine law.
N. 8he third paragraph of Art. $- of the Civil Code provides
,anessa can recover damages under :hilippine law for !reach of contract of carriage, :hilippine law should govern as the law of the place where the plane tic0ets were !ought
=ala&ea v.
and the contract of carriage was e"ecuted. n
that:
Page 16 of 119
order, pu!lic policy and good customs shall not !e rendered ineffective !y laws or /udgments promulgated,
":rohi!itive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their o!/ect pu!lic
&aris then returned to the :hilippines and in a civil
ceremony cele!rated in Ce!u City according to the

formalities of :hilippine law, she married her former
or !y determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
classmate ,incent li0ewise a Cilipino citi1en.
foreign country." Accordingly, a stateDs own conflict of laws rule may, e"ceptionally !e inapplica!le, given pu!lic policy considerations !y the law of the forum. Going into the specific provisions of the contract in 7uestion, would rule as follows: $. 8he duration of the contract is opposed :hilippine law and it can therefore valid stipulated) not to !e as
a. (as the marriage of &aris and 3ohnson valid when cele!rated? s their marriage still validly e"isting now?
Ieason s.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
the country where they are solemni1ed *3apan., and valid
*a. 8he marriage of &ans and 3ohnson was valid when cele!rated !ecause all marriages solemni1ed outside the :hilippines *8o0yo. in accordance with the laws in force in there as such, are also valid in the :hilippines.
8heir marriage no longer validly su!sists, !ecause it has !een dissolved !y the a!solute divorce validly o!tained !y
3ohnson which capacitated &aris to remarry *Art. 5G.
5.
8he
second
notwithstanding duration, 3apan Air Lines *3AL. may with our La!or laws)
provision to effect
the that
Camily Code..
terminate her employment is invalid, !eing inconsistent
2pplicable Laws; laws governing marriages ('##()

Gene and 3ane, Cilipino, met and got married in +ngland
8hat the contract shall !e construed as governed under and !y the laws of 3apan and only the courts of 8o0yo,
3apan shall have /urisdiction, is invalid as clearly opposed to the aforecited third paragraph of Arts. $and $-== of the Civil Code, which provides:
9.
while !oth were ta0ing up post6graduate courses there. A few years after their graduation, they decided to annul their
marriage. 3ane filed an action to annul her marriage to
"Art. $-==. 8he relations !etween capital and la!or are not merely contractual. 8hey are so impressed with pu!lic interest that la!or contracts must yield
to the common good. 8herefore, such contracts are su!/ect to the special laws on la!or unions, collective !argaining, stri0es and loc0outs, closed shop, wages, wor0ing conditions, hours of la!or
Gene in +ngland on the ground of latterOs sterility, a ground for annulment of marriage in +ngland. 8he +nglish court decree Ieturnin marriag annulle th d the e d. g to e
:hilippines, Gene as0ed you whether or not he would !e
free to marry his former girlfriend. advice !e? AB

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
(hat would your legal
and similar su!/ects."
'o, Gene is not free to marry his former Hi girlfriend. s marriage to 3ane is valid according to the forms and
solemnities of Nritish law, is valid here *Article $-, $st par.,

'CC.. However, since Gene and 3ane are still Cilipinos
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE"0
A. (hen a contract has a foreign element such as in the
factual setting stated in the pro!lem where one of the sustained as valid particularly the stipulation e"pressing that the contract is governed !y the laws of the foreign country. Given this generally accepted principle of international law, the contract !etween &aritess and 3AL is valid and it should
therefore !e enforced.
parties is a foreign corporation, the contract can !e
sterility is not one of the grounds for the annulment of a
although living in +ngland, the dissolution of their marriage is still governed !y :hilippine law *Article $A, 'CC.. #ince,
marriage under Article JA of the Camily Code, the annulment of GeneOs marriage to 3ane on that ground is not valid in the :hilippines *Article $-, 'CC.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
>es, Gene is free to marry his girlfriend !ecause his marriage was validly annulled in 8h issue +ngland. e of therefore, is governed !y the law of the place where the marriage was solemni1ed *le" loci cele!rationis.. Hence,
2pplicable Laws; laws governing marriages (199')
whether or not a marriage is voida!le, including the grounds
n $<F<, &aris, a Cilipino citi1en, married her !oss 3ohnson, an American citi1en, in 8o0yo in a wedding ceremony
cele!rated according to 3apanese laws. %ne year later,
3ohnson returned to his native 'evada, and he validly

o!tained in that state an a!solute divorce from his wife
even if sterility is not a ground to annul the marriage under the :hilippine law, the marriage is nevertheless voida!le !ecause sterility ma0es the marriage voida!le under +nglish
law. 8herefore, annulment of the marriage in +ngland is
&aris. After &aris received the final /udgment of divorce, she married her childhood sweetheart :edro, also a Cilipino
valid in the :hilippines.
citi1en, in a religious ceremony in Ce!u City, cele!rated according to the formalities of :hilippine law. :edro later
2pplicable Laws; ale of 1eal 4ropert" (1999) (hile in Afghanistan, a 3apanese !y the name of #ato sold
to Iamoncito, a Cilipino, a parcel of land situated in the $. (hat law governs the formality in the e"ecution of the
left for the Lnited #tates and !ecame naturali1ed as an American citi1en. &aris followed :edro to the Lnited
#tates, and after a serious 7uarrel, &aris filed a suit and
:hilippines which #ato inherited from his Cilipino mother.
contract of sale? +"plain your answer and give its legal !asis.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
o!tained a divorce decree issued !y the court in the state of

&aryland.
Page 17 of 119
Lnder Art. $G par. $, 'CC, real property is su!/ect to the law of the country where it is situated. #ince the property is situated in the :hilippines, :hilippine law applies. 8he rule of le" rei sitae in Article $G prevails over le" loci contractu
in Article $- of the 'CC.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
9. 8he distri!ution of the personal properties in Germany shall !e governed !y Crench law. 8he legal !asis is Art. $G, 'CC..
2pplicable Laws; 8ills e<ec%te0 abroa0 (199() A, a Cilipino, e"ecuted a will in Ruwait while there as a
Afghanistan law governs the formal re7uirements of the
contract since the e"ecution is in Afghanistan. Art. $- of the Civil Code provides that the forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other pu!lic instruments shall !e
contract wor0er. Assume that under the laws of Ruwait, it is enough that the testator affi" his signature to the presence of two witnesses and that the will need not !e
ac0nowledged !efore a notary pu!lic.
governed !y the laws of the country in which they are e"ecuted. However, if the contract was e"ecuted !efore the diplomatic or consular officials of the Iepu!lic of the
:hilippines in Afghanistan, :hilippine law shall apply.
&ay the will !e pro!ated in the :hilippines?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
the place of e"ecution. f the will was e"ecuted with the
>es. Lnder Articles F$A and $- of the Civil Code, the formality of the e"ecution of a will is governed !y the law of
2pplicable Laws; %ccession; )ntestate & =estamentar" ('##1)

Ale" was !orn a Cilipino !ut was a naturali1ed Canadian
formalities prescri!ed !y the laws of Ruwait and valid there as such, the will is valid and may !e pro!ated in the :hilippines. Definition; Cognovit; ;orrowing tat%te; C&aracteri>ation (199!) n :rivate nternational Law *Conflict of Laws. what is: $M Cognovit? 5. A !orrowing statute? 9. Characteri1ation?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
citi1en at the time of his death on Eecem!er 5A, $<<F. He left !ehind a last will and testament in which he !e7ueathed all his properties, real and personal, in the :hilippines to his ac0nowledged illegitimate Cillpina daughter and nothing to his two legitimate Cilipino sons. 8he sons sought the annulment of the last will and testament on the ground that it deprived them of their legitimes !ut the daughter was a!le
to prove that there were no compulsory heirs or legitimes under Canadian law. (ho should prevail? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. a. C%G'%, 8 is a confession of /udgment where!y a portion of the complaint is confessed !y the defendant who denies the rest thereof *:hilippine law Eictionary, 9rd +d.. *%campo v. Clorenciano, L6& $9AA9, 5S59SA=.. !. C%G'%, 8 confession" is a "statement of
8he daughter should prevail !ecause Article $G of the 'ew Civil Code provides that intestate and testamentary
succession shall !e governed !y the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. 2pplicable Laws; %cession of 2liens (1999)
%ftentimes, it is referred to as a "power of attorney" or
simply as a "power", it is the written authority of the de!tor
&ichelle, the a German national, died properties in :hilippines as properties in Germany.
Crench daughter of :enreich, in #pain leaving real the well as valua!le personal
and his direction to the cler0 of the district court, or /ustice of the peace to enter /udgment against the de!tor as stated therein. *(ords and :hrases, vol. -, pp. $$A6 $GG.. c. C%G'%, 8 is a plea in an action which ac0nowledges
that the defendant did underta0e and promise as the plaintiff in its declaration has alleged, and that it cannot
$. (hat law determines who shall succeed the deceased?

+"plain your answer and give its legal !asis.
5. (hat law regulates the distri!ution of the real properties

in the :hilippines? +"plain your answer and give its legal
deny that it owes and un/ustly detains from the plaintiff the
sum claimed !y him in his declaration, and consents that
!asi s. 9.
properties in Germany? +"plain your answer and give its
(hat law governs the distri!ution of the personal
/udgment !e entered against the defendant for a certain sum. 2(ords and :hrases, vol. -, pp. $$A6 $GG.. C%G'%, 8 is a note authori1ing a d. lawyer for confession of /udgment !y defendant.
5. "N%II%( 'G #8A8L8+" 6 Laws of the state or
legal !asis.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Assuming that the estate of the decedent is !eing settled in

the :hilippines.
$. 8he national law of the decedent *Crench law. shall

govern in determining who will succeed to his estate. 8he legal !asis is Art. $G par. 5, 'CC.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
/urisdiction used !y another state in deciding conflicts 7uestioned involved in the choice of law *Nlac0Ds Law Eictionary, Ath ed. $<-<..
9. a. "CHAIAC8+I HA8 %'" is otherwise called "classification" or "7ualification." t is the process of assigning a disputed 7uestion to its correct legal category
Crench law shall govern the distri!ution of his real
properties in the :hilippines e"cept when the real property

is land which may !e transmitted to a foreigner only !y hereditary succession.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*:rivate nternational Law, #alonga..

!. "CHAIAC8+I HA8 %'" is a process in determining
5. 8he distri!ution of the real properties in the :hilippines shall !e governed !y Crench law. 8he legal !asis is Art. $G,
'CC..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. *:aras, Conflict of Laws, p. <J. $<FJ ed..
Page 18 of 119
Definition; for%m non?conveniens; long?arm stat%te (199!) $. (hat is the doctrine of Corum non conveniens? 5. (hat is a "long arm statute"?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
nationality theory, and the issue involved is which of the laws of the two countries should apply to determine the
$. a. C%IL& '%' C%',+' +'# is a principle in
order of succession, the amount of successional rights, or, the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. #uch issue is not involved in this case.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
:rivate nternational Law that where the ends of /ustice
strongly indicate that the controversy may !e more suita!ly tried elsewhere, then /urisdiction should !e declined and the
parties relegated to relief to !e sought in another forum.
>es. "Ienvoi" 6 which means "referring !ac0" is relevant
!ecause here, we are applying L.#. law to &ario, !eing

already its citi1en, although the formalities of the second
*&oreno. :hilippine Law Eictionary, p. 5AJ, $<F5 ed...

!. (here in a !road sense the ends of /ustice strongly indicate that the controversy may !e more suita!ly tried
marriage will !e governed !y :hilippine law under the

principle of le" loci cele!rationis. Domiciliar" t&eor" vs. .ationalit" =&eor" ('##!) Eistinguish !riefly !ut clearly !etween: Eomiciliary theory
elsewhere, then /urisdiction should !e declined and the
parties relegated to relief to !e sought in another forum. *Hand!oo0 on :rivate nternational Law, Aruego.. c. C%IL& '%' C%',+' +'# means simply that a
and nationality theory of personal law. *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
court may resist imposition upon its /urisdiction even when
domicile or the place of his ha!itual residence. 8he
E%& C L AI> 8H+%I> posits that the personal status and rights of a person are governed !y the law of his 'A8 %'AL 8> 8H+%I>, on the other hand, postulates
/urisdiction is authori1ed !y the letter of a general venue statute. *#alonga. :rivate nternational Law. p, A$. $<G- ed..
that it is the law of the personDs nationality that governs
such status and rights

,or%m .on Conveniens & Le< Loci Contract%s ('##') Celipe is a Cilipino citi1en. (hen he went to #ydney for
d. Corum non conveniens is a doctrine where!y a court of law having full 3urisdiction over a case !rought in a proper venue or district declines to determine the case on its merits !ecause 3ustice would !e !etter served !y the trial over the
case in another /urisdiction. *(e!sterDs Eictionary.
vacation, he met a former !usiness associate, who proposed

to him a transaction which too0 him to &oscow. Celipe
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*5M a. L%'G AI& #8A8L8+ is a legislative act which
!ro0ered a contract !etween #ydney Coals Corp. *Coals., an Australian firm, and &oscow +nergy Corp. *+nergy., a Iussian firm, for Coals to supply coal to +nergy on a
monthly !asis for three years. Noth these firms were not
provides for personal /urisdiction, via su!stituted service or

process, over persons or corporations which are non6
residents of the state and which voluntarily go into the state,

directly or !y agent or communicate with persons in the state for limited purposes, inactions which concern claims
doing, and still do not do, !usiness in the :hilippines. Celipe shuttled !etween #ydney and &oscow to close the contract.
He also e"ecuted in #ydney a commission contract with
Coals and in &oscow with +nergy, under which contracts
relating to performance or e"ecution of those purposes

*Nlac0Ds Law Eictionary, Ath +d. $<-<..
he was guaranteed commissions !y !oth firms !ased on a
percentage of deliveries for the three6year period, paya!le in

#ydney and in &oscow, respectively, through deposits in
!. Long arm statute refers simply to authori1ed su!stituted

service.
accounts that he opened in the two cities. Noth firms paid
Celipe his commission for four months, after which they
stopped paying him. Celipe learned from his contacts, who
Divorce; effect of 0ivorce grante0 to former ,ilipinos; 1envoi Doctrine (1997)
are residents of #ydney and &oscow, that the two firms tal0ed to each other and decided to cut him off. He now
n $<--, &ario and Clara, !oth Cilipino citi1ens, were

married in the :hilippines. 8hree years later, they went to
files suit in &anila against !oth Coals and +nergy for specific performance. A. Eefine or e"plain the principle of ?le" loci contractus@. *5B. N. Eefine or e"plain the rule of ?forum non conveniens@
C. #hould the :hilippine court assume /urisdiction over
the Lnited #tates of America and esta!lished their residence in #an Crancisco, California. n $<F-, the couple applied for, and were granted, L.#. citi1enship. n $<F<, &ario, claiming
to have !een a!andoned !y Clara, was a!le to secure a decree of divorce in Ieno, 'evada, L.#.A.
*9B.
n $<<=, &ario returned to the :hilippines and married

3uana who 0new well &arioDs past life. *a. s the marriage !etween &ario and 3uana valid? *!. (ould the renvoi doctrine have any relevance to the
the case? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
L+4 L%C C%'8IAC8L# may !e understood in two senses, as follows:
A.
*$. t is the law of the place where contracts, wills, and
case?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a >es, !ecause :hil law recogni1es the . divorce !etween

&ario and Clara as valid.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*!. 'o, 8he renvoi doctrine is relevant in cases where one

country applies the domiciliary theory and the other the
paragraph, Article $- of the 'ew Civil Code) or *5. t is the proper law of the contract) e.i., the system of law intended to govern the entire contract, including
other pu!lic instruments are e"ecuted and governs their ?forms and solemnities@, pursuant to the first
its essential re7uisites, indicating the law of the place with which the contract has its closest connection or
Page 19 of 119
where the main elements of the contract converge. As illustrated !y =ala&ea v. Co.rt o* A''eals
[1993]), it is the law of the place where the ($$8 SCRA $3
country of which they are citi1ens. #ince their marriage is
valid under Hong Rong law, it shall !e valid and respected

in the :hilippines.
airline tic0et was issued, where the passengers are nationals and residents of, and where the defendant airline company
maintained its office.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Lnder the doctrine of le" loci A. contractus, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, o!ligation and interpretation. 8his has !een said to
!e the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to !e performed, and particularly so, if the place of the ma0ing
.at%rali>ation ('##() &iss Lniverse, from Cinland, came to the :hilippines on a tourist visa. (hile in this country, she fell in love with and married a Cilipino doctor. Her tourist visa having !een e"pired and after the ma"imum e"tension allowed therefore,
the Nureau of mmigration and Eeportation *N E. is
and the place of performance are the same

(>n"te% A"rl"ne v.
CA, ;.R. 0o. 1$4110, A'r"l $0, $001).
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
presently demanding that she immediately leave the country !ut she refuses to do so, claiming that she is already a Cilipino Citi1en !y her marriage to a Cilipino citi1en. Can the N E still order the deportation of &iss Lniverse? +"plain. AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, the N E can order the deportation of &iss Lniverse.
C%IL& '%' C%',+' +'# means that a court has discretionary authority to decline /urisdiction over a cause of action when it is of the view that the action may
N. !e /ustly and effectively ad/udicated elsewhere.
8he marriage of an alien woman to a Cilipino does not automatically ma0e her a #he must Cilipino Citi1en. first
prove in an appropriate proceeding that she does not have

any dis7ualification for :hilippine citi1enship.
C!. Re'./l"+ o* t!e SCRAv.793 [1988])
(?.n, >an
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
C. 'o, the :hilippine courts cannot ac7uire /urisdiction over the case of Celipe. Cirstly, under the rule of forum non conveniens, the :hilippine court is not a convenient forum
as all the incidents of the case occurred outside the :hilippines. 'either are !oth Coals and +nergy doing
#ince &iss Lniverse is still a foreigner, despite her marriage to a Cilipino doctor, she can !e deported upon e"piry of her allowa!le stay in the :hilippines.
A'!$.E" (+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!"l"''"nes, 178
'o, the Nureau of mmigration cannot order her deportation. An alien woman marrying a Cilipino, native6
!orn or naturali1ed, !ecomes ipso facto a Cilipino if she is

not dis7ualified to !e a citi1en of the :hilippines (Mo ?a
4, 0at.ral"@at"on 5a9).
!usiness inside the :hilippines. #econdly, the contracts were not perfected in the :hilippines. Lnder the principle of le"
loci contractus, the law of the place where the contract is
5"& v Co&&"ss"on o* I&&",rat"on, 41 SCRA $9$ [19(1]), (Se+
made shall apply. Lastly, the :hilippine court has no power
All that she has to do is prove in the deportation proceeding the fact of her marriage and that she is not dis7ualified to !ecome a Cilipino Citi1en.
to determine the facts surrounding the e"ecution of said
contracts. And even if a proper decision could !e reached, such would have no !iding effect on Coals and +nergy as the court was not a!le to ac7uire /urisdiction over the said corporations. (Man"la Aotel Cor'. v. 05RC. 343
SCRA 1, 136
14[$00 0])
A'!$.E" (+&&E($E# A'(WE":
t depends. f she is dis7ualified to !e a Cilipino citi1en, she may !e deported. f she is not dis7ualified to !e a Cilipino
citi1en, she may not !e deported. marries a Cilipino citi1en !ecomes one. An alien woman who 8he marriage of
.ationalit" =&eor" ('##!)
:H L, are HR 8heir parents are and Chinese. now Cilipino citi1ens who live in &anila. (hile still students in &'# #tate, they got married although they are first cousins. t appears that !oth in HR and in &'# #tate first cousins
could marry legally.
&iss Lniverse to the Cilipino doctor did not automatically ma0e her a Cilipino citi1en. #he still has to prove that she is not dis7ualified to !ecome a citi1en.
=&eor"; significant relations&ips t&eor" (199!) A!le, a corporation domiciled in #tate A, !ut, doing
!usiness in the :hilippines, hired +ric, a Cilipino engineer,
for its pro/ect in #tate N. n the contract of employment
8hey plan to reside and set up !usiness in the :hilippines. Nut they have !een informed, however, that the marriage of first cousins here is considered void from the !eginning !y reason of pu!lic policy. 8hey are in a dilemma. 8hey donOt want to !rea0 :hilippine law, much less their marriage vow. 8hey see0 your advice on whether their civil status will !e adversely affected !y :hilippine domestic law? (hat is your
advice *AB. ?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
e"ecuted !y the parties in #tate N, it was stipulated that the

contract could !e terminated at the companyDs will, which
dismissed !y A!le, he sued A!le for damages in the
stipulation is allowed in #tate N. (hen +ric was summarily :hilippines. (ill the :hilippine court apply the contractual stipulation?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
a. Lsing the "SI NIFICANT RELATIONS!IPS T!EOR"", there are contacts significant to the :hilippines.
Among these are that the place of !usiness is the :hilippines, the employee concerned is a Cilipino and the
&y advise is as follows: 8he civil status ofD :H and L, will not !e adversely affected !y :hilippine law !ecause they are nationals of Hong Rong and not Cilipino citi1ens.Neing foreigners, their status, conditions and legal capacity in the
:hilippines are governed !y the law of Hong Rong, the
suit was filed in the :hilippines, there!y /ustifying the application of :hilippine law. n the American Airlines case the Court held that when what is involved is such PARAMOUNT STATE INTEREST as the
Page 20 of 119
protection of the rights of Cilipino la!orers, the court can
natural mother as her middle name. 8he Court has ruled
disregard choice of forum and choice of law. 8herefore the

:hilippine Court should not apply the stipulation in 7uestion.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
that there is no law prohi!iting an illegitimate child adopted !y her natural father to use, as middle name, her motherDs use of the maternal name as the middle name is in accord with Cilipino culture and customs and adoption is intended for the !enefit of the adopted [In reB A%o't"on
o* Ste'!an"e 0at!y Astor,a ;ar+"a, ;.R. 0o. 148311, Mar+! 31, $007C Ra/.ya, T!e 5a9 on ersons an% 8a&"ly Relat"ons, '. 613].
surname. (hat is not prohi!ited is allowed. After all, the
!. 'o, le" fori should !e applied !ecause the suit is filed in :hilippine courts and +ric was hired in the :hilippines. 8he :hilippine Constitution affords full protection to la!or and the stipulation as to summary dismissal runs counter to our
fundamental and statutory laws. =orts; 4rescriptive 4erio0 ('##!)
)nter?Co%ntr" 20option; ,ormalities ('##9)
n a class suit for damages, plaintiffs claimed they suffered in/uries from torture during martial law. 8he suit was filed
upon :resident +&Os arrival on e"ile in H , a L.#. state.
Hans Ner!er, a German national, and his Cilipino wife, Ihoda, are permanent residents of Canada. 8hey desire so
much to adopt &agno, an F6year old orphaned !oy and a !aptismal godson of Ihoda. #ince the accidental death of
8he court in H awarded plaintiffs the e7uivalent of :$== !illion under the L.#. law on alien tort claims. %n appeal, +&Os +state raised the issue of prescription. t argued that since said L.#. law is silent on the matter, the court should apply: *$. H Os law setting a two6year limitation on tort
claims) or *5. the :hilippine law which appears to re7uire that claims for personal in/ury arising from martial law !e !rought within one year. :laintiffs countered that provisions of the most analogous
&agnoDs parents in 5==J, he has !een staying with his aunt who, however, could hardly afford to feed her own family.
Lnfortunately, Hans and Ihoda cannot come to the :hilippines to adopt &agno although they possess all the
7ualifications as adoptive parents. Is t!ere a 'oss"/"l"ty *or t!e& to a%o't Ma,no1 Ao9 s!o.l% t!ey ,o a/o.t "t1 (74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, it is possi!le for Hans and Ihoda to adopt &agno.
federal statute, the 8orture ,ictims :rotection Act, should !e t sets ten years as the period for applied. prescription. &oreover, they argued that e7uity could toll the statute of limitatio Cor appeared that +& had it procured ns.
Constitutional amendments granting himself and those acting under his direction immunity from suit during his
Iepu!lic Act 'o. F=J9 or the nter6Country Adoption Act,

allows aliens or Cilipinos permanently residing a!road to
apply for inter6country adoption of a Cilipino child. 8he law however re7uires that only legally free child, or one who has !een voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the E#(E
or any of its accredited agencies, may !e su!/ect of inter6
tenure. n this case, has prescription set in or not? Considering the differences in the cited laws, which prescriptive period
country adoption. 8he law further re7uires that aside from possessing all the 7ualifications, the adoptive parents must come from a country where the :hilippines has diplomatic relations and that the government maintains a similarly
should !e applied: one year under :hilippine law, two years under H Os law, ten years under L.#. federal law, or none of
the a!ove?
accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under the
national law of the alien. &oreover, it must !e further

shown that all possi!ilities for a domestic adoption have !een e"hausted and the inter6country adoption is !est for
+"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he L# Court will apply L# law, the law of the 3orum, in

determining the applica!le prescriptive period. (hile L# law is silent on this matter, the L# Court will not apply :hilippine law in determining the prescriptive period. t is
the interest of the child. Hans and Ihoda have to file an application to adopt &agno, either with the Iegional 8rial Court having Adoption Noard in Canada. Hans and Ihoda will then undergo a trial custody for si" *G. months from the time of placement. t is only after the lapse of the trial custody that the decree of adoption can !e issued.
/urisdiction over nter6Country &agno or with the
generally affirmed as a principle in private international law that procedural is one of the law e"ceptions to the application of foreign law !y the forum. #ince prescription
is a matter of procedural law even in :hilippine /urisprudence, *Codaltn v. :%+AS 3,LICSNroum and Ioot 59F #CIA -5$ 2$<<J;., the L# nternational, Court
will apply either H or Cederal law in determining the

applica!le prescriptive period and not :hilippine law. 8he Iestatement of American law affirms this principle.
4arental 2%t&orit"; 1escission of 20option (199!) n $<-A, Carol !egot a daughter Ning, out of wedloc0.
A#!P$I!'
20option; /se of %rname of &er .at%ral *ot&er ('##-)
May an "lle,"t"&ate +!"l%, .'on a%o't"on /y !er nat.ral *at!er, .se t!e s.rna&e o* !er nat.ral &ot!er as t!e &"%%le na&e1 ($.74)
catered to tourists. #ome of the girls lived with 'orma and &anuel. Carol got Ning !ac0, who in the first place wanted
(hen Ning was ten years old, Carol gave her consent for NingDs legal adoption !y 'orma and &anuel, which was granted !y the court in $<<=. n $<<$, Carol learned that 'orma and &anuel were engaged in a call6 girl6ring that
>es, an illegitimate child, upon adoption !y her natural father, can use the surname of her
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
to return to her natural mother. $. (ho has a !etter right to the custody of Ning, Carol or 'orma? 5. Aside from ta0ing physical custody of Ning, what legal
actions can Carol ta0e to protect Ning?
Page 21 of 119

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
t depends on whether or not Ning was at $. a. least $F

years old at the time Carol asserts the prerogative to ta0e
sister. 8hus, under the a!ove6cited provision, +va is
7ualified to adopt ,ic0y. /) )o.l% yo.r ans9er /e t!e sa&e "* t!ey so.,!t to a%o't 2vaDs "lle,"t"&ate %a.,!ter1 23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
custody of Ning. f she was at least $F years old, then she is

no longer under parental authority and neither Carol nor
'orma can assert the prerogative to ta0e custody. However, if she was less than $F years old, then 'orma has a !etter right since the adoption !y 'orma of Ning terminates the
parental authority of Carol over Ning.
!. 8he natural mother, Carol, should have the !etter right in

light of the principle that the childDs welfare is the paramount consideration in custody rights. %!viously,
&y answer will still !e the same. :aragraph 9*a. of Article $FJ of the Camily Code does not ma0e any distinction. 8he provision states that an alien who is a former Cilipino citi1en is 7ualified to adopt a relative !y consanguinity. +) S.''os"n, t!at t!ey *"le% t!e 'et"t"on to a%o't #"+Ey "n t!e year $000, 9"ll yo.r ans9er /e t!e sa&e1 23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
NingDs continued stay in her adopting parentsD house, where
interaction with the call girls is inevita!le, would !e detrimental to her moral and spiritual development. 8his
could !e the reason for NingDs e"pressed desire to return to her natural mother. t should !e noted, however, that Ning is no longer a minor, !eing $< years of age now. t is dou!tfu$ that a court can still resolve the 7uestion of
custody over one who is sui /uris and not otherwise incapacitated.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
a %n the assumption that Ning is still a . minor or otherwise incapacitated, Carol may petition the proper court for resolution or rescission of the decree of adoption on the ground that the adopting parents have e"posed, or are e"posing, the child to corrupt influence, tantamount to giving her corrupting orders or e"amples. #he can also as0 for the revesting in her of parental authority over Ning. f However, Ning is already $< years of age and therefore no
5.
country has diplomatic relations with the :hilippines, that he has !een living in the :hilippines for at least three *9. continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has !een certified !y his
>es, my answer will still !e the same. Lnder #ec. -*!., Art. of the 'ew Eomestic Adoption Act, an alien who possesses all the 7ualifications of a Cilipino national who is 7ualified to adopt may already adopt provided that his
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he has the legal capacity to adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child.
longer a minor, it is not Carol !ut Ning herself who can petition the court for /udicial rescission of the adoption, provided she can show a ground for disinheritance of an
6%alification of 20opter; 2pplicable Law ('##1) A German couple filed a petition for adoption of a minor Cilipino child with the Iegional 8rial Court of &a0ati under the provisions of the Child and >outh (elfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt. Nefore the petition could !e heard,
ascendant. !. Carol may file an action to deprive 'orma of parental authority under Article 59$ of the Camily Code or file an
the Camily Code, which repealed the Child and >outh (elfare Code, came into effect. Conse7uently, the #olicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the petition, on the
ground that the Camily Code prohi!its aliens from adopting. f you were the /udge, how will you rule on the motion?
action for the rescission of the adoption under Article $<$

in relation to Article 59$ *5. of the Camily Code. 6%alification of 20opter ('##9) n $<FJ, +va, a Cilipina, went to wor0 as a nurse in the
*AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
L#A. 8here, she met and fell in love with :aul, an American
citi1en, and they got married in $<FA. +va ac7uired American citi1enship in $<F-. Euring their so/ourn in the
:hilippines in $<<=, they filed a /oint petition for the adoption of ,ic0y, a -6year old daughter of +vaDs sister. 8he
government, through the %ffice of the #olicitor General, opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioners, !eing !oth foreigners, are dis7ualified to adopt ,ic0y. a) ($4)
8he motion to dismiss the petition for adoption should !e denied. 8he law that should govern the action is the law in force at the time of filing of the petition. At that time, it was the Child and >outh (elfare Code that was in effect, not the Camily Code. :etitioners have already ac7uired a vested right on their 7ualification to adopt which cannot !e ta0en away !y the Camily Code. (Re'./l"+ v.
M"ller ;.R. 0o.
1$793$, A'r"l $1, 1999, +"t"n, Re'./l"+ v. Co.rt o* A''eals, $07 SCRA 376)
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Is t!e ,overn&entDs o''os"t"on tena/le1 23'la"n.
8he motion has to !e granted. 8he new law shall govern
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he governmentDs position is untena!le. Lnder paragraph 9, Article $FJ of the Camily Code, an alien, as a general rule
cannot adopt. However, an alien who is a former Cilipino
their 7ualification to adopt and under the new law, the German couple is dis7ualified from adopting. 8hey cannot claim that they have already ac7uired a vested right !ecause adoption is not a right !ut a mere privilege. 'o one ac7uires a vested right on a privilege.
#Note$ If t%e e&aminee 'ase( %is ans)er on t%e current la)* RA +,,-* %is
citi1en and who see0s to adopt a relative !y consanguinity is 7ualified to adopt, *par. 92a;, Art. $FJ, Camily Code.
n the given pro!lem, +va, a naturali1ed American citi1en woul li0e to adopt ,ic0y, a -6year old d daughter of her
ans)er s%oul( 'e consi(ere( correct. T%is .uestion is 'ase( on t%e repeale(
pro/ision of t%e Famil0 Co(e on A(option.1
6%alifications of 20opter ('###)
Page 22 of 119
#ometime in $<<=, #arah, !orn a Cilipino !ut !y then a naturali1ed American citi1en, and her American hus!and
under #ec. -*!. of IAFAA5. 8he #upreme Court has held in

several cases that when hus!and and wife are re7uired to
8om, filed a petition in the Iegional 8rial Court of &a0ati, for the adoption of the minor child of her sister, a Cilipina.
Can the petition !e granted? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
adopt /ointly, each one of them must !e 7ualified to adopt in his or her own right (Re'./l"+ v. Tole%ano,
$33 SCRA 9 (1994). However, the American hus!and must
*per dondee. effective
t depends. Iules on Adoption
August 55, 5==5 provides the following)

SEC. 4. Who may adopt. T 8he following may adopt: Any Filipino Citizen of legal of full civil capacity and a. age, legal rights, in !. possession of good moral character, c. has not !een convicted of any crime d. involving moral
comply with the re7uirements of the law including the residency re7uirement of three *9. years. %therwise, the adoption will not !e allowed. %ccessional 1ig&ts of 20opte0 C&il0 ('##!) A Cilipino couple, &r. and &rs. N&, 3r., decided to adopt
>,, an orphan from #t. ClaireOs orphanage in 'ew >or0
e.
turpitude) who is emotionally and psychologically capa!le of caring

for children,
f. g.
at least si"teen *$G. years older than the adoptee,
and who is in a position to support and care for his children in 0eeping with the means of the family.
City. 8hey loved and treated her li0e a legitimate child for they have none of their very own. However, N&, 3r., died in an accident at sea, followed to the grave a year later !y his sic0 father, N&, #r. +ach left a si1a!le estate consisting of !an0 deposits, lands and !uildings &ay the in &anila.
adopted child, >,, inherit from N&, 3r.?
8he re7uirement of a $G6year difference !etween the
age of the adopter and adoptee may !e waived when the
inherit from N&, #r.? s there a difference? *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
&ay she o (hy +"plain ? .
als
adopter is the !iological parent of the adoptee or is the

spouse of the adopteeOs parent)
>, can inherit from N&, 3r. 8he succession to the estate of
N&, 3r. is governed !y :hilippine law !ecause he was a
Any Alien possessing the same 7ualifications as a!ove6stated

for Cilipino nationals: :rovided, a. 8hat his country has diplomatic relations with the
Cilipino when he died *Article $G, Civil Code.. Lnder
Article $=9< of the Civil Code, the capacity of the heir to
Iepu!lic of the :hilippines,

!. that he has !een living in the :hilippines for at least
succeed is governed !y the national law of the decedent and not !y the national law of the heir. Hence, whether or not
>, can inherit from N&, 3r. is determined !y :hilippine law. Lnder :hilippine law, the adopted inherits from the
three *9. continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until
the adoption decree is entered,
c.
adopter as a legitimate child of the adopter.
that he has !een certified !y his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the
legal capacity to adopt in his country,
d.
and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child.
right fro , m the father of the adopter, N&, #r., !ecause he is not a legal heir of N&, #r. 8he legal fiction of adoption e"ists only !etween the adopted and the adopter. (Teot"+o v. Fel
>,, however, cannot inherit, in his own
#al 13 SCRA
406 [1967]).
'either may he inherit from
:rovided, further, 8hat the re7uirements on residency and
certification of the alienOs 7ualification to adopt in his country

may !e waived for the following: a former Cilipino citi1en who see0s to adopt a. a relative within the fourth *Jth. degree of consanguinity or affinity) or !. Cilipino spouse) one who is married
representing N&, 3r. representation, the
!ecause
in
is representing !ut also of the decedent from whom the
representative must !e a legal heir not only of the person he represented was supposed to inherit *Article <-9, Civil Code..
one who see0s to adopt the legitimate child of his
c. or
to a Cilipino citi1en and see0s to
A)IL* C!#E
adopt /ointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth *Jth. degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Cilipino spouse.
Emancipation (199()
6%alifications of 20opter ('##() Lina, a former Cilipina who !ecame an American citi1en li0e her one the
shortly after her marriage to an American hus!and, would
consents have !een o!tained, could the contemplated /oint
to adopt in the :hilippines, /ointly with hus!and, of her minor !rothers. Assuming that all re7uired
adoption in the :hilippine prosper? +"plain.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
party at the house of a mutual friend. Lea met 3a0e, also $F years old, who showed interest in her. Lea seemed to entertain 3a0e !ecause she danced with him many times. n a fit of /ealousy, 3ulio shot 3a0e with his fatherDs 9F cali!er revolver which, !efore going to the party he was a!le to get from the unloc0ed drawer inside his fatherDs !edroom. 3a0e died as a result of the lone gunshot wound he sustained. His parents sued 3ulioDs parents for damages arising from 7uasi6
delict. At the time of the incident, 3ulio was $F years old
3ulio and Lea, !oth $F years old, were sweethearts. At a
>es, Lina and her American hus!and can /ointly adopt a minor !rother of Lina !ecause she and her hus!and are
!oth 7ualified to adopt. Lina, as a former Cilipino citi1en, can adopt her minor !rother under #ec. -*!.*i. of IA FAA5 *Eomestic Adoption Act of $<<F., or under Art. $FJ *9.*$. alien hus!and can now of Camily Code. adopt the 8he
living with his parents. 3ulioDs parents moved to dismiss the complaint against them claiming that since 3ulio was already of ma/ority age, they were no longer lia!le for his acts. $. #hould the motion to dismiss !e granted? (hy? 5. (hat is the lia!ility of 3ulioDs parents to 3a0eDs parents? +"plain your answer.
Page 23 of 119
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. 'o, the &otion to Eismiss should not !e granted. Article 59G of the Camily Code as amended !y Iepu!lic Act GF=<, provides in the third paragraph that "nothing in this Code shall !e construed to derogate from the duty or responsi!ility of parents and guardians for children and wards !elow twenty6one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 5$F= of the Civil Code".
5. 8he lia!ility of 3ulioDs parents to 3a0eDs parents arises
the family home in &anila to a foreigner. ,ictor and his family transferred to another house of his in :asig. Can the two family homes !e the su!/ect of e"ecution on a /udgment against ,ictorDs wife for non6payment of the purchase in $<<5 of household appliances?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
from 7uasi6delict *Arts. 5$-G and 5$F= Civil Code. and shall cover specifically the following: a. :A=,===.== for the death of the son) !. such amount as would correspond to lost earning capacity) and c. moral damages. ,amil" Co0e; 1etroactive 2pplication; @este0 1ig&ts ('###) %n April $A, $<F=, Iene and Angelina were married to each other without a marriage settlement. n $<FA, they ac7uired a parcel of land in Pue1on City. %n 3une $, $<<=, when Angelina was away in Naguio, Iene sold the said lot to &arcelo. s the sale void or voida!le? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he two *5. so6called family homes can !e the su!/ect of e"ecution. 'either of the a!odes are considered family homes !ecause for purposes of availing the !enefits under the Camily Code, there can only !e one *$. family home which is defined as the "dwelling house" where the hus!and and the wife and their family actually "reside" and the land on which it is situated. *Arts. $A5 and $G$, Camily Code.
8he sale is void. #ince the sale was e"ecuted in $<<=, the Camily Code is the law applica!le. Lnder Article $5J of the CC, the sale of a con/ugal property !y a spouse without the consent of the other is void.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he sale is voida!le. 8he provisions of the Camily Code may apply retroactively !ut only if such application will not impair vested rights. (hen Iene and Angelina got married in $<F=, the law that governed their property relations was the 'ew Civil Code. Lnder the 'CC, as interpreted !y the #upreme Court in Ae"rs o* 8el"'e v. Al%on, 100 SCRA
6$8 an% re"terate% "n Ae"rs o* Ay.ste v. Mala/on,a, ;.R 0o, 118(84, $ Se'te&/er 1999, the sale e"ecuted !y the hus!and
without the consent of the wife is voida!le. 8he hus!and has already ac7uired a vested right on the voida!le nature of dispositions made without the consent of the wife. Hence, Article $5J of the Camily Code which ma0es the sale void does not apply. ,amil" Aome; Dwelling Ao%se (199!) n $<<$, ,ictor esta!lished /udicially out of con/ugal property, a family home in &anila worth :5==.===.== and e"tra/udicially a second family home in 8agaytay worth :A=.===.==. ,ictor leased
,amil"; Constit%tional *an0ates; Divorce (1991) A. How does the $<F- Constitution strengthen the family as an nstitution? N. Eo the Constitutional policy on the family and the provision that marriage is the foundation of the family and shall !e protected !y the #tate !ar Congress from enacting a law allowing divorce in the :hilippines?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*!. #uppose that children were !orn from the union of H and (, what would !e the status of said children? +"plain your answer.
*c. f the su!se7uent marriage of H to # was contracted !efore compliance with the statutory condition for its validity, what are the rights of the children of the first marriage *i.e., of H and (. and of the children of the
A. #ec, 5, Article of the Constitution provides that: 8he #tate recogni1es the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a !asic autonomous social institution. t shall e7ually protect the life of the mother and the life of the un!orn from conception. 8he natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. #ection , Article 4,, further provides that: 8he #tate recogni1es the Cilipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
2Note$ T%e Committee recommen(s t%at a citation of eit%er one of t%e pro/isions 'e cre(ite( as a complete ans)er3.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
su!se7uent marriage *of H and #.?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a. H, or either spouse for that matter, can marry again after complying with the provisions of Article A5 of the Camily Code, namely, there must !e a partition and distri!ution, of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
:age 24 of
$$<
N, 'o, the Constitutional policy, as well as the supporting provision, does not amount to a prohi!ition to Congress to enact a law on divorce. 8he Constitution only meant to help the marriage endure, to "strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development."
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
N. >es. Congress is !arred from enacting a law allowing divorce, since #ection 5 of Article 4, provides: "#ec. 5. &arriage, as an inviola!le social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall !e protected !y the #tate." #ince marriage is " nviola!le", it cannot !e dissolved !y an a!solute divorce. *arriage; 2nn%lment; Effects; 1e$%isites ;efore 1emarriage (199#) 8he marriage of H and ( was annulled !y the competent court. Lpon finality of the /udgment of nullity. H !egan loo0ing for his prospective second mate. He fell in love with a se"y woman # who wanted to !e married as soon as possi!le, i.e., after a few months of courtship. As a young lawyer, you were consulted !y H, *a. How soon can H !e /oined in lawful wedloc0 to his girlfriend #? Lnder e"isting laws, are there certain re7uisites that must !e complied with !efore he can remarry? (hat advice would you give H?
childrenDs presumptive legitimes which should !e recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property. H
should !e so advised.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE": for
se"ually6transmissi!le disease, found to !e serious and
*a.
8he following are the re7uisites prescri!ed !y law and advice to H is to comply with them, namely: $. f either spouse contracted the marriage in !ad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
appears incura!le. 8wo *5. years after their marriage, which too0 place on $= %cto!er $<FF, Nethel discovered that her hus!and 3ames has a se"ually6transmissi!le disease which he contracted even prior to their marriage although 3ames did
not 0now it himself until he was e"amined two 25. years later when a child was already Nethel !orn to them. sues
property : or con/ugal partnership property shall !e forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse !y a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse)
3ames for annulment of their marriage. 3ames opposes the annulment on the ground that he did not even 0now that he had such a disease so that there was no fraud or !ad faith on his part. Eecide. N. #uppose that !oth parties at the time of their marriage
were similarly afflicted with se"ually6 transmissi!le diseases, serious and incura!le, and !oth 0new of their respective
5. Eonations !y reason of marriage shall remain valid e"cept that if the donee contracted the marriage in !ad faith, such donations made to said donee are revo0ed 9. 8he spouse who contracted the su!se7uent marriage in !ad faith shall !e dis7ualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse !y testate and intestate succession) J. f !oth spouses of the su!se7uent marriage acted in !y operation of law)
infirmities, can Nethel or 3ames sue for annulment of their marriage?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
a defense when the ground is !ased upon se"ually6
A. 8he marriage can !e annulled, !ecause good faith is not transmissi!le disease on the part of either party.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!ad faith all donations !y reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made !y one in favor of the
N. >es, the marriage can still !e annulled !ecause the fact

that !oth of them are afflicted with se"ually6 transmissi!le diseases does not efface or nullity the ground.
Alternati1e Answer:
other are revo0ed !y operation of law. 8h /udgment of annulment of the marriage, the A. e
partition and distri!ution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrenDs presumptive legitimes shall !e recorded in the appropriate civil
N. 'o, the marriage can no longer !e annulled, !ecause the

fact that !oth were afflicted and that !oth 0new of their respective infirmities constitutes a waiver of that ground.
registry and registers of property, *Articles A9. A5, J9. JJ. Camily Code..
*arriage; 2nn%lment; 7%0icial Declaration (199() &aria and Luis, !oth Cilipinos, were married !y a Catholic
priest in Lourdes Church, Pue1on City in $<-G, Luis was altar soon after the ceremony. After marriage, Luis never
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*!. 8he children !orn from the union of H and ( would !e legitimate children if conceived or !orn !efore the decree of
drun0 on the day of his wedding. n fact, he slumped at the
annulment of the marriage *under Art. JA of the Camily
Code. has !ecome final and e"ecutory *Art. AJ, Camily

CodeM.
had a steady /o! !ecause he was drun0 most of the time. Cinally, he could not get employed at all !ecause of
drun0enness. Hence, it was &aria who had to earn a living

to support herself and her child !egotten with Luis. n $<FG, &aria filed a petition in the church matrimonial court in
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*c. 8he children of the first marriage shall !e considered
Pue1on City to annul her marriage with Luis on the ground
legitimate children if conceived or !orn !efore the
of psychological incapacity to comply with his marital
3udgment of annulment of the marriage of H and ( has
o!ligation. Her petition was granted !y the church
!ecome final and e"ecutory. Children conceived or !orn of the su!se7uent marriage shall li0ewise !e legitimate even if
the marriage of H and # !e null and void for failure to
matrimonial court. Can &aria now get married legally to $. another man under :hilippine laws after her marriage to Luis was
comply with the re7uisites of Article A5 of the Camily Code

*Article A9, Camily Code.. As legitimate children, they have the following rights)
annulled !y the church matrimonial court? +"plain. 5. lawfully to another man under :hilippine laws?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
(hat must &aria do to ena!le her to get married
a. 8o !ear the surnames of the father and the mother in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on #urnames)
8o receive support from their !. parents, their
sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on #upport) and 8o !e entitled to the legitime c. and other successional rights granted to them !y the Civil
ascendants, and in proper cases, their !rothers and
$. 'o, &aria cannot validly contract a su!se7uent marriage without a court declaration of nullity of the first marriage. 8he law does not recogni1e the church declaration of nullity of a marriage. 5. 8o ena!le &aria to get married lawfully to another man. she must o!tain a /udicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage under Article 9G Camily Code.
*arriage; 2nn%lment; Legal 2ctions (199-) eparation; 4rescription of
Code *Article $-J, Camily Code..

*arriage; 2nn%lment; Bro%n0s (1991)
%ne of the grounds for annulment of marriage is that either party, the time of their marriage was at afflicted with a
5. Nert and Na!y were married to each other on Eecem!er

59, $<FF. #i" months later, she discovered that he was a
Page 25 of 119
drug addict. +fforts to have him reha!ilitated were unsuccessful. Can Na!y as0 for annulment of marriage, or legal
separation? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n $<F<, &aris, a Cilipino citi1en, married her !oss 3ohnson, an American citi1en, in 8o0yo in a wedding ceremony
cele!rated according to 3apanese laws. %ne year later,
3ohnson returned to his native 'evada, and he validly
'o, Na!y cannot as0 for annulment of her marriage or for legal separation !ecause !oth these actions had already
prescri!ed. (hile concealment of drug addiction e"isting at
o!tained in that state an a!solute divorce from his wife
&aris. After &aris received the final /udgment of divorce, she married her childhood sweetheart :edro, also a Cilipino
the time of marriage constitutes fraud under Art. JG of the CC which ma0es the marriage voida!le under Art. JA of the
citi1en, in a religious ceremony in Ce!u City, cele!rated according to the formalities of :hilippine law. :edro later
CC, the action must, however, !e !rought within A years from the discovery thereof under Article J-*9., CC, #ince
left for the Lnited #tates and !ecame naturali1ed as an American citi1en. &aris followed :edro to the Lnited
#tates, and after a serious 7uarrel, &arts filed a suit and
the drug addiction of Nert was discovered !y Na!y in 3une
$<F<, the action had already prescri!ed in 3une of $<<J. Although drug addiction is a ground for legal separation under Art. AA*A. and Art. A- of the CC re7uires that the of the cause. #ince Nert had !een a drug addict from the
o!tained a divorce decree issued !y the court in the state of &aryland.

&aris then returned to the :hilippines and in a civil
action must !e !rought within A years from the occurrence time of the cele!ration of the marriage, the action for legal Eecem!er $<<9. Hence, Na!y cannot, now, !ring the action
for legal separation.
ceremony cele!rated in Ce!u City according to the

formalities of :hilippine law, she married her former
separation must have !een !rought not later than 59
classmate ,incent li0ewise a Cilipino citi1en. (as the marriage of &aris and :edro !. valid when
cele!rated? s their marriage still valid e"isting now?
Ieasons. c. (as the marriage of &arts and ,incent valid when

cele!rated? s their marriage still validly e"isting now?
*arriage; 2nn%lment; 4roper 4art" (199#)
E and G, age 5= and $<, respectively, and !oth single, eloped and got married to each other without parental consent in the case of G, a teenaged student of an e"clusive
college for girls. 8hree years later, her parents wanted to
Ieasons. d. At this point in time, who is the lawful hus!and of &arts? Ieasons.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
see0 /udicial annulment on that ground. >ou were consulted
and as0ed to prepare the proper complaint. (hat advice would you give GDs parents? +"plain your answer.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*!. valid when cele!rated !ecause the divorce validly o!tained !y 3ohnson &aris and :edro is still validly e"isting, !ecause the marriage has not !een validly dissolved !y the &aryland divorce 2Art. 5G, Camily Code..
in &anila capacitated &aris to marry :edro. 8he marriage of
8he marriage of &aris and :edro was
G himself should file the complaint under Article JA of the
Camily Code, and no longer the parents !ecause G is

already 55 years of age. *arriage; 2nn%lment; 4roper 4art" (1999) *c. 8he marriage of &aris and ,incent is void a! initio
>vette was found to !e positive for H , virus, considered se"ually transmissi!le, serious and incura!le. Her !oyfriend
!ecause it is a !igamous marriage contracted !y &aris during the su!sistence of her marriage with :edro *Art 5A and J$, Camily Code..
8he marriage of &aris and ,incent does not validly e"ist !ecause Article 5G does not apply. :edro was not a foreigner at the time of his marriage with marts and the
3oseph was aware of her condition and yet married her. After two *5. years of coha!iting with >vette, and in his
!elief that she would pro!a!ly never !e a!le to !ear him a healthy child, 3oseph now wants to have his marriage with
>vette annulled. >vette opposes the suit contending that 3oseph is estopped from see0ing annulment of their
divorce a!road *in &aryland. was initiated and o!tained not !y the alien spouse, !ut !y the Cilipino spouse. Hence, the
&aryland divorce did not capacitate &arts to marry
marriage since he 0new even !efore their marriage that she was afflicted with H , virus.
,incent. *d. At this point in time, :edro is still the lawful hus!and of &aris !ecause their valid marriage has not !een dissolved !y any valid cause *Art. 5G. Camily Code. *arriage; Divorce Decrees; ,iliation of C&il0ren ('##9) n $<FA, #onny and Lulu, !oth Cilipino citi1ens, were married in the :hilippines. n $<F-, they separated, and #onny went to Canada, where he o!tained a divorce in the sam year. He then married another Cilipina, e Auring, in Canada on 3anuary $,$<FF. 8hey had two sons, 3ames and 3ohn. n $<<=, after failing to hear from #onny, Lulu #onny visited the :hilippines where he succum!ed to heart attac0..
married 8irso, !y whom she had a daughter, ,erna. n $<<$,
Can the action of 3oseph for annulment of his marriage with >vette prosper? Eiscuss fully.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, 3oseph 0new that >vette was H , positive at the time of the marriage. He is, therefore, not an in/ured party. 8he CC gives the right to annul the marriage only to an in/ured
party. 2Art. J- *A., CC;
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he action for annulment can prosper !ecause the prescriptive period of five *A. years has not yet lapsed. 2Art.
JA *G., CC;.
*arriage; Divorce Decree; @oi0 *arriages (199')
Page 26 of 119
a) F"s+.ss t!e e**e+t o* t!e %"vor+e o/ta"ne% /y Sonny

an% 5.l. "n Cana%a. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Clor and ,irgillo were married to each other in Io"as City in $<F%. n $<FJ, Clor was offered a teaching 3o! in
Canada, which she accepted. n $<F<, she applied for and was granted Canadian citi1enship. 8he following year, she sued for divorce from ,irgilio in a Canadian court. After
8he divorce is not valid. :hilippine law does not provide for
a!solute divorce. :hilippine courts cannot grant it. A
marriage !etween two *5. Cilipinos cannot !e dissolved !y a divorce o!tained a!road. (;ar+"a v. Re%o, ;.R. and Lulu.
,irgilio was served with summons, the Canadian court tried married a Canadian.
0o. 1383$$, <+to/er $, $001). :hilippine laws apply to #onny
the case and decreed the divorce. #hortly thereafter, Clor Can ,irgilio marry again in the :hilippines? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Lnder Article $A of the 'ew Civil Code, laws relating to
family rights and duties, status, and capacity of persons are !inding upon citi1ens of the :hilippines wherever they may !e. 8hus, the marriage of #onny and Lulu is still valid and
su!sisting.
'o, ,irgilio cannot validly remarry. His case is not covered

!y Article 5G of the Camily Code, Cor said Article to !e
applica!le, the spouse who filed for divorce must !e a
/) 23'la"n t!e stat.s o* t!e &arr"a,e /et9een Sonny

an% A.r"n,. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
#ince the decree of divorce o!tained !y Lulu and #ony in Canada is not recogni1ed here in the :hilippines, the
were Cilipinos at the time of the marriage, the divorce o!tained !y Clor did not capacitate ,irgilio to remarry. 8he fact that Clor was already an alien at the time she o!tained
the divorce does not give ,irgilio the capacity to remarry
foreigner at the time of the marriage. #ince !oth of them
marriage !etween #onny and Auring is void. *Art. 9A, Camily Code. Any marriage su!se7uently contracted during
the lifetime of the first spouse shall !e illegal and void, su!/ect only to the e"ception in the cases of a!sence or
under :hilippine Law.

a. >es, ,irgilio can validly remarry. Art. 5G of the CC,
merely #tates the alien spouse without ta0ing into consideration his or her nationality at the time of the
marriage. (hile his case is not covered !y the letter of
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. (0"nal

v. Gaya%o,, ;.R. 0o. 133((8, Mar+! 14, $000)
8he marriage
of #onny and Auring does not fall within the e"ception.
Article 5G CC, it is, however, covered !y the spirit of said

Article, the in/ustice to the Cilipino spouse sought to !e
+) an% T"rso. ($4)
23'la"n t!e stat.s o* t!e &arr"a,e /et9een 5.l.
cured !y said Article is present in this case. *Eepartment of

3ustice %pinion 'o. $9J #eries of $<<9..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he marriage of Lulu and 8irso is also void. &ere a!sence

of the spouse does not give rise to a right of the present
involved Cilipino !. citi1ens, it eventually !ecame a marriage !etween an alien and a Cilipino after Clor !ecame a Canadian citi1en. 8hus,
the divorce decree was one o!tained !y an alien spouse
Although the marriage originally
spouse to remarry. Article J$ of the Camily Code provides for a valid !igamous marriage only where a spouse has !een
married to a Cilipino. Although nothing is said a!out
a!sent for four consecutive years !efore the second
marriage and the present spouse had a well6 founded !elief that the a!sent spouse is already dead. *Iepu!lic v. 'olasco, G.I. 'o. <J=A9, &arch $-, $<<9. %) 23'la"n t!e res'e+t"ve *"l"at"on o* -a&es, -o!n an%
#erna. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
whether such divorce did capacitate Clor to remarry, that
fact may as well !e assumed since the pro!lem states that she married a Canadian shortly after o!taining the divorce.
Hence, ,irgillo can marry again under :hilippine law, pursuant to Art. 5G. CC which applies !ecause Clor was already an alien at the time of the divorce. *arriage; Divorce Decrees; ,ilipino 2lien (1999) po%ses becoming
3ames, 3ohn and ,erna are illegitimate children since their parents are not validly married. Lnder Article $GA of the Camily Code, children conceived and !orn outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this
Nen and +va were !oth Cilipino citi1ens at the time of their
marriage in $<G-, (hen their marriage turned sour, Nen
Cod e.
e) S.,,este% ans9erB
)!o are t!e !e"rs o* Sonny1 23'la"n. ($4)
went to a small country in +urope, got himself naturali1ed there, and then divorced +va in accordance with the law of that country, Later, he returned to the :hilippines with his
new wife.
#onnyDs heirs include 3ames, 3ohn, and Lulu. Article FF- of
the Civil Code provides that the compulsory heirs of the deceased are among others, his widow and his illegitimate children. 8he widow referred to in Article FFis the legal
against Nen. #he also wants to 0now if she can li0ewise marry again. (hat advice can you give her? VAB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
+va now wants to 0now what action or actions she can file
wife of the deceased. Lulu is still a compulsory heir of
Considering that Art. 5G*5nd par.. contemplates a divorce
#onny !ecause the divorce o!tained !y #onny in Canada cannot !e recogni1ed in the :hilippines. 8he legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one6 half of the legitime of a legitimate child. *Art. $-G, Camily Code. *arriage; Divorce Decrees; ,ilipino 2lien (199-) po%ses becoming
!etween a foreigner and a Cilipino, who had such respective

nationalities at the time of their marriage, the divorce in
advice we can give her is either to file a petition for legal
+urope will not capacitate the Cilipino wife to remarry. 8he

separation, on the ground of se"ual infidelity and of
contracting a !igamous marriage a!road, or to file a petition to dissolve the con/ugal partnership or a!solute community of property as the case may!e.
Page 27 of 119

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
+va may file an action for legal separation on the grounds

of se"ual infidelity of her hus!and and the contracting !y her hus!and of a !igamous marriage a!road.
the marriage, the conclusion is that EignaDs father may revo0e the donation and get !ac0 the car. *arriage; Bro%n0s; Declaration of .%llit"C 2nn%lmentC Legal eparationC eparation of 4ropert" ('##() (hich of the following remedies, i.e., *a. declaration of nullity of marriage, *!. annulment of marriage, *c. legal
separation, andSor *d. separation of property, can an
#he may remarry. (hile a strict interpretation of Article 5G

of the Camily Code would capacitate a Cilipino spouse to
remarry only when the other spouse was a foreigner at the time of the marriage, the E%3 has issued an opinion *%pinion $9J s. of $<<9. that the same in/ustice sought to !e cured !y Article 5G is present in the case of spouses who
aggrieved spouse avail himselfSherself of6 f the wife discovers after the *i. marriage that her *ii. hus!and has ?A E#@. f the wife goes *to. a!road to wor0 as a nurse and
were !oth Cilipino at the time of the marriage !ut one
!ecame an alien su!se7uently. #aid in/ustice is the anomaly of +va remaining married to her hus!and who is no longer married to her. Hence, said %pinion ma0es Article 5G
refuses to come home after the e"piration of her
applica!le to her case and the divorce o!tained a!road !y her former Cilipino hus!and would *iv. capacitate her to
remarry. 8o contract a su!se7uent marriage, all she needs to

do is present to the civil registrar the decree of divorce
three6year contract there. *iii. f the hus!and discovers after the marriage that his wife has !een a prostitute !efore they got married. f the hus!and has a serious affair with his secretary and refuses to stop notwithstanding advice from relatives and friends. f the hus!and !eats up his wife every time he comes home drun0. AB #ince A E# is a serious and incura!le se"ually6
when she applies for a marriage license under Article $9 of

the Camily Code. *arriage; Donations b" 1eason of *arriage; Effect of
*v.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*i.
Declaration of .%llit" (199-) $. %n the occasion of EignaDs marriage to George, her father gave her a donation propter nuptias of a car.
transmissi!le disease, the wife may file an action for
#u!se7uently, the marriage was annulled !ecause of the

psychological immaturity of George. &ay EignaDs father revo0e the donation and get !ac0 the car? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
ann%lment of the marriage on this ground whether such fact was concealed or not from the wife, provided that the disease was present at the time of the marriage. 8he marriage is voida!le even though the hus!and was not aware that he had the disease at the time of marriage.
f the wife refuses to come home for three *9. months from the e"piration of her contract, she is
'o, EignaDs father may not revo0e the donation !ecause
*ii.
Eigna was not in !ad faith, applying Art. FG*9. of the

Camily Code.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
presumed to have a!andoned the hus!and and he may file

an action for /%0icial separation of propert". f the refusal
a. >es, the donation is revoca!le. #ince the ground for the
continues for more than one year from the e"piration of her
annulment of the marriage is the psychological immaturity
contract, the hus!and may file the action for legal
of George, the /udgment was in the nature of a declaration of nullity under Art. 9G of the CC and, therefore, the donation may !e revo0ed under Art. FG* $. of the CC for
the reason that the marriage has !een /udicially declared void a! initio.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
separation under Art. AA *$=. of the Camily Code on the
deemed to have a!andoned the hus!and when she leaves the con/ugal dwelling without any intention of returning *Article $=$, CC.. 8he intention not to return cannot !e presumed during the 9=year period of her contract.
ground of a!andonment of petitioner !y respondent without /ustifia!le cause for more than one year. 8he wife is
!. 'o, the donation cannot !e revo0ed. 8he law provides
that a donation !y reason of marriage may !e revo0ed !y the donor if among other cases, the marriage is /udicially declared void a! initio 2par. *$. Art. FG. Camily Code;, or
wife was a prostitute !efore they got married, he has no
*iii.
f the hus!and discovers after the marriage that his
when the marriage is annulled and the donee acted in !ad

faith 2par. *9., d.;. #ince the pro!lem states that the marriage was annulled and there is no intimation of !ad
remedy. 'o misrepresentation or deceit as to character,

health, ran0, fortune or chastity shall constitute fraud as legal ground for an action for the annulment of marriage
faith on the part of the donee Eigna, the conclusion is that

the donor cannot revo0e the donation.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
*Article JG CC..
8he wife may file an action for legal separation. 8he hus!andOs se"ual infidelity is a ground for legal
*iv.
c. >es, the donation can !e revo0ed. 8he ground used in
dissolving the marriage was the psychological immaturity of George, which is not a ground for annulment of marriage. f this term is e7uated with psychological incapacity as used in Art. 9G of the Camily Code, then it is a ground for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Conse7uently, par. *$. of Art. FG, CC, is the applica!le law. #ince Art. FG of the CC
ma0es no 7ualification as to who furnished the ground or
separation <Article AA, CC.. #he may also file an action for /%0icial separation of propert" for failure of her hus!and to comply with his martial duty of fidelity *Article $9A *J., $=$, CC.. 8he wife may file an action for legal separation *v. on the ground of repeated physical violence on her person *Article AA *$., CC.. #he may also file an action for /%0icial
who was in !ad faith in connection with the nullification of
Page 28 of 119
separation of propert" for failure of the hus!and to comply Article $=$, CC.. #he may also file an action for 0eclaration
with his marital duty of mutual respect *Article $9A *J., of n%llit" of the marriage if the hus!andOs !ehavior constitute psychological incapacity e"isting at the time of the cele!ration of marriage.
#audi Ara!ia to wor0. 8here, after !eing converted into slam, Ariel married &ystica, Iosa learned of the second
marriage of Ariel on 3anuary $, $<<5 when Ariel returned to the :hilippines with &ystica. Iosa filed an action for legal separation on Ce!ruary A, $<<J,
$. Eoes Iosa have legal grounds to as0 for legal separation? Has the action 5. prescri!ed?
*arriage; Bro%n0s; .%llit"; 2nn%lment; Legal eparation (1997) Lnder what conditions, respectively, may drug addiction !e a ground, if at all, *a. for a declaration of nullity of marriage, *!. for an annulment of the marriage contract, and *c. for
legal separation !etween the spouses?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. a. >es, the a!andonment of Iosa !y Ariel for more than
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
one *$. year is a ground for legal separation unless upon returning to the :hilippines, Iosa agrees to coha!it with
Ariel which is allowed under the &uslim Code. n this case,

there is condonation.
!. >es. 8he contracting of a su!se7uent !igamous marriage
*a . Eeclaration of nullity of marriage: $. 8he drug addiction must amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential o!ligations
of marriage)
whether in the :hilippines or a!road is a ground for legal
separation under Article AA*-. of the Camily Code. (hether the second marriage is valid or not, Ariel having converted into slam, is immaterial.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
5. t must
marriage., grave and incura!le:
!e antecedent *e"isting at the time of
9. 8he case !e filed !efore August $, must $<<F. Necause if they got married !efore August 9, $<<F, it must !e filed !efore August $, $<<F. *! Annulment of the &arriage . Contract:
Lnder Article A- of the Camily Code, the aggrieved spouse must file the action within five *A. years
5.
'o.
from the occurrence of the cause. 8he su!se7uent marriage of Ariel could not have occurred earlier than $<<=, the time
he went to #audi Ara!ia. Hence, Iosa has until $<<A to !ring the action under the Camily Code.
$. 8he drug addiction must !e concealed)
5. t must e"ist at the time of marriage)

9. 8here should !e no on
coha!itati
0nowledge of the drug addiction) 8he case is within five *A. J. filed
wit h
full
year from s
n one of the trysts, #aulDs wife, Cecile, caught them in flagrante. Armed with a gun, Cecile shot #aul in a fit of
*arriage; Legal eparation; *%t%al g%ilt ('##-) #aul, a married man, had an adulterous relation with 8essie.
discovery.
*c. Legal #eparation) drug addiction)
e"treme /ealousy, nearly 0illing him. Cour *J. years after the
incident, #aul filed an action for legal separation against
$. 8here should !e no condonation or consent to the 5. 8he action must !e filed within five *A. years from
Cecile on the ground that she attempted to 0ill him. (1) I* yo. 9ere Sa.lDs +o.nsel, !o9 9"ll yo. ar,.e !"s +ase1 ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
As the counsel of #aul, will argue that an attempt !y the
9. Erug addiction arises during the marriage and not

at the time of marriage.
the occurrence of the cause.
wife against the life of the hus!and is one of the grounds

enumerated !y the Camily Code for legal separation and
there is no need for criminal conviction for the ground to

!e invo0ed *Art. AA, par. <, Camily Code..
*arriage; Legal eparation; Declaration of .%llit" ('##')
f drug addiction, ha!itual alcoholism, les!ianism or
homose"uality should occur only during the marriage,
($) I* yo. 9ere t!e la9yer o* Ce+"le, 9!at 9"ll /e yo.r %e*ense1 ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
would this constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for legal separation, or would they render the marriage
voida!le? *$B..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
As the counsel of Cecile, will invo0e the adultery of #aul. &utual guilt is a ground for the dismissal of an action for
legal separation *Art. AG, par. J, Camily Code.. 8he rule is
n accordance with law, if drug addiction, ha!itual alcoholism, les!ianism or homose"uality should occur only
during the marriage, they: *Art. 9G, Camily Code.)
anchored on a well6esta!lished principle that one must

come to court with clean hands. (3) I* yo. 9ere t!e :.%,e, !o9 9"ll yo. %e+"%e t!e
a. (ill not constitute as ground for declaration of nullity !. (ill constitute as grounds for legal separation *Art. AG,
CC. and c. will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage voida!le *Art.JAand JG, CC.
+ase1 (74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
f were the /udge, will dismiss the action on the ground protects marriage as an inviola!le social institution *Art.
of mutual guilt of the parties. 8he :hilippine Constitution 4,, #ec. 5, $<F- Constitution.. An action for legal
*arriage; Legal
eparation; Bro%n0s; 4rescriptive 4erio0
(199!)
separation involves pu!lic interest and no such decree

should !e issued if any legal o!stacle thereto appears on
Iosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of 8arlac, 8arlac on 3anuary A. $<FF. n $<<=, Ariel went to
record. 8his is in line with the policy that in case of dou!t,
Page 29 of 119
the court shall uphold the validity and sanctity of marriage

(Gro9n v. ?a&/ao, ;.R. 0o. 5610699, <+to/er 18, 197().
the preceding Article, only the properties ac7uired !y !oth of the parties through their actual /oint contri!ution of common in proportion to their respective contri!utions. n
money, property, or industry shall !e owned !y them in
*arriage; .on?;igamo%s *arriages ('##-)
&arvin, a Cilipino, and #helley, an American, !oth residents

of California, decided to get married in their local parish.
the a!sence, of proof to the contrary, their contri!utions and corresponding shares are presumed to !e e7ual. 8he
8wo years after their marriage, #helley o!tained a divorce in California. (hile in Noracay, &arvin met &anel, a Cilipina,
who was vacationing there. &arvin fell in love with her.
same rule and presumption shall apply to /oint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
After a !rief courtship and complying with all the
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
re7uirements, they got married in Hong0ong to avoid
C.
t should !e distinguished when the property was
pu!licity, it !eing &arvinDs second marriage. s his marriage

to &anel valid? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es. 8he marriage will not fall under Art. 9A*J. of the Camily Code on !igamous marriages, provided that #helley
ac7uired. U f it was ac7uired !efore &aryDs death, the estate of &ary is entitled to $S5 of the share of 3ames.
U
f it was ac7uired after &aryDs death, there will
o!tained an a!solute divorce, capacitating her to remarry
!e no share at all for the estate of &ary. *arriage; 4s"c&ological )ncapacit" (199-) %n April $A, $<F9, 3ose, an engineer, and &arina, a nurse,
were married to each other in a civil ceremony in Noac.
under her national law. Conse7uently, the marriage !etween &arvin and &anel may !e valid as long as it was solemni1ed and valid in accordance with the laws of Hong0ong 2Art. 5G,
paragraphs $ and 5, Camily Code;.
*arriage; 4ropert" 1elations; @oi0 *arriages (1991)
&arindu7ue. #i" months after their marriage, 3ose was employed in an oil refinery in #audi Ara!ia for a period of was no longer living in their house, !ut in Ham!oanga City, wor0ing in a hospital. He as0ed her to come home, !ut she
refused to do so, unless he agreed not to wor0 overseas anymore !ecause she cannot stand living alone. He could three years. (hen he returned to the :hilippines, &arina
n 3une $<FA, 3ames married &ary. n #eptem!er $<FF, he also married %phelia with whom he !egot two *5. children, A and N. n 3uly $<F<, &ary died. n 3uly $<<=, he married #hirley and a!andoned %phelia, Euring their union. 3ames and %phelia ac7uired a residential lot worth :9==,===.==. %phelia sues 3ames for !igamy and prays that his marriage with #hirley !e declared null and void. 3ames, on the other
hand, claims that since his marriage to %phelia was
not agree as in fact, he had signed another three year

contract. (hen he returned in $<F<, he could not locate &arina anymore. n $<<5, 3ose filed an action served !y pu!lication in a newspaper of general circulation. &arina did not file any answer, a possi!le collusion !etween the parties was ruled out !y the :u!lic :rosecutor. 8rial was
contracted during the e"istence of his marriage with &ary, the former is not !inding upon him, the same !eing void a!
initio he further claims that his marriage to #hirley is valid and !inding as he was already legally capacitated at the time
he married her.
conducted and &arina neither appeared nor presented evidence in her favor.
a. s the contention of 3ames correct? !. (hat property Ielations governed the union of 3ames
and %phelia? c. s the estate of &ary entitled to a share in the residential lot ac7uired !y 3ames and %phelia?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
f you were the /udge, will you grant the annulment. +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
As /udge, will not grant the annulment. 8he facts do not

show any taint of personality disorder on the part of the
A. >es. His marriage to %phelia is void a! initio !ecause of his su!sisting prior marriage to &ary. His marriage to
#hirley, after &aryDs death, is valid and !inding.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
wife &arina so as to lend su!stance to her hus!andDs averment of psychological incapacity within the meaning of Art 9G of the Camily Code. n Santos vs. CA ($40 SCRA $0), this particular ground for nullity of marriage was held to !e
3ames is not correct. A. 'o. 8he contention of Art. J=, Camily Code, provides that the "a!solute nullity of a
previous marriage may !e invo0ed for purposes of remarriage on the !asis solely of a final /udgment declaring such previous marriage void." t can !e said, therefore, that the marriage of 3ames to #hirley is void since his previous marriage to %phelia, although itself void, had not yet !een
/udicially declared void,
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
agreed not to wor0 overseas, far from !eing indicative of an insensitivity to the meaning of marriage, or of a personality disorder, actually shows a sensitive awareness on her part of the marital duty to live together as hus!and and wife. &ere
refusal to re/oin her hus!and when he did not accept the condition imposed !y her does not furnish any !asis for concluding that she was suffering from psychological
limited only to the most serious cases of personality disorders *clearly demonstrative of utter sensitivity or ina!ility to give meaning and significance to the marriage. &arinaDs refusal to come home to her hus!and unless he
'o. 8he contention of 3ames is not A. correct. cannot set up as a defense his own criminal act or
He
wrongdoing6
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
N. 8he provisions of Art $JF of the Camily Code, shall
incapacity to discharge the essential marital o!ligations. &ere intention to live apart does not fall under Art. 9G, CC. Curthermore, there is no proof that the alleged psychological incapacity e"isted at the time of the marriage.
govern: Art. $JF. n cases of coha!itation not falling under
Page 30 of 119
(Santos v. CA, ;.R. 0o. 11$019, -an.
(C!" M"n, Tso"
*arriage; 4s"c&ological )ncapacit" ('##-)

Gemma filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Arnell on the ground of psychological incapacity. #he alleged that after 5 months of their marriage, Arnell showed signs of disinterest in her, neglected her and went a!road. He returned to the :hilippines after 9 years !ut did not even get in touch with her. (orse, they met several times in social functions !ut he snu!!ed her. (hen she got sic0, he did not visit her even if he 0new of her confinement in the hospital. &eanwhile, Arnell met an accident which disa!led him from reporting for wor0 and earning a living to support himself.
JG, Camily Code.. 8hey may serve as indicia of psychological incapacity, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder

1997). Hence, if the condition of homose"uality, les!ianism or se"ual perversion, e"isting at the inception of the marriage, is of such a degree as to prevent any form of se"ual intimacy, any of them may 7ualify as a ground for psychological incapacity. 8he law provides that the hus!and and wife are o!liged to live together, o!serve mutual love, respect and fidelity *Art. GF, Camily Code.. 8he mandate is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection !etween the spouses. n the natural order it is se"ual intimacy which 4,
(ill GemmaDs suit prosper? +"plain. *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!rings the spouses wholeness and oneness v.

CA, ;.R. 0o. 119190, -an.ary 16,199().
'o, GemmaDs suit will not prosper. +ven if ta0en as true, the grounds, singly or collectively, do not constitute "psychological incapacity." n Santos v. CA, ;.R. 0o. 11$019, -an.ary 4, 1997 , the #upreme Court clearly e"plained that "psychological incapacity must !e characteri1ed !y *a. gravity, *!. /uridical antecedence, and *c. incura!ility"
(8errar"s v. 8errar"s, ;.R. 0o. 16$368, -.ly 1(, $006C C!oa v. C!oa, ;.R. 0o. 1433(6, 0ove&/er $6, $00$) . 8he illness must !e
shown as downright incapacity or ina!ility to perform oneDs marital o!ligations, not a mere refusal, neglect, difficulty or much less, ill will. &oreover, as ruled in
Re'./l"+ v. Mol"na, ;R 0o. 108(63, 8e/r.ary 13, 199(, it is essential that the hus!and is
capa!le of meeting his marital responsi!ilities due to psychological and not physical illness
(Anton"o v. Reyes, ;.R. 0o. 177800, Mar+! 10, $006C Re'./l"+ v. H."ntero6Aa&ano, ;.R. 0o. 149498, May $0, $004) .
Curthermore, the condition complained of did not e"ist at the time of the cele!ration of marriage. *arriage; 4s"c&ological )ncapacit" ('##-) Article 9G of the Camily Code provides that a marriage contracted !y any party who, at the time of the cele!ration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital o!ligations of marriage, shall !e void. Choose the spouse listed !elow who is psychologically incapacitated. +"plain. *5.AB. a. 'agger !. Gay or Les!ian c. Congenital se"ual pervert d. Gam!ler e. Alcoholic
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he !est answers are N and C. 8o !e sure, the e"istence and concealment of these conditions at the inception of marriage renders the marriage contract voida!le *Art.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
'one of them are necessarily psychologically incapacitated. Neing a nagger, etc. are at !est only physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. &ore than /ust showing the manifestations of incapacity, the petitioner must show that the respondent is incapacitated to comply with the essential marital o!ligations of marriage and that it is also essential that he must !e shown to !e incapa!le of doing so due to some psychological, not physical illness
(Re'./l"+ v. H."ntero6Aa&ano, ;.R. 0o. 149498, May $0, $004).
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
A congenital se"ual pervert may !e psychologically incapaci6 tated if his perversion incapacitates him from discharging his marital o!ligations. Cor instance, if his perversion is of such a nature as to preclude any normal se"ual activity with his spouse. *arriage; 1e$%isites (1999) sidro and rma, Cilipinos, !oth $F years of age, were passengers of Clight 'o. 9$- of %riental Airlines. 8he plane they !oarded was of :hilippine registry. (hile en route from &anila to Greece some passengers hi/ac0ed the plane, held the chief pilot hostage at the coc0pit and ordered him to fly instead to Li!ya. Euring the hi/ac0ing sidro suffered a heart attac0 and was on the verge of death. #ince rma was already eight months pregnant !y sidro, she pleaded to the hi/ac0ers to allow the assistant pilot to solemni1e her marriage with sidro. #oon after the marriage, sidro e"pired. As
the plane landed in Li!ya rma gave !irth. However, the !a!y died a few minutes after complete delivery. Nac0 in the :hilippines rma immediately filed a claim for inheritance. 8he parents of sidro opposed her claim contending that the marriage !etween her and sidro was void a! initio on the following grounds: *a. they had not given their consent to the marriage of their son) *!. there was no marriage license) *c. the solemni1ing officer had no authority to perform the marriage) and, *d. the solemni1ing officer did not file an affidavit of marriage with the proper civil registrar. $. Iesolve each of the contentions *2a; to 2d;. raised !y the parents of sidro. Eiscuss fully.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. *a. 8he fact that the parents of sidro and of rma did not give their consent to the marriage did not ma0e the marriage void a! initio. 8he marriage is merely voida!le under Art JA of the CC. *!. A!sence of marriage license did not ma0e the marriage void a! initio. #ince the marriage was solemni1ed in articulo mortis, it was e"empt from the license re7uirement under Art. 9$ of the CC. *c. %n the assumption that the assistant pilot was acting for and in !ehalf of the airplane chief who was under disa!ility, and !y reason of the e"traordinary and e"ceptional circumstances of the case 2ie. hostage situation., the marriage was solemni1ed !y an authori1ed officer under Art. - *9. and Art. 9$. of the CC.
:age 31 of
$$<
*d. Cailure of the solemni1ing officer to file the affidavit of

marriage did not affect the validity of the marriage. t is merely an irregularity which may su!/ect the solemni1ing officer to sanctions.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
f the two Cilipinos !elieved in good faith that the 'otary

:u!lic is authori1ed to solemni1e marriage, then the marriage is valid.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Considering that the solemni1ing officer has no authority to authori1es only the airplane chief, the marriage is void,
hence, a, c, and d are immaterial.
perform the marriage !ecause under Art. the law
*e. Lnder the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemni1e a marriage !ut said law is silent as to the
*arriage; 1e$%isites (1999) (hat is the status of the following marriages and why?
*a. A marriage !etween two $<6year olds without parental conse nt, *5B.
mem!ers of the 3udiciary to solemni1e a marriage, it would seem that the mayor did not have the re7uisite authority to
territorial limits for the e"ercise !y a town mayor of such However, !y analogy, with the authority. authority of
solemni1e a marriage outside of his territorial /urisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void, unless it was contracted with
*!. A marriage !etween two 5$6year olds without parental *c. A marriage !etween two Cilipino first cousins in #pain where such marriage is valid. *5B.
*d. A marriage !etween two Cilipinos in Hong0ong !efore a notary pu!lic. *5B. away from his /urisdiction, advice . *5B.
either or !oth parties !elieving in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to solemni1e this particular marriage *Art 9A, par 5 Camily Code..
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he marriage is valid. Lnder the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor to solemni1e marriages is not authority even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the
marriage he solemni1ed outside his municipality is valid. municipality, such marriage will nevertheless, !e valid
*e. A marriage solemni1ed !y a town mayor three towns *5B.
restricted within his municipality implying that he has the
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a. 8he marriage is voida!le. 8he consent of the parties to

the marriage was defective. Neing !elow 5$ years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their parents. 8he consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensa!le for its validity.
And even assuming that his authority is restricted within his !ecause solemni1ing the marriage outside said municipality is a mere irregularity applying !y analogy the case of 0avarro v Fo&a,toy, $79 S+ra 1$9. n this case, the #upreme
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*!. Netween 5$6year olds, the marriage is valid
despite the a!sence of parental advice, a!sence !ecause such is merely an irregularity affecting a formal re7uisite i.e., the
Court held that the cele!ration !y a /udge of a marriage outside the /urisdiction of his court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the validity of the marriage notwithstanding Article - of the Camily Code which
marriage license and does not affect the validity of the
provides that an incum!ent mem!er of the /udiciary is

authori1ed to solemni1e marriages only within the courtOs
marriage itself. 8his is without pre/udice to the civil,
/urisdictio n.
criminal, or administrative lia!ility of the party responsi!le

therefor.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!etween *c. Cilipino first cousins is void 2Art. 9F, par. *$., Camily Code;, and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in a foreign
Ny reason of pu!lic policy, the marriage
country in this case, #painW does not validate it, !eing an e"ception to the general rule in Art. <G of said Code which accords validity to all marriage solemni1ed outside the
:hilippine " " " and valid there as such.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE"
*arriage; 1e$%isites; *arriage License (199-) %n ,alentineDs Eay $<<G, +llas and Cely, !oth single and 5A years of age, went to the city hall where they sought out a fi"er to help them o!tain a 7uic0ie marriage. Cor a fee, the fi"er produced an ante6dated marriage license for them, ssued !y the Civil Iegistrar of a small remote municipality. He then !rought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant !ehind the city hall, and the latter solemni1ed their marriage
right there and then.
$.
s their marriage valid, void or voida!le? +"plain.
8he marriage it void. Lnder Article <G of the Camily Code, a marriage valid where cele!rated is valid in the :hilippines
e"cept those marriages enumerated in said Article which marriages will remain void even though valid where solemni1ed. 8he marriage !etween first cousins is one of
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he marriage is valid. 8he irregularity in the issuance of a valid license does not adversely affect the validity of the
marriage. 8he marriage license is valid !ecause it was in fact issued !y a Civil Iegistrar *Arts. 9 and J. CC..
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void even though valid in #pain where it was cele!rated.
Ny reason of Art. $A in relation to Article 9F of the Civil
t depends. f !oth or one of the parties was a mem!er of the religious sect of the solemni1ing officer, the marriage is !oth of them were aware of the fact, the marriage is void. 8hey cannot claim good faith in !elieving that the solemni1ing officer was authori1ed !ecause the scope of the
authority of the solemni1ing officer is a matter of law. f,
valid. f none of the parties is a mem!er of the sect and
Code, which applies to Cilipinos wherever they are, the marriage is void.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*d. t depends. f the marriage !efore the notary pu!lic is

valid under Hong0ong Law, the marriage is valid in the :hilippines. Hong0ong will !e invalid in the :hilippines.
%therwise, the marriage that is invalid in
however, one of the parties !elieved in good faith that the other was a mem!er of the sect, then the marriage is valid
Page 32 of 119
under Article 9A *5., CC. n that case, the party in good faith is acting under a mista0e of fact, not a mista0e of law, 5. (ould your answer !e the same if it should turn out that
the marriage license was spurious? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8his is different from the case of 0"nal #.

Gaya%o,, (3$8 SCRA 1$$ [$000]..
n the said case, the
during the Ielations of the new Civil Code where Article -G thereof clearly provides that during the five6year coha!itation, the parties must !e unmarried. 8his is not so
anymore in the Camily Code. 8he Change in the Camily
situation occurred
'o, the answer would not !e the same. 8he marriage would
!e void !ecause of the a!sence of a formal re7uisite. n such a case, there was actually no valid marriage license. *arriage; 1e$%isites; *arriage License ('##')
Code is significant. f the second marriage occurred !efore the effectivity of the Camily Code, the answer would that !e N. Eoes #otero have the personality to see0 the declaration
of nullity of the marriage, especially now that Cacundo is that the marriage is void.
%n &ay $, $<-F Cacundo married :etra, !y whom he had a son #otero. :etra died on 3uly $, $<<G, while Cacundo died
on 3anuary $, 5==5. Nefore his demise, Cacundo had
already deceased? +"plain. *9B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
married, on 3uly $, 5==5, Puercia. Having lived together as hus!and and wife since 3uly $, $<<=, Cacundo and Puercia did not secure a marriage license !ut e"ecuted the re7uisite affidavit for the purpose. 8o ensure that his inheritance rights are not adversely affected !y his father second marriage, #otero now !rings a
suit to see0 a declaration of the nullity of the marriage of
party in any proceeding where the resolution of the issue is material. Neing a compulsory heir, #oterro has the personality to 7uestion the validity of the marriage of
Cacundo and Puercia. %therwise, his participation in the
N. A void marriage may !e 7uestioned !y any interested
estate on Cacundo would !e affected.

3$8 SCRA 1$$ [$000] ).
(0"nIl #. Gaya%o,,
Cacundo and Puercia, grounded on the a!sence of a valid marriage license. Puercia contends that there was no need
for a marriage license in view for her having lived continuously with Cacundo for five years !efore their
marriage and that has #otero has no legal personality to see0
a declaration of nullity of the marriage since Cacundo is now deceased.
*arriage; 1e$%isites; olemni>ing Officers (199!) $M 8he complete pu!lication of the Camily Code was made on August J, $<F-. %n #eptem!er J, $<F-, 3unior Cru1 and Gemma Ieyes were married !efore a municipal mayor. (as the marriage valid? 5. #uppose the couple got married on #eptem!er $, $<<J at
A.
despite the a!sence of a marriage license? +"plain. *5B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
s the marriage of Cacundo and Puercia valid,
A.
from the re7uirement of a marriage license under Art, 9J,
8he marriage with Puercia is void. 8he e"emption
the &anila Hotel !efore the :hilippine Consul General to Hong0ong, who was on vacation in &anila. 8he couple e"ecuted an affidavit consenting to the cele!ration of the marriage at the &anila Hotel. s the marriage valid?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Camily Code, re7uires that the man and woman must have
$.
a. >es, the marriage is valid. 8he Camily Code too0
lived together as hus!and and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other during
effect on August 9, $<FF. At the time of the marriage on

#eptem!er J, $<F-, municipal mayors were empowered to
those five years. 8he coha!itation of Cacundo and Puercia for si" years from $<<= to 3uly $, $<<G when :etra died was one with a legal impediment hence, not in compliance with
the re7uirement of law. %n other hand, the coha!itation
solemni1e marriage under the Civil Code of $<A=. a. 8he marriage is not Consuls and vice6 5. valid. consuls are empowered to solemni1e marriages !etween :hilippine citi1ens a!road in the consular office of the foreign country
to which they were assigned and have no power to
thereafter until the marriage on 3uly $, 5===, although free from legal impediment, did not meet the A6year coha!itation
re7uirement.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
solemni1e marriage on :hilippine soil.

!. A :hilippine consul is authori1ed !y law to solemni1e
8he marriage of Cacundo and Puercia is ,AL E. 8he second marriage was solemni1ed on 3uly $, 5===, when the
Camily code was already affective. 8he family code too0
marriages a!road !etween Cilipino citi1ens. He has no Conse7uently, the marriage in 7uestion is void, unless either or !oth of the contracting parties !elieved in good faith that the consul general had authority to solemni1e their marriage
in which case the marriage is valid. authority to solemni1e a marriage in the :hilippines.
effect on August 9, $<FF. Lnder the Camily Code, no

marriage license is re7uired if the parties have !een
coha!iting for the period of five years and there is no legal

impediment. 8here must no legal impediment
<05? AT
TA2 TA2
TIM2
<8
TA2
S<52M0I=ATI<0
<8
MARRIA;2, and not the whole five years M"n.tes o* t!e
period. 8his is clearly the intent of the code framers *see

170t! :o"nt C"v"l Co%e o* t!e 8a&"ly 5a9 Co&&"ttees !el% on A.,.st 9, 1986.. Also, in Man@ano #. San+!e@, AM 0<. MT J0061$9, Mar+! 8, $001, the #upreme Court said
&anila. %n August 9, $<FF, while in first year college, they eloped. 8hey stayed in the house of a mutual friend in town August 9=, $<FF, their marriage was solemni1ed !y the town mayor of 4 in his office. 8hereafter, they returned to &anila and continued to live separately in their respective !oarding
4, where they were a!le to o!tain a marriage license. %n
*arriage; 1e$%isites; @oi0 *arriage (199() A and N, !oth $F years old, were sweethearts studying in
that, as one of the re7uisites for the e"ception to apply, there must !e no legal impediment at the time of the marriage. 8he #upreme Court did not say that the legal impediment must
e"ist all throughout the five6year period.
houses, concealing from their parents, who were living in
the province what they had done. n $<<5, after graduation
Page 33 of 119
from college, A and N decided to !rea0 their relation and
parted ways. Noth went home to their respective towns to

live and wor0.
$. (as the marriage of A and N solemni1ed on August 9=, $<FF !y the town mayor of 4 in his office a valid marriage? +"plain your answer.
5. Can either or !oth of them contract marriage with another person without committing !igamy? +"plain your answer.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
:hilippine Law, his marriage to Anne is void !ecause of a prior e"isting marriage which was not dissolved !y the divorce decreed in %slo. Eivorce o!tained a!road !y a
Cilipino is not recogni1ed.
f Noni was no longer a Cilipino citi1en, the divorce is valid.
Hence, his marriage to Anne is valid if cele!rated in accordance with the law of the place where it was
$. 8he marriage of A and N is void !ecause the solemni1ing officer had no legal authority to solemni1e the marriage. Nut if either or !oth parties !elieved in good faith that the
solemni1ing officer had the legal authority to do so, the
cele!rated. #ince the marriage was cele!rated a!oard a vessel of 'orwegian registry, 'orwegian law applies. f the
#hip Captain has authority to solemni1e the marriage a!oard
his ship, the marriage is valid and shall !e recogni1ed in the :hilippines. As to the second 7uestion, if Noni is still a Cilipino, Anne can file an action for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to him. *arriage; @oi0 *arriages ('##-) Gigi and Iic, Catholics, got married when they were $F
marriage is voida!le !ecause the marriage !etween the parties, !oth !elow 5$ years of age, was solemni1ed without the consent of the parents. *Art. 9A, par. *5. and Art. JA par.
*$., Camily Code.
5. +ither or !oth of the parties cannot contract marriage in the :hilippines with another person without committing !igamy, unless there is compliance with the re7uirements of Article A5 Camily Code, namely: there must !e a /udgment
of annulment or a!solute nullity of the marriage, partition and distri!ution of the properties of the spouses and the
years old. 8heir marriage was solemni1ed on August 5, $<F< !y IicDs uncle, a Naptist &inister, in Calam!a, Laguna. He
overloo0ed the fact that his license to solemni1e marriage
delivery of their childrenDs presumptive legitimes, which shall !e recorded in the appropriate Civil Iegistry and
e"pired the month !efore and that the parties do not !elong to his congregation. After A years of married life and !lessed
with 5 children, the spouses developed irreconcila!le
Iegistry of :roperty, otherwise the same shall not affect void. *Arts. A5 and A9. Camily Code.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
differences, so they parted ways.

(hile separated, Iic fell in love with 3uliet, a $G year6old
third persons and the su!se7uent marriage shall !e null and
sophomore in a local college and a #eventh6 Eay Adventist.

8hey decided to get married with the consent of 3ulietDs is $F years old. Iic never dou!ted her age much less the authenticity of her !irth certificate. 8hey got married in a
5. >es, they can. 8he su!se7uent marriage contracted !y
parents. #he presented to him a !irth certificate showing she
one of the parties will not give rise to !igamy even in the
a!sence of a court declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. 8he su!sistence of a prior valid marriage is an indispensa!le element of the crime of !igamy. 8he prior
court declaration of nullity of the first marriage is re7uired !y the Camily Code only for the purpose of the validity of the su!se7uent marriage, not as an element of the crime of !igamy.
*arriage; @oi0 *arriages ('##!)
Catholic church in &anila. A year after, 3uliet gave !irth to twins, Aissa and Aretha. (1) )!at "s t!e stat.s o* t!e &arr"a,e /et9een ;"," an% R"+ K val"%, vo"%a/le or vo"%1 23'la"n. ($.74) (+&&E($E# A'(WE": +ven if the &inisterDs license e"pired, the marriage is valid if either or !oth Gigi and Iic
!elieved in good faith that he had the legal authority to
A. N%' and A''+ met while wor0ing overseas. 8hey !ecame sweethearts and got engaged to !e married on 'ew
>earOs +ve a!oard a cruise ship in the Cari!!ean. there is a Cilipino consulate.
8hey too0 the proper license to marry in 'ew >or0 City, where
Nut as planned the wedding
solemni1e marriage. (hile the authority of the solemni1ing officer is a formal re7uisite of marriage, and at least one of the parties must !elong to the solemni1ing officerDs church, the law provides that the good faith of the parties cures the
defect in the lac0 of authority of the solemni1ing officer
(Art. 37 'ar. $, 8a&"ly Co%eC Se&'"o6F"y, '. 34C Ra/.ya, T!e 5a9 on ersons an% 8a&"ly Relat"ons, '. $08).
ceremony was officiated !y the captain of the 'orwegian6

registered vessel in a private suite among selected friends. Nac0 in &anila, Anne discovered that Noni had !een
8he a!sence of parental consent despite their having
married in Nacolod City A years earlier !ut divorced in %slo
married at the age of $F is deemed cured !y their continued coha!itation !eyond the age of 5$. At this point, their
marriage is valid *#ee Art. JA, Camily Code..
only last His first wife was also a Cilipina year. !ut now !ased in Noni himself is a resident of #weden. 'orway where he and Anne plan to live permanently. Anne retains your services to advise her on whether her marriage to Noni is valid under :hilippine law? s there anything else she should do under the circumstances? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
($)
)!at "s t!e stat.s o* t!e &arr"a,e /et9een R"+
an% -.l"et K val"%, vo"%a/le or vo"%1 ($.74)

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he marriage !etween 3uliet and Iic is void. Cirst of all, the marriage is a !igamous marriage not falling under Article J$ 2Art. 9A*J.Camily Code;, A
su!sisting marriage constitutes a legal impediment to re6 marriage. #econdly, 3uliet is !elow eighteen years of age. 8he marriage is void even if consented to !y her parents
f Noni is still a Cilipino citi1en, his legal capacity is

governed !y :hilippine Law *Art. $A Civil Code.. Lnder
Page 34 of 119
2Art. 9A*$., Camily Code;. 8he fact that Iic was not aware
of her real age is immaterial.
Lnder Article 5$9 of the Camily Code, no child under -
years of age shall !e separated from the mother unless the

court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (1) 23'la"n t!e rat"onale o* t!"s 'rov"s"on. ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
(3) S.''ose R"+ !"&sel* 'ro+.re% t!e *als"*"e% /"rt! +ert"*"+ate to 'ers.a%e -.l"et to &arry !"& %es'"te !er Ae %"% not %"v.l,e to !er !"s 'r"or &arr"a,e 9"t! ;",". )!at a+t"on, "* any, +an -.l"et taEe a,a"nst !"&1
23'la"n. ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
&"nor"ty an% ass.re% !er t!at everyt!"n, "s "n or%er.
8he rationale of the 5nd paragraph of Article 5$9 of the her !a!y torn away from her. t is said that the maternal affection and care during the early years of the child are
Camily Code is to avoid the tragedy of a mother who sees
the declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that he

willfully caused loss or in/ury to her in a manner that is
3uliet can file an action for
generally needed !y the child more than paternal care
contrary to morals, good customs and pu!lic policy 2Art. 5$,
(Aont"veros v. IAC, ;.R. 0o. 6498$, <+to/er $3, 1984C Tolent"no, Co&&entar"es an% -.r"s'r.%en+e on t!e C"v"l Co%e, #ol.&e <ne, ''. (186(19). 8he general
rule is that a
'ew Civil Code;. #he may also !ring criminal actions for seduction, falsification, illegal marriage and !igamy against
mother due to his !asic need for her loving care (2s'"r"t. v.
C.A., ;.R. 0o. 117640, Mar+! 17,1997).
child !elow - years old shall not !e separated from his
Iic. (4) I* yo. 9ere t!e +o.nsel *or ;",", 9!at a+t"onLs 9"ll yo. taEe to en*or+e an% 'rote+t !er "nterests1 23'la"n.
($.7 4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
($) ;"ve at least 3 e3a&'les o* M+o&'ell"n, reasonsM

9!"+! :.st"*y t!e &ot!erDs t!e taE"n,
a9ay
*ro&
+.sto%y o* !er +!"l% .n%er ( years o* a,e. ($.74)

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
the marriage !etween 3uliet and Iic null and void a! initio and for IicDs share in the co6ownership of that marriage to !e forfeited in favor and considered part of the a!solute community in the marriage !etween Gigi and Iic 2Arts. $JF X $J-, Camily Code;. would also file an action for damages against Iic on the grounds that his acts constitute an a!use of right and they are contrary to law and morals,
causing damages to Gigi *#ee Arts $<, 5=, 5$, 'ew Civil
would file an action to declare
a.
8he mother is insane (Se&'"o6F"y, Aan%/ooE on t!e 8a&"ly Co%e o* t!e !"l"''"nes, ''. $966$9())
!. 8he mother is sic0 with a disease that is com6
munica!le and might endanger the health and life
of the child) c. 8he mother has !een maltreating the child)

d.
e. 8he mother is engaged in adulterous relationship)

f. 8he mother is a drug addict) g. 8he mother is a ha!itual drun0 or an alcoholic) h. 8he mother is in /ail or serving sentence. 4arental 2%t&orit"; =eac&ers ('##() pecial 4arental 2%t&orit"; Liabilit" of
8he mother is engaged in prostitution)
Code. .
*arriage; @oi0 *arriages; 4s"c&ological )ncapacit" ('##')
A.
Give a !rief definition or e"planation of the term
?psychological incapacity@ as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage. *5B. f e"isting at the inception of marriage, N. would the state of !eing of unsound mind or the concealment of drug addiction, ha!itual alcoholism, homose"uality or les!ianism
!e considered indicia of psychological incapacity? +"plain.
f during class hours, while the teacher was chatting with
other teachers in the school corridor, a - year old male pupil sta!s the eye of another !oy with a !all pen during a fight,
causing permanent !lindness to the victim, who could !e
lia!le for damages for the !oyOs in/ury: the teacher, the
school authorities, or the guilty !oyOs parents? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*5B..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
A.@ :#>CH%L%G CAL mental
'CA:AC 8>@ is a
disorder of the most serious type showing the incapa!ility
8he school, its administrators, and teachers have special parental authority and responsi!ility over the minor child 5$F, CC.. 8hey are principally and solidarily lia!le for the damages caused !y the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor unless they e"ercised the proper CC.. n the pro!lem, the 8+ACH+I and the #CH%%L
of one or !oth spouses to comply the essential marital
while under their supervision, instruction or custody *Article
o!ligations of love, respect, coha!itation, mutual help and
support, trust and commitment. t must !e characteri1ed !y
3uridical antecedence, gravity and incura!ility and its root
causes must !e clinically identified or e"amined.

(Santos v.
CA, $40 SCRA $0 [1997]).
diligence re7uired under the circumstances *Article 5$<,
AL8H%I 8 +# are lia!le for the !lindness of the victim,

!ecause the student who cause it was under their special parental authority and they were negligent. 8hey were
N. n the case of Santos v. Co.rt o* A''eals, unsound mind, drug addiction, les!ianism or
$40 SCRA $0 (1997), the #upreme Court held that !eing of
ha!itual
alcoholism,
negligent !ecause they were chatting in the corridor during

the class period when the sta!!ing incident occurred. 8he incident could have !een prevented had the teacher !een
homose"uality may !e indicia of psychological incapacity, depending on the degree of severity of the disorder. However, the concealment of drug addiction, ha!itual
inside the classroom at that time. 8he guilty !oyOs

:AI+'8# are su!sidiarily lia!le under Article 5$< of the
alcoholism, les!ianism or homose"uality is a ground of

annulment of marriage. 4arental 2%t&orit"; C&il0 %n0er 7 "ears of age ('##-)
Camily Code.
4arental 2%t&orit"; %bstit%te vs. pecial ('##!)
Page 35 of 119
Eistinguish !riefly !ut clearly !etween: #u!stitute parental authority and special parental authority.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
sperm. After a series of test, AndyDs sperm was medically introduced into NethDs ovary. #he !ecame pregnant and <
n su!stitute parental authority, the parents lose their
parental authority in favor of the su!stitute who ac7uires it

to the e"clusion of the parents.
months later, gave !irth to a !a!y !oy, named Alvin. (1) )!o "s t!e 8at!er o* Alv"n1 23'la"n. ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n special parental authority, the parents or anyone e"ercising parental authority does not lose parental authority. 8hose who are charged with special parental
authority e"ercise such authority only during the time that the child is in their custody or supervision.
the sperm. Andy is the legal father of Alvin !ecause there was neither consent nor ratification to the artificial insemination. Lnder the law, children conceived !y artificial insemination are legitimate children of the spouses, provided, that !oth of them authori1ed or ratified the insemination in a written instrument e"ecuted and signed !y !oth of them !efore the !irth of the child *Art. $GJ, Camily Code.. ($) )!at are t!e reN."re&ents, "* any, "n or%er *or 2%
to esta/l"s! !"s 'atern"ty over Alv"n. ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Andy is the !iological father of Alvin !eing the source of
#u!stitute parental authority displaces parental authority
while special parental authority concurs with parental
authority.
4aternit" & ,iliation (1999)
*a. 8wo *5. months after the death of her hus!and who was shot !y un0nown criminal elements on his way home from office, Iose married her childhood !oyfriend, and seven *-.
months after said marriage, she delivered a !a!y. n the
8he following are the re7uirements for +d to esta!lish his paternity over Alvin: 8he artificial insemination has !een a. authori1ed or
ratified !y the spouses in a written instrument
a!sence of any evidence from Iose as to who is her childDs father, what status does the law give to said child? +"plain. *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
e"ecuted and signed !y them !efore the !irth of the child) and 8he written instrument is recorded in the civil registry
together with the !irth certificate of the child *Art.
!.
*a. 8he child is legitimate of the second marriage under

Article $GF*5. of the Camily Code which provides that a "child !orn after one hundred eighty days following the
$GJ, 5nd paragraph, Camily Code..
4aternit" & ,iliation; Common?Law /nion ('##!)

A. I' and E&, without any impediment to marry each other, had !een living together without !enefit of church
cele!ration of the su!se7uent marriage is considered to have !een conceived during such marriage, even though it !e !orn within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage."
4aternit" & ,iliation; 4roofs (1999)
!lessings. 8heir common6law union resulted in the !irth of ceremony. Could H&' !e legitimated? Ieason. *AB.
H&'. 8wo years later, they got married in a civil
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*!. 'estor is the illegitimate son of Er. :ere1. (hen Er.
H&' was legitimated !y the su!se7uent marriage of I'
:ere1 died, 'estor intervened in the settlement of his fatherDs estate, claiming that he is the illegitimate son of said deceased, !ut the legitimate family of Er. :ere1 is denying 'estorDs claim. (hat evidence or evidences should 'estor present so that he may receive his rightful share in his
fatherDs estate? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
and E& !ecause at the time he was conceived, I' and E& could have validly married each Lnder the other. Camily
Code children conceived and !orn outside of wedloc0 of parents who, at the time of the formerDs conception, were
not dis7ualified !y any impediment to marry each other are legitimated !y the su!se7uent marriage of the parents. 4aternit" & ,iliation; 4roofs; Limitations; 20opte0 C&il0 (1999) A!raham died intestate on - 3anuary $<<J survived !y his
filiation of *!. 'estor must have !een admitted !y his father in any of the following: *$. the record of !irth appearing in the civil register, *5. a final /udgment, *9. a pu!lic document signed !y the father, or
8o !e a!le to inherit, the illegitimate
*J. a private handwritten document signed !y the lather

*Article $-# in relation to Article $-5 of the Camily
Code..
4aternit" & ,iliation; 2rtificial )nsemination; ,ormalities
Ce!ruary $<<=. Eanilo who claims to !e an adulterous child of Carlos intervenes in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of A!raham in representation of Carlos. Eanilo was legally adopted on $- &arch $<-= !y Carlos with the $. Lnder the Camily Code, how may an illegitimate filiation !e proved? +"plain.
5. As lawyer for Eanilo, do you have to prove EaniloDs consent of the " latterDs wife.
son Nraulio. A!rahamDs older son Carlos died on $J
('##-) +d and Neth have !een married for 5= years without

children. Eesirous to have a !a!y, they consulted Er. 3un He advised Neth to undergo artificial insemination. t was
Canlas, a , prominent medical specialist on human fertility. found that +dOs sperm count was inade7uate to induce
pregnancy Hence, the couple loo0ed for a willing donor. Andy the !rother of +d, readily consented to donate his
illegitimate filiation? +"plain. 9. Can Eanilo inherit from A!raham in representation of

his father Carlos? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. Lnder Art. $-5 in relation to Art. $-9 andArt. $-A of the CC, the filiation of illegitimate children may !e esta!lished
Page 36 of 119
in the same way and !y the same evidence as legitimate children. Art. $-5 provides that the filiation of legitimate
recognition of an illegitimate child can !e !rought at any
children is esta!lished !y any of the following: *$. the record of !irth appearing in the civil register or a final
3udgment) or *5. an admission of legitimate filiation in a pu!lic document or a private handwritten instrument and
time during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is !ased on "open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child, the same can !e filed during the
lifetime of the putative father." n the present case, the action for compulsory recognition was filed !y 3oeyDs mother, Eina, on &ay $G,$<<J, after the death of #teve, the putative father. 8he action will prosper if 3oey can present his !irth certificate that !ears the signature of his putative father. However, the facts clearly state that
the !irth certificate of 3oey did not indicate the fatherDs name. A !irth certificate not signed !y the alleged father
signed !y the parent concerned. n the a!sence of the

foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall !e proved
!y: *$. the open and continuous possession of the status of

a legitimate child) or *5. any other means allowed !y the Iules of Court and special laws.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o #ince Eanilo has already !een adopted 5. . !y Carlos, he ceased to !e an illegitimate child. An adopted child ac7uires all the rights of a legitimate child under Art, $F< of
the CC.
cannot !e ta0en as a record of !irth to prove recognition of the child, nor can said !irth certificate !e ta0en as a recognition in a pu!lic instrument. (Reyes
v. Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 3973(, Mar+! 19, 1987)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
9. 'o, he cannot. Eanilo cannot represent Carlos as the latterDs adopted child in the inheritance of A!raham !ecause
adoption did not ma0e Eanilo a legitimate grandchild of
Conse7uently, the action filed !y 3oeyDs mother has already prescri!ed.

/)
A!raham. Adoption is personal !etween Carlos and Eanilo. child !ecause in such case he is !arred !y Art. <<5 of the
'CC from inheriting from his illegitimate grandfather A!raha m.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Are t!e %e*enses set .' /y T"nt"n tena/le1
He cannot also represent Carlos as the latterDs illegitimate
23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, the defenses of 8intin are tena!le. n
Taya, v. Co.rt o* A''eals (;.R. 0o. 97$$9, -.ne 9,199$), a
An adopted childDs successional rights do not include the
!efore effectivity of the Camily Code !y the mother of a
complaint to compel recognition of an illegitimate child was !rought minor child !ased on "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child." 8he #upreme Court held that the right of action of the minor child has !een vested !y the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of
right to represent his deceased adopter in the inheritance of the latterDs legitimate parent, in view of Art. <-9 which
provides that in order that representation may ta0e place, the representative must himself !e capa!le of succeeding
the decedent. Adoption !y itself did not render Eanilo an heir of the adopterDs legitimate parent. 'either does his
the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Camily Code. 8he ruling in Ta0a4 /. Court of Appeals finds no
!eing a grandchild of A!raham render him an
application in the instant case. Although the child was !orn
heir of the
latter !ecause as an illegitimate child of Carlos, who was a legitimate child of A!raham, Eanilo is incapa!le of
succeeding A!raham under Art. <<5 of the Code. 4aternit" & ,iliation; 1ecognition of illegitimate C&il0 ('##9)
!efore the effectivity of the Camily Code, the complaint was

filed after its effectivity. Hence, Article $-A of the Camily Code should apply and not Article 5FA of the Civil Code.
#teve was married to Linda, with whom he had a daughter, 8intin. #teve fathered a son with Eina, his secretary of 5= years, whom Eina named 3oey, !orn on #eptem!er 5=,
$<F$. 3oeyDs !irth certificate did not indicate the fatherDs
t!e a+t"on, s!o.l% t!e a+t"on /e %"s&"sse%1 23'la"n.
+) S.''os"n, t!at -oey %"e% %.r"n, t!e 'en%en+y o* ($4)

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
name. #teve died on August $9, $<<9, while Linda died on Eecem!er 9, $<<9, leaving their legitimate daughter, 8intin, as sole heir. %n &ay $G, $<<J, Eina filed a case on !ehalf of
3oey, praying that the latter !e declared an ac0nowledged
f 3oey died during the pendency of the action, the action should still !e dismissed !ecause the right of 3oey or his heirs to file the action has already prescri!ed. *Art. $-A,
Camily Code.
illegitimate son of #teve and that 3oey !e given his share in
#teveDs estate, which is now !eing solely held !y 8intin. 8intin put up the defense that an action for recognition
4aternit" & ,iliation; 1ig&ts of Legitimate C&il0ren (199#) N and G *college students, !oth single and not dis7ualified
to marry each other. had a romantic affair, G was seven
shall only !e filed during the lifetime of the presumed

parents and that the e"ceptions under Article 5FA of the Civil Code do not apply to him since the said article has
months in the family way as of the graduation of N. Iight

after graduation N went home to Ce!u City. Ln0nown to
!een repealed !y the Camily Code. n any case, according to

8intin, 3oeyDs !irth certificate does not show that #teve is his
father . a) Foes -oey !ave a +a.se o* a+t"on a,a"nst T"nt"n *or

re+o,n"t"on an% 'art"t"on1 23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, 3oey does not have a cause of action against 8intin for recognition and partition. Lnder Article $-A of the Camily a compulsor gener rule actio Code, s a al , an n for y
G, N had a commitment to C *his childhood sweetheart. to marry her after getting his college degree. 8wo wee0s after N marriage in Ce!u City, G gave !irth to a son + in &etro &anil a. After ten years of married life in Ce!u, N !ecame a widower !y the sudden death of C in a plane crash. %ut of the union of N and C, two children, 4 and > were !orn. Ln0nown to C while on wee0end trips to &anila during the last A years
of their marriage, N invaria!ly visited G and lived at her
residence and as a result of which, they renewed their relationship. A !a!y girl C was !orn to N and G two years
Page 37 of 119
!efore the death of C. Nringing his family later to &anila, N

finally married G. Iecently. G died.
:aulita left the con/ugal home !ecause of the e"cessive

drin0ing of her hus!and, Al!erto. :aulita, out of her own endeavor, was a!le to !uy a parcel of land which she was a!le to register under her name with the addendum "widow." #he also ac7uired stoc0s in a listed corporation registered in her name. :aulita sold the parcel of land to
(hat are the rights of NDs four children: 4 and > of his first marriage) and + and C, his children with G? +"plain your
answer.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Lnder the facts stated, 4 and > are legitimate children of N legitimated child of NXG. C is the illegitimate child of N and
and C. + is the legitimate children of N and G. + is the C. As legitimate children of N and C, 4 and > have the following rights:
Iafael, who first e"amined the original of the transfer

certificate of title. $. Has Al!erto the right to share in the shares of stoc0 ac7uired !y :aulita?
$. 8o !ear the surnames of the father and the mother, in

conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
5. Can Al!erto recover the land from Iafael?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. a. >es. 8he Camily Code provides that all property appears to have !een made, contracted or registered in the
community property unless the contrary is proved.
#urnames) 5. 8o receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their !rothers and sisters, in6 conformity with the provisions of the Camily Code on
#upport) and 9. 8o !e entitled to the legitime and other successional
ac7uired during the marriage, whether the ac7uisition
name of one or !oth spouses, is presumed to !e a!solute
rights granted to them !y the Civil Code. *Article $-J,

Camily Code..
+ is the legitimated child of N and G. Lnder Art. $-- of the Camily Code, only children conceived and !orn outside of
wedloc0 of parents who, at the time of the conception of
!. >es. 8he shares are presumed to !e a!solute community property having !een ac7uired during the marriage despite the fact that those shares were registered only in her name. Al!ertoDs right to claim his share will only arise, however, at dissolution.
c. 8he presumption is still that the shares of stoc0 are owned in Hence, they will form part common. of the
the former, were not dis7ualified !y any impediment to
marry each other may !e legitimated. + will have the same

rights as 4 and >.
a!solute community or the con/ugal partnership depending

on what the property Ielations is.
C is the illegitimate child of N and G. C has the right to use the surname of G, her mother, and is entitled to support as well as the legitime consisting of $S5 of that of each of 4, > and +. *Article $-G, Camily Code.
4res%mptive Legitime (1999)
d. #ince :aulita ac7uired the shares of stoc0 !y onerous

title during the marriage, these are part of the con/ugal or
a!solute community property, as the case may!e *depending

on whether the marriage was cele!rated prior to. or after,
the effectivity of the Camily Her physical Code.. separation from her hus!and did not dissolve the
(hat do you understand !y "presumptive legitime", in what
community of
property. Hence, the hus!and has a right to share in the shares of stoc0.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
case or cases must the parent deliver such legitime to the

children, and what are the legal effects in each case if the
parent fails to do so? *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
:I+#L&:8 ,+ L+G 8 &+ is not defined in the law. ts

definition must have !een ta0en from Act 5-$=, the %ld
Eivorce Law, which re7uired the delivery to the legitimate children of "the e7uivalent of what would have !een due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of
property." As used in the Camily Code, presumptive legitime is understood as the e7uivalent of the legitimate
childrenDs legitimes assuming that the spouses had died immediately after the dissolution of the community of
property.
5. a. Lnder a community of property, whether a!solute or relative, the disposition of property !elonging to such community is void if done !y /ust one spouse without the consent of the other or authority of the proper court. However, the land was registered in the name of :aulita as "widow". Hence, the !uyer has the right to rely upon what appears in the record of the Iegister of Eeeds and should, conse7uently, !e protected. Al!erto cannot recover the land from Iafael !ut would have the right of recourse against his wife !. 8he parcel of land is a!solute community property having !een ac7uired during the marriage and through
:aulitaDs industry despite the registration !eing only in the name of :aulita. 8he land !eing community property, its
:resumptive legitime is re7uired to !e delivered to the common children of the spouses when the marriage is annulled or declared void a! initio and possi!ly, when the con/ugal partnership or a!solute community is dissolved as
in the case of legal separation. Cailure of the parents to
sale to Iafael without the consent of Al!erto is void. However, since the land is registered in the name of :aulita as widow, there is nothing in the title which would raise a
suspicion for Iafael to ma0e in7uiry. He, therefore, is an
deliver the presumptive legitime will ma0e their su!se7uent

marriage null and void under Article A9 of the Camily Code. 4ropert" 1elations; 2bsol%te Comm%nit" (199!)
innocent purchaser for value from whom the land may no longer !e recovered.
Page 38 of 119
c. 'o. Iafael is an innocent purchaser in good faith who,

upon relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, ac7uires rights which are to !e protected !y the courts.
$. #ince No! and #ofia got married n $<-=, then the law
Lnder the esta!lished principles of land registration law, the presumption is that the transferee of registered land is not
aware of any defect in the title of the property he purchased.
(See To:onera v. Co.rt o* A''eals, 103 SCRA 46(). &oreover,
that governs is the 'ew Civil Code *:ersons., in which case, the property relations that should !e applied as regards the property of the spouses is the system of relative community
or con/ugal partnership of gains *Article $$<, Civil Code..
Ny con/ugal partnership of gains, the hus!and and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
the person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way o!lige him to go !ehind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. [F"re+tor o* 5an%s
v. A/a+!e, et al. (3 !"l. 606). 'o strong considerations of
pu!lic policy have !een presented which would lead the Court to reverse the esta!lished and sound doctrine that the !uyer in good
and the income from their wor0 or ndustry *Article $J5, Civil Code.. n this instance, the lot inherited !y No! in $<-A is his own separate property, he having ac7uired the same !y lucrative title *par. 5, Art. $JF, Civil Code.. However, the house constructed from his own savings in $<F$ during the su!sistence of his marriage with ssa is
con/ugal property and not e"clusive property in accordance

with the principle of "reverse accession" provided for in
faith of a registered parcel of land does not have to loo0
!eyond the 8orrens 8itle and search for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or diminish his right to what he purchased. (5o'e@ v. Co.rt o*
A''eals. 189
SCRA $(1)
Art. $AF, Civil Code.

A'!$.E" A'(WE":
d. 8he parcel of land is a!solute community property having !een ac7uired during the marriage and through
:aulitaDs industry despite registration only in the name of Iafael without the consent of Al!erto is void. 4ropert" 1elations; 2nte .%ptial 2greement (1999)
with his surviving spouse *Arts. <FA, <FG and <<-, Civil Code., may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not con/ugal !ut !elong to the hereditary estate of No!. 8he value of the land !eing more than the cost of the
$.
#ofia, !eing her deceased sonDs legal heir concurring
improvement *Art. $5=, Camily Code..

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
:aulita. 8he land !eing community property, its sale to
5. >es, the answer would still !e the same. #ince No! and
#uppose 8irso and 8essie were married on 5 August $<FF

without e"ecuting any ante nuptial agreement.
ssa contracted their marriage way !ac0 in $<-=, then the property relations that will govern is still the relative community or con/ugal partnership of gains *Article $$<,
after their marriage, 8irso while supervising the clearing of 8essieDs inherited land upon the latterDs re7uest, accidentally
found the treasure not in the new river !ed !ut on the
%ne year
Civil Code.. t will not matter if No! died !efore or after August 9. $<FF *effectivity date of the Camily Code;, what
matters is the date when the marriage was contracted. As
No! and ssa contracted their marriage way !ac0 in $<-=.
property of 8essie. +"plain.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8o whom shall the treasure !elong?
the property relation that governs them is still the con/ugal

partnership of gains. *Art. $AF, Civil Code.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
#ince 8irso and 8essie were married !efore the effectivity of
5.
the Camily Code, their property relation is governed !y Code, the share of the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or the proprietor !elongs to the con/ugal partnership of gains. 8he one6half share pertaining to 8essie as owner of the land, and the one6half share pertaining to 8irso as finder of the treasure, !elong to the con/ugal
partnership of gains.
con/ugal partnership of gains. Lnder Art. AJ of the Civil
the Camily Code too0 effect, the answer will not !e the same. Art. $AF. Civil Code, would then apply. 8he land
f No! died !e fore August 9, $<FF. which is the date
would then !e deemed con/ugal, along with the house, since con/ugal funds were used in constructing it. 8he hus!andDs estate would !e entitled to a reim!ursement of the value of the land from con/ugal partnership funds.
4ropert"
1elations;
*arriage
ettlement;
Con5%gal
4ropert" 1elations; Con5%gal 4artners&ip of Bains (1993)
n $<-=, No! and ssa got married without e"ecuting a marriage settlement. n $<-A, No! inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in $<F$, he constructed a two6 room !ungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was worth :F==.===.== while the house, when finished cost :G==,===.==. n $<F< No! died, survived only !y his wife, ssa and his mother, #ofia. Assuming that the
relative values of !oth assets remained at the same
City on 3uly $=, $<<=. :rior thereto, they e"ecuted a
4artners&ip of Bains ('##9) Ga!!y and &ila got married at Lourdes Church in Pue1on
proportion: #tate whether #ofia can rightfully claim that $. the house and lot are not con/ugal !ut e"clusive property of her deceased son. 29B; 5. August 9, $<FF? 25B;
marriage settlement where!y they agreed on the regime of con/ugal partnership of gains. 8he marriage settlement was registered in the Iegister of Eeeds of &anila, where &ila is a resident. n $<<5, they /ointly ac7uired a residential house and lot, as well as a condominium unit in &a0ati. n $<<A, they decided to change their property relations to the regime of complete separation of property. &ila consented, as she was then engaged in a lucrative !usiness. 8he spouses
then signed a private document dissolving their con/ugal partnership and agreeing on a complete separation of
property.
(ill your answer !e the same if No! died !efore
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
:age 39 of
$$<
8hereafter, Ga!!y ac7uired a mansion in Naguio City, and a

A6hectare agricultural land in %riental &indoro, which he registered e"clusively in his name. n the year 5===, &ilaDs !usiness venture failed, and her
Nar Candidates :atricio &ahigugmaon and Iowena Amor
decided to marry each other !efore the last day of the $<<$
creditors sued her for :$=,===,===.==. After o!taining a favora!le /udgment, the creditors sought to e"ecute on the
spousesD house and lot and condominium unit, as well as Ga!!yDs mansion and agricultural land. a)
own handwriting. 8hey agreed on the following: *$. a con/ugal partnership of gains) *5. each donates to the other fifty percent *A=B. of hisSher present property, *9. Iowena
Nar +"aminations. 8hey agreed to e"ecute a &arriage #ettlement. Iowena herself prepared the document in her
shall administer the con/ugal partnership property) and *J.
F"s+.ss t!e stat.s o* t!e *"rst an% t!e a&en%e%
&arr"a,e settle&ents. ($4)

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
neither may !ring an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of their marriage. Noth signed the
agreement in the presence of two *5. witnesses. 8hey did
8he marriage settlement !etween Ga!!y and &ila adopting

the regime of con/ugal partnership of gains still su!sists. t is
not dissolved !y the mere agreement of the spouses during the marriage. t is clear from Article $9J of the Camily Code that in the a!sence of an e"press declaration in the marriage settlement, the separation of property !etween the spouses
during the marriage shall not ta0e place e"cept !y /udicial orde r.
not, however, ac0nowledge it !efore a notary pu!lic. A. As to form, is the &arriage #ettlement valid? &ay it !e registered in the registry of property? f not, what steps
must !e ta0en to ma0e it registera!le?
N. Are the stipulations valid? C. f the &arriage #ettlement is valid as to form and the a!ove stipulations are li0ewise valid, does it now follow that said &arriage #ettlement is valid and enforcea!le?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
/)
F"s+.ss t!e e**e+ts o* t!e sa"% settle&ents on t!e
'ro'ert"es a+N."re% /y t!e s'o.ses. ($4)

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he regime of con/ugal partnership of gains governs the properties ac7uired !y the spouses. All the properties ac7uired !y the spouses after the marriage !elong to the
A. >es, it is valid as to form !ecause it is in writing. 'o, it cannot !e registered in the registry of property !ecause it is not a pu!lic document. 8o ma0e it registera!le, it must !e reformed and has to !e notari1ed. N. #tipulations *$. and *9. are valid !ecause they are not contrary to #tipulation *J. is void law. !ecause it is contrary to #tipulation *5. is valid up to $SA law. of their respective present properties !ut void as to the e"cess *Art FJ, Camily Code..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE": (+&&E($E# A'(WE":
con/ugal partnership. Lnder Article $$G of the Camily Code,
even if Ga!!y registered the mansion and A6hectare agricultural land e"clusively in his name, still they are presumed to !e con/ugal properties, unless the contrary is proved. +)
)!at 'ro'ert"es &ay /e !el% ans9era/le *or
M"laDs o/l",at"ons1 23'la"n. ($4)

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
C. 'o. on #eptem!er $A, $<<$, the marriage settlement is not yet valid and enforcea!le until the cele!ration of the
#ince all the properties are con/ugal, they can !e held answera!le for &ilaDs o!ligation if the o!ligation redounded
to the !enefit of the family. *Art. $5$ 29;, Camily Code. However, the !urden of proof lies with the creditor claiming against the properties. (Ayala
Invest&ent v. Co.rt
marriage, to ta0e place !efore the last day of the $<<$ !ar +"aminations.
4ropert" 1elations; *arriage ettlements (1999)
o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 118307, 8e/r.ary 1$,1998, re"terate% "n Ao&eo9ners Sav"n,s O 5oan GanE v. Fa"lo, ;.R. 0o.
17380$, Mar+! 11, $007)
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
%n $= #eptem!er $<FF Revin, a 5G6year old !usinessman, winsom lass of married (ithout Rarla, a $F. the e
0nowledge of their parents or legal guardians, Revin and Rarla entered into an ante6nuptial contract the day !efore
+"cept for the residential house which is the family home,
their marriage stipulating that con/ugal partnership of gains
all other properties of Ga!!y and &ila may !e held answera!le for &ilaDs o!ligation. #ince the said properties
shall govern their marriage. At the time of their marriage
are con/ugal in nature, they can !e held lia!le for de!ts and o!ligations contracted during the marriage to the e"tent that the family was !enefited or where the de!ts were contracted !y !oth spouses, or !y one of them, with the consent of the othe r. A family home is a dwelling place of a person and his
family. t confers upon a family the right to en/oy such
RevinDs estate was worth A= &illion while RarlaDs was valued at 5 &illion.
A month after their marriage Revin died in a frea0
helicopter accident. He left no will, no de!ts, no o!ligations. #urviving Revin, aside from Rarla, are his only relatives: his
!rother Luis and first cousin Lilia.
property, which must remain with the person constituting it as a family home and his heirs. t cannot !e sei1ed !y creditors e"cept in special cases. (Taneo, -r.
v. Co.rt o*
A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 10873$, Mar+! 9, 1999)
$. property Ielations governed the (hat marriage of Revin and Rarla? +"plain. 5. Eetermine the value of the estate of Revin, (ho are RevinDs 9. heirs? muc eac of RevinDs heirs J. How h is h entitled to inherit?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. #ince the marriage settlement was entered into without
the consent and without the participation of the parents
4ropert" 1elations; *arriage ettlements (1991)
*they did not sign the document., the marriage settlement is invalid applying Art. which provides that a -F, C.C. minor
Page 40 of 119
who according to law may contract marriage may also enter into marriage settlements !ut they shall !e valid only if the parties to the agreement. *Rarla was still a minor at the time
the marriage settlement was e"ecuted in #eptem!er $<FF
person who may give consent to the marriage are made
together, Iico was a salaried employee and &a!el 0ept house for Iico and did full6time household chores for him.
Euring their coha!itation, a parcel of coconut land was ac7uired !y Iico from his savings.
!ecause the law, I.A. GF=<, reducing the age of ma/ority to $F years too0 effect on $F Eecem!er $<F<.. 8he marriage settlement !eing void, the property Ielations governing the
marriage is, therefore, under Art. -A of the CC. a!solute community of property,
After living together for one *$. year, Iico and &a!el separated. Iico then met and married Letty, a single woman
twenty6si" *5G. years of age. Euring the marriage of Iico
5. All the properties which Revin and Rarla owned at the

time of marriage !ecame community property which shall
and Letty, !ought a mango orchard out of Letty her own personal earnings. (ho would own the riceland, and what a. property
Ielations governs the ownership? +"plain.
!e divided e7ually !etween them at dissolution. #ince Revin

owned A= &illion and Rarla. 5 &illion, at the time of the
!. (ho would own the coconut land, and what property

Ielations governs the ownership? +"plain.
marriage, A5 &illion constituted their community property. Lpon the death of Revin, the community was dissolved and
half of the A5 &illion or 5G &illion is his share in the community. 8his 5G &illion therefore is his estate.
(ho would own the mango orchard, c. and what property Ielations governs the ownership? +"plain. *a. Iico and Cora are the co6owners of the riceland. 8he first paragraph..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Ielations is that of co6ownership *Art. $J-, Camily Code,

2Optional A((en(um$ !o)e/er* after Rico5s marria4e to Lett0*
9.
Rarla and Luis are the ntestate heirs of Revin.
8hey are entitled to share the estate J. e7ually under Article $==$ of the 'CC. 8herefore. Rarla gets $9 &illion
and Luis gets $9 &illion.
t%e %alf interest of Rico in t%e ricelan( )ill t%en 'ecome a'solute
communit0 propert0 of Rico an( Lett0.3
*!. Iico is the e"clusive owner of the coconut land. 8he
Ielations is a soleSsingle proprietorship *Art. $JF. Camily
4ropert" 1elations; Obligations; ;enefit of t&e ,amil"
('###) As finance officer of R and Co., ,ictorino arranged a loan of :A &illion from :'N for the corporation. However, he was re7uired !y the !an0 to sign a Continuing #urety
Agreement to secure the repayment of the loan. 8he
Code, first paragraph is applica!le, and not Art. $J- Camily Code..
2Optional A((en(um$ !o)e/er* after Rico5s marria4e to Lett0* t%e coconut lan( of Rico )ill t%en 'ecome a'solute communit0
propert0 of Rico an( Lett0.3
corporation failed to pay the loan, and the !an0 o!tained a /udgment against it and ,ictorino, /ointly and severally. 8o enforce the /udgment, the sheriff levied on a farm owned !y
*c. Iico and Letty are the co6owners. 8he Ielations is the A!solute Community of :roperty *Arts, -A,<=and<l, Camily Code..
the con/ugal partnership of ,ictorino and his wife +lsa. s

the levy proper or not? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he levy is not proper there !eing no showing that the
surety agreement e"ecuted !y the hus!and redounded to the !enefit of the family. An o!ligation contracted !y the hus!and alone is chargea!le against the con/ugal partnership
only when it was contracted for the !enefit of the family.
(hen the o!ligation was contracted on !ehalf of the family !usiness the law presumes that such o!ligation will redound to the !enefit of the family. However, when the o!ligation was to guarantee the de!t of a third party, as in the pro!lem, the o!ligation is presumed for the !enefit of the third party, not the family. Hence, for the o!ligation under
the surety against the agreement to !e chargea!le
4ropert" 1elations; /nions wit&o%t *arriage (1997) Luis and Ii11a, !oth 5G years of age and single, live e"clusively with each other as hus!and and wife without the !enefit of marriage, Luis is gainfully employed, Ii11a is not employed, stays at home, and ta0es charge of the household chores. After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was a!le to save from his salary earnings during that period the
amount of :5==,===.== presently deposited in a !an0. A
partnership it must !e proven that the family was !enefited and that the !enefit was a direct result of such agreement,
(Ayala Invest&ent v. C!"n,, $86 SCRA $($)
house and lot worth :A==,===.== was recently purchased for the same amount !y the couple. %f the :A==.===.== used !y the common6law spouses to purchase the property, :5==.===.== had come from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda owned !y Luis and :9==,===.== from the rentals of a !uilding !elonging to Ii11a. n fine, the sum of :A==.===.== had !een part of the fruits received during the
period of coha!itation from their separate property, a car
4ropert" 1elations; /nions wit&o%t *arriage (199')
n $<F<, Iico, then a widower forty *J=. years of age, coha!ited with Cora, a widow thirty *9=. years of age. (hile living together, they ac7uired from their com!ined earnings a parcel of riceland.
After Iico and Cora separated, Iico lived together with
worth :$==.===.==. !eing used !y the common6law spouses, was donated 3ust months ago to Ii11a !y her parents. Luis and Ii11a now decide to terminate their coha!itation,
and they as0 you to give them your legal advice on the
following: *a. How, under the law should the !an0 deposit of
:5==,===.== the house and lot valued at :A==.===.== and
&a!el, a maiden si"teen
*$G. years of age. (hile living
the car worth :$==.===.== !e allocated to them?
Page 41 of 119
*!. (hat would your answer !e *to the a!ove 7uestion. had
Luis and Ii11a !een living together all the time, ie., since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
a. (ho will !e entitled to the house and lot? *9B. 8ony and #usan are entitled to the house and lot as co6 owners in e7ual shares. Lnder Article $J- of the Camily Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other lived e"clusively with each other as hus!and and wife, the property ac7uired during their coha!itation are presumed to have !een o!tained !y their
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
a. Art. $J- of the Camily Code provides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live e"clusively with each other as hus!and and wife without the !enefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall !e owned !y them in e7ual shares
and the property ac7uired !y !oth of them through their
wor0 or industry shall !e governed !y the rules of co6 ownership. n the a!sence of proof to the contrary, properties ac7uired
while they lived together shall !e presumed to have !een
/oint efforts, wor0 or industry and shall !e owned !y them in e7ual shares. 8his is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
!. (ould it ma0e any difference if 8ony could not marry
o!tained !y their 3oint efforts, wor0er ndustry, and shall !e owned !y them in e7ual shares. A party who did not participate in the ac7uisition !y the other party of any property shall !e deemed to have contri!uted /ointly in the
ac7uisition thereof if the formerDs efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
#usan !ecause he was previously married to Alice from

whom he is legally separated? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, it would ma0e a difference. Lnder Article $JF of the Camily Code, when the parties to the coha!itation could not
8hus: the wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of :5==,===.== shall !e divided e7ually !etween Luis and
$.
marry each other !ecause of an impediment, only those properties ac7uired !y !oth of them through their actual
Ii11a.
valued at :A==.===.== having !een ac7uired !y !oth of them through wor0 or industry shall !e divided !etween them in proportion to their respective
5. lot
the house and
maintaining the family and household are not considered
/oint contri!ution of money, property, or ndustry shall !e owned !y them in common in proportion to their respective contri!utions. 8he efforts of one of the parties in ade7uate contri!ution in the ac7uisition of the properties.
#ince #usan did not contri!ute to the ac7uisition of the
contri!ution, in consonance with the rules on co6 ownership. Hence, Luis gets 5YA while Ii11a gets 9YA of :A==.===.==.
9. the car worth :$==,===.== shall !e e"clusively owned !y Ii11a, the same having !een donated to her !y her parents.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
house and lot, she has no share therein. f 8ony coha!ited with #usan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is his e"clusive property. f he coha!ited with #usan
!efore his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot !elongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
*!. 8he property relations !etween Luis and Ii11a, their
marriage having !een cele!rated 5= years ago *under the
Civil Code. shall !e governed !y the con/ugal partnership of
(+CCE((I!'
2mo%nt of %ccessional 1ig&ts ('##!) &r. 48 and &rs. >8 have !een married for 5= years. #uppose the wife, >8, died childless, survived only !y her
hus!and, 48.
(hat would !e the share of 48 from her
gains, under which the hus!and and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income
from their separate properties and those ac7uired !y either

or !oth spouses through their efforts or !y chance, and
upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or !enefits o!tained !y either or !oth spouse shall !e divided e7ually !etween them *Art. $J5. Civil Code.. 8hus: $. 8he salary of Luis deposited in the !an0 in the amount of :5==.===.== and the house and lot valued at :A==,===.== shall !e divided e7ually !etween Luis and Ii11a. 5. However, the car worth :$==.===,== donated to Ii11a !y her parents shall !e considered to her own paraphernal property, having !een ac7uired !y lucrative title *par. 5, Art.
$JF, Civil Code..
estate as inheritance? (hy? +"plain. *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Lnder the Civil Code, the widow or widower is a legal and compulsory heir of the deceased spouse. f the widow is the
only surviving heir, there !eing no legitimate ascendants,
descendants, !rothers, and sisters, nephews and nieces, she

gets the entire estate.
;arrier between illegitimate & legitimate relatives (199() A is the ac0nowledged natural child of N who died when A
was already 55 years old. (hen NDs full !lood !rother, C,
4ropert" 1elations; /nions wit&o%t *arriage ('###)
Cor five years since $<F<, 8ony, a !an0 ,ice6 president, and
#usan, an entertainer, lived together as hus!and and wife
died he *C. was survived !y his widow and four children of his other !rother E. Claiming that he is entitled to inherit
from his fatherDs !rother C. A !rought suit to o!tain his
without the !enefit of marriage although they were more than enough for their needs, #usan stopped wor0ing and merely "0ept house". Euring that period, 8ony was a!le
share in the estate of C. (ill his action prosper?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
capacitated to many each other. #ince 8onyDs salary was
to !uy a lot and house in a plush su!division. However, after five years, 8ony and #usan decided to separate.
'o, the action of A will not prosper. %n the premise that N, C and E are legitimate !rothers, as an illegitimate child of N,
A cannot inherit in intestacy from C who is a legitimate
!rother of N. %nly the wife of C in her own right and the
Page 42 of 119
legitimate relatives of C *i.e. the children of E as CDs legitimate nephews inheriting as collateral relatives. can inherit in intestacy. *Arts. <<5, $==$, $%%A and <-A, Civil
Code.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
How will you rule on 3orgeDs opposition to the pro!ate of &ariaDs will. f you were the 3udge? As 3udge, shall rule as follows: 3orgeDs opposition should !e sustained in part and denied in part. 3orgeDs omission as spouse of &aria is not preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line. Hence, Art. FAJ of the Civil Code does not apply, and the institution of &iguela as heir is valid, !ut only entitled to one6half of the estate as his legitime. *Art. $==$,
Civil Code.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE"(: (+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he action of A will not prosper. Neing an illegitimate, he is !arred !y Article <<5 of the Civil Code from inheriting a!
intestato from the legitimate relatives of his father.
to the e"tent of the free portion of one6half. 3orge is still
;arrier between illegitimate & legitimate relatives (199-) Cristina the illegitimate daughter of 3ose and &aria, died intestate, without any descendant or ascendant. Her valua!le estate is !eing claimed !y Ana, the legitimate daughter of 3ose, and +duardo, the legitimate son of &aria.
a. As 3udge, shall rule as follows: 3orgeDs opposition should !e sustained in part and denied in part. 8his is a case of
s either, !oth, or neither of them entitled to inherit?

+"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
ineffective disinheritance under Art, <$F of the Civil Code, !ecause the omission of the compulsory heir 3orge !y &aria was intentional. Conse7uently, the institution of &iguela as
heir is void only insofar as the legitime of 3orge is one6half of the estate, and &iguela gets the other half.
As 3udge, follows: shall rule as
'either Ana nor +duardo is entitled to inherit of a! intestato from Cristina. Noth are legitimate relatives of
CristinaDs illegitimate parents and therefore they fall under the prohi!ition prescri!ed !y Art. <<5, 'CC
(Man.el v. 8errer, $4$ SCRA 4((C F"a@ v. Co.rt o* A''eals, 18$ SCRA 4$().
pre/udiced. Accordingly, 3orge is entitled to his legitime of
!.
3orgeDs opposition
Collation (199() 3oa7uin Ieyes !ought from 3ulio Cru1 a residential lot of
9== s7uare meters in Pue1on City for which 3oa7uin paid 3ulio the amount of :9==,===.==, (hen the deed was a!out
to !e prepared 3oa7uin told 3ulio that it !e drawn in the name of 3oa7uina Io"as, his ac0nowledged natural child.
should !e 8his is a case of preterition sustained. under Article FAJ Civil Code, the result of the omission of 3orge as compulsory heir having the same right e7uivalent to a legitimate child "in the direct line" is that total intestacy will arise, and 3orge will inherit the entire estate. As 3udge, shall rule as follows: the c. opposition should !e denied since it is predicated upon causes not recogni1ed
!y law as grounds for disallowance of a wll, to wit:
8hus, the deed was so prepared and e"ecuted !y 3ulio. 3oa7uina then !uilt a house on the lot where she, her
hus!and and children resided. Lpon 3oa7uinDs death, his
$. that the will was made without his 0nowledge) 5. that the will was made without his consent) and
legitimate children sought to recover possession and ownership of the lot, claiming that 3oa7uina Io"as was !ut
a trustee of their father. (ill the action against 3oa7uina Io"as prosper?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
9.
that it has the effect of depriving him of his legitime, which is a ground that goes into the intrinsic validity of the will and need not !e
resolved during
>es, !ecause there is a presumed donation in favor of 3oa7uina under Art. $JJF of the Civil Code (Fe However, the donation should !e collated to the hereditary estate and the
legitime of the other heirs should !e preserved.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
los Santos v. Reyes, $( -an.ary 199$, $06 SCRA 43().
the purpose of securing to the hus!and his right to the legitime on the theory that the will constitutes an ineffective disinheritance under Art. <$F of the Civil Code, d. follows: entitled to receive his legitime from the estate of his wife. He was not disinherited in the will even assuming that he gave ground for disinheritance, hence, he is still entitled to his legitime. 3orge, however, cannot receive anything from the free portio He claim preterition is not n. cannot as he a
compulsory heir in the !eing direct line. 8here no preterition, the institution of the sister was valid and the As 3udge, shall rule as 3orge is
the pro!ate proceedings. However, the opposition may !e entertained for,
>es, the action against 3oa7uina Io"as will prosper, !ut only to the e"tent of the ali7uot hereditary rights of the
legitimate children as heirs. 3oa7uina will !e entitled to retain her own share as an illegitimate child, *Arts. $JJ= and
$JA9. Civil Code) Art. $-G, C. C..
Disin&eritance vs. 4reterition (199()
&aria, to spite her hus!and 3orge, whom she suspected was having an affair with another woman, e"ecuted a will,
un0nown to him, !e7ueathing all the properties she
only right of 3orge is to claim his legitime.
inherited from her parents, to her sister &iguela. Lpon her
death, the will was presented for pro!ate. 3orge opposed
pro!ate of the will on the ground that the will was e"ecuted !y his wife without his 0nowledge, much less consent, and that it deprived him of his legitime. After all, he had given her no cause for disinheritance, added 3orge in his opposition.
Disin&eritance; )neffective (1999) &r. :alma, widower, has three daughters E, E6l and E65. He e"ecutes a (ill disinheriting E !ecause she married a
man he did not li0e, and instituting daughters E6$ and E65 as his heirs to his entire estate of : $,===,===.==, Lpon &r,
:almaDs death, how should his estate !e divided? +"plain.
*AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
:age 43 of
$$<
8his is a case of ineffective disinheritance !ecause marrying a man that the father did not approve of is not a ground for
disinheriting E. 8herefore, the institution of E6l and E65
$=5F for !eing in consideration of her adulterous relation with the testator. #he is, therefore, dis7ualified to receive
shall !e annulled insofar as it pre/udices the legitime of E, and the institution of E6l and E65 shall only apply on the E6l and E65 will get their legitimes of :A==.===.== divided
the legacy. +rnie will receive the legacy in his favor !ecause it is not inofficious. 8he institution of Naldo, which applies only to the free portion, will !e respected. n sum, the estate
of Lam!erto shall !e distri!uted as follows:
free portion in the amount of :A==,===.==. 8herefore, E,

into three e7ual parts and E6l and E65 will get a reduced
Heir Naldo
testamentary disposition of :5A=,===.== each. Hence, the shares will !e:
Legitim e
Legac y
nstitution 5==.===
8%8AL
-==,== = 5A=,===
E
E6l E65
:$GG,GGG.GG :$GG,GGG.GG Z :5A=.===.== :$GG,GGG.GG Z :5A=,===.==
A==,== = 5A=,== +lvira = +rnie A=,=== -A=,== 8%8AL =
A=,=== A=,===
5==,===
$,===,===
Disin&eritance; )neffective; 4reterition ('###) n his last will and testament, Lam!erto $. disinherits his daughter (ilma !ecause "she is disrespectful towards me and raises her voice tal0ing to me", 5. omits entirely his
A'!$.E" AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
#ame answer as the first Alternative Answer e"cept as to
spouse +lvira, 9. leaves a legacy of :$==,===.== to his
distri!ution. 3ustice 3urado solved this pro!lem differently. n his opinion, the legitime of the heir who was disinherited is distri!uted among the other compulsory heirs in
proportion to their respective legitimes, while his share in
mistress Iosa and :A=,===.== to his driver +rnie and J.
institutes his son Naldo as his sole heir. How will you
distri!ute his estate of :$,===,===.==? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he disinheritance of (ilma was ineffective !ecause the
legal heirs !y accretion under Article $=$F of the 'CC in proportion to their respective intestate shares. n sum the distri!ution shall !e as follows:
Hei r Eistri!utio Legitime n of (ilmaOs Legitime 5A=,=== = $5A,=== *5A=.=== . 5A=,=== $5A.=== Lega nstitutio cy n 8%8AL
the intestate portion. f any, is distri!uted among the other
ground relied upon !y the testator does not constitute maltreatment under Article <$<*G. of the 'ew Civil Code. Hence, the testamentary provisions in the will shall !e annulled !ut only to the e"tent that her legitime was
impaired.
Naldo (ilma +lvira +rnie 8%8AL
5==,===
A-A,=== 9-A.=== A=.===
8he total omission of +lvira does not constitute preterition !ecause she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. %nly
A=,=== A==,=== 5A=,===
compulsory heirs in the direct line may !e the su!/ect of
A=,== 5==,== $,===,== = = =
preterition. 'ot having !een preterited, she will !e entitled

only to her legitime.
Aeirs; )ntestate Aeirs; 1eserva =roncal (1999)
8he legacy in favor of Iosa is void under Article $=5F for
sidro and rma, Cilipinos, !oth $F years of age, were passengers of Clight 'o. 9$- of %riental Airlines. 8he plane
!eing in consideration of her adulterous relation with the
testator. #he is, therefore, dis7ualified to receive the legacy

of $==,=== pesos. 8he legacy of A=,=== pesos in favor of +rnie is not inofficious not having e"ceeded the free
portion. Hence, he shall !e entitled to receive it.

8he institution of Naldo, which applies only to the free
they !oarded was of :hilippine registry. (hile en route from &anila to Greece some passengers hi/ac0ed the plane, held the chief pilot hostage at the coc0pit and ordered him to fly instead to Li!ya. Euring the hi/ac0ing sidro suffered a heart attac0 and was on the verge of death. #ince rma was already eight months pregnant !y sidro, she pleaded to the
hi/ac0ers to allow the assistant pilot to solemni1e her marriage with sidro. #oon after the marriage, sidro
portion, shall !e respected. n sum, the estate of Lam!erto

will !e distri!uted as follows: Naldo66666666666666 66 6 JA=,=== (ilma6666666666666 5A=,== 66 = +lvira6666666666666666 5A=,== = 6 +rnie666666666666666 66 A=,===
e"pired. As the plane landed in Li!ya rma gave !irth. However, the !a!y died a few minutes after complete delivery . Nac0 in the :hilippines rma mmediately filed a claim for
inheritance. 8he parents of sidro opposed her claim contending that the marriage !etween her and sidro was void a! initio on the following grounds: *a. they had not given their consent to the marriage of their son) *!. there
$,===,== =
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he disinheritance !ecause
of
(ilma
was
effective
disrespect of, and raising of voice to, her father constitute maltreatment under Article <$<*G. of the 'ew Civil Code. #he is, therefore, not entitled to inherit anything. Her
was no marriage license) *c. the solemni1ing officer had no authority to perform the marriage) and, *d. the solemni1ing officer did not file an affidavit of marriage with the proper
civil registrar. 5. Eoes rma have any successional rights at all? Eiscuss
inheritance will to the other legal heirs. 8he go total omission of +lvira is not preterition !ecause she is not a
fully.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
compulsory heir in the direct line. #he will receive only her legitime. 8he legacy in favor of Iosa is void under Article
5. rma
spouse to
succeeded to the estate of sidro as his surviving

the estate of legitimate child. (hen her sidro
Page 44 of 119
died, he was succeeded !y his surviving wife rma, and his legitimate un!orn child. 8hey divided the estate e7ually !etween them, the child e"cluding the parents of sidro. An un!orn child is considered !orn for all purposes favora!le to it provided it is !orn later. 8he child was considered !orn
!ecause, having an intra6uterine life of more than seven
*c. 4 [ $S5 !y representation of N C[lS5 !y representation of C
> [ $SJ
*d. 4 6 $S9 in his own right >6 $S9 in his own right 5 6 $S9
in his own right
months, it lived for a few minutes after its complete
delivery. t was legitimate !ecause it was !orn within the
Article <-- of the Civil Code provides that heirs who repudiate their share cannot !e represented.
valid marriage of the parents. #uccession is favora!le to it. (hen the child died, rma inherited the share of the child.
However, the share of the child in the hands of rma is
su!/ect to reserva troncal for the !enefit of the relatives of the child within the third degree of consanguinity and who
!elong to the line of sidro.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
& *his mother., ( *his widow., A and N *his legitimate
)ntestate %ccession (1997) "8" died intestate on $ #eptem!er $<<-.He was survived !y children., C *his grandson, !eing the legitimate son of N., E
f the marriage is void. rma has no successional rights with

respect to sidro !ut she would have successional rights
*his other grandson, !eing the son of + who was a legitimate son of, and who predeceased, "8"., and C *his grandson, !eing the son of G, a legitimate son who
with respect to the child.

Aeirs; )ntestate Aeirs; &ares ('##()
Luis was survived !y two legitimate children, two illegitimate children, his parents, and two !rothers. He left
an estate of :$ million. Luis died intestate. (ho are his intestate heirs, and how much is the share of each in his estate?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
repudiated the inheritance from "8".. His distri!uta!le net estate is :$5=.===.==. How should this amount !e shared in intestacy among the surviving heirs?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he legal heirs are A, N, E, and (. C is e"cluded !y N who
is still alive. E inherits in representation of + who
8he intestate heirs are the two *5. legitimate children and the two *5. illegitimate children. n intestacy the estate of
predeceased. C is e"cluded !ecause of the repudiation of G, the predecessor. & is e"cluded !y the legitimate children of 8. 8he answer may !e premised on two theories: the 8heory of +"clusion and the 8heory of Concurrence. Lnder the T!eory o* 23+l.s"on the legitimes of the heirs are accorded them and the free portion will !e given e"clusively to the legitimate descendants. Hence under the +"clusion 8heory:
A will get :5=.===.==. and : $9.999.99 *$S9 of the free portion.
N will get : 5=,===.==. and :$9. 999.99 *$S9 of the free portion.
the decedent is divided among the legitimate and illegitimate children such that the share of each illegitimate child is one
6 half the share of each legitimate child. 8heir share are :
Cor each legitimate child T :999,999.99

Cor each illegitimate child T :$GG,GGG.GG
(Art"+le 983, 0e9 C"v"l Co%eC Art"+le 1(6, 8a&"ly Co%e)
E will get :5=.===.==. and :$9. 999.99 *$S9 of the free portion.
)ntestate %ccession (199')
(, the widow is limited to the legitime of :5=.===.==

Lnder the T!eory o* Con+.rren+e. n addition to their legitimes, the heirs of A, N, E and ( will !e given e7ual
C had three *9. legitimate children: A, N, and C. N has one *$. legitimate child 4. C has two *5. legitimate children: >
and H.
C and A rode together in a car and perished together at the

same time in a vehicular accident, C and A died, each of them leaving su!stantial estates in intestacy. a. (ho are intestate heirs of (ha the C? t are their
!. (ho are the intestate heirs of A? (hat are their

respective fractional shares?
respective fractional shares?
shares in the free portions: A: :5=.===.== plus :$=.===.== *$ SJ of the free portion. N: :5=,===.== plus :$=.===.== *lSJ of the free portlon. C: :5=,===.== plus :$=.===.== *$SJ of the free portion. (: :5=,===.== plus :$=,===.== *lSJ of the free portion. Alternative Answer: #hares in ntestacy
8 6 decedent #urvived !y: +state: :$5=.===.==
c. f N and C !oth predeceased C, who are COs intestate heirs? (hat are their respective fractional shares? Eo
they inherit in their own right or !y representation?
&6 &other............................'one
( 6 (idow.............................: 9=,===.== A 6 #on.................................: 9=,===.==

N6 #on.................................:9=.== =.==
+"plain your answer. d. f N and C !oth repudiated their shares in the estate of C who are CDs intestate heirs? (hat are their
C 6 Grandson *son of N..............'one E 6 Grandson *son of + who predeceased 8.................: 9=,===.== from"8"........................ 'one
respective fractional shares? Eo they inherit in their own right or !y representation? +"plain your answer,
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
C 6 Grandson *son of G who repudiated the nheritance
*a. N [ $S5 H [ $SJ !y representation of C
*!. N [ $S5
Article <F5 of the Civil Code provides that grandchildren inherit !y right of representation.
C[ $S5
legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving
legitimate children and descendants of the deceased. !. 8he widowDs share is :9=.===.== !ecause under Art, <<G it states that if the widow or widower and
Explanation: a. 8he mother *&. cannot inherit from 8 !ecause under Art. <FA the ascendants shall inherit in default of
Page 45 of 119
spouse has in the succession the same share as that of

each of the children, c. C has no share !ecause his father is still alive hence
succession !y representation shall not apply *Art. <-A.. who predeceased 8 !y virtue of Art. <F$ on the right of
!e set aside as &arioDs con/ugal share from the community property. 8he other half, amounting to one million pesos, is her con/ugal share *net estate., and should !e distri!uted to
her intestate heirs. Applying the a!ove provision of law,
d. E inherits :9=.=== which is the share of his father +
representat ion. e. C has no share !ecause his father G repudiated the inheritance Lnder Article <-- heirs who . repudiate their share may not !e represented. )ntestate %ccession (1993)
&ichelle and 3orelle, 8essieDs nieces, are entitled to one6half of her con/ugal share worth one million pesos, or A==,=== pesos, while the other one6half amounting to :A==,=== will go to &ario, 8essieDs surviving spouse. &ichelle and 3orelle are then entitled to :5A=,=== pesos each as their hereditary share. )ntestate %ccession (1999)
&r. and &rs. Cru1, who are childless, met with a serious
+nri7ue died, leaving a net hereditary estate of :$.5 million. He is survived !y his widow, three legitimate children, two legitimate grandchildren sired !y a legitimate child who
predeceased him, and two recogni1ed illegitimate children. Eistri!ute the estate in intestacy. 2AB;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Lnder the theory of Concurrence, the shares are as follows:

A *legitimate child. [ :5==,===
motor vehicle accident with &r. Cru1 at the wheel and &rs. Cru1 seated !eside him, resulting in the instant death of &r. Cru1. &rs. Cru1 was still alive when help came !ut she also died on the way to the hospital. 8he couple ac7uired properties worth %ne &illion *:$,===,===.==. :esos during
their marriage, which are !eing claimed !y the parents of
!oth spouses in e7ual shares. s the claim of !oth sets of
N *legitimate child. [ :5==,===
C *legitimate child. [ :5==,=== E *legitimate child. [ % *predeceased;

+ *legitimate child of E. [ :$==,=== 6 !y right of representation C *legitimate child of E. [ :$==,=== 6 !y right of representation G *illegitimate child. [ :$==,=== 6 $S5 share of the legitimate child H *illegitimate child. [ :$==,=== 6 $S5 share of the legitimate child ( *(idow. [ :5==.=== 6 same share as legitimate child
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
parents valid and why? *9B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a. 'o, the claim of !oth parents is not valid. (hen &r.
Cru1 died, he was succeeded !y his wife and his parents as

his intestate heirs who will share his estate e7ually. a!solute community amounting to $ &illion :esos.
estate was =.A &illion pesos which is his half share in the
His
wife, will, therefore, inherit %.5A &illion :esos and his

parents will inherit =.5A &illion :esos.
His
Lnder the theory of +"clusion the free portion *:9==,===. is distri!uted only among the legitimate children and is given to them in addition to their legitime. All other ntestate heirs are entitled only to their respective legitimes.
8he distri!ution is as follows:
Legitime F ee "otal
(hen &rs. Cru1 died, she was succeeded !y her parents as

her intestate heirs. 8hey will inherit all of her estate community and her =.5A &illion inheritance from her
consisting of her =.A &illion half share in the a!solute hus!and, or a total of =.-A= &illion :esos.
!o tion
A 2legitimate child. N Vlegitimate child. C *legitimate child. E *legitimate child. + *legitimate child of E. C *legitimate child of E. G *illegitimate child. H *illegitimate child. ( *(idow.
:$A=.== = :$A=.== = :$A=.== = =
Z : -A,=== Z :$A=.=== Z : -A.===

=
6 :55A.=== 6 :55A.=== 6 :55A.=== = 6 :$$5,A== 6 :$$5,A== 6: -A,A== 6 : -A,A== 6:$A=.===
: -A,=== Z :9A.A== : -A.=== Z : -A.=== : -A.=== :$A=,== = : 9-.A== = =

=
n sum, the parents of &r. Cru1 will inherit 5A=,=== :esos while the parents of &rs. Cru1 will inherit -A=,=== :esos. )ntestate %ccession ('###) +ugenio died without issue, leaving several parcels of land in Nataan. He was survived !y Antonio, his legitimate !rother) &artina, the only daughter of his predeceased sister predeceased !rother. #hortly after +ugenioDs death, Antonio also died, leaving three legitimate children. #u!se7uently, Antonio e"ecuted an e"tra/udicial settlement of the estate of +ugenio, dividing it among themselves. 8he succeeding year, a petition to annul the e"tra/udicial settlement was filed !y Antero, an illegitimate son of Antonio, who claims he is
&artina, the children of 3oa7uin and the children of &ercedes) and five legitimate children of 3oa7uin, another
)ntestate %ccession (1993)
8essie died survived !y her hus!and &ario, and two nieces, &ichelle and 3orelle, who are the legitimate children of an elder sister who had predeceased her. 8he only property she
left !ehind was a house and lot worth two million pesos,
which 8essie and her hus!and had ac7uired with the use of &arioDs savings from his income as a doctor. How much of
the property or its value, if any, may &ichelle and 3orelle claim as their hereditary shares? 2AB;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Article $==$ of the Civil Code provides, "#hould !rothers
and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall !e entitled to one6 half of the inheritance and the !rothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
8essieDs gross estate consists of a house and lot ac7uired
entitled to share in the estate of +ugenio. 8he defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Antero is !arred !y Article <<5 of the Civil Code from inheriting from the legitimate !rother of his father. How will you
resolve the motion? *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
during her marriage, ma0ing it part of the community property. 8hus, one6half of the said property would have to
8he motion to dismiss should !e granted. Article <<5 does not apply. Antero is not claiming any inheritance from +ugenio. He is claiming his share in the inheritance of his
father consisting of his fatherDs share in the inheritance of
Page 46 of 119
+ugenio (Fela Mer+e% v. Fela Mer+e%, ;r 0o.

1$6(0(, $7 8e/r.ary 1999).
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
A& inherited !y &rs. Luna from &r. Luna will !e inherited from her !y her parents.
However, if the child had intra6uterine life of less than months, half of the estate of &r. Luna, or A&, will !e
t depends. f Antero was not ac0nowledged !y Antonio,
the motion to dismiss should !e granted !ecause Antero is
not a legal heir of Antonio. f Antero was ac0nowledged, the motion should !e denied !ecause Article <<5 is not
applica!le. 8his is !ecause Antero is claiming his inheritance

from his illegitimate father, not from +ugenio.
inherited !y the widow *&rs. Luna., while the other half, or A&, will !e inherited !y the parents of &r. Luna. Lpon the
death of &rs. Luna, her estate of A& will !e inherited !y her own parents.
)ntestate %ccession; 1eserva =roncal (1999) &r. Luna died, leaving an estate of 8en &illion *:$ =,===,===.==. :esos. His widow gave !irth to a child four
months after &r, LunaDs death, !ut the child died five hours after !irth. 8wo days after the childDs death, the widow of &r. Luna also died !ecause she had suffered from difficult child!irth. 8he estate of &r. Luna is now !eing claimed !y his parents, and the parents of his widow. (ho is entitled to
&r. LunaDa estate and why? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
son., N *a granddaughter, !eing the daughter of A. and C and E *the two ac0nowledged illegitimate children of the
Legitime (1997) "4", the decedent, was survived !y ( *his widow.. A *his
decedent.. "4" died this year *$<<-. leaving a net estate of

:$F=,===.==. All were willing to succeed, e"cept A who repudiated the inheritance from his father, and they see0
Half of the estate of &r. Luna will go to the parents of &rs.
your legal advice on how much each can e"pect to receive as their respective shares in the distri!ution of the estate. Give your answer.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Luna as their inheritance from &rs. Luna, while the other half will !e inherited !y the parents of &r. Luna as the
reservatarios of the reserved property inherited !y &rs.

Luna from her child.
(hen &r. Luna died, his heirs were his wife and the un!orn
child. 8he un!orn child inherited !ecause the inheritance
8he heirs are N, (, C and E. A inherits nothing !ecause of his renunciation. N inherits a legitime of :<=.===.== as the nearest and only legitimate descendant, inheriting in his own right not !y representation !ecause of ADs renunciation. ( gets a legitime e7uivalent to one6half *$ S 5. that of N amounting to :JA.===. C and E each gets a legitime :JA.===.== each. Nut since the total e"ceeds the entire
estate, their !e reduced legitimes would e7uivalent to one6half *$S5. that of N amounting to have
was favora!le to it and it was !orn alive later though it lived only for five hours. &rs. Luna inherited half of the $=
&illion estate while the un!orn child inherited the other half. (hen the child died, it was survived !y its mother,
to
&rs. Luna. As the only heir, &rs. Luna inherited, !y operation of law, the estate of the child consisting of its A
corresponding to :55.A==.== each *Art. F<A. CC.. 8he total of all of these amounts to :$F=.===.==.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
&illion inheritance from &r. Luna. n the hands of &rs.
I0T2STAT2 S>CC2SSI<0
2STAT2B 180,000.00
(6 *widow gets $S5 share.
Luna, what she inherited from her child was
:<=.===.== *Art. <<F.
reserva troncal for the !enefit of the relatives of the child within the third degree of consanguinity and who !elong to
the family of &r. Luna, the line where the property came from.
(hen &rs. Luna died, she was survived !y her parents as her only heirs. Her parents will inherit her estate consisting of the A &illion she inherited from &r. Luna. 8he other A &illion she inherited from her child will !e delivered to the
parents of &r. Luna as !eneficiaries of the reserved property.
A6 *son who repudiated his inheritance. 'one Art. <--. N 6 *Granddaughter. 'one C 6 *Ac0nowledged illegitimate :JA.===.= *Art.<<F child. =. E 6 *Ac0nowledged illegitimate :JA,===.= *Art. child. = <<F. 8he ac0nowledged illegitimate child gets $S5 of the share of each legitimate child.
Legitime; Comp%lsor" Aeirs ('##() Luis was survived !y two legitimate children, two illegitimate children, his parents, and two !rothers. He left
an estate of :$ million. (ho are the compulsory heirs of
Luis, how much is the legitime of each, and how much is

the free portion of his estate,
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n sum, A &illion :esos of &r. LunaDs estate will go to the parents of &rs. Luna, while the other A &illion :esos will go to the parents of &r. Luna as reservatarios.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
if any?
8he compulsory heirs are the two legitimate children and the two illegitimate children. 8he parents are e"cluded !y
f the child had an intra6uterine life of not less than months, it inherited from the father. n which case, the
estate of $=& will !e divided e7ually !etween the child and

the widow as legal heirs. Lpon the death of the child, its share of A& shall go !y operation of law to the mother, which shall !e su!/ect to reserva troncal. Lnder Art. F<$,
the legitimate children, while the !rothers are not compulsory heirs at all. 8heir respective legitimate are:
a. 8he legitime of the two *5. legitimate children is one half *$S5. of the estate *:A==,===.==. to !e divided
the reserva is in favor of relatives !elonging to the paternal line and who are within 9 degrees from the child. 8he
parents of &r, Luna are entitled to the reserved portion
!etween them e7ually, or :5A=,===.== each. !. 8he legitimate of each illegitimate child is one6half
*$S5. the legitimate legitime of child or each
:$5A,===.==.
which is A& as they are 5 degrees related from child. 8he
Page 47 of 119
c. #ince the total legitime of the compulsory heirs is :-A=,===.==, the !alance of :5A=,===.== is the free
portion.
legitime of the legitimate children and it follows that the legitime of one legitimate child is :$==,===. 8he legitime,
Legitime; Comp%lsor" Aeirs vs. econ0ar" Comp%lsor"

Aeirs ('##9)
+mil, the testator, has three legitimate children, 8om, Henry and (arlito) a wife named Adette) parents named :epe and
:ilar) an illegitimate child, Iamon) !rother, &ar0) and a
therefore, of the oldest son is :$==,===. However, since the donation given him was :$==,===, he has already received in full his legitime and he will not receive anything anymore from the decedent. 8he remaining :<==,===, therefore, shall go to the four younger children !y institution in the will, to !e divided e7ually among them. +ach will receive :55A,===.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
sister, 'anette. #ince his wife Adette is well6off, he wants to leave to his illegitimate child as much of his estate as he can legally do. His estate has an aggregate net amount of :l,5==,===.==, and all the a!ove6named relatives are still
Assuming that the donation is valid as to form and su!stance, 3uan cannot invo0e preterition !ecause he actually had received a donation inter vivos from the
living. +mil now comes to you for advice in ma0ing a will. How will you distri!ute his estate according to his wishes without violating the law on testamentary succession? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
testatri" * 8olentino $FF,$<<5 ed... He would only have a right to a completion of his legitime under Art. <=G of the Civil Code. 8he estate should !e divided e7ually among the five children who will each receive :55A,===.== !ecause the
total hereditary estate, after collating the donation to 3uan *Art. $=G$, CC., would !e :$ million. the actual distri!ution of the net estate, 3uan gets nothing while his n
:G==,===.== W legitime to !e divided e7ually !etween 8om, Henry and (arlito as the legitimate children. +ach will !e
entitled to :5==,===.==. *Art. FFF, Civil Code. :$==,===.== 6 6 share of Iamon the illegitimate child.
si!lings will get :55A,===.== each.
+7uivalent to $S5 of the share of each legitimate child. *Art.

$-G, Camily Code.
4reterition; Comp%lsor" Aeir (1999)
*a. &r, Cru1, widower, has three legitimate children, A, N

and C. He e"ecuted a (ill instituting as his heirs to his estate of %ne &illion *:$,===,===.==. :esos his two children A and N, and his friend C. Lpon his death, how should &r. Cru1Ds estate !e divided? +"plain. *9B.
:5==,===.== W Adette the wife. Her share is e7uivalent to
the share of one legitimate child. *Art. F<5, par. 5, Civil Code.
:epe and :ilar, the parents are only secondary compulsory

heirs and they cannot inherit if the primary compulsory heirs *legitimate children. are alive. *Art. FF-, par. 5, Civil Code.
Nrother &ar0 and sister 'anette are not compulsory heirs
!ut gave a legacy of : $==,===.== to his friend C. How should the estate of &r, Cru1 !e divided upon his death?
n the preceding suppose &r. *!. 7uestion, Cru1 instituted his two children A and N as his heirs in his (ill,
+"plain, *5B.
since they are not included in the enumeration under Article

FF- of the Civil Code. 8he remaining !alance of :9==,===.== is the free portion which can !e given to the illegitimate child Iamon as an instituted heir. *Art. <$J, Civil Code. f so given !y the decedent, Iamon would receive a total of :J==,===.==.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a. Assuming that the institution of A, N and C were to the

entire estate, there was preterition of C since C is a
compulsory heir in the direct line. 8he preterition will result in the total annulment of the institution of heirs. 8herefore, the institution of A, N and C will !e set aside and &r. Cu1Ds
estate will !e divided, as in intestacy, e7ually among A, N
4reterition ('##1) Necause her eldest son 3uan had !een pestering her for capital to start a !usiness, 3osefa gave him :$==,===. Cive
and C as follows: A 6 :999,999.99) N 6 :999.999.99) and C 6 :999,999.9 9.

*!. %n the same assumption as letter *a., there was preterition of C. 8herefore, the institution of A and N is annulled !ut the legacy of :$==.===.== to C shall !e respected for not !eing inofficious. 8herefore, the
years later, 3osefa died, leaving a last will and testament in which she instituted only her four younger children as her sole heirs. At the time of her death, her only properly left
was :<==,===.== in a !an0. 3uan opposed the will on the
remainder of :<==.===.== will !e divided e7ually among A,

N and C. 4rocee0ings; )ntestate 4rocee0ings; 7%ris0iction ('##!)
ground of preterition. How should 3osefaDs estate !e divided among her heirs? #tate !riefly the reason*s. for your answer. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8here was no preterition of the oldest son !ecause the

testatri" donated $==,=== pesos to him. 8his donation is
considered an advance on the sonDs inheritance. 8here !eing no preterition, the institutions in the will shall !e respected !ut the legitime of the oldest son has to !e completed if he
received less.
n his lifetime, a :a0istani citi1en, AE L, married three times under :a0istani law. (hen he died an old widower, he left !ehind si" children, two sisters, three homes, and an estate worth at least 9= million pesos in the :hilippines. He was !orn in Lahore !ut last resided in Ce!u City, where he had a mansion and where two of his youngest children now
live and wor0.
After collating the donation of :$==.=== to the remaining
property of :<==,===, the estate of the testatri" is

:$,===,===. %f this amount, one6half or :A==,===, is the
#ulu, while the two middle6aged children are employees in Ham!oanga City. Cinding that the deceased left no will, the youngest son wanted to file intestate proceedings !efore the 8wo other Iegion 8rial Court of Ce!u si!lings al City.
8wo of his oldest children are farmers in
Page 48 of 119
o!/ected, arguing that it should !e in 3olo !efore a #hariOa court since his sisters Nut lands are in #ulu. AdilOs in :a0istan want the proceedings held in Lahore !efore a
:a0istani court.
mother, in favor of another sister, with their mother not
(hich court has /urisdiction and is the proper venue for the intest proceedings 8he law which ate ? of country shall
govern succession to his estate? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
mother and her children which cannot !e revo0ed !y the mother. #aid deeds of sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance.
only giving her authority thereto !ut even signing said deeds, there is a valid partition inter vivos !etween the
n so far as the properties of the decedent located in the
:hilippines are concerned, they are governed !y :hilippine law *Article $G, Civil Code.. Lnder :hilippine law, the proper venue for the settlement of the estate is the domicile of the decedent at the time of his death. #ince the decedent
last resided in Ce!u City, that is the proper venue for the intestate settlement of his estate.
" t would !e un/ust for the mother to revo0e the sales to a son and to e"ecute a simulated sale in favor of a daughter who already !enefited !y the partition."
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
C. >es, under Arts. A$ and A5 of the 'ew Camily Code. n case of legal separation, annulment of marriage, declaration
of nullity of marriage and the automatic termination of a
However, the successional rights to the estate of AE L are governed !y :a0istani law, his national law, under Article $G of the Civil Code. %ccession; Deat&; 4res%mptive Legitime (1991) a. Cor purposes of succession, when is death deemed to
occur or ta0e place? vivos? llustrate.
su!se7uent marriage !y the reappearance of the a!sent spouse, the common or community property of the spouses shall !e dissolved and li7uidated. Art, A$. n said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final /udgment of the trial court, shall !e delivered in
cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, !y
!. &ay succession !e conferred !y contracts or acts inter which allows the delivery to compulsory heirs of their presumptive legitimes during
the lifetime of their parents? f so, in what instances?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
mutual agreement, /udicially approved, had already provided for such matters. 8he children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may as0 for the enforcement of the /udgment. 8he delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescri!ed shall in no way pre/udice the ultimate successional rights of the parents) !ut the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or a!solute nullity shall !e considered as advances on their legitime.
the children accruing upon the death of either or !oth of
c.
la s there any w
A. Eeath as a fact is deemed to occur when it actually ta0es place. Eeath is presumed to ta0e place in the circumstances under Arts. 9<=69<$ of the Civil Code. 8he
time of death is presumed to !e at the e"piration of the $=6 year period as prescri!ed !y Article 9<= and at the moment
of disappearance under Article
9<$. N.
Lnder Art. FJ of the Camily Code amending Art $9= of the Civil Code, contractual succession is no longer possi!le since the law now re7uires that donations of future property !e governed !y the provisions on the testamentary succession and formalities of wills.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Art. A5. 8he /udgment of annulment or of a!solute nullity

of the marriage, the partition and distri!ution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrenDs

presumptive legitimes shall !e recorded in the appropriate
N. n the case of Corona%o vs.CA(l91 SCRA81), it was ruled that no property passes under a will without its !eing pro!ated, !ut may under Article $=AF of the Civil Code of $F<F, !e sustained as a partition !y an act inter vivos
[Many6<y vs. CA 144SCRA33).
civil registry and registries of property) otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.
8ills; Co0icil; )nstit%tion of Aeirs;
%bstit%tion of Aeirs
('##') Ny virtue of a Codicil appended to his will, 8heodore devised to Eivino a tract of sugar land, with the o!ligation
on the part of Eivino or his heirs to deliver to Netina a specified volume of sugar per harvest during NetinaOs o!ligation is not fulfilled, Netina should immediately sei1e
And in the case of C!ave@ vs, IAC 1191 SCRA$11), it was ruled that while the law prohi!its contracts upon future
inheritance, the partition !y the parent, as provided in Art. $=F= is a case e"pressly authori1ed !y law. A person has two options in ma0ing a partition of his estate: either !y an act inter vivos or !y will. f the partition is !y will, it is imperative that such partition must !e e"ecuted in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills) if !y an act inter vivos, such partition may even !e oral or written, and need not !e in the form of a will, provided the legitime is not pre/udiced. "(here several sisters e"ecute deeds of sale over their $ SG undivide shar o th parapher proper e ty d f e nal of their
lifetime. t is also stated in the Codicil that in the event the the property from Eivino or latterOs heirs and turn it over to
8heodoreOs compulsory heirs. Eivino failed to fulfill the
o!ligation under the Codicil. Netina !rings suit against Eivino for the reversion of the tract of land.
a. Eistinguish !etween modal institution and su!station of heirs. *9B. !. Eistinguish !etween fideicommissary
simple
and
su!stitution of heirs. *5B.

c. Eoes Netina have a cause of action against Eivino?
+"plain *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
:age 49 of
$$<
A. of an heir made for a certain purpose or cause *Arts. F-$ and FF5, 'CC.. #LN#8 8L8 %' is the appointment of
A &%EAL '#8 8L8 %' is the institution
another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originality instituted. *Art. FA-, 'CC.. n a # &:L+ #LN#8 8L8 %' of heirs, N. the testator designates one or more persons to su!stitute the
!. n the case of a foreigner, his national law shall govern su!stantive validity whether he e"ecutes his will in the
:hilippines or in a foreign country.
heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die !efore him, or should not wish or should !e incapacitated to
accept the inheritance. C E+ C%&& ##AI> n a
#LN#8 8L8 %', the testator institutes a first heir and charges him to preserve and transmit the whole or part of
the inheritance to a second heir. n a simple su!stitution, only one heir inherits. n a fideicommissary su!stitution, !oth the first and second heirs inherit. *Art. FA< and FG<, 'CC.
8ills; Aolograp&ic 8ills; )nsertions & Cancellations (199-) ,anessa died on April $J, $<F=, leaving !ehind a holographic will which is entirely written, dated and signed in her own handwriting. However, it contains insertions and cancellations which are not authenticated !y her signature. Cor this reason, the pro!ate of ,anessaDs will was opposed !y her relatives who stood to inherit !y her intestacy.
&ay ,anessaDs holographic will !e pro!ated? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Netina has a cause of action against Eivino. 8his is a case of a testamentary disposition su!/ect to a mode and the will itself provides for the conse7uence if the mode is not complied with. 8o enforce the mode, the will itself gives Netina the right to compel the return of the property to the heirs of 8heodore. (Ra/a%"lla v. Cons+ol.ella,
C. 334 SCRA 7$$
[$000] ;R 113($7, $9 -.ne $000).
F$J, 'CC. 8he original will, however, remains valid !ecause a holographic will is not invalidated !y the unauthenticated insertions or alterations (A:ero v. CA, $36
SCRA 468].
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
>es, the will as originally written may !e pro!ated. 8he insertions and alterations were void since they were not authenticated !y the full signature of ,anessa, under Art.
t depends. As a rule, a holographic will is not adversely
affected !y nsertions or cancellations which were not
authenticated !y the full signature of the testator (A:ero v. CA, $36 SCRA 468). However, when the insertion or cancellation amounts to revocation of the will, Art.F$J of
8ills; ,ormalities (199#) *$. f a will is e"ecuted !y a testator who is a Cilipino citi1en, what law will govern if the will is e"ecuted in the
:hilippines? (hat law will govern if the will is e"ecuted in

another country? +"plain your answers.
the 'CC does not apply !ut Art. F9=. 'CC. Art. F9= of the 'CC does not re7uire the testator to authenticate his cancellation for the effectivity of a revocation effected through such cancellation (Pala9 v. Relova,
13$ SCRA $3().
n the Ralaw case, the original holographic will designated

only one heir as the only su!stantial provision which was altered !y su!stituting the original heir with another heir. Hence, if the unauthenticated cancellation amounted to a
*5. f a will is e"ecuted !y a foreigner, for instance, a 3apanese, residing in the :hilippines, what law
will govern if
the will is e"ecuted in the :hilippines? And what law will country, for instance, the L.#.A.? +"plain your answers.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
revocation of the will, the will may not !e pro!ated !ecause it had already !een revo0ed.
govern if the will is e"ecuted in 3apan, or some other
8ills; Aolograp&ic 8ills; 8itnesses (199!)
*$. a. f the testator who is a Cilipino citi1en e"ecutes his will in the :hilippines, :hilippine law will govern the formalities.
!. f said Cilipino testator e"ecutes his will in another

country, the law of the country where he may!e or
%n his death!ed, ,icente was e"ecuting a will. n the room were Carissa, Carmela, Comelio and Atty. Cimpo, a notary pu!lic. #uddenly, there was a street !rawl which caught
ComelioDs attention, prompting him to loo0 out the
:hilippine law will govern the formalities. *Article F$A, Civil

CodeM
window. Cornelio did not see ,icente sign a will. s the will valid?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE"(:
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*5. a. f the testator is a foreigner residing in the :hilippines

and he e"ecutes his will in the :hilippines, the law of the
a. >es, 8he will is valid. 8he law does not re7uire a witness to actually see the testator sign t is the will. sufficient if the witness could have seen the act of signing had he chosen to do so !y casting his eyes to the proper direction.
!. >es, the will is valid. Applying the "test of position",
country of which he is a citi1en or :hilippine law will

govern the formalities.
!. f the testator is a foreigner and e"ecutes his will in a
although Comelio did not actually see ,icente sign the will,
Cornelio was in the proper position to see ,icente sign if
foreign country, the law of his place of residence or the law
of the country of which he is a citi1en or the law of the place of e"ecution, or :hilippine law will govern the formalities *Articles $-. F$G. F$-. Civil Code..
P!((I-LE A##I$I!'AL A'(WE"(:
Cornelio so wished.
8ills; 7oint 8ills ('###) &anuel, a Cilipino, and his American wife +leanor, e"ecuted a 3oint (ill in Noston, &assachusetts when they were
residing in said city. 8he law of &assachusetts allows the e"ecution of /oint wills. #hortly thereafter, +leanor died. Can the said (ill !e pro!ated in the :hilippines for the
a. n the case of a Cilipino citi1en, :hilippine law shall govern su!stantive validity whether he e"ecutes his will in
the :hilippines or in a foreign country.
settlement of her estate? *9B.
Page 50 of 119
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, the will may !e pro!ated in the :hilippines insofar as the estate of +leanor is concerned. (hile the Civil Code prohi!its the e"ecution of 3oint wills here and a!road, such prohi!ition applies only to Cilipinos. Hence, the /oint will which is valid where e"ecuted is valid in the :hilippines !ut only with respect to +leanor. Lnder Article F$<, it is void with respect to &anuel whose /oint will remains void in the :hilippines despite !eing valid where e"ecuted.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
considered void are those made !etween persons who were guilty of adultery or concu!inage at the time of the donation.
*c. As a general rule, the will should !e admitted in pro!ate proceedings if all the necessary re7uirements for its e"trinsic validity have !een met and the court should not consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of said will. However, the e"ception arises when the will in effect contains only one testamentary disposition. n effect, the only testamentary disposition under the will is the giving of the free portion to 4, since legitimes are provided !y law. Hence, the trial court may consider the intrinsic validity of
8he will cannot !e pro!ated in the :hilippines, even though valid where e"ecuted, !ecause it is prohi!ited under Article F$F of the Civil Code and declared void under Article F$<, 8he prohi!ition should apply even to the American wife !ecause the 3oint will is offensive to pu!lic policy. &oreover, it is a single /uridical act which cannot !e valid as to one testator and void as to the other. 8ills; 4robate; )ntrinsic @ali0it" (199#)
H died leaving a last will and testament wherein it is stated that he was legally married to ( !y whom he had two legitimate children A and N. H devised to his said forced heirs the entire estate e"cept the free portion which he gave to 4 who was living with him at the time of his death.
the provisions of said will. (0.,."% v. 0.,."%,
etal.. 0o. 56 $3447, -.ne $3, 1966, 1( SCRAC 0e'o&.+eno v. CA, 566$97$, 9 <+to/er 1987. 139 SCRA $06).
n said will he e"plained that he had !een estranged from his wife ( for more than 5= years and he has !een living with 4 as man and wife since his separation from his legitimate family. n the pro!ate proceedings, 4 as0ed for the issuance of letters testamentary in accordance with the will wherein she is named sole e"ecutor. 8his was opposed !y ( and her children. *a. #hould the will !e admitted in said pro!ate proceedings? *!. s the said devise to 4 valid? *c. (as it proper for the trial court to consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of said will? +"plain your answers,
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a. >es, the will may !e pro!ated if e"ecuted according to the formalities prescri!ed !y law. *!. 8he institution giving 4 the free portion is not valid, !ecause the prohi!itions under Art. -9< of the Civil Code on donations also apply to testamentary dispositions *Article $=5F, Civil Code., Among donations which are
8ills; 4robate; .otarial an0 Aolograp&ic 8ills (1997)

3ohnny, with no 0nown living relatives, e"ecuted a notarial will giving all his estate to his sweetheart. %ne day, he had a serious altercation with his sweetheart. A few days later, he was introduced to a charming lady who later !ecame a dear friend. #oon after, he e"ecuted a holographic will e"pressly revo0ing the notarial will and so designating his new friend as sole heir. %ne day when he was clearing up his des0, 3ohnny mista0enly !urned, along with other papers, the only copy of his holographic will. His !usiness associate, +duardo 0new well the contents of the will which was shown to him !y 3ohnny the day it was e"ecuted. A few days after the !urning incident, 3ohnny died. Noth wills were sought to !e pro!ated in two separate petitions.
order that a will may !e revo0ed !y a su!se7uent will, it is necessary that the latter will !e valid and e"ecuted with the formalities re7uired for the ma0ing of a will. 8he latter should possess all the re7uisites of a valid will whether it !e ordinary or a holographic will, and should !e pro!ated in order that the revocatory clause thereof may produce effect. n the case at !ar, since the holographic will itself cannot !e presented, it cannot therefore !e pro!ated. #ince it cannot !e pro!ated, it cannot revo0e the notarial will previously written !y the decedent. 5. %n the !asis of the Iules of Court, Iule -G, #ec. G, provides that no will shall !e proved as a lost or destroyed will unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved !y at least two *5. credi!le witnesses. Hence, if we a!ide strictly !y the two6witness rule to prove a lost or destroyed will, the holographic will which 3ohnny allegedly mista0enly !urned, cannot !e pro!ated, since there is only one witness, +duardo, who can !e called to testify as to the e"istence of the will. f the holographic will, which purportedly, revo0ed the earlier notarial will cannot !e proved !ecause of the a!sence of the re7uired witness, then the petition for the pro!ate of the notarial will should prosper.
(ill either or !oth petitions prosper?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he pro!ate of the notarial will will prosper. 8he holographic will cannot !e admitted to pro!ate !ecause a holographic will can only !e pro!ated upon evidence of the will itself unless there is a photographic copy. Nut since the holographic will was lost and there was no other copy, it cannot !e pro!ated and therefore the notarial will will !e admitted to pro!ate !ecause there is no revo0ing will.
A##I$I!'AL A'(WE"(:
$. n the case of ;an vs. ?a' (104 !"l 709), the e"ecution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not !e proved !y the !are testimony of witnesses who have seen or read such will. 8he will itself must !e presented otherwise it shall produce no effect. 8he law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. &oreover, in
8ills; 1evocation of 8ills; Depen0ent 1elative 1evocation ('##()

&r. Ieyes e"ecuted a will completely valid as to form. A wee0 later, however, he e"ecuted another will which e"pressly revo0ed his first will, which he tore his first will to pieces. Lpon the death of &r. Ieyes, his second will was presented for pro!ate !y his heirs, !ut it was denied pro!ate
Page 51 of 119
due to formal defects. Assuming that a copy of the first will

is availa!le, may it now !e admitted to pro!ate and given effect? (hy?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
e"cluded !y a legitimate son of the decedent 2Art. FF-, 'ew Civil Code;. 8his follows the principle that the descendants e"clude the ascendants from inheritance.
>es, the first will may !e admitted to pro!ate and given effect. (hen the testator tore first will, he was under the
mista0en !elief that the second will was perfectly valid and
he would not have destroyed the first will had he 0nown that the second will is not valid. 8he revocation !y destruction therefore is dependent on the validity of the second will. #ince it turned out that the second will was invalid, the tearing of the first will did not produce the
8ills; =estamentar" )ntent (199-) Alfonso, a !achelor without any descendant or ascendant,
wrote a last will and testament in which he devised." all the properties of which may !e possessed at the time of my death" to his favorite !rother &anuel. At the time he wrote the will, he owned only one parcel of land. Nut !y the time
he died, he owned twenty parcels of land. His other
effect of revocation. 8his is 0nown as the doctrine of

!"l 3(.)
dependent relative revocation (Molo v. Molo, 90

'o, the first will cannot !e admitted to pro!ate. (hile it is true that the first will was successfully revo0ed !y the
second will !ecause the second will was later denied pro!ate, the first will was, nevertheless, revo0ed when the
!rothers and sisters insist that his will should pass only the parcel of land he owned at the time it was written, and did not cover his properties ac7uired, which should !e !y
intestate succession. &anuel claims otherwise.
(ho is correct? +"plain.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
testator destroyed it after e"ecuting the second invalid will.

(F"a@ v. Fe 5eon, 43 !"l 413 [19$$]).
&anuel is correct !ecause under Art. -<9, 'CC, property ac7uired after the ma0ing of a will shall only pass there!y, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of ma0ing the
8ills; =estamentar" Disposition ('##-)
Eon died after e"ecuting a Last (ill and 8estament leaving

his estate valued at :$5 &illion to his common6law wife
will, should it e"pressly appear !y the will that such was his intention. #ince AlfonsoDs intention to devise all properties he owned at the time of his death e"pressly appears on the
will, then all the 5= parcels of land are included in the
Ioshelle. He is survived !y his !rother Ionie and his half6

sister &ichelle.
(1) )as FonDs testa&entary %"s'os"t"on o* !"s estate "n a++or%an+e 9"t! t!e la9 on s.++ess"on1 )!et!er yo. a,ree
or not, e3'la"n yo.r ans9er. 23'la"n.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE": >es,
devise.
#!'A$I!'
Donation vs. ale ('##()
a. &ay a person sell something that does not !elong to
disposition
EonDs testamentary
of his estate is in accordance with the law on succession. Eon has no compulsory heirs not having ascendants,
descendants nor a spouse 2Art. FF-, 'ew Civil Code;. Nrothers and sisters are not compulsory heirs. 8hus, he can
!e7ueath his entire estate to anyone who is not otherwise
him? +"plain. !. &ay a person donate something that does not !elong to him? +"plain. AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a.
>es, a person may sell something which does not
incapacitated to inherit from him. A common6 law wife is not incapacitated under the law, as Eon is not married to
!elong to him. Cor the sale to !e valid, the law does not
anyone.
($) I* Fon *a"le% to e3e+.te a 9"ll %.r"n, !"s l"*et"&e, as !"s
la9yer, !o9 9"ll yo. %"str"/.te !"s estate1 23'la"n. ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE": After
re7uire the seller to !e the owner of the property at the time of the sale. *Article $J9J, 'CC.. f the seller cannot transfer ownership over the thing sold at the time of delivery !ecause he was not the owner thereof, he shall !e lia!le for
!reach of contact.
paying the legal o!ligations of the estate, will give Ionie, as full6!lood !rother of Eon, 5S9 of the net estate, twice the share of &ichelle, the half6 sister who shall receive $S9. Ioshelle will not receive
anything as she is not a legal heir 2Art. $==G 'ew Civil Code ;.
(3)
*!.
As a general rule, a person cannot donate
something which he cannot dispose of at the time of the
donation *Article -A$, 'ew Civil Code..
Ass.&"n, !e %"e% "ntestate s.rv"ve% /y !"s /rot!er
Donations; Con0ition; Capacit" to %e (199-) #ometime in $<AA, 8omas donated a parcel of land to his stepdaughter rene, su!/ect to the condition that she may
Ron"e, !"s !al*6s"ster M"+!elle, an% !"s le,"t"&ate son -ayson,

!o9 9"ll yo. %"str"/.te !"s estate1 23'la"n. ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE": 3ayson
will !e entitled to the entire :$5 &illion as the !rother and sister will !e e"cluded !y a legitimate son of the decedent. 8his follows the principle of
pro"imity, where "the nearer e"cludes the farther."
not sell, transfer or cede the same for twenty years. #hortly thereafter, he died. n $<GA, !ecause she needed money for medical e"penses, rene sold the land to Conrado. 8he following year, rene died, leaving as her sole heir a son !y
the name of Armando. (hen Armando learned that the
land which he e"pected to inherit had !een sold !y rene to Conrado, he filed an action against the latter for annulment
of the sale, on the ground that it violated the restriction
(4) Ass.&"n, *.rt!er !e %"e% "ntestate, s.rv"ve% /y !"s *at!er -.an, !"s /rot!er Ron"e, !"s !al*6s"ster M"+!elle, an% !"s le,"t"&ate son -ayson, !o9 9"ll yo. %"str"/.te !"s estate1
23'la"n. ($.74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
to the
3ayson will still !e entitled
entire :$5 &illion as the father, !rother and sister will !e
imposed !y 8omas. Conrado filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that Armando did not have the legal capacity to su e. f you were the 3udge, how will you rule on this motion to dismiss? +"plain.
Page 52 of 119
96 SCRA 34$ an% ot!er +ases) (Teves vs. 1141).
(FG CA.
.s.
AAC, $3 SCRA
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
As /udge, will grant the motion to dismiss. Armando has no personality to !ring the action for annulment of the sale to Conrado. %nly an aggrieved party to the contract may !ring the action for annulment thereof *Art. $9<-. 'CC.. (hile Armando is heir and successor6 in6interest of his mother *Art. $9$$, 'CC., he 2standing in place of his mother. has no personality to annul the contract. Noth are not aggrieved parties on account of their own violation of the condition of, or restriction on, their ownership imposed !y the donation. %nly the donor or his heirs would have the personality to !ring an action to revo0e a donation for violation of a condition thereof or a restriction thereon.
(;arr"%o .. CA, $36 SCRA 470).
to annul the contract of sale !ecause their rights are pre/udiced !y one of the contracting parties thereof [FG v. CA, 96 SCRA 34$C Teves vs. AAC. $3 SCRA 114]. #ince Armando is neither the donor nor heir of the donor, he has no personality to !ring the action for annulment.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Conse7uently, while the donor or his heirs were not parties to the sale, they have the right
As /udge, will grant the motion to dismiss. Compliance with a condition imposed !y a donor gives rise to an action to revo0e the donation under Art. -GJ, 'CC. However, the right of action !elongs to the donor. s transmissi!le to his heirs, and may !e e"ercised against the doneeDs heirs. #ince Armando is an heir of the donee, not of the donor, he has no legal capacity to sue for revocation of the donation. Although he is not see0ing such revocation !ut an annulment of the sale which his mother, the donee, had e"ecuted
in violation of the condition imposed !y the donor, an action for annulment of a contract may !e !rought only !y those who are principally or su!sidiarily o!liged there!y *Art. $9<-, 'CC.. As an e"ception to the rule, it has !een held that a person not so o!liged may nevertheless as0 for annulment if he is pre/udiced in his
property to Cerdinand who then sued to recover the land from the city government. (ill the suit prosper?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
rights regarding one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment
which would result to him from the contract in which he
had no intervention,
#uch detriment or pre/udice cannot !e shown !y Armando. As a forced heir, ArmandoDs interest in the property was, at !est, a mere e"pectancy. 8he sale of the land !y his mother did not impair any vested right. 8he fact remains that the premature sale made !y his mother *premature !ecause only half of the period of the !an had elapsed. was not voida!le at all, none of the vices of consent under Art. $9< of the 'CC !eing present. Hence, the motion to dismiss should !e granted. Donations; Con0itions; 1evocation (1991)
#pouses &ichael and Linda donated a 96hectare residential land to the City of Naguio on the condition that the city government would !uild thereon a pu!lic par0 with a !o"ing arena, the construction of which shall commence within si" *G. months from the date the parties ratify the donation. 8he donee accepted the donation and the title to the property was transferred in its name. Cive years elapsed !ut the pu!lic par0 with the !o"ing arena was never started. Considering the failure of the donee to comply with the condition of the donation, the donor6spouses sold the
Cerdinand has no right to recover the land. t is true that the donation was revoca!le !ecause of !reach of the conditions. Nut until and unless the donation was revo0ed, it remained valid. Hence, #pouses &ichael and Linda had no right to sell the land to Cerdinand. %ne cannot give what he does not have. (hat the donors should have done first was to have the donation annulled or revo0ed. And after that was done, they could validly have disposed of the land in favor of Cerdinand.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
A. Lntil the contract of donation has !een resolved or rescinded under Article $$<$ of the Civil Code or revo0ed under Art. -GJ of the Civil Code, the donation stands effective and valid. Accordingly, the sale made !y the donor to Cerdinand cannot !e said to have conveyed title to Cerdinand, who, there!y, has no cause of action for recovery of the land acting for and in his !ehalf.
N. 8he donation is onerous, And !eing onerous, what applies is the law on contracts, and not the law on donation *Ee Luna us. A!rigo, F$ #CIA $A=.. Accordingly, the prescriptive period for the filing of such an action would !e the ordinary prescriptive period for contacts which may either !e si" or ten depending upon whether it is ver!al or written. 8he filing of the case five years later is within the prescriptive period and, therefore, the action can prosper,
Alternati1e Answer:
8he law on donation lays down a special prescriptive period in the case of !reach of condition, which is four years from non6 compliance thereof *Article -GJ Civil Code.. #ince the action has prescri!ed, the suit will not prosper, Donations; Effect; illegal & immoral con0itions (1997) Are the effects of illegal and immoral conditions on simple donations the same as those effects that would follow when such conditions are imposed on donations con causa onerosa?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, they donDt have the same effect. llegal or impossi!le conditions in simple and remuneratory donations shall !e considered as not imposed. Hence the donation is valid. 8he donation will !e considered as simple or pure. 8he condition or mode is merely an accessory disposition, and its nullity does not affect the donation, unless it clearly appears that the donor would not
have made the donation without the mode or condition.

Eonations con causa onerosa is governed !y law on o!ligations and contracts, under which an impossi!le or llicit condition annuls the o!ligation dependent upon the condition where the condition is positive and suspensive. f the impossi!le or illicit condition is negative, it is simply considered as not written, and the o!ligation is converted into a pure and simple one. However, in order that an illegal condition may annul a contract, the impossi!ility must e"ist at the time of the creation of the o!ligation) a supervening impossi!ility does not affect the e"istence of the o!ligation.
A##I$I!'AL A'(WE":
Page 53 of 119
'o. n simple or pure donation, only the illegal or
irrevoca!le, the latter is revoca!le. n the pro!lem given, all

the clauses or conditions mentioned in the deed of donation, e"cept one, are consistent with the rule of irrevoca!ility and would have sustained the view that the donation is inter vivos and therefore valid. 8he lone
impossi!le condition is considered not written !ut the donation remains valid and !ecomes free from conditions. 8he condition or mode !eing a mere accessory disposition. ts nullity does not affect the donation unless it clearly appears that the donor would not have made the donation without the mode or condition. %n the other hand, onerous donation is governed !y the rules on contracts. Lnder Article $$F9, mpossi!le or illegal conditions shall annul the o!ligation which depends upon them. n these cases, !oth
the o!ligation and the condition are void.
e"ception is the clause which reserves the donorDs right to sell the property at any time !efore his death. #uch a reservation has !een held to render the donation revoca!le and, therefore, !ecomes a donation mortis causa ( .", vs. enN*lor"%a, 17 SCRA $(6, at '. $86). 8hat the right was not
e"ercised is immaterial) its reservation was an implied recognition of the donorDs power to nullify the donation anytime he wished to do so. Conse7uently, it should have !een em!odied in a last will and testament. 8he suit for
Donations; ,ormalities; *ortis Ca%sa (199#)
N donated to & a parcel of land in $<F=. N made the deed

of donation, entitled ?Eonation nter ,ivos,@ in a pu!lic
nullity will thus prosper.
instrument and & accepted the donation in the same document. t was provided in the deed that the land
donated shall !e immediately delivered to & and that &
shall have the right to en/oy the fruits fully. 8he deed also
provided that N was reserving the right to dispose of said
Donations; )nter @ivos; 2cceptance (199() %n 3anuary 5$, $<FG, A e"ecuted a deed of donation inter
vivos of a parcel of land to Er. N who had earlier constructed thereon a !uilding in which researches on the
land during his *NOs. lifetime, and that & shall not register the deed of donation until after NOs death. Lpon NOs death, (, NOs widow and sole heir, filed an action for the recovery of the donated land, contending that the donation made !y N is a donation mortis causa and not a donation inter vivos.
(ill said action prosper? +"plain your answer.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
dreaded disease A E# were !eing conducted. 8he deed, ac0nowledged !efore a notary pu!lic, was handed over !y A to Er. N who received it. A few days after, A flew to Eavao
City. Lnfortunately, the airplane he was riding crashed on
landing 0illing him. 8wo days after the unfortunate accident. Er. N, upon advice of a lawyer, e"ecuted a deed
ac0nowledged !efore a accepting the notary
>es, the action will prosper. 8he donation is a donation
pu!lic
mortis causa !ecause the reservation is to dispose of all the property donated and, therefore, the donation is revoca!le
at will. Accordingly, the donation re7uires the e"ecution of a 'CC..
donation. s the donation effective? +"plain your answer.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
valid will, either notarial or holographic *Arts -AA, -5F
'o, the donation is not effective. 8he law re7uires that the separate acceptance of the donee of an immova!le must !e done in a pu!lic document during the lifetime
of the donor
Donations; ,ormalities; *ortis Ca%sa (1993)
+rnesto donated in a pu!lic instrument a parcel of land to Eemetrio, who accepted it in the same document. t is there declared that the donation shall ta0e effect immediately,
with the donee having the right to ta0e possession of the land and receive its fruits !ut not to dispose of the land
*Art. -JG X -J<, Civil Code. n this case, N e"ecuted the deed of acceptance !efore a notary pu!lic after the donor had already died.
Donations; 4erfection (1993)

%n 3uly 5-, $<<-, :edro mailed in &anila a letter to his
while +rnesto is alive as well as for ten years following his death. &oreover, +rnesto also reserved in the same deed his right to sell the property should he decide to dispose of it at any time 6 a right which he did not e"ercise at all. After his death, +rnestoDs heirs seasona!ly !rought an action to recover the property, alleging that the donation was void as it did not comply with the formalities of a will. (ill the suit
prosper? 2AB;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!rother, 3ose, a resident of lollo City, offering to donate a vintage sports car which the latter had long !een wanting to !uy from the former. %n August A, $<<-, 3ose called :edro
!y cellular phone to than0 him for his generosity and to
inform him that he was sending !y mail his letter of acceptance. :edro never received that letter !ecause it was
never mailed. %n August $J, $<<-, :edro received a
telegram from loilo informing him that 3ose had !een
0illed in a road accident the day !efore *August $9, $<<-.
>es, the suit will prosper as the donation did not comply
with the formalities of a will. n this instance, the fact that the donor did not intend to transfer ownership or
possession of the donated property to the donee until the
$. s there a perfected donation? 25B; 5. (ill your answer !e the same if 3ose did mail his
acceptance letter !ut it was received !y :edro in &anila
days after 3oseDs death? 29B;

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
donorDs death, would result in a donation mortis causa and in this 0ind of disposition, the formalities of a will should !e complied with, otherwise, the donation is void. n this nstance, donation mortis causa em!odied only in a pu!lic instrument without the formalities of a will could not have
transferred ownership of disputed property to another.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
$. 'one. 8here is no perfected donation. Lnder Article -JF of the Civil Code, the donation of a mova!le may !e made
orally or in writing. f the value of the personal property
donated e"ceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall !e made in writing. Assuming that the
value of the thing donated, a vintage sports car, e"ceeds
%ne of the essential distinctions !etween a donation inter
vivos and a donation mortis causa is that while the former is
:A,===.== then the donation and the acceptance must !e in writing. n this instance, the acceptance of 3ose was not in
writing, therefore, the donation is void. Lpon the other
Page 54 of 119
hand, assuming that the sports car costs less than :A,===.==
then the donation may!e oral, !ut still, the simultaneous delivery of the car is needed and there !eing none, the donation was never perfected.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Code which re7uires the donation and the acceptance thereof to !e in a pu!lic instrument in order to !e valid. 8he acceptance not !eing in a pu!lic instrument, the part
which is not onerous is void and Iosa may recover it from Amanda.
Donations; /nregistere0; Effects; .on?Compliance;
5. >es, the answer is the same. f 3oseDs mail containing his acceptance of the donation was received !y :edro after the formerDs death, then the donation is still void !ecause under Article -9J of the Civil Code, the donation is perfected the moment the donor 0nows of the acceptance !y the donee. 8he death of 3ose !efore :edro could receive the acceptance indicates that the donation was never perfected. Lnder Article -JG acceptance must !e made during the
lifetime of !oth the donor and the donee.
1esol%tor" Con0ition ('##-)

#pouses Alfredo and Iac7uel were active mem!ers of a religious congregation. 8hey donated a parcel of land in
favor of that congregation in a duly notari1ed Eeed of

Eonation, su!/ect to the condition that the &inister shall
construct thereon a place of worship within $ year from the acceptance of the donation. n an affidavit he e"ecuted on
!ehalf of the congregation, the &inister accepted the donation. 8he Eeed of Eonation was not registered with
Donations; 1e$%isites; )mmovable 4ropert" Anastacia purchased a house and lot on installments at a
the Iegistry of Eeeds.

However, instead of constructing a place of worship, the
housing pro/ect in Pue1on City. #u!se7uently, she was employed in California and a year later, she e"ecuted a deed of donation, duly authenticated !y the :hilippine Consulate
&inister constructed a !ungalow on the property he used as
in Los Angeles, California, donating the house and lot to to the owner of the pro/ect and discovered that Anastacia
his residence. Eisappointed with the &inister, the spouses
her friend Amanda. 8he latter !rought the deed of donation left unpaid installments and real estate ta"es. Amanda paid these so that the donation in her favor can !e registered in the pro/ect ownerDs office. 8wo months later, Anastacia died, leaving her mother Iosa as her sole heir. Iosa filed an
action to annul the donation on the ground that Amanda did not give her consent in the deed of donation or in a
revo0ed the donation and demanded that he vacate the premises immediately. Nut the &inister refused to leave,
claiming that aside from using the !ungalow as his residence, he is also using it as a place for worship on
special occasions. Lnder the circumstances, can Al*re%o an% Ra+N.el ev"+t t!e M"n"ster an% re+over 'ossess"on
separate pu!lic instrument. Amanda replied that the donation was an onerous one !ecause she had to pay unpaid installments and ta"es) hence her acceptance may !e implied. (ho is correct? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
o* t!e 'ro'erty1 I* yo. 9ere t!e +o.'leDs +o.nsel, 9!at a+t"on yo. taEe to 'rote+t t!e "nterest o* yo.r +l"ents1 (74)
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
>es, Alfredo and Iac7uel can !ring an action for e/ectment against the &inister for recovery of possession of the
property evict the &inister and recover possession of the
Iosa is correct !ecause the donation is void. 8he property donated was an immova!le. Cor such donation to !e valid, Article -J< of the 'ew Civil Code re7uires !oth the 8here !eing no showing that AmandaDs acceptance was made in a pu!lic instrument, the donation is void. 8he contention that the donation is onerous and, therefore, need
not comply with Article -J< for validity is without merit.
property. An action for annulment of the donation, reconveyance and damages should !e filed to protect the
interests of my client. 8he donation is an onerous donation

and therefore shall !e governed !y the rules on contracts. Necause there was no fulfillment or compliance with the
donation and the acceptance to !e in a pu!lic instrument.
condition which is resolutory in character, the donation may

now !e revo0ed and all rights which the donee may have ac7uired under it shall !e deemed lost and e"tinguished
(Central !"l"''"ne >n"vers"ty, ;.R. 0o. 11$1$(, -.ly 1(,1997).
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he donation is not onerous !ecause it did not impose on Amanda the o!ligation to pay the !alance on the purchase price or the arrears in real estate ta"es. Amanda too0 it upon herself to pay those amounts voluntarily. Cor a donation to !e onerous, the !urden must !e imposed !y the donor on the donee. n the pro!lem, there is no such !urden imposed
!y the donor on the donee. 8he donation not !eing
'o, an action for e/ectment will not prosper. would advice

Alfredo and Iac7uel that the &inister, !y constructing a
structure which also serves as a place of worship, has

pursued the o!/ective of the donation. His ta0ing up
residence in the !ungalow may !e regarded as a casual
onerous, it must comply with the formalities of Article -J<.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
!reach and will not warrant revocation of the donation. #imilarily, therefore, an action for revocation of the
'either Iosa nor Amanda is correct. 8he donation is
donation will !e denied (C. -. ?.lo O Sons, In+.

v. Ro&an Cat!ol"+ G"s!o', ;.R. 0o. 133(07, Mar+! 31, $007C Ae"rs o*Ro@en%o Sev"lla v. Fe 5eon, ;.R. 0o. 1497(0, Mar+! 1$, $004).
onerous only as to the portion of the property corresponding to the value of the installments and ta"es paid !y Amanda.
8he portion in e"cess thereof is not onerous. 8he onerous portion is governed !y the rules on contracts which do not re7uire the acceptance !y the donee to !e in any form. 8he
onerous part, therefore, is valid. 8he portion which is not onerous must comply with Article -J< of the 'ew Civil
Donations; @ali0it"; Effectivit"; for /nborn C&il0 (1999) +lated that her sister who had !een married for five years was pregnant for the first time, Alma donated :$==,===.== to the un!orn child. Lnfortunately, the !a!y died one hour after delivery. &ay Alma recover the :$==.===.== that she
Page 55 of 119
had donated to said !a!y !efore it was !orn considering
that the !a!y died? #tated otherwise, is the donation valid

and !inding? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
not !een fi"ed in the Eeed of Eonation, the donee is not yet default in his o!ligation until the period is fi"ed !y order
of the court under Article $$<- of the 'ew Civil Code.
8he donation is valid and !inding, !eing an act favora!le to the un!orn child, !ut only if the !a!y had an intra6uterine life of not less than seven months and provided there was due acceptance of the donation !y the proper person representing said child. f the child had less than seven months of intra6uterine life, it is not deemed !orn since it died less than 5J hours following its delivery, in which ease the donation never !ecame effective since the donee never
!ecame a person, !irth !eing determinative of personality.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
#ince the period has not !een fi"ed as yet, the donee is not yet default, and therefore the donor has no cause of action to revo0e the donation. (F"ssent"n, o'"n"on o*
Fav"%e, C-, Central !"l"''"ne >n"vers"ty v. Co.rt o* A''eals, $46 SCRA 711 [1997])
P"!PE"$*
+ven if the !a!y had an intra6uterine life of more than seven months and the donation was properly accepted, it would !e void for not having conformed with the proper
2ccretion; 2ll%vion ('##1) Cor many years, the Iio Grande river deposited soil along its !an0, !eside the titled land of 3ose. n time, such deposit
reached an area of one thousand s7uare meters. (ith the permission of 3ose, ,icente cultivated the said area. 8en the $=== s7uare meters to the opposite !an0, !eside the
form. n order to !e valid, the donation and acceptance of personal property e"ceeding five thousand pesos should !e
in writing. *Article -JF, par. 9.
years later, a !ig flood occurred in the river and transferred land of Agustin. 8he land transferred is now contested !y claims ownership !y prescription. (ho should prevail,? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
3ose and Agustin as riparian owners and !y ,icente who
Donations; wit& 1esol%tor" Con0ition ('##()
n $<A=, Er. Al!a donated a parcel of land to Central Lniversity on condition that the latter must esta!lish a medical college on the land to !e named after him. n the year 5===, the heirs of Er. Al!a filed an action to annul the donation and for the reconveyance of the property donated to them for the failure, after A= years, of the Lniversity to
esta!lished on the property a medical school named after
!elongs !y right of accretion to 3ose, the riparian owner *Art. JA- CC.. (hen, as given in the pro!lem, the very same area" was "transferred" !y flood waters to the
3ose should prevail. 8he disputed area, which is an alluvion,
their father. 8he Lniversity opposed the action on the ground of prescription and also !ecause it had not used the
property for some purpose other than that stated in the donation. #hould the opposition of the Lniversity to the
opposite !an0, it !ecame an avulsion and ownership thereof is retained !y 3ose who has two years to remove it *Art. JA<, CC.. ,icenteDs claim !ased on prescription is !aseless since his possession was !y mere tolerance of 3ose and, therefore,
did not adversely affect 3oseDs possession and ownership
action of Er. Al!aOs heirs !e sustained? +"plain.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he donation may !e revo0ed. 8he non6 esta!lished of the
*Art. A9-, CC.. nasmuch as his possession is merely that of a holder, he cannot ac7uire the disputed area !y prescription.
medical college on the donated property was a resolutory
condition imposed on the donation !y the donor. Although
the Eeed of Eonation did not fi" the time for the
esta!lished of the medical college, the failure of the donee
to esta!lish the medical college after fifty *A=. years from the ma0ing of the donation should !e considered as occurrence of the resolutory condition, and the donation
2ccretion; 2v%lsion ('##() Andres is a riparian owner of a parcel of registered land. His land, however, has gradually diminished in area due to the current of the river, while the registered land of &ario on
the opposite !an0 has gradually increased in area !y 5==6
may now !e revo0ed. (hile the general rule is that in case the period is not fi"ed in the agreement of the parties, the period must !e fi"ed first !y the court !efore the o!ligation may !e demanded, the period of fifty *A=. years was more condition. Hence, in this case, there is no more need for the
s7uare meters. (ho has the !etter right over the *a. 5==6s7uare meter area that has !een added to &arioOs registered land, &ario or Andres? &ay a third person ac7uire said 5==6 *!. s7uare meter
land !y prescription?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
than enough time for the donee to comply with the court to fi" the period !ecause such procedure with the condition. (Central !"l"''"ne >n"vers"ty v. CA.
$46 SCRA
711).
A'!$.E" (+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he donation may not as yet revo0ed. 8he esta!lishment of a medical college is not a resolutory or suspensive condition
!ut a ?charge@, o!ligation@, or a ?mode@. 8he non6
a. &ario has a !etter right over the 5== s7uare meters increase in area !y reason of accretion, applying Article JAof the 'ew Civil Code, which provides that ?to the owners of lands ad/oining the !an0s of rivers !elong the accretion
which they gradually received from the effects of the
current of the waters@.
compliance with the charge or mode will give the donor the right to revo0e the donation within four *J. years from the time the charge was supposed to have !een complied with, or to enforce the charge !y specific performance within ten *$=. years from the time the cause of action accrued. nasmuch as the time to esta!lished the medical college has
Andres cannot claim that the increase in &arioOs
land is his own, !ecause such is an accretion and not result of the sudden detachment of a 0nown portion of his land
and its attachment to &arioOs land, a process called
?avulsion@. He can no longer claim ownership of the portion of his registered land which was gradually and naturally eroded due to the current of the river, !ecause he
Page 56 of 119
had lost it !y operation of law. 8hat portion of the land has

!ecome part of the pu!lic domain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!. >es, a third party may ac7uire !y prescription
reasona!le rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the !uilding after proper indemnity. 8he parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court fi" the terms thereof.
the 5== ;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& vs. ;a0 ,ait& (1999) Necause of confusion as to the !oundaries of the *a. ad/oining lots that they !ought from the same su!division
s7uare meters, increase in area, !ecause it is not included in
the 8orrens 8itle of the riparian owner. Hence, this does not involve the imprescripti!ility conferred !y #ection J-,
:.E. 'o. $A5<. 8he fact that the riparian land is registered
does not automatically ma0e the accretion thereto a registered land. (;ran%e v. CA, 117 7$1
(196$)C -a,.al"n, v. CA, 194 SCRA 60( (1991).
;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& (199')
company, 4 constructed a house on the ad/oining lot of > in the honest !elief that it is the land that he !ought from the su!division (hat are the respective rights of company. 4 and > with respect to 4Ds house? *9B. #uppose 4 was in good faith !ut > 0new *!. that 4 was constructing on his *>Ds. land !ut simply 0ept 7uiet a!out it, thin0ing perhaps that he could get 4Ds house later. (hat are
the respective rights of the parties over 4Ds house in this case? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
A owns a parcel of residential land worth :A==,===.== un0nown to A, a residential house costing : $==,===.== is !uilt on the entire parcel !y N who claims ownership of the land. Answer all the following 7uestions !ased on the premise that N is a !uilder in good faith and A is a
landowner in good faith.
a. &ay A ac7uire the house !uilt !y N? f so, how? !. f the land increased in value to :A==,===.== !y reason
*a. 8he rights of >, as owner of the lot, and of 4, as !uilder

of a house thereon, are governed !y Art. JJF of the Civil
of the !uilding of the house thereon, what amount
should !e paid !y A in order to ac7uire the house from N?

c. Assuming that the cost of the house was :<=,===.== and not :$==,===.==, may A re7uire N to !uy the land? d. f N voluntarily !uys the land as desired !y A, under what circumstances may A nevertheless !e entitled to
Code which grants to > the right to choose !etween two its value plus whatever necessary e"penses the latter may compel 4 to !uy the land if the price of the land is not
remedies: *a. appropriate the house !y indemnifying 4 for
have incurred for the preservation of the land, or *!.
e. n what situation may a "forced lease" arise !etween A

and N. and what terms and conditions would govern Give reasons for your answers.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
have the house removed?
considera!ly more than the value of the house. f it is, then 4 cannot !e o!liged to !uy the land !ut he shall pay reasona!le rent, and in case of disagreement, the court shall fi" the terms of the lease.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
the lease?
*a. >es, A may ac7uire the house !uild !y N !y paying
indemnity to N. Article JJF of the Civil Code provides that
*!. #ince the lot owner > is deemed to !e in !ad faith *Art JA9., 4 as the party in good faith may *a. remove the house and demand indemnification for damages suffered !y him,
the owner of the land on which anything has !een !uilt,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the wor0s, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles AJG and
AJG of the Civil Code.
or *!. demand payment of the value of the house plus reparation for damages *Art JJ-, in relation to Art JAJ.. > continues as owner of the lot and !ecomes, under the second option, owner of the house as well, after he pays the
sums demanded. ;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& vs. ;a0 ,ait& ('###) n good faith, :edro constructed a five6door commercial (hen :a!lo discovered the construction, he opted to
*!. A should pay N the sum of :A=,===. Article AJF of the Civil Code provides that useful e"penses shall !e refunded
to the possessor in good faith with the right of retention,
!uilding on the land of :a!lo who was also in good faith. appropriate the !uilding !y paying :edro the cost thereof. However, :edro insists that he should !e paid the current mar0et value of the !uilding, which was much higher !ecause of inflation.
$. (ho is correct :edro or :a!lo?*$B. 5. n the meantime that :edro is not yet paid, who is entitled to the rentals of the !uilding, :edro or :a!lo? *$B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the e"penses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have ac7uired !y reason thereof. 8he increase in value amounts
to :A=,===.==.
*c. >es, A may re7uire N to !uy the land. Article JJF of the
Civil Code provides that the owner of the land on which
anything has !een !uilt in good faith shall have the right to o!lige the one who !uilt to pay the price of the land if its value is not considera!ly more than that of the !uilding, *d. f N agrees to !uy land !ut fails to pay, A can have the
house removed ( Fe'ra vs. F.&lao, 136
SCRA 4(7).
*e. Article JJF of the Civil Code provides that the !uilder cannot !e o!liged to !uy the land if its value is considera!ly
:a!lo is correct. Lnder Article JJF of the 'ew Civil Code in relation to Article AJG, the !uilder in good faith is entitled to a refund of the necessary and useful e"penses incurred !y him, or the increase in value which the land may have ac7uired !y reason of the improvement, at the option of the landowner. 8he !uilder is entitled to a refund of the improvement
e"penses he incurred, and not to the mar0et value of the
more than that of the !uilding. n such case, he shall pay
Page 57 of 119
8he case of e+son v. CA, $44 SCRA 40(, is not applica!le to the pro!lem. n the :ecson case, the !uilder was the owner of the land who later lost the property at a pu!lic sale due to
non6payment of ta"es. 8he Court ruled that Article JJF
s7uare meters. 3ose claims that &i0e is a !uilder in !ad faith !ecause he should 0now the !oundaries of his lot, and
demands that the portion of the house which encroached on his land should !e destroyed or removed. &i0e replies
does not apply to the case where the owner of the land is the !uilder !ut who later lost the land) not !eing applica!le, the indemnity that should !e paid to the !uyer must !e the
fair mar0et value of the !uilding and not /ust the cost of
that he is a !uilder in good faith and offers to !uy the land occupied !y the !uilding instead.
$. s &i0e a !uilder in good faith or !ad faith? (hy? *9B.
construction thereof. 8he Court opined in that case that to

do otherwise would un/ustly enrich the new owner of the
5. (hose preference should !e followed? (hy? *5B. $. >es, &i0e is a !uilder in good faith. 8here is no showing that when he !uilt his house, he 0new that a portion thereof encroached on 3oseDs lot. Lnless one is versed in the science of surveying, he cannot determine the precise !oundaries or location of his property !y merely e"amining his title. n the a!sence of contrary proof, the law presumes that the encroachment was done in good faith 2Te+!no,as !"ls, v.
CA, $68 SCRA 7, 17 (199()].
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
land.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
:edro is correct. n :ecson vs. CA, it was held that Article AJG of the 'ew Civil Code does not specifically state how the value of useful improvements should !e determined in fi"ing the amount of indemnity that the owner of the land should pay to the !uilder in good faith. #ince the o!/ective
of the law is to ad/ust the rights of the parties in such
manner as "to administer complete /ustice to !oth of them
in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich
himself of that which does not !elong to him", the Court
of the Civil Code, it is the owner of the land who has the
option or choice, not the !uilder. %n the other hand, the
5M 'one of the preferences shall !e followed. 8he preference of &i0e cannot prevail !ecause under Article JJF
ruled that the !asis of reim!ursement should !e the fair mar0et value of the !uilding.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
5. :a!lo is entitled to the rentals of the !uilding. As the
owner of the land, :a!lo is also the owner of the !uilding !eing an accession thereto. However, :edro who is entitled
to retain the !uilding is also entitled to retain the rentals.
option !elongs to 3ose, he cannot demand that the portion of the house encroaching on his land !e destroyed or removed !ecause this is not one of the options given !y law to the owner of the land. 8he owner may choose !etween
the appropriation of what was !uilt after payment of indemnity, or to compel the !uilder to pay for the land if
He, however, shall apply the rentals to the indemnity paya!le to him after deducting reasona!le cost of repair and
maintenance.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
the value of the land is not considera!ly more than that of

the !uilding. %therwise, the !uilder shall pay rent for the
portion of the land encroached.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
:a!lo is entitled to the rentals. :edro !ecame a possessor in !ad faith from the time he learned that the land !elongs to
&i0e cannot !e considered a !uilder in good faith !ecause he !uilt his house without first determining the
$.
:a!lo. As such, he loses his right to the !uilding, including

the fruits thereof, e"cept the right of retention.
corners and !oundaries of his lot to ma0e sure that his construction was within the perimeter of his property. He
could have done this with the help of a geodetic engineer as the circumstances.
;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& vs. ;a0 ,ait&; 2ccession ('###)
a. Eemetrio 0new that a piece of land !ordering the !each !elonged to +rnesto. However, since the latter was studying in +urope and no one was ta0ing care of the land, Eemetrio occupied the same and constructed thereon nipa sheds with ta!les and !enches which he rented out to people who want to have a picnic !y the !each. (hen +rnesto returned, he demanded the return of the land. Eemetrio agreed to do so after he has removed the nipa sheds. +rnesto refused to let Eemetrio remove the nipa sheds on the ground that these already !elonged to him !y right of accession. (ho is
correct? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
an ordinary prudent and reasona!le man would do under
5. 3oseDs preference should !e followed. He may have the

!uilding removed at the e"pense of &i0e, appropriate the
!uilding as his own, o!lige &i0e to !uy the land and as0 for
damages in addition to any of the three options. *Articles JJ<, JA=, JA$, CC.
C&attel *ortgage vs. 4le0ge (1999)
Eistinguish a contract of chattel mortgage from a contract of pledge. *5B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
+rnesto is correct, Eemetrio is a !uilder in !ad faith !ecause he 0new !eforehand that the land !elonged to +rnesto, under Article JJ< of the 'ew Civil Code, one who
!uilds on the land of another loses what is !uilt without
n a contract of CHA88+L &%I8GAG+ possession

!elongs to the creditor, while in a contract of :L+EG+
possession !elongs to the de!tor.
right to indemnity. +rnesto !ecomes the owner of the nipa

sheds !y right of accession. Hence, +rnesto is well within his right in refusing to allow the removal of the nipa sheds. ;%il0er; Boo0 ,ait& vs. ;a0 ,ait&; 4res%mption ('##1)
A chattel mortgage is a formal contract while a pledge is a real contract. A contract of chattel mortgage must !e recorded in a pu!lic instrument to !ind third persons while a contract of pledge must !e in a pu!lic instrument containing description of the thing pledged and the date thereof to !ind third persons.
&i0e !uilt a house on his lot in :asay City. 8wo years later,
a survey disclosed that a portion of the !uilding actually
stood on the neigh!oring land of 3ose, to the e"tent of J=
Page 58 of 119
C&attel *ortgage; )mmovables (199!) ,ini constructed a !uilding on a parcel of land he leased
foreclosure sale, foreclosed the mortgage and ac7uired 4Os

house and lot. Learning of the proceedings conducted !y the !an0, H is now demanding that the !an0 reconvey to
from Andrea. He chattel mortgaged the land to Celicia. (hen he could not pay Celicia. Celicia initiated foreclosure proceedings. ,ini claimed that the !uilding he had constructed on the leased land cannot !e validly foreclosed
!ecause the !uilding was, !y law, an immova!le. s ,ini correct?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE"(:
him 4Os house or pay 4Os loan to him plus interests. s HOs demand against the !an0 valid and sustaina!le? (hy? AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, HOs demand is not valid. A !uilding is immova!le or
real property whether it is erected !y the owner of the land, mova!le !y the parties to chattel mortgage !ut such is
!y a usufructuary, or !y a lessee. t may !e treated as a
a. 8he Chattel &ortgage is void and cannot !e foreclosed

!ecause the !uilding is an immova!le and cannot !e an o!/ect of a chattel mortgage.
!inding only !etween them and not on third parties
!. t depends. f the !uilding was intended and is !uilt of

light materials, the chattel mortgage may !e considered as valid as !etween the parties and it may !e considered in
this case, since the !an0 is not a party to the chattel mortgage, it is not !ound !y it, as far as the Nan0 is concerned, the chattel mortgage, does not e"ist. &oreover,
the chattel mortgage does not e"ist. &oreover, the chattel mortgage is void !ecause it was not registered. Assuming
(2van,el"sta v. Alto S.rety Col, "n+. 103 401 [1978]). n
!"l.
respect to them as mova!le property, since it can !e removed from one place to another. Nut if the !uilding is of
strong material and is not capa!le of !eing removed or
transferred without !eing destroyed, the chattel mortgage is

void and cannot !e foreclosed.
that it is valid, it does not !ind the Nan0 !ecause it was not annotated on the title of the land mortgaged to the !an0. H cannot demand that the Nan0 pay him the loan H e"tended
to 4, !ecause the Nan0 was not privy to such loan
c. f it was the land which ,ini chattel mortgaged, such mortgage would !e void, or at least unenforcea!le, since he
was not the owner of the land.
transaction.
f what was mortgaged as a chattel is the !uilding, the chattel mortgage is valid as !etween the parties only, on
'o, HOs demand against the !an0 is not valid. His demand that the !an0 reconvey to him 4Os house presupposes that he has a real right over the house. All that H has is a personal right against 4 for damages for !reach of the
contract of loan. 8he treatment of a house, even if !uilt on rented land, as
A'!$.E" (+&&E($E# A'(WE":
grounds of estoppel which would preclude the mortgagor from assailing the contract on the ground that its su!/ect6 matter is an immova!le. 8herefore ,iniDs defense is
untena!le, and Celicia can foreclose the mortgage over the !uilding, o!serving, however, the procedure prescri!ed for
mova!le property is void insofar as third persons, such as the !an0, are concerned. %n the other hand, the Nan0
the e"ecution of sale of a /udgment de!torDs immova!le
already had a real right over the house and lot when the mortgage was annotated at the !ac0 of the 8orrens title.
under Iule 9<, Iules of Court, specifically, that the notice of auction sale should !e pu!lished in a newspaper of
general circulation.
8he !an0 later !ecame the owner in the foreclosure sale. H cannot as0 the !an0 to pay for 4Os loan plus interest. 8here
is no privity of contract !etween H and the !an0.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
d. 8he pro!lem that ,ini mortgaged the land !y way of a

chattel mortgage is untena!le.
matter of a real estate mortgage and only an a!solute owner

of real property may mortgage a parcel of land. *Article 5=FA *5. Civil Code.. Hence, there can !e no foreclosure.
Land can only !e the su!/ect
8he answer hinges on whether or not the !an0 is an
innocent mortgagee in good faith or a mortgagee in !ad faith. n the former case, HOs demand is not valid. n the latter case, HOs demand against the !an0 is valid and
sustaina!le. Lnder the 8orrens system of land registration, every person dealing with registered land may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in any way o!lige to him to loo0 !ehind or !eyond the certificate in order to anything not annotated or reflected in the certificate. f he proceeds to !uy the land or accept it as a collateral relying on the certificate, he is considered a !uyer or a mortgagee in good faith. %n this ground, the Nan0 ac7uires a clean title to the land and the house. However, a !an0 is not an ordinary mortgagee. Lnli0e
private individuals, a !an0 is e"pected to e"ercise greater determine the condition of the title. He is not !ound !y
Nut on the assumption that what was mortgaged !y way of chattel mortgage was the !uilding on leased land, then the parties are treating the !uilding as chattel. A !uilding that is
not merely superimposed on the ground is an immova!le property and a chattel mortgage on said !uilding is legally void !ut the parties cannot !e allowed to disavow their
contract on account of estoppel !y deed. However, if third
parties are involved such chattel mortgage is void and has no effect. C&attel *ortgage; )mmovables ('##()
4 constructed a house on a lot which he was leasing from >. Later, 4 e"ecuted a chattel mortgage over said house in #till later, 4 ac7uired ownership of the land where his house was constructed, after which he mortgaged !oth house and land in favor of a !an0, which mortgage was annotated on
favor of H as security for a loan o!tained from the latter.
care and prudence in its dealings. 8he ascertainment of the condition of a property offered as collateral for a loan must
the 8orrens Certificate of 8itle. (hen 4 failed to pay his
!e a standard and indispensa!le part of its operation. 8he !an0 should have conducted further in7uiry regarding the
loan to the !an0, the latter, !eing the highest !idder at the
house standing on the land considering that it was already
Page 59 of 119
standing there !efore 4 ac7uired the title to the land. 8he !an0 cannot !e considered as a mortgagee in good faith. %n this ground, HOs demand against the Nan0 is valid and
sustaina!le.
was then valued only at :$ &illion. Lawrence was declared insolvent. Assuming that the aircraft was sold for :l &illion, give the order of preference of the creditors of Lawrence and distri!ute the amount of :$ &illion.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
C&attel *ortgage; 4ossession (199()
A, a!out to leave the country on a foreign assignment, entrusted to N his !rand new car and its certificate of registration. Calsifying ADs signature. N sold ADs car to C for :5==,===.==. C then registered the car in his name. 8o complete the needed amount, C !orrowed :$==.===.==
from the savings and loan association in his office,
Assuming that the aircraft was sold for :$ &illion, there is
no order of preference. 8he :$ &illion will all go to the
!an0 as a chattel mortgagee !ecause a chattel mortgage under Art. 55J$ *J. 'CC defeats Art. 55JJ *$5. and *$JM. Art. 55J$ *9. and *A. are not applica!le !ecause the aircraft is no longer in the possession of the creditor.
constituting a chattel mortgage on the car. Cor failure of C

to pay the amount owed, the savings and loan association
filed in the I8C a complaint for collection with application for issuance of a writ of replevin to o!tain possession of the
Easement vs. /s%fr%ct (1999) $. (hat is easement? Eistinguish easement from usufruct.
5. Can there !e *a. an easement over a usufruct? *!. a usufruct over an easement? *c. an easement over another
vehicle so that the chattel mortgage could !e foreclosed. 8he I8C issued the writ of replevin. 8he car was then
sei1ed from C and sold !y the sheriff at pu!lic auction at
easement? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
which the savings and loan association was the lone !idder.
Accordingly, the car was sold to it. A few days later, A
arrived from his foreign assignment. Learning of what
$. An +A#+&+'8 or servitude is an encum!rance imposed upon an immova!le for the !enefit of another immova!le !elonging to a different owner. *Art. G$9, 'CC.
happened to his car, A sought to recover possession and ownership of it from the savings and loan association. association? +"plain your answer.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Can A recover his car from the savings and loan
L#LCILC8 gives a right to en/oy the property of another

with the o!ligation of preserving its form and su!stance,
unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.

*Art. AG5, 'CC..
Lnder the prevailing rulings of the #upreme Court, A can recover the car from the #avings and Loan Association provided he pays the price at which the Association !ought
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
the car at a pu!lic auction. Lnder that doctrine, there has !een an unlawful deprivation !y N of A of his car and, therefore, A can recover it from any person in possession
+asement is an encum!rance imposed upon an immova!le
thereof. Nut since it was !ought at a pu!lic auction in good
for the !enefit of another immova!le !elonging to a different owner in which case it is called real or predial easement, or for the !enefit of a community or group of
persons in which case it is 0nown as a
faith !y the #avings and Loan Association, he must
personal easement. 8he distinctions !etween usufruct and easement are: purposes, including /us fruendi. +asement is limited to a specific use. !. Lsufruct may !e constituted on immova!le or mova!le property. +asement may !e constituted only on an
immova!le property. a. Lsufruct includes all uses of the property and for all
reim!urse the Association at the price for which the car was !ought.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
>es, A can recover his car from the #avings and Loan Association. n a Chattel &ortgage, the mortgagor must !e
the a!solute owner of the thing mortgaged. Curthermore, the person constituting the mortgage must have the free
disposal of the property, and in the a!sence thereof, must
!e legally authori1ed for the purpose. n the case at !ar,
these essential re7uisites did not apply to the mortgagor N, hence the Chattel &ortgage was not valid.
C&attel *ortgage; 4reference of Cre0itors (1999)
c. +asement is not e"tinguished !y the death of the owner of the dominant estate while usufruct is e"tinguished !y the death of the usufructuary unless a d. An easement contemplates two *5. estates !elonging to two *5. different owners) a usufruct contemplates only one property *real or personal. where!y the usufructuary uses and en/oys the property as well as its period of the usufruct. e. separately from the property to which it attaches, while an easement cannot attaches.
A usufruct may !e alienated contrary intention appears.
Lawrence, a retired air force captain, decided to go into the air transport !usiness. He purchased an aircraft in cash e"cept for an outstanding !alance of :A==,===.==. He incurred an inde!tedness of :9==,===.== for repairs with an aircraft repair company. He also !orrowed :$ &illion from a !an0 for additional capital and constituted a chattel
mortgage on the aircraft to secure the loan. (hile on a test flight the aircraft crashed causing physical
fruits, while another owns the na0ed title during the
!e alienated separately from the property to which it

NOTE$ It is recommen(e( '0 t%e Committee t%at
in/uries to a third party who was awarded damages of :5==,===.==. denied thus leaving him nothing else !ut the aircraft which
an0 t)o 2-3 (istinctions s%oul( 'e 4i/en full cre(it.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
LawrenceDs insurance claim for damage to the aircraft was
Page 60 of 119
5. *a. 8here can !e no easement over a usufruct. #ince an

easement corporeal may !e constituted only on a
immova!le property, no easement may !e constituted on a
usufruct which is not a corporeal right *!. 8here can !e no usufruct over an easement. (hile a usufruct may!e created over a right, such right must have an e"istence of its own independent of the property. A
there is a degree of regularity to indicate continuity of possession and that if coupled with an apparent sign, such easement of way may !e ac7uired !y prescription.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
>es, +rnie could close the pathway on his land. Eon has not ac7uired an easement of right of way either !y
servitude cannot !e the o!/ect of a usufruct !ecause it has no e"istence independent of the property to which t
attaches.
agreement or !y /udicial grant. 'either did the !uyers. 8hus, esta!lishment of a road or unlawful use of the land of +rnie owner, which under Article J5< of the Civil Code may !e
would constitute an invasion of possessory rights of the
8here cannot !e a usufruct over an easement since an
repelled or prevented. +rnie has the right to e"clude any
easement presupposes two *5. tenements !elonging to
person from the en/oyment and disposal of the land. 8his is

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
an attri!ute of ownership that +rnie en/oys. >es, +rnie may close the pathway, su!/ect however, to the
different persons and the right attaches to the tenement and not to the owner. (hile a usufruct gives the usufructuary a right to use, right to en/oy, right to the fruits, and right to possess, an easement gives only a limited use of the servient
estate.
rights of the lot !uyers. #ince there is no access to the
pu!lic road, this results in the creation of a legal easement.

8he lot !uyers have the right to demand that +rnie grant
However, a usufruct can !e constituted over a property that has in its favor an easement or one !urdened with servitude. 8he usufructuary will e"ercise the easement
during the period of usufruct.
them a right of way. n turn, they have the o!ligation to pay the value of the portion used as a right of way, plus damages. +) 23'la"n. *5B.
)!at are t!e r",!ts o* t!e lot /.yers, "* any1
*c. 8here can !e no easement over another easement for the same reason as in *a.. An easement, although it is a real right
over an immova!le, is not a corporeal right. 8here is a
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Ioman ma"im which says that: 8here can !e no servitude

over another servitude.
:rior to the grant of an easement, the !uyers of the dominant estate have no other right than to compel grant of
easement of right of way.
Easement; Effects; Discontin%o%s Easements; 4ermissive /se ('##9)
Eon was the owner of an agricultural land with no access to

a pu!lic road. He had !een passing through the land of
+rnie with the latterDs ac7uiescence for over 5= years. #u!se7uently, Eon su!divided his property into 5=
demand an easement of a right of way provided proper indemnity is paid and the right of way demanded is the shortest and least pre/udicial to +rnie.
(#"llan.eva
#ince the properties of the !uyers are surrounded !y other immova!les and has no ade7uate outlet to a pu!lic highway and the isolation is not due to their acts, !uyers may
#elas+o, ;.R. 0o. 130847, 0ove&/er $(, $000).
v.
residential lots and sold them to different persons. +rnie
!loc0ed the pathway and refused to let the !uyers pass through his land. a) F"% Fon a+N."re an ease&ent o* r",!t o* 9ay1
23'la"n. ($4)
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Easement; .%isance; 2batement ('##')

Lauro owns an agricultural land planted mostly with fruit
trees. Hernando owns an ad/acent land devoted to his

piggery !usiness, which is two *5. meters higher in
elevation. Although Hernando has constructed a waste

disposal lagoon for his piggery, it is inade7uate to contain the waste water containing pig manure, and it often overflows and inundates LauroOs plantation. 8his has
'o, Eon did not ac7uire an easement of right of way. An easement of right of way is discontinuous in nature W it is e"ercised only if a man passes over some!odyDs land. Lnder Article G55 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may only !e ac7uired !y virtue of a title. 8he #upreme Court, in A/ellana, Sr.
v. Co.rt o* A''eals (;.R. 0o. 9(039, A'r"l $4, 199$),
ruled that an
increased the acidity of the soil in the plantation, causing the trees to wither and die. Lauro sues for damages caused to his plantation. Hernando invo0es his right to the !enefit of a natural easement in favor of his higher estate, which
easement of right of way !eing discontinuous in nature is not ac7uira!le !y prescription. Curther, possession of the easement !y Eon is only
imposes upon the lower estate of Lauro the o!ligation to receive the waters descending from the higher estate. s Hernando correct? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
permissive, tolerated or with the ac7uiescence of +rnie. t is settled in the case of C.ay+on, v. Gene%"+to over the land
Hernando is wrong. t is true that LauroOs land is !urdened

with the natural easement to accept or receive the water which naturally and without interruption of man descends
(;.R. 0o. 9989, Mar+! 13, 1918) that a permissive use of a road
of another, no matter how long continued, will not create an easement of way !y prescription.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
>es, Eon ac7uired an easement of right of way. An easement that is continuous and apparent can !e ac7uired
!y prescription and title. According to :rofessor 8olentino, an easement of right of way may have a continuous nature if
from a higher estate to a lower estate. However, Hernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his piggery and it is this waste water that flows downward to LauroOs land. Hernando has, thus, interrupted the flow of water and has created and is maintaining a nuisance. Lnder Act. G<- 'CC, a!atement of a nuisance does not preclude recovery of damages !y Lauro even for the past e"istence of a nuisance.
Page 61 of 119
8he claim for damages may also !e premised in Art. 5$<$ *J. 'CC.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
to time. As 8omasD !usiness grows, the need for use of
modern conveyances re7uires widening of the easement.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Hernando is not correct. Article G9- of the 'ew Civil Code

provides that the owner of the higher estate cannot ma0e
8he facts show that the need for a wider right of way arose from the increased production owing to the ac7uisition !y
8omas of an additional area. Lnder Art. G5G of the Civil Code, the easement can !e used only for the immova!le
wor0s which will increase the !urden on the servient estate. owner of the higher estate may !e compelled to pay
damages to the owner of the lower estate.
(Re&&an 2nter'r"ses, In+. v. CA, 330 SCRA 147 [$000]). 8he
originally contemplated. Hence, the increase in width is /ustified and should have !een granted. Easements; 1ig&t of 8a" ('###) 8he coconut farm of Cederico is surrounded !y the lands of Iomulo. Cederico see0s a right of way through a portion of
the land of Iomulo to !ring his coconut products to the
Easements; Classification (1993)

Eistinguish !etween: $. Continuous and discontinuous easements) K 5B; 5. Apparent and non6apparent easements) and 25B; 9. :ositive and negative easements. 2$B;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
C%'8 'L%L# +A#+&+'8# are those the use $. of

which is or may !e incessant, without the intervention of
any act of man, while E #C%'8 'L%L# +A#+&+'8# are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the
acts of man. *Art. G$A, Civil Code.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
housing pro/ect of Iomulo. 8he latter wants him to pass another way which is one 0ilometer longer. (ho should prevail? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
mar0et. He has chosen a point where he will pass through a
Code, the easement of right of way shall !e esta!lished at

the point least pre/udicial to the servient estate and where
Iomulo will prevail. Lnder Article GA= of the 'ew Civil
5. A::AI+'8 +A#+&+'8# are those which are made

0nown and are continually 0ept in view !y e"ternal signs
the distance from the dominant estate to a pu!lic highway is the shortest. In case of conflict* t%e criterion of least pre6u(ice pre/ails
that reveal the use and en/oyment of the same, while '%'6
o/er t%e criterion of s%ortest (istance. #ince the route chosen !y
A::AI+'8 +A#+&+'8# are those which show no e"ternal indication of their e"istence. *Art. G$A, Civil Code.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Cederico will pre/udice the housing pro/ect of Iomulo, Iomulo has the right to demand that Cederico pass another way even though it will !e longer. Easements; 1ig&t of 8a"; )nseparabilit" ('##1)
+mma !ought a parcel of land from +7uita!le6:C Nan0, which ac7uired the same from Celisa, the original owner.
9. upon the owner of the servient estate the o!ligation of allowing something to !e done or of doing it himself, while
:%# 8 ,+ +A#+&+'8# are those which impose
'+GA8 ,+ +A#+&+'8# are those which prohi!it the owner of the servient estate from doing something which
8hereafter, +mma discovered that Celisa had granted a right which had no outlet to a pu!lic highway, !ut the easement
of way over the land in favor of the land of Georgina, was not annotated when the servient estate was registered
he could lawfully do if the easement did not e"ist. *Art. G$A.

Civil Code.
Easements; 1ig&t of 8a" (199() 8omas +ncarnacionDs 9,=== s7uare meter parcel of land,
where he has a plant nursery, is located /ust !ehind Aniceta &agsinoDs two hectare parcel land. 8o ena!le 8omas to have access to the highway, Aniceta agreed to grant him a
under the 8orrens system. +mma then filed a complaint for cancellation of the right of way, on the ground that it had !een e"tinguished !y such failure to annotate. How would you decide the controversy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he complaint for cancellation of easement of right of way
road right of way a meter wide through which he could pass. 8hrough the years 8omasD !usiness flourished which
must fail. 8he failure to annotate the easement upon the title of the servient estate is not among the grounds for
ena!led him to !uy another portion which enlarged the area of his plant nursery. Nut he was still landloc0ed. He could not !ring in and out of his plant nursery a /eep or delivery
panel much less a truc0 that he needed to transport his
seedlings. He now as0ed Aniceta to grant him a wider portion of her property, the price of which he was willing to pay, to ena!le him to construct a road to have access to his plant nursery. Aniceta refused claiming that she had already
allowed him a previous road right of way. s 8omas entitled to the easement he now demands from Aniceta?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
estate to which they actively or passively !elong. %nce it attaches, it can only !e e"tinguished under Art. G9$, and they e"ist even if they are not stated or annotated as an
e"tinguishing an easement under Art. G9$ of the Civil Code. Lnder Article G$-, easements are insepara!le from the
encum!rance on the 8orrens title of the servient estate. *

8olentino 95G, $<F- ed..
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Lnder #ection JJ, :E 'o. $A5<, every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of

registration, and every su!se7uent innocent purchaser for
value, shall hold the same free from all encum!rances

e"cept those noted on said certificate. 8his rule, however,
Art. GA$ of the Civil Code provides that the width of the
easement must !e sufficient to meet the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly change from time to time. t is the need of the dominant estate which determines the width of the passage. 8hese needs may vary from time
admits of e"ceptions. Lnder Act J<G, as amended !y Act 'o. 5=$$, and #ection J,
Act 9G5$, an easement if not registered shall remain and shall !e held to pass with the land until cutoff or
Page 62 of 119
e"tinguished !y the registration of the servient estate.
consistent with this rule, where the distance to the street or

highway is shortest.
However, this provision has !een suppressed in #ection JJ, :E 'o. $A5<. n other words, the registration of the servient estate did not operate to cut6off or e"tinguish the right of way. 8herefore, the complaint for the cancellation
of the right of way should !e dismissed.
5. s Eavid entitled to a right of way in this case? (hy or why not?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Easements; 1ig&t of 8a"; 1e$%isites (199-)
Eavid is the owner of the su!division in #ta. Iosa, Laguna,

without an access to the highway. (hen he applied for a
'o, Eavid is not entitled to the right of way !eing claimed. 8he isolation of his su!division was due to his own act or omission !ecause he did not develop into an access road the rice field which he was supposed to purchase according to
his own representation when he applied for a license to
license to esta!lish the su!division, Eavid represented that he will purchase a rice field located !etween his land and the highway, and develop it into an access road. Nut. when the
esta!lish the su!division (8loro .s. 5lena%o,

$44 SCRA(13).
license was already granted, he did not !other to !uy the rice field, which remains unutili1ed until the present.
E5ectment %it vs. Cancellation of =itle ('##9) n an e/ectment case filed !y Eon against Cesar, can the
nstead, he chose to connect his su!division with the neigh!oring su!division of 'estor, which has an access to
the highway. 'estor allowed him to do this, pending negotiations on the compensation to !e paid. (hen they
latter as0 for the cancellation of EonDs title considering that he *Cesar. is the rightful owner of the lot? +"plain. *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
failed to arrive at an agreement, 'estor !uilt a wall across the road connecting with EavidDs su!division. Eavid filed a complaint in court, for the esta!lishment of an easement of
Cesar cannot as0 for the cancellation of EonDs title even if he is the rightful owner of the lot. n an action for
e/ectment, the only issue involved is one of possession de
right of way through the su!division of 'estor which he claims to !e the most ade7uate and practical outlet to the highway.
$. (hat are the re7uisites for the esta!lishment of a

compulsory easement of a right of way?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
facto, the purpose of which is merely to protect the owner from any physical encroachment from without. 8he title of the land or its ownership is not involved, for if a person is in actual possession thereof, he is entitled to !e maintained and respected in it even against the owner himself. (;ar+"a
v. Anas, ;.R. 0o. 56$061(, May 31, 1967)
Art, GJ<, 'CC. 8he owner, or any person who !y virtue of

a real right may cultivate or use any immova!le which is
#ince the case filed !y Eon against Cesar is an e/ectment He has to file the proper action where the issue of
case, the latter cannot as0 for the cancellation of EonDs title.
surrounded !y other immova!les pertaining to other persons and without ade7uate outlet to a pu!lic highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neigh!oring
estates, after payment of the property indemnity.
ownership over the property can !e raised.
E5ectment %it; Commo0at%m ('##-)
Al!erto and 3anine migrated to the Lnited #tates of
#hould this easement !e esta!lished in such a manner that its use may !e continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, esta!lishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of
the damage caused to the servient estate.
America, leaving !ehind their J children, one of whom is
n case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage
Al!erto died. His widow and all his children e"ecuted an +"tra/udicial #ettlement of Al!ertoDs estate wherein the 56 door apartment was assigned !y all the children to their
&anny. 8hey own a duple" apartment and allowed &anny to live in one of the units. (hile in the Lnited #tates,
for the cultivation of the estate surrounded !y others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate
without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the

payment of the damage cause !y such encum!rance.
mother, 3anine. #u!se7uently, she sold the property to George. 8he latter re7uired &anny to sign a prepared Lease Contract so that he and his family could continue occupying the unit. &anny refused to sign the contract alleging that his
parents allowed him and his family to continue occupying the premises.
8his easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the

immova!le is due to the proprietorDs own acts. *AGJa.. 8he easement of right of way shall !e esta!lished at the
I* yo. 9ere ;eor,eDs +o.nsel, 9!at le,al ste's 9"ll yo. taEe1 23'la"n. (74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
point least pre/udicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a pu!lic highway may !e the shortest *Art. 670, 0CCB #%a. %e Galta@ar v. CA. $47 SCRA 333M
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
f were GeorgeDs counsel, would first demand that &anny vacate the apartment. f &anny refuses, will file an e/ectment suit. (hen &anny was allowed !y his parents to occupy the premises, without compensation, the contract of
commodatum was created. Lpon the death of the father,
8he re7uisites for a compulsory easement of right of way are: *a. the dominant estate is surrounded !y other immova!les and is without an ade7uate outlet to a pu!lic isolation must not !e due to the acts of the owner of the dominant estate) and *d. the right of way claimed is at a
the contract was e"tinguished as it is a purely personal

contract. As the new owner of the apartment George is
entitled to e"ercise his right of possession over the same.

E<tra?7%0icial 4artition; ,ra%0 (199#) 4 was the owner of a $=,=== s7uare meter property. 4
street or highway) *!. proper indemnity must !e paid) *c. the
point least pre/udicial to the servient estate and, insofar as is
married > and out of their union. A, N and C were !orn.
Page 63 of 119
After the death of >, 4 married H and they !egot as children, E, + and C. After the death of 4, the children of the first and second marriages e"ecuted an e"tra/udicial partition of the aforestated property on &ay $, $<-=. E, + and C were given a one thousand s7uare meter portion of the property. 8hey were minors at the time of the e"ecution of the document. E was $- years old, + was $J and C was $5) and they were made to !elieve !y A, N and C that unless they sign the document they will not get any share. H was
not present then. n 3anuary $<-J, E, + and C filed an action in court to nullify the suit alleging they discovered the fraud only in $<-9.
share allotted !y law to the finder since the phrase "!y chance" means "!y accident", meaning an une"pected discovery. 8he li!eral view, however, would sustain 8imDs right to the allocated share interpreting the phrase in
7uestion as meaning "!y a stro0e of good fortune", which does not rule out deli!erate or intentional search. t is su!mitted that the li!eral view should prevail since in
practical reality, hidden treasure is hardly ever found
without conscious effort to find it, and the strict view would tend to render the codal provision in 7uestion illusory.
Ai00en =reas%res (1997)

&arcelino, a treasure hunter as /ust a ho!!y, has found a treasure. He has an idea of the land where the treasure might possi!ly !e found. Lpon in7uiry, &arcelino learns
*a. Can the minority of E, + and C !e a !asis to nullify the

partition? +"plain your answer. *!. How a!out fraud? +"plain your answer.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
map which appears to indicate the location of hidden
*a. >es, minority can !e a !asis to nullify the partition !ecause E, + and C were not properly represented !y their parents or guardians at the time they contracted the e"tra6
/udicial partition. *Articles $95-. $9<$, Civil Code..
*!. n the case of fraud, when through insidious words or machinations of one party the other is induced to enter into
that the owner of the land, Leopoldo, is a permanent resident of Canada, 'o!ody, however, could give him LeopoldoDs e"act address. Lltimately, anyway, he enters the land and conducts a search. He succeeds. the treasure from &arcelino !ut the latter is not willing to
Leopoldo learning of &arcelinoDs "find", see0s to recover part with it. Cailing to reach an agreement, Leopoldo sues
the contract without which he would not have agreed to,
the action still prosper !ecause under Art, $9<$ of the Civil
Code, in case of fraud, the action for annulment may !e !rought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
&arcelino for the recovery of the property. &arcelino contests the action. How would you decide the case?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Ai00en =reas%re (1999) 8im came into possession of an old map showing where a
purported cache of gold !ullion was hidden. (ithout any
authority from the government 8im conducted a relentless search and finally found the treasure !uried in a
would decide in favor of &arcelino since he is considered a finder !y chance of the hidden treasure, hence, he is entitled to one6half *$S5. of the hidden treasure. (hile &arcelino may have had the intention to loo0 for the
hidden treasure, still he is a finder !y chance since it is enough that he tried to loo0 for it. Ny
new river
!ed formerly part of a parcel of land owned !y spouses
chance in the law
8irso and 8essie. 8he old river which used to cut through
the land of spouses Lrsula and Lr!ito changed its course through natural causes. 8o whom shall the treasure !elong? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
does not mean sheer luc0 such that the finder should have no intention at all to loo0 for the treasure. Ny chance means good luc0, implying that one who intentionally loo0s for the treasure is em!raced in the provision. 8he reason is that it is
e"tremely difficult to find hidden treasure without loo0ing for it deli!erately. &arcelino is not a trespasser since there is no prohi!ition
8he treasure was found in a property of pu!lic dominion, the new river #ince 8im did not have !ed. authority from
the government and, therefore, was a trespasser, he is not
for him to enter the premises, hence, he is entitled to half of the treasure.
entitled to the one6half share allotted to a finder of hidden

treasure. All of it will go to the #tate.
n addition, under
Art. J9F of the 'CC in order that the finder !e entitled to the $S5 share, the treasure must !e found !y chance, that is !y sheer luc0. n this case, since 8im found the treasure not !y chance !ut !ecause he relentlessly searched for it, he is
not entitled to any share in the hidden treasure.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
$. &arcelino did not find the treasure !y chance !ecause he had a map, he 0new the location of the hidden treasure and he intentionally loo0ed for the treasure, hence, he is not
entitled to any part of the treasure.
8he law grants a one6half share to a finder of hidden treasure provided he is not a trespasser and the finding is !y chance. t is su!mitted that 8im is not a trespasser despite his not getting authority from the government, !ecause the new river !ed where he found the treasure is property for
5. &arcelino appears to !e a trespasser and although there may !e a 7uestion of whether he found it !y chance or not, as he has found the hidden treasure !y means of a treasure map, he will not !e entitled to a finderDs share. 8he hidden treasure shall !elong to the owner.
9. 8he main rule is that hidden treasure !elongs to the
pu!lic use *Art. J5= 'CC., to which the pu!lic has legitimate access. 8he 7uestion, therefore, !oils down to
whether or not the finding was !y chance in view of the fact that 8im "conducted a relentless search" !efore finding the
treasure. 8he strict or literal view holds that deli!erate or
owner of the land, !uilding or other property on which it is found. f it is found !y chance !y a third person and he is not a trespasser, he is entitled to one6 f he is half *$S5.. a trespasser, he loses everything.
intentional search
precludes entitlement to the one6half
*ortgage; 4act%m Commissori%m (1999)
Page 64 of 119
*a. 4 !orrowed money from > and gave a piece of land as security !y way of mortgage. t was e"pressly that upon nonpayment of the de!t on time !y 4, the mortgaged land would already !elong to >. f 4 defaulted in paying, would > now !ecome the owner
of the mortgaged land? (hy? *9B. agreed !etween the parties in the mortgage contract
Are the right of redemption and the e7uity of redemption given !y law to a mortgagor the same? +"plain. *5B. 8he e7uity of redemption is different from the right of redemption. +PL 8> %C I+E+&:8 %' is the right of
the mortgagor after /udgment in a /udicial foreclosure to the /udgment de!t !efore the sale or confirmation of the sale. %n the other hand, I GH8 %C I+E+&:8 %' is
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
redeem the property !y paying to the court the amount of
*!. in
#uppose
!etween 4 and > was that if 4 failed to pay the
the preceding 7uestion, the agreement
same as in the preceding 7uestion? +"plain. *9B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
mortgage de!t on time, the de!t shall !e paid with the land mortgaged !y 4 to >. (ould your answer !e the
the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property sold at an e"tra6/udicial foreclosure !y paying to the !uyer in the
foreclosure sale the amount paid !y the !uyer within one year from such sale.
*a. 'o, > would not !ecome the owner of the land. 8he stipulation is in the nature of pactum commissorium which is prohi!ited !y 8he property should !e sold at law. pu!lic
auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the inde!tedness. Any e"cess shall !e given to the mortgagor.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
.%isance; ,amil" Ao%se; .ot .%isance per se ('##-) A drug lord and his family reside in a small !ungalow where they sell sha!u and other prohi!ited drugs. (hen the police house !ecause according to them, it was a nuisance per se +"plain. *AB.
found the illegal trade, they immediately demolished the
that should !e a!ated. Can this demolition !e sustained?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*d. 'o, the answer would not !e the same. 8his is a valid stipulation and does not constitute pactum commissorium.
n pactum commissorium, the ac7uisition is automatic
without need of any further action. n the instant pro!lem

another act is re7uired to !e performed, namely, the conveyance of the property as payment *dacion en pago.. *ortgage; 4act%m Commissori%m ('##1)
'o, the demolition cannot !e sustained. 8he house is not a nuisance per se or at law as it is not an act, occupation, or
structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings. A nuisance per se is a nuisance in and of itself, without regard to circumstances [Tolent"no, '. 697, +"t"n,
)!eeler v. R"ver 8alls o9er Co., $17 Ala. 677, 111 So. 90(].
8o secure a loan o!tained from a rural !an0, :urita assigned her leasehold rights over a stall in the pu!lic mar0et in favor of the !an0. 8he deed of assignment provides that in case of default in the payment of the loan, the !an0 shall have the right to sell :uritaDs rights over the mar0et stall as her
.%isance; 4%blic .%isance vs. 4rivate .%isance ('##9) #tate with reason whether each of the following is a
nuisance, and if so, give its classification, whether pu!lic or

private: Article G<J of the Civil Code defines nuisance as
attorney6in6fact, and to apply the proceeds to the payment

of the loan.
any act, omission, esta!lishment, !usiness, condition or

property, or anything else which in/ures or endangers the
$. (as the assignment of leasehold rights a mortgage or a

cession? (hy? *9B. 5. Assuming the assignment to !e a mortgage, does the provision giving the !an0 the power to sell :uritaDs rights constitute pactum commissorium or not? (hy?
health or safety of others, or annoys or offends the senses, or shoc0s, defies or disregards decency or morality or
o!structs or interferes with the free passage of any pu!lic
highway or street or any !ody of water or hinders or impairs the use of property.
t is a pu!lic nuisance if it affects a community or
*5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$.
leasehold rights. transferred
8he assignment was a mortgage, not a cession, of the

A cession would have
ownership to the !an0. However, the grant of authority to
the !an0 to sell the leasehold rights in case of default is proof that no such ownership was transferred and that a
mere encum!rance was constituted. 8here would have !een

no need for such authority had there !een a cession.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
neigh!orhood or any considera!le num!er of persons. t is a direct encroachment upon pu!lic rights or property which results in/uriously to the pu!lic. t is a private nuisance, if it affects only a person or small num!er of persons. t violates only private rights. a) A sN.atterDs !.t (14)
f constructed on pu!lic streets or river!eds, it is a pu!lic
5.
commissorium. It is pactum commissorium )%en (efault in t%e pa0ment of t%e loan automaticall0 /ests o)ners%ip of t%e encum'ere(
'o, the clause in 7uestion is not a pactum
;.R. 0o. 56$6073, 8e/r.ary $1,196()
nuisance !ecause it o!structs the free use !y the pu!lic of said places. (C"ty o* Man"la v. ;ar+"a,
propert0 in t%e 'an7. n the pro!lem given, the !an0 does not
automatically !ecome owner of the property upon default of the 8he !an0 has to sell the mortgagor. property and apply the proceeds to the inde!tedness.
f constructed on private land, it is a private nuisance !ecause it hinders or impairs the use of the property !y the owner. A s9"&&"n, 'ool (14) 8his is not a nuisance in the a!sence of any unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water. n
/)
*ortgage; 1ig&t of 1e0emption vs. E$%it" of 1e0emption
A"%al,o 2nter'r"ses v. Galan%an (;.R. 0o. 56 34$$, -.ne 13, 197$), the #upreme Court ruled that a
(1999)
swimming pool is !ut
Page 65 of 119
a duplication of nature W thus, could not !e considered as a
*!. 8he mortgage shall not !ind the $S9 right and interest
of A and shall !e deemed to cover only the rights and interests of N and C in the house and lot. 8he mortgage
nuisanc e.
+) A !o.se o* 'rost"t.t"on (14)
rrespective of its location and how its !usiness is conducted, it is a nuisance since it defies, shoc0s and disregards decency and morality. t is a pu!lic nuisance !ecause of its in/ury to the pu!lic.
%) A no"sy or %an,ero.s *a+tory "n a 'r"vate lan% (14) f the noise in/uriously affects the health and comfort of
shall !e limited to the portion *5S9. which may !e allotted to N and C in the partition *Art. J<9, Civil Code..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*c. NDs sole decision to !uild the concrete fence is not
!inding upon A and C. +"penses to improve the thing owned in common must !e decided upon !y a ma/ority of the co6owners who represent the controlling interest *Arts. JF< and J<5. Civil Code..
ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasona!le e"tent, it

is a nuisance. t is a pu!lic nuisance !ecause there is a tendency to annoy the pu!lic. (#elas+o v.
Man"la 2le+tr"+ Co., ;.R. 0o. 5618390, A.,.st 6, 19(1)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
e)
>n+olle+te% ,ar/a,e (14)
*d. CDs sole decision to !uild the grotto is not !inding upon A and N who cannot !e re7uired to contri!ute to the e"penses for the em!ellishment of the thing owned in
t will !ecome a nuisance if it su!stantially impairs the comfort and en/oyment of the ad/acent occupants. 8he annoyance and the smell must !e su!stantial as to interfere sensi!ly with the use and en/oyment !y persons of ordinary sensi!ilities. t is a pu!lic nuisance !ecause of its in/ury to the pu!lic.
Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip (199')
common if not decided upon !y the ma/ority of the co6
owners who represent the controlling interest *Arts. JF< and

J<5, Civil Code..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
A, N and C are the co6owners in e7ual shares of a residential

house and lot. Euring their co6ownership, the following acts were respectively done !y the co6 owners:
*e. 8he sale to 4 shall not !ind the $S9 share of N and shall !e deemed to cover only the 5S9 share of A and C in the land *Art. J<9, Civil Code.. N shall have the right to redeem the 5S9 share sold to 4 !y A and C since 4 is a third person *Art. $G5=, Civil Code.. Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; 4rescription ('###) n $<AA, Iamon and his sister Iosario inherited a parcel of
$. A undertoo0 the repair of the foundation of the house,

then tilting to one side, to prevent the house from
5. N and C mortgaged the house and lot to secure a loan. 9. N engaged a contractor to !uild a concrete fence all around the lot.
collapsing.
land in Al!ay from their parents. #ince Iosario was gainfully employed in &anila, she left Iamon alone to possess and cultivate the land. However, Iamon never shared the
harvest with Iosario and was even a!le to sell one6half of

the land in $<FA !y claiming to !e the sole heir of his
J. C !uilt a !eautiful grotto in the garden.
A and C sold the land to 4 for a very good A. price. *a. s ADs sole decision to repair the foundation of the house !inding on N &ay A re7uire and C? N and C to contri!ute their 5S9 share of the
*!. (hat is the legal effect of the mortgage contract
e"pense? Ieasons.
parents. Having reached retirement age in $<<= Iosario returned to the province and upon learning what had transpired, demanded that the remaining half of the land !e given to her as her share. Iamon opposed, asserting that he has already ac7uired ownership of the land !y prescription, and that Iosario is !arred !y laches from demanding
partition and reconveyance. Eecide the conflicting claims.
e"ecuted !y N and C? Ieasons. s NDs sole decision to !uild the fence *c. !inding contri!ute their 5S 9 share of the e"pense? Ieasons. s CDs sole decision to !uild the grotto *d. !inding
*AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
upon A and C? &ay N re7uire A and C to
Iamon is wrong on !oth counts: prescription and laches. prescription. :ossession !y a co6owner is deemed not
His possession as co6owner did not give rise to ac7uisitive adverse to the other co6owners !ut is, on the contrary, deemed !eneficial to them ( on,on v. ;A,
166 SCRA 3(7).
upon A and N? &ay C re7uire A and N to
contri!ute their 5S 9 share of the e"pense? Ieasons.
IamonDs possession will !ecome adverse only when he has repudiated the co6ownership and such repudiation was
made 0nown to Iosario. Assuming that the sale in $<FA where Iamon claimed he was the sole heir of his parents amounted to a repudiation of the co6 ownership, the
*e. (hat are the legal effects of the contract of sale e"ecuted !y A. C and 4? Ieasons.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a >es. ADs sole decision to repair the . foundation is !inding upon N and C. N and C must contri!ute 5S9 of the e"pense. +ach co6owner has the right to compel the other co6owners to contri!ute to the e"pense of preservation of
the thing *the house. owned in common in proportion to their respective interests *Arts. JFA and JFF, Civil Code..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
prescriptive period !egan to run only from that time. 'ot

more than 9= years having lapsed since then, the claim of
Iosario has not as yet prescri!ed. 8he claim of laches is not also meritorious. Lntil the repudiation of the co6ownership was made 0nown to the other co6owners, no right has !een violated for the said co6owners to vindicate. &ere delay in
vindicating the right, standing alone, does not constitute
laches.
Page 66 of 119
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Iamon has ac7uired the land !y ac7uisitive prescription, and !ecause of laches on the part of Iosario. IamonDs possession of the land was adverse !ecause he asserted sole ownership thereof and never shared the harvest therefrom. His adverse possession having !een continuous and uninterrupted for more than 9= years, Iamon has ac7uired the land !y prescription. Iosario is also guilty of laches not having asserted her right to the harvest for more than J= years. Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; 4rescription ('##')
#enen and :eter are !rothers. #enen migrated to Canada early while still a teenager. :eter stayed in Nulacan to ta0e care of their widowed mother and continued to wor0 on the Camily farm even after her death. Ieturning to the country some thirty years after he had left, #enen see0s a partition of the farm to get his share as the only co6heir of :eter. :eter interposes his opposition, contending that ac7uisitive prescription has already set in and that estoppel lies to !ar the action for partition, citing his continuous possession of the property for at least $= years, for almost 9= years in fact. t is undisputed that :eter has never openly claimed sole ownership of the property. f he ever had the intention to do so, #enen was completely ignorant of it. (ill #enenOs action prosper? +"plain. *AB..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
first marriage, and C and E, daughters !y a second marriage. n $<J=, the !an0 foreclosed the mortgage for non6payment of the principal o!ligation. As the only !idder at the e"tra/udicial foreclosure sale, the !an0 !ought the property and was later issued a certificate of sale. 8he war supervened in $<J$ without the !an0 having !een a!le to o!tain actual possession of the property which remained with ADs three children who appropriated for themselves the income from it. n $<JF, N !ought the property from the !an0 using the money he received as !ac0 pay from the L. #. Government, and utili1ed the same in agri!usiness. n $<G=, as NDs !usiness flourished, C and E sued N for partition and accounting of the income of the property, claiming that as heirs of their father they were co6owners
#enenOs action will prosper. Article J<J of the 'ew Civil Code provides that ?no prescription shall run in favor of a co6owner or co6heir against his co6owners or co6 heirs so long as he e"pressly or impliedly recogni1es the co6 ownership nor notified #enen of his having repudiated the same.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
#enenOs action will prosper. 8his is a case of implied trust. *Art $JJ$, 'CC. Cor purposes of prescription under the concept of an owner *Art. AJ=, 'CC.. 8here is no such concept here. :eter was a co6owner, he never claimed sole ownership of the property. He is therefore estopped under Art. $J9$, 'CC. Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; 1e0emption (199()
n $<9-, A o!tained a loan of :5=,===.== from the 'ational City Nan0 of 'ew >or0, an American6owned !an0 doing !usiness in the :hilippines. 8o guarantee payment of his o!ligation, A constituted a real estate mortgage on his 9=6 hectare parcel of agricultural land. n $<9<, !efore he could pay his o!ligation. A died intestate leaving three children. N, a son !y a
thereof and offering to reim!urse N for whatever he had paid in purchasing the property from the !an0. n !rief, how will you answer the complaint of C and E, if you were engaged !y E as his counsel?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; 1e0emption ('##')

Antonio, Nart, and Carlos are !rothers. 8hey purchased from their parents specific portions of a parcel of land as evidenced !y three separates deeds of sale, each deed referring to a particular lot in meter and !ounds. (hen the deeds were presented for registration, the Iegister of Eeeds could not issue separate certificates of 8itle had to !e issued, therefore, in the names of three !rothers as co6 owners of the entire property. 8he situation has not changed up to now, !ut each of the !rothers has !een receiving rentals e"clusively from the lot actually purchased !y him. Antonio sells his lot to a third person, with notice to his !rothers. 8o ena!le the !uyer to secure a new title in
As counsel of N, shall answer the complaint as follows: (hen N !ought the property, it was not !y a right of redemption since the period therefore had already e"pired. Hence, N !ought the property in an independent unconditional sale. C and E are not co6 owners with N of the property. 8herefore, the suit of C and E cannot prosper.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
As counsel of N, shall answer the complaint as follows: Crom the facts descri!ed, it would appear that the Certificate of sale has not !een registered. 8he one6year period of redemption !egins to run from registration. n this case, it has not yet even commenced. Lnder the Iules of Court, the property may !e released !y the 3udgment de!tor or his successor in interest. *#ec. 5<, Iule 5-.. t has !een held that this includes a /oint owner. (Re*.
Ma,no vs.C"ola, 61 !"l. 80).
:age #$ of
$$<
Owners&ip; Co?Owners&ip; 1e0emption ('###)

Am!rosio died, leaving his three daughters, Nelen, Iosario and #ylvia a hacienda which was mortgaged to the :hilippine 'ational Nan0 due to the failure of the daughters to pay the !an0, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and the hacienda was sold to it as the highest !idder. #i" months later, #ylvia won the grand pri1e at the lotto and used part of it to redeem the hacienda from the !an0. 8hereafter, she too0 possession of the hacienda and refused to share its fruits with her sisters, contending that it was owned e"clusively !y her, having !ought it from the !an0 with her own money. s she correct or not? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
#ylvia is not correct. 8he 9 daughters are the co6owners of the hacienda !eing the only heirs of Am!rosio. (hen the property was foreclosed, the right of redemption !elongs also to the 9 daughters. (hen #ylvia redeemed the entire property !efore the lapse of the redemption period, she also e"ercised the right of redemption of her co6 owners on their !ehalf. As such she is holding the shares of her two sisters in the property, and all the fruits corresponding thereto, in trust for them. Iedemption !y one co6owner inures to the !enefit of all (A%"lle v. CA.17( SCRA 477). #ylvia, however, is entitled to !e reim!ursed the shares of her two sisters in the redemption price.
his name, the deed of sale was made to refer to undivided

interest in the property of the seller *Antonio., with the metes and !ounds of the lot sold !eing stated. Nart and Carlos reacted !y signifying their e"ercise of their right of
redemption as co owners. Antonio in his !ehalf and in

!ehalf of his !uyer, contends that they are no longer co6 owners, although the title covering the property has remained in their names as such.
#alvador, a tim!er concessionaire, !uilt on his lot a warehouse where he processes and stores his tim!er for shipment. Ad/oining the warehouse is a furniture factory owned !y 'AIIA& 4 of which #alvador is a ma/ority stoc0holder. 'AIIA& 4 leased space in the warehouse
where it placed its furniture6ma0ing machinery. $. How would you classify the furniture6 ma0ing machinery #uppose the lease contract !etween 5. #alvador and 'AIIA& 4 stipulates that at the end of the lease the machinery shall !ecome the property of the lessor, will your
answer !e the same? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
&ay Nart and Carlos still redeem the lot sold !y Antonio?
+"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
as property under the Civil Code? +"plain.
'o, they may not redeem !ecause there was no Co6
ownership among Antonio, Nart, and Carlos to start with.
8heir parents already partitioned the land in selling separate portions to them. 8he situation is the same as in the case S"
v. Co.rt o* A''eals, (34$ SCRA 673 [$000]).
4ossession (1993)
!ecause it was not owner of installed !y the the tenement. 8o !ecome immova!le under Art. J$A *A. of the 'CC, the machinery must !e installed !y the owner of the tenement.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
$. 8he furniture6ma0ing machinery is mova!le property
Lsing a falsified managerDs chec0, 3ustine, as the !uyer, was

a!le to ta0e delivery of a second hand car which she had
/ust !ought from Lnited Car #ales nc. 8he sale was registered with the Land 8ransportation %ffice. A wee0 later, the seller learned that the chec0 had !een dishonored, !ut !y that time, 3ustine was nowhere to !e seen. t turned out that 3ustine had sold the car to 3erico, the present possessor who 0new nothing a!out the falsified chec0. n a suit !y Lnited Car #ales, nc. against 3erico for recovery of the car, plaintiff alleges it had !een unlawfully deprived of its property through fraud and should, conse7uently, !e allowed to recover it without having to reim!urse the defendant for the price the latter had paid. #hould the suit
prosper? 2AB;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
t depends on the circumstances of the case. f the machinery was attached in a fi"ed manner, in such a way
that it cannot !e separated from the tenement without !rea0ing the material or causing deterioration thereof, it is
immova!le property 2Art. J$A *9., 'CC;. However, if the
machinery can !e transported from place to place without impairment of the tenement to which they were fi"ed, then it is mova!le property. 2Art. J$G *J., 'CC;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he suit should prosper as to the recovery
5. t is immova!le property. (hen there is a provision in the lease contract ma0ing the lessor, at the end of the lease, owner of the machinery installed !y the lessee, the said machinery is considered to have !een installed !y the lessor through the lessee who acted merely as his agent. Having
of the car. However, since 3erico was not guilty of any fraud and appears to !e an innocent purchaser for value, he should !e reim!ursed for the price he paid. 8his is without pre/udice to Lnited Car #ales, nc. right of action against 3ustine. As
!etween two innocent parties, the party causing the in/ury should suffer the loss. 8herefore, Lnited Car #ales, nc. should suffer the loss.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
!een installed !y the owner of the tenement, the machinery

!ecame immova!le .under Art. J$A of the 'CC. (Favao
Sa9&"ll v. Cast"llo 61 (09) !"l.
4ropert"; 1eal vs. 4ersonal 4ropert" (1997) :edro is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
&alolos, Nulacan. n $<-9, he mortgaged the land to the :hilippine 'ational Nan0 *:'N. to secure a loan of
>es, the suit will prosper !ecause the criminal act of estafa should !e deemed to come within the meaning of unlawful
deprivation under Art. AA<, Civil Code, as without it plaintiff would not have parted with the possession of its
car.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
'o, the suit will not prosper. 8he sale is valid and 3erico is a
!uyer in good faith.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
Lnder the law on #ales, when the thing sold is delivered !y the seller to the !uyer without reservation of ownership, the ownership is transferred to the !uyer. 8herefore in the suit of Lnited Car #ales, nc. against 3erico for the recovery of
the car, the plaintiff should not !e allowed to recover the
:$==.===.==. Cor :edroDs failure to pay the loan, the :'N foreclosed on the mortgage in $<F=, and the land was sold at pu!lic auction to :'N for !eing the highest !idder. :'N secured title thereto in $<F-. n the meanwhile, :edro, who was still in possession of the land, constructed a warehouse on the property. n $<FF, the :'N sold the land to :a!lo, the Eeed of #ale was amended in $<F< to include the warehouse.
:edro, claiming ownership of the warehouse, files a complaint to annul the amended Eeed of #ale !efore the
car without reim!ursing the defendant for the price that the latter paid. (2FCA ./l"s!"n, an%
F"str"/.t"n, Cor'. vs.
Santos, 184 SCRA 614, A'r"l $6, 1990)
Iegional 8rial Court of Pue1on City, where he resides, against !oth the :'N and :a!lo. 8he :'N filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint for improper venue contending
4ropert"; 1eal vs. 4ersonal 4ropert" (1999)
that the warehouse is real property under Article J$A*$. of the Civil Code and therefore the action should have instead !een filed in &alolos, Nulacan. :edro claims otherwise. 8he 7uestion arose as to whether the warehouse should !e
considered as real or as personal property.
Page 68 of 119
f consulted, what would your legal advice !e?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he warehouse which is a construction adhered to the soil is
an immova!le !y nature under Art. J$A *$. and the proper venue of any case to recover ownership of the same, which is what the purpose of the complaint to annul the amended
latter vacate the premises and deliver the same to the former. :etronila refused to vacate the place on the ground that the usufruct in her favor would e"pire only on $ 3une
$<<F when &anuel would have reached his 9=th !irthday
Eeed of #ale amounts to, should !e the place where the property is located, or the I8C of Nulacan.
A##I$I!'AL A'(WE"(:
and that the death of &anuel !efore his 9=th !irthday did not e"tinguish the usufruct. (hose contention should !e accepted?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. Nuildings are always immova!le property, and even in the instances where the parties to a contract seem to have
dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it
stood in no wise does it change its character as immova!le property. A !uilding is an immova!le even if not erected !y the owner of the land. 8he only criterion is union or incorporation with the soil. (5a%era vs.
Ao%,es (CA) 48 <.;. 43(4) (Reyes an% !"l"''"ne C"v"l 5a9,
#ol. $. '.()
.no, <.tl"ne o*
Civil Code, a usufruct granted for the time that may elapse !efore a third person reaches a certain age shall su!sist for the num!er of years specified even if the third person should die unless there is an e"press stipulation in the contract that states otherwise. n the case at !ar, there is no e"press stipulation that the consideration for the usufruct is the e"istence of :etronilaDs son. 8hus, the general rule and not the e"ception should apply in this case.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
:etronilaDs contention is correct. Lnder Article G=G of the
8he warehouse !uilt !y :edro on the 5. mortgaged property is real property within the conte"t of Article J$A of the 'ew Civil Code, although it was !uilt !y :edro after the foreclosure sale without the 0nowledge and consent of the does not alter the character of the warehouse as a real property !y incorporation. t is a structure which cannot !e removed without causing in/ury to the land. #o, my advice
to :edro is to file the case with the I8C of Nulacan, the
8his is a usufruct which is clearly intended for the !enefit of &anuel until he reaches 9= yrs. of age with :etronila serving only as a conduit, holding the property in trust for his
!enefit. 8he death of &anuel at the age of 5G therefore,
new owner which ma0es him a !uilder in !ad faith, this
terminated the usufruct.
LA'# $"A'( E" , #EE#(

2c$%isition of Lan0s; Citi>ens&ip 1e$%irement ('##() n $<-=, the spouses 3uan and 3uana de la Cru1, then Cilipinos, !ought the parcel of unregistered land in the :hilippines on which they !uilt a house which !ecame their
residence. n $<FG, they migrated to Canada and !ecame
situs of the property,

2Note$ If t%e e&aminee (oes not mention t%at t%e structure )as 'uilt '0 a 'uil(er in 'a( fait%* it s%oul( 'e 4i/en full cre(it3.
ower; Boo0 ,ait&D ;a0 ,ait& ('###)
Celi" cultivated a parcel of land and planted it to sugar cane, !elieving it to !e his own. (hen the crop was eight months old, and harvesta!le after two more months, a resurvey of
the land showed that it really !elonged to Cred. (hat are
for the registration of the aforesaid land in
Canadian citi1ens. 8hereafter, in $<<=, they applied, opposed !y the Iepu!lic,
the options availa!le to Cred? *5B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
their names.
As to the pending crops planted !y Celi" in good faith, Cred has the option of allowing Celi" to continue the cultivation and to harvest the crops, or to continue the cultivation and
harvest the crops himself. n the latter option, however,
#hould the application of the spouses de la Cru1 !e granted over the Iepu!licOs opposition? (hy? AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Celi" shall have the right to a part of the e"penses of

cultivation and to a part of the net harvest, !oth in proportion to the time of possession. *Art. AJA 'CC.,
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Constitution prohi!its aliens from owning private lands in the :hilippines. 8his rule, however, does not apply to the
>es, the application should !e granted. As a rule, the
spouses 3uan and 3uana de la Cru1 !ecause at the time they ac7uired ownership over the land, al!eit imperfect, they were still Cilipino citi1ens. 8he application for registration is spouses have already ac7uired !efore they !ecame Canadian citi1ens. (Re'./l"+ v. CA, $37 SCRA 76(
[1994]).
#ince sugarcane is not a perennial crop. Celi" is considered a sower in good faith. Neing so, Art. JJF applies. 8he options availa!le to Cred are: *a. to appropriate the crop after paying Celi" the indemnity under Art. AJG, or *!. to re7uire Celi" to
pay rent.
a mere confirmation of the imperfect title which the
/s%fr%ct (1997) %n $ 3anuary $<F=, &inerva, the owner of a !uilding, granted :etronila a usufruct over the property until =$ 3une $<<F when &anuel, a son of :etronila, would have reached
his 9=th !irthday. &anuel, however, died on $ 3une $<<=
20verse Claims; .otice of Lev" (1993) #ection -= of :residential Eecree 'o. $A5<, concerning adverse claims on registered land, provides a 9=6day period of effectivity of an adverse claim, counted from the date of
its registration. #uppose a notice of adverse claim !ased
when he was only 5G years old.

&inerva notified :etronila that the usufruct had !een
e"tinguished !y the death of &anuel and demanded that the
upon a contract to sell was registered on &arch $, $<<- at the instance of the NL>+I, !ut on 3une $, $<<-, or after the lapse of the 9=6day period, a notice of levy on e"ecution in favor of a 3LEG&+'8 CI+E 8%I was also registered to enforce a final /udgment for money against the registered owner. 8hen, on 3une $A, $<<- there having !een no formal cancellation of his notice of adverse claim, the NL>+I pays
Page 69 of 119
to the seller6owner the agreed purchase price in full and registers the corresponding deed of sale. Necause the
residential, commercial, industrial, or similar productive
annotation of the notice of levy is carried over to the new title in his name, the NL>+I !rings an action against the 3LEG&+'8 CI+E 8%I to cancel such annotation, !ut the latter claims that his lien is superior !ecause it was annotated after the adverse claim of the NL>+I had ipso
facto ceased to !e effective. (ill the suit prosper? 2AB;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
purposes, and only !y lease when not needed !y the government for pu!lic service. *5. f the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or a7uaculture purposes, it comes under the 3urisdiction of the Nureau of Cisheries and A7uatic Iesources *NCAI. and can only !e ac7uired !y lease. *:.E. -=A. *9. Cree :atent is a mode of concession under #ection J$,
Chapter , applica!le
8he suit will prosper. (hile an adverse claim duly annotated at the !ac0 of a title under #ection -% of :.E. $A5< is good
of the :u!lic Land Act, which is
only for 9= days, cancellation thereof is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription thereof will
only for agricultural lands. *J. 8he certificate of the district forester that the land is
already "aliena!le and disposa!le" simply means that the
remain annotated as a lien on the property. (hile the life of adverse claim is 9% days under :.E. $A5<, it continuous to !e effective until it is canceled !y formal petition filed with
the Iegister of Eeeds.
land is no longer needed for forest purposes, !ut the Nureau of Lands could no longer dispose of it !y free patent
!ecause it is already covered !y a lease contract !etween
8he cancellation of the notice of levy is /ustified under #ection $=F of :.E. $A5< considering that the levy on e"ecution can not !e enforced against the !uyer whose
adverse claim against the registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of levy on e"ecution.
NCAI and Iegina. 8hat contract must !e respected. *A. 8he free patent of 3orge is highly irregular and void a!
initio, not only !ecause the Nureau has no statutory authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore area, !ut
2nnotation of Lis 4en0ens; 8&en 4roper ('##1) &ario sold his house and lot to Carmen for :$ million paya!le in five *A. e7ual annual installments. 8he sale was registered and title was issued in CarmenDs name. Carmen
also !ecause of the false statements made in his sworn

application that he has occupied and cultivated the land
failed to pay the last three installments and &ario filed an.
action for collection, damages and attorneys fees against
her. Lpon filing of the complaint, he caused a notice of lis pendens to !e annotated on CarmenDs title. s the notice of
lis pendens proper or not? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
since 3uly J, $<JA, as re7uired !y the free patent law. Lnder #ection <$ of the :u!lic Land Act, any patent concession or title o!tained thru false representation is void a! initio. n cases of this nature, it is the government that shall institute annulment proceedings considering that the suit carries with it a prayer for the reversion of the land to the state.
However, Iegina is a party in interest and the case will
prosper !ecause she has a lease contract for the same land
8he notice of lis pendens is not proper for the reason that
the case filed !y &ario against Carmen is only for collection, damages, and attorneyDs fees.
with the government. ,orger"; )nnocent 4%rc&aser; Aol0er in ;a0 ,ait& ('##9) Iod, the owner of an C4 ta"i, found in his vehicle an envelope containing 8C8 'o. GAJ95 over a lot registered in CesarDs name. :osing as Cesar, Iod forged CesarDs signature
on a Eeed of #ale in IodDs favor. Iod registered the said
Annotation of a lis pendens can only !e done in cases involving recovery of possession of real property, or to
7uiet title or to remove cloud thereon, or for partition or
any other proceeding affecting title to the land or the use or occupation thereof. 8he action filed !y &ario does not fall
on anyone of these. ,ores&ore Lan0s ('###)
document with the Iegister of Eeeds, and o!tained a new
title in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to Eon, a !uyer in good faith and for value, who also registered the lot
in his name.
a) F"% Ro% a+N."re t"tle to t!e lan%1 23'la"n. ($4)

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Iegina has !een leasing foreshore land from the Nureau of Cisheries and A7uatic Iesources for the past $A years.
Iecently, she learned that 3orge was a!le to o!tain a free patent from the Nureau of Agriculture, covering the same
'o, Iod did not ac7uire title to the land. 8he inscription in
the registry, to !e effective, must !e made in good faith. 8he defense of indefeasi!ility of a 8orrens 8itle does not
land, on the !asis of a certification !y the Eistrict Corester that the same is already "aliena!le and disposa!le". &oreover, 3orge had already registered the patent with the
Iegister of Eeeds of the province, and he was issued an %riginal Certificate of 8itle for the same. Iegina filed an action for annulment of 3orgeDs title on the ground that it was o!tained fraudulently. (ill the action prosper? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
e"tend to a transferee who ta0es the certificate of title with notice of a flaw. A holder in !ad faith of a certificate of title cannot !e used as a shield for frauds.
(Sa&onte v. Co.rt o*
A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 104$$3, -.ly 1$, $001)
is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law
An action for the annulment of 3orgeDs %riginal Certificate of 8itle will prosper on the following grounds: *$. Lnder Chapter 4 of C .A, 'o. $J$, otherwise 0nown as the :u!lic Land Act, foreshore lands are disposa!le for
n the case at !ar, Iod only forged CesarDs signature on the 6Eeed of #ale. t is very apparent that there was !ad faith on the part of Iod from the very !eginning. As such, he is not entitled to the protection of the Land Iegistration Act. F"s+.ss t!e r",!ts o* Fon, "* /) any, over t!e
'ro'erty. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Page 70 of 119
t is a well60nown rule in this /urisdiction that persons 8he mortgage to Eesiderio should !e cancelled without the face of the 8orrens Certificate of 8itle and to pre/udice to his right to go after Catalino dispense andSor the
dealing with registered land have the legal right to rely on with the need to in7uire further, e"cept when the party
concerned has actual 0nowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasona!ly cautious man to ma0e such
in7uiry. (0aa9an Co&&.n"ty R.ral GanE v.
Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 1$87(3, -an.ary 13, $003)
government for compensation from the assurance fund.
n the given pro!lem, the property was already registered in the name of Iod when he !ought the same from the latter. 8hus, Eon could !e considered as a !uyer in good faith and for value. However, since Iod did not actually sell any property to him, Eon has no right to retain ownership over the property. He has only the right to recover the purchase
price plus damages.
,ra%0; 4roc%rement of 4atent; Effect ('###) n $<-<, 'estor applied for and was granted a Cree :atent over a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 9= hectares, located in General #antos City. He presented the Cree :atent to the Iegister of Eeeds, and he was issued a corresponding %riginal Certificate of 8itle *%C8. 'o. 9-A, #u!se7uently, 'estor sold the land to +ddie. 8he deed of
sale was su!mitted to the Iegister of Eeeds and on the !asis thereof, %C8 'o, 9-A was cancelled and 8ransfer
,orger"; )nnocent 4%rc&aser; *irror 4rinciple (1991)

Nruce is the registered owner, of a parcel of land with a
!uilding thereon and is in peaceful possession thereof. He pays the real estate ta"es and collects the rentals therefrom.
Certificate of 8itle *8C8. 'o. JA-G was issued in the name of +ddie. n $<FG, the Eirector of Lands filed a complaint for annulment of %C8 'o, 9-A and 8C8 'o. JA-G on the ground that 'estor o!tained the Cree :atent through fraud. +ddie filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he was
an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith and as
Later, Catalino, the only !rother of Nruce, filed a petition
where he, misrepresenting to !e the attorney6in6fact of Nruce and falsely alleging that the certificate of title was lost, succeeded in o!taining a second ownerDs duplicate copy of
such, he has ac7uired a title to the property which is valid, unassaila!le and indefeasi!le. Eecide the motion. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he motion of 'estor to dismiss the complaint for
annulment of %.C.8. 'o. 9-A and 8.C.8. 'o. JA-G should !e denied for the following reasons:
$. an +ddie cannot innocent claim protection as
the title and then had the same transferred in his name
through a simulated deed of sale in his favor. Catalino then mortgaged the property to Eesiderio who had the mortgage annotated on the title. Lpon learning of the fraudulent
transaction, Nruce filed a complaint against Catalino and
Eesiderio to have the title of Catalino and the mortgage in favor of Eesiderio declared null and void. (ill the complaint prosper, or will the title of
purchaser for value nor can he interpose the defense of indefeasi!ility of his title, !ecause his 8C8 is rooted on a void title. Lnder #ection <$ of CA 'o. $J$, as
amended, otherwise 0nown as the :u!lic Land Act,
statements of material facts in the applications for pu!lic land must !e under oath. #ection <$
Catalino and
the mortgage to Eesiderio !e sustained?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he complaint for the annulment of CatalinoDs 8itle will
prosper. n the first place, the second ownerDs copy of the

title secured !y him from the Land Iegistration Court is
essential conditions and parts of the concession, title, or permit issued, any false statement therein, or
of the same act provides that such statements shall !e considered as
omission of facts shall ipso facto produce the

cancellation of the concession. 8he patent issued to
void a! initio, the ownerDs copy thereof having never !een lost, let alone the fact that said second ownerDs copy of the title was fraudulently procured and improvidently issued !y the Court. n the second place, the 8ransfer Certificate of 8itle procured !y Catalino is e7ually null and void, it having !een issued on the !asis of a simulated or forged Eeed of titl e. 8he mortgage in favor of Eesiderio is li0ewise null and void !ecause the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property. (hile it may !e true that under the "Mirror Principle" of the 8orrens #ystem of Land Iegistration, a !uyer or mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears on e"cite suspicion, is under no o!ligation to loo0 !eyond the certificate and investigate the mortgagorDs title, this rule does not find application in the case at hand !ecause here.
CatalinoDs title suffers from two fatal infirmities, namely:
was o!tained !y fraud !ut also !ecause it covers 9=
'estor in this case is void a! initio not only !ecause it hectares which is far !eyond the ma"imum of 5J
hectares provided !y the free patent law.

5. 8he government can see0 annulment of the original
#ale. A forged deed is an a!solute nullity and conveys no
and transfer certificates of title and the reversion of the

land to the state. +ddieDs defense is untena!le. 8he protection afforded !y the 8orrens #ystem to an
innocent purchaser for value can !e availed of only if the land has !een titled thru /udicial proceedings where the issue of fraud !ecomes academic after the lapse of
one *$. year from the issuance of the decree of registration. n pu!lic land grants, the action of the
the Certificate of 8itle, and in the a!sence of anything to
government to annul a title fraudulently o!tained does not prescri!e such action and will not !e !arred !y the transfer of the title to an innocent purchaser for value.
a. 8he fact that it emanated from a forged deed of a
Aomestea0 4atents; @oi0 ale (1999)
simulated sale) 8he fact that it was derived from a !. fraudulently
procured or improvidently issued second ownerDs copy, the real ownerDs copy !eing still intact and in the
possession of the true owner, Nruce.
n $<A=, the Nureau of Lands issued a Homestead patent to A. 8hree years later, A sold the homestead to N. A died in $<<=, and his heirs filed an action to recover the homestead
from N on the ground that its sale !y their father to the
latter is void under #ection $$F of the :u!lic Land Law. N contends, however, that the heirs of A cannot recover the
Page 71 of 119
homestead from him anymore !ecause their action has prescri!ed and that furthermore, A was in pari delicto.
Eecide. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Cesar !ought a residential condominium unit from High
8he sale of the land !y A to N 9 years after issuance of the homestead patent, !eing in violation of #ection $$F of the
:u!lic Land Act, is void from its inception.
Iise Co. and paid the price in full. He moved into the unit, !ut somehow he was not given the Condominium Certificate of 8itle covering the property. Ln0nown to him,
High Iise the entire Co. su!se7uently mortgaged
condominium !uilding to &etro!an0 as security for a loan
of :A== million. High Iise Co. failed to pay the loan and
8he action filed !y the heirs of N to declare the nullity or ine"istence of the contract and to recover the land should
!e given due course. NDs defense of prescription is untena!le !ecause an action
the !an0 foreclosed the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, the !an0 ac7uired the !uilding, !eing the highest !idder.
which see0s to declare the nullity or ine"istence of A contract does not prescri!e. (Art"+le 1410C
Gana,a vs. Soler, $
8CRA (67)
(hen Cesar learned a!out this, he filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale insofar as his unit was concerned. 8he !an0 put up the defense that it relied on the condominium certificates of title presented !y High Iise Co., which were clean. Hence, it was a mortgagee and !uyer in good faith. s this defense tena!le or not? (hy? *AB..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
%n the other hand, NDs defense of pari (elicto is e7ually

untena!le. (hile as a rule, parties who are in pari delicto
&etro!an0Ds defense is untena!le. As a rule, an innocent
have no recourse against each other on the principle that a transgressor cannot profit from his own wrongdoing, such rule does not apply to violations of #ection $$F of the :u!lic Land Act !ecause of the underlying pu!lic policy in the said Act "to conser/e t%e lan( )%ic% a %omestea(er %as ac.uire(
'0 4ratuitous 4rant from t%e 4o/ernment for %imself an( %is famil0".
purchaser for value ac7uires a good and a clean title to the property. However, it is settled that one who closes his eyes to facts that should put a reasona!le man on guard is not an
innocent purchaser for value. n the present pro!lem the !an0 is e"pected, as a matter of standard operating procedure, to have conducted an ocular inspection, of the
promises !efore granting any loan. Apparently, &etro!an0

did not follow this procedure. %therwise, it should have
n 0eeping with this policy, it has !een held that one who purchases a homestead within the five6year prohi!itory period can only recover the price which he has paid !y filing a claim against the estate of the deceased seller
(5a/ra%or vs.
Felos Santos 66
that no one
!"l. 7(9) under the principle
discovered that the condominium unit in 7uestion was occupied !y Cesar and that fact should have led it to ma0e further in7uiry. Lnder the circumstances, &etro!an0 cannot !e considered a mortgagee and !uyer in good faith. *irror 4rinciple (199#) n $<A=Ds, the Government ac7uired a !ig landed estate in
Central Lu1on from the registered owner for su!division
shall enrich himself at the e"pense of another. Applying the pari (elicto rule to violation of #ection $$F of the :u!lic Land Act, the Court of Appeals has ruled that "the homesteader suffers the loss of the fruits reali1ed !y the vendee who in
into small farms and redistri!ution of !onafide occupants, C
turn forfeits the improvement that he has introduced into the land." *</ot vs. San%a%">as, 69 <;, A'r"l 37, 1966M
I"($ AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he action to declare the nullity of the sale did not prescri!e
*Art. $J$=M, such sale !eing one e"pressly prohi!ited and
was a former lessee of a parcel of land, five hectares in area. After completion of the resurvey and su!division, C applied to !uy the said land in accordance with the guidelines of the
implementing agency. Lpon full payment of the price in
declared void !y the :u!lic Lands Act 2Art. $J=<, par. *-.;.
8he prohi!ition of the law is clearly for the protection of
the heirs of A such that their recovering the property would enhance the pu!lic policy regarding ownership of lands
ac7uired !y homestead patent *Art. $J$G.. 8he defense of
$<A-, the corresponding deed of a!solute sale was e"ecuted in his favor and was registered, and in $<G$, a new title was issued in his name. n $<G9, C sold the said land to 4) and in $<GA 4 sold it to >, new titles were successively issued in the names of the said purchasers. n $<--, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to C, 4 and > and their titles, on the ground that he *C. had !een in actual physical possession of the land, and that the sale to C and the su!se7uent sales should !e set aside on the ground
of fraud. Lpon motion of defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding their defenses of their !eing innocent purchasers for value, prescription and laches. :laintiff appealed.
pari delicto is not applica!le either, since the law itself allows the homesteader to reac7uire the land even if it has
!een sold.
(EC!'# AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
:rescription does not arise with respect to actions to declare a void contract a nullity *Article $J$=.. 'either is the doctrine of pari delicto applica!le !ecause of pu!lic policy. 8he law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff so as to enhance the pu!lic policy of the :u!lic Land Act to give
land to the landless.
f the heirs are not allowed to recover, it could !e on the ground of laches inasmuch as J= years had elapsed and the owner had not !rought any action against N especially if the latter had improved the land. t would !e detrimental to N if
the plaintiff is allowed to recover.
*a. s the said appeal meritorious? +"plain your answer *!. #uppose the government agency concerned /oined C in filing the said action against the defendants, would that change the result of the litigation? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
)nnocent 4%rc&aser for @al%e ('##1)
*a. 8he appeal is not meritorious. 8he trial court ruled correctly in granting defendantDs motion to dismiss for the following reasons: $. (hile there is the possi!ility that C, a former lessee of the land was aware of the fact that C was the !ona fide
Page 72 of 119
occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer certificate of title may !e vulnera!le, the transfer of the same land and
the issuance of new 8C8s to 4 and > who are innocent
purchasers for value render the latterDs titles indefeasi!le. A
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
re7uired to e"plore !eyond what the record in the registry indicates on its face in 7uest for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may su!se7uently defeat his right thereto. 8his is the "&"rror 'r"n+"'leD of the 8orrens system which ma0es it possi!le for a forged deed to !e the root of a good title. Nesides, it appears that spouses 4 and > are guilty of
contri!utory negligence when they delivered this %C8 to the mortgagee without annotating the mortgage thereon. Netween them and the innocent purchaser for value, they
correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in any way o!lige him to go !ehind the certificate to determine the condition of the property in search for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or diminish the right to the land. 8his is the mirror principle of
the 8orrens #ystem of land registration. 5. 8he action to annul the sale was instituted in $<-- or
should !ear the loss.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
more than *$=. years from the date of e"ecution thereof in

$<A-, hence, it has long prescri!ed.
9. Lnder #ec JA of Act J<G, ?the entry of a certificate of
aware of the adverse possession of the land !y the spouses 4 and >, then the latter cannot recover the property from N. N has in his favor the presumption of good faith which
f the !uyer N, who relied on the teller ADs title, was not
title shall !e regarded as an agreement running with the
land, and !inding upon the applicant and all his successors
in title that the land shall !e and always remain registered
land. A title under Act J<G is indefeasi!le and to preserve that character, the title is cleansed anew with every transfer for value *Fe -es.s v C"ty o* Man"laC $9 !"l. (3C
5a'eral v
C"ty o* Man"la, 6$ 111..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
can only !e overthrown !y ade7uate proof of !ad faith. However, no!ody !uys land without seeing the property, hence, N could not have !een unaware of such adverse possession. f after learning of such possession, N simply closed his eyes and did nothing a!out it, then the suit for
reconveyance will prosper as the !uyerDs !ad faith will have !ecome evident. .otice of Lis 4en0ens (1999) Iommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel of land in Pue1on City. %ne year later Iachelle, the legitimate
owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent registration
!"l 313C
en.llar v
0G 1$0 S
*!. +ven if the government /oins C, this will not alter the
outcome of the case so much !ecause of estoppel as an
e"press provision in #ec JA of Act J<G and #ec 9$ of :E $A5< that a decree of registration and the certificate of title issued in pursuance thereof ?shall !e conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the national government and all !ranches thereof, whether mentioned !y name in the
o!tained !y Iommel. #he filed a complaint against Iommel for reconveyance and caused the annotation of a notice of Iommel now invo0es the indefeasi!ility of his title considering that one year has already elapsed from its
lis pendens on the certificate of title issued to Iommel.
application or not.@
*irror 4rinciple; ,orger"; )nnocent 4%rc&aser (1999) 8he spouses 4 and > mortgaged a piece of registered land
to A, delivering as well the %C8 to the latter, !ut they continued to possess and cultivate the land, giving $S5 of each harvest to A in partial payment of their loan to the
issuance. He also see0s the cancellation of the notice of Lis pendens. &ay the court cancel the notice of lis pendens even !efore final /udgment is rendered? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
A 0ot"+e o* 5"s even !efore
en%ens may !e canceled
latter, A, however, without the 0nowledge of 4 and >, forged a deed of sale of the aforesaid land in favor of himself, got a 8C8 in his name, and then sold the land to N, who !ought the land relying on ADs title, and who thereafter
also got a 8C8 in his name. t was only then that the
final 3udgment upon proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting or harassing the adverse party or that the notice of lis pendens is not necessary to protect the right of the party who caused it to !e registered. *#ection --, :.E. 'o. $A5<. n this case, it is given that Iachelle is the legitimate owner of the land in 7uestion. t can !e said, therefore, that when she filed her notice of lis pendens her purpose was to protect her interest in the land and not /ust to molest Iommel. t is necessary to record the Lis pendens to protect her interest !ecause if she did not do it, there is a possi!ility that the land will fall into the hands of an loses control over the land ma0ing any favora!le /udgment thereon moot and academic. Cor these reasons, the notice of lis pendens may not !e canceled.
innocent purchaser for value and in that event, the court
spouses 4 and > learned that their land had !een titled in NDs name. &ay said spouses file an action for reconveyance
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
of the land in 7uestion against !? Ieason. *AB. 8he action of 4 and > against N for reconveyance of the
land will not prosper !ecause N has ac7uired a clean title to

the property !eing an innocent purchaser for value. A forged deed is an a!solute nullity and conveys no title.
8he fact that the forged deed was registered and a certificate of title was issued in his name, did not operate to vest upon an ownership over the property of 4 and >. 8he
registration of the forged deed will not cure the infirmity.
However, once the title to the land is registered in the name

of the forger and title to the land thereafter falls into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the latter ac7uires
a clean title thereto. A !uyer of a registered land is not
Nart for annulment of the sale and reconveyance of the
.otice of Lis 4en0ens; =ransferee 4en0ente Lite ('##') #ancho and :acifico are co6owners of a parcel of land. #ancho sold the property to Nart. :acifico sued #ancho and
Page 73 of 119
property !ased on the fact that the sale included his one6
the o!ligation. However, the action was !rought within the

ten6year prescriptive period provided !y law wherein actions !ased on written contracts can !e instituted. a. (ill the defense prosper? Ieason. *9B.
half pro6indiviso share. :acifico had a notice of lis pendens annotated on the title covering the property and ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. 8he notice of lis
pendens could not !e cancelled immediately !ecause the
!. (hat are the essential elements of laches? *5B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
title over the property was with a !an0 to which the property had !een mortgaged !y Nart. :acifico appealed the case. (hile the appeal was pending and with the notice of lis pendens still uncancelled, Nart sold the property to Carlos, who immediately caused the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well as the issuance of a new title in
his name. s Carlos *a. a purchaser in good faith, or *!. a transferee pendente lite? f your answer is *a., how can the right of :acifico as co6owner !e protected? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, the defense will not prosper. 8he pro!lem did not give
facts from which laches may !e inferred. &ere delay in filing
an action, standing alone, does not constitute laches (A,ra v.

0G. 309 SCRA 709).
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!. 8he four !asic elements of laches are) *$. conduct on the
Carlos is a !uyer in !ad faith. 8he notice of lis pendens was still annotated at the !ac0 of the title at the
A.
time he !ought the land from Nart. 8he uncancelled notice of lis pendens operates as constructive notice of its contents as well as interests, legal or e7uita!le, included therein. All
persons are charged with the 0nowledge of what it contains. n an earlier case, it was held that a notice of an adverse
part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he !ases his suit) and *J. in/ury or pre/udice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to !e !arred. 4rescription & Lac&es; )n0efeasibilit" 1%le of =orrens =itle ('##') (ay !ac0 in $<JF, (indaOs hus!and sold in favor of ,erde
#ports Center Corp. hectare property *,erde. a $=6
part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complainant see0s a remedy) *5. delay in asserting the complainantDs rights, the complainant having had 0nowledge or notice of the defendantDs conduct and having !een afforded an opportunity to institute suit) *9. lac0 of 0nowledge on the
claim remains effective and !inding notwithstanding the lapse of the 9= days from its inscription in the registry. 8his
ruling is even more applica!le in a lis pendens.
Carlos is a transferee pendente lite insofar as #anchoOs share

in the co6ownership in the land is concerned !ecause the land was transferred to him during the pendency of the
!elonging to their con/ugal partnership. 8he sale was made (inda learned of the sale, when she discovered the deed of sale among the documents in her hus!andOs vault after his demise. #oon after, she noticed that the construction of the
without (indaOs 0nowledge, much less consent. n $<A=,
appea l.
:acifico can protect his right as a co6 N. owner !y pursuing his appeal) as0ing the Court of Appeals to order
the re6annotation of the lis pendens on the title
sports comple" had started. Lpon completion of the construction in $<A5, she tried !ut failed to get free
of Carlos)
and !y invo0ing his right of redemption of NartOs share under Articles $G5= of the 'ew Civil Code.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
mem!ership privileges in ,erde. (inda now files a suit against ,erde for the annulment of the sale on the ground that she did not consent to the sale. n answer, ,erde contends that, in accordance with the #panish Civil Code which was then in force, the sale in $<JF
of the property did not need her concurrence. ,erde contends that in any case the action has prescri!ed or is
A.
Carlos is a purchaser in good faith. A possessor in
good faith has !een defined as ?one who is unaware that there e"ists a flaw which invalidates his ac7uisition of the thing@ *Art. A5G, 'CC.. Good faith consists in the possessorOs !elief that the person from whom he received
the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his
title. n the case 2at !ar;, in 7uestion, while Carlos !ought
the su!/ect property from Nart while a notice of lis pendens was still annotated thereon, there was also an e"isting court order canceling the same. Hence, Carlos cannot !e considered as !eing ?aware of a flaw which invalidates
2their; the ac7uisition of the thing@ since the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was already !eing ordered
!arred !y laches. (inda re/oins that her 8orrens title covering the property is indefeasi!le, and imprescripti!le.
A. Eefine or e"plain the term ?laches@. *5B.
N. Eecide the case, stating your reasons for your decision. *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
A.
unreasona!le and une"plained length of time, to do what,
LACH+# means failure or neglect, for an
cancelled at the time of the purchase. %n this ground alone, Carlos can already !e considered a !uyer in good faith. ( o
5a& v. Co.rt o* A''eals, 34( SCRA 86, [$000]).
!y e"ercising due diligence, could or should have !een done earlier. t is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasona!le time. (Fe #era v. CA, 307 SCRA
6$4 [1999])
8o protect his right over the su!/ect property, N. :acifico should have timely filed an action for reconveyance and reinstated the notice of lis pendens.
N.
(hile Article $J$9 of the #panish Civil Code did
not re7uire the consent of the wife for the validity of the sale, an alienation !y the hus!and in fraud of the wife is
void as held in >y CoN.e v. 0avas, 47

!"l. 430 (19$3).
4rescription & Lac&es; Elements of Lac&es ('###)
n an action !rought to collect a sum of money !ased on a

surety agreement, the defense of laches was raised as the
Assuming that the alienation in $<JF was in fraud of (inda and, therefore, ma0es the sale to ,erde void, the action to se asid th sale nonethel alread !arre ! t e , ess, is y d y e
claim was filed more than seven years from the maturity of
Page 74 of 119
prescription and laches. &ore than A5 years have already elapsed from her discovery of the sale in $<A=.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
*a. 8he mortgage contract e"ecuted !y %, if at all, is only a

voida!le contract since it involves a con/ugal partnership
N. (indaOs claim that her 8orrens 8itle covering the
property is indefeasi!le and imprescripti!le 2does not hold water; is not tena!le. 8he r.le o* "n%e*eas"/"l"ty o* a Torrens T"tle means that after one year from the date of into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the title
!ecomes incontesta!le and incontroverti!le.
property. 8he action to annul the same instituted in $<--, or eleven years after the e"ecution of the sheriffDs final sale, has
o!viously prescri!ed !ecause:
issue of the decree of registration or if the land has fallen
$. An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must !e !rought within four *J. years from the date of discovery of the fraud. #ince this is in essence an action to recover it must !e rec0oned ownership, from the date of e"ecution of the contract or from the the assessorDs office for the purpose of transferring the
Inter&e%"ate A''ellate Co.rt ;. R. 56 (44$3 -an.30, 1989 169 SCRA 61().
IMPRESCRIPTI8ILIT", on the other hand, means that no title to the land in derogation of that of the registered owner
registration of the alleged fraudulent document with
may !e ac7uired !y adverse possession or ac7uisitive prescription or that the registered owner does not lose !y e"tinctive prescription his right to recover ownership and possession of the land.
ta" declaration, this !eing unregistered land, (Gael ..
5. f the action is to !e treated as an action to recover ownership of land, it would have prescri!ed /ust the
8he action in this case is for annulment of the sale e"ecuted

!y the hus!and over a con/ugal partnership property
same !ecause more than $= years have already elapsed since the date of the e"ecution of the sale.
covered !y a 8orrens 8itle. A+t"on on +ontra+ts are

s./:e+t to 'res+r"'t"on. 4rescription (199#) n $<G=, an unregistered parcel of land was mortgaged !y
*a. 8he action to recover has !een !arred !y ac7uisitive
prescription in favor of & considering that & has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten *$=. years with a /ust title.
owner % to &, a family friend, as collateral for a loan. %
*!. f & had secured a 8orrens 8itle to the land, all the
acted through his attorney6in6fact, son #, who was duly authori1ed !y way of a special power of attorney, wherein % declared that he was the a!solute owner of the land, that the that he has !een in open, continuous and adverse
possession in the concept of owner.
more # and : could not recover !ecause if at all their

remedies would !e: $. A :etition to Ieview the Eecree of Iegistration. 8his
ta" declarationsSreceipts were all issued in his name, and
can !e availed of within one *$. year from6the entry thereof, !ut only upon the !asis of "actual fraud." 8here is no showing that & committed actual fraud in securing his title
to the land) or
As % was una!le to pay !ac0 the loan plus interest for the past five 2A. years, & had to foreclose the mortgage. At the
5. An action in personam against & for the reconveyance of the title in their favor. Again, this remedy is availa!le within
foreclosure sale, & was the highest !idder. Lpon issuance
of the sheriffOs final deed of sale and registration in 3anuary,
$<GG, the mortgage property was turned over to &Ds
possession and control & has since then developed the said property. n $<G-, % died, survived !y sons # and :. n $<--, after the tenth *$=th. death anniversary of his father %. son : filed a suit to annul the mortgage deed and su!se7uent sale of the property, etc., on the ground of
fraud. He asserted that the property in 7uestion was con/ugal in nature actually !elonging, at the time of the to their sons *# and :. and to %. *a. s the suit filed !y : !arred !y prescription? +"plain your answer.
*!. After the issuance of the sheriffDs final deed of sale in
four years from the date of the discovery of the fraud !ut not later than ten *$=. years from the date of registration of the title in the name of &.
4rescription; 1eal 1ig&ts (199')
A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the 8arlac

side of the !oundary !etween 8arlac and :angasinan. His
!rother N owned the ad/oining parcel of unregistered land on the :angasinan side. A sold the 8arlac parcel to 4 in a deed of sale e"ecuted as a pu!lic instrument !y A and 4. After 4 paid in full the, price of the sale, 4 too0 possession of the :angasinan parcel in the !elief that it was the 8arlac parcel covered !y the deed
of sale e"ecuted !y A and 4.
mortgage, to % and his wife, (, whose con/ugal share went
$<GG in this case, assuming that & applied for registration under the 8orrens #ystem and was issued a 8orrens 8itle to
the said property in 7uestion, would that added fact have any significant effect on your conclusion? #tate your reason.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a. Lnder Art. $-9 of the Civil Code, the action is !arred !y prescription !ecause the wife had only ten *$=. years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the annulment of the mortgage deed.
Alternati1e Answers to
After twelve *$5. years, a controversy arose !etween N and 4 on the issue of the ownership of the :angasinan parcel, N claims a vested right of ownership over the :angasinan parcel !ecause N never sold that parcel to 4 or to anyone else.
%n the other hand, 4 claims a vested right of ownership over the :angasinan parcel !y ac7uisitive prescription,
*a. first Alternative Answer:
!ecause 4 possessed this parcel for over ten *$=; years under claim of ownership.
Page 75 of 119
Eecide on these claims, giving your reasons.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he right to recover possession of registered land li0ewise

does not prescri!e !ecause possession is /ust a necessary
At this point in time, 4 cannot claim the right of vested
ownership over the :angasinan parcel !y ac7uisitive
incident of ownership.
prescription. n addition to the re7uisites common to ordinary and e"traordinary ac7uisitive prescription consisting of uninterrupted, peaceful, pu!lic, adverse and actual possession in the concept of owner, ordinary ac7uisitive prescription for ten *$=. years re7uires *$.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
possession in good faith and *5. /ust title. "3ust title" means that the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recogni1ed !y law for
the ac7uisition of ownership !ut the grantor was not the
&i0aeloDs defense of laches, however, appears to !e more sustaina!le. Ienren !ought the land and had the sale registered way !ac0 in $<GA. Crom the facts, it appears that it was only in $<<F or after an ine"plica!le delay of 99 years that he too0 the first step asserting his right to the land. t was not even an action to recover ownership !ut only
!. possession of the land. Ny ordinary standards, 99 years of
owner or could not transmit any right *Art. $$5<. Civil Code.. n this case, there is no "/ust title" and no "mode"
that can !e invo0ed !y 4 for the ac7uisition of the :angasinan parcel. 8here was no constructive delivery of
neglect or inaction is too long and may!e considered unreasona!le. As often held !y the #upreme Court, the principle of imprescripti!ility sometimes has to yield to the e7uita!le principle of laches which can convert even a registered land ownerDs claim into a stale demand.
&i0aeloDs claim of laches, however, is wea0 insofar as the
the :angasinan parcel !ecause it was not the su!/ect6matter of the deed of sale. Hence, N retains ownership of the
:angasinan parcel of land.
4rimar" Entr" ;oo+; 2c$%isitive 4rescription; Lac&es (1993) n $<GA, Ienren !ought from Io!yn a parcel of registered land evidenced !y a duly e"ecuted deed of sale. 8he owner presented the deed of sale and the ownerDs certificate of title to the Iegister of Eeeds. 8he entry was made in the day!oo0 and corresponding fees were paid as evidenced !y
official receipt. However, no transfer of certificate of title
element of e7uity is concerned, there !eing no showing in the facts how he entered into the ownership and possession of the land. 1eclamation of ,ores&ore Lan0s; Limitations ('###)
Iepu!lic Act $F<< authori1es municipalities and chartered
cities to reclaim foreshore lands !ordering them and to

construct thereon ade7uate doc0ing and har!or facilities. :ursuant thereto, the City of Cavite entered into an
was issued to Ienren !ecause the original certificate of title in Io!ynDs name was temporarily misplaced after fire partly gutted the %ffice of the Iegister of Eeeds. &eanwhile, the land had !een possessed !y Io!ynDs
agreement with the Cil6+state Iealty Company, authori1ing the latter to reclaim 9== hectares of land from the sea !ordering the city, with 9=B of the land to !e reclaimed to
!e owned !y Cil6+state as compensation for its services.
8he #olicitor General 7uestioned the
distant cousin, &i0aelo, openly, adversely and continuously in the concept of owner since $<G=. t was only in April $<<F that Ienren sued &i0aelo to recover possession. &i0aelo invo0ed a. ac7uisitive prescription and !. laches, as0ing that he !e
declared owner of the land. Eecide the case !y evaluating these defenses, 2AB;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
validity of the agreement on the ground that it will mean reclaiming land under the sea which is !eyond the commerce of man. 8he
City replies that this is authori1ed !y IA. $F<< !ecause it authori1es the construction of doc0s and har!ors. (ho is
correct? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he #olicitor General is correct. 8he authority of the City of foreshore lands. 8he Act did not authori1e it to reclaim land from the sea. "8he reclamation !eing unauthori1ed, the City of Cavite did not ac7uire ownership over the reclaimed land. 'ot !eing the owner, it could not have conveyed any portion thereof to the contractor.
t depends. f the reclamation of the land from the sea is
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
a.
IenrenDs action to recover possession of the land will
Cavite under IA $F<< to reclaim land is limited to
prosper. n $<GA, after !uying the land from Io!yn, he su!mitted the Eeed of #ale to the Iegistry of Eeeds for
registration together with the ownerDs duplicate copy of the

title, and paid the corresponding registration fees. Lnder
#ection AG of :E 'o. $A5<, the Eeed of #ale to Ienren is considered registered from the time the sale was entered in
the Eay Noo0 *now called the :rimary +ntry Noo0..
Cor all legal intents and purposes, Ienren is considered the registered owner of the land. After all, it was not his fault
that the Iegistry issue the of Eeeds could not
corresponding transfer certificate of title. &i0aeloDs defense of prescription can not !e sustained. A
8orrens title is imprescripti!le. 'o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall !e ac7uired !y prescription or adverse possession. *#ection J-,
:.E. 'o, $A5<.
necessary in the construction of the doc0s and the har!ors, the City of Cavite is correct. %therwise, it is not. #ince IA $F<< authori1ed the city to construct doc0s and har!ors, all wor0s that are necessary for such construction are deemed authori1ed. ncluding the reclamation of land from the sea. 8he reclamation !eing authori1ed, the city is the owner of the reclaimed land and it may convey a portion thereof as payment for the services of the contractor.
A'!$.E" AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
entered into !efore IA $F<< was repealed !y :E 96A, the City of Cavite is correct. Lands under the sea are "!eyond the commerce of man" in the sense that they are not suscepti!l privat appropriatio ownershi or n, p e of e
%n the assumption that the reclamation contract was
Page 76 of 119
alienation. 8he contract in 7uestion merely calls for the reclamation of 9== hectares of land within the coastal waters of the city. :er se, it does not vest, alienate or
transfer ownership of land under the sea. 8he city merely
engaged the services of Cil6+state to reclaim the land for the city.
1egistration; Dee0 of *ortgage (199!)
answer or show up on the date of initial hearing, does not guarantee the success of the application. t is still incum!ent upon the applicant to prove with well nigh incontroverti!le evidence that he has ac7uired a title to the land that is fit for registration. A!sent such registra!le title, it is the clear duty
of the Land Iegistration Court to dismiss the application
and declare the land as pu!lic land. An application for land registration is a proceeding in rem. ts main o!/ective is to esta!lish the status of the res
How do you register now a deed of mortgage of a parcel of

land originally registered under the #panish &ortgage Law?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
a. After the #panish &ortgage Law was a!rogated !y :.E. F<5 on Ce!ruary $G, $<-G, all lands covered !y #panish titles that were not !rought under the 8orrens system within si" $G; months from the date thereof have !een considered as
"unregistered private lands."
under the Iegalian doctrine or has ac7uired the character of

a private property. applicant to
whether it is still part of our pu!lic domain as presumed t is the duty of the
overcome that presumption with sufficient evidence. 1eme0ies; 7%0icial 1econstit%tion of =itle (199-) n $<F<, the heirs of Gavino, who died on August $=, $<F-,
8hus, a deed of mortgage affecting land originally registered
under the #panish &ortgage Law is now governed !y the
filed a petition for reconstitution of his lost or destroyed
system of registration of transactions or instruments affecting unregistered land under #ection $<J of the Ievised Administrative Code as amended !y Act 'o. 99JJ. Lnder this law, the instrument or transaction affecting unregistered land is entered in a !oo0 provided for the purpose !ut the
registration thereof is purely voluntary and does not adversely affect third persons who have a !etter right.
8orrens 8itle to a parcel of land in +rmita, &anila. 8his was

opposed !y &arilou who claimed ownership of the said
land !y a series of sales. #he claimed that Gavino had sold the property to Nernardo way !ac0 in $<J$ and as evidence
Eeclaration in the name of Gavino. 8hen she presented two deeds of sale duly registered with the Iegister of Eeeds, the
first one e"ecuted !y Nernardo in $<AJ selling the same
thereof, she presented a 8a" Eeclaration in $<JF in the name of Nernardo, which cancelled the previous 8a"
!. Ny recording and registering with the Iegister of Eeeds

of the place where the land is located, in accordance with Act 99JJ. However, :.E. F<5 re7uired holders of #panish
title to !ring the same under the 8orrens #ystem within G

months from its effectivity on Ce!ruary $G, $<-G.
property to Carlos, and the second one e"ecuted !y Carlos in $<G9, selling the same property to her. #he also claimed that she and her predecessors in interest have !een in
possession of the property since $<JF. f you were the /udge, how will you decide the petition?
1eme0ies; 7%0icial Confirmation; )mperfect =itle (199()
%n 3une 9=, $<FG, A filed in the I8C of A!ra an
+"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
application for registration of title to a parcel of land under
f were the /udge, will give due course to the petition of
:. E. 'o. $A5<, claiming that since 3une $5, $<JA, he has !een in open, continuous, e"clusive and notorious possession and occupation of said parcel of land of the
the heirs of Gavino despite the opposition of &arilou for
pu!lic domain which was aliena!le and disposa!le, under a !ona fide claim of ownership. After issuance of the notice
of initial hearing and pu!lication, as re7uired !y law, the petition was heard on 3uly 5<, $<F-. %n the day of the hearing no!ody !ut the applicant appeared. 'either was
the following reasons: a. 3udicial reconstitution of a certificate of title under IA. 'o. 5G parta0es of a land registration proceeding and is perforce a proceeding in rem. t denotes restoration of an e"isting instrument which has !een lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. 8he purpose of same reproduced, after proceedings. n the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. !. f the Court goes !eyond that purpose, it acts without
or in e"cess of /urisdiction. 8hus, where the 8orrens reconstitution of title or any document is to have the
there anyone who opposed the application. 8hereupon, on motion of the applicant, the I8C issued an order of general
default and allowed the applicant to present his evidence. 8hat he did. %n #eptem!er 9=, $<F<, the I8C dismissed
ADs application for lac0 of sufficient evidence. A appealed to

the Court of Appeals. 8he appellant urged that the I8C erred in dismissing his
8itle sought to !e reconstituted is in the name of Gavino, the court cannot receive evidence proving that
&arilou is the owner of the land. &arilouDs dominical
application for registration and in not ordering registration of his title to the parcel of land in 7uestion despite the fact that there was no opposition filed !y any!ody to his application. Eid the I8C commit the error attri!uted to it?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
claim to the land should !e ventilated in a separate civil action !efore the Iegional 8rial Court in its capacity as
a court of general /urisdiction.
REFERENCES$ !eirs of Pe(ro Pinate /s. Dula0. 9+: SCRA 9-;-< 29==<3> 8una4an /s. CF9 Ce'u 8ranc% ?I. =: SCRA :29=+<3>
Repu'lic /s. IAC. 9,: SCRA @-*@@ 29=++3> Mar4olles /s. CA* -A<
SCRA :<=> Repu'lic us* Feliciano* 9B+ SCRA =-B.
'o, the I8C did not commit the error attri!uted to it. n an application for 3udicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to pu!lic agricultural land under #ection JF
of the :u!lic Land Act, the lac0 of opposition and the
1eme0ies; 4roce0%re; Cons%lta (199!)

(hat is the procedure of consulta when an instrument is
denied registration?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
conse7uent order of default against those who did not
Page 77 of 119
$. 8he Iegister of Eeeds shall notify the interested party in writing, setting forth the defects of the instrument or
the legal ground denying the relied upon for
registration, and advising that if he is not agreea!le to

such ruling, he withdrawing the may, without
documents from the Iegistry, elevate the matter !y Consulta to the Administrator of the Land Iegistration
Authority *LIA.. (ithin five VA. days from receipt of notice 5. of denial, Iegister of Eeeds concerned and pay the consulta fee.
*a. is not the proper remedy, !ecause Huey is an innocent purchaser for value. 8he proper recourse is for Louie to go after Eewey for damages !y reason of the fraudulent registration and su!se7uent sale of the land. f Eewey is insolvent, Louie may file a claim against the Assurance Cund (Ae"rs o*
e%ro 5o'e@ v. Fe Castro 3$4 SCRA 791 [$000] +"t"n, S's.
An action for reconveyance against Huey
2%.arte v. CA, 3$3
!"l. 46$, 46( [1996]).
the party6in6interest shall file his Consulta with the After receipt of the Consulta and
9. payment of the
corresponding fee the Iegister of Eeeds ma0es an annotation of the pending consulta at the !ac0 of the
certificate of title. 8he Iegister of Eeeds then elevates the J. case to the
LIA Administrator with certified records thereof and a

summary of the facts and issues involved. 8he LIA Administrator then conducts A. hearings after due notice or may /ust re7uire parties to su!mit their memoranda. After hearing, the LIA Administrator issues G. an order
*!. action prescri!es in ten *$=. years, not within one *$. year when a petition for the reopening of the registration decree may !e filed. 8he action for reconveyance is distinct from the petition to reopen the decree of registration *Grey Al!a v. Ee la Cru1, $- :hil. J< 2$<$=M.. 8here is no need to reopen the registration proceedings, !ut the property should /ust !e reconveyed to the real owner.
8he action for reconveyance is !ased on implied or constructive trust, which prescri!es in ten *$=. years from
>es, the remedy will prosper !ecause the
prescri!ing the step to !e ta0en or the memorandum to !e made. His resolution in consulta shall !e conclusive
and !inding upon all Iegisters of Eeeds unless
the date of issuance of the original certificate of title. 8his rule assumes that the defendant is in possession of the land. (here it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the land, the action for reconveyance would !e in the nature of a suit for 7uieting for the title which action is imprescripti!le (Fav"%
v. Malay, 318 SCRA (11 [1999]).
reversed on appeal !y the Court of Appeals or !y the

#upreme Court. *#ection $$-, :.E. $A5<.. 8he procedure of consulta is a mode of appeal from denial !y the Iegister of Eeeds of the registration of the instrument to the Commissioner of Land
1eme0ies; 1econve"ance; Elements (1999) Iommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel of land in Pue1on City. %ne year later Iachelle, the legitimate
owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent registration
Iegistration. U
(ithin five days from receipt of the notice of denial,
o!tained !y Iommel. #he filed a complaint against Iommel for reconveyance and caused the annotation of a notice of Iommel now invo0es the indefeasi!ility of his title
lis pendens on the certificate of title issued to Iommel.
the interested party may elevate the matter
!y consulta
to the Commissioner of Land Iegistration who shall
enter an order prescri!ing the step to !e ta0en or memorandum to !e made. Iesolution in consulta shall
!e !inding upon all Iegisters of Eeeds provided that
considering that one year has already elapsed from its issuance. He also see0s the cancellation of the notice of Lis pendens. (il Iachell l eDs
suit for reconveyance prosper? +"plain.
the party in interest may appeal to the Court of Appeals

within the period prescri!ed *#ec. $$-, :.E. $A5<.. 1eme0ies; 1econve"ance vs. 1eopening of a Decree;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, IachelleDs suit will prosper !ecause all elements for an action for reconveyance are present, namely: a. claiming dominical rights over Iachelle is the same land. !. Iommel procured his title to the land !y fraud. c. 8he action was !rought within the statutory period of four *J. years from discovery of the fraud and not later
than ten *$=M years from the date of registration of IommelDs title.
d. 8itle to the land has not passed into the hands of an
4rescriptive 4erio0 ('##() Louie, !efore leaving the country to train as a chef in a five6 star hotel in 'ew >or0, L.#.A., entrusted to his first6degree cousin Eewey an application for registration, under the Land Iegistration Act, of a parcel of land located in Nacolod City. A year later, Louie returned to the :hilippines and discovered that Eewey registered the land and o!tained an %riginal Certificate of 8itle over the property in his
EeweyOs name. Compounding the matter, Eewey sold the
innocent purchaser for value. Iommel can invo0e the indefeasi!ility of his title if Iachelle had filed a petition to reopen or review the decree of registration. Nut Iachelle instead filed an ordinary action in personam for reconveyance. n the latter action, indefeasi!ility is not a valid defense !ecause, in filing such action, Iachelle is not see0ing to nullify nor to impugn the indefeasi!ility of IommelDs title. #he is only as0ing the court to compel Iommel to reconvey the title to her as the
legitimate owner of the land.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
land to Huey, an innocent purchaser for value. Louie promptly filed an action for reconveyance of the parcel of
land against Huey. s the action pursued !y Louie the proper remedy? *a.
Assuming that reconveyance is the *!. proper remedy, will the action prosper if the case was filed !eyond one year, !ut within ten years, from the entry of the decree of registration? AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Page 78 of 119
>es. 8he property registered is deemed to !e held in trust for the real owner !y the person in whose name it is registered. 8he 8orrens system was not designed to shield
one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and
8his action does not prescri!e. (ith respect to :ercivalDs action for reconveyance, it would have prescri!ed, having !een filed more than ten *$=. years after registration and the inherent infirmity of the latterDs title. Lnder the facts,
thus holds the title in !ad faith. ()alstro& v.
issuance of an %.C.8. in the name of &elvin, were it not for the statute of limitations will not apply to :ercival !ecause
Ma'a -r., (; .R 3838(, $9 -an. 1990) as +"te% "n Mart"ne@, F., S.&&ary o* SC
Fe+"s"ons, -an.ary to -.ne, 1990, '. 379],
1eme0ies; 1econve"ance; 4rescriptive 4erio0 (1997) %n $= #eptem!er $<GA, &elvin applied for a free patent
&elvin 0new that a part of the land covered !y his title actually !elonged to :ercival. #o, instead of nullifying in
covering two lots 6 Lot A and Lot N 6 situated in #antiago,

sa!ela. Lpon certification !y the :u!lic Land nspector
that &elvin had !een in actual, continuous, open, notorious, e"clusive and adverse possession of the lots since $<5A, the Eirector of Land approved &elvinDs application on =J 3une
$<G-. %n 5G Eecem!er $<G-, %riginal Certificate of 8itle *%C8. 'o. :655-- was issued in the name of &elvln.
toto the title of &elvin, the court, in the e"ercise of e7uity and /urisdiction, may grant prayer for the reconveyance of Lot N to :ercival who has actually possessed the land under a claim of ownership since $<J-. After all, if &elvinDs title is declared void a! initio and the land is reverted to the pu!lic
domain, :ercival would /ust the same !e entitled to
preference right to ac7uire the land from the government.

Nesides, well settled is the rule that once pu!lic land has !een in open, continuous, e"clusive and notorious ownership for the period prescri!ed !y #ection JF of the in contemplation of law ac7uired the character of private
%n - #eptem!er $<-$, :ercival filed a protest alleging that

Lot N which he had !een occupying and cultivating since
possession under a !onafide claim of ac7uisition of :u!lic Land Act, the same ipso /ure ceases to !e pu!lic and land. 8hus, reconveyance of the land from &elvin to :ercival would !e the !etter procedure,
(#"tale vs. Anore, 90 !"l. 877C ena, 5an% T"tles an% Fee%s, 198$, a,e 4$()
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
$<J- was included in the Cree :atent issued in the name of &elvin. 8he Eirector of Lands ordered the investigation of
:ercivalDs protest. 8he #pecial nvestigator who conducted
the investigation found that :ercival had !een in actual cultivation of Lot N since $<J-. %n 5F 'ovem!er $<FG, the #olicitor General filed in !ehalf of the Iepu!lic of the :hilippines a complaint for
cancellation of the free patent and the %C8 issued in the name of &elvin and the reversion of the land to pu!lic domain on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation in
8he action of the #olicitor General should prosper, considering that the doctrine of indefeasi!ility of title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud. A certificate
of title cannot !e used as shield to perpetuate fraud. 8he #tate is not !ound !y the period of prescription stated in
A/an"lla, 1$4
SCRA 378)
#ec. 9F of Act J<G. (F"re+tor o* 5an%s vs.
o!taining the free patent. %n the same date, :ercival sued &artin for the reconveyance of Lot N.
8he action for reconveyance filed !y :ercival may still
&elvin filed his answers interposing the sole defense in

!oth cases that the Certificate of 8itle issued in his name
innocent third party for value (Fa/lo .s. Co.rt

o* A''eals. $$6 SCRA 618), and provided that the action
prosper provided that the property has not passed to an
!ecame incontroverti!le and indefeasi!le upon the lapse of

one year from the issuance of the free patent. Given the circumstances, can the action of the #olicitor General and the case for reconveyance filed !y :ercival possi!ly prosper?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
is filed within the prescriptive period of ten years (Tale was filed !y
vs. Co.rt o* A''eals. $08 SCRA $66). #ince the action
:ercival $< years after the issuance of &elvinDs title, it is
" f fraud !e discovered in the application which led to the

issuance of the patent and Certificate of 8itle, this 8itle
!ecomes ipso facto null and void. 8hus, in a case where a person who o!tained a free patent, 0nowingly made a false
statement of material and essential facts in his application
su!mitted that the same is already !arred !y prescription. AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE" *to second part of 7uestion. 8he action for reconveyance filed !y :ercival will prosper, !ecause the land has ceased to !e pu!lic land and has !ecome private land !y open, continuous, pu!lic, e"clusive possession under a !ona fide claim of ownership for more
than thirty years, and :ercival is still in possession of the property at present. His action for reconveyance can !e
for the same, !y stating therein that the lot in 7uestion was part of the pu!lic domain not occupied or claimed !y any other person, his title !ecomes ipso facto canceled and
conse7uently rendered null and void."
considered as an action to 7uiet title, which does not
prescri!e if the plaintiff is in possession of the property.

(<lv",a v. CA. ;R 1048013. <+to/er $1, 1993)
" t is to the pu!lic interest that one who succeeds n fraudulently ac7uiring title to pu!lic land should not !e
1eme0ies; 1eopening of a Decree; Elements (199')

(hat are elements allowance a decree
allowed to !enefit therefrom and the #tate, through the
the essential re7uisites or for the of the reopening or review of of
#olicitor General, may file the corresponding action for annulment of the patent and the reversion of the land involved to the pu!lic domain" (F"nero .s.
F"re+tor o* 5an%sC Paya/an vs. Re'./l"+ 563330(,86$06 (3C F"re+tor o*
5an%s .s. Aon. $96(4.)
registration?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he essential elements are: *$. that the petitioner has a real
e%ro Sa&son An"&as, 563(68$, 36
or dominical right) *5. that he has !een deprived thereof through fraud) *9. that the petition is filed within one *$.
year from the issuance of the decree) and *J. that the
property has not yet !een transferred to an innocent
Page 79 of 119
purchaser QR./l"+o vs. <rellana 30 SCRA 711C

>/.%an vs. ;"l
47 SCRA 1().
!P$I!'AL E2$E'#E# A'(WE":
Administrative Code of $<F- which prohi!its officers and employees of the government from purchasing directly or
:etition for review of the Eecree of Iegistration. A remedy
indirectly any property sold !y the government for
e"pressly provided in #ection 95 of :. E. 'o. $A5< *formerly #ection 9F. Act J<G., this remedy has the following elements:
nonpayment of any ta", fee or other pu!lic charge.
a. petition must filed !y person 8he !e a claiming dominical or other real rights to the land registered in !. 8he registration of the land in the name of respondent
was *not the name of respondent.
*a. s the sale to 3uan valid? f so, what is the effect of the ssuance of the Certificate of 8itle to &aria? *!. f the sale is void, may 3uan recover the :$=,===.==? f
not, why not?
*c. f the sale is void, did it not nevertheless, operate to

divert &aria of her ownership? f it did, who then is the
constructive. fraud, which must !e e"trinsic. Craud is
procured /ust
!y
means
of
actual,
owner of the property?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
actual if the registration was made through deceit or any other intentional act of downright dishonesty to
enrich oneself at the e"pense of another. t is e"trinsic when it is something that was not raised, litigated and
passed upon in the main proceedings.
A. 8he sale of the land to 3uan is not valid, !eing contrary to law. 8herefore, no transfer of ownership of the land was effected from the delin7uent ta"payer to him. 8he original certificates of title o!tained !y &aria thru a free patent grant
from the Nureau of Lands under Chapter , , CA $J$ is
c. 8he petition must !e filed within one *$. year from the
date of the issuance of the decree.
8itle to the land has not passed
valid !ut in view of her delin7uency, the said title is su!/ect

to the right of the City Government to sell the land at pu!lic auction. 8he issuance of the %C8 did not e"empt the land from the ta" sales. #ection JJ of :.%. 'o. $A5<
d. to an
nnocent purchaser for value *Li!udan vs. Gil, JA\ #CIA 5-,
$<-5., Iu!lico vs. %rrelana. 9= #CIA A$$, $<G<.) I:

vs. CA, A- G. I 'o. J=J=5. &arch $G, $<F-.. =orrens "stem vs. 1ecor0ing of Evi0ence of =itle (199!)
provides that every registered owner receiving a Certificate

of 8itle shall hold the same free from an encum!rances,
su!/ect to certain e"emptions.

N. 3uan may recover !ecause he was not a party to the
Eistinguish the 8orrens system of land registration from the system of recording of evidence of title.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
violation of the law. C. 'o, the sale did not divest &aria of her title precisely !ecause the sale is void. t is as good as if no sale ever too0 place. n ta" sales, the owner is divested of his land initially upon award and issuance of a Certificate of #ale, and finally after the lapse of the $ year period from date of registration, to
8h #>#8+& a. e 8%II+'# %C LA'E I+G #8IA8 %' is a system for the registration of title to
the land. 8hus, under this system what is entered in the
Iegistry of Eeeds, is a record of the ownerDs estate or
interest in the land, unli0e the system under the #panish
&ortgage Law or the system under #ection $<J of the Ievised Administrative Code as amended !y Act 99JJ
where only the evidence of such title is recorded. n the latter system, what is recorded is the deed of conveyance from hence the ownerDs title emanatedWand not the title
sufficient in form and effects to convey the property. &aria remained owner of the land until another ta" sale is to !e performed in favor of a 7ualified !uyer.
redeem, upon e"ecution !y the treasurer of an instrument
itself. !. 8orrens system of land registration is that which is prescri!ed in Act J<G *now :E $A5<., which is either 3udicial or 7uasi6/udicial. #ystem or recording of evidence of title is merely the registration of evidence of ac7uisitions of land with the Iegister of Eeeds, who annotates the same on the e"isting title, cancels the old one and issues a new title !ased on the document presented for registration.
C!'$"AC$(
Consens%al vs. 1eal Contracts; Ein0s of 1eal Contracts
(1993) Eistinguish consensual from real contracts and name at least four *J. 0inds of real contracts under the present law. 29B;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
/nregistere0 Lan0 (1991) &aria +nri7ue1 failed to pay the realty ta"es on her unregistered agricultural land located in &agdugo, 8oledo City. n $<F<, to satisfy the ta"es due, the City sold it at pu!lic auction to 3uan &iranda, an employee at the
C%'#+'#LAL C%'8IAC8# are those which are perfected !y mere consent *Art. $9$A. Civil Code.. I+AL C%'8IAC8# are those which are perfected !y the delivery of the o!/ect of the o!ligation. *Art. $9$G, Civil Code.
+"amples of real deposit, pledge, contracts are
8reasurerDs %ffice of said City, whose !id at :$=,===.== was the highest. n due time, a final !ill of sale was e"ecuted in
his favor.
commodatum and simple loan *mutuum..
Consi0eration; @ali0it" ('###)
&aria refused to turn6over the possession of the property to

3uan alleging that *$. she had !een, in the meantime, granted
Lolita was employed in a finance company. Necause she
a free patent and on the !asis thereof an %riginal Certificate of 8itle was issued to her, and *5. the sale in favor of 3uan is
void from the !eginning in view of the provision in the
could not account for the funds entrusted to her, she was charged with estafa and ordered arrested. n order to secure her release from /ail, her parents e"ecuted a promissory note
to pay the finance company the amount allegedly misappropriated !y their daughter. 8he finance company
Page 80 of 119
CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics (Year 19902006) then e"ecuted an affidavit of desistance which
led to the withdrawal of the information against Lolita and her release from /ail. 8he parents failed to comply with their
promissory note and the finance company sued them for specific performance. (ill the action prosper or not? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he action will prosper. 8he promissory note e"ecuted !y LolitaDs parents is valid and !inding, the consideration !eing the e"tinguishment of LolitaDs civil lia!ility and not the
stifling of the criminal prosecution.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
with the consent of the parties and the o!/ect of contract !eing present, a perfected contract of option was created.
&y answer will not !e the same as to damages. &arvin will !e lia!le for damages for !reach of contract of option. (ith the payment of the consideration for the option given, and
(San M",.el, In+. v. A.an,, ;.R. 0o. 13($90, -.ly 31, $000) Lnder Article $$-= of the Civil Code, those who in
the performance guilty of of their o!ligation
are
contravention thereof, as in this case, when &arvin did not

give Carlos the agreed period of ten days, are lia!le for
8he action will not prosper !ecause the consideration for the promissory note was the non6 prosecution of the
damages.
criminal case for estafa. 8his cannot !e done anymore !ecause the information has already !een filed in court and to do it is illegal. 8hat the consideration for the promissory
note is the stifling of the criminal prosecution is evident
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
from the e"ecution !y the finance company of the affidavit of desistance immediately after the e"ecution !y LolitaDs
parents of the promissory note. 8he consideration !eing
&y answer will not !e the same if Carlos paid &arvin :$=,===.== !ecause an option contract was perfected. 8hus, if &arvin withdrew the offer prior to the e"piration of the $=6day period, he !reached the option contract. *Article $95J, Civil Code. +) S.''os"n, t!at Carlos a++e'te% t!e o**er /e*ore Marv"n +o.l% +o&&.n"+ate !"s 9"t!%ra9al t!ereo*1 F"s+.ss t!e le,al +onseN.en+es. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
illegal, the promissory note is invalid and may not !e

enforced !y court action. Contract of Option; Elements ('##9)
A contract to construct the house of Carlos is perfected.
&arvin offered to construct the house of Carlos for a very

reasona!le price of :<==,===.==, giving the latter $= days
within which to accept or re/ect the offer. %n the fifth day, !efore Carlos could ma0e up his mind, &arvin withdrew his
offer . a)
Contracts are perfected !y mere consent manifested !y the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. (;o&e@ v. Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 1$0(4(, Se'te&/er $1, $000)
Lnder Article $9$A of the Civil Code, Carlos and &arvin are !ound to fulfill what has !een e"pressly stipulated and all
)!at "s t!e e**e+t o* t!e 9"t!%ra9al o* Marv"nDs
o**er1 ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he withdrawal of &arvinDs offer will cause the offer to cease in law. Hence, even if su!se7uently accepted, there
conse7uences thereof. Lnder Article $$G-, if &arvin would refuse to construct the house, Carlos is entitled to have the
construction !e done !y a third person at the e"pense of
could !e no concurrence of the offer and the
acceptance. n the a!sence of concurrence of offer and acceptance, there
&arvin. &arvin in that case will !e lia!le for damages under Article $$-=. )ne<istent Contracts vs. 2nn%llable Contracts ('##!) Eistinguish !riefly !ut clearly !etween ne"istent contracts and annulla!le contracts.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
can !e no consent. (5a.%"+o v. Ar"as Ro%r",.e@, ;.R.
0o. 16730, Mar+! 31, 19$$) (ithout consent, there is no perfected contract for the construction of the house of Carlos. (Salon,a v. 8arrales, ;.R. 0o. 56 4(088, -.ly 10, 1981) Article $9$F of the Civil Code provides that there can
!e no contract unless the following re7uisites concur: *$.
'+4 #8+'8 C%'8IAC8# are considered as not having

!een entered into and, therefore, void o! initio. 8hey do
consent of the parties) *5. o!/ect certain which is the su!/ect

matter of the contract) and *9. cause of the o!ligation.
&arvin will not !e lia!le to pay Carlos any damages for withdrawing the offer !efore the lapse of the period
not create any o!ligation and cannot !e ratified or validated, as there is no agreement to ratify or validate. %n the other hand, A''LLLANL+ or ,% EANL+ C%'8IAC8# are
valid until invalidated !y the court !ut may !e ratified. n
granted. n this case, no consideration was given !y Carlos for the option given, thus there is no perfected contract of
option for lac0 of cause of o!ligation. &arvin cannot !e
held to have !reached the contract. 8hus, he cannot !e held

lia!le for damages.
/) )"ll yo.r ans9er /e t!e sa&e "* Carlos 'a"% Marv"n

10,000.00 as +ons"%erat"on *or t!at o't"on1 23'la"n. ($4 )
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
ine"istent contracts, one or more re7uisites of a valid contract are a!sent. n anulla!le contracts, all the elements of a contract are present e"cept that the consent of one of the contracting parties was vitiated or one of them has no capacity to give consent.
.at%re of Contracts; Obligatoriness (1991)
&y answer will !e the same as to the perfection of the contract for the construction of the house of Carlos. 'o perfected contract arises !ecause of lac0 of consent. (ith
Ioland, a !as0et!all star, was under contract for one year to play6for6play e"clusively for Lady Love, nc. However, even !efore the !as0et!all season could open, he was offered a
more attractive pay plus fringes !enefits !y #weet 8aste, nc. Ioland accepted the offer and transferred to #weet
the withdrawal of the offer, there could !e no concurrence

of offer and acceptance.
8aste. Lady Love sues Ioland and #weet 8aste for !reach of contract. Eefendants claim that the restriction to play for
Lady Love alone is void, hence, unenforcea!le, as it
Page 81 of 119
constitutes an undue interference with the right of Ioland to enter into contracts and the impairment of his freedom
to play and en/oy !as0et!all.
any payment at all. :rintado has also a standing contract with pu!lisher :u!lico for the printing of $=,=== volumes
Can Ioland !e !ound !y the contract he entered into with Lady Love or can he disregard the same? s he lia!le at all?
How a!out #weet 8aste? s it lia!le to Lady Love?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
of school te"t!oo0s. #uplico was aware of said printing contract. After printing $,=== volumes, :rintado also fails to
perform under its printing contract with :u!lico. #uplico sues :rintado for the value of the unpaid deliveries under
Ioland is !ound !y the contract he entered into with Lady Love and he cannot disregard the same, under the principles of o!ligatoriness of contracts. %!ligations arising from
contracts have the force of law !etween the parties.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
their order agreement. At the same time :u!lico sues :rintado for damages for !reach of contract with respect to
their own printing agreement. n the suit filed !y #uplico,
:rintado counters that: *a. #uplico cannot demand payment

for deliveries made under their order agreement until
>es, Ioland is lia!le under the contract as far as Lady Love is concerned. He is lia!le for damages under Article $$-= of the Civil Code since he contravened the tenor of his o!ligation. 'ot !eing a contracting party, #weet 8aste is not !ound !y the contract !ut it can !e held lia!le under Art. $9$J. 8he !asis of its lia!ility is not prescri!ed !y contract
!ut is founded on 7uasi6delict, assuming that #weet 8aste
#uplico has completed performance under said contract) *!. #uplico should pay damages for !reach of contract) and *c.
with :u!lico should !e lia!le for :rintadoOs !reach of his
contract with :u!lico !ecause the order agreement !etween #uplico and :rintado was for the !enefit of :u!lico. Are the contentions of :rintado tena!le? +"plain your answers as to each contention. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
0new of the contract. Article $9$J of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall !e lia!le for damages to the other
contracting party.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
having failed to pay for the printing paper covered !y the

delivery invoices on time, #uplico has the right to cease ma0ing further delivery. And the latter did not violate the
'o, the contentions of :rintado are untena!le. :rintado
order agreement (Inte,rate% a+Ea,"n,
t is assumed that Lady Love 0new of the contract. 'either

Ioland nor #weet 8aste would !e lia!le, !ecause the restriction in the contract is violative of Article $9=G as
Cor'orat"on v. Co.rt o* A''eals, (333 SCRA 1(0, ;.R. 0o. 11711(, -.ne 8, [$000]).
#uplico cannot !e held lia!le for damages, for !reach of
!eing contrary to law morals, good customs, pu!lic order or pu!lic policy.
contract, as it was not he who violated the order agreement, !ut :rintado. #uplico cannot !e held lia!le for :rintadoOs !reach of entered into !y and !etween :rintado and :u!lico. 8heirs is
contract with :u!lico. He is not a party to the agreement not a stipulation pour atrui. 2Aforesaid; #uch contracts do
.at%re of Contracts; 4rivit" of Contract (199-)
Naldomero leased his house with a telephone to 3ose. 8he lease contract provided that 3ose shall pay for all electricity,
water and telephone services in the leased premises during the period of the lease. #i" months later. 3ose surreptitiously vacated the premises. He left !ehind unpaid telephone !ills for overseas telephone calls amounting to over :5=,===.==. Naldomero refused to pay the said !ills on the ground that
3ose had already su!stituted him as the customer of the telephone company. 8he latter maintained that Naldomero
could not affect third persons li0e #uplico !ecause of the
!asic civil law principle of relativity of contracts which provides that contracts can only !ind the parties who
entered into it, and it cannot favor or pre/udice a third
person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with 0nowledge thereof. (Inte,rate%
a+Ea,"n, Cor'orat"on
v. CA, s.'ra.)
remained as his customer as far as their service contract was

concerned, notwithstanding the lease contract !etween
1escission of Contracts; 4roper 4art" (199-)
Naldomero and 3ose. (ho is correct, Naldomero or the

telephone company? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n Eecem!er $<FA, #alvador and the #tar #emiconductor Company *##C. e"ecuted a Eeed of Conditional #ale
8he telephone company is correct !ecause as far as it is
wherein the former agreed to sell his 5,=== s7uare meter lot in Cainta, Ii1al, to the latter for the price of :$,===,===.==,
concerned, the only person it contracted with was

Naldomero. 8he telephone company has no contract with
3ose. Naldomero cannot su!stitute 3ose in his stead without Naldomero is, therefore, lia!le under the contract.
paya!le :$==,===.== down, and the !alance G= days after the s7uatters in the property have !een removed. f the s7uatters are not removed within si" months, the
the consent of the telephone company *Art. $5<9, 'CC..
:$==,===.== down payment shall !e returned !y the vendor to the vendee,

#alvador filed e/ectment suits against the s7uatters, !ut in not leave. n August, $<FG, #alvador offered to return the :$==,===.== down payment to the vendee, on the ground
.at%re of Contracts; 1elativit" of Contracts ('##') :rintado is engaged in the printing !usiness. #uplico supplies printing paper to :rintado pursuant to an order
spite of the decisions in his favor, the s7uatters still would
agreement under which #uplico !inds himself to deliver the same volume of paper every month for a period of $F
months, with :rintado in turn agreeing to pay within G=
days after each delivery. #uplico has !een faithfully

delivering under the order agreement for $= months !ut
that he is una!le to remove the s7uatters on the property. ##C refused to accept the money and demanded that #alvador e"ecute a deed of a!solute sale of the property in its favor, at which time it will pay the !alance of the price.
ncidentally, the value of the land had dou!led !y that time.
thereafter stopped doing so, !ecause :rintado has not made
Page 82 of 119
#alvador consigned the : $==,===.== in court, and filed an

action for rescission of the deed of conditional sale, plus damages. (ill the action prosper? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
property of H>, his wife may also sue to recover it under
Article 5=$G of the Civil Code if she and the family needed
the money for support.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE" 345:
'o, the action will not prosper. 8he action for rescission
may !e !rought only !y the aggrieved party to the contract.
#ince it was #alvador who failed to comply with his conditional o!ligation, he is not the aggrieved party who
A. *5.. &rs. H> cannot file a suit to recover what her hus!and lost. Art 5=$J of the Civil Code provides that any
loser in a game of chance may recover his loss from the
may file the #tar
the
action
for
rescission
!ut
winner, with legal interest from the time he paid the amount
lost. 8his means that only he can file the suit. &rs. H>
#emiconductor Company. 8he company, however, is not
opting to rescind the contract !ut has chosen to waive
cannot recover as a spouse who has interest in the a!solute

community property or con/ugal partnership of gains, !ecause under Art. $$-*-M of the Camily Code, losses are
#alvadorDs compliance with the condition which it can do
under Art. $AJA, 'CC.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he action for rescission will not prosper. 8he !uyer has
!orne e"clusively !y the loser6spouse. 8herefore, these cannot !e charged against a!solute community property or
not committed any !reach, let alone a su!stantial or serious one, to warrant the rescissionSresolution sought !y the
con/ugal partnership of gains. 8his !eing so, &rs. H> has

no interest in law to prosecute and recover as she has no
vendor. %n the contrary, it is the vendor who appears to have failed to comply with the condition imposed !y the
legal standing in court to do so. Con0itional Obligations ('###) :edro promised to give his grandson a car if the latter will
contract the fulfillment of which would have rendered the

o!ligation to pay the !alance of the purchase price
demanda!le. Curther, far from !eing una!le to comply with what is incum!ent upon it, ie., pay the !alance of the price 6
the !uyer has offered to pay it even without the vendor
pass the !ar e"aminations. (hen his grandson passed the said e"aminations, :edro refused to give the car on the
ground that the condition was a purely potestative one. s he correct or not? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
having complied with the suspensive condition attached to

the payment of the price, thus waiving such condition as
well as the G=6day term in its favor 8he stipulation that the :$==,===.== down payment shall !e returned !y the vendor
'o, he is not correct. Cirst of all, the condition is not purely potestative, !ecause it does not depend on the sole will of
one of the parties. #econdly, even if it were, it would !e
to the vendee if the s7uatters are not removed within si" months, is also a covenant for the !enefit of the vendee, which the latter has validly waived !y implication when it
valid !ecause it depends on the sole will of the creditor *the donee. and not of the de!tor *the donor..
offered to pay the !alance of the purchase price upon the

e"ecution of a deed of a!solute sale !y the vendor. *Art. $AJA, 'CC.
Are the following o!ligations valid, why, and if they are
Con0itional Obligations ('##()
valid, when is the o!ligation demanda!le
in each case?
a. f the de!tor promises to pay as soon as he has the
!-LI&A$I!'(
2leator" Contracts; Bambling ('##!) A. &r. H> lost :$==,=== in a card game called Iussian the time the session ended.
!. means to pay)
f the de!tor promises to pay when he li0es) c. f the de!tor promises to pay when he !ecomes a lawyer) with cancer, does not die within one year. AB
po0er, !ut he had no more cash to pay in full the winner at
d. f the de!tor promises to pay if his son, who is sic0

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
winner, two wee0s thereafter. Nut he failed to do so despite
He promised to pay :4, the
the lapse of two months, so :4 filed in court a suit to collect the amount of :A=,=== that he won !ut remained
8he o!ligation is valid. t is an o!ligation *a. su!/ect to an indefinite period !ecause the de!tor !inds himself to
pay when his means permit him to do so *Article $$F =,
unpaid. (ill the collection suit against H> prosper? Could &rs. H> file in turn a suit against :4 to recover the
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
:$==,=== that her hus!and lost? Ieason. *AB.
A. $. 8he suit !y :4 to collect the !alance of what he won from H> will not prosper. Lnder Article 5=$J of the Civil
Code, no action can !e maintained !y the winner for the
period, and when the definite period as set !y the court arrives, the o!ligation to pay !ecomes demanda!le <Article $$<-, 'CC..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'CC.. (hen the creditor 0nows that the de!tor already has the means to pay, he must file an action in court to fi" the
collection of what he has won in a game of chance.

Although po0er may depend in part on a!ility, it is
fundamentally a game of chance. 5. f the money paid !y H> to :4 was con/ugal or community property, the wife of H> could sue to recover it
!ecause Article $$-*-. of the Camily Code provides that losses in gam!ling or !etting are !orne e"clusively !y the
8he o!ligation ?to pay when he li0es@ is a suspensive condition the fulfillment of which is su!/ect to the sole will of the de!tor and, therefore the conditional
*!.
o!ligation is void. *Article $$F5, 'CC..

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*c.
condition, i.e. the future and uncertain event of his
8he o!ligation is valid. t is su!/ect to a suspensive
loser6spouse. Hence, con/ugal or community funds may not !e used to pay for such losses. f the money were e"clusive
!ecoming a lawyer. 8he performance of this o!ligation does
Page 83 of 119
not depend on the will of the de!tor !ut solely also on other factors outside the de!torOs control.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
condition of +va passing the $<<F Nar +"aminations.
Hence, upon +vaDs passing the Nar, the rights of the other
!uyer terminated and +va ac7uired ownership of the
8he o!ligation is valid. 8he death of the *d. son of cancer within one year is made a negative suspensive
property.
condition to his ma0ing the payment. 8he o!ligation is demanda!le if the son does not die within one year *Article
$$FA, 'CC..
8he sale to another person !efore +va could !uy it from
Con0itional Obligations; 4romise (1997) n two separate documents signed !y him, 3uan ,alentino "o!ligated" himself each to &aria and to :erla, thus 6
D8o &aria, my true love, you my
&anuel is valid, as the contract !etween &anuel and +va is a mere promise to sell and +va has not ac7uired a real right over the land assuming that there is a price stipulated in the contract for the contract to !e considered a sale and there was delivery or tradition of the thing sold.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
o!ligate myself to give
*!. 'o, she is not entitled to the rentals collected !y &anuel
one and only horse when feel li0e t." 6 and 6
!ecause at the time they accrued and were collected, +va
was not yet the owner of the property.

I"($ AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
D8o :erla, my true sweetheart, o!ligate myself to pay you

the :A==.== owe you when feel li0e it."
Assuming that +va is the one entitled to !uy the house and
lot, she is not entitled to the rentals collected !y &anuel !efore she passed the !ar e"aminations. (hether it is a are deemed imposed A for the seller to deliver the o!/ect sold and for the !uyer to pay the price. Nefore the
&onths passed !ut 3uan never !othered to ma0e good his promises. &aria and :erla came to consult you on whether
or not they could recover on the !asis of the foregoing settings. (hat would your legal advice !e?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
contract of sale or a contract to sell, reciprocal prestations
would advise &aria not to !other running after 3uan for

the latter to ma0e good his promise. 28his is !ecause a promise is not an actiona!le wrong that allows a party to recover especially when she has not suffered damages
happening of the condition, the fruits of the thing and the interests on the money are deemed to have !een mutually
compensated under Article $$F-.
resulting from such promise. A promise does not create an o!ligation on the part of 3uan !ecause it is not something which arises from a contract, law, 7uasi6 contracts or 7uasi6 delicts *Art, $$A-.;. Lnder Art. $$F5, 3uanDs promise to
&aria is void !ecause a conditional o!ligation depends upon the sole will of the o!ligor.
Lnder Art. $$GJ, there is no o!ligation on the part of &anuel to deliver the fruits *rentals. of the thing until the o!ligation to deliver the thing arises. As the suspensive condition has not !een fulfilled, the o!ligation to sell does not arise. E<ting%is&ment; 2ssignment of 1ig&ts ('##1)
As regards e"press
:erla,
the
document
is
an
8he sugar cane planters of Natangas entered into a long6
ac0nowledgment of a de!t, and the promise to pay what he owes her when he feels li0e it is e7uivalent to a promise to pay when his means permits him to do so, and is deemed to !e one with an indefinite period under Art. $$F=. Hence the amount is recovera!le after :erla as0s the court to set the
period as provided !y Art. $$<-, par. 5. Con0itional Obligations; 1esol%tor" Con0ition (1999)
term milling contract with the Central A1ucarera de Eon
:edro nc. 8en years later, the Central assigned its rights to the said milling contract to a 8aiwanese group which would ta0e over the operations of the sugar mill. 8he planters filed an action to annul the said assignment on the ground that the 8aiwanese group was not registered with the Noard of nvestments. (ill the action prosper or not? +"plain !riefly. *AB.
2Note$ T%e .uestion presupposes 7no)le(4e an( re.uires t%e application of t%e pro/isions of t%e Omni'us In/estment Co(e*
n $<<-, &anuel !ound himself to sell +va a house and lot which is !eing rented !y another person, if +va passes the
$<<F !ar e"aminations. Luc0ily for +va, she passed said e"aminations .
)%ic% properl0 'elon4s to Commercial la)3

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*a.
another !efore +va passed the $<<F !ar e"aminations, is such sale valid? (hy? *5B.
#uppose &anuel had sold the same house and lot to
8he action will prosper not on the ground invo0ed !ut on the ground that the farmers have not given their consent to the assignment. 8he milling contract imposes reciprocal
o!ligations on the parties. 8he sugar central has the o!ligation to mill the sugar cane of the farmers while the
*!.
house and lot, is she entitled to the rentals collected !y
Assuming that it is +va who is entitled to !uy said
&anuel !efore she passed the $<<F !ar e"aminations? (hy? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
latter have the o!ligation to deliver their sugar cane to the sugar central. As to the o!ligation to mill the sugar cane, the
sugar central is a de!tor of the farmers. n assigning its
*a. >es, the sale to the other person is valid as a sale with a resolutory condition !ecause what operates as a suspensive
condition for +va operates a resolutory condition for the
rights under the contract, the sugar central will also transfer to the 8aiwanese its o!ligation to mill the sugar cane of the farmers. 8his will amount to a novation of the contract !y
su!stituting the de!tor with a third party. Lnder Article
!uye r.
I"($ AL$E"'A$IVE A'( WE":
>es, the sale to the other person is valid. However, the !uye ac7uire th propert su!/ec resolutor r y t y d e to a
$5<9 of the Civil Code, such su!stitution cannot ta0e effect without the consent of the creditor. 8he formers, who are creditors as far as the o!ligation to mill their sugar cane is
Page 84 of 119
concerned, may annul such assignment for not having given

their consent thereto.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
+ven 2if; assuming that there was a perfect right of first
8he assignment is valid !ecause there is a!solute freedom to transfer the credit and the creditor need not get the
refusal, compensation did not ta0e place !ecause the claim is unli7uidated. E<ting%is&ment; Compensation vs. 4a"ment (1993)
Eefine compensation as a mode of e"tinguishing an
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
consent of the de!tor. He only needs to notify him.

E<ting%is&ment; Ca%se of 2ction ('##!)
o!ligation, and distinguish it from payment. 25B; C%&:+'#A8 %' is a mode of e"tinguishing to the concurrent amount, the o!ligations of those persons who in
their own right are reciprocally de!tors and creditors of
84 filed a suit for e/ectment against NE for non6 payment of condominium rentals amounting to :$A=,===. Euring the pendency of the case, NE offered and 84 accepted the full amount due as rentals from NE, who then filed a motion to dismiss the e/ectment suit on the ground that the action is already e"tinguished. s NEOs contention correct? (hy or
why not? Ieason. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
each other (Tolent"no, 1991 e%., '. 367,

+"t"n, $ Castan 760
an% 8ran+"a vs. IAC. 16$ SCRA (73). t involves the simultaneous !alancing of two o!ligations in order to
e"tinguish them to the e"tent in which the amount of one is

covered !y that of the other.
+"t"n, 8 Manresa 401).
NEDs contention is not correct. 84 can still maintain the
(Fe 5eon, 199$ e%., '. $$1,
suit for e/ectment. 8he acceptance !y the lessor of the payment !y the lessee of the rentals in arrears even during
the pendency of the e/ectment case does not constitute a
:A>&+'8 means not only delivery of money !ut also
waiver or a!andonment of the e/ectment case. (S'o.ses

Cl.tar"o v. CA, $16 SCRA 341 [199$]).
performance of an o!ligation *Article $595, Civil Code.. n payment, capacity to dispose of the thing paid and capacity
to receive payment are re7uired for de!tor and creditor, respectively: in compensation, such capacity is not necessary, !ecause the compensation operates !y law and
E<ting%is&ment; Compensation ('##')
#toc0ton is a stoc0holder of Core Corp. He desires to sell his shares in Core Corp. n view of a court suit that Core Corp. has filed against him for damages in the amount of : $= million, plus attorneyOs fees of : $ million, as a result of
statements pu!lished !y #toc0ton which are allegedly
not !y the act of the parties. n payment, the performance must !e complete) while in compensation there may !e
partial e"tinguishment of an o!ligation *8olentino, supra.
defamatory !ecause it was calculated to in/ure and damage

the corporationOs reputation and goodwill. 8he articles of incorporation of Core Corp. provide for a right of first refusal in favor of the corporation.
E<ting%is&ment; CompensationD et?Off; ;an+s (1993)
4, who has a savings deposit with > Nan0 in the sum of
the sum of :F==.===.== which has !ecome due. (hen 4
:$,===,===.== incurs a loan o!ligation with the said Nan0 in
Accordingly, #toc0ton notice to the
gave
written
tries to withdraw his deposit, > Nan0 allows only :5==.===.== to !e withdrawn, less service charges, claiming
corporation of his offer to sell his shares of : $= million.
8he response of Core corp. was an acceptance of the offer in the e"ercise of its rights of first refusal, offering for the
purpose payment in form of compensation or set6off against the amount of damages it is claiming against him,
that compensation has e"tinguished its o!ligation under the

savings account to the concurrent amount of 4Ds de!t. 4 contends that compensation is improper when one of the
e"clusive of the claim for attorneyOs fees. #toc0ton re/ected the offer of the corporation, arguing that compensation !etween the value of the shares and the amount of damages demanded !y the corporation cannot legally ta0e effect. s
de!ts, as here, arises from a contract of deposit. Assuming that the promissory note signed !y 4 to evidence the loan does not provide for compensation !etween said loan and his savings deposit, who is correct? 29B;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
> !an0 is correct. An. $5F-, Civil Code, does not apply. All
the re7uisites of Art. $5-<, Civil Code are present. n the case of ;.llas vs. 0G [6$ !"l. 719), the #upreme Court
#toc0ton correct? Give reason for your answer. *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE"(:
#toc0ton is correct. 8here is no right of compensation

!etween his price of :$= million and Core Corp.Os
held: "8he Civil Code contains provisions regarding

compensation *set off. and 8hese portions deposit. of :hilippine law provide that compensation shall ta0e place when two persons are reciprocally creditor and de!tor of each other. n this connection, it has !een held that the
unli7uidated claim for damages. n order that compensation may !e proper, the two de!ts must !e li7uidated and
demanda!le. 8he case for the : $=million damages !eing still pending in court, the corporation has as yet no claim
which is due and demanda!le against #toc0ton.

A'!$.E" )AI' A'(WE":
relation e"isting !etween a depositor and a !an0 is that of
creditor and de!tor, " " " As a general rule, a !an0 has a
8he right of first refusal was not perfected as a right for the reason that there was a conditional acceptance e7uivalent to a counter6offer consisting in the amount of damages as !eing credited on the purchase price. 8herefore, compensation did not result since there was no valid right
of first refusal *Art. $J-A X $9$<, 'CC.
A'!$.E" )AI' A'(WE":
right of set off of the deposits in its hands for the payment of any inde!tedness to it on the part of a depositor." Hence, compensation too0 place !etween the mutual o!ligations of 4 and > !an0.
paid :9==,===.==, his father died. (hen the administrator of his fatherDs estate re7uested payment of the !alance of :5==,===.==. Arturo replied that the same had !een
E<ting%is&ment; Con0onation ('###) Arturo !orrowed :A==,===.== from his father. After he had
Page 85 of 119
condoned !y his father as evidenced !y a notation at the
8he action will not prosper. 8he e"istence of inflation or
!ac0 of his chec0 payment for the :9==,===.== reading: " n full payment of the loan". (ill this !e a valid defense in an
action for collection? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
deflation re7uires an official declaration !y the Nang0o #entral ng :ilipinas.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
t depends. f the notation "in full payment of the loan" was

written !y ArturoDs father, there was an implied condonation of the !alance that discharges the o!ligation.
8he unlawful detainer action will prosper. t is a given fact

in the pro!lem, that there was inflation, which caused the
n such case, the notation is an act of the father from which

condonation may !e inferred. 8he condonation !eing
implied, it need not comply with the formalities of a donation to !e effective. 8he defense of full payment will,
therefore, !e valid.
e"change rate to dou!le. #ince the contract itself authori1es the increase in rental in the event of an inflation or devaluation of the :hilippine peso, the dou!ling of the monthly rent is reasona!le and is therefore a valid act under the very terms of the contract. NrianDs refusal to pay is thus
a ground for e/ectment.
(hen, however, the notation was written !y Arturo himself. t merely proves his intention in ma0ing that payment !ut in no way does it !ind his father (?a& v. CA, ;.R
0o. 104($6. 11 8e/r.ary 1999). n such case, the notation
was not the act of his father from which condonation may !e inferred. 8here !eing no condonation at all the defense of full payment will not !e valid.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
E<ting%is&ment; Loss (199!) Eino sued Nen for damages !ecause the latter had failed to deliver the anti7ue &arcedes Nen1 car Eino had purchased from Nen, which wasW !y agreementWdue for delivery on Eecem!er 9$, $<<9. Nen, in his answer to EinoDs complaint, said EinoDs claim has no !asis for the suit, !ecause as the car was !eing driven to !e delivered to Eino on 3anuary $, $<<J, a rec0less truc0 driver had rammed into the &ercedes
Nen1. 8he trial court dismissed EinoDs complaint, saying
f the notation was written !y ArturoDs father, it amounted to an e"press condonation of the !alance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to !e valid under the 5nd paragraph of Article $5-= of the 'ew Civil Code. #ince the amount of the !alance is more than A,=== pesos, the acceptance !y Arturo of the condonation must also !e in writing under Article -JF. 8here !eing no acceptance in
writing !y Arturo, the condonation is void and the o!ligation to pay the !alance su!sists. 8he defense of full payment is, therefore, not valid. n case the notation was
NenDs o!ligation had indeed, !een e"tinguished !y force ma/eure. s the trial court correct?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
a. 'o. Article $5G5, 'ew Civil Code provides, "An o!ligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate
thing shall !e e"tinguished if it should !e lost or destroyed without the fault of the de!tor, and !efore he has incurred
in delay.
not written !y ArturoDs father, the answer is the same as the

answers a!ove.
!. 8he /udgment of the trial court is incorrect. Loss of the

thing due !y fortuitous events or force ma/eure is a valid
defense for a de!tor only when the de!tor has not incurred
delay. +"tinguishment of lia!ility for fortuitous event E<ting%is&ment; E<traor0inar" )nflation or Deflation ('##1)
%n 3uly $, $<<F, Nrian leased an office space in a !uilding

for a period of five years at a rental rate of :$,===.== a
month. 8he contract of lease contained the proviso that "in case of inflation or devaluation of the :hilippine peso, the monthly rental will automatically !e increased or decreased depending on the devaluation or inflation of the peso to the dollar." #tarting &arch $, 5==$, the lessor increased the rental to :5,=== a month, on the ground of inflation proven !y the fact that the e"change rate of the :hilippine peso to
the dollar had increased from :5A.==[Q$.== to :A=.==[Q$.==. Nrian refused to pay the increased rate and an action for unlawful detainer was filed against him. (ill the action prosper? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
re7uires that the de!tor has not yet incurred any delay. n the present case, the de!tor was in delay when the car was destroyed on 3anuary $, $<<9 since it was due for delivery
on Eecem!er 9$, $<<9. *Art. $5G5 Civil Code.
c. t depends whether or not Nen the seller, was already in

default at the time of the accident !ecause a demand for
him to deliver on due date was not complied with !y him.

8hat fact not having !een given in the pro!lem, the trial
court erred in dismissing EinoDs complaint. Ieason: 8here is default ma0ing him responsi!le for fortuitous events
including the assumption of ris0 or loss.
8he unlawful detainer action will not prosper. +"traordinary inflation or deflation is defined as the sharp decrease in the purchasing power of the peso. t does not necessarily refer to the e"change rate of the peso to the dollar. (hether or not there e"ists an e"traordinary inflation or deflation is for the courts to decide. 8here !eing no showing that the
purchasing reduced power of the peso had
has !een sent to him prior to the accident, then we must
f on the other hand Nen was not in default as no demand
distinguish whether the price has !een paid or not. f it has !een paid, the suit for damages should prosper !ut only to noted that Nen, the seller, must !ear the loss on the for damages as the loss of the car was not imputa!le to his fault or fraud. n any case, he can recover the value of the car from the party whose negligence caused the accident. f no price has !een paid at all, the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the complaint.
E<ting%is&ment; Loss; )mpossible ervice (199() principle of res perit (omino. He cannot !e held answera!le ena!le the !uyer to recover the price paid. t should !e
!een
tremendously, there could !e no inflation that would /ustify

the increase in the amount of rental to !e paid. Hence, Nrian could refuse to pay the increased rate.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Page 86 of 119
n $<-$, A!le Construction, nc. entered into a contract with 8ropical Home Eevelopers, nc. where!y the former
would !uild for the latter the houses within its su!division.
8he cost of each house, la!or and materials included, was :$==,===.==. Cour hundred units were to !e constructed
has !een e"tinguished !y the novation or e"tinction of the principal o!ligation insofar as third parties are concerned.
within five years. n $<-9, A!le found that it could no longer continue with the /o! due to the increase in the price
of oil and its derivatives and the concomitant worldwide spiraling of prices of all commodities, including !asic raw materials re7uired for the construction of the houses. 8he
E<ting%is&ment; 4a"ment (1999) n $<F9 :H LCI+E 8 e"tended loans to Iivett6#trom

&achineries, nc. *I ,+8886#8I%&., consisting of L#Q$= &illion for the cost of machineries imported and
directly paid !y :H8LCI+E 8, and A &illion in cash

paya!le in installments over a period of ten *$=. years on the
cost of development had risen to unanticipated levels and to such a degree that the conditions and factors which formed the original !asis of the contract had !een totally changed. A!le !rought suit against 8ropical Homes praying that the
Court relieve it of its o!ligation. s A!le Construction entitled to the relief sought?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!asis of the value thereof computed at the rate of e"change of the L.#. dollar vis6]6vis the :hilippine peso at the time of payment.
I ,+886#8I%& made payments on !oth loans which if !ased on the rate of e"change in $<F9 would have fully
settled the loans.

:H LCI+E 8 contends that the payments on !oth loans
>es, the A!le Construction. nc. is entitled to the relief sought under Article $5G-, Civil Code. 8he law provides: "(hen the service has !ecome so difficult as to !e
should !e !ased on the rate of e"change e"isting at the time
manifestly !eyond the contemplation of the parties, the

o!ligor may also !e released therefrom, in whole or in part." E<ting%is&ment; .ovation (199!)
of payment, which rate of e"change has !een consistently
increasing, and for which reason there would still !e a

considera!le !alance on each loan.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
s the contention of :H LCI+E 8 correct? Eiscuss fully. As regards the loan consisting of dollars, the contention of
:H LCI+E 8 is correct. t has to !e paid in :hilippine
n $<-F, No!!y !orrowed :l,===,===.== from Chito paya!le

in two years. 8he loan, which was evidenced !y a promissory note, was secured !y a mortgage on real
property. 'o action was filed !y Chito to collect the loan or

to foreclose the mortgage. Nut in $<<$, No!!y, without
receiving any amount from Chito, e"ecuted another promissory note which was worded e"actly as the $<-F promissory note, e"cept for the date thereof, which was the
date of its e"ecution.
currency computed on the !asis of the e"change rate at the 8 &+ %C :A>&+'8 of each installment, as held in Palalo v. 5.@, 34 SCRA 33(. As regards the :A &illion loan in :hilippine pesos, :H LCI+E 8 is wrong. 8he payment
thereof cannot !e measured !y the peso6 dollar e"change rate. 8hat will !e violative of the Lniform Currency Act *IA, A5<; which prohi!its the payment of an o!ligation
$. Can Chito demand payment on the $<<$ promissory note in $<<J?
which, although to !e paid in :hilippine currency, is
measured !y a foreign currency. ( alan+a v.

CA, $38 SCRA 793).
5. Can Chito foreclose the real estate mortgage if No!!y fails to ma0e good his o!ligation under the $<<$ promissory note?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. >es, Chito can demand payment on the $<<$ promissory

note in $<<J. Although the $<-F promissory note for :$
Liabilit"; Lease; 7oint Liabilit" ('##1) Cour foreign medical students rented the apartment of 8helma for a period of one year. After one semester, three
million paya!le two years later or in $<F= !ecame a natural
o!ligation after the lapse of ten *$=. years, such natural o!ligation can !e a valid consideration of a novated
of them returned to their home country and the fourth transferred to a !oarding house. 8helma discovered that
promissory note dated in $<<$ and paya!le two years later,

or in $<<9. All the elements of an implied real novation are present:
they left unpaid telephone !ills in the total amount of :F=,===.==. 8he lease contract provided that the lessees shall pay for the telephone services in the leased premises.
a. an old valid o!ligation)

!. a new valid o!ligation) c. capacity of the parties) d. animus novandi or intention to novate) and
amount of the unpaid telephone !ills, !ut the latter is willing to pay only one fourth of it. (ho is correct? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8helma demanded that the fourth student pay the entire
8he fourth student is correct. His lia!ility is only /oint,

hence, pro rata. 8here is solidary lia!ility only when the
e. 8he old and the new o!ligation should !e incompati!le with each other on all material points *Article $5<5.. 8he two promissory notes cannot stand together, hence, the
period of prescription of ten *$=. years has not yet lapsed.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
o!ligation e"pressly so states or when the law or nature of

the o!ligation re7uires solidarity *Art. $5=-, CC.. 8he
contract of lease in the pro!lem does not, in any way, stipulate solidarity. Liabilit"; oli0ar" Liabilit" (1993) 3oey, 3ovy and 3o/o are solidary de!tors under a loan
5. 'o. 8he mortgage !eing an accessory contract prescri!ed with the loan. 8he novation of the loan, however, did not e"pressly include the mortgage, hence, the mortgage is e"tinguished under Article $5<G of the 'CC. 8he contract
o!ligation of :9==,===.== which has fallen due. 8he creditor
has, however, condoned 3o/oDs entire share in the de!t. #ince 3ovy has !ecome insolvent, the creditor ma0es a
demand on 3oey to pay the de!t.
Page 87 of 119
$. How much, if any, may 3oey !e compelled to pay? 25B;
5. 8o what e"tent, if at all, can 3o/o !e compelled !y 3oey to contri!ute to such payment? 29B;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
promissory note as a result of the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. *c. 8he third defense of > is untena!le. > is a surety of 4 and the e"tra/udicial demand against the principal de!tor is not inconsistent with a /udicial demand against the surety. A suretyship may co6e"ist with a mortgage. *d. 8he fourth defense of > is untena!le. > is lia!le for the entire prestation since > incurred a solidary o!ligation with 4.
(Arts. 1$0(, 1$16. 1$7$ an% $04( C"v"l Co%eC G"+ol Sav"n,s an% 5oan Asso+"ates vs. ;."n!a9a 188 SCRA 64$)
$. 3oey can !e compelled to pay only the remaining !alance
of :5==.===, in view of the remission of 3o/oDs share !y the

creditor. *Art. $5$<, Civil Code.
5. 3o/o can !e compelled !y 3oey to contri!ute :A=.=== Art. $5$-. par. 9, Civil Code provides. "(hen one of the solidary
de!tors cannot, !ecause of his insolvency, reim!urse his share to the de!tor paying the o!ligation, such share shall
!e !orne !y all his co6de!tors, in proportion to the de!t of each."
Liabilit"; oli0ar" Obligation; *%t%al B%arant" ('##()
#ince the insolvent de!torDs share which 3oey paid was :$==,===, and there are only two remaining de!tors 6
namely 3oey and 3o/o 6 these two shall share e7ually the !urden of reim!ursement. 3o/o may thus !e compelled !y 3oey to contri!ute :A=.===.==. Liabilit"; oli0ar" Obligation (199')
A,N,C,E, and + made themselves solidarity inde!ted to 4 for the amount of :A=,===.==. (hen 4 demanded payment from A, the latter refused to pay on the following grounds. a.
!.
N is only $G years old.

C has already !een condoned !y 4
c. E is insolvent.
n 3une $<FF, 4 o!tained a loan from A and e"ecuted with > as solidary co6ma0er a promissory note in favor of A for the sum of :5==,===.==. 8he loan was paya!le at
:5=,===.== with interest monthly within the first wee0 of
the consent of the other four co6de!tors. #tate the effect of each of the a!ove defenses put up !y A on his o!ligation to pay 4, if such defenses are found to !e tru e.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE"(:
d. + was given !y 4 an e"tension of G months without
each month !eginning 3uly $<FF until maturity in April

$<F<. 8o secure the payment of the loan. 4 put up as security a chattel mortgage on his car, a 8oyota Corolla
sedan. Necause of failure of 4 and > to pay the principal
avail himself of any defense which personally !elongs to a solidary co6de!tor, !ut only as to the share of that co6 de!tor.
A may avail the minority of N as a defense, !ut only for NOs share of : $=,===.==. A solidary de!tor may
*a.
amount of the loan, the car was e"tra/udicially foreclosed. A

ac7uired the car at ADs highest !id of :$5=,===.== during the auction sale.
After several fruitless letters of demand against 4 and >, A sued > alone for the recovery of :F=.===.==
from the nature of the o!ligation and of those which are
A may avail of the condonation !y 4 of COs *!. share of : $=, ===.==. A solidary de!tor may, in actions filed !y the creditor, avail himself of all defenses which are derived
constituting the
deficiency. > resisted the suit raising the following defenses:
a. 8hat > should not !e lia!le at all !ecause 4 was not

sued together with >. !. 8hat the o!ligation has !een paid completely !y ADs ac7uisition of the car through "dacion en pago" or payment !y cession.
personal to him or pertain to his own share. (ith respect to those which personally !elong to others, he may avail
himself thereof only as regards that part of the de!t for
which the latter are responsi!le. *Article $555, 'CC.. A may not interpose the defense of *c. insolvency of E as a defense. Applying the principle of mutual guaranty among solidary de!tors, A guaranteed the payment of EOs share and of all the other co6de!tors. Hence, A cannot avail of the defense of EOs insolvency. 8he e"tension of si" *G. months given !y 4 *d. to + may !e availed of !y A as a partial defense !ut only for the share of +, there is no novation of the o!ligation !ut only an act of li!erality granted to + alone.
c. 8hat > should not !e held lia!le for the deficiency of :F=,===.== !ecause he was not a co6 mortgagor in the e"ecuted !y 4 alone as owner and mortgagor. d. 8hat assuming that > is lia!le, he should only pay the proportionate sum of :J=,===.==. Eecide each defense with reasons.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
chattel mortgage of the car which contract was
*a. 8his first defense of > is untena!le. > is still lia!le as solidary de!tor. 8he creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary de!tors. 8he demand against one does not
preclude further demand against the others so long as the de!t is not fully paid.
Loss of t&e t&ing 0%e; ,orce *a5e%re ('###)

Rristina !rought her diamond ring to a /ewelry shop for
cleaning. 8he /ewelry shop undertoo0 to return the ring !y Ce!ruary $, $<<<." (hen the said date arrived, the /ewelry
shop informed Rristina that the 3o! was not yet finished. 8hey as0ed her to return five days later. %n Ce!ruary G,
*!. 8he second defense of > is untena!le. > is still lia!le. 8he chattel mortgage is only given as a security and not as payment for the de!t in case of failure to pay. > as a solidary co6ma0er is not relieved of further lia!ility on the
$<<<, Rristina went to the shop to claim the ring, !ut she was informed that the same was stolen !y a thief who
entered the shop the night !efore. Rristina filed an action
Page 88 of 119
for damages against the /ewelry shop which put up the

defense of force ma/eure. (ill the action prosper or not?
Nernie A=B of the total payments made. (R"llo

v. Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 1$734(, -.ne 19,199()
*AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he action will prosper. #ince the defendant was already in default not having delivered the ring when delivery was demanded !y plaintiff at due date, the defendant is lia!le for
the loss of the thing and even when the loss was due to force ma/eure.
4erio0; %spensive 4erio0 (1991)
n a deed of sale of a realty, it was stipulated that the !uyer would construct a commercial !uilding on the lot while the
seller would construct a private passageway !ordering the
.on?4a"ment of 2morti>ations;
%b0ivision ;%"er; 8&en
5%stifie0 ('##9) Nernie !ought on installment a residential su!division lot from E+,LA'E. After having faithfully paid the installments for JF months, Nernie discovered that E+,LA'E had failed to develop the su!division in accordance with the approved plans and specifications
lot. 8he !uilding was eventually finished !ut the seller failed to complete the passageway as some of the s7uatters, who were already 0nown to !e there at the time they entered into the contract, refused to vacate the premises. n fact, prior to its e"ecution, the seller filed e/ectment cases against the s7uatters. 8he !uyer now sues the seller for specific performance with damages. 8he defense is that the o!ligation to construct the passageway should !e with a period which, incidentally, had not !een fi"ed !y them, hence, the need for fi"ing a /udicial period. (ill the action for specific performance of the !uyer against the seller prosper?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
within the time frame in the plan. He thus wrote a letter to

E+,LA'E informing it that he was stopping payment.
Conse7uently, E+,LA'E cancelled the sale and wrote Nernie, informing him that his payments are forfeited in its
favo r. a) ($4 )
)as t!e a+t"on o* F2#5A0F 'ro'er1 23'la"n.
'o. the action for specific performance filed !y the !uyer is premature under Art. $$<- of the Civil Code. f a period has
not !een fi"ed although contemplated !y the parties, the parties themselves should fi" that period, failing in which,
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, the action of E+,LA'E is not proper. Lnder #ection 59 of :residential Eecree 'o. <A-, otherwise 0nown as the
#u!division and Condominium NuyerDs :rotection Eecree, non6payment of amorti1ations !y the !uyer is /ustified if
the Court may!e as0ed to fi" it ta0ing into consideration the pro!a!le contemplation of the parties. Nefore the period is
fi"ed, an action for specific performance is premature.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
non6payment is due to the failure of the su!division owner to develop the su!division pro/ect according to the approved plans and within the limit for complying.
(2.,en"o v. Fr"lon, ;.R. 0o. 109404, -an.ary $$, 1996)
69., that the
t has !een held in Gorro&eo vs. CA (4( SCRA
#upreme Court allowed the simultaneous filing of action to
fi" the pro!a!le contemplated period of the parties where none is fi"ed in the agreement if this would avoid
/) tan+es. ($4)
F"s+.ss t!e r",!ts o* Gern"e .n%er t!e +"r+.&s6
multiplicity of suits. n addition, technicalities must !e su!ordinated to su!stantial /ustice.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Lnder :.E. 'o. <A-, a cancellation option is availa!le to Nernie. f Nernie opts to cancel the contract, E+,LA'E
8he action for specific performance will not prosper. 8he filing of the e/ectment suit !y the seller was precisely in
must reim!urse Nernie the total amount paid and the

amorti1ations interest, e"cluding delin7uency interest, plus
compliance with his o!ligations and should not, therefore, !e faulted if no decision has yet !een reached !y the Court on the matter.
interest at legal rate. (2.,en"o v. Fr"lon,

;.R. 0o. 109404,
-an.ary $$, 1996)
$"+($
E<press =r%st; 4rescription (1997) %n =$ 3anuary $<F=, Iedentor and Iemedies entered into an agreement !y virtue of which the former was to register a parcel of land in the name of Iemedies under the e"plicit covenant to reconvey the land to Iemigio, son of Iedentor,
upon the sonDs graduation from college. n $<F$, the land
+) S.''os"n, F2#5A0F !a% *.lly %evelo'e% t!e s./%"v"s"on /.t Gern"e *a"le% to 'ay *.rt!er "nstall&ents a*ter 4 years %.e to /.s"ness reverses.
F"s+.ss t!e r",!ts an% o/l",at"ons o* t!e 'art"es. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n this case, pursuant to #ection 5J of :.E. 'o. <A-, I.A. 'o. GAA5 otherwise 0nown as the Iealty nstallment Nuyer :rotection Act, shall govern. Lnder #ection 9 thereof,
Nernie is entitled: $. to pay without additional interest the unpaid installments due within a grace period of four *J.
was registered in the name of Iemedies. Iedentor died a year later or in $<F5. n &arch $<F9, Iemigio graduated from college. n Ce!ruary $<<5, Iemigio accidentally found a copy of the document so constituting Iemedies as the trustee of the land. n &ay $<<J, Iemigio
filed a case against Iemedies for the reconveyance of the
months or one month for every year of installment paid) 5. if the contract is cancelled, Nernie is entitled to the refund of the cash surrender value e7ual to A=B of the total
payments made.
E+,LA'E on the other hand has the right to cancel the

contract after 9= days from receipt !y Nernie of notice of cancellation. E+,LA'E is however o!liged to refund to
land to him. Iemedies, in her answer, averred that the decided?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
action already prescri!ed. How should the matter !e
Page 89 of 119
8he matter should !e decided in favor of Iemigio *trustee. !ecause the action has not prescri!ed. 8he case at !ar involves an e"press trust which does not prescri!e as long
as they have not !een repudiated !y the trustee (F"a@ vs.
;orr"+!o. 103 !"l, $61).
)mplie0 =r%st (1993) 3uan and his sister 3uana inherited from their mother two parcels of farmland with e"actly the same areas. Cor
$. 3uana has the right of action to recover *a. her one6half share in the proceeds of the sale with legal interest thereof, and *!. such damages as she may !e a!le to prove as having !een suffered !y her, which may include actual or compensatory damages as well as moral and e"emplary damages due to the !reach of trust and !ad faith (I&'er"al vs. CA, $79 SCRA 67). %f course, if the !uyer 0new of the co6ownership over the lot he was !uying, 3uana can see0 *c.
reconvenyance of her one6half share instead !ut she must
convenience, the 8orrens certificates of title covering !oth lots were placed in 3uanDs name alone. n $<<G, 3uan sold to an innocent purchaser one parcel in its entirety without the
0nowledge and consent of 3uana, and wrongfully 0ept for himself the entire price paid.
implead the !uyer as co6defendant and allege his !ad faith in purchasing the entire lot. Cinally, consistent with the
ruling in mperial us. CA. 3uana may see0 instead *d. a declaration that she is now the sole owner of the entire
$.
andSor the !uyer? K9B;
(hat rights of action, if any, does 3uana have against
remaining lot on the theory that 3uan has forfeited his one6 half share therein.
A##I$I!'AL A'(WE":
#ince the two lots have the same area, 5. suppose 3uana flies a complaint to have herself declared sole owner of the
entire remaining second lot, contending that her !rother had forfeited his share thereof !y wrongfully disposing of her undivided share in the first lot. (ill the suit prosper? 25B ;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$.
having fraudulently sold one of the two parcels which he partly held in trust for 3uanaDs !enefit. 3uana may claim
3uana can file an action for damages against 3uan for
actual or compensatory damage for the loss of her share in

the land) moral damages for the mental anguish, an"iety,
moral shoc0 and wounded feelings she had suffered)
$. (hen, for convenience, the 8orrens title to the two parcels of land were placed in 3oanDs name alone, there was created an implied trust *a resulting trust. for the !enefit of
3uana with 3uan as trustee of one6half undivided or ideal
e"emplary damage !y way of e"ample for the common good, and attorneyDs fees. 3uana has no cause of action against the !uyer who ac7uired the land for value and in good faith, relying on the transfer certificate showing that 3uan is the registered owner of the lan d.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
portion of each of the two lots. 8herefore, 3uana can file an action for damages against 3oan for having fraudulently sold
one of the two parcels which he partly held in trust for 3uanaDs !enefit. 3uana may claim actual or compensatory
5.
damage for the loss of her share in the land) moral damages
the entire remaining area will not prosper !ecause while 3uanDs act in selling the other lot was wrongful. t did not
3uanaDs suit to have herself declared as sole owner of
for the mental anguish, an"iety, moral shoc0 and wounded feelings she had suffered) e"emplary damage !y way of
e"ample for the common good, and attorneyDs fees.
have the legal effect of forfeiting his share in the remaining

lot. However, 3uana can file an action against 3uan for
3uana has no cause of action against the !uyer who ac7uired the land for value and in good faith, relying on the transfer certificate of title showing that 3uan is the registered owner
of the land.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
partition or termination of the co6ownership with a prayer that the lot sold !e ad/udicated to 3uan, and the remaining lot !e ad/udicated and reconveyed to her.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
$. Lnder Article J-G of the Civil Code, 3uana can file an
5. 8he suit will prosper, applying the ruling in mperial vs. CA cited a!ove. Noth law and e7uity authori1e such a result, said the #upreme Court.
#trictly spea0ing, 3uanaDs contention that her !rother had
action for 7uieting of title as there is a cloud in the title to

the su!/ect real property. #econd, 3uana can also file an
action for damages against 3uan, !ecause the settled rule is that the proper recourse of the true owner of the property
who was pre/udiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to !ring an action for damages against those who caused or employed the same. 8hird, since 3uana had the
forfeited his share in the second lot is incorrect. +ven if the

two lots have the same area, it does not follow that they
have the same value. #ince the sale of the first lot on the 8orrens title in the name of 3uan was valid, all that 3uana
right to her share in the property !y way of inheritance, she can demand the partition of the thing owned in common, under Article J<J of the Civil Code, and as0 that the title to
the remaining property !e declared as e"clusively hers.
may recover is the value of her undivided interest therein, plus damages. n addition, she can as0 for partition or
reconveyance of her undivided interest in the second lot, without pre/udice to any agreement !etween them that in
lieu of the payment of the value of 3uanaDs share in the first lot and damages, the second lot !e reconveyed to her.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
However, since the farmland was sold to an innocent purchaser for value, then 3uana has no cause of action
against the !uyer consistent with the esta!lished rule that
the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must !e respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed !y the seller in securing his title.
(2%.arte vs. CA,
$73 SCRA 391)
A##I$I!'AL A'(WE":
poc0eting the entire proceeds of the sale of the first lot is not a ground for divesting him of his rights as a co6owner not constitute, for the !enefit of 3uana, any of the modes of ac7uiring ownership under Art. -$5, Civil Code.
of the second lot. ndeed, such wrongdoing !y 3uan does
5. 8he suit will not prosper, since 3uanDs wrongful act of
Page 90 of 119
CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics
(Year 1990-2006)
=r%st; )mplie0 1es%lting =r%st (1999) n $<G=, &aureen purchased two lots in a plush su!division registering Lot $ in her name and Lot 5 in the name of her !rother (alter with the latterDs consent. 8he idea was to circumvent a su!division policy against the ac7uisition of more than one lot !y one !uyer. &aureen constructed a house on Lot $ with an e"tension on Lot 5 to serve as a guest house. n $<F-, (alter who had suffered serious !usiness losses demanded that &aureen remove the e"tension house since the lot on which the e"tension was !uilt was his property. n $<<5, &aureen sued for the reconveyance to her of Lot 5 asserting that a resulting trust was created when she had the lot registered in (alterDs name even if she paid the purchase price. (alter opposed the (+&&E($E# A'(WE": suit arguing that assuming the e"istence of a 8his is a trust case the of action an implied resulting f resulting of &aureen has trust. already (alter claims to have ac7uired ownership of the prescri!ed since ten years have already elapsed land or the if title he anchors his from !y the prescription registration of in his name. defense on e"tinctive prescription, the ten Eecide. Eiscuss fully. year period must !e rec0oned from $<Fwhen he demanded that &aureen remove the e"tension house on Lot 'o. 5 !ecause such demand amounts to an e"press repudiation of the trust and it was made 0nown 13, to &aureen. 8he action for reconveyance filed in 1994). $<<5 is not yet !arred !y prescription. (S'o.ses
A.an, v. Co.rt o* A''eals, Se't.
(ALE(
2ssignment of Cre0it vs. %brogation (199() :eter Co, a trader from &anila, has dealt !usiness with Allied Commodities in Hong0ong for five years. All through the years, :eter Co accumulated an inde!tedness of :A==,===.== with Allied Commodities. Lpon demand !y its agent in &anila, :eter Co paid Allied Commodities !y chec0 the amount owed. Lpon deposit in the payeeDs account in &anila, the chec0 was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Cor and in consideration of :$.==, Allied Commodities assigned the credit to Had/i Nutu who !rought suit against :eter Co in the I8C of &anila for recovery of the amount owed. :eter Co moved to dismiss the (ill :eter against CoDs defense of the a!sence of that complaint him on ground agreement a not su!rogation of creditor Had/i Nutu to was a real party in interest prosper? (+&&E($E# A'(WE": and, therefore, without legal capacity to sue and 'o, CoDs defense not prosper. 8his is not that he had not will agreed to a su!rogation of a case of su!rogation, !ut an assignment of creditor. credit. ASSI NMENT OF CREDIT is the process of transferring the right of the assignor to the assignee. 8he assignment may !e done either gratuitously or onerously, in which case, the assignment has an effect similar to that of a sale (0y+o Sales Cor'.v.GA 8"nan+e Cor'. ;.R 0o.(1694. A.,.16, 1991 $00 SCRA 63(). As a result of the assignment, the plaintiff ac7uired all the rights of the assignor including the right to sue in his own name as the legal assignee. n assignment, the de!torDs consent is not essential for the validity of the assignment
(Art. 16$4C 14(7. CCC Ro%r",.e@ v. CA, et al, ;. R 0o. 84$$0, Mar+! $7. 199$ $0( SCRA 773).
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
'o, the defense of :eter Co will not prosper. Had/i Nutu validly ac7uired his right !y an assignment of credit under Article $G5J of the Civil Code. However, the provisions on the contract of sale *Article $J-A Civil Code. will apply, and the transaction is covered !y the #tatute of Crauds. *Art. $J=9 par. *5. Civil Code. Con0itional ale vs. 2bsol%te ale (1997) Eistinguish !etween a conditional sale, on the one hand, and an a!solute sale, on the other hand.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
A C%'E 8 %'AL #AL+ is one where the vendor is granted the right to unilaterally rescind the contract predicated on the fulfillment or non6fulfillment, as the case may !e, of the prescri!ed condition. An AN#%LL8+ #AL+ is one where the title to the property is not reserved to the vendor or if the vendor is not granted the right to rescind the contract !ased on the fulfillment or non6 fulfillment, as the case may !e, of the prescri!ed condition.
Contract of ale vs. 2genc" to ell (1999) A granted N the e"clusive right to sell his !rand of &aong pants in sa!ela, the price for his merchandise paya!le within G= days from delivery, and promising N a commission of 5=B on all sales. After the delivery of the merchandise to N !ut !efore he could sell any of them, NOs store in sa!ela was completely !urned without his fault, together with all of ADs pants. &ust N pay A for his lost pants? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he contract !etween A and N is a sale not an agency to sell !ecause the price is paya!le !y N upon G= days from delivery even if N is una!le to resell it. f N were an agent, he is not !ound to pay the price if he is una!le to resell it. As a !uyer, ownership passed to N upon delivery and, under Art. $A=J of the Civil Code, the thing perishes for the owner. Hence, N must still pay the price. Contract of ale; *arital Comm%nit" 4ropert"; ,ormalities ('##-)
#pouses Niong and Linda wanted to sell their house. 8hey found a prospective !uyer, Iay. Linda negotiated with Iay for the sale of the property. 8hey agreed on a fair price of :5 &illion. Iay sent Linda a letter confirming his intention to !uy the property. Later, another couple, Nernie and +lena, offered a similar
house at a lower price of : $.A &illion. Nut Iay insisted on !uying the house of Niong and Linda for sentimental reasons. Iay prepared a deed of sale to !e signed !y the couple and a managerDs chec0 for :5 &illion. After receiving the :5 &illion, Niong signed the deed of sale. However, Linda was not a!le to sign it !ecause she was a!road. %n her return, she refused to sign the document saying she changed her mind. Linda filed suit for nullification of the deed of sale and for moral and e"emplary damages against Iay.
)"ll t!e s."t 'ros'er1 23'la"n. ($.74)

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Page 91 of 119
'o, the suit will not prosper. 8he contract of sale was perfected when Linda and Iay agreed on the o!/ect of the sale and the price 2Art. $J-A, 'ew Civil Code;. 8he consent of Linda has already !een given, as shown !y her agreement to the price of the sale. 8here is therefore consent on her part as the consent need not !e given in any specific form. Hence, her consent may !e given !y implication, especially since she was aware of, and participated in the sale of the property ( elayo v. CA, ;.R. 0o. 1413$3, -.ne 8, $007). Her action for moral and e"emplary damages will also not
prosper !ecause the case does not fall under any of those mentioned in Art. 55$< and 5595 of the Civil Code.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
n a C%'8IAC8 %C #AL+, ownership is transferred to the !uyer upon delivery of the o!/ect to him while in a
C%'8IAC8 8% #+LL, ownership is retained !y the seller

until the purchase price is fully paid. n a contract to sell,
delivery of the o!/ect does not confer ownership upon the !uyer. n a contract of sale, there is only one contract e"ecuted !etween the seller and the !uyer, while in a contract to sell, there are two contracts, first the contract to sell *which is a conditional or preparatory sale. and a
second, the final deed of sale or the principal contract which is e"ecuted after full payment of the purchase price.
8he suit will prosper. #ale of community property re7uires
written consent of !oth spouses. 8he failure or refusal of Linda to affi" her signature on the deed of sale, coupled with her e"press declaration of opposing the sale negates any valid consent on her part. 8he consent of Niong !y himself is insufficient to effect a valid sale of community
Ruwait, to occupy it. 8he relationship !etween > and A
Contract to ell; 2cceptance; 1ig&t of ,irst 1ef%sal (1991) A is the lessee of an apartment owned !y >. A allowed his married !ut employed daughter N, whose hus!and wor0s in soured. #ince he has no reason at all to e/ect A, >, in connivance with the City +ngineer, secured from the latter an order for the demolition of the !uilding. A immediately
filed an action in the Iegional 8rial Court to annul the order
property (Art. 96, 8a&"ly Co%eC A/alos v.

Ma+atan,ay, ;.R. 0o. 177043, Se'te&/er 30, $004).
Foes Ray !ave any +a.se o* a+t"on a,a"nst G"on, an% 5"n%a1 Can !e also re+over %a&a,es *ro& t!e s'o.ses1
23'la"n. ($.74) Considering that the contract has already !een perfected
and to en/oin its enforcement. > and A were a!le to forge a compromise agreement under which A agreed to a twenty percent *5=B. increase in the monthly rentals. 8hey further agreed that the lease will e"pire two *5. years later and that in the event that > would sell the property, either A or his
daughter N shall have the right of first refusal. 8he
and ta0en out of the operation of the statute of frauds, Iay can compel Linda and Niong to o!serve the form re7uired !y law in order for the property to !e registered in the name of Iay which can !e filed together with the action for the recovery of house 2Art. $9A- 'ew Civil Code;. n the alternative, he can recover the amount of 8wo million pesos
*:5,===,===.==. that he paid. %therwise, it would result in
Compromise Agreement was approved !y the court. #i" *G. the property to the ,isorro Iealty Corp. without notifying N. N then filed an action to rescind the sale in favor of the
corporation and to compel > to sell the property to her
months !efore the e"piration of the lease, A died. > sold
since under the Compromise Agreement, she was given the
solutio inde!iti or un/ust enrichment. Iay can recover moral damages on the ground that the
right of first refusal which, she maintains is a stipulation pour atrui under Article $9$$ of the Civil Code. s she
correct?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
action filed !y Linda is clearly an unfounded civil suit which

falls under malicious prosecution Q on+e v.
5e,as'", ;.R. 0o. (9184, May 6,199$).
N is not correct. Her action cannot prosper. Article $9$$
Contract to ell ('##1) Arturo gave Iichard a receipt which states:
re7uires that the third person intended to !e !enefited must communicate his acceptance to the o!ligor !efore the revocation. 8here is no showing that N manifested her
acceptance to > at any time !efore the death of A and !efore the sale. Hence, N cannot enforce any right under
%e&eipt Ieceived from Iichard as down payment for my $<<A

8oyota Corolla 59.............. with plate 'o. 4>H6$
the alleged stipulation pour atrui.
:A=.===.==
Nalance paya!le: $5S9=S=$........ #eptem!er $A, 5==$. *#gd.. Arturo Eoes this receipt evidence a contract to sell? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Do%ble ales ('##1) %n 3une $A, $<<A, 3esus sold a parcel of registered land to
:A= ===.==
3aime. %n 3une 9=, $<<A, he sold the same land to 3ose. (ho has a !etter right if: the first sale is registered ahead of the a. second sale, !. the second sale is registered ahead of the first sale, with 0nowledge of the latter? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
with 0nowledge of the latter. (hy? *9B.
t is a contract of sale !ecause the seller did not reserve
*a. 8he first !uyer has the !etter right if his sale was first second sale. 8he fact that he 0new of the second sale at the time of his registration does not ma0e him as acting in !ad faith !ecause the sale to him was ahead in time, hence, has a priority in right. (hat creates !ad faith in the case of dou!le sale of land is 0nowledge of a previous sale.
to !e registered, even though the first !uyer 0new of the
ownership until he was fully paid.
Contract to ell vs. Contract of ale (1997)
#tate the !asic difference *only in their legal effects. 6 Netween a contract to sell, on the one hand, and a contract
of sale, on the other.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
:age 92 of
$$<
!. 8he first !uyer is still to !e preferred, where the second sale is registered ahead of the first sale !ut with 0nowledge of the latter. 8his is !ecause the second !uyer, who at the time he registered his sale 0new that the property had already !een sold to someone else, acted in !ad faith.
*Article $AJJ, C.C.. Do%ble ales ('##!)
*5. years, or until 9 3une $<-9. t is further stated therein
3,, owner of a parcel of land, sold it to ::. Nut the deed of sale was not registered. %ne year later, 3, sold the parcel
again to II, who succeeded to register the deed and to
that should the ,endor *3uliet. fail to e"ercise her right to redeem within the said period, the conveyance shall !e deemed a!solute and irrevoca!le. Iomeo did not ta0e possession of the property. He did not pay the ta"es thereon. 3uliet died in 3anuary <-9 without having repurchased the property. Her only surviving heir, her son 4, failed to repurchase the property on or !efore 9 3une $<-9. n $<-A, learning of the sale, 4 filed an action for the nullification of the sale and for the recovery of the property on the ground that the so6called deed of a!solute sale e"ecuted !y his account the inade7uacy of the price and the failure of
Iomeo to ta0e possession of the property and to pay the Iomeo sold the property to > for :A=,===.==. Lpon
o!tain a transfer certificate of title over the property in his

own name.
(ho has a !etter right over the parcel of land, II or ::?

(hy? +"plain the legal !asis for your answer. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
mother was merely an e7uita!le mortgage, ta0ing into
t depends on whether or not II is an innocent purchaser

for value.
Lnder the 8orrens #ystem, a deed or instrument operated

only as a contract !etween the parties and as evidence of
authority to the Iegister of Eeeds to ma0e the registration. t is the registration of the deed or the instrument that is the operative act that conveys or affects the land. *#ec. A$, :.E.
'o. $A5<..
a!solute sale and that the document signed !y the former on 9 3une $<-9 was merely a promise to sell.
ta"es thereon. Iomeo and > maintain that there was a valid
a. f you were the 3udge, would you uphold the theory of

!. f you decide in favor of Iomeo and >, would you uphold the validity of the promise to sell?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
4?
n cases of dou!le sale of titled land, it is a well6 settled rule

that the !uyer who first registers the sale in good faith ac7uires a !etter right to the land. *Art. $AJJ, Civil Code..
:ersons dealing with property covered !y 8orrens title are

not re7uired to go !eyond what appears on its face.
(<rN."ola v. CA 386, SCRA 301, [$00$]C Fo&"n,o v. Ra+es 401
SCRA 19(, [$003]). 8hus, a!sent any showing
A. will not uphold the theory of 4 for the nullification of the sale and for the recovery of the property on the ground that the so6called sale was only an e7uita!le mortgage. An e7uita!le mortgage may arise only if, in truth, the sale was one with the right of repurchase. 8he facts of the case state that the right to repurchase was granted after the a!solute deed of sale was e"ecuted. Collowing the rule in Cr.@o vs.
Carr"a,a (1(4 SCRA 330), a deed of
that II 0new a!out, or ought to have 0nown the prior sale of the land to :: or that he acted in !ad faith, and !eing first to register
repurchase e"ecuted
independently of the deed of sale where the two stipulations are found in two instruments instead of one document, the
the sale, II ac7uired a good and a clean title to the property as against ::.
right of repurchase would amount only to one option granted !y the !uyer to #ince the the seller. contract
cannot !e upheld as a contract of sale with the right to repurchase, Art. $G=5 of the Civil Code on e7uita!le
E$%itable *ortgage (1991) %n 5= Eecem!er $<-=, 3uliet, a widow, !orrowed from
Iomeo :J,===.== and, as security therefore, she e"ecuted a

deed of mortgage over one of her two *5. registered lots
mortgage will not apply. 8he rule could have !een different if !oth deeds were e"ecuted on the same occasion or date,
in which case, under the ruling in spouses
Claravall v. CA (190 SCRA 439), the contract may still !e
which has a mar0et value of :$A,===.==. 8he document and the certificate of title of the property were delivered to
Iomeo.
sustained as an e7uita!le mortgage, given the circumstances e"pressed in
%n 5 3une $<-$, 3uliet o!tained an additional sum of :9,===

from Iomeo. %n this date, however, Iomeo caused the preparation of a deed of a!solute sale of the a!ove
Art. $G=5. 8he reserved right to repurchase is then deemed an original intention. N. f were to decide in favor of Iomeo and >, would
not uphold the validity of the promise to sell, so as to
property, to which 3uliet affi"ed her signature without first
reading the document. 8he consideration indicated is :-,===.==. #he thought that this document was similar to the first she signed. (hen she reached home, her son 4,
enforce it !y an action for specific performance. 8he
promise to sell would only amount to a mere offer and, therefore, it is not enforcea!le unless it was sought to !e
e"ercised !efore a withdrawal or denial thereof. +ven assuming the facts given at the end of the case, there
would have !een no separate consideration for such
after reading the duplicate copy of the deed, informed her

that what she signed was not a mortgage !ut a deed of a!solute sale. %n the following day, 9 3une $<-$, 3uliet,
accompanied !y 4, went !ac0 to Iomeo and demanded the reformation it, Iomeo prepared and signed a document wherein, as vendee in the deed of sale a!ove mentioned, he
o!ligated and !ound himself to resell the land to 3uliet or
promise to sell. 8he contract would at most amount to an option which again may not !e the !asis for an action for specific performance.
E$%itable *ortgage vs. ale ('##9)
her heirs and successors for the same consideration as reflected in the deed of sale *:-,===. within a period of two
%n 3uly $J, 5==J, :edro e"ecuted in favor of 3uan a Eeed of A!solute #ale over a parcel of land covered !y 8C8 'o.
Page 93 of 119
G5JA. t appears in the Eeed of #ale that :edro received
from 3uan :$5=,===.== as purchase price. However, :edro retained the ownerDs duplicate of said title. 8hereafter, 3uan, as lessor, and :edro, as lessee, e"ecuted a contract of lease over the property for a period of one *$. year with a monthly rental of :l,===.==. :edro, as lessee, was also o!ligated to pay the realty ta"es on the property during the
period of lease.
4 sold a parcel of land to > on =$ 3anuary 5==5, payment and delivery to !e made on =$ Ce!ruary 5==5. t was stipulated that if payment were not to !e made !y > on =$ Ce!ruary 5==5, the sale !etween the parties would automatically !e rescinded. > failed to pay on =$ Ce!ruary 5==5, !ut offered to pay three days later, which payment 4
refused to accept, claiming that their contract of sale had
already !een rescinded. s 4Os contention correct? (hy? AB

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
#u!se7uently, :edro filed a complaint against 3uan for the reformation of the Eeed of A!solute #ale, alleging that the transaction covered !y the deed was an e7uita!le mortgage. n his verified answer to the complaint, 3uan alleged that the property was sold to him under the Eeed of A!solute #ale, and interposed counterclaims to recover possession of the
'o, 4 is not correct. n the sale of immova!le property,
even though it may have !een stipulated, as in this case, that

upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the
property and to compel :edro to turn over to him the ownerDs duplicate of title. Iesolve the case with reasons. *GB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
rescission of the contract shall of right ta0e place, the vendee may pay, even after the e"piration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has !een made upon him either /udicially or !y a notarial act *Article $A<5, 'ew Civil code.. #ince no demand for rescission was made on >, either /udicially or !y a notarial act, 4 cannot
refuse to accept the payment offered !y > three *9. days
8he complaint of :edro against 3uan should !e dismissed. 8he instances when a contract W regardless of its nomenclature W may !e presumed to !e an e7uita!le mortgage are enumerated in Article $G=5 of the Civil Code: "Art. $G=5. 8he contract shall !e presumed to !e an
e7uita!le mortgage, in any of the following cases: $. (hen the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inade7uate: 5. (hen the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise)
after the e"piration of the period. 8his is a contract to sell and not a contract of a!solute sale, since as there has !een no delivery of the land. Article $A<5
of the 'ew Civil code is not applica!le. nstead, Article $A<A of the 'ew Civil Code applies. 8he seller has two
A'!$.E" (+&&E($E# A'(WE":
alternative remedies: *$. specific performance, or *5. rescission or resolution under Article $$<$ of the 'ew Civil code. n !oth remedies, damages are due !ecause of default.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
9. (hen upon or after the e"piration of the right to repurchase another instrument e"tending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is e"ecuted) J. (hen the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price)
>es, the contract was automatically rescinded upon >Os failure to pay on =$ Ce!ruary 5==5. Ny the e"press terms of the contract, there is no need for 4 to ma0e a demand in
order for rescission to ta0e place. (Art"+le
1191, 0e9 C"v"l
Co%e, S.r"a v. IAC 171 SCRA 661 [198(]C >. . v. %e los
A. (hen the vendor !inds himself to pay the ta"es on the thing sold) the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a de!t or the performance of any other o!ligation.
An,eles 37 SCRA 10$ [19(0]).
G. n any other case where it may !e fairly inferred that
*ace0a Law ('###) :riscilla purchased a condominium unit in &a0ati City from the Citiland Corporation for a price of :$= &illion, paya!le
:9 &illion down and the !alance with interest thereon at $JB per annum paya!le in si"ty *G=. e7ual monthly
" n any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other

!enefit to !e received !y the vendee as rent or otherwise
installments of :$<F,999.99. 8hey e"ecuted a Eeed of vendee fail to pay three *9. successive installments, the sale shall !e deemed automatically rescinded without the
necessity of /udicial action and all payments made !y the Conditional #ale in which it is stipulated that should the
shall !e considered as interest which shall !e su!/ect to the

usury laws."
Article $G=J states that "the provisions of article $G=5 shall

also apply to a contract purporting to !e an a!solute sale." Cor Articles $G=5 and $G=J to apply, two re7uisites must
vendee shall !e forfeited in favor of the vendor !y way of
concur: $. the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale) and 5. their intention was to secure an e"isting de!t !y way of mortgage. (Ae"rs o*
Gal"te v. 5"&,
;.R. 0o. 17$168, Fe+e&/er 10, $004)
months, she failed to pay. %n the J<th month, she tried to pay the installments due !ut the vendor refused to receive
the payments tendered !y her. 8he following month, the
rental for the use and occupancy of the unit and as li7uidated damages. Cor JG months, :riscilla paid the monthly installments religiously, !ut on the J-th and JFth
vendor sent her a notice that it was rescinding the Eeed of

Conditional #ale pursuant to the stipulation for automatic
n the given case, although :edro retained possession of the property as lessee after the e"ecution of the Eeed of #ale, there is no showing that the intention of the parties was to complaint of :edro should !e dismissed.
)mmovable 4ropert"; 1escission of Contract ('##()
rescission, and demanded that she vacate the premises. #he

replied that the contract cannot !e rescinded without
/udicial demand or notarial act pursuant to Article $A<5 of

the Civil Code.
secure an e"isting de!t !y way of mortgage. Hence, the
a. s Article $A<5 applica!le? *9B. !. Can the vendor rescind the contract? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Page 94 of 119
Article $A<5 of the Civil Code does not apply to a conditional n #alarao v. CA, 304 SCRA sale. 177, the
a.
Option Contract ('##')

+"plain the nature of an option contract. *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
#upreme Court held that Article $A<5 applies only to a

contract of sale and not to a Eeed of Conditional #ale
where the seller has reserved title to the property until full
An %:8 %' C%'8IAC8 is one granting a privilege to t must !e supported !y a consideration distinct from the
payment of the purchase price. 8he law applica!le is the &aceda Law.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!uy or sell within an agreed time and at a determined price. price. *Art. $J-< and $JF5, 'CC.
!. circumstances. Lnder the &aceda Law, which is the law applica!le, the seller on installment may not rescind the
'o, the vendor cannot rescind the contract under the
contract till after the lapse of the mandatory grace period of
Option Contract; Earnest *one" (199() L8 applied with N: to purchase a house and lot in Pue1on
City, one of its ac7uired assets. 8he amount offered was
9= days for every one year of installment payments, and only after 9= days from notice of cancellation or demand for rescission !y a notarial act. n this case, the refusal of the
seller to accept payment from the !uyer on the J<th month was not /ustified !ecause the !uyer was entitled to G= days grace period and the payment was tendered within that
period. &oreover, the notice of rescission served !y the
:l,===,===.== paya!le, as follows: :5==,===.== down payment, the !alance of :F==,===.== paya!le within <= days from 3une $, $<FA. N: accepted the offer, whereupon L8
drew a chec0 for :5==,===.== in favor of N: which the
seller on the !uyer was not effective !ecause the notice was not !y a notarial act. Nesides, the seller may still pay within 9= days from such notarial notice !efore rescission may !e effected. All these re7uirements for a valid rescission were
not complied with !y the seller. Hence, the rescission is
latter thereafter deposited in its account. %n #eptem!er A, $<FA, L8 wrote N: re7uesting e"tension until %cto!er $=, $<FA within which to pay the !alance, to which N: agreed. %n %cto!er A, $<FA, due to the e"pected delay in the remittance of the needed amount !y his financier from the Lnited #tates, L8 wrote N: re7uesting a last e"tension
until %cto!er 9=, $<FA, within which to pay the !alance.
invalid.
N: denied L8s re7uest !ecause another had offered to !uy the same property for :$,A==,===.==. N: cancelled its agreement with L8 and offered to return to him the amount
of :5==,===.== that L8 had paid to it. %n %cto!er 5=,
*ace0a Law; 1ecto Law (1999)
(hat are the so6called "&aceda" and "Iecto" laws in

connection with sales on installments? Give the most important features of each law. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$<FA, upon receipt of the amount of :F==,===.== from his L# financier, L8 offered to pay the amount !y tendering a
cashierDs chec0 therefor !ut which N: refused to accept.
8he 'ACE(A LAW *I.A. GAA. is applica!le to sales of immova!le property on installments. 8he most important features are (R"llo v. CA, $4( SCRA 461)B
L8 then filed a complaint against N: in the I8C for specific performance and deposited in court the amount of :F==,===.==. s N: legally correct in canceling its contract
*$. After having paid installments for at least two years, the !uyer is entitled to a mandatory grace period of one month
for every year of installment payments made, to pay the
with L8?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
N: is not correct in canceling the contract with L8. n 5"na

To'a+"o v Co.rt o* A''eals an% G I Invest&ent (;. R 0o. 10$606, -.ly 3. 1993, $11 SCRA $91) the
unpaid installments without interest.

f the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the !uyer the cash surrender value e7uivalent to fifty percent *A=B. of the total payments made, and after five years of
#upreme Court held that the earnest money is part of the purchase price and is proof of the perfection of the contract. #econdly, notarial or
/udicial rescission under Art. $A<5 and $<<$ of the Civil
Code is necessary (Ta,./a v. %e 5eon, 13$

SCRA ($$.)
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
installments, an additional five percent *AB. every year !ut

not to e"ceed ninety percent *<=B. of the total payments made.
N: is correct in canceling its contract with L8 !ut N:
must do so !y way of /udicial rescission under Article $$<$
*5. n case the installments paid were less than 5 years, the seller shall give the !uyer a grace period of not less than G=
days. f the !uyer fails to pay the installments due at the e"piration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after 9= days from receipt !y the !uyer of the
rescission (Son, 8o O Co, vs, Aa9a""an !"l

Co., 4( !"ls.
8$1), Eelay in the fulfillment of the
Civil Code. 8he law re7uires a /udicial action, and mere notice of rescission is insufficient if it is resisted. 8he law also provides that slight !reach is not a ground for
notice of cancellation or demand for rescission !y notarial

act .
o!ligation *Art. $$G<, Civil Code. is a ground to rescind, only if time is of the essence. %therwise, the court may refuse the rescission if there is a /ust cause for the fi"ing of a period.
8he %EC") LAW *Art. $JFJM refers to sale of mova!les
paya!le in installments and limiting the right of seller, in case of default !y the !uyer, to one of three remedies: a. e"act fulfillment) !. cancel the sale if two or more installments have not
4erfecte0 ale; 2cceptance of Earnest *one" ('##')

Nert offers to !uy #imeonOs property under the following terms and conditions: :$ million purchase price, $=B option money, the !alance paya!le in cash upon the
!een paid) c. foreclose the chattel mortgage on the things sold, also in case of default of two or more installments, with no
further action against the purchaser.
clearance of the property of all illegal occupants. 8he option money is promptly paid and #imeon clears the property of
illegal occupants in no time at all. However, when Nert
tenders payment of the !alance and as0 #imeon for the deed
Page 95 of 119
for a!solute sale, #imeon suddenly has a change of heart,
&ay Adela still e"ercise her right of redemption? +"plain.
claiming that the deal is disadvantageous to him as he has found out that the property can fetch three time the agreed purchase price. Nert see0s specific performance !ut #imeon
contends that he has merely given Nert an option to !uy and nothing more, and offers to return the option money which Nert refuses to accept. (ill NertOs action for specific N. performance prosper? +"plain. *JB.
C.
*AB.
>es, Adela may still e"ercise her right of redemption of the sale given to her !ecause Article $G59 of the 'ew Civil Code re7uires that the notice in writing of the sale must come from the prospective vendor or vendor as the the vendee and the Iegister of Eeeds. 8he period of 9=
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
notwithstanding the lapse of more than 9= days from notice
case may !e. n this case, the notice of the sale was given !y
&ay #imeon /ustify his refusal to proceed with the
sale !y the fact that the deal is financially disadvantageous to
days never tolled. #he can still avail of that right.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
him? +"plain. *JB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
NertOs action for specific performance will prosper !ecause there was a !inding agreement of sale, not /ust an option contract. 8he sale was perfected upon acceptance !y #imeon of $=B of the agreed price. 8his amount is in really earnest money which, under Art. $JF5, ?shall !e considered
N.
as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the
[199$]C #"llon,+o
co6owner, she had only 9= days from the time she received written notice of the sale which in this case too0 the form of a copy of the deed of sale !eing given to her (Cone:ero v.
CA, 16 SCRA ((7 [1966]). 8he law does not
Adela can no longer e"ercise her right of redemption. As
prescri!e any particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner (2t+./an v.
CA, 148 SCRA 70( [198(]). #o long as the redemptioner
contract.@ (To'a+"o v. CA, $11 SCRA $91

Realty v. Gor&a!e+o, 67 SCRA 37$ [19(7]).
was informed in writing, he has no cause to complain

(F"str"to v. CA, 19(
SCRA 606, 609 [1991]). n fact, in Eistrito, a
written notice
#imeon cannot /ustify his refusal to proceed with C. the sale !y the fact that the deal financially is
was held unnecessary where the co6owner had actual
disadvantageous to him. Having made a !ad !argain is not a legal ground for pulling out a !iding contract of sale, in the a!sence of some actiona!le wrong !y the other party (#ales
v. #"lla, 37 !"l (69 [1916]), and no such
0nowledge of the sale, having acted as middleman and !eing

present when the vendor signed the deed of sale.
wrong has !een committed !y Nert.
1ig&t of ,irst 1ef%sal; Lessee; Effect (199-) L!aldo is the owner of a !uilding which has !een leased !y
Iemigio for the past 5= years. L!aldo has repeatedly
1e0emption; Legal; ,ormalities ('##1) Netty and Lydia were co6owners of a parcel of land. Last 3anuary 9$, 5==$, when she paid her real estate ta", Netty
discovered that Lydia had sold her share to
assured Iemigio that if he should decide to sell the !uilding, he will give Iemigio the right of first refusal. %n 3une 9=, $<<J, L!aldo informed Iemigio that he was willing to sell the !uilding for :A &illion. 8he following day, Iemigio sent a letter to L!aldo offering to !uy the
+mma on
'ovem!er $=, 5===. 8he following day, Netty offered to redeem her share from +mma, !ut the latter replied that NettyDs right to redeem has already prescri!ed. s +mma correct or not? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!uilding at :J.A &illion. L!aldo did not reply. %ne wee0 later, Iemigio
received a letter from #antos informing him that the
+mma, the !uyer, is not correct. Netty can still enforce her right of legal redemption as a co6owner. Article $G59 of the Civil Code gives a co6owner 9= days from written notice of
the sale !y the vendor to e"ercise his right of legal
!uilding has !een sold to him !y L!aldo for :A &illion, and that he will not renew IemigioDs lease when it e"pires. Iemigio filed an action against L!aldo and #antos for cancellation of the sale, and to compel L!aldo to e"ecute a deed of a!solute sale in his favor, !ased on his right of first refusal. a. (ill the action prosper? +"plain. !. f L!aldo had given Iemigio an option to purchase the
redemption. n the present pro!lem, the 9=6day period for

the e"ercise !y Netty of her right of redemption had not
even !egun to run !ecause no notice in writing of the sale

appears to have !een given to her !y Lydia. 1e0emption; Legal; ,ormalities ('##')
!uilding instead of a right of first refusal, will your answer !e the same? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, the action to compel L!aldo to e"ecute the deed of
Adela and Neth are co6owners of a parcel of land. Neth sold

her undivided share of the property to 4andro, who
a!solute sale will not prosper. According to

An, ?. v. Co.rt
o* A''eals ($38 SCRA 60$), the right of first
promptly notified Adela of the sale and furnished the latter a copy of the deed of a!solute sale. (hen 4andro presented the deed for registration, the register of deeds also notified
Adela of the sale, enclosing a copy of the deed with the notice. However, Adela ignored the notices. A year later, 4andro filed a petition for the partition of the property.
refusal is not !ased on contract !ut is predicated on the provisions of
given to the offeree. n this case, however, Iemigio was
human relations and, therefore, its violation is predicated on 7uasi6delict. #econdly, the right of first refusal implies that the offer of the person in whose favor that right was given must conform with the same terms and conditions as those offering only :J.A &illion instead of :A &illion.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Lpon receipt of summons, Adela immediately tendered the re7uisite amount for the redemption. 4andro contends that Adela lost her right of redemption after the e"piration of 9= days from her receipt of the notice of the sale given !y him.
dictate on the lessor the price at which the latter should sell
'o, the action will not prosper. 8he lesseeDs right of first refusal does not go so far as to give him the power to
Page 96 of 119
his property. Lpon the facts given, the lessor had
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
sufficiently complied with his commitment to give the lessee a right of first refusal when he offered to sell the property to the lessee for :A &illion, which was the same price he got in
selling it to #antos. He certainly had the right to treat the
$. A can e"ercise his right of repurchase within four *J. years from the date of the contract *Art. $G=G, Civil Code..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
lesseeDs counter6offer of a lesser amount as a re/ection of his offer to sell at :A &illion. 8hus, he was free to find another !uyer upon receipt of such unaccepta!le counter6offer *Art.
$9$<. 'CC..
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
5M would advise N to file an action for consolidation of
title and o!tain a /udicial order of consolidation which must

!e recorded in the Iegistry of :roperty *Art. $G=-. Civil
Code.. =ransfer of Owners&ip; .on?4a"ment of t&e 4rice (1991) :a!lo sold his car to Alfonso who issued a postdated chec0 in full payment therefor. Nefore the maturity of the chec0, Alfonso sold the car to Gregorio who later sold it to Ga!riel. (hen presented for payment, the chec0 issued !y Alfonso was dishonored !y the drawee !an0 for the reason that he, Alfonso, had already closed his account even !efore
he issued his chec0.
>es, the answer will !e the same. 8he action will not
prosper !ecause an option must !e supported !y a
consideration separate and distinct from the purchase price.

n this case there is no separate consideration. 8herefore,
the option may !e withdrawn !y L!aldo at any time. *Art.

$95J, 'CC.
1ig&t of ,irst 1ef%sal; Lessee; Effect (1993) n a 5=6year lease contract over a !uilding, the lessee is e"pressly granted a right of first refusal should the lessor decide to sell !oth the land and !uilding. However, the
:a!lo sued to recover the car from Ga!riel alleging that he AlfonsoDs deception. (ill the suit prosper?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*:a!lo. had !een unlawfully deprived of it !y reason of
lessor sold the property to a third person who 0new a!out the lease and in fact agreed to respect it. Conse7uently, the lessee !rings an action against !oth the lessor6 seller and the
!uyer *a. to rescind the sale and *!. to compel specific
'o. 8he suit will not prosper !ecause :a!lo was not
unlawfully deprived of the car although he was unlawfully
performance of his right of first refusal in the sense that the lessor should !e ordered to e"ecute a deed of a!solute sale
in favor of the lessee at the same price. 8he defendants
deprived of the 8he perfection of the sale price. and the delivery of the car was enough to allow Alfonso to have a right of ownership over the car, which can !e lawfully
transferred to Gregorio. Art. AA< applies only to a person
who is in possession in good faith of the property, and not

to the owner thereof. Alfonso, in the pro!lem, was the
contend that the plaintiff can neither see0 rescission of the sale nor compel specific performance of a "mere" right of
first refusal. Eecide the case. 2AB;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
owner, and, hence, Ga!riel ac7uired the title to the car. 'on6payment of the price in a contract of sale does not render ineffective the o!ligation to deliver. 8he o!ligation
8he action filed !y the lessee, for !oth rescission of the
offending sale and specific performance of the right of first
to deliver a thing is different from the o!ligation to pay its
refusal which was violated, should prosper. 8he ruling in

2N.ator"al Realty Fevelo'&ent, In+. vs. May*a"r T!eater, In+. ($64 SCRA 483), a case with similar facts,
price. 2FCA ./l"s!"n, Co. v. Santos (1990)
sustains !oth
rights of action !ecause the !uyer in the su!se7uent sale 0new the e"istence of right of first refusal, hence in !ad
faith.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
=ransfer of Owners&ip; 1is+ of Loss (199#) E sold a second6hand car to + for :$A=,===.== 8he agreement !etween E and + was that half of the purchase price, or :-A,===.==, shall !e paid upon delivery of the car
to + and the !alance of :-A,===.== shall !e paid in five
8he action to rescind the sale and to compel the right to
first refusal will not prosper. (An, ?. As.n+"on en !anc decision that the right of first refusal is not founded upon contract !ut on a 7uasi6delictual relationship covered !y the
principles of human relations and un/ust enrichment *Art.
vs. CA, $38 SCRA 60$). 8he Court ruled in a unanimous
e7ual monthly installments of :$A,===.== each. 8he car was delivered to +, and + paid the amount of :-A.===.== to E. Less than one month thereafter, the car was stolen from +Ds garage with no fault on +Ds part and was never recovered. s
+ legally !ound to pay the said unpaid !alance of
$<, et se7. Civil Code.. Hence the only action that will
prosper according to the #upreme Court is an "action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose."
:-A.===.==? +"plain your answer.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, + is legally !ound to pay the !alance of :-A,===.==.
1ig&t of 1ep%rc&ase (199()
%n 3anuary 5, $<F=, A and N entered into a contract

where!y A sold to N a parcel of land for and in
8he ownership of the car sold was ac7uired !y + from the moment it was delivered to him. Having ac7uired ownership, + !ears the ris0 of the loss of the thing under the doctrine of res perit domino. 2Articles $J<G. $J<-, Civil Code..
consideration of :$=.===.==. A reserving to himself the right to repurchase the same. Necause they were friends, no
period was agreed upon for the repurchase of the property. $. Lntil when must A e"ercise his right of repurchase? 5. f A fails to redeem the property within the allowa!le
LEA(E
E<ting%is&ment; =otal Distr%ction; Lease0 4ropert" (199()
period, what would you advise N to do for his !etter protection?
A is the owner of a lot on which he constructed a !uilding in the total cost of :$=,===,===.==. %f that amount N
Page 97 of 119
contri!uted :A,===,===.== provided that the !uilding as a
whole would !e leased to him *N. for a period of ten years from 3anuary $. $<FA to Eecem!er 9$, $<<A at a rental of :$==,===.== a year. 8o such condition, A agreed. %n Eecem!er 5=, $<<=, the !uilding was totally !urned. #oon
thereafter, ADs wor0ers cleared the de!ris and started
phenomenon are still unpredicta!le despite the advances in science, the phenomenon is considered unforeseen.
Leasee & Lessor; 1ig&ts an0 Obligations (199#)
construction of a new !uilding. N then served notice upon A that he would occupy the !uilding !eing constructed
upon completion, for the une"pired portion of the lease
A vacant lot several !loc0s from the center of the town was leased !y its owner to a young !usinessman N for a term of After ta0ing possession of the lot, the lessee !uilt thereon a !uilding of mi"ed materials and a store. As the years passed, he e"panded his !usiness, earning more profits. Ny the tenth *$=th. year of his possession, he was a!le to !uild a
three *9.6story !uilding worth at least :9==,===.==. Nefore the end of the term of the lease, N negotiated with the so, they could not agree on the new conditions for the fifteen *$A. years renewal upon agreement of the parties.
term, e"plaining that he had spent partly for the construction of the !uilding that was !urned. A re/ected NDs
demand. Eid A has a right in re/ecting NDs demand?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es. A was correct in re/ecting the demand of N. As a result of the total destruction of the !uilding !y fortuitous event,
the lease was e"tinguished. *Art. $GAA, Civil Code..
landowner for its renewal, !ut despite their attempts to do
)mplie0 .ew Lease (1999)
Lnder what circumstances would an implied new lease or a

ta+"ta re+on%.++"on *5B. arise?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
renewal. Lpon the e"piration of the term of the lease, the landowner as0ed N to vacate the premises and remove his !uilding and other improvements. N refused unless he was
reim!ursed for necessary and useful e"penses. N claimed
that he was a possessor and !uilder in good faith, with right

of retention. 8his issue is now !efore the court for
An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion arises if at the end of the contract the lessee should continue en/oying the thing leased for $A days with the ac7uiescence of the lessor,
resolution in a pending litigation. a. (hat are the rights of N?
and unless a notice to the contrary !y either parties has previously !een given *Art. $G-=.. n short, in order that
!. (hat are the rights of the landowner?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
there may !e tacita reconduccion there must !e e"piration

of the contract) there must !e continuation of possession
N has the right to remove the !uilding and other improvements unless the landowner decides to retain the
a.
for $A days or more) and there must !e no prior demand to

vacate.
Lease of 1%ral Lan0s ('###) n $<<A, &ar0 leased the rice land of 'arding in 'ueva
+ci/a for an annual rental of :$,===.== per
!uilding at the time of the termination of the lease and pay the lessee one6half of the value of the improvements at that time. 8he lessee may remove the !uilding even though the principal thing may suffer damage !ut N should not cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is 8he claim of N that he was a necessar possessor and y.
hectare. n $<<F,
due to the +l 'ino phenomenon, the rice harvest fell to only J=B of the average harvest for the previous years.
!uilder in good faith with the right of retention is not tena!le. N is not a !uilder in good faith !ecause as lessee he
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
&ar0 as0ed 'arding for a reduction of the rental to :A==.==

per hectare for that year !ut the latter refused. s &ar0 legally entitled to such reduction? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
does not claim ownership over the property leased.
!. 8he landownerSlessor may refuse to reim!urse $S5 of

the value of the improvements and re7uire the lessee to
'o, &ar0 is not entitled to a reduction. Lnder Article $GF= of the Civil Code, the lessee of a rural land is entitled to a reduction of the rent only in case of loss of more than $S5
of the fruits unforeseen through e"traordinary and
remove the improvements. 2Article $G-F, Civil Code.,
Leasee; Deat& =&ereof; Effects (1997) #tating !riefly the thesis to support your answer to each of
the following cases, will the death 6 a. of the lessee
fortuitous events. (hile the drought !rought a!out !y the "+l 'ino" phenomenon may !e classified as e"traordinary, it is not considered as unforeseen.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
e"tinguish the lease agreement?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o. 8he death of the lessee will not e"tinguish the lease
>es, &ar0 is entitled to a reduction of the rent. His loss was e"traordinary and unforeseen fortuitous event. 8he "+l
'ino" phenomenon !ecause it is is e"traordinary
agreement, since lease is not personal in character and the

F"&a+.lan,an
more than $S5 of the fruits and the loss was due to an
right is transmissi!le to the heirs. (Ae"rs o*

vs. IAC, 1(0 SCRA 393).
uncommon) it does not occur with regularity. And neither
Option to ;%"; E<pire0 ('##1)

%n 3anuary $, $<F=, 'estor leased the fishpond of &ario
could the parties have foreseen its occurrence. 8he event
should !e foreseea!le !y the parties so that the lessee can change the time for his planting, or refrain from planting, or ta0e steps to avoid the loss. 8o !e foreseea!le, the time and the place of the occurrence, as well as the magnitude of the
for a period of three years at a monthly rental of :$,===.==, with an option to purchase the same during the period of the lease for the price of :A==,===.==. After the e"piration of the three6year period, &ario allowed 'estor to remain in
the leased premises at the same rental rate. %n 3une $A,
adverse effects of the fortuitous event must !e capa!le of !eing predicted. #ince the e"act place, the e"act time, and
the e"act magnitude of the adverse effects of the "+l 'ino"
$<F9, 'estor tendered the amount of :A==,===.== to &ario and demanded that the latter e"ecute a deed of a!solute sale of the fishpond in his favor. &ario refused, on the ground that 'estor no longer had an option to !uy the fishpond.
Page 98 of 119
'estor filed an action for specific performance. (ill the action prosper or not? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
su!lessee can invo0e no right superior to that of his su!lessor, the moment the su!lessor is duly ousted from the
premises, the su!lessee has no leg to stand on. 8he su!lesseeDs right, if any, is to demand reparation for damages from his su!lessor, should the latter !e at fault.
$6, 199$).
'o, the action will not prosper. 8he implied renewal of the lease on a month6to6month !asis did not have the effect of e"tending the life of the option to purchase which e"pired at the end of the original lease period. 8he lessor is correct in refusing to sell on the ground that the option had e"pired. %blease vs. 2ssignment of Lease; 1escission of Contract ('##9)
Lnder a written contract dated Eecem!er $, $<F<, ,ictor leased his land to 3oel for a period of five *A. years at a monthly rental of :l,===.==, to !e increased to :l,5==.== and :l,A==.== on the third and fifth year, respectively. %n 3anuary $, $<<$, 3oel su!leased the land to Conrad for a period of two *5. years at a monthly rental of :l,A==.==.
(Ae"rs o*Sev"lla v. Co.rt o* A''eals ;.R. 0o. 498$3, 8e/r.ary
%blease; Dela" in 4a"ment of 1entals (199!)
n 3anuary $<<9, Cour6Gives Corporation leased the entire twelve floors of the GP# 8owers Comple", for a period of
ten years at a monthly rental of :9,===,===.==. 8here is a
provision in the contract that the monthly rentals should !e paid within the first five days of the month. Cor the month
of &arch, &ay, 3une, %cto!er and Eecem!er $<<9, the
rentals were not paid on time with some rentals !eing paper wor0 involved in processing the chec0s.
delayed up to ten days. 8he delay was due to the heavy
%n Eecem!er 9$, $<<5, 3oel assigned the lease to his compadre, +rnie, who acted on the !elief that 3oel was the rightful owner and possessor of the said lot. 3oel has !een faithfully paying the stipulated rentals to ,ictor. (hen
,ictor learned on &ay $F, $<<5 a!out the su!lease and assignment, he sued 3oel, Conrad and +rnie for rescission of
floors to wholly6owned su!sidiaries. 8he lease contract e"pressly prohi!its the assignment of the lease contract or
Cour6Gives Corporation also su!leased five of the twelve
any portion thereof. 8he rental value of the !uilding has
the contract of lease and for damages.

a)
)"ll t!e a+t"on 'ros'er1 I* so, a,a"nst 9!o&1
increased !y A=B since its lease to Cour6Gives Corporation. $. Can the !uilding owner e/ect Cour6Gives Corporation on
grounds of the repeated delays in the payment of the rent? 5M Can the !uilding owner as0 for the cancellation of the
23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, the action of for rescission of the contract of lease and

for damages will prosper. Lnder Article $GA< of the Civil Code, "if the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the o!ligations set forth in Articles $GAJ and $GA-, the aggrieved party may as0 for rescission of the contract and
contract for violation of the provision against assignment?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE"(:
$. a. 8he "repeated delays" in the payment of rentals would, at !est, !e a slight or casual !reach which does not furnish a ground for e/ectment especially !ecause the delays were only due to heavy paper wor0. 'ote that there was not even
indemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force." Article $GJ< of the same Code provides that "the lessee cannot assign the lease without the
consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary." Consent is necessary !ecause assignment would cause novation !y the su!stitution of one of the parties.
(Gan,ayan v. Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 1$3781, A.,.st $9,
199()
a demand for payment o!viously !ecause the delay lasted
for only a few days *$= days !eing the longest., at the end of which time payments were presuma!ly made and were
accepted. 8here was, therefore, no default. 'ote also that there was no demand made upon the lessee to vacate the premises for non6payment of the monthly rent. 8here is,
However, the rule is different in the case of
therefore, no cause of action for e/ectment arising from the "repeated delays". !uildin owne canno e/ec Cour6 8he g !. r t t Gives Corporation on the ground of repeated delays in the
is minimal and cannot !e made the !asis of an e/ectment
su!leasing. (hen there is no e"press prohi!ition in the

Contract of Lease, the lessee may su!let the thing leased. *Art. $GA=, Civil Code.
n the given case, when 3oel assigned the lease to +rnie, the
same was done without the consent of ,ictor. 8he
payment of rentals. 8he delay in the payment of the rentals suit. 8he delay was due to the heavy paperwor0 involved in
assignment is void. However, there is no indication that in the written contract of lease !etween ,ictor and 3oel, that
su!leasing the premises is prohi!ited. Hence, the su!lease
processing the chec0s. t would !e otherwise if the lease
contract stated that in the payment of rentals within the first

five days of the month, time is of the essence or that the
of 3oel with Conrad is valid. n view of the foregoing, ,ictor can file the case of rescission and damages only
against 3oel and +rnie !ut he cannot include Conrad. In +ase o* res+"ss"on, %"s+.ss t!e /) r",!ts an% o/l",at"ons o* t!e 'art"es. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
lessee will !e in delay if he falls to pay within the agreed period without need of demand. n this case he can
/udicially e/ect the tenant on the ground of lac0 of payment $G-9*5., 'ew Civil Code.,
of the price stipulated after a demand *Articl to vacate, e
Iescission of the lease necessarily re7uires the return of the thing to the lessor. Hence, the /udgment granting rescission
c. 'o. Iesolution of a contract will not !e permitted for a
slight or casual !reach, !ut only for such su!stantial and
of the contract should also order the lessee to vacate and
fundamental !reach as would defeat the very o!/ect of the

parties in ma0ing the agreement.(=e'e%a v. .
CA, $16 SCRA $93] 8he delay of ten *$=.. days is not such a
return the leased premises to the lessor. However, since the
su!stantial
Page 99 of 119
and fundamental !reach to warrant the resolution of the
contract of lease specially so when the delay was due to the

heavy paperwor0 in processing the chec0s.
A, and that he has not !een remiss in the payment of rent. (ill the action prosper? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
5. a. 'o. #u!lease is different from assignment of lease. #u!lease, not !eing prohi!ited !y the contract of lease is therefore allowed and cannot !e invo0ed as a ground to
>es, the action will prosper. Lnder Article $GA$ of the Civil Code, the su!lessee is !ound to the lessor for all acts which refer to the use and preservation of the thing leased in the manner stipulated !etween the lessor and the lessee. %blease; @ali0it"; 2ssignment of %blease (199#) A leased a parcel of land to N for a period of two years. 8he
lease contract did not contain any e"press prohi!ition
cancel the lease, !. 'o, the lessor cannot have the lease cancelled for alleged violation of the provision against assignment. 8he lessee did
not assign the lease, or any portion thereof, to the
su!sidiaries. t merely su!leased some floors to its su!sidiaries. #ince the pro!lem does not state that the contract of lease contains a prohi!ition against su!lease, the su!lease is lawful, the rule !eing that in the a!sence of an e"press prohi!ition a lessee may su!let the thing leased, in whole or in part, without pre/udice to hisSits responsi!ility
to the lessor for the performance of the contract. %blease; %blessee; Liabilit" (1999)
the leased premises. Euring the third year of the lease, N su!leased the land to C. n turn, C, without ADs consent, assigned the su!lease to E. A then filed an action for the
against the assignment of the leasehold or the su!leasing of
rescission of the contract of lease on the ground that N has violated the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. f you were the /udge, how would you decide the case,
particularly with respect to the validity of:
*a. NDs su!lease to C? and *!. CDs assignment of the su!lease to E?

Although the original period of two years for the lease contract has e"pired, the lease continued with the ac7uiescence of the lessor during the
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
&ay a lessee su!lease the property leased without the consent of the lessor, and what are the respective lia!ilities
*a. NDs su!lease to C is valid.
of the lessee and su!6lessee to the lessor in case of such su!lease? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
third year. Hence, there has !een an implied renewal of the

contract of lease. Lnder Art. $GA= of the Civil Code, the
>es, provided that there is no e"press prohi!ition against
su!leasing. Lnder the law, when in the contract of lease of things there is no e"press prohi!ition, the lessee may su!let
the thing leased without pre/udice to his responsi!ility for the performance of the contract toward the lessor. 2Art, $GA=.
lessee may su!let the thing leased, in whole or in part, when the contract of lease does not contain any e"press prohi!ition 2Articl $G-= Civil . es $GA=, Code.. ADs
action for rescission should not prosper on this ground.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n case there is a su!lease of the premises !eing leased, the su!lessee is !ound to the lessor for all the acts
*!. CDs assignment of the su!lease to E is not valid. Lnder

Art. $GJ<, of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the
which refer to the use and preservation of the thing leased in the
manner stipulated !etween the lessor and the lessee. *Art. $GA$M
lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. 8here is no such stipulation in
the contract.
f the law prohi!its assignment of the lease
8he su!lessee is su!sidiarily lia!le to the lessor for any rent

due from the lessee. However, the su!lessee shall not !e
responsi!le !eyond the amount of the rent due from him.

*Art. $GA5. As to the lessee, the latter shall still !e responsi!le to the lessor for the rents) !ring to the 0nowledge of the lessor every usurpation or untoward act which any third person may have committed or may !e openly preparing to carry
without the consent of the lessor, all the more would the assignment of a su!lease !e prohi!ited without such consent. 8his is a violation of the contract and is a valid
ground for rescission !y A.
C!))!' CA""IE"(
E<traor0inar" Diligence ('###)
out upon the thing leased) advise the owner the need for all repairs) to return the thing leased upon the termination of the lease /ust as he received it, save what has !een lost or impaired !y the lapse of time or !y ordinary wear and tear
or from an inevita!le cause) responsi!le for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves that it too0 place without his fault.
Eespite a warning from the police that an attempt to hi/ac0 a :AL plane will !e made in the following wee0, the airline did not ta0e e"tra precautions, such as fris0ing of
passengers, for fear of !eing accused of violating human rights. 8wo days later, an armed hi/ac0er did attempt to
hi/ac0 a :AL flight to Ce!u. Although he was su!dued !y
the other passengers, he managed to fire a shot which hit
%blease; %blessee; Liabilit" ('###) A leased his house to N with a condition that the leased
premises shall !e used for residential purposes only. N
and 0illed a female passenger. 8he victimDs parents sued the airline for !reach of contract, and the airline raised the defense of force ma/eure. s the airline lia!le or not? *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
su!leased the house to C who used it as a warehouse for
fa!rics. Lpon learning this, A demanded that C stop using

the house as a warehouse, !ut C ignored the demand, A
then filed an action for e/ectment against C, who raised the defense that there is no privity of contract !etween him and
8he airline is lia!le. n case of death of a passenger, common carriers are presumed to have !een at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they o!served
e"traordinary diligence
*Articl $-AG, Civil e Code..
8h e
Page 100 of 119

failure of the airline to ta0e e"tra precautions despite a police warning that an attempt to hi/ac0 the plane would !e made, was negligence on the part of the airline. Neing
negligent, it is lia!le for the death of the passenger. 8he
negate sale !ecause they indicate that ownership over the
units was never intended to transfer to the distri!utor.
defense of force ma/eure is not tena!le since the shooting
2genc"; co%ple0 wit& an interest ('##1) Iichard sold a large parcel of land in Ce!u to Leo for :$==
incident would not have happened had the airline ta0en
steps that could have prevented the hi/ac0er from !oarding the plane.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Lnder Article $-G9 of the Civil Code, the common carrier is

not re7uired diligence in to o!serve
e"traordinary
preventing in/ury to its passengers on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers. 8he common carrier, in that case, is re7uired to e"ercise only the diligence of a good father of a family) hence, the failure of the airline to ta0e +48IA precautions in fris0ing the
passengers and !y leaving that matter to the security personnel of the airport, does not constitute a !reach of
million paya!le in annual installments over a period of ten years, !ut title will remain with Iichard until the purchase price is fully paid. 8o ena!le Leo to pay the price, Iichard gave him a power6of6attorney authori1ing him to su!divide the land, sell the individual lots, and deliver the proceeds to Iichard, to !e applied to the purchase price. Cive years later,
Iichard revo0ed the power of attorney and too0 over the
sale of the su!division lots himself. s the revocation valid or not? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
that duty so as to ma0e the airline lia!le. Nesides, the use of irresisti!le force !y the hi/ac0ers was farce ma/eure that could not have !een prevented even !y the o!servance of
e"traordinary diligence.
8he revocation is not valid. 8he power of attorney given to the !uyer is irrevoca!le !ecause it is coupled with an interest: the agency is the means of fulfilling the o!ligation of the !uyer to pay the price of the land *Article $<5-, CC.. n other words, a !ilateral contract *contract to !uy and sell
the land. is dependent on the agency.
A&E'C*
2genc" ('##()
3o6Ann as0ed her close friend, Aissa, to !uy some groceries for her in the supermar0et. (as there a nominate contract entered into !etween 3o6Ann and Aissa? n the affirmative,
what was it? +"plain. AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
2genc"; B%arantee Commission ('##!) As an agent, AL was given a guarantee commission, in addition to his regular commission, after he sold 5= units of refrigerators to a customer, H8 8he Hotel. customer,
however, failed to pay for the units sold.
EIN , demanded from AL payment for the customerOs accounta!ility. AL o!/ected, on the ground that his /o! was only to sell and not to collect payment for units !ought !y
the customer. s ALOs o!/ection valid?
ALOs principal,
>es, there was a nominate contract.
that Aissa accepted the re7uest of her close friend 3o6Ann to !ut some groceries for her in the supermar0et, what they
entered into was a nominate contract of Agency.
%n the assumption
Can EIN collect from him or
not? Ieason. *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Article $FGF of the 'ew Civil Code provides that !y the contract of agency a person !inds himself to render some service or to
do something in representation or on !ehalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
'o, ALDs o!/ection is not valid and EIN can collect from AL. #ince AL accepted a guarantee commission, in addition
to his regular commission, he agreed to !ear the ris0 of
collection and to pay the principal the proceeds of the sale on the same terms agreed upon with the purchaser *Article $<=-, Civil Code.
>es, they entered into a nominate contract of lease to

service in the a!sence of a relation of principal and agent !etween them *Article $GJJ, 'ew Civil Code.. 2genc" vs. ale ('###) 2genc"; 1eal Estate *ortgage ('##!)
A foreign manufacturer of computers and a :hilippine

distri!utor entered into a contract where!y the distri!utor
C4 e"ecuted a special power of attorney authori1ing E> to secure a loan from any !an0 and to mortgage his property covered !y the ownerOs certificate of title. n securing a loan from &Nan0, E> did not specify that he was acting for C4
in the transaction with said !an0.
agreed to order $,=== units of the manufacturerDs computers

every month and to resell them in the :hilippines at the
s C4 lia!le for the !an0 loan? (hy or why not? 3ustify your answer. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
manufacturerDs suggested prices plus $=B. All unsold units

at the end of the year shall !e !ought !ac0 !y the
C4 is lia!le for the !an0 loan !ecause he authori1ed the E>. f E> later defaults and fails to pay the loan, C4 is
manufacturer at the same price they were ordered. 8he
manufacturer shall hold the distri!utor free and harmless from any claim for defects in the units. s the agreement
mortgage on his property to secure the loan contracted !y
one for sale or agency? *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he contract is one of agency, not sale. 8he notion of sale is negated !y the following indicia: *$. the price is fi"ed !y the
manufacturer with the $=B mar06up constituting the
lia!le to pay. However, his lia!ility is limited to the e"tent of the value of the said property. AL8+I'A8 ,+ A'#(+I: C4 is not personally lia!le to the !an0 loan !ecause it was
contracted !y E> in his personal capacity. %nly the property of C4 is lia!le. Hence, while C4 has authori1ed
commission) *5. the manufacturer reac7uires the unsold units at e"actly the same price) and *9. warranty for the units was !orne !y the manufacturer. 8he foregoing indicia
the mortgage on his property to secure the loan of E>, the !an0 cannot sue C4 to collect the loan in case E> defaults thereon. 8he !an0 can only foreclose the property of C4.
Page 101 of 119
And if the proceeds of the foreclosure are not sufficient to pay the loan in full, the !an0 cannot run after C4 for the deficiency.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
All those contracts were e"ecuted !y N while A was on the validity and !inding effect of each of the a!ove
confined due to illness in the &a0ati &edical Center. Iule contracts upon A the principal. +"plain your answers,
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
(hile as a general rule the principal is not lia!le for the
contract entered into !y his agent in case the agent acted in
his own name without disclosing his principal, such rule
8he agency couched in general terms comprised only acts of
does not apply if the contract involves a thing !elonging to the principal. n such case, the principal is lia!le under
administration *Art. $F--, Civil Code.. 8he lease contract
Article $FF9 of the Civil Code. 8he contract is deemed made on his !ehalf (Sy6:.+o v. Sy6:.+o 40 !"l. 634
[19$0]).
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
on the &anila parcel is not valid, not enforcea!le and not !inding upon A. Cor N to lease the property to C, for more than one *$. year, A must provide N with a special power of attorney *Art. $F-F. Civil Code.. 8he lease of the Caloocan City property to E is valid and !inding upon A. #ince the lease is without a fi"ed term, it is understood to !e from month to month, since the rental is paya!le monthly *Art. $GF-, Civil Code.. 8he sale of the Pue1on City parcel to + is not valid and not
!inding upon A. N needed a special power of attorney to
C4 would not !e lia!le for the !an0 loan. C4Ds property
would also not !e lia!le on the mortgage. #ince E> did not specify that he was acting for C4 in the transaction with the
!an0, E> in effect acted in his own name. n the case of
R.ral GanE o* Go&/on v. CA, $1$ SCRA, (199$),
the #upreme Court, under the same facts, ruled that "in order to !ind the
principal !y a mortgage on real property e"ecuted !y an
agent, it must upon its face purport to !e made, signed and

sealed in the name of the principal, otherwise, it will !ind
the agent only. t is not enough merely that the agent was in fact authori1ed to ma0e the mortgage, if he, has not acted in the name of the principal. 'either is it ordinarily sufficient that in the mortgage the agent descri!es himself as acting !y virtue of a power of attorney, if in fact the agent has acted in his own name and has set his own hand and seal to the
mortgage. 8here is no principle of law !y which a person
validly sell the land *Arts. $F-- and $F-F, Civil Code.. 8he sale of the land at a very good price does not cure the defect of the contract arising from lac0 of authority
4owers of t&e 2gent (199!)

:rime Iealty Corporation appointed 'estor the e"clusive
can !ecome lia!le on a real estate mortgage which she never

e"ecuted in person or !y attorney in fact".
2ppointment of %b?2gent (1999)
agent in the sale of lots of its newly developed su!division. :rime Iealty told 'estor that he could not collect or receive payments from the !uyers. 'estor was a!le to sell ten lots to 3esus and to collect the down payments for said lots. He did not turn over the collections to :rime Iealty. (ho shall !ear the loss for 'estorDs defalcation, :rime Iealty or 3esus?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
4 appoints > as his agent to sell his products in Ce!u City.

Can > appoint a su!6agent and if he does, what are the effects of such appointment? *AB.
a. 8he general rule is that a person dealing with an agent
must in7uire into the authority of that agent. n the present case, if 3esus did not in7uire into that
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, the agent may appoint a su!stitute or su!6 agent if the principal has not prohi!ited him from doing so, !ut he shall
!e responsi!le for the acts of the su!stitute: *$. when he was not given the power to appoint one)
authority, he is lia!le for the loss due to 'estorDs defalcation unless Article $<==,
Civil Code governs, in which case the developer corporation
!ears the loss. Art. $<== Civil Code provides: "#o far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to have !een performed within the scope of the agentDs authority, if such act is within the terms of the power of attorney, as written, even if the agent has in fact e"ceeded the limits of his authority according to an understanding !etween the principal and the agent.
However, if 3esus made due in7uiry and he was not
*5. when he was given such power, !ut without designating the person, and the person appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent.
Beneral 2genc" vs. pecial 2genc" (199')
A as principal appointed N as his agent granting him general and unlimited management over ADs properties, stating that A withholds no power from N and that the agent may e"ecute such acts as he may consider appropriate. Accordingly, N leased ADs parcel of land in &anila to C for
four *J. years at :G=,===.== per year, paya!le annually in advance.
informed !y the principal :rime Iealty of the limits of

'estorDs authority. :rime Iealty shall !ear the loss.
!. Considering that :rime Iealty Corporation only "told"
'estor that he could not receive or collect payments, it appears that the limitation does not appear in his written
N leased another parcel of land of A in Caloocan City to E without a fi"ed term at :9,===.== per month paya!le
monthly.
authority or power of attorney. n this case, insofar as 3esus,

who is a third person is concerned, 'estorDs acts of
N sold to + a third parcel of land !elonging to A located in Pue1on City for three *9. times the price that was listed in
the inventory !y A to N.
collecting payments is deemed to have !een performed within the scope of his authority VArticle $<==. Civil Code.. Hence, the principal is lia!le.
However, if 3esus was aware of the limitation of 'estorDs
power as an agent, and :rime Iealty Corporation does not
Page 102 of 119
ratify the sale contract, then 3esus shall !e lia!le *Article $F<F. Civil Code.. =ermination; Effect of Deat& of 2gent (1997)
allowing the other general partner to !ind the corporation will violate the corporation law principle that only the !oard of directors may !ind the corporation. 9. 'o, for the same reasons given in the Answer to 'um!er 5 a!ove.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
#tating !riefly the thesis to support your answer to each of the following cases, will the of an agent end death 6 *c. an agenc y?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es. 8he death of an agent e"tinguishes the agency, !y

e"press provision of par. 9, Art $<$< of the Civil Code.
the capital, they also agree on e7ual distri!ution of whatever
Conve"ance of a 4artnerFs &are Dissol%tion (1993) Eielle, Rarlo and Lna are general partners in a merchandising firm. Having contri!uted e7ual amounts to net profit is reali1ed per fiscal period. After two years of
PA"$'E"(.IP
Composition of 4artners&ips; po%ses; Corporations
(199!) $. Can a hus!and and wife form a limited partnership to

engage in real estate !usiness, with the wife !eing a limited partner? 5. two corporations Can organi1e a under the Civil Code of the :hilippines? 9. a corporation and an Can individual general partnership form a general
operation, however, Lna conveys her whole interest in the partnership to 3ustine, without the 0nowledge and consent of Eielle and Rarlo. $. s the partnership dissolved? $5B; 5. (hat are the rights of 3ustine, if any, should she desire to participate in the management of the partnership and in
the distri!ution of a net profit of :9G=.===.== which was
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
reali1ed after her purchase of LnaDs interest? 29B; $. 'o, a conveyance !y a partner of his whole interest in a partnership does not of itself dissolve the partnership in
the a!sence of an agreement. *Art. $F$9. Civil Code.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
partnership?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. a. >es. 8he Civil Code prohi!its a hus!and and wife from constituting a universal #ince a partnership. limited partnership is not a universal partnership, a hus!and and wife may validly form one. !. >es. (hile spouses cannot enter into a universal
3ustin cann interfe o participa r te e ot re in the management or administration of the partnership !usiness
5.
partnership, they can enter into a limited partnership or !e
mem!ers thereof *C I u. #uter, etal. 5- #CIA $A5..

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
or affairs. #he may, however, receive the net profits to which Lna would have otherwise !een entitled. n this case, :$5=.=== *Art. $F$9, Civil Code. Dissol%tion of 4artners&ip (1999) :auline, :atricia and :riscilla formed a !usiness partnership for the purpose of engaging in neon advertising for a term
a.
5.
directo rs.
co6partners would have the power to ma0e the corporation
'o, A corporation is managed !y its !oard of f the corporation were to !ecome a partner,
party to transactions in an irregular manner since the
partners are not agents su!/ect to the control of the Noard of Eirectors. Nut a corporation may enter into a /oint
venture with another corporation as long as the nature of the venture is in line with the !usiness authori1ed !y its charter. (T.ason O Co., In+. v. Golano, 97 !"l.
106).
of five *A. years. :auline su!se7uently assigned to :hilip her interest in the partnership. (hen :atricia and :riscilla learned of the assignment, they decided to dissolve the partnership !efore the e"piration of its term as they had an
unproductive !usiness relationship with :hilip in the past. %n the other hand, unaware of the move of :atricia and
!. As a general rule a corporation may not form a general

partnership with another corporation or an individual !ecause a corporation may not !e !ound !y persons who are neither directors nor officers of the corporation.
:riscilla !ut sensing their negative reaction to his ac7uisition of :aulineDs interest, :hilip simultaneously petitioned for the dissolution of the partnership.
$. s the dissolution done !y :atricia and :riscilla without the consent of :auline or :hilip valid? +"plain.
However, a corporation may form a general partnership with another corporation or an individual provided the
following conditions are met: $. 8he Articles of ncorporation of the corporation e"pressly allows the corporation to enter into
5. Eoes :hilip have any right to petition for the dissolution of the partnership !efore the e"piration of its specified term? +"plain. $, Lnder Art. $F9= *$. *c. of the 'CC, the dissolution !y :atricia and :riscilla is valid and did not violate the contract of partnership even though :auline and :hilip did not !ecause she had already assigned her interest to :hilip. 8he
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
partnerships)
5.
8he Articles of :artnership must provide that all
consent thereto. 8he consent of :auline is not necessary consent of :hilip is not also necessary !ecause the partner, under Art, $F$9 of the 'CC.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
partners will manage the partnership, and they

shall !e /ointly and severally lia!le) and n case of a foreign corporation, it must !e 9. licensed to do !usiness in the :hilippines.
assignment to him of :aulineDs interest did not ma0e him a
c. 'o. A corporation may not !e a general partner !ecause

th principle of mutual e agency in
nterpreting Art. $F9= *$. *c. to mean that if one of the
general partnership
partne rs
had assigned his interest on the partnership to
Page 103 of 119
another the remaining partners may not dissolve the
A should !e hired as #ecretary. 8he decision for the hiring

of A prevails !ecause it is an act of administration which
partnership, the dissolution !y :atricia and :riscilla without

the consent of :auline or :hilip is not valid.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
can !e performed !y the duly appointed managing partners, ( and 4. N cannot !e hired, !ecause in case of a tie in the decision of the managing partners, the deadloc0 must !e decided !y the
partners owning the controlling interest. n this case, the opposition of 4 and > prevails !ecause > owns the
5.
!ecause he does not have the standing of a partner *Art. $F$9 'CC..
'o, :hilip has no right to petition for dissolution
Dissol%tion of 4artners&ip; =ermination (199()
A, N and C formed a partnership for the purpose of

contracting with the Government in the construction of one of its !ridges. %n 3une 9=, $<<5, after completion of the pro/ect, the !ridge was turned over !y the partners to the Government. %n August 9=, $<<5, E, a supplier of materials used in the pro/ect sued A for collection of the inde!tedness to him. A moved to dismiss the complaint
controlling nterest *Art. $F=$, Civil Code..
Obligations of a 4artner; )n0%strial 4artner ('##1)
3oe and Iudy formed a partnership to operate a car repair shop in Pue1on City. 3oe provided the capital while Iudy
contri!uted his la!or and industry. %n one side of their
shop, 3oe opened and operated a coffee shop, while on the

other side, Iudy put up a car accessories store. &ay they
against him on the ground that it was the ANC partnership that is lia!le for the de!t. E replied that ANC partnership
engage in such separate !usinesses? (hy? 2AB;

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
was dissolved upon completion of the pro/ect for which purpose the partnership was formed. (ill you dismiss the complaint against A f you were the 3udge?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
3oe, the capitalist partner, may engage in the restaurant
!usiness !ecause it is not the same 0ind of !usiness the
partnership is engaged in. %n the other hand, Iudy may not e"pressly permits him to do so !ecause as an industrial partner he has to devote his full time to the !usiness of the partnership 2Art. $-F<, CC..
engage in any other !usiness unless their partnership
As 3udge, against A.
would not dismiss the complaint
!ecause A is still lia!le as a general partner for his pro rata share of $S9 *Art. $F$G, C. C.3. Eissolution of a partnership caused !y the termination of the particular underta0ing specified in the agreement does not e"tinguish o!ligations,
which must !e li7uidated during the "winding up" of the partnership affairs *Articles $F5< and $F9=. par. $6a, Civil
Co66odatu6 , )utuu6
Commo0at%m (199() A, upon re7uest, loaned his passenger 3eepney to N to ena!le N to !ring his sic0 wife from :ani7ui. 8arlac to the :hilippine General Hospital in &anila for treatment. %n the
Code..
Effect of Deat& of 4artner (1997)
#tating !riefly the thesis to support your answer to each of the following cases, will the death 6 of a partner terminate
way !ac0 to :ani7ui, after leaving his wife at the hospital,
the partnership?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es. 8he death of a partner will terminate the partnership,

!y e"press provision of par. A, Art. $F9= of the Civil Code. Obligations of a 4artner (199')
(, 4, > and H organi1ed a general partnership with ( and 4 as industrial partners and > and H as capitalist partners. >
contri!uted :A=,===.== and H contri!uted :5=,===.== to
the common fund. Ny a unanimous vote of the partners, ( and 4 were appointed managing partners, without any specification of their respective powers and duties. A applied for the position of #ecretary and N applied for the
position of Accountant of the partnership.
8he hiring of A was decided upon !y ( and 4, !ut was
people stopped the passenger 3eepney. N stopped for them and allowed them to ride on !oard, accepting payment from the /ust as in the case of ordinary passenger 3eepneys m plying their route. As N was crossing Nam!an, there was an onrush of Lahar from &t :inatu!o, the 3eep that was loaned to him was wrec0ed. $. (hat do you call the contract that was entered into !y A and N with respect to the passenger 3eepney that was loaned !y A to N to transport the latterDs sic0 wife to &anila?
5. s N o!liged to pay A for the use of the passenger
/eepney? 9. s N lia!le to A for the loss of the 3eepney?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. 8he contract is called "commodatum". 2Art. $<99. Civil Code.. C%&&%EA8L& is a contract !y which one of the
parties *!ailor. delivers to another *!ailee. something not
opposed !y > and H. 8he hiring of N was decided upon !y ( and H, !ut was opposed !y 4 and >.
consuma!le so that the latter may use it for a certain time and return it. 5.
(ho of the applicants should !e hired !y the partnership?

+"plain and give your reasons.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o, N is not o!liged to pay A for the use of the passenger 3eepney !ecause commodatum is essentially gratuitous. *Art. $<99. Civil Code;
9. >es, !ecause N devoted the thing to a purpose different
from that for which it has !een loaned *Art. $<J5, par. 5, Civil Code.
Page 104 of 119

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
'o, !ecause an o!ligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall !e e"tinguished if it should !e lost or destroyed without the fault of the de!tor, and !efore he has incurred in delay. *Art. $5G5. Civil Code. Commo0at%m ('##9)
Nefore he left for Iiyadh to wor0 as a mechanic, :edro left his Adventure van with 8ito, with the understanding that the latter could use it for one year for his personal or family use while :edro wor0s in Iiyadh. He did not tell 8ito that the !ra0es of the van were faulty. 8ito had the van tuned up and the !ra0es repaired. He spent a total amount of :$A,===.==. After using the vehicle for two wee0s, 8ito discovered that it consumed too much fuel. 8o ma0e up for the e"penses, he leased it to Anna!elle.
*Art. $<J< of the Civil Code. n the given pro!lem, :edro left his Adventure van with 8ito so that the latter could use it for one year while he was in Iiyadh. 8here was no mention of a consideration. 8hus, the contract perfected was commodatum. 8he amount of :$A,===.== was spent !y 8ito to tune up the van and to repair its !ra0es. #uch e"penses are e"tra6ordinary e"penses !ecause they are necessary for the preservation of the van 8hus, the same should !e !orne !y the !ailor, :edro.
/) )!o s!all /ear t!e +osts *or t!e vanDs *.el, o"l an% ot!er &ater"als 9!"le "t 9as 9"t! T"to1 23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8wo months later, :edro returned to the :hilippines and as0ed 8ito to return the van. Lnfortunately, while !eing driven !y 8ito, the van was accidentally damaged !y a cargo truc0 without his fault. a) )!o s!all /ear t!e 17,000.00 s'ent *or t!e re'a"r o* t!e van1 23'la"n. ($4)
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8ito must !ear the :$A,===.== e"penses for the van. Generally, e"traordinary e"penses for the preservation of the thing loaned are paid !y the !ailor, he !eing the owner of the thing loaned. n this case however, 8ito should !ear the e"penses !ecause he incurred the e"penses without first informing :edro a!out it. 'either was the repair shown to !e urgent. Lnder Article $<J< of the Civil Code, !ailor generally !ears the e"traordinary e"penses for the preservation of the thing and should refund the said e"penses if made !y the !ailee) :rovided, 8he !ailee !rings the same to the attention of the !ailor !efore incurring them, e"cept only if the repair is urgent that reply cannot !e awaited.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he :$A,===.== spent for the repair of the van should !e !orne !y :edro. (here the !ailor delivers to the !ailee a non6 consumma!le thing so that the latter may use it for a certain time and return the identical thing, the contract perfected is a Contract of Commodatum. *Art. $<99, Civil Code. 8he !ailor shall refund the e"traordinary e"penses during the contract for the preservation of the thing loaned provided the !ailee !rings the same to the 0nowledge of the !ailor !efore incurring the same, e"cept when they are so urgent that the reply to the notification cannot !e awaited without danger.
8ito must also pay for the ordinary e"penses for the use and preservation of the thing loaned. He must pay for the gasoline, oil, greasing and spraying. He cannot as0 for reim!ursement !ecause he has the o!ligation to return the identical thing to the !ailor. Lnder Article $<J$ of the Civil Code, the !ailee is o!liged to pay for the ordinary e"penses for the use and preservation of the thing loaned. +) Foes e%ro !ave t!e r",!t to retr"eve t!e van even /e*ore t!e la'se o* one year1 23'la"n. ($4)
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
'o, :edro does not have the right to retrieve the van !efore the lapse of one year. 8he parties are mutually !ound !y the terms of the contract. Lnder the Civil Code, there are only 9 instances when the !ailor could validly as0 for the return of the thing loaned even !efore the e"piration of the period. 8hese are when: *$. a precarium contract was entered *Article $<J-.) *5. if the !ailor urgently needs the thing *Article $<JG.) and *9. if the !ailee commits acts of ingratitude *Article $<JF.. 'ot one of the situations is present in this case. 8he fact that 8ito had leased the thing loaned to Anna!elle would not /ustify the demand for the return of the thing loaned !efore e"piration of the period. Lnder Article $<J5 of the Civil Code, leasing of the thing loaned to a third person not mem!er of the household of the !ailee, will only entitle !ailor to hold !ailee lia!le for the loss of the thing loaned.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
As a rule, :edro does not have the right to retrieve the van !efore the lapse of one year. Article $<JG of the Code provides that "the !ailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned till after the e"piration of the period stipulated, or after the accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum has !een constituted. However, if in the meantime, he should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return or temporary use." n the given pro!lem, :edro allowed 8ito to use the van for one year. 8hus, he should !e !ound !y the said agreement and he cannot as0 for the return of the car !efore the e"piration of the one year period. However, if :edro has urgent need of the van, he may demand for its return or temporary use. %) )!o s!all /ear t!e e3'enses *or t!e a++"%ental %a&a,e +a.se% /y t!e +ar,o tr.+E, ,rant"n, t!at t!e tr.+E %r"ver an% tr.+E o9ner are "nsolvent1 23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Generally, e"traordinary e"penses arising on the occasion of the actual use of the thing loaned !y the !ailee, even if incurred without fault of the !ailee, shall !e shouldered e7ually !y the !ailor and the !ailee. *Art. $<J< of the Civil Code.. However, if :edro had an urgent need for the vehicle, 8ito would !e in delay for failure to immediately return the same, then 8ito would !e held lia!le for the e"traordinary e"penses. Commo0at%m vs. /s%fr%ct (1993)
Page 105 of 119
Eistinguish usufruct from commodatum and state whether

these may !e constituted over consuma!le goods. 25B;
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
$. L#LCILC8 is a right given to a person *usufructuary. to
en/oy the property of another with the o!ligation of preserving its form and su!stance. *Art. AG5. Civil Code.
*%t%%m; )nterests ('##1) #amuel !orrowed :9==,===.== housing loan from the !an0 at $FB per annum interest. However, the promissory note
contained a proviso that the !an0 "reserves the right to
increase interest within the limits allowed !y law," Ny virtue

of such proviso, over the o!/ections of #amuel, the !an0
%n the other hand, C%&&%EA8L& is a contract !y which one of the parties *!ailor. delivers to another *!ailee. something not consuma!le so that the latter may use it for a
certain time and return it.
increased the interest rate periodically until it reached JFB per annum. Cinally, #amuel filed an action 7uestioning the
right of the !an0 to increase the interest rate up to JFB. 8he !an0 raised the defense that the Central Nan0 of the
n usufruct the usufructuary gets the right to the use and to

the fruits of the same, while in commodatum, the !ailee only ac7uires the use of the thing loaned !ut not its fruits.
:hilippines had already suspended the Lsury Law. (ill the action prosper or not? (hy? *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he action will prosper. (hile it is true that the interest
Lsufruct may !e constituted on the whole or a part of the

fruits of the thing. *Art. AGJ. Civil Code.. t may even !e
ceilings set !y the Lsury Law are no longer in force, it has !een held that :E 'o. $GFJ and CN Circular 'o. <=A
merely allow contracting parties to stipulate freely on any
constituted over consuma!les li0e money

(Al.nan v. #eloso,
7$ !"l. 747). %n the other hand, in commodatum, consuma!le goods may !e su!/ect thereof only when the
ad/ustment in the interest rate on a loan or for!earance of

money !ut do not authori1e a unilateral increase of the
purpose of the contract is not the consumption of the o!/ect, as when it is merely for e"hi!ition. *Art. $<9G, Civil
Code.
A'!$.E" A'(WE":
8here are several points of distinction $. !etween usufruct and commodatum. Lsufruct is constituted !y law, !y contract, !y testamentary succession, or !y prescription *Art. $<99. Civil Code.. Lsufruct creates a real right to the fruits of anotherDs property, while commodatum creates only a purely personal right to use anotherDs property, and re7uires a stipulation to ena!le the !ailee to "ma0e use" of the fruits *Arts. $<9<X $<J=, Civil Code.. Lsufruct may!e onerous while commodatum is always or essentially
interest rate !y one party without the otherDs consent ( 0G v. CA, $38 SCRA $< [1994]]). 8o say otherwise will violate the principle of mutuality of contracts under Article $9=F of the Civil Code. 8o !e valid, therefore, any change of interest must !e mutually agreed upon !y the parties (F"@on v,
Ma,saysay, 7( SCRA $7< [19(4]).
n the
the de!tor not having given his consent to the increase in interest, the increase is void.
present pro!lem,
*%t%%m; )nterests ('##') Carlos sues Eino for *a. collection on a promissory note for a loan, with no agreement on interest, on which Eino defaulted, and *!. damages caused !y Eino on his *CarlosO. priceless &ichaelangelo painting on which Eino is lia!le on
gratuitous *Arts. $<99 X $<9A, Civil Code..
8he contract
constituting usufruct is consensual, while commodatum is a real contract *perfected only !y delivery of the su!/ect matter thereof.. However, !oth involve the en/oyment !y a person of the property of another, differing only as to the e"tent and scope of such en/oyment 2/us fruendi in one and
3us utendi in the other.) !oth may have as su!/ect matter either an immova!le or a mova!le) and, !oth may!e
the promissory note and awards damages to Carlos for the damaged painting, with interests for !oth awards. (hat rates of interest may the court impose with respect to !oth awards? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
(ith respect to the collection of money or promissory note, it !eing a for!earance of money, the legal rate of interest for
having defaulted on the payment of $5B will apply. (ith respect to the damages to the painting, it is GB from the
constituted over consuma!le goods *Arts. A-J X $<9G, Civil Code. .

A consuma!le thing may !e the su!/ect6 matter of an a!normal usufruct !ut in a normal usufruct, the su!/ect6
time of the final demand up to the time of finality of /udgment until /udgment credit is fully paid. 8he court
considers the latter as a for!earance of money. (2astern
S!"''"n, 5"nes, In+. v. CA, $34 SCRA (8 [1994]C Art $$10 an% $$11, CC)
matter may !e used only for e"hi!ition. A commodatum of
a consuma!le thing may !e only for the purpose of e"hi!iting, not consuming it. *%t%%m vs. Commo0at%m ('##!)
Eistinguish !riefly !ut clearly !etween &utuum and

commodatum.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*%t%%m; )nterests ('##!) 8he parties in a contract of loan of money agreed that the yearly interest rate is $5B and it can !e increased if there is
a law that would authori1e the increase of interest rates.
n &L8LL&, the o!/ect !orrowed must !e a consuma!le thing the ownership of which is transferred to the !orrower who incurs the o!ligation to return the same consuma!le to
the lender in an e7ual amount, and of the same 0ind and 7uality. n C%&&%EA8L&, the o!/ect !orrowed is
#uppose %N, the lender, would increase !y AB the rate of
interest to !e paid !y 8>, the !orrower, without a law authori1ing such increase, would %NOs action !e /ust and
valid? (hy? Has 8> a remedy against the imposition of the rate increase? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
usually a non6consuma!le thing the ownership of which is not transferred to the !orrower who incurs the o!ligation to return the very thing to the lender.
%NDs action is not /ust and valid. 8he de!tor cannot !e
re7uired to pay the increase in interest there !eing no law

authori1ing it, as stipulated in the contract. ncreasing the
Page 106 of 119
CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics (Year 19902006) rate in the a!sence of such law violates the
principle of
mutuality of contracts.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
+ven if there was a law authori1ing the increase in interest

rate, the stipulation is still void !ecause there is no
8o whom should a deliver the !ag of money? Eecide with reasons.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
corresponding stipulation to decrease the interest due when

the law reduces the rate of interest.
#EP!(I$
Compensation; ;an+ Loan (1997)
N would have no right to claim the money. Article $<<= of the Civil Code is not applica!le. 8he law refers to another thing received in su!stitution of the o!/ect deposited and is predicated upon something e"changed. 8he &ayor of &anila cannot invo0e. Article -$< of the Civil Code which re7uires the finder to deposit the thing with the
&ayor only when the previous possessor is un0nown.
n order to secure a !an0 loan, 4>H Corporation surrendered its deposit certificate, with a maturity date of =$ #eptem!er $<<- to the !an0. 8he corporation defaulted on the due repayment of the loan, prompting the !an0 to encash the deposit certificate. 4>H Corporation 7uestioned the a!ove action ta0en !y the !an0 as !eing a case of
pactum commissorium. 8he !an0 disagrees. (hat is your opinion?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n this case , a must return the !ag of money to the !an0 as

the previous possessor and 0nown owner *Arts. -$< and
$<<=. Civil Code..
(+"E$*
1ecover" of Deficienc" (1997) AN sold to CE a motor vehicle for and in consideration of :$5=,===.== to !e paid in twelve monthly e7ual installments
(e su!mit that there is no pactum commissorium here.
Eeposits of money in !an0s and similar institutions are governed !y the provisions on simple loans *Art. $<F=. Civil Code.. 8he relationship !etween the depositor and a !an0 is
one of creditor and de!tor. Nasically this is a matter of
of :$=,===,==, each installment !eing due and paya!le on
the $Ath day of each month starting 3anuary $<<-.

8o secure the promissory note, CE *a. e"ecuted a chattel
compensation as all the elements of compensation are present in this case (G I vs. CA, $3$ SCRA 30$).
A##I$I!'AL A'(WE":
mortgage on the su!/ect motor vehicle, and *!. furnished a

surety !ond issued !y :hilam life, CE failed to pay more
(here the security for the de!t is also money deposited in a

!an0, it is not illegal for the creditor to encash the time deposit certificates to pay the de!torDs overdue o!ligation.
(C!. .s. CA, et al., ;.R (8719, Se'te&/er $6, 1989).
than two *5. installments, AN went after the surety !ut he was only a!le to o!tain three6fourths *9SJ. of the total amount still due and owing from CE. AN see0s your advice
on how he might, if at all, recover the deficiency.
Deposit; E<c&ange (199') 4 and > staged a daring !an0 ro!!ery in &anila at $=:9=
How would you counsel AN?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
A& in the morning of a regular !usiness day, and escaped
>es, he can recover the deficiency. 8he action of AN to go after the surety !ond cannot !e ta0en to mean a waiver of
with their loot of two *5. !ags, each !ag containing
:A=,===,==. Euring their flight to elude the police, 4 and > entered the near!y loc0ed house of A, then wor0ing in his Pue1on City office. Crom ADs house, 4 and > stole a !o" containing cash totaling :A=,===.== which !o" A had !een 0eeping in
deposit for his friend N.
his right to demand payment for the whole de!t, 8he amount received from the surety is only payment pro tanto, and an action may !e maintained for a deficiency de!t.
A'$IC."E(I(
2ntic&resis (1999) %livia owns a vast mango plantation which she can no longer properly manage due to a lingering illness. #ince she is inde!ted to :eter in the amount of :A==.===.== she as0s :eter to manage the plantation and apply the harvest to the
payment of her o!ligation to him, principal and interest,
n their hurry, 4 and > left in ADs !edroom one *$. of the
!ags which they had ta0en from the !an0.
(ith 4 and > now at large and nowhere to !e found, the !ag containing :A=.===.== is now claimed !y N, !y the
&ayor of &anila, and !y the !an0.
N claims that the depository. A, !y force ma/eure had

deposited !y N.
until her inde!tedness shall have !een fully paid. :eter agrees.
o!tained the !ag of money in place of the !o" of money
$. (hat 0ind of contract is entered into !etween %livia
8he &ayor of &anila, on the other hand, claims that the !ag of money should !e deposited with the %ffice of the &ayor as re7uired of the finder !y the provisions of the Civil Code. 8he !an0 resists the claims of N and the &ayor of &anila.
and :eter? +"plain. 5. (hat specific o!ligations are imposed !y law on :eter as a conse7uence of their contract? 9. Eoes the law re7uire any specific form for the validity
J. &ay %livia re6ac7uire the plantation !efore her entire
of their contract? +"plain
inde!tedness shall have !een fully paid? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Page 107 of 119
$. A contract of antichresis was entered into !etween
payment of the loan. However, the loan was not paid on time. A month after J years, may the shares of stoc0 pledged !e deemed owned !y ANC or not? Ieason. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
%livia and :eter. Lnder Article 5$95 of the 'ew Civil Code, !y a contract of antichresis the creditor ac7uires the
right to receive the fruits of an immova!le of his de!tor, with the o!ligation to apply them to the payment of the
interest, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
8he shares of stoc0 cannot !e deemed owned !y ANC upon
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
5. :eter must pay ta"es and charges upon the land and
!ear the necessary e"penses for preservation and repair which he may deduct from the fruits. *Art, 5$9A, 'CC.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
default of &'%. 8hey have to !e foreclosed. Lnder Article 5=FF of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot appropriate the things given !y way of pledge. And even if the parties have
stipulated that ANC !ecomes the owner of the shares in
case &'% defaults on the loan, such stipulation is void for !eing a pactum commissorium. 4le0ge; *ortgage; 2ntic&resis (199-) n the province, a farmer couple !orrowed money from the local merchant. 8o guarantee payment, they left the 8orrens 8itle of their land with the merchant, for him to hold until they pay the loan. s there a 6 a. contract of pledge,
!. contract of mortgage, c. contract of antichresis, or
9.
specified in writing, otherwise the antichresis will !e void. *Art. 5$9J, 'CC.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he amount of the principal and interest must !e
the de!tor J. cannot re6ac7uire the en/oyment of the immova!le without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor. However, it is potestative on the part of the creditor to do
'o. Art. 5$9G specifically provides that
so in order to e"empt him from his o!ligation under Art. 5$9A, 'CC, 8he de!tor cannot re6ac7uire the en/oyment
d. none of the a!ove? +"plain.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
unless :eter compels %livia to enter again the en/oyment of

the property.
'one of the a!ove. 8here is no pledge !ecause only
mova!le property may !e pledged *Art. 5=<J. 'CC.. f at
all, there was a pledge of the paper or document
PLE#&E
4le0ge (199!)
constituting the 8orrens 8itle, as a mova!le !y itself, !ut
n $<F5, #teve !orrowed :J==.===.== from Eanny, collaterali1ed !y a pledge of shares of stoc0 of Concepcion
Corporation worth :F==,===,==. n $<F9, !ecause of the
not of the land which the title represents. 8here is no mortgage !ecause no deed or contract was
e"ecuted in the manner re7uired !y law for a mortgage
*Arts. 5=FA to 5=<5, 'CC) 5$5J to 5$9$, 'CC.. 8here is no contract of antichresis !ecause no right to the fruits of the property was given to the creditor *Art. 5$95 'CC..
economic crisis, the value of the shares pledged fell to only

:$==,===.==. Can Eanny demand that #teve surrender the other shares worth :-==,===.==?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
a. 'o. Nilateral contracts cannot !e changed unilaterally. A pledge is only a su!sidiary contract, and #teve is still inde!ted to Eanny for the amount of :J==,===.== despite
A contract of simple loan was entered into with security
arrangement agreed upon !y the parties which is not one of

those mentioned a!ove.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
the fall in the value of the stoc0s pledged. 'o. EannyDs right as pledgee is to sell !. the pledged
shares at a pu!lic sale and 0eep the proceeds as collateral for the loan. 8here is no showing that the fall in the value of the pledged property was attri!uta!le to the pledgerDs fault or fraud. %n the contrary, the economic crisis was the culprit. Had the pledgee !een deceived as to the su!stance or 7uality of the pledged shares of stoc0, he would have had
the right to claim another thing in their place or to the immediate payment of the o!ligation. 8his is not the case
8here is a contract of mortgage constituted over the land.
8here is no particular form re7uired for the validity of a
mortgage of real property. t is not covered !y the statute of frauds in Art. $J=9, 'CC and even assuming that it is covered, the delivery of the title to the creditor has ta0en it out of the coverage thereof. A contract of mortgage of real property is consensual and is !inding on the parties despite
a!sence of writing. However, third parties are not !ound
her e.
4le0ge ('##!)
ANC loaned to &'% :J=,=== for which the latter pledged J== shares of stoc0 in 4>H nc. t was agreed that if the pledgor failed to pay the loan with $=B yearly interest within four years, the pledgee is authori1ed to foreclose on re7uire share stoc0 the s of . As d, &'% delivered
possession of the shares to ANC with the understanding
!ecause of the a!sence of a written instrument evidencing the mortgage and, therefore the a!sence of registration. Nut this does not affect the validity of the mortgage !etween the parties *Art. 5$5A, 'CC., 8he creditor may compel the
de!tor to e"ecute the mortgage in a pu!lic document in
order to allow its registration *Art. $9A-.'CC in relation to Art. $9AF. 'CC..
/+A(I-C!'$"AC$
Page 108 of 119
tha the t shares
woul !e returned d to &'%
upon the
6%asi?Contracts; .egotiori%m Bestio (199')
n fear of reprisals from lawless elements !esieging his !arangay, 4 a!andoned his fishpond, fled to &anila and left for +urope. #ee0ing that the fish in the fishpond were ready
for harvest, >, who is in the !usiness of managing fishponds on a commission !asis, too0 possession of the property, harvested the fish and sold the entire harvest to H.
house under the principle of negotiorum gestio. He was not lia!le as the !urning of the house is a fortuitous event. s N lia!le to A for damages under the foregoing circumstances?
'o. N is not lia!le for damages, !ecause he is a gestor in
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8hereafter, > !orrowed money from ( and used the

money to !uy new supplies of fish fry and to prepare the fishpond for the ne"t crop.
negotiorum gestio *Art. 5$JJ, Civil Code. Curthermore, N is not lia!le to A !ecause Article 5$J- of the Civil Code is not applica!le . N did not underta0e ris0y operations which the owner was not accustomed to em!ar0 upon:
a. he has not preferred his own interest to that of the
a. (hat is the 3uridical relation !etween 4 and > during

4Ds a!sence? !. Lpon the return of 4 to the !arangay, what are the o!ligations of > to 4 as regards the contract with H? Lpon 4Ds return, what are the o!ligations c. of 4 as regards >Ds contract with (?
owner) !. he has not failed to return the property or !usiness after demand !y the owner) and c. he has not assumed the management in !ad faith.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
d. (hat legal effects will result if 4 e"pressly ratifies >Ds

management and what would !e the o!ligations of 4 in favor of >? +"plain all your answers.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
He would !e lia!le under Art. 5$J- *$. of the Civil Code,

!ecause he used the property for an operation which the
*a. 8he /uridical relation is that of the 7uasi6 contract of
"negotiorum gestio". > is the "gestor" or "officious

manager" and 4 is the "owner" *Art. 5$JJ, Civil Code..
operator is not accustomed to, and in so doing, he e"posed the house to increased ris0, namely the operation of a pension house on the second floor and stores on the first
floor 6%asi?Contracts; .egotiori%m Bestio (1999)
*!. > must render an account of his operations and deliver to 4 the price he received for the sale of the harvested fish
*Art, 5$JA, Civil Code..
Armando owns a row of residential apartments in #an 3uan,
*c. 4 must pay the loan o!tained !y > from ( !ecause 4

must answer for o!ligations contracted with third persons in the interest of the owner *Art. 5$A=, Civil Code., *d. +"press ratification !y 4 provides the effects of an
uncollected rentals accumulated for three *9. years. Amparo,

a niece of Armando, concerned with the interest of her
&etro &anila, which he rents out to tenants. %n $ April $<<$ he left for the Lnited #tates without appointing any administrator to manage his apartments such that
uncle, too0 it upon herself to administer the property. As a

conse7uence, she incurred e"penses in collecting the rents and in some instances even spent for necessary repairs to
e"press agency and 4 is lia!le to pay the commissions
ha!itually received !y the gestor as manager *Art. 5$J<,
preserve the property. $. (hat 3uridical relation !etween Amparo
Civil Code..
and Armando,
6%asi?Contracts; .egotiori%m Bestio (199()
if any, has resulted from AmparoDs unilateral act of assuming the administration of ArmandoDs apartments?
n #eptem!er, $<-5, upon declaration of martial rule in the :hilippines. A, together with his wife and children. disappeared from his residence along A. &a!ini #treet.
+rmita, &anila. N, his immediate neigh!or, noticing that mysterious disappearance of A and his family, closed the doors and windows of his house to prevent it from !eing
+"plain. 5. (hat rights and o!ligations, if any, does Amparo have under the circumstances? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'egotiorum gestio e"isted !etween Amparo and #he voluntarily too0 charge of the Armando, agency or
$.
!urglari1ed. >ears passed without N hearing from A and his family, N continued ta0ing care of ADs house, even causing
minor repairs to !e done at his house to preserve it. n
management of the !usiness or property of her uncle without any power from her uncle whose property was
neglected. #he is called the gestor negotiorum or officious manager, *Art. 5$JJ, 'CC. t is recommended !y the Committee
$<-G, when !usiness !egan to per0 up in the area, an enterprising man. C, approached N and proposed that they !uild stores at the ground floor of the house and convert its second floor into a pension house. N agreed to Cs proposal and together they spent for the construction of stores at the ground floor and the conversion of the second floor into a
pension house. (hile construction was going on, fire
5. that an enumeration of any two *5. o!ligations and two *5. rights as enumerated in Arts. 5$JA to 5$A5, 'CC, would entitle the e"aminee to full credit.
Art. 5$JA. 8he officious manager shall perform his duties
occurred at a near!y house. 8he houses at the entire !loc0,

including ADs were !urned. After the +E#A revolution in
Ce!ruary $<FG, A and his family returned from the Lnited
with all the diligence of a good father of a family, and pay the damages which through his fault or negligence may !e managem ent.
#tates where they too0 refuge in $<-5. Lpon learning of what happened to his house. A sued N for damages, N
suffered !y the owner of the property or !usiness under
pleaded as a defense that he merely too0 charge of his
Page 109 of 119
8he courts may, however, increase or moderate the

indemnity according to the circumstances of each case. Art. 5$JG. f the officious manager delegates to another person all or some of his duties, he shall !e lia!le for the acts of the delegate, without pre/udice to the direct o!ligation of the latter toward the owner of the !usiness.
*5. (hen the contract refers to things pertaining to the
owner of the !usiness,
2NOTE$ It is recommen(e( '0 t%e Committee t%at an enumeration of an0 t)o 2-3 o'li4ations an( an0 t)o 2-3 ri4%ts as enumerate( la Arts. -9B, to -9,-* NCC )oul( entitle t%e e&aminee to full cre(it.3
8he responsi!ility of two or more officious managers shall
6%asi?Contracts; ol%tio )n0ebiti ('##!) E:% went to a store to !uy a pac0 of cigarettes worth
!e solidary, unless management was assumed to save the thing or !usiness from imminent danger. Art. 5$J-. 8he officious manager shall !e lia!le for any fortuitous event:
:55A.== only. He gave the vendor, IIA, a :A==6peso !ill. 8he vendor gave him the pac0 plus :9-A.== change. (as
there a discount, an oversight, or an error in the amount given? (hat would !e E:%Os duty, if any, in case of an
*$. f he underta0es ris0y operations which the owner was

not accustomed to em!ar0 upon) *5. f he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner)
e"cess in the amount of change given !y the vendor? How is this situational relationship !etween E:% and IIA denominated? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8here was error in the amount of change given !y IIA.
8his is a case of solutio in(e'iti in that E:% received
*9. f he fails to return the property or !usiness after

demand !y the owner, *J. f he assumed the management in !ad faith. Art. 5$JF. +"cept when the management was assumed to save the property or !usiness from imminent danger, the officious manager shall !e lia!le for fortuitous events
something that is not due him. He has the o!ligation to return the :$==.==) otherwise, he will un/ustly enrich
himself at the e"pense of IIA. *Art. 5$AJ, Civil Code.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
E:% has the duty to return to IIA the e"cess :$== as
trustee under Article $JAG of the Civil Code which provides: f property is ac7uired through mista0e or fraud, the person
o!taining it is, !y force of law, considered a trustee of an
*$. f he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management) *5. f !y his ntervention h e prevented a more competent person from ta0ing up the management. Art. 5$J<. 8he ratification of the management !y the owner of the !usiness produces the effects of an e"press agency,
even if the !usiness may not have !een successful.
implied trust for the !enefit of the person from whom the
property comes. 8here is, in this case, an implied or
constructive trust in favor of IIA.
$!"$( , #A)A&E(
Collapse of tr%ct%res; Last Clear C&ance (199#) &r and &rs I own a !urned6out !uilding, the firewall of which collapsed and destroyed the shop occupied !y the family of &r and &rs #, which resulted in in/uries to said
Art. 5$A=, Although the officious management may not
have !een e"pressly ratified, the owner of the property or !usiness who en/oys the advantages of the same shall !e
lia!le for o!ligations incurred in his interest, and shall reim!urse the officious manager for the necessary and
useful e"penses and for the damages which the latter may
have suffered in the performance of his duties. 8he same o!ligation shall !e incum!ent upon him when the management had for its purpose the prevention of an imminent and manifest loss, although no !enefit may have
!een derived.
couple and the death of their daughter. &r and &rs # had !een warned !y &r X &rs I to vacate the shop in view of its pro"imity to the wea0ened wall !ut the former failed to do so.
recovery of damages the former suffered as a result of the collapse of the firewall. n defense, &r and &rs I rely on the doctrine of last clear chance alleging that &r and &rs # had the last clear chance to avoid the accident if only they
heeded the formerOs warning to vacate the shop, and therefore &r and &rs IOs prior negligence should !e
&r X &rs # filed against &r and &rs I an action for
Art. 5$A$. +ven though the owner did not derive any !enefit and there has !een no imminent and manifest
danger to the property or !usiness, the owner is lia!le as under the first paragraph of the preceding article, provided: *$. 8he officious manager has acted in good faith, and
disregarded. f you were the /udge, how would you decide the case? #tate your reasons.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
*5. 8he property or !usiness is intact, ready to !e returned

to the owner.
Art. 5$A5. 8he officious manager is personally lia!le for
would decide in favor of &r X &rs #. 8he proprietor of a !uilding or structure is responsi!le for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should !e due
to the lac0 of necessary repairs *Art 5$<= Civil Code.
contracts which he has entered into with third persons, even though he acted in the name of the owner, and there shall !e no right of action !etween the owner and third persons.
8hese provisions shall not apply:
As regards the defense of ?last clear chance,@ the same is not tena!le !ecause according to the #C in one +ase (Fe
Roy v CA 5680(18, -an $9, 1988, 17( S (7()
the doctrine of last
*$. f the owner has e"pressly or tacitly ratified the

management, or
clear chance is not applica!le to instances covered !y Art 5$<= of the Civil Code.
Page 110 of 119
CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics (Year 1990-2006) Availing of that portion of #ection $5 of Article Curther, in !oen"3 Constr.+t"on, In+. v. of the Inter&e%"ate A''ellate Co.rt (;.R. 5667$97, Mar+! 10, $<F- Constitution which 198(. 148 SCRA reads)
373) the #upreme Court held that the role of the
common law "last clear chance" doctrine in relation to Article 5$-< of
the Civil Code is merely to mitigate damages within the conte"t of contri!utory negligence.
Damages (199!) %n 3anuary A, $<<5, 'onoy o!tained a loan of :l,===,===.== from his friend Iaffy. 8he promissory note did not stipulate any payment for nterest. 8he note was
due on 3anuary A, $<<9 !ut !efore this date the two !ecame political enemies. 'onoy, out of spite, deli!erately defaulted
in paying the note, thus forcing Iaffy to sue him. $. (hat actual damages can Iaffy recover? 5. Can Iaffy as0 for moral damages from 'onoy? 9. Can Iaffy as0 for nominal damages? J. Can Iaffy as0 for temperate damages? A. Can Iaffy as0 for attorneyDs fees?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he #tate " "" shall e7ually protect the life of the mother and the life of the un!orn from conception, """"" which he claims confers a civil personality on the un!orn from the moment of conception. Noy filed a case for damages against the a!ortionist, praying therein that the latter !e ordered to pay him: *a. :9=,===.== as indemnity for the death of the fetus, *!. :$==.===.== as moral damages for the mental anguish and an"iety he
suffered, *c. :A=,===.== damages, *d. as e"emplary
:5=,===.== as nominal damages, and *e. :5A,===.== as

attorneyDs fees. &ay actual damages !e also recovered? f so, what facts should !e alleged and proved?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, provided that the pecuniary loss suffered should !e
su!stantiated and duly proved.
$. Iaffy may recover the amount of the promissory note
of :$ million, together with interest at the legal rate from the date of /udicial or e"tra/udicial n demand. addition,
Damages arising from Deat& of /nborn C&il0 ('##() f a pregnant woman passenger of a !us were to suffer an
however, inasmuch as the de!tor is in !ad faith, he is lia!le for all damages which may !e reasona!ly attri!uted to the
non6performance of the o!ligation. *Art. 55=$*5.. 'CC..
5.
a!ortion following a vehicular accident due to the gross negligence of the !us may she and her driver, hus!and
claim damages from the !us company for the death of their un!orn child? +"plain. AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es, under Article 555=, 'CC moral damages are
recovera!le in case of !reach of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in !ad faith.
9. 'ominal damages may not !e recovera!le in this case !ecause Iaffy may already !e indemnified of his losses with the award of actual and compensatory damages. '%& 'AL EA&AG+# are ad/udicated only in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has !een violated
'o, the spouses cannot recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the loss of life of the un!orn child. 8his is !ecause the un!orn child is not yet considered a person and the law allows indemnity only for loss of life of person. 8he mother, however may recover damages for the !odily in/ury she suffered from the loss of the fetus which is considered
part of her internal 8he parents may also organ. recover damages for in/uries that are inflicted directly upon them, e.g., moral damages for mental anguish that
or invaded !y the defendant may !e vindicated or recogni1ed, and not
attended the loss of the un!orn child.

(;el.s v. CA, $ SCRA 801 [1961])
#ince there is gross negligence,
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered !y him. *Article 559$. Civil Code.
J.
e"emplary damages can also !e recovered.
awarded temperate damages, for the reason that his actual damages may already !e compensated upon proof thereof with the promissory note. 8+&:+IA8+ EA&AG+#
Iaffy may as0 for, !ut would most li0ely not !e
may !e awarded only when the court finds that some

pecuniary loss has !een suffered !ut its amount cannot,
Deat& )n0emnit" (199!) 3ohnny &atonDs conviction for homicide was affirmed !y the Court of Appeals and in addition, although the prosecution had not appealed at all. 8he appellate court increased the indemnity for death from :9=,===.== to :A=,===.==. %n his appeal to the #upreme Court, among
from the nature of the case, !e proved with certainty. *Article 555J, Civil Code. A. >es, under paragraph 5, Article 55=F of the Civil Code,
considering that 'onoyDs act or omission has compelled Iaffy to litigate to protect his interests. Curthermore.
the other things 3ohnny &aton !rought to the high courtDs

attention, was the increase of indemnity imposed !y the
Court of Appeals despite the clear fact that the :eople had not appealed from the appellate courtDs /udgment.
s 3ohnny &aton correct?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
attorneysD fees may !e awarded !y the court when it is /ust

and e7uita!le. *Article 55=F*$$=. Civil Code..
a. n A/e:a& v. Co.rt o* A''eals, the #upreme Court said that even if the issue of damages were not raised !y the
appellant in the Court of Appeals !ut the Court of Appeals

in its findings increased the damages, the #upreme Court
Damages arising from Deat& of /nborn C&il0 (1991) %n her third month of pregnancy, Iosemarie, married to
will not distur! the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Noy, for reasons 0nown only to her, and without informing Noy, went to the clinic of 4, a 0nown a!ortionist, who for a
fee, removed and e"pelled the fetus from her wom!, Noy
!. 'o, the contention of the accused is not correct !ecause upon appeal to the Appellate Court, the court ac7uired #ince the conviction of homicide had !een appealed, there
learned of the a!ortion si" *G. months later.
/urisdiction over the entire case, criminal as well as civil.
Page 111 of 119
is no finality in the amount of indemnity !ecause the civil

lia!ility arising from the crime and the /udgment on the
A van owned !y %rlando and driven !y Eiego, while negotiating a downhill slope of a city road, suddenly gained
crime has not yet !ecome final
c. >es. #ince the civil indemnity is an award in the civil
action arising from the criminal offense, the rule that a party
cannot !e granted affirmative relief unless he himself has
appealed should apply. 8herefore, it was error for the Court of Appeals to have e"panded the indemnity since the
/udgment on the civil lia!ility had !ecome final.
and !umped a car in front of it, causing severed damage to the care and serious in/uries to its passengers. %rlando was not in the car at the time of the incident. 8he car owner and the in/ured passengers sued %rlando and Eiego for damages caused !y EiegoOs negligence. n their defense, Eiego claims
that the downhill slope caused the van to gain speed and
speed, o!viously !eyond the authori1ed limit in the area,
that, as he stepped on the !ra0es to chec0 the acceleration, eventually to hit the car in front of it. %rlando and Eiego
contend that the sudden malfunction of the vanOs !ra0e system is a fortuitous even and that, therefore, they are the !ra0es loc0ed, causing the van to go even faster and
'o. Courts can review matters not d. assigned as errors.

(Ay%ro Reso.r+e vs. CA . $04 SCRA 309).
Defense; D%e Diligence in election ('##()
e"empt from any lia!ility.
As a result of a collision !etween the ta"ica! owned !y A and another ta"ica! owned !y N, 4, a passenger of the first ta"ica!, was seriously in/ured. 4 later filed a criminal action
against !oth drivers.
s this contention tena!le? +"plain. *5B.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
'o. &echanical defects of a motor vehicle do not constitute fortuitous event, since the presence of such defects would
have !een readily detected !y diligent maintenance chec0.
&ay !oth ta"ica! owners raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their drivers to !e
a!solved from lia!ility for damages to 4? Ieason. AB
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he failure to maintain the vehicle in safe running condition

constitutes negligence.
Liabilit"; 2irline Compan"; .on?4erformance of an Obligation ('##!) E8 and &8 were prominent mem!ers of the fre7uent
t depends. f the civil action is !ased on a 7uasi6delict the ta"ica! owners may raise the defense of diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver) if the action against them is !ased on culpa
contractual or civil lia!ility arising from a crime, they cannot

raise the defense. ,iling of eparate Civil 2ction; .ee0 for 1eservation ('##()
they were upgraded !y computer to Cirst Class for the flight to &anila !ecause the Nusiness #ection was over!oo0ed.
travelersO clu! of C4 Airlines. n Hong0ong, the couple were assigned seats in Nusiness Class for which they had !ought %n chec0ing in, however, they tic0ets. were told
As a result of a collision !etween the ta"ica! owned !y A and another ta"ica! owned !y N, 4, a passenger of the first
Noth refused to transfer despite !etter seats, food, !everage and other services in Cirst Class. 8hey said they had guests
ta"ica!, was seriously in/ured. 4 later filed a criminal action

against !oth drivers.
s it necessary for 4 to reserve his right to institute a civil

action for damages against !oth ta"ica! owners !efore he can file a civil action for damages against them? (hy
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
in Nusiness Class they should attend to. 8hey felt humiliated, em!arrassed and ve"ed, however, when the stewardess allegedly threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade. 8hus they gave in, !ut during the transfer of luggage E8 suffered pain in his arm and wrist.
After arrival in &anila, they demanded an apology from C4Os management as well as indemnity payment. (hen none was forthcoming, they sued the airline for a million
t depends. f the separate civil action is to recover damages arising from the criminal act, reservation is necessary. f the
civil action against the ta"ica! owners is !ased on culpa contractual, or on 7uasi6delict, there is no need for
pesos in damages. s the airline lia!le for actual and moral damages? why not? +"plain !riefly. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
(hy or
reservation.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
'o, such reservation is not necessary. Lnder #ection $ of
Iule $$$ of the 5=== Iules on Criminal :rocedure, what is
?deemed instituted@ with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil lia!ility arising from the crime or e" delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 95, 99, 9J
E8 and &8, over their o!/ections, to Cirst Class !ecause they had contracted for Nusiness Class passage. However, although there is a !reach of contract, E8 and &8 are entitled to actual damages only for such pecuniary losses
C4 Airlines committed !reach of contract when it upgraded
and 5$-G of the 'ew Civil Code are no longer ?deemed
instituted@, and may !e filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action *#ection 9, Iule $$$, !id.. 8he failure to ma0e a
reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right

to file a separate and independent civil action !ased on
are not entitled to actual damages. &oreover, E8 could
suffered !y them as a result of such !reach. 8here seems to !e no showing that they incurred such pecuniary loss. 8here is no showing that the pain in E8Ds arm and wrist resulted directly from the carrierDs acts Hence, complained of. they have avoided the alleged in/ury !y re7uesting the airline staff to do the luggage transfer as a matter of duty on their part.
8here is also no !asis to award moral damages for such
these articles of the 'ew Civil Code (Cas.'anan

v. 5aroya ;R 0o. 147391, A.,.st $6, $00$).
!reach of contract !ecause the facts of the pro!lem do not show !ad faith or fraud on the part of the airline. (Cat!ay
However, they
a+"*"+ v. #a@N.e@, 399 SCRA $0( [$003]).
,ort%ito%s Event; *ec&anical Defects ('##')
Page 112 of 119
may recover moral damages if the cause of action is !ased

on Article 5$ of the Civil Code for the humiliation and
8he action may or may not prosper. &oral damages include

physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious an"iety, !esmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc0,
em!arrassment they felt when the stewardess threatened to

offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
f it can !e proved that E8Ds pain in his arm and wrist
occasioned !y the transfer of luggage was caused !y fault or negligence on the part of the airlineDs stewardess, actual
damages may !e recovered. 8he airline may !e lia!le for moral damages pursuant to Art.
they are the pro"imate result of the defendantDs wrongful act or omission. &oral damages predicated upon a !reach
social humiliation, and similar in/ury. Although incapa!le of pecuniary computation, moral damages may !e recovered if
55$< *$=. if the cause of action is !ased on Article 5$ or an act contrary to morals in view of the humiliation suffered !y
E8 and &8 when they were separated from their guests and were threatened to !e offloaded.
(Cat!ay a+"*"+ A"r9ays, 5t%. v. Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 60701, Mar+! 7, 1993) (here there is no showing that the
of contract of carriage are recovera!le only in instances where the carrier is guilty of fraud or !ad faith or where the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger.
airline acted fraudulently or in !ad faith, lia!ility for damages is limited to the natural and pro!a!le conse7uences of the !reach of
the contract of carriage which the parties had foreseen or
Liabilit"; 2irline Compan"; .on?4erformance of an

Obligation ('##9)
could have reasona!ly foreseen. n such a case the lia!ility does not include moral and e"emplary damages. n the instant case, if the involuntary upgrading of the AlmedasD seat accommodation was not attended !y fraud or !ad faith, the award of moral damages has no leg to stand on. 8hus, spouses would not also !e entitled to e"emplary damages. t is a re7uisite in the grant of e"emplary damages
that the act of the offender must !e accompanied !y !ad
Er. and &rs. Almeda are prominent citi1ens of the country

and are fre7uent travelers a!road. n $<<G, they !oo0ed
round6trip !usiness class tic0ets for the &anila6 Hong Rong6 &anila route of the :inoy Airlines, where they are holders of Gold &a!alos Class Cre7uent Clier cards. %n their return
flight, :inoy Airlines upgraded their tic0ets to first class
without their consent and, inspite of their protestations to !e allowed to remain in the !usiness class so that they could !e with their friends, they were told that the !usiness class was already fully !oo0ed, and that they were given priority in upgrading !ecause they are elite mem!ersSholders of Gold &a!alos Class cards. #ince they were em!arrassed at the discussions with the flight attendants, they were forced to ta0e the flight at the first class section apart from their friends who were in the !usiness class. Lpon their return to
faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner.

(Morr"s v. Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 1$(97(, 8e/r.ary $1, $001) &oreover, to !e entitled thereto, the
claimant must
first esta!lish temperate, or
his
right
to
moral,
compensatory damages. *Art. 559J, Civil Code. #ince the
Almedas are not entitled to any of these damages, the award for e"emplary damages has no legal !asis. (here the awards
&anila, they demanded a written apology from :inoy Airlines. (hen it went unheeded, the couple sued :inoy
for moral and e"emplary damages are eliminated, so must
the award for attorneyDs fees !e eliminated.
Airlines for !reach of contract claiming moral and

e"emplary damages, as well as attorneyDs fees. (ill the action prosper? Give reasons. *AB.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
(<rosa v. Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 111080, A'r"l 7, $000C Morr"s v. Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 1$(97(, 8e/r.ary $1, $001)
8he most that can !e ad/udged in their favor for :inoy AirlinesD !reach of 555$ of the Civil Code. (Cat!ay
>es, the action will prosper. Article 55=$ of the Civil Code entitles the person to recover damages which may !e
A"r9ays v. Co.rt o* A''eals (;.R. 0o. ((011, -.ly $4, 1990),
contract is an award for nominal damages under Article

a+"*"+ A"r9ays v. S's. Fan"el O Mar"a 5."sa #asN.e@, ;.R. 0o. 170843, Mar+! 14,
$003)
attri!uted to non6performance of an o!ligation. n Al"tal"a
when an airline issues tic0et to a passenger confirmed on a

particular flight, a contract of carriage arises and the
However, if spouses Almeda could prove that there was !ad

faith on the part of :inoy Airlines when it !reached the
passenger e"pects that he would fly on that day. (hen the airline deli!erately over!oo0ed, it too0 the ris0 of having to
contract of carriage, it could !e lia!le for moral, e"emplary as well as attorneyDs fees.
deprive some passengers of their seat in case all of them would show up. Cor the indignity and inconvenience of
!eing refused the confirmed seat, said passenger is entitled

to moral damages.
Liabilit"; Emplo"er; Damage ca%se0 b" Emplo"ees (1997) a. (hen would an employerDs lia!ility for damage, caused
!y an employee in the performance of his assigned tas0s, !e primary and when would it !e su!sidiary in
n the given pro!lem, spouses Almeda had a !oo0ed

roundtrip !usiness class tic0et with :inoy Airlines. (hen
nature? !. (ould the defense of due diligence in the selection and

supervision of the employee !e availa!le to the employer in !oth instances?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE"::
their tic0ets were upgraded to first class without their

consent, :inoy Airlines !reached the contract. As ruled in
=.l.eta v. an A&er"+an (;.R. 0o. 56$8789, -an.ary 8, 19(3),
in case of over!oo0ing, airline is in !ad faith. 8herefore, spouses Almeda are entitled to damages.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
*a. 8he employerDs lia!ility for damage !ased on culpa
a7uiliana under Art, 5$-G and 5$F= of the Civil Code is primary) while that under Art. $=9 of the Ievised :enal
Code is su!sidiary.
Page 113 of 119
8he defense of diligence in the *!. selection and supervision of the employee under Article 5$F= of the Civil Code is availa!le only to those primarily lia!le thereunder, !ut not to those su!sidiarily lia!le under Article $=9 of the Ievised :enal Code (?.&.l vs. -.l"ano, ($ !"l.
94).
the vehicle at the time of the accident, !e held solidarily
lia!le with his driver, 3ohn? *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
>es. Art may !e held solidary lia!le with 3ohn, if it was proven that the former could have prevented the
Liabilit"; owner w&o was in t&e ve&icle (199-)
&arcial, who does not 0now how to drive, has always !een driven !y Nen, his driver of ten years whom he had chosen carefully and has never figured in a vehicular mishap. %ne
day, &arcial was riding at the !ac0 seat of his &ercedes
misfortune with the use of due diligence. Article 5$FJ of the Civil Code states: " n motor mishaps, the owner is solidary lia!le with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, !y the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune, " " ""
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
$.
Nen1 !eing driven along +E#A !y Nen. A!sor!ed in reading a !oo0, &arcial did not notice that they were approaching the corner of Pue1on Avenue, when the traffic
light had /ust turned yellow. Nen suddenly stepped on the gas to cross the intersection !efore the traffic light could
C!a'&an vs, >n%er9oo% ($(
t depends. 8he #upreme Court in

!"l 3(4), held: "An owner who
turn red. Nut, too late. &idway in the intersection, the traffic
automo!ile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of law !y the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasona!le opportunity to o!serve them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom,
sits in his
light changed, and a 3eepney full of passengers suddenly
crossed the carDs path. A collision !etween the two vehicles was inevita!le. As a result, several /eepney passengers were
seriously in/ured. A suit for damages !ased on culpa
a7uiliana was filed against &arcial and Nen, see0ing to hold

them /ointly and severally lia!le for such in/uries. &ay &arcial !e held lia!le? +"plain.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
other hand, if the driver, !y a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasona!le opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, in/ures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automo!ile, although present therein at the time the act was committed is not responsi!le, either civilly or criminally, therefor. 8he act complained of must !e continued in the presence of the
owner for such a length of time that the owner, !y his
!ecomes himself responsi!le for such acts, " " " %n the
&arcial may not !e lia!le !ecause under Art. 5$FJ, 'CC,
the owner who is in the vehicle is not lia!le with the driver if !y the e"ercise of due diligence he could have prevented the in/ury. 8he law does not re7uire the owner to supervise
the driver every minute that he was driving. %nly when
ac7uiescence, ma0es his driverDs act his own."
Liabilit"; owner w&o was in t&e ve&icle ('##')
Eoes the presence of the owner inside the vehicle causing
through his negligence, the owner has lost an opportunity to

prevent the accident would he !e lia!le *Cae%o v. ?tt P!e
T!a", $6 SCRA 410 +"t"n, C!a'&an v. >n%er9oo% an%
damage to a third party affect his lia!ility for his driverOs negligence? +"plain *5B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
n motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is made solidarily
Manlan,"t v. Ma.ler, $70 SCRA 760). n this
case, the fact
that the owner was a!sor!ed in reading a !oo0 does not conclusively show that he lost the opportunity to prevent
lia!le with his driver if he *the owner. was in the vehicle and could have, !y the use of due diligence, prevented the mishap. (Cae%o v. ?. P!e T!a", $6 SCRA 410
[1968]).
the accident through his negligence.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
>es, &arcial should !e held lia!le. Art. 5$GJ. 'CC ma0es
an owner of a motor vehicle solidarily lia!le with the driver if, !eing in the vehicle at the time of the mishap, he could have prevented it !y the e"ercise of due diligence. 8he traffic conditions along +E#A at any time of day or night
are such as to re7uire the o!servance of utmost care and
*oral Damages & 2tt" ,ees ('##') %rtillo contracts Ca!ricato, nc. to supply and install tile
total alertness in view of the large num!er of vehicles

running at great speed. &arcial was negligent in that he
materials in a !uilding he is donating to his province. %rtillo pays A=B of the contract price as per agreement. t is also agreed that the !alance would !e paya!le periodically after every $=B performance until completed. After performing
a!out <9B of the contract, for which it has !een paid an
rendered himself o!livious to the traffic ha1ards !y reading

a !oo0 instead of focusing his attention on the road and
additional J=B as per agreement, Ca!ricato, nc. did not complete the pro/ect due to its sudden cessation of
supervising the manner in which his car was !eing driven. 8hus he failed to prevent his driver from attempting to !eat the traffic light at the /unction of Pue1on Avenue and +E#A, which &arcial, without !eing a driver himself could
have easily perceived as a rec0less course of conduct.
operations. nstead, Ca!ricato, nc. demands payment of the last $=B of the contract despite its non6 completion of the pro/ect. %rtillo refuses to pay, invo0ing the stipulation that payment of the last amount $=B shall !e upon completion. Ca!ricato, nc. !rings suit for the entire $=B. :lus damages, %rtillo counters with claims for *a. moral damages for Ca!ricato, nc.Os unfounded suit which has damaged his
reputation as a philanthropist and respect !usinessman in his community, and *!. attorneyOs fees.
A. Eoes %rtillo have a legal !asis for his claim for moral
Liabilit"; owner w&o was in t&e ve&icle (1993)
A Gallant driven !y 3ohn and owned !y Art, and a Corolla

driven !y its owner, Gina, collided somewhere along Adriatico #treet. As a result of the accident, Gina had a concussion. #u!se7uently. Gina !rought an action for
damages? *5B.
N. How a!out his claim for attorneyOs fees, having hired a

lawyer to defend him? *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
damages against 3ohn and Art. 8here is no dou!t that the
collision is due to 3ohnDs negligence. Can Art, who was in
Page 114 of 119
A. 8here is no legal !asis to %rtilloOs claim for moral damages. t does not fall under the coverage of Article 55$<
of the 'ew Civil Code.
)!en a (6year ol% /oy "n:.res !"s a) 'lay&ate 9!"le 'lay"n, 9"t! !"s *at!erDs r"*le. 23'la"n. ($4) 8he parents of the -6year old !oy who caused in/ury to his playmate are lia!le under Article 5$< of the Camily Code, in relation to Article 5$F= of the Civil Code since they e"ercise parental authority over the person of the !oy.
(Ta&ar,o v.
Co.rt o* A''eals, ;.R. 0o. 87044, -.ne 3, 199$C 2l+ano v. A"ll, ;.R. 0o. 56$4803, May $6, 19(()
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
N. %rtillo is entitled to attorneyOs fees !ecause Ca!ricatoOs complaint is a malicious prosecution or a case of clearly
unfounded civil action. *Art. 55=F 2J; and 2$$;, 'CC..

*oral Damages; .on?1ecover" =&ereof ('##-)
Lnder Article 55$< of the Civil Code, moral damages may !e recovered in the cases specified therein several of which are enumerated !elow. Choose the case wherein you cannot recover moral
damages. +"plain. *5.AB. a. A criminal offense resulting in physical in/uries !. Puasi6delicts causing physical in/uries c.
/)
)!en a %o&est"+ !el'er, 9!"le !a,,l"n, *or a
lo9er 'r"+e 9"t! a *"s! ven%or "n t!e +o.rse o* /.y"n, *oo%st.**s *or !er e&'loyerDs *a&"ly, sla's t!e *"s! ven%or, +a.s"n, !er to *all an% s.sta"n "n:.r"es. 23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
mmorality or dishonesty
llegal search
d.
e. &alicious prosecution (+&&E($E# A'(WE": mmorality and dishonesty, per se,
vendor. Lnder Article 5$F=, par. A of the Civil Code, "employers shall !e lia!le for the damages caused !y their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tas0s, even though the former are not
+mployer of the domestic helper who slapped a fish
are not among those cases enumerated in Article 55$< which can !e the !asis of an action for moral damages. 8he
law specifically mentions adultery or concu!inage, etc. !ut not any and every immoral act.
engaged in any !usiness or industry."

A +ar'enter "n a +onstr.+t"on
+o&'any +) a++"%entally !"ts t!e r",!t *oot o* !"s +o6 9orEer 9"t! a !a&&er. 23'la"n. ($4)
6%asi?Delict (199') As the result of a collision !etween a pu!lic service
8he owner of the construction company. Article 5$F=,

paragraph J states that "the owners and managers of an
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
passenger !us and a cargo truc0 owned !y E, 4 sustained physical in/uries and > died. Noth 4 and > were passengers of the !us. Noth drivers were at fault, and so 4 and H, the
only heir and legitimate child of the deceased >, sued the owners of !oth vehicles.
esta!lishment or enterprise are li0ewise responsi!le for
damages caused !y their employees in the service of the !ranches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions."
a. &ay the owner of the !us raise the defense of having

e"ercised the diligence of a good father of a family?
!. &ay E raise the same defense?
c. &ay 4 claim moral damages from !oth defendants?
%) sta/s !"s +lass&ate 9!o "s !"s r"val *or a ,"rl 9!"le t!ey 9ere ,o"n, o.t o* t!e +lassroo& a*ter t!e"r last +lass.
A 176year ol% !",! s+!ool st.%ent
d. &ay H claim moral damages from !oth
23'la"n. ($4)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
reasons for all your answers,

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he school, teacher and administrator as they e"ercise

Art. 5$F and Art. 5$< of the Camily Code.
*a. 'o. 8he owner of the !us cannot raise the defense !ecause the carrierDs lia!ility is !ased on !reach of contract *!. >es. E can raise the defense !ecause his lia!ility is
special parental authority. *Art. 5$F=, par. in relation to
e) )!at %e*ense, "* any, "s ava"la/le to t!e&1 ($4)

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!ased on a 7uasi6 delict. *c. Necause 4 suffered physical in/uries, 4 can claim moral damages against E, !ut as against the owner of the !us. 4
8he defense that might !e availa!le to them is the o!servance of a good father of the family to prevent the
damage. *Last par., Art. 5$F=, Civil Code.
can claim moral damages only if 4 proves rec0less negligence of the carrier amounting to fraud. *d. H can claim moral damages against !oth defendants !ecause the rules on damages arising from death due to a
6%asi?Delict; 2cts contrar" to morals (199-) Iosa was leasing an apartment in the city. Necause of the
Ient Control Law, her landlord could not increase the rental as much as he wanted to, nor terminate her lease as
long as she was paying her rent. n order to force her to
7uasi6delict are also applica!le to death of a passenger

caused !y !reach of contract !y a common carrier *Arts.
$-A A. $-AG, $-GJ, 55=G and 55$<. Civil Code..
leave the premises, the landlord stopped ma0ing repairs on the apartment, and caused the water and electricity services to !e disconnected. 8he difficulty of living without
6%asi?Delict ('##9)
electricity and running water resulted in IosaDs suffering a nervous !rea0down. #he sued the landlord for actual and
Lnder the law on 7uasi6delict, aside from the persons who caused in/ury to persons, who else are lia!le under the
following circumstances:
moral damages. (ill the action prosper? +"plain.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
Page 115 of 119
>es, !ased on 7uasi6delict under the human relations
for 7uasi6delict may nonetheless prosper. 8he #upreme

Court has consistently ruled that the act that !rea0s the
provisions of the 'ew Civil Code *Articles $<, 5= and 5$. !ecause the act committed !y the lessor is contrary to morals. &oral damages are recovera!le under Article 55$< *$=. in relation to Article 5$. Although the action is !ased on 7uasi6delict and not on contract, actual damages may !e recovered if the lessee is a!le to prove the losses and
e"penses she suffered.
contract may also !e a tort. 8here is a fiduciary relationship !etween the !an0 and the depositor, imposing utmost
diligence in managing the accounts of the depositor. 8he
dishonor of the chec0 adversely affected the credit standing of 8ony, hence, he is entitled to damages
(S"n,son v. G I, ;.R. 0o. 56$493$, -.ne $(, 1968C A&er"+an 23'ress Internat"onal, In+. v. IAC, ;.R. 0o. ($383, 0ove&/er 9, 1988C Consol"%ate% GanE an% Tr.st v. CA, ;.R. 0o. 56(0(66 0ove&/er 9,1998).
a. >es, !ased on !reach of contract. 8he lessor has the
o!ligation to underta0e repairs to ma0e the apartment

ha!ita!le and to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and
ade7uate en/oyment of the lease for the entire duration of
the contract *Article $GAJ. 'CC.. #ince there was willful !reach of contract !y the lessor, the lessee is entitled to
moral damages under Article 955=, 'CC.
entitled to actual damages, e. g. loss of income, medical e"penses, etc., which she can prove at the trial.
#he is also
@icario%s Liabilit" (1991) Iomano was !umped !y a minivan owned !y the #olomon #chool of :ractical Arts *##:A.. 8he minivan was driven !y :eter, a student assistant whose assignment was to clean the after regular classes, in e"change for free tuition. :eter was a!le to drive the school vehicle after persuading the regular driver, :aul, to turn over the wheel to him *:eter.. Iomano suffered serious physical in/uries. 8he accident happened at night when only one headlight of the vehicle was functioning and :eter only had a student driverDs permit. As a conse7uence, :eter was convicted in the criminal case.
8hereafter, Iomano sued for damages against :eter and school passageways daily one hour !efore and one hour
!. >es, !ased on contract andSor on tort. 8he lessor willfully !reached his o!ligations under Article $GAJ. 'CC, hence, he is lia!le for !reach of contract. Cor such !reach, the 'CC, and actual damages that she may have suffered on
the lessee may recover moral damages under Art. 555= of account thereof. And since the conduct of the lessor was contrary to morals, he may also !e held lia!le for 7uasi6
##:A.
delict. 8he lessee may recover moral damages under Article

55$< *$=. in relation to Article 5$, and all actual damages which she may have suffered !y reason of such conduct under Articles <, 5= and 5$.
a. (ill the action for damages against :eter and ##:A
prosper? !. (ill your answer !e the same if, :aul, the regular
driver, was impleaded as party defendant for allowing :eter to drive the minivan without a regular driverDs
c. >es, the action should prosper for !oth actual and moral
damages. n fact, even e"emplary damages and attorneyDs
c. s the e"ercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of :eter and :aul a material issue to !e
license.
fees can !e claimed !y Iosa, on the authority of given, the lessorDs willful and illegal act of disconnecting the water and
Ma,/an.a vs. IAC (13( SCRA 3$8), considering that, as
resolved in this case?

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
electric services resulted in IosaDs suffering a nervous !rea0down. Art. 5= 'CC and Art, 5$, 'CC authori1e the
award of damages for such willful and illegal conduct.

6%asi?Delict; *ismanagement of DepositorFs 2cco%nt
A. >es. t will prosper *Art, 5$F=. !ecause at the time he drove the vehicle, he was not performing his assigned tas0s as provided for !y Art. 5$F=. (ith respect to ##:A, it is not
lia!le for the acts of :eter !ecause the latter was not an employee as held !y #upreme Court in
8"la&er C!r"st"an
Inst"t.te vs. CA. (190 SCRA 487). :eter
('##-) 8ony !ought a Cord +"pedition from a car dealer in

&untinlupa City. As payment, 8ony issued a chec0 drawn against his current account with :remium Nan0. #ince he
!elongs to a special
category of students who render service to the school in
e"change for free tuition fees. N. would maintain the same answer !ecause the incident did not occur while the employee was in the performance of
his duty as such employee. 8he incident occurred at night
has a good reputation, the car dealer allowed him to immediately drive home the vehicle merely on his assurance
that his chec0 is sufficiently funded. (hen the car dealer deposited the chec0, it was dishonored on the ground of
"Account Closed." After an investigation, it was found that an employee of the !an0 misplaced 8onyDs account ledger.
8hus, the !an0 erroneously assumed that his account no longer e"ists. Later it turned out that 8onyDs account has more than sufficient funds to cover the chec0. 8he dealer however, immediately filed an action for recovery of possession of the vehicle against 8ony for which he was
time, and in any case, there was no indication in the pro!lem that he was performing his duties as a driver.
C. n the case of :eter, if he were to !e considered as
employee, the e"ercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of peter would not !e a material issue since the conviction of :eter would result in a su!sidiary lia!ility where the defense would not !e availa!le !y the employer. n the case of :aul, since the !asis of su!sidiary lia!ility is the pater familias rule under Art. 5$F=, the defense of selection and supervision of the employee would !e a valid defense.
terri!ly humiliated and em!arrassed. Eoes 8ony have a

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
cause of action against :remium Nan0? +"plain. *AB. >es, 8ony may file an action against :remium Nan0 for relationship !etween 8ony and :remium Nan0, an action
damages under Art. 5$-G. +ven if there e"ists a contractual
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Page 116 of 119
C. n the case of :eter, if he were to !e considered an
8he doctrine of , CAI %L# L AN L 8> is that which
employee, the e"ercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of :eter would not !e a material issue since the conviction of :eter would result in a su!sidiary lia!ility where the defense would not !e availa!le !y the employer. n the case of :aul, since he was in the performance of his wor0 at the time the incident occurred, the school may !e held su!sidiarily lia!le not !ecause of the conviction of
:eter, !ut !ecause of the negligence of :aul under Art.
renders a person lia!le for the negligence of others for whose acts or omission the law ma0es him responsi!le on the theory that they are under his control and supervision. @icario%s Liabilit" ('##!) %3 was employed as professional driver of && 8ransit !us
owned !y &r. n the course of his wor0, N8. %3 hit a pedestrian who was seriously in/ured and later died in the
5$F=.
@icario%s Liabilit" ('##1) After wor0ing overtime up to midnight, Al!erto, an e"ecutive of an insurance company drove a company and sang some songs with friends to "unwind". At 5:==
hospital as a result of the accident. 8he victimOs heirs sued the driver and the owner of the !us for damages. s there a presumption in this case that &r. N8, the owner, had !een f so, is the presumption negligent? a!solute or not? +"plain. *AB.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
vehicle to a favorite ,ideo0e !ar where he had some drin0s a.m., he drove home, !ut in doing so, he !umped a tricycle, resulting in the death of its driver. &ay the insurance
company !e held lia!le for the negligent act of Al!erto?
employer. However, such presumption is re!utta!le. 8he lia!ility of the employer shall cease when they prove that
>es, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the
they o!served the diligence of a good father of a family to

prevent damage *Article 5$F=, Civil Code.. (hen the employee causes damage due to his own
(hy?
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
8he insurance company is not lia!le !ecause when the
accident occurred, Al!erto was not acting within the assigned tas0s of his employment.
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the
6uris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,
re!utta!le only !y proof of o!servance of the diligence of a

good father of a family (Metro Man"la
Trans"t v. CA, $$3 SCRA 7$1 [1993]C 5"nes v, COtA Felsan Trans'ort
t is true that under Art. 5$F= *par. A., employers are lia!le
for damages caused !y their employees who were acting
Constr.+t"on, 41$ SCRA 7$4 $003).
within the scope of their assigned tas0s. However, the mere fact that Al!erto was using a service vehicle of the employer mean that he was operating the vehicle within the scope of his employment. n Cast"le3 In%.str"al Cor'.
v. #asN.e@ -r
at the time of the in/urious accident does not necessarily
Li0ewise, if the driver is charged and convicted in a criminal case for criminal negligence, N8 is su!sidiarily lia!le for the
damages arising from the criminal act.
@icario%s Liabilit" ('##-)
(3$1
SCRA393
Court held that
[1999]).
the #upreme
notwithstanding the fact that the employee did some overtime wor0 for the company, the former was, nevertheless, engaged in his own affairs or carrying out a
/amin too0 the vehicle !ut did not register the sale with the minor who did not have a driverDs license, to drive the car to !uy pan de sal in a !a0ery. %n the way, Carlos driving in a
rec0less manner, sideswiped Eennis, then riding a !icycle. As a result, he suffered serious physical in/uries. Eennis filed a criminal complaint against Carlos for rec0less Land 8ransportation %ffice. He allowed his son Carlos, a
Arturo sold his :a/ero to Nen/amin for :$ &illion. Nen6
personal purpose when he went to a restaurant at 5:== a.m. after coming out from wor0. 8he time of the accident *also 5:== a. m.. was outside normal wor0ing hours.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he insurance company is lia!le if Al!erto was negligent in the operation of the car and the car was assigned to him for the !enefit of the insurance company, and even though he
was not within the scope of his assigned tas0s when the accident happened. n one case decided !y the #upreme Court, where an e"ecutive of a pharmaceutical company was
imprudence resulting in serious physical in/uries.
1. Can Fenn"s *"le an "n%e'en%ent +"v"l a+t"on a,a"nst Carlos an% !"s *at!er Gen:a&"n *or %a&a,es /ase% on N.as"6%el"+t1 23'la"n. ($,74)
(+&&E($E# A'(WE": >es,
given the use of a company car, and after office hours, the e"ecutive made personal use of the car and met an accident,
the employer was also made lia!le under Art. 5$F= of the
Eennis can file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father for damages !ased on 7uasi6delict there !eing an act or omission causing
damage to another without contractual o!ligation. Lnder
Civil Code for the in/ury caused !y the negligent operation

of the car !y the e"ecutive, on the ground that the car
which caused the in/ury was assigned to the e"ecutive !y the

employer for the prestige of the company. 8he insurance
#ection $ of Iule $$$ of the 5=== Iules on Criminal :rocedure, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil lia!ility arising from
the act or omission punished !y law. An action !ased on
company was held lia!le even though the employee was not performing within the scope of his assigned tas0s when the accident happened [#alen@.ela v. CA, $73 SCRA
3<3 (1996)].
7uasi6delict is no longer deemed instituted and may !e filed separately 2#ection 9, Iule $$$, Iules of Criminal :rocedure;.
$. Ass.&"n, Fenn"sD a+t"on "s tena/le, +an Gen:a&"n ra"se
t!e %e*ense t!at !e "s not l"a/le /e+a.se t!e ve!"+le "s not
@icario%s Liabilit" ('##') +"plain the concept of vicarious lia!ility in 7uasi6delicts.
*$B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
re,"stere% "n !"s na&e1 23'la"n. ($.74)
Page 117 of 119

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
raise the
'o, Nen/amin cannot
called ?oncomouse@ in &anila? (hat will !e your advice to him? *AB.

(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
defense that the vehicle is not registered in his name. His
lia!ility, vicarious in character, is !ased on Article 5$F= !ecause he is the father of a minor who caused damage due
to negligence. (hile the suit will prosper against the
*$. 8he reciprocity principle in private international law may

!e applied I.A. F5<9, ntellectual reciprocity,
registered owner, it is the actual owner of the private vehicle who is ultimately lia!le (See F.av"t v. CA, ;.R.
0o. 56$9(79, May 18, 1989). 8he purpose of car registration
in our /urisdiction. #ection 9 of the :roperty Code, provides for as
is to reduce difficulty in identifying the party lia!le in case of accidents

(#"llan.eva v. Fo&"n,o, ;.R. 0o. 144$(4, Se'te&/er 14,
$00 4).
follows: "Any person who is a national, or who is domiciled, or has a real and effective industrial esta!lishment in a country which is a party to any convention, treaty or agreement relating to intellectual property rights or the repression of unfair competition, to which the :hilippines is also a party,
or e"tends reciprocal rights to nationals of the :hilippines
@icario%s Liabilit"; 4%blic /tilit" ('###)
#ilvestre leased a car from Avis6Ient6A6Car Co. at the &actan nternational Airport. 'o sooner had he driven the car outside the airport when, due to his negligence, he
!umped an C4 ta"i owned and driven !y ,ictor, causing
damage to the latter in the amount of :$==,===.==. ,ictor for damages against !oth #ilvestre filed an and Avis, action !ased on 7uasi6 Avis filed a motion to dismiss delict. the complaint against it on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action. Iesolve the motion. *9B.
(+&&E($E# A'(WE":
!y law, shall !e entitled to !enefits to the e"tent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of an intellectual property right is otherwise entitled !y this Act. *n." 8o illustrate: the :hilippines may refrain from
imposing a incorporation re7uirement or of local
esta!lishment of a local domicile for the protection of

industrial property rights of foreign nationals *citi1ens of Canada, #wit1erland, L.#.. if the countries of said foreign
8he motion to dismiss should !e granted, A, # is not the
employer of #ilvestre) hence, there is no right of action against A, # under Article 5$F= of the Civil Code. 'ot !eing the employer, A, # has no duty to supervise #ilvestre. 'either has A, # the duty to o!serve due diligence in the selection of its customers. Nesides, it was
nationals refrain from imposing said re7uirement on Cilipino citi1ens.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
Ieciprocity principle cannot !e applied in our /urisdiction
!ecause the :hilippines is a party to the 8I :# agreement and the (8%. 8he principle involved is the most6favored
nation clause which is the principle of non6 discrimination.
given in the pro!lem that the cause of the accident was the
negligence of #ilvestre.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he protection afforded to intellectual property protection
in the :hilippines also applies to other mem!ers of the
8he motion should !e denied. Lnder the :u!lic #ervice
(8%. 8hus, it is not really reciprocity principle in private

international law that applies, !ut the most6 favored nation
Law, the registered owner of a pu!lic utility is lia!le for the damages suffered !y third persons through the use of such pu!lic utility. Hence, the cause of action is !ased in law, the
:u!lic #ervice Law.
clause under pu!lic international law.

*5. 8here is no legal reason why "oncomouse" cannot !e
protected under the law. Among those e"cluded from

patent protection are "plant varieties or animal !reeds, or essentially !iological process for the production of plants
I'$ELLEC$+AL P"!PE"$*
)ntellect%al Creation ('##!) Er. AL4 is a scientist honored for wor0 related to the human genome Among pioneeri pro/ect. his ng efforts
and animals" *#ection 55.J ntellectual :roperty Code, I.A. 'o. F5<9.. 8he "oncomouse" in the pro!lem is not an essentially !iological process for the production of animals. t is a real invention !ecause its !ody cells do not naturally
occur in nature !ut are the product of manDs ingenuity, intellect and industry.
concern stem cell research for the cure of Al1heimerOs disease. Lnder corporate sponsorship, he helped develop a
micro!e that ate and digested oil spills in the sea. 'ow he leads a college team for cancer research in &##
#tate. 8he team has e"perimented on a mouse whose !ody replica !e cancerou cells te and ar s tumor. Called
?oncomouse@, it is a life6form useful for medical research and it is a novel ts !ody cells do not creation. naturally
8he !reeding of oncomouse has novelty, inventive step and industrial application. 8hese are the three re7uisites of patenta!ility. *#ec. 5<, :C. 8here are no ethical reasons why Er. AE4 and his college
team cannot !e given e"clusive ownership over their
occur in nature !ut are the product of manOs intellect, industry and However, there is a dou!t ingenuity. whether
local property laws and ethics would allow rights of
invention. 8he use of such genetically modified mouse, useful for cancer research, outweighs considerations for
animal rights.
e"clusive ownership on any life6form. Er. AL4 needs your
advice: *$. whether the reciprocity principle in private international law could !e applied in our /urisdiction) and *5.
8here are no legal and ethical reasons that would frustrate Er. AL4Ds claim of e"clusive ownership over "oncomouse".
Animals are property capa!le of !eing appropriated and
whether there are legal and ethical reasons that could frustrate his claim of e"clusive ownership over the life6form
ownedD. n fact, one can own pet dogs or cats, or any other
animal. f wild animals are capa!le of !eing owned, with
more reason animals technologically enhanced or corrupted
Page 118 of 119
!y manDs invention or industry are suscepti!le to e"clusive ownership !y the inventor.

AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he oncomouse is a higher life form which does not fall within the definition of the term "invention". 'either may it fall within the am!it of the term "manufacture" which usually implies a non6living mechanistic product. 8he oncomouse is !etter regarded as a "discovery" which is the common patrimony of man.
AL$E"'A$IVE A'(WE":
8he "oncomouse" is a non6 patenta!le invention. Hence, cannot !e owned e"clusively !y its inventor. t is a method for the treatment of the human or animal !ody !y surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on said !odies are not patenta!le under #ec. 55 of the :C.
Page 119 of 119

Answers To Bar Examination Questions in Civil Law (2006)

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CIVIL LAW Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics (Year 1990-2006)