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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Petitioner v. STATE OF MAINE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES Respondent I. * * * * * * NATURE OF ACTION TO BE REVIEWED MRCivP RULE 80(C) 5 MRSA 11001 11008 PETITION FOR REVIEW OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION

This is an action challenging the STATE OF MAINE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLEs decision to administratively suspend drivers license #1491178 on January 5, 2010 pursuant to 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) and 5 MRSA 10004(3) and their successive and repeated refusals to grant an administrative hearing after being notified by Petitioner on March 18, 2013 that required notices and Petitioners actual knowledge of the suspension did not occur until March 7, 2011 and actual knowledge of the statutory authority and subject matter of the medical suspension, or her right to an administrative hearing did not occur until early March 2013. Respondents repeated refusal to grant the administrative hearing despite the uncontested facts of the record was contrary to law in that it was based on an interpretation inconsistent with statutory and constitutional duties, was made upon unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner asks this court, if it is within their discretion to do so at this time, to review the evidence in support of AUG-CR-2011-512 and AUG-CR-2011-513 and make any judicial decisions and corrections to the record as it deems appropriate, just and reasonable. If it is not within this courts jurisdiction to review that evidence at this time, to take notice that Petitioner reserves her right to request review of this issue at a later date and this court advise Petitioner of the appropriate appellate procedure to have this information reviewed. Petitioner seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to require Respondent to provide the required administrative hearing and prove their allegations with the
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required substantial evidence that Petitioner was incompetent to safely operate an automobile at the time of the administrative medical suspension on January 5, 2010. II. 1. 2. 3. 4. JURISDICTION AND VENUE This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 5 MRSA 11001 11008, Petitioner has standing to bring this petition. Venue is proper in this court as this Petition seeks review of final agency Petitioner believes she has exhausted all of her administrative remedies in

and Rule 80(C) of Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.

action by an agency of the state of Maine. trying to rectify the improper administrative medical suspension on January 5, 2010 and the resulting improper criminal prosecution on July 5, 2011. III. 5. GROUNDS FOR THIS PETITION Petitioner alleges the Respondent erred by refusing to grant the required

preliminary and post-suspension administrative hearings despite their failure to provide Petitioner with any curative instruction on March 7 or 8, 2011, or at any time thereafter, notifying Petitioner of her right to preliminary and post-suspension administrative hearings, and then the Respondent turned the scenario around by claiming Petitioners time to request those administrative hearings has now expired. 6. Petitioner claims that the March 8, 2011 termination of the administrative medical suspension and reinstatement of license #1491178 should have no negative bearing on this courts decision to review this agencys action because the State has used the January 5, 21010 administrative medical suspension as a prior offense to prosecute Petitioner for two (2) operating after suspension violations on July 5, 2011 under 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A)(A) docketed as AUG-CR-2011-512 and AUG-CR-2011513 which ultimately resulted in a coerced plea agreement for AUG-CR-2011-513 after Petitioner was threatened with wrongful imprisonment and excessive fines by both the Assistant District Attorney Steve Parker and District Court Judge Beth Dobson on July 5, 2011 and again on December 19, 2011. 7. Petitioner alleges and the record confirms that the coerced plea agreement from July 5, 2011 docketed as AUG-CR-2011-513 is now being used by this court as a prior offense for pending cases AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667 which have been joined together under AUG-CR-2012-286.

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8.

Petitioner alleges Respondent erred by failing to provide proper and

sufficient evidence for the administrative medical suspension of January 5, 2010 claiming incompetence when the record specifically requires the inclusion of such evidence and clearly expresses any suspension without a preliminary hearing must be supported by clear and sufficient evidence on the record at the time of Respondents action. 9. Petitioner alleges that Respondent failed to properly notify the public of a potential danger of a health or safety hazard which was the basis for their decision to suspend license #1491178 under 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) without preliminary hearing. 10. #1491178. 11. Respondents refusal to grant the required administrative hearing does in fact violate Petitioners right to confront and cross examine all accusers as protected by the 6th Amendment which would in fact prove that Respondent relied on forbidden hearsay evidence, if there was any evidence at all, and clearly did not have enough evidence to commence the administrative medical suspension against license #1491178 on January 5, 2010 pursuant to 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D). 12. Respondent abused their discretion by maintaining that improper administrative medical suspension for 397 days beyond the 30 day limitation pursuant to 5 MRSA 10004(3) which unlawful extension was the direct cause and necessary prior offense used in AUG-CR-2011-512 and AUG-CR-2011-513. 13. was: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record; and (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion. The standard of review for this petition are that the Respondent suspending Maine driving license #1491178 on January 5, 2010 for incompetence Respondent has not rebutted Petitioners claim that proper service of required notices was clearly not completed also sufficiently evidenced in driving record

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IV. 14.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Gina Lynn Turcotte unwillingly became transient in September

2007 after surviving a dangerous and destructive micro-burst tornado in Windsor, Maine which severely damaged her rented residence and consequently caused her residency to become stopgap and unstable for the next few years. Petitioner has since lived in no less than two dozen different residences with some of those residencies lasting for less than two weeks. Petitioners residency has recently stabilized. 15. Consequently, Petitioner was unable to keep a current mailing address consistently on file with Respondent which prevented Respondents notices from being properly and immediately delivered directly to Petitioner. As a result of Petitioners inability to receive timely correspondences from Respondent, Petitioner unknowingly and innocently failed to fulfill a request for a medical evaluation in late 2009 because those requests were returned to Respondent marked as UNDELIVERABLE by the United States Postal Service. The record shows that the Respondent did not post subsequent public notices in their attempt to follow due process nor did they give required notices to the public at large of a potential health or safety hazard allegedly caused by Petitioners continued operation. 16. 17. In fact, no notices, private or public, were properly served to support a Despite Respondents own knowledge and records showing that Petitioner legal suspension of any kind. had not received nor been served with the required notices, Respondent knowingly ignored procedural due process by not posting public notices and did in fact suspend drivers license #1491178 on January 5, 2010 pursuant to 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) and 5 MRSA 10004(3) without holding a preliminary hearing, without having clear and sufficient evidence of incompetency, without receiving any reports of adverse operation, without having clear and sufficient evidence of a health or safety hazard, and without the advice of the Medical Advisory Board or any other competent medical professional. Additionally, Respondent maintained the administrative medical suspension for 397 days beyond the statutory limitations as imposed by 5 MRSA 10004(3) Action without Hearing which states: Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 10003 and 10051, an agency may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew any license without proceedings in conformity with subchapters IV or VI, when:
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3. Health or safety hazard. The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days. 18. Respondent initially suspended license #1491178 under the statutory authority of 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) citing incompetence; therefore, it is reasonable that Respondent was also invoking 5 MRSA 10004(3) Action without Hearing because of the alleged potential danger allegedly caused by Petitioners continued operation, but which also places clear restrictions on Respondents statutory authority and their irrevocable duties to Petitioner. 19. On February 10, 2011, Augusta Police Officer Eric DosSantos initiated a traffic stop without jurisdiction or any evidence that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed, and which resulted in Petitioner being released from the scene after being issued a Violation Summons and Complaint for failure to obey a traffic control device. Officer DosSantos did not indicate in any way nor inform Petitioner that license #1491178 was suspended or revoked. 20. On March 7, 2011, which was four hundred twenty seven (427) days after the administrative medical suspension began, Augusta Police Officer Eric DosSantos, without jurisdiction or any evidence that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed, affected a traffic stop and twice asked Petitioner if her license was suspended which Petitioner twice denied; this communication served as Petitioners first actual notice of the administrative medical suspension only. Officer DosSantos asked Petitioner if she knew any reason the Medical Unit at Bureau of Motor Vehicle would have to suspend the license which Petitioner declined any knowledge and insisted the license should be active. 21. Officer DosSantos advised Petitioner that she was being served with two (2) Uniform Summons And Complaints under 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A)(A) (for February 10, 2011 and March 7, 2011) with a court appearance for April 13, 2011. 22. Officer DosSantos and Petitioner discussed the medical suspension at length at which time Officer DosSantos indicated there was a possibility the District Attorneys office would dismiss both complaints upon Petitioner immediately providing
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proof that the medical suspension was properly terminated. Petitioner called a friend for a ride from the traffic stop to her residence at which time she immediately contacted the Medical Unit at Bureau of Motor Vehicle but because of the lateness of the day, Petitioner was unable to contact her physicians office until the next day. 23. On March 8, 2011, Petitioner fulfilled Respondents request for a medical evaluation by submitting a declaration signed by Petitioners physician that Petitioner, in fact, was not under the influence of any medications nor did her mild medical conditions cause any known difficulty to her safely operating any type of automobile. 24. At no time on March 7th or 8th, 2011, or at any time thereafter, during Petitioners conversations with the employees in the Medical Unit at Bureau of Motor Vehicle, did Petitioner receive any type of notice that she was entitled to an administrative hearing or that the license had been suspended for incompetency without any adverse report or the advice of the Medical Advisory Board. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. Effectively, all medical restrictions against license #1491178 were Respondent did not require Petitioner to remit any reinstatement fee nor Respondent deleted the administrative medical suspension from record Respondent properly issued a violation free credit on March 8, 2011 Petitioner personally contacted the District Attorneys office immediately terminated on March 8, 2011. surrender to any other civil sanctions, administrative remedies or criminal penalties. #1491178 on March 8, 2011. for the calendar year 2010. upon Respondent administratively reinstating license #1491178 asking that the USACs be dismissed with prejudice, which the District Attorney explicitly rejected. 30. Petitioner had no reason to know the Assistant District Attorney Steve Parker would knowingly and passionately prosecute Petitioner for actions not defined as any type of crime under the Maine Constitution or laws of this state, and that Petitioner would be continually intimidated, coerced and threatened with excessive and punitive fines, wrongful imprisonment and a continued violation of her liberties if she did not plead guilty to at least one of the USACs issued on March 7, 2011. 31. Petitioner has expressly reserved and continues to expressly reserve all of her natural and common law rights as protected and guaranteed by the federal and Maine Constitutions, on and for the record, nunc pro tunc.
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32.

On July 5, 2011, Petitioner submitted a certified copy of driving record

#1491178 to the court which was printed and certified by Respondent on July 5, 2011 clearly showing that no suspension existed on February 10, 2011 (AUG-CR-2011-513) nor on March 7, 2011 (AUG-CR-2011-512), but the District Attorneys office willfully and knowingly refused to accept Respondents true and certified records issued by Respondent on that day as evidence of Petitioners innocence. 33. Petitioner repeatedly expressed to the court that she had not received notice nor did she have actual knowledge of any suspension until March 7, 2011 and that all charges must be dismissed for Respondents failure to comply with notice requirements under 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A)(A) which specifies: 1-A. Offense; penalty. A person commits operating while license suspended or revoked if that person: A. Operates a motor vehicle on a public way or in a parking area when that person's license has been suspended or revoked, and that person: (1) Has received written notice of a suspension or revocation from the Secretary of State or a court; (2) Has been orally informed of the suspension or revocation by a law enforcement officer or a court; (3) Has actual knowledge of the suspension or revocation; (4) Has been sent written notice in accordance with section 2482 or former Title 29, section 2241, subsection 4; or 34. Driving record #1491178 clearly shows evidence of two failed notices, lack of evidence to support a suspension for incompetence nor any other kind of violation, and, in fact , the administrative medical suspension was not an offense of any kind as evidenced by no reinstatement fee and the violation free credit issued on March 8, 2011. 35. Respondents records clearly prove that proper notices were not served pursuant to 29-A MRSA 2482(3) which clarifies The notice is deemed received 3 days after mailing, unless returned by postal authorities. 36. Because both notices were returned to Respondent by the United States Postal Service, Respondent cannot claim that proper notices were either sent or received by Petitioner because those notices were returned to Respondent by postal authorities effectively nullifying any notices Respondent attempted to serve.
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030811 123110 030811 DELETE DATE ENTRY DATE 010109 111009 122909 010110 110109 ACTION DATE 123108 111009 122909 123109 010510 DESCRIPTION VIOLATION FREE CREDITS USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS DELETED DRV SUSP INDEFINITE (BMV) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MED. EVAL REQ FL FILE MED EVAL RESTORED: 03/08/11 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS

37.

Despite both the District Court and the Assistant District Attorney

having clear evidence that continued prosecution of Petitioner was suspect, the court knowingly accepted a coerced plea agreement from Petitioner for one violation of 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A)(A) for the offense dated February 10, 2011 docketed under AUG-CR-2011-513. Petitioner expressly reserved all her natural and common law rights, on and for the record, and expressly indicated that her acceptance of the plea agreement was being made under threat, duress and coercion. Nonetheless, the court entered a guilty verdict and assessed a $250 fine and a 60-day license suspension. 38. On December 19, 2011, Petitioner was attending to unrelated civil personal business at district court at which time she was ordered by Judge Beth Dobson to answer a bench warrant for failure to pay the fine assessed on July 5, 2011. Petitioner indicated that her refusal to pay the fine was a peaceful civil protest for the illegal and improper prosecution of a non-crime which was pursued in express violation of the statutes of this state. Judge Dobson ordered Petitioner to pay the fine or immediately be arrested and taken to jail. Petitioner once again expressly reserved all her natural and common law rights and indicated her payment of the fine was made under threat of being kidnapped, duress, intimidation and coercion by the court. Judge Dobson indicated that she took exception to Petitioners use of the word kidnapped; Petitioner responded that she took exception to being threatened with being kidnapped for peacefully and civilly protesting something that was not a crime. 39. Petitioner has been attempting to exhaust her lawful and procedural
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remedies for the unlawful prosecution of AUG-CR-2011-513 through Petitioner filing

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a Petition for Post-Conviction Review on July 6, 2012 which was summarily dismissed by Justice William Anderson on September 13, 2012 and filed with this court on September 17, 2012, followed up by Petitioners Motion to Reconsider Petition for Post-Conviction Review dated and filed on October 5, 2012 which was denied by Justice William Anderson on October 31, 2012 and filed with this court on November 5, 2012. 40. Petitioner claims that Justice Andersons denial for post-conviction review was made without having all the necessary facts and evidence describing the improper basis and lack of required notices for the administrative medical suspension because that administrative action was not reviewable under Justice Andersons jurisdiction at the time the petition for post-conviction review was filed. 41. At the time of her petition for post-conviction review Petitioner was still unaware of her right to request an administrative hearing to challenge the integrity of the administrative medical suspension, nor did Petitioner know the specific statutory authority and subject matter of the administrative medical suspension until March 2013 which was discovered during her review of evidence for pending cases docketed as AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667. 42. On March 18, 2013, Petitioner sent her first request for an administrative hearing to Respondent which was rejected by Assistant Director Susan Cole on March 20, 2013 citing no statutory authority for her rejection and only that Petitioners current suspensions do not allow for an administrative hearing with the agency. 43. On March 28, 2013, Petitioner sent her second demand for an administrative hearing clarifying the administrative medical suspension was commenced improperly, without sufficient evidence to support the suspension, without required notices and in violation of due process which was addressed and sent directly to Robert OConnell, Director of Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings. 44. On April 2, 2013, Mr. OConnell rejected Petitioners demand for an administrative hearing specifying, Your request for an administrative hearing on a license suspension of which you became knowledgeable two years ago and that was terminated two years past is denied as untimely.

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45.

On April 8, 2013, Petitioner sent her third demand for an administrative

hearing and notice of violation of procedural due process to Respondent again demanding an administrative hearing and the opportunity to review the evidence which supported Respondents decision to suspend license #1491178 without notice or opportunity for preliminary hearing. 46. On April 10, 2013, Mr. OConnell rejected Petitioners demand for an administrative hearing specifying, I am in receipt of your correspondence of April 8, 2013 in response to my letter of April 2, 2013 to you denying your request for an administrative hearing. As I advised you in that letter, my decision represents final agency action in this matter. You may seek judicial review of this final agency action pursuant to the provisions of 5 M.R. S. 11001-11008. 47. At no time has Respondent disputed or contested any facts as set forth in the record including the facts stated above. Nor has Respondent presented any other facts or evidence in considering and denying Petitioners statutory demands. 48. Respondent has abused their discretion by suspending license #1491178 without sufficient and clear evidence and in violation of procedural due process, and then improperly denying Petitioners right to an administrative hearing upon the unfounded presumption that Petitioners actual knowledge of her right to an administrative hearing was properly given by Respondent. 49. Respondent improperly suspending license #1491178 has resulted in Petitioner being abusively prosecuted under 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A)(A) for actions which are protected and secured by the Maine constitution and which do not constitute any type of civil or criminal violation and docketed as AUG-CR-2011-512 (violation date March 7, 2011) and AUG-CR-2011-513 (violation date February 10, 2011). V. A. 50. CLAIM FOR RELIEF Administrative Medical Suspension under 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D Petitioners foundational argument rests upon constitutional protections

against deprivation of life, liberty and the pursuit of safety and happiness without due process of laws, Respondents duty to have sufficient and relevant evidence to support such a deprivation, Petitioners right to confront and question all accusers and Respondents duty to strictly comply with all statutory provisions requiring faithful adherence to procedural due process before any such a deprivation occurs.
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51.

Petitioner states the basic grounds for this appeal rest upon the

Respondents willful violation of constitutional protections and statutory provisions in their improper application of the procedural suspension process as applied to the administrative medical suspension on January 5, 2010 under the guise of 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D). 52. Petitioner states there are no grounds or sufficient evidence in the record to support any type of suspension, either medical, administrative or criminal, from May 26, 2007 through March 8, 2011, and that Respondent acted in excess of their statutory authority by arbitrarily suspending license #1491178 without strictly adhering to procedural due process. 53. Petitioner affirms that she has several family members and friends in the immediate area who diligently and faithfully read public newspaper notices and who would have promptly notified Petitioner of any properly published public notice regarding drivers license #1491178. 54. Respondents refusal to post public notices in fact directly contradicts their claim that a potential danger existed at the time of their action which was evidently based upon their unfounded and unsubstantiated claim that Petitioner was incompetent to safely operate an automobile and thereby caused a health or safety hazard to herself or the community at large. 55. Respondent issued a violation free credit on March 8, 2011, the same day Respondent reinstated license #1491178. A violation free credit indicates that no offenses, violations or adjudications occurred during the year 2010. 56. Respondent did not require nor assess any reinstatement fee against license #1491178 on March 8, 2011 supporting evidence that the administrative medical suspension was not an offense, violation or crime of any kind. 57. Respondent deleted the administrative medical suspension from record #1491178 further supporting the benign, non-offensive, and non-criminal nature of the administrative medical suspension action. 58. Respondent cannot show by clear and sufficient evidence on the record that Petitioners continued licensing and operation of an automobile would constitute an immediate and potential danger of a health or safety hazard to herself and/or the public community at large because no evidence exists.

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59.

Respondent cannot claim that Petitioners reluctant stopgap residency

issues was clear and sufficient evidence of incompetency or an immediate and potential danger of a health or safety hazard to herself and/or the public community at large. 60. Respondent acted outside of its statutory authority and limitations when it suspended license #1491178 without clear and sufficient evidence of incompetency or an immediate and potential danger of a health or safety hazard to herself and/or the public community at large. 61. Petitioner argues that Respondents true motivation for administratively suspending license #1491178 was actually intended to provoke Petitioner to update her mailing address, and to complete the standard four-year medical evaluation which was subsequently discovered to be unnecessary. 62. Petitioner argues that excepting the unnecessary medical evaluation request, Respondent had no reason to send urgent communications to Petitioner nor to suspend license #1491178. 63. Petitioner argues that Respondents action to administratively suspend license #1491178 for the purpose of provoking her to update her mailing address and to complete a standard administrative document was in excess of Respondents statutory authority of the agency. 64. Petitioner argues that Respondents improper action to administratively suspend license #1491178 for the purpose of provoking her to update her mailing address and to complete a standard administrative document was made upon unlawful procedure in that there is no procedure devised to allow for Respondents actions. 65. Petitioner argues that Respondents unlawful, unfounded, and unsubstantiated administrative medical suspension was unknown to Petitioner until March 7, 2011, which was 427 days from the commencement of the administrative medical suspension and being 397 days beyond the limitations of 30 days as imposed by 5 MRSA 10004(3) Action without hearing, and that Petitioner had no knowledge of the subject matter, statutory authority, supporting evidence or knowledge of her right to preliminary and post-suspension administrative hearings until March 2013 during inspection of properly discovered evidence in pending cases AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667.
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B.

Criminal Prosecution and Suspension under 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A)(A) 66. Petitioner argues that Respondents improper administrative medical

suspension was used as a prior offense in the improper and abusive criminal prosecution of AUG-CR-2011-512 (violation date March 7, 2011) and AUG-CR-2011513 (violation date February 10, 2011) resulting in a coerced plea agreement assessing a fine of $250 and a 60-day suspension for AUG-CR-2011-513 and dismissing AUGCR-2011-512. 67. Petitioner argues that Judge Beth Dobson and Assistant District Attorney Steve Parker were made fully aware during open court proceedings on July 5, 2011 that there were no prior suspensions on either of the violation dates of February 10 or March 7, 2011 as evidenced by a certified copy of driving record #1491178 printed on July 5, 2011 showing that no violations to support a suspension of any kind had occurred for the years 2008, 2009, 2010 up to an including June 27, 2011, all inclusively. 68. Petitioner argues that both Judge Beth Dobson and Assistant District Attorney Steve Parker arbitrarily, capriciously and abusively ignored their duty to apply the written law and to uphold their oath to abide by the constitutional securities in the application of that written law. 69. Petitioner argues that there is no administrative, judicial nor criminal sanction or penalty for an alleged violation entitled operating after administrative medical suspension; therefore, Judge Beth Dobson and Assistant District Attorney Steve Parker improperly and fraudulently applied Maine statutes in cases AUG-CR2011-512 and AUG-CR-2011-513 in order to achieve an unlawful, improper and blatant deprivation of Petitioners right to life, liberty and the pursuit of safety and happiness. 70. Petitioner argues that AUG-CR-2011-513 is now being used by this court to enhance the sentences in pending cases AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667 which have been joined together under AUG-CR-2012-286. C. Respondents Refusal to Grant Administrative Hearings 71. Petitioner argues that Respondents refusal to grant preliminary, post-

suspension and post-restoration administrative hearings was made in violation of statutory provisions and constitutional protections requiring the opportunity for a

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hearing in all deprivations of life, liberty and the pursuit of safety and happiness as guaranteed by the Maine constitution. 72. Petitioner argues that Respondents refusal to grant preliminary, postsuspension and post-restoration administrative hearings was made in excess of their authority in that the reason for their denial was that Petitioners request was made untimely which is evidence that Respondent ignored the fact that Respondent never properly issued those mandatory curative instructions, neither verbally nor in writing, which is adequately substantiated by the evidence in the record. 73. Petitioner argues that Respondent cannot lawfully deprive Petitioner of preliminary, post-suspension and post-restoration hearings all the while knowing the administrative medical suspension was unsupported by the evidence on the whole record, made arbitrarily, capriciously and in abuse of their discretion and that they acted upon unlawful procedure and error of law. VI. 74. DEMAND FOR RELIEF

Respondents decision to administratively suspend license #1491178

without clear and sufficient evidence of medical incompetency was a violation of statutory and constitutional provisions, was contrary to law, and should be reversed because: a. Contrary to Respondents claim that Petitioners continued operation posed a potential danger of a health or safety hazard, Respondent cannot produce one piece of evidence to support those allegations as required by 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), and b. Respondents decision to maintain the administrative medical suspension in excess of statutory limitations of 30 days under 5 MRSA 10004(3) is a violation of statutory and constitutional provisions, is contrary to law and was the direct cause of AUG-CR-2011-512 and AUG-CR-2011-513. 75. Respondents decision to administratively suspend license #1491178 without clear and sufficient evidence of medical incompetency and which was maintained in excess of statutory limitations of 30 days was made upon unlawful procedures, by error of law and should be reversed requiring a judicial correction to the record because: a. It clearly violated the provisions of 5 MRSA 10004(3), and
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b.

The unfounded, unsubstantiated and improperly extended administrative

medical suspension was the direct cause for Petitioner being wrongfully prosecuted under docket AUG-CR-2011-513. 76. Respondents decision to administratively suspend license #1491178 without clear and sufficient evidence of medical incompetency or other substantial evidence, without proof of service of required notices, and in excess of statutory limitations was unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was in fact an arbitrary, capricious and abusive use of their discretion and should be reversed requiring and supporting a judicial correction to the record. VII. 77. RELIEF REQUESTED

Wherefore this Court should reverse the Respondents January 5, 2010

administrative medical suspension or remand this action back to the Respondent under 5 MRSA 11006(1)(C) with orders for the Respondent to grant an administrative hearing and to remain in compliance with all statutory provisions. 78. Petitioner requests this court to review the record of evidence to determine

if substantial evidence exists to support AUG-CR-2011-512 and AUG-CR-2011-513, and if this court finds no substantial evidence to sustain either AUG-CR-2011-512 or AUG-CR-2011-513 that this court shall properly correct the record. 79. Petitioner requests that this court exercise its authority to take additional

evidence under 5 MRSA 11006(1)(A) if this court also discovers alleged irregularities in Respondents procedures which are not adequately revealed in the record so a determination may be made by this court as to the sufficiency of the procedures used. 80. Petitioner requests this court order any other appropriate relief it deems

just and reasonable. DATED: April 22, 2013 ____________________________________ Gina Lynn Turcotte, Petitioner 3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1 Augusta, Maine 04330

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