U.S.

Efforts to Secure Russia's Nuclear

Warheads: Background and Issues

NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION Charles L. Thornton

Ph.D. Candidate & Graduate Research Fellow

DO NOT CITE OR REFERENCE WITHOUT THE Center for International & Security Studies
AUTHOR’
AUTHOR’S PERMISSION School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland

Presentation to:
Managing the Atom Project
BCSIA, JFKSG, Harvard University

24 October 2003
Charles L. Thornton 24 October 2003 1 Charles L. Thornton 24 October 2003 2

My Background Agenda
z Scope and nature of the issue
z 2001 – Present : University of Maryland
ß Ph.D. student z US Government’
Government’s foreign
assistance programs
z 2001 – Present : Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
ß Focus: Department of
ß Consultant, DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
Defense
z 1998 – 2001 : SAIC
z Current issues and a Proposal
ß Program Management Support, Russian Nuclear Weapons Protection,
Control, & Accounting, Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate,
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
z 1994 – 1998 : SAIC
ß Policy & Program Management Support, FSU Nuclear Weapons &
Contact Information: The views and data expressed in this presentation are
Fissile Material Security, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Office clt@umd.edu [through 2004] my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my
of the Secretary of Defense clthornton@yahoo.com [permanent] institute, company, or other affiliated organization.
PO Box 61551, Potomac, Maryland 20859 USA Moreover, the views and data expressed in this
+1 301 332 7869 [mobile] presentation should not be construed as official
+1 202 318 7795 [fax – private line] U.S. Government information or policy.

Charles L. Thornton 24 October 2003 3 Charles L. Thornton 24 October 2003 4

 Russia’s Nuclear Warheads
z Intact warheads z Status
ß Strategic ß Mated to delivery system
ß In storage
ß Tactical / Nonstrategic
‹ National stockpile
z Custody of the Ministry of ‹ Deployment site
Scope and Nature of the Issue Defense
ß 12th Main Directorate
‹ Temporary location
ß In transit
ß Services

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RVSN & 12th MD Sites START-Associated / Strategic Facilities

Charles L. Thornton
Source: Kommersant
Vlast, 12 May 2003
Source: U.S.
24 October 2003 7 Charles L. Thornton 24 October 2003 Government
8
 Nature of the Issue: Locations Nature of the Issue: Numbers
z Where are the warheads? z How many warheads exist?
ß Widely dispersed
ß START data deployed strategic warheads: 5,436
ß Unknown number
ß Additional warheads in storage: 2,000-
2,000-6,000
ß Possibly in regions of concern
z Order of relative security?
z Tactical weapons deployed or in storage: 6,000-
6,000-10,000 (?)
ß Mated to delivery system and deployed z Total: 18,000-
18,000-22,000
ß National stockpile site
ß Deployed level bunker z How many sites exist?
ß Deployed level temporary location
ß 52? 123? More?
ß In transit
ß MOD has not provided specifics
ß Temporary storage in transit
[more on this later]
z Irony: most secure is highest direct threat to U.S.

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Nature of the Issue: Past Security MOD’s “Traditional” Approach to Security

z Large withdrawals from East Europe and (former) Republics z Key concepts: remoteness; secrecy; obfuscation

z Storage site consolidations within Russia z Decades old approach

ß Reliance on guards
z Trends in security
ß Non-
Non-integrated systems
ß Early 1990s transition period: many legitimate concerns
ß No automated access control
ß Late 1990s economic problems ß Minimal supporting infrastructure: power; lighting; guard force
ß Well known incidents in both periods training and operating facilities
ß Lack of intrusion detection
z MOD’
MOD’s “traditional”
traditional” approach to security
ß Minimal of inter-
inter- and intra-
intra-site land and radio communication
[see next slide]
ß Obstructed perimeters and degraded fencing

z Paper-
Paper-based inventory control

z Insider threat versus Outsider threat

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 Nature of the Issue: Current Security
z Is there a currently ‘problem’
problem’?

z Recent trends: has level of security improved, declined, or remained

remained
stead? Depends may be right answer

z Empirical indicators : positive trends

ß Media reports of incidents have largely dropped off Nunn-Lugar
ß No more wage problems
ß Defense budget increases
Cooperative Threat Reduction
ß Consolidations appear to have stopped, and even reversed

z Behavioral indicators : negative trends

ß Post 9/11 MOD letters regarding terrorism
ß Granting of foreign access to storage sites
ß High operational and training tempo

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Warhead Security & the CTR Process DoD CTR Goals & Objectives
z Objective:
ß Enhance safety, security, control, accounting, and centralization
centralization
of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union to prevent their
proliferation and encourage their reduction

z Sub-
Sub-Objectives:
ß Storage Security (NWSS): provision of equipment, technical
expertise, materials, training, and services to develop and
implement security enhancements for nuclear storage
structures

ß Transportation Security (NWTS): safe and secure movement of

tactical and strategic warheads from deployed locations to
enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities

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 CTR Storage Security
Formal DoD-MOD Agreements Enhancements Assistance

CTR UMBRELLA AGREEMENT

JUNE 1992
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY&SECURITY NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRANSPORTATION
Security Assessment & Training Center for
NWSS IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT AUDIT & EXAMINATION AGREEMENT NWTS IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT Center (SATC) -- Sergiev Posad Nuclear Weapons Storage Site Technological Diagnostics
APRIL 1995 OCT 1995 APRIL 1995
Enhancements
A&E SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS NWTS IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENT
SEPT 1997 NOV 1999
PROTOCOLS FOR LIMITED ACCESS
FEB 2003
PROTOCOLS ON SENSITIVE INFO
FEB 2003

ASSESS
Personnel
Reliability
Program
Multi-Level Automated Dosimeters
Warhead Inventory Control Guard Force
& Management System Training

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Transporting Warheads:
DoD Access to 12th MD Sites: Initial Ten
Crowning Achievement?
NWT Shipment Legs by Category and Month
(As of: 2 Sep 03)

10
9
8
7
6
5
4 4
3
2
1
0
Jul-00

Jul-01

Jul-02

Jul-03
Jan-00

Jan-01

Jan-02

Jan-03
Apr-00

Oct-00

Apr-01

Oct-01

Apr-02

Oct-02

Apr-03

Oct-03

Store to Destroy Ops to Destroy Ops to Store Source: Kommersant

Vlast, 12 May 2003
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 Belgorod Zhukovka [Bryansk-18]
z 20km from z 80km from
Ukraine Belarus
z 6 bunkers z 6 bunkers

Ikonos 1m image by
1970 4m image provided
SpaceImaging.com
by Josh Handler /
via NRCD
FAS via NRDC

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Zhukovka [Bryansk-18] U.S. Department of Energy Involvement

z Layers of z Primary recipient: Russian z DoD is now encouraging DOE
fencing Navy to upgrade more sites
appear to be z Budget and resource
z Number and types of sites:
new overlaps?
ß Navy storage sites: 5
z Wall + 2 z MOD shopping?
ß SRF storage sites: 2
sensored z Issues?
layers + 3 ß Navy operational sites: 27
mash layers (scaling back?)
ß Navy temporary sites: 4
ß SRF temporary sites: 1+
ß 12th MD sites: 1+ (?)
z DOE direct involvement in 33
of 36+ upgrades

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 Major Issues
z My #1 concern: inventory
ß Current paper-
paper-based system
‹ 12th MD claims it can conduct full inventory in 72 hours
‹ Susceptible to fudging – and simple mistakes
ß If MOD does not know how many warheads it has, how would it know if
Current Issues and a Proposal any were or were not missing?
ß Automation may, though, make situation worse

z My #2 concern: making security worse through CTR

[see next slide]

z My #3 concern: pace of enhancements much too long

ß DoD’
DoD’s current plan: complete 1st ten sites by late 2005

z Too many unknowns

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Problems with Replacing

“Traditional” Methods
Consolidation? A Calculation
Number of warheads in the Soviet arsenal 1980s (stored or deployed):
deployed): 30,000-
30,000-45,000
z High technology security system
Number of WSAs for the Soviet arsenal 1980s : ~500
ß Trained and experienced operators Inflows & Outflows of the Storage System:

ß Power/electricity requirements Eastern Europe (unilateral initiatives; dissolution of Warsaw Pact):

Pact): +
Former Soviet Republics (START; unilateral initiatives; INF; dissolution
dissolution of USSR): +
ß Guards walking perimeter versus sitting in a command shack
Russian Federation (SORT; unilateral initiatives): +

z Automated inventory MinAtom Disassembly: -

MinAtom Assembly/Refurbishment: +
ß Full arsenal versus warheads destined for dismantlement
Deployment to Services: -
ß Dueling inventories: paper versus electronic Number of warheads in the Russian arsenal today (stored or deployed):
deployed): 18,000-
18,000-22,000

ß Data input Number of WSAs today:

National Stockpile Sites: 50-
50-70
z Sustainability Deployed/Service Level Sites: 60-
60-80

ß Rule of thumb: 10% of equipment procurement cost is annual Temporary Sites: 40-
40-60

sustainability cost => eventually $hundreds of millions per year TOTAL: 150-
150-210

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 Proposal: Consolidation
z MOD may have been experiencing a shortage of storage space
since 1992 or earlier (overflows reported up to 220%)
ß This problem has persisted and may continue
z To reduce the number of facilities, therefore, MOD may need to
sustain or even expand aggregate capacity
z Concept: trade small sites for large facilities
ß CTR assistance to re-
re-open recently closed NSS
ß Shut down deployed-
deployed-level sites as SORT dictates
z Cost may be roughly equivalent to enhancing all of the deployed-
deployed-
level sites
z More upgrades at fewer sites = double security boost for the money
money
Conclusions
z Is MOD’
MOD’s current state of security inadequate?
z Is Russia prepared to provide acceptable security?
z DoD finally has access to make significant strides in achieving
goals of reducing the threat of proliferation of WMD
z U.S. has good relationship with MOD; but, capabilities of Russian
Russian
government and contractors to absorb substantial influx of
assistance is questionable
z U.S. contractors are experienced
z Benefits of extending cooperative enterprise continues to outweigh
outweigh
costs and risks
z But, foreseeable pace of enhancements raises question of real
need

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Discussion Backup Slides

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