CASE DIGEST ON TAADA v.

TUVERA [136 SCRA 27 (1985)] November 10, 2010 Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President. Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Held: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (6 AIV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Judgment: Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect. Impt Point: It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man Marcosare in fact laws of genl application & provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers.

The generality of law (CC A14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime. Philippine International Trading Co. vs Angeles on November 20, 2010 263 scra 420 Publication Administrative Orders PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed byEO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision. ISSUE: Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid. HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of localapplication and

private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character. Republic vs Extelcom, [373 SCRA 316; GR 147096, January 15, 2002] Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 (Administrative Law, quasi-legislative power, proper procedure, filing and publication) Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures. Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase on its own initiative were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center. Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and effect in granting provisional authority. Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations can take effect. 72 Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission [GR 70632, 11 February 1986]; also Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition v. Napocor [ GR L-68474] Resolution En Banc, Plana (J) : 5 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: The Official Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) pamphlet, entitled "The Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1" was published in 1985 when Commissioners Manuel Eugenio, Quirino Navarro, and Alejandro Ver Albano had already been appointed to their present positions. Other pamphlets entitled "Nuclear Power Safe, Clean, Economical, and Available," and Nuclear Power Plant and Environmental Safety were issued earlier, but the majority of the Commissioners even then were already occupying positions of responsibility in the PAEC. Commissioner Eugenio was Acting Chief of the PAEC Department on Nuclear Technology and Engineering from June, 1980 to July, 1984; Commissioner Navarro was PAEC Chief Science Research Specialist from May, 1980 to September, 1984; and Commissioner Albano was PAEC Deputy Commissioner from March, 1980 to September, 1984. These pamphlets continued to be distributed by PAEC as late as March 1985. Their official distribution continued after the filing of National Power Corporation (Napocor)'s motion for conversion on 27 June 1984 and even after PAEC had issued its order dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting the said motion for conversion. In GR 70632, the competence of the PAEC Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1) was questioned; (2) the validity of Napocor's motion/application for the conversion of its construction permit into an operating license for PNPP-1 was assailed, and (3) PAEC Commissioners were charged with bias and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) prejudgment. Issue: Whether the PAEC Commissioner may sit in judgment in determining the safety of PNPP-1. Held: The PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry because they already have prejudged the safety of PNPP-1. The PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility from the official pamphlets, which clearly indicate the prejudgment that PNPP-1 is safe. The official distribution of the pamphlets continued when the Commissioners had already been appointed to their present positions and and even after PAEC had issued its order dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting Napocors motion for conversion. Felicidad Anzaldo vs Jacobo Clave on November 25, 2010 Due Process Administrative Due Process Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January

5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman. ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines. Tejano vs. Ombudsman ,GR 159190, 30 June 2005; Second Division, Chico-Nazario [J] FACTS: On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred inthe approval of his subordinates on the filing of the proper information for violation of Section3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against petitioner Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz andVicente dela Cruz of V&G. Afterwards, the case was filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation. Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation and ordered the Officeof the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. Upon reinvestigation, convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente delaCruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, recommended the dismissal of the case. On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminaryinvestigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the

case with the marginal note assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively. ISSUE: WON THE OMBUDSMAN IS JUSTIFIED IN DISAPPROVEDING THERECOMMENDATION FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE. HELD. NO. Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review hisdecision on appeal. Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant caseand having recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved OmbudsmanDesierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during thereinvestigatio CASE DIGEST ON TABUENA v. SANDIGANBAYAN [121 SCRA 389 (1983)] November 10, 2010 Facts: ? In a Presidential Memorandum (the Marcos Memorandum) dated Jan. 6, 1986, President Marcos allegedly commanded petitioner Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this Office (Office of the President), the sum P55M in cash as partial payment of MIAAs account with said company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Robert Ongpin to this Office dated Jan. 7,1985 Tabuena withdrew the sum of 55M on three separate occasions (25M, 25M, 5M with Adolfo Peralta) and delivered them to Gimenez, Marcoss private secretary. ? It is without dispute that Tabuena did not follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and delivery of the money (no disbursement slips and paid in cold cash). ? Tabuena was only issued a receipt after the third delivery and it did not mention anything about the purpose of the receipt or the money being used to pay PNCC, but merely acknowledged that Gimenez had received the sum of 55M from Tabuena on three occasions. Furthermore, there was no receipt from the PNCC recognizing payment of debt.

? Prosecution: there were no standing obligations in favor of the PNCC at the time of disbursement of 55M. PNCC said themselves that they didnt receive the P55M. ? Tabuena claimed that he was only complying with the direct order of Marcos (plus the Marcos memorandum which contained same order) to immediately forward to the office of the President, 55M in cash, as partial payment of MIAAs obligations to PNCC and that he believed that MIAA indeed had those liabilities to PNCC. In short, that Tabuena acted in good faith. ? Sandiganbayan rejected Tabuenas claim of good faith and found him guilty of malversation by negligence, hence this case. Issue: WON Tabuena, in following the orders of his superior, was guilty of malversation (or if because of the justifying circumstance of following the orders of his superior, in good faith, he would not be criminally liable, but merely civilly liable)? Held: Tabuena is merely civilly liable. The very fact that he was merely following the orders of his superior is a justifying circumstance. Ratio: 1. On the point raised by Tabuena that he cannot be charged with intentional malversation and be convicted by malversation by negligence, the Court ruled that the dolo and culpa of the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. The same felony is still there and conviction thereof is proper. 2. On the defense of good faith: it is a valid defense against malversation because it would negate criminal intent. To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimesbe accompanied by criminal intent or such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as is equivalent to criminal intent The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not commited if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent (malversation cases: US v. Catolico, US v. Elvina). 3. The Court, based on the evidence presented, found that Tabuena had no other choice but to actually follow the order stated in the Marcos Memorandum, because, as president of the Philippines, indubitably the head of governmental agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC, Marcos is undeniably the superior of Tabuena. 4. Tabuena entitled to the justifying circumstance of any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose because he is only acting in good faith, faithfully and efficiently carrying out orders from the highest official in the land. Moreover, there was nothing in the Marcos Memorandum that may invite suspicion there was no question about the lawfulness of the

order contained in such a memorandum. Tabuena had reason to believe that the 55M was indeed part of a due and demandable debt, a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC (existence of such debts determined from testimonies). So even if the order was illegal and Tabuena was not aware of the illegality, he would not be liable because there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. 5. Tabuena followed the memorandum to the letter, paying immediately the PNCC, through this office (office of the president) the sum of 55M. Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the money because as Chief Executive, Marcos exercised supervision and control over governmental agencies (good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation). 6. While even Tabuena admitted that procedures were ignored and that the disbursement was unusual, he is found to be excused from such because the Marcos Memorandum enjoined his IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE. On the other hand, while this allows for the negation of criminal intent, as Tabuena acted in good faith, he would still be civilly liable (but hes not criminally liable anymore, escaping the harsher penalties) (see page 362). 7. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do with the creation of the Marcos Memorandum that even if the real purpose behind the memorandum was to get 55M from public funds, it is clear that he did and would not profit from such and that he did not have anything to do with the creation of the memorandum. 8. Tabuena case is a case concerning obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. The order/memorandum came from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the president himself, in effect allowing for the presumption that such order was regularly issued and patently legal. Furthermore, the wording of the memorandum expressed a certain urgency to its execution Obedienta est legis essential (act swiftly without question). 9. Main Ratio: Furthermore, the Court itself raises the contention that the case involves a violation of the accuseds right to due process in the sense that it was obvious that the Sandiganbayan was overzealous in its attempt to convict parties involved as seen in the volume of questions asked, and the manner the same were posed (cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation). To quote Justice Cruz, Respect for the Constitution is more important that securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused. Sandiganbayan was obviously biased, denying Tabuena and parties involves the requirement of the cold neutrality of

an impartial judge. As a consequence of such violation of due process, the order of Sandiganbayan was found void. Note that this defense was not raised by Tabuena.