MANILA PRINCE VS GSIS Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. HELD: MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy. Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities.

No. L-73002. December 29, 1986.*THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents. FACTS: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela , which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel,members of the Dumagat tribe .The land subjects of the Land Registration proceedings was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities .I SSUE: Whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares .RULING: The correct rule, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.

Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed

G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

Lee Hong Kok vs. David

Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.

FACTS: This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an originalcertificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim. ISSUE:

Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property. The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietarycharacter. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

Sunday, September 19, 2010

CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose. While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Carino V. Insular Government (1909)
212 U.S. 449 February 23, 1909 Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)

Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution

FACTS:

Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application

For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process only established possessory title

Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration. HELD: YES. Petition Granted.

Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made.

Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.

DENR vs YAP These are two consolidated cases. In G.R. No. 167707, Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for Declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling

purposes for the land theyve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest,which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed. G.R. No. 173775 During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The

Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roadsand trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest landprotection purposes. This was on May 22, 2006Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracaylandowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullificationof Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots inBoracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested rightover their occupied portions in the island. Boracay isan unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimedportions of the island are inalienable and cannot bethe subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title.It is only the executive department, not the courts,which has authority to reclassify lands of the publicdomain into alienable and disposable lands. There is aneed for a positive government act in order to releasethe lots for disposition. ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle forrespondents, and all those similarly situated, toacquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island. HELD: The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay etal. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of thepublic domain belong to the State, that the State isthe source of any asserted right to ownership of landand charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from thegovernment, either by purchase or by grant, belongto the State as part of the inalienable public domain. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required . In keeping with thepresumption of State ownership, there must bea positive act of the government ,such as anofficial proclamation, declassifying inalienable publicland into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation,executive order, administrative action, report,

statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land isalienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh in controvertible evidence, the Court cannot accept thesubmission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Mattersof land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. Also, private claimants also contend that theircontinued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No.926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable It isplain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CANo. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law .There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land byhimself or through his predecessors-in-interest under bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorialor from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable anddisposable land of the public domain.The tax declarations in the name of private claimantsare insufficient to prove the first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the taxdeclarations in the name of private claimants wereissued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the taxdeclarations are not sufficient to convince this Courtthat the period of possession and occupationcommenced on June 12, 1945. Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have avested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millionsof pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot.They say their continued possession and investmentsgive them a vested right which cannot be unilaterallyrescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.The continued possession and considerableinvestment of private claimants do not automaticallygive them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do thesegive them a right to apply for a title to the land they

G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990

FACTS: Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable. CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention. ISSUE:

Whether or not land is alienable

HELD:

The SC affirmed.

Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive

act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City

G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995

Regalian Doctrine Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception

FACTS: Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was issued an OCT. Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free patent acquired by Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime. Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free Patent and the OCT. Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court. ISSUE:

Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land

HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim. Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -an intentional omission of fact required by law. Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands.

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by thegovernment when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES: 1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES 2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc 1. YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law 2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009 Chico-Nazario, J.: Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause. Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, asamended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP. Issue: Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which thegovernment may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA) Held: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purviewof the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus berevoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected bythe due process clause of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No lawimpairing the obligation of contracts shall be p assed." cannot be invoked.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuringPICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation wouldresult in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control andsupervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME114 SCRA 799DATE: June 29, 1982PETITIONER: Manila Electric CompanyRESPONDENTS: Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV and Republicof the PhilippinesPONENTE: J. AquinoFACTS:The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an assessedvalue of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, whohad consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3 rd of July 1947, theoriginal owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for theconfirmation of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the followingcontentions:1.

The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguingspouses for more than thirty years had essentially been converted toprivate land by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutionalprohibition banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable publicland is not applicable.2.

It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but forthe Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicialconfirmation of their imperfect title to the landISSUES:1.

Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply fora judicial confirmation of an imperfect/incomplete title.2.

Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.3.

Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private propertyis contingent on the judicial confirmation of title.RULING:1. NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as ajuridical person, is disqualified from applying for the judicial confirmationof imperfect title. Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from holdalienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed 1000hectares in area. In fine, only natural persons and citizens of thePhilippines are allowed to apply for confirmation under the PLA.2. NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private propertyis contingent upon (1) fulfilling the necessary condition of possession by

the predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2)the judicial confirmation of the title by the Court of First Instance. C.J.Fernando concurred with the decision, but accepted that a conversionindeed took place.3.

HELD. This was maintained in the ruling of J. Aquino. C.J. Fernando, J.Abad Santos and J. De Castro, concurred accordingly. J. Teehankeedissented and traced the line of jurisprudence from Carino to Susi toHerico which maintained that the conversion or acquisition effectivelyhappens by the operation of law, ipso jure , as soon as it can beconclusively presumed, juris et de jure,

that all the conditions for theconfirmation of the grant have been met. According to his reasoning, uponthe fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions, the confirmation of animperfect title is only a formality

Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; GR No. 113472, December 20, 1994
Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011

(Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands) Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land. Respondent contends that she bought the said land from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale; and entrusted the administration of the same to petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brot her of respondents husband. Petitioner on the other hand claims that she bought the disputed land from the same vendor and the sale is evidenced by a photocopy of a deed of sale. Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale. Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands, hence disqualified also in acquiring private lands. The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public domain.

I. Local JurisprudenceRegister of Deeds vs. Ung Si Su TempleFacts: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for recorda deed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipinocitizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2,block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered religious organization UngSiu Si Temple, operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality,founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latterand its trustees. The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consulta to the IVth Branch of theCourt of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds, stating that this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of theprovisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of thePhilippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens,or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capitalstock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question shouldnot be admitted for registration." (Printed Rec. App. pp. 17-18).Counsel for the done UySiu Si Temple appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming:(1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized andpermitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows: "SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the PhilippineIslands or in the name

of other country, or not incorporated at all, to holdland in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions. "SECTION. 2.Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations;. . ." (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.) and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates Article III, Section 1 (7) or the freedom of religion clause of the Constitution.

Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs.

the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question shouldnot be

admitted for registration." (Printed Rec. App. pp. 1718).Counsel for the done UySiu Si

Temple appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming:(1) that the acquisition of

the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized andpermitted by Act No.

271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows: "SEC TION 1. It shall be lawful

for all religious associations, of whatever s ort or denomin ation, whether incorporated i

n the Philippin eIslands or in the name of other country, or not incorporated at all, to holdland

in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, oreducational

or charitable institutions. "S ECTION. 2.Such religious institutions, if not

incorporated, shallhold the land in the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations;. .

." (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.) and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates Article III,

Section 1 (7) or thefreedom of religion clause of the Constitution.