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Environmental Politics
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Changing climate, changing democracy: a cautionary tale

Mhairi Aitken
a a

Centre for Population Health Sciences, Medical School, Edinburgh, Scotland Available online: 09 Mar 2012

To cite this article: Mhairi Aitken (2012): Changing climate, changing democracy: a cautionary tale, Environmental Politics, 21:2, 211-229 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.651899

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Environmental Politics Vol. 21, No. 2, March 2012, 211229

Changing climate, changing democracy: a cautionary tale

Mhairi Aitken*
Centre for Population Health Sciences, Medical School, Edinburgh, Scotland

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Climate change has come to hold a central position within many policy arenas. However, a particular framing of climate change and climate science, underpinned by modernist assumptions, dominates policy discourse. This leads to restricted policy responses reecting particular interests and socio-political imaginaries. There is little public debate concerning this framing or the assumptions underpinning approaches to climate policy. The implications of this are illustrated by considering the ways in which UK planning policy has adapted to reect commitments to mitigate climate change. It is shown that the importance attributed to climate change mitigation has had negative impacts on democratic involvement in planning processes. Given the uncertainty and high stakes of climate science (typical of post-normal science), value may be gained by incorporating the views and perspectives of extended peer communities, to question not only the processes and ndings of climate science but also the ways in which the science is interpreted and responded to through policy. Keywords: climate change; planning; post-normal science; renewable energy

Introduction Climate change has come to take a central position within many areas of international, national and local policy. It has become a dominant issue within contemporary society and has been described as the key narrative within which political issues from the local to the global are framed (Rayner 2009, p. xxiii). It is routinely called upon to justify and legitimate a range of diverse political and social functions (Hulme 2010) and is unique in its currency as claiming relevance across countless diverse and disparate policy areas. Despite inevitable uncertainties and ambiguities in climate science, the ways in which it is discussed in the media, and in policy debates largely suggest that climate change poses a clear, certain threat to the global environment and society (Swyngedouw 2010). I argue that the dominant position of climate change in

*Email: mhairi.aitken@ed.ac.uk
ISSN 0964-4016 print/ISSN 1743-8934 online 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.651899 http://www.tandfonline.com

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policy and public spheres has given this issue or at least references to this issue a powerful and dangerous role within society. Climate change has been depoliticised (Swyngedouw 2010) and it has become dicult to challenge or refute claims relating to it, and even more so to contest policies or projects which have been justied in terms of climate change mitigation. However, it is a particular framing of climate change and climate science that dominates policy discourse, one which is strongly underpinned by modernist assumptions. This framing leads to restricted policy responses reecting particular interests and socio-political imaginaries. Yet there is little opportunity for public debate concerning this framing or the assumptions underpinning approaches to climate policy. This has negative and worrying implications for democracy. I will highlight how climate change has been placed at the centre of justications for a diverse range of international, national and local policies, but that this has occurred without public debate or reection on how climate science (or which climate science) is adopted and interpreted and what this means in particular geographic, social, cultural or political contexts. The implications of this central position of (a particular framing of) climate change will be illustrated through considering the ways in which one area of policy UK planning policy has adapted to reect commitments to mitigate climate change. I will show that, where there are planning applications for developments justied in terms of mitigating climate change (e.g. renewable energy developments), the importance attributed to mitigation has had negative impacts on the scope of public participation in planning processes Furthermore, the positioning of climate change as the key challenge for society and the environment globally can lead to marginalisation of opponents to projects justied in terms of climate change mitigation. The de-politicisation of climate change Despite a range of views expressed in relation to climate change and the inevitable uncertainties or ambiguities in climate science, a fragile consensus has emerged both in relation to the nature of the problem and the arrays of managerial and institutional technologies to mitigate the most dramatic consequences (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 215). Over the past two decades, a climate politics has developed which, through science, media and policy institutions, has established climate change as the paramount environmental and social problem facing the world (Szerszynski and Urry 2010). This framing of climate change has made it dicult to challenge either climate science or policies relating to climate change without being branded a climate sceptic or denier. Moreover, individuals who are critical of technologies or policies justied in terms of climate change mitigation often receive hostile reactions (for example, see Nature 2010). However, as I will argue, the climate science and policies which are advanced relate to particular visions of climate change and how it might be addressed and are far from unambiguous.

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Whilst the Climategate scandal of 2009 forced a reconsideration of the complexities and social dynamics of climate science (see Hulme and Ravetz 2009) these are generally glossed over in policy and public discourses relating to climate change. As Stirling (2010, p. 1029) has noted it is typically assumed that expert advice is . . . most useful to policy when it is presented as a single denitive interpretation. Thus, expert committees are under pressure to reach consensus and to present unambiguous advice to policymakers. Policymakers, in turn, are encouraged to pursue (and claim) science-based decisions (Stirling 2010, p. 1029) in such a way as to deny the existence of uncertainty, ambiguity or ignorance. Hulme and Ravetz (2009) have urged climate scientists to show their working and called for a new approach that makes explicit the ambiguities within science. They argue that climate scientists should reect on, and make explicit the processes for creating, validating and mobilising scientic knowledge about climate change. Moreover, given the political nature of the subject, they have called for greater openness and transparency in climate science together with citizen involvement and public ownership. However, a challenge for realising this will be ensuring that the public has access to accurate and impartial information. This is a signicant challenge given that media reporting of climate change (as of many other complex issues) is often inaccurate, partial or incomplete (see Bell 1994, Weingart et al. 2000). The media plays a central role which perpetuates a form of symbolic politics whereby complex issues are condensed or compressed into easily understandable messages; this Blu hdorn (2007, p. 256) suggests always entails the strategic construction of realities and manipulation of mass audiences. Information is simplied and managed to convey particular messages. Climate change is routinely presented as a scientic discovery as something only comprehensible through scientic experimentation and analysis (Wynne 2010). Whilst there remains huge uncertainty as to the scale, impact and speed of future climate changes (Szerszynski and Urry 2010, p. 2), climate change is frequently represented as a certain, well-understood environmental danger. This simplied representation of climate change and/or climate science inevitably creates challenges for meaningful public engagement. Moreover, through the framing of climate change as a global humanitarian cause it has become close to impossible to dissent or disagree with the need for policy solutions and action: this framing produces a thoroughly depoliticized imaginary, one that does not revolve around choosing one trajectory rather than another, one that is not articulated with specic political programmes or socio-ecological project or revolutions (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 219). In this context, climate change can be presented as a straightforwardly scientic issue with clear and pressing environmental and social implications. However, social, ethical or political inuences and factors within the discovery, interpretation and framing of climate change are overlooked. This reects positivist visions of science whereby science is viewed as uniquely positioned to provide non-political views on the world through objective

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inquiry untouched by social or political inuences. However, such positivist visions overlook the multitude of ways in which social, institutional and political factors enter into scientic practices and shape scientic understandings (Irwin 2001). For example, in the case of climate science, political factors (as opposed to scientic breakthroughs) have been shown to have played signicant roles in determining when climate change became a central topic of research (see Hart and Victor 1993). Additionally, there is not simply one form of climate science providing unambiguous insights and understanding, rather there are multiple ways of investigating the climate or the role of greenhouse gases (GHG). Dierent scientic disciplines and methods compete for policy attention and funding and political and social inuences are inherent in decisions relating to which climate science gets funded, conducted and subsequently accorded policy attention (see Hart and Victor 1993, Demeritt 2001). Additionally, the emergence of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the key forum for mediating and assessing knowledge on climate change was itself a highly political (and not inevitable) occurrence (see Hulme and Mahoney 2010). Subsequently the IPCC has become a powerful body validating and prioritising certain knowledge claims (Hulme and Mahoney 2010.). Climate scientists do not operate in a vacuum sealed o from social and political inuences, but rather actively position and frame their work in particular ways so as to maximise its policy relevance (and/ or secure funding). How research questions are framed and key concepts interpreted can reect political, social or geographical positions and subsequently reinforce inequalities or policy biases (see Yearley 2005, Hulme 2009). The production of IPCC reports, for example, is not simply a process of reporting pure science but rather is a political process prioritising particular forms and sources of knowledge claims (Hulme and Mahoney 2010). Overlooking social and political factors within climate science presents an unrealistic picture of how the facts have been reached and simultaneously limits the extent to which non-experts can engage with the issue: The discourse on climate politics so far is an expert and elitist discourse in which peoples, societies, citizens, workers, voters and their interests, views and voices are very much neglected (Beck 2010, pp. 254255). This encourages members of the public to take a passive role, to sit back, and want to be told what they must do, rather than go out and learn as well as take their share of responsibility for what could have been presented as a more complex, multidimensional and inherently indeterminate set of human problems, which citizens and their representatives can and should help dene (Wynne 2010, p. 300). Where this elitist discourse is challenged and more active engagement with climate change occurs (for example through the climate justice discourse) this receives limited policy attention since it does not t and cannot be taken up within the dominant framing of climate change. This reects a traditional or normal approach to science. However, a post-normal approach may be more tting for climate science. Post-normal

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science is described as being characterised by high levels of uncertainty, disputed values, high stakes and high levels of urgency for decision-making (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). This science is based on assumptions of unpredictability, incomplete control, and a plurality of legitimate perspectives (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, p. 739). Under these conditions uncertainty is viewed as an inevitable part of science and hence is not banished but is managed (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, p. 740). Moreover, whilst traditional science has sought to separate facts from values (prioritising facts), in postnormal science facts and values cannot be separated and indeed values play an integral role. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993, p. 742) contend that scientic expertise has led us into policy dilemmas which it is incapable of resolving itself. Many areas of scientic research are characterised by uncertainties which can be inter alia practical, political or ethical. In these contexts science, whilst ever-more necessary, cannot provide denitive answers or policy recommendations (Luks 1999). Frequently, science can achieve at best only mathematical models and computer simulations, which are essentially untestable (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, p. 742). The problem then becomes one not of discovering scientic facts or universal truths but rather of understanding and managing complex realities. Science and resulting policies should not aim to maintain an illusion of denitive answers but should instead be more explicitly based on understandings and evaluations of uncertainties. As Hulme and Ravetz (2009) urged, climate scientists ought to show their working and engage in a more open and transparent science: a science which reects on its own processes of validation and mobilisation. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) argue that given the complex and uncertain nature of post-normal science a wider range of actors should be involved in its quality assurance processes. This should reach beyond narrow sets of scientists and professionals to the extended peer community including members of the public. More recently, Hulme and Ravetz (2009) have called for a revolution in science which might, among other things, bring forth a Citizens Panel on Climate Change (CPCC) and foster a more open, inclusive form of climate science. Opening up opportunities for wider involvement is seen to be benecial not only for members of the public or for democratic institutions but also to science (Luks 1999). Climate science can be viewed as characterising post-normal science in terms of its inherent uncertainty, high stakes and urgency for policymakers. It therefore appears to present an important opportunity to implement Funtowicz and Ravetzs notion of extended peer communities and to test the value and limits of wider involvement in scientic practices and related decision-making. Saloranta (2001) has contended that climate science has already oered illustrations of extended peer communities in action through the process of compiling and subsequently peer reviewing the Second Assessment Report (SAR) of the IPCCs Working Group 1 (WG1). Saloranta (2001, p. 400) also argues that the IPCC has adopted a post-normal approach in relation to the management of uncertainties in climate science, since it not

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only notes the usual expressions of technical uncertainties [but] also the methodological uncertainties. Rather optimistically Saloranta (2001, p. 402) concludes that the goal of Post-Normal Science, namely more eective problem-solving, has seemingly been achieved by the IPCC. However, Hulme and Ravetz (2009) suggest that a post-normal approach requires greater openness, inclusiveness and less centralisation in the production of expert reports. There appears to be some way still to go before the IPCC can be said to have fully embraced post-normal science. Additionally, an inclusive and transparent approach is also needed within decision-making at regional, national or local levels here a role for extended peer communities is largely lacking. Questions around how climate science is framed and interpreted; what its implications are within particular geographical, social, political or cultural contexts and; how policymakers should respond to the challenges that it poses could all benet from the inclusion of diverse voices and interests. The role of climate change in policy Climate change now plays a central role within many areas of international, national and local policy (Rayner 2009). In a similar way to how sustainable development has previously been described as coloniz[ing] environmental policy by oering an objective from which one apparently could not wish to diverge (Yearley 1996, p. 133, emphasis in original), so the importance of mitigating climate change has become an aim which policymakers cannot reasonably contest. The consensus around climate change and the importance of reducing emissions combined with the ease by which dissenters can be discredited as climate sceptics, mean that policies consistently repeat the mantra of taking urgent action to address climate change. This mantra suggests that the urgent action needed is clearly identiable and that there is (at least a degree of) inevitability in its outcome. Moreover, it is used to justify or legitimate a range of policies and actions in dierent areas. For example, in the United Kingdom climate change is connected to policies relating to inter alia transport (Department for Transport 2009), energy (HM Government 2007), health (Department of Health 2010) and business (MET Oce 2007). Furthermore, it has been connected to controversial policy areas such as nuclear energy (HM Government 2008) and played a role in increasing support for previously unpopular policies. For example, Bickersta et al. (2008) have shown that framing nuclear energy in terms of emissions reduction and climate change mitigation (re-branding it as a low carbon technology) led to increased public support or less public opposition for the technology (although the result was described as a reluctant acceptance). As such, climate change holds valuable discursive power to potentially legitimate a range of policies. Therefore the instances where, and methods by which, this concept is referred to are signicant. Justifying a preferred policy in terms of climate change appears to restrict the possibilities to credibly contest its value or

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relevance. The ways in which this concept is mobilised and the ends which it is called upon to justify must therefore be scrutinised. It has been noted that currently the dominant policy approaches to addressing climate change reect modernist and capitalist assumptions (Brooks et al. 2009, Doyle and Chaturvedi 2010, Swyngedouw 2010, Szerszynski and Urry 2010). Whilst it could easily be contended that current levels of GHG emissions are a result of practices in the industrialised world and are connected to capitalist ways of life; the policy architecture around climate change insists that this excessive state is not inscribed in the functioning of the system itself, but is an aberration that can be cured by mobilizing the very inner dynamics and logic of the system (privatization of CO2, commodication and market exchange via carbon and carbon-oset trading) (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 223). As such the dominant policy framework around climate change stems from and perpetuates the cultural and economic position of Northern, industrialised states (Doyle and Chaturvedi 2010). It demonstrates a commitment to capitalism, economic growth and minimising disruption to industrialised economies. As Szerszynski and Urry (2010, p. 4) comment: Any description and prediction of climate change and its impacts is entangled with specic imaginaries of how society is, and how it ought to be; similarly even the most apparently technical of suggested responses will carry with it certain ideas of society. This commitment to maintaining the status quo reects the position of Ecological Modernisation (EM) which has been described as having come to dominate environmental policy debates since the 1980s (Hajer 1995, Mol and Spaargaren 2000, Barry and Paterson 2004). EM is, broadly speaking, a mechanism for challenging the traditional assumption that economic growth and environmental sustainability cannot coexist happily and that pursuing either one will be to the detriment of the other (Mol and Spaargaren 2000, Barry and Paterson 2004). Accordingly, EM suggests that although modern institutions may need to adapt they do not need to or should not be overthrown (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). Clearly, from the perspective of industrialised economies EM oers an attractive approach. As noted by Sutton (2004, p. 150): ecological modernisation is a political programme, which promotes a particular way of dealing with environmental issues at the expense of others. This political programme is especially attractive to northern governments as it is much less threatening than radical Green politics. Within this context policies relating to climate change are formulated in ways which are non-threatening to industrialised states economies and ways of life. This simultaneously limits the range of policy options to be considered and further restricts debate in this area. Here extended peer communities could play an important role in questioning and/or challenging the framing of climate change and the dominant assumptions about its policy implications. They might also provide insights into particular social, political, cultural or ethical contexts.

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It should be noted that environmental organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) do oer alternative and (at times) more radical framings. For example, Greenpeace have called for an Energy Revolution which would require fundamental changes in the way we generate energy, in the way we live and travel and in our behaviour in general (Greenpeace 2007, p. 3) and the climate justice movement draws attention to social justice aspects of climate change and calls for policies which address inequalities in the impacts of climate change as well as uneven responsibility for its causes (see Bali Principles 2002). However, to date such alternative framings have not led to radical change or action and have had little impact on mainstream policy discourses. Given that they do not sit comfortably with dominant framings of climate change they have struggled to receive policy attention. This may appear to be at odds with vocal policy commitments to tackling climate change, however it can also be seen to illustrate the post-ecologist zeitgeist which Blu hdorn (2007) suggests characterises late-modern societies. He contends that the post-ecologist turn is a complex cultural transformation in which much more inclusive understandings of eco-politics are superseded by technical and managerial approaches which are symbolically empty, i.e. which deal with short term and narrowly dened problems, but are no longer inspired by any comprehensive ecological alternative to the established socio-economic system (Blu hdorn 2007, pp. 262264). Furthermore, Blu hdorn (2007, p. 272) argues that not only is this illustrated through a lack of political will for radical or transformational policies, but it is also apparent in the responses of the wider public who are seen to simultaneously acknowledge that radical and eective change is urgent and inescapable and resolve to sustain what is known to be unsustainable. Whilst there is an acknowledgement of the unsustainability of ecological, social and cultural systems, society is rmly committed to maintaining the current capitalist system which is seen to oer optimal conditions for the realisation, expression and experience of the consumer-Self (Blu hdorn 2007, p. 261). Therefore, whilst individuals might declare commitments to societal and lifestyle changes to address the challenges of climate change, there may be limited support for policies which require radical transformations or which are perceived to challenge the capitalist underpinnings of late-modern society. This represents what Blu hdorn (2007) has termed the simulative nature of contemporary eco-politics and may go some way to explaining why, despite the political consensus around the urgency of climate change, there has been little by way of meaningful action or change and little support for more radical policy recommendations. The ways in which public and policy preferences are shaped then becomes an important area to consider. The dominant framing of climate change may have emerged through an inuential role of commercial interest groups together with societys preference for preserving the capitalist system. Alternatively (or simultaneously) it may have come about through political elites shaping the agenda to avoid consideration of more radical framings. A third consideration is that peoples preferences for maintaining the status quo

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may have been shaped through subtle forms of power which have inuenced individuals perceptions of their own interests and preferences (Lukes 2005). In this way, although current framings of climate change lead to limited policy responses which serve to uphold unsustainable social structures, messages conveyed through political, social and cultural media shape peoples perceptions so that they would consider the maintenance of the status quo to be in their interests and thus do not challenge political institutions upholding this. The importance of scrutinising how messages relating to climate change are conveyed to, and received by, wider society and what assumptions are implicit within these messages is therefore vitally important. The following section will draw on one example of an area where policy reects the depoliticised nature of climate change, its central justifying role and the modernist presumptions underpinning policy. It will be shown that references to climate change (reecting particular modernist framings) can be used to play a dangerous role in upholding the status quo and preventing meaningful dissent. Low carbon energy In 2003 the UK government published a white paper entitled Our energy future creating a low carbon economy (DTI 2003) in which key challenges relating to energy production and use were set out. The rst challenge related to the threat of climate change and in response a target for the UK to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 60% by the year 2050 was set. The second challenge was in responding to the decline of UK-sourced energy supplies, (i.e. oil, gas, nuclear and coal). It was suggested that by the year 2020 three quarters of the UKs energy may be expected to be imported, hence there were concerns over security of supply and a diversication of energy supply sources was reported as necessary. The third challenge was to update the UKs energy infrastructure. Particularly this meant upgrading or replacing old plants, and this was to be done at least partly through new, renewable technologies. As well as the above challenges, the white paper acknowledged four goals for UK government policy. These were: . to put ourselves on a path to cut the UKs CO2 emissions by some 60% by about 2050, with real progress by 2020; . to maintain reliability of supplies; . to promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond, helping to raise the rate of sustainable economic growth and improve our productivity; and . to ensure that every home is adequately and aordably heated. (DTI 2003) The white paper described improvements in energy eciency as the cheapest and safest way of meeting the objectives. However, renewable energy

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was seen to be an important component. Additionally, the white paper raised the possibility of investment in a new generation of nuclear power plant. The subsequent 2007 energy white paper (HM Government 2007) estimated that the UK would need between 30 and 35 giga watts (GW) of new generating capacity over the next 20 years. The white paper stated that the government must set the market framework for investment in new generation and that this must be done in such a way as to encourage a low carbon mix. Thus whilst fossil fuels were acknowledged to have continued importance, renewable sources of energy were emphasised along with the possibility of investment in new nuclear build. As noted above, in recent policy documents and consultations nuclear energy has been framed as a low emissions (or low carbon) technology and consequently as potentially having a valuable role to play in eorts to mitigate climate change (see HM Government 2007). In 2009 the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) published The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan. This reiterated and expanded on many of the earlier commitments and set out the UKs plan for delivering emission cuts of 18% on 2008 levels by the year 2020. As in earlier white papers it highlighted the important role of energy eciency measures, however it continued to stress the value of investing in renewable and nuclear energy. It emphasised the importance of maintaining security of energy supplies as well as the value of creating economic opportunities through new green industries. The energy future envisaged within the 2003, 2007 and 2009 white papers addresses a number of concerns, (i.e. energy security, economic factors and emissions reductions). Whilst they place emphasis on the importance of low carbon transitions, the challenges discussed and solutions identied highlight the centrality of modernist and economic rationales. Improvements in energy eciency and reduction in energy demand, which may be crucial for tackling climate change, are largely sidelined in favour of pro-development solutions focused on building new infrastructure and creating new investment opportunities.1 This clearly reects the ethos of EM. UK energy policies have emerged out of a pro-development worldview which centres on a modernist faith in science and technologys ability to address contemporary environmental (or economic) challenges. Policies to develop renewable energy capacity might have found their justications through references to creating new domestic industries and providing new sources of investment whilst also diversifying UK energy supplies and reducing reliance on international imports. However, climate change provides a worthy (depoliticised) cause which is mobilised to present a strong rationale for energy policies, and one which is very hard to credibly contest. Climate change is not the only or main driver behind investment in and policy support for new renewable energy infrastructure but it provides the most robust rationale. It is important to highlight the dominant modernist underpinning of energy and climate change policies which emphasise the importance of meeting current (and growing) energy demand, rather than reducing energy demand through societal and individual lifestyle changes. Whilst the latter would require a

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fundamental transformation in societal structures within industrialised countries, the former enables policymakers to vocalise strong policy commitments to addressing climate change whilst avoiding major disruption or challenges to the status quo. Policymakers therefore have vested interests in focusing on energy security and production and remaining largely silent in relation to reducing energy demand and consumption. This also oers some explanation to the lack of attention given to the topic of peak oil within policy circles. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that global oil production could reach its peak within the rst half of the twenty-rst century, after which point it is expected to go into terminal decline (Bardi 2009). This might provide strong incentives to re-evaluate patterns of energy use and dependence on oil. However, current policy in industrialised countries is largely silent on this topic. Moreover, governments have challenged peak oil theories (Bardi 2009) or, it has been suggested, even actively concealed evidence relating to peak oil (Monbiot 2011). Instead energy policies, discussed in the context of climate change, are presented as being faced by challenges of lowering emissions but importantly through means which do not threaten, or call into question current societal structures. Out of this context renewable energy has been framed as a key component in the national strategy for addressing climate change through reducing emissions. Currently there is a UK target that 15% of the UKs energy (including for electricity, heat and transport) should come from renewable sources by the year 2020 (HM Government 2009). In Scotland there is a more ambitious target that 50% of demand for Scottish electricity and 11% of Scotlands heat should come from renewable sources by 2020 (Scottish Government 2008). Accordingly, the planning system has adapted to reect these commitments. Planning for renewable energy in the UK In the United Kingdom planning is a devolved matter meaning that England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own planning systems directed by the devolved administrations. Each set of planning policies assert commitments to sustainable development and addressing climate change (see, for example, Oce of the Deputy Prime Minister 2005, Scottish Government 2010). Climate change policy has been described as having an overarching nature and it has been advised that it is important that proper weight is attached to climate change policy in relation to other planning considerations (Arup and Partners 2010, p. 111). Planning policies emphasise both that planning has a central role to play in addressing climate change and also that climate change must be a central consideration in planning decisions (see Scottish Government 2010, Welsh Assembly Government 2010). Whilst environmental stewardship is presented as being an important component of the planning system, enabling development is a key objective.

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For example, Scottish planning policy states that the central purpose of the planning system is increasing sustainable economic growth (Scottish Government 2010, p. 1). The modernist underpinning of the planning system is clear within planning policies. For example, the recent modernisation of the Scottish planning system had four principal goals, namely: strengthening the involvement of communities; speeding up decisions; reecting local views better; and allowing quicker investment decisions (Scottish Executive 2005). Whilst on the one hand these goals reect commitments to public engagement and democratic accountability, on the other hand they reect modernist goals of enabling development through speeding up the planning process and allowing quicker investment decisions. Within this pro-development context there is an important role to be played by renewable energy. The strong policy commitments to developing renewable energy discussed above are reected within planning policies across the UK. For example, it is stated that Development plans should support all scales of development associated with the generation of energy and heat from renewable sources, ensuring that an areas renewable energy potential is realised and optimised (Scottish Government 2010, p. 37), and that planning policies should be designed to promote and not restrict renewable and low-carbon energy and supporting infrastructure (Department for Communities and Local Government 2007, p. 14); furthermore, it is stated that planning policies should provide for renewable and low carbon energy sources at all scales (Welsh Assembly Government 2010, p. 48). As such, in response to policies and targets emphasising the importance of developing renewable energy capacity the planning system has developed an explicit bias in favour of renewable energy projects. However, the planning system is simultaneously legitimated by claims to its democratic character and planning policies across the UK frequently reassert the importance of public involvement in planning processes (e.g. Oce of the Deputy Prime Minister 2005, Scottish Government 2010); this includes the right of members of the public to make representations relating to particular planning applications. This situation can lead to an uncomfortable combination of commitments to development and public involvement. At times the goals of developing renewable energy capacity and reecting public views in planning processes and decisions may be in conict with one another. How these goals are met or traded o is therefore a crucial consideration. Public responses to renewable energy Much has been written about public opposition to renewable energy developments (particularly wind power) and it has frequently been asserted that this is responsible for slow rates of development (Bell et al. 2005, Breukers and Wolsink 2007, Devine-Wright 2007, Ellis et al. 2007, Peel and Lloyd 2007, Barry et al. 2008). The literature on this subject and policy responses routinely frame public opposition as an obstacle or problem which needs to be overcome in order to achieve national targets for renewable energy capacity

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(Aitken 2010b). This has led to a conviction that there is a planning problem impeding the development of renewable energy (Ellis et al. 2009). Planning has been viewed as a barrier to the expansion of wind energy (Ellis et al. 2009, p. 523) and a discourse has emerged which portrays the planning system as an obstacle impeding the goals of sustainability. Signicant emphasis has been placed on how planning processes can be made more ecient and approval rates can be increased (e.g. BWEA 2004, 2008). Within both policy and academic discourse this has informed an approach to understanding local opposition which essentially views it as a problem or obstacle to be overcome. It is routinely argued that the majority of the public are supportive of policies to support the development of renewable energy capacity and hence that local opposition to particular proposed developments represents a deviation from real public opinion (Aitken 2010b). Perhaps the clearest illustrations of this thinking are NIMBY (not in my back yard) explanations of opposition to renewable energy. Here it is presumed that individuals are supportive of renewable energy as a general concept but object to particular proposed developments in their area (Warren et al. 2005). Such explanations view objectors as rational, individualistic actors and overlook the range of complex contextual, social or personal factors shaping public responses (Devine-Wright 2005). NIMBY explanations have been widely renounced in the academic literature, yet remain widely mobilised for example, actors within particular planning conicts have been observed to refer to NIMBY explanations either to explain other peoples opposition or to refute that they themselves are NIMBYs (Burningham 2000, Ellis et al. 2007, van der Horst 2007, Barry et al. 2008). This is signicant as it illustrates that opposition to desirable policy goals is framed as a problem, or as deviant from real public opinion not simply in abstract academic discussions but also on the ground within particular planning debates. Accordingly, it appears that opposition to policies or projects justied in terms of climate change mitigation may be becoming socially unacceptable. This overlooks the range of motivations and experiences behind public opposition to renewable energy developments. For example, opposition may: . be grounded in local knowledge and concerns relating to particular features of the local environment (Aitken et al. 2008, Aitken 2009); . stem from awareness of controversy around scientic or policy claims regarding the potential contribution of renewable energy in tackling climate change (e.g. Ellis et al. 2007); or . relate to perceived injustice or inequity in the benets accruing from developments (Walker and Devine-Wright 2008, Ellis et al. 2009). Renewable energy remains a contested subject matter (Devine-Wright and Devine-Wright 2006) and it is perhaps inevitable that proposed developments will not be greeted with unanimous public support. Moreover, opposition can be based on a variety of valid concerns and relevant knowledge. The dominant

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framing which presents opposition as deviant therefore overlooks a potentially valuable resource of knowledge and insights or extended facts (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). However, instead of seeking to address public concerns and incorporate public viewpoints the current approach appears to be focused on overcoming or avoiding public opposition. This illustrates a worrying conception of the planning system which sees it not as a democratic forum for mediating public views, but rather as a bureaucratic system for legitimising and facilitating government policies. Moreover, despite arguments that public opposition to renewable energy developments represents an obstacle to meeting national targets, the power or inuence of members of the public in planning processes relating to renewable energy developments appears to be limited (Aitken et al. 2008, Aitken 2010a). For example, whilst planning processes, particularly public inquiries, have previously been described as provid[ing] crucial institutional spaces for challenges to the status quo (Cowell and Owens 2006, p. 405) recent analyses have suggested that in relation to renewable energy developments public inquiries are instead serving to uphold the status quo and protect government policies from challenge (Aitken et al. 2008). Arup and Partners (2010) found that whilst local authority planning departments vary, planning inspectorates determining appeals increasingly rely on climate change considerations in justifying their decisions. Government policies can be seen to have an untouchable status in planning processes (Aitken et al. 2008) and can be used to close down debate and limit opportunities for public participation. Cowell and Owens (2006) provide a range of examples of instances where public inquiries have previously been used to call into question dominant policy assumptions and to eect change (for example in relation to road transport or minerals planning). However, in the case of renewable energy this does not appear to be so. This might be due to the particularly strong policy commitments relating to renewable energy development or the depoliticised nature of climate change which has made it dicult to credibly contest policies justied in terms of climate change mitigation. Yet despite limited evidence that objectors are powerful actors in planning processes, opposition to renewable energy developments continues to be presented as an obstacle to be tackled or overcome in order to meet targets and address the challenges of climate change. This has important implications for democratic accountability. There is an evident conviction that projects which address climate change are necessary and appropriate. Yet there is little public debate around how climate change can most eectively be addressed, or concerning the implications of dominant policy approaches to climate change. Therefore the questions of whether particular projects or policies are the most appropriate for addressing climate change are left largely unanswered or even unasked. In this context, framing energy policy in terms of climate change mitigation (as opposed to alternative economic framings) provides a robust justication

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for the expansion of renewable energy capacity and one which it is very dicult to challenge or refute. In this context opposition to renewable energy projects is not viewed as a valid expression of public concern within a democratic institution but rather as a harmful obstruction to an agreed upon policy goal. The focus is on nding ways of overcoming or avoiding opposition rather than seeking to address, incorporate or reect public concerns. Furthermore, the pro-development and pro-renewables position underpinning the planning system creates limits to the possibilities for public participation and debate. Cautionary discussion The depoliticised nature of climate change and its framing as the paramount environmental and social problem facing global society have given it a unique powerful position. The widespread agreement that action must be taken to mitigate climate change has resulted in a range of policies focusing on emissions reduction. However, it is a particular framing of climate change and mitigation which has come to dominate. Policy typically follows modernist approaches favouring innovation, development and technological xes. Climate change and potential solutions have been framed in ways which reect the interests of Northern industrialised economies. Whilst widespread lifestyle and behavioural changes appear necessary, current policies emphasise the need for investment in new clean technologies and innovative approaches to supplying current (and growing) energy demands. In comparison, policymakers remain largely silent in relation to energy consumption and reducing demand through lifestyle and societal changes. The policy approach taken largely serves to protect the status quo and minimise disruption to modern, capitalist lifestyles. This restricted framing of the issue limits opportunities for debate concerning the implications of climate change for societal structures or regarding alternative (more radical) approaches to addressing the challenges of climate change. This eectively sets limits to democracy by dening the scope of public debate. Given the diculty associated with credibly challenging claims relating to the necessity of addressing climate change, it is possible to justify a wide range of policies through connecting them to this goal. In the case of planning for renewable energy in the UK it is clear that the framing of the development of renewable energy as a key component of the governments strategy for addressing climate change justies and perpetuates the discrediting of opposition arguments. A planning problem is perceived since the desired outcome has been agreed upon (more renewable energy) and the planning process is conceptualised as a vehicle through which this outcome should be reached. In this context the planning system is no longer viewed as an inclusive and essentially democratic institution for mediating disputes and reecting public views but rather as a system for legitimising existing policies and reinforcing existing priorities. Public opinion where this takes the form of public opposition is not valued as an opportunity to reect and incorporate

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dierent points of view and sources of knowledge, but instead is discredited and treated as an obstacle to the globally important goal of climate change mitigation. The dominance of narrow, modernist framings of climate change serves to shut down debate and alternative framings are largely excluded from public and policy discourse. Moreover, despite vocal commitments to addressing climate change, society is largely unwilling to make signicant sacrices and lifestyle changes in order to meet this goal (Blu hdorn 2007). Therefore, more radical framings are not advanced since they are perceived to be adverse to individuals and societys interests. One must therefore consider how peoples perceptions of their interests have been shaped, and in particular how the dominant framing of climate change has been advanced and maintained through social, political and cultural media. References to climate change can be used to justify a wide range of policies and projects and to limit the scope for public debate and dissent. Assumptions implicit in the mobilisation of climate change, and in decisions around which policies or projects climate change is called upon to justify and the implications that this has for broader social and political institutions warrant scrutiny. Public debate and dissensus have important roles to play in questioning how policy decisions are made and in examining the social, political or economic interests implicit in climate science and related policies. In particular, dissent has a valuable role to play in challenging the modernist assumptions underpinning current policy approaches and drawing attention to alternative framings. Acknowledgements
I thank the three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and the ESRC for funding this research (award number PTA-026-27-2236).

Note
1. Parallels can be drawn with the way in which planning has responded to the threat of ooding. White and Howe (2002) have noted that the pro-development underpinning of the planning system has resulted in a system which favours development with measures to protect against ooding instead of precautionary approaches which would help to prevent future ooding. They suggest that this prodevelopment approach has fostered an environment susceptible to ooding.

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