Edu vs.

Ericta
Facts: Respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the Reflector Law (RA 5715) as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. Under the law, a vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having reflective device prior to being registered at the LTO. In a manifestation he further sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that said statute is upheld as constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner Edu, implementing such legislation, be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. CFI Judge Ericta ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. Issues: WoN the Refelctor Law (RA 5715) and Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner Edu are unconsititutional. Held: NO. 1. As to RA 5715: Valid exercise of Police Power of the State. - The Reflector Law requires that all motor vehicles must have sufficient reflector lights or other similar warning devices attached to the corners of said vehicles, otherwise said vehicles shall not be registered. It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. - Justice Laurel in Calalang vs. Williams: Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." - Primicias v. Fugoso: Police power is "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." - Justice Malcolm: "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." - Morfe v. Mutuc: Police power could be hardly distinguishable with the totality of legislative power. - It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs." - Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. - What is critical or urgent changes with the time." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined.

- RA 5715 is a legitimate response to a felt public need, and is thus a valid exercise of police power by the State. - The Court says that our 1935 Constitutions philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity (police power). This was in response to Respondent Galos reliance on his argument of laissez-faire predicated on American State Court decisions. 2. As to Administrative Order No. 2: Constitutional - Admin. Order No. 2 has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. There is also a section on dimensions, placement and color of said reflectors. Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." - under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. - What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. - A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. - Standard: at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. - The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained is "safe transit upon the roads." - J.B.L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. - It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation

Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose.

Ermita Malate vs. City of Manila

Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila. They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information. There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague. The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary. It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel. The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance. The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila. Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause? Held: No. Judgment reversed. Ratio: "The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the

kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors. Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power. In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest. What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and

exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc. vs. Torres

Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc. (PASIE) is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers, including domestic helpers. On June 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. Pursuant to the previous issuances, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. Issues: 1. Whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars 2. Whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are unconstitutional, unreasonable, unfair and oppressive Held:
They are in accordance but legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Art 2 of CC, Art 5 of the Labor Code and Sec 3(1) and 4, Chap 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. 1. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging as provided by Articles 15, 17 and 20 of the Labor Code. 2. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino land-based workers for overseas employment. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: The Department Order at issue in this case aims to protect women from being victims of trafficking, abuse, and violence. It seems to put the burden, however, on women, instead of employment agencies and recruiters, under the assumption that women become victims of violence and abuse because they lack the skill to be entertainers. This case revolves around the Artist Record Book (ARB) as required and implemented by the DOLE and EIAC (impelled by the Maricris Sioson killing). The Secretary of Labor and Employment (the Secretary) subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad. The Secretary, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an ARB, a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. Several Orders were, thereafter, issued by the DOLE. The said orders were contested on the following grounds: (1) it violated the constitutional right to travel; (2) it abridged existing contracts for employment; (3) it deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law; and (4) that the issuance of the ARB was discriminatory, illegal, and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life, liberty, and property. Complaint was dismissed by the trial court. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the same, tracing circumstances which led to the creation of the EIAC, i.e. the Maricris Sioson killing; it held the same to be a valid exercise of police power. Issue: Whether or not the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.

Held: Yes. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power. In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China. According to the National Statistics Office, this diaspora was augmented annually by over 450,000

documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions. Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991, the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson. It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse." Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action." Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution. Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters. Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC, which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based. Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies. Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation. As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers. The

requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations. On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth. In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control.