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Western nuclear experts have criticised this type of reactor primarily because it lacks a
containment structure and requires large quantities of combustible graphite within its
core.
In order to prevent the test run of the reactor being interrupted, the safety systems were
deliberately switched off. For the test, the reactor had to be powered down to 25 per cent
of its capacity. This procedure did not go according to plan: for unknown reasons, the
reactor power level fell to less than 1 per cent. The power therefore had to be slowly
increased. But 30 seconds after the start of the test, there was a sudden and unexpected
power surge. The reactor's emergency shutdown (which should have halted the chain
reaction) failed.
Within fractions of a second, the power level and temperature rose many times over. The
reactor went out of control. There was a violent explosion. The 1000-tonne sealing cap on
the reactor building was blown off. At temperatures of over 2000°C, the fuel rods
melted. The graphite covering of the reactor then ignited. In the ensuing inferno, the
radioactive fission products released during the core meltdown were sucked up into the
atmosphere.
What caused the accident?
Determining the causes of the accident was not easy, because there was no experience of
comparable events to refer to. Eyewitness reports, measurements carried out after the
accident, and experimental reconstructions were necessary. The causes of the accident are
still described as a fateful combination of human error and imperfect technology.
The test during which the accident happened was conducted under time pressure. Shortly
after it started, on Friday 25 April 1986, the test run was interrupted for nine hours.
Electricity still had to be supplied to the capital, Kiev. The test then took place at night.
Today, several flaws in the technical design of the reactor type are thought to have been
decisive.
These include the handling of the control rods. In a reactor, the power level is controlled
by raising and lowering the control rods: the fewer control rods are positioned between
the fuel elements, the greater the reactor power. In this type of reactor, however, the
management of the "braking" process has a fatal flaw. If the control rods are raised and
then, to "put on the brakes", lowered between the fuel elements, the initial effect is the
exact opposite: reactor power is increased.
If, as was the case in the test at Chernobyl, too many control rods are raised at once and
then reinserted simultaneously during an emergency shutdown, the power level rises so
dramatically that the reactor is destroyed. A similar error, but with much less severe
consequences, had already occurred in a reactor of the same type in Lithuania in 1983.
This experience, however, was not passed on to the operating crew in Chernobyl.