Communication Theory

Carl Patrick Burrowes

Six:

One February 1996 Pages: 88-103

From Functionalism to Cultural Studies: Manifest Ruptures and Latent Continuities

Functionalism practically disappeared as an explicit tradition in communications due to the radical theoretical realignments of the 1980s. Three criticisms proved decisive to this undoing; political conservatism; problems of logic, mainly tautology and an inappropriate appeal to teleological explanations; and a tendency to impose psychological and sociological analyses on specifically cultural materials. Formulated in reference to systemic Parsonian functionalism, which dominated the broader social sciences, these criticisms are relatively easy to reconcile within the contextual, actionist Mertonian tradition, which took root in the communications context, but only through a constructive dialogue with the cultural studies and cultural indicators approaches, both of which have spent the last decade investigating a traditionally functionalist concern - the hypothesis of cultural systems integration. I f functionalism offers to this cross-fertilization a focus on the normative orders of society, the cultural indicators approach provides a rigorous methodology and cultural studies cautions a greater sensitivity to social hierarchies.

Functionalism in communications is generally regarded as a philosophical position that emphasizes the consequences (functions) for the social system of the phenomena under study. Unlike scholars who focus on episodic events, functionalists study patterns, rituals, and routines along with their consequences for society and its members. This concern with systemness assumes the existence of boundaries that delineate the unit under analysis from its environment. At the heart of this approach is a concern with the way in which people behave, or misbehave, following, making or breaking cultural rules (Kuper, 1985, p. 528; also Parsons, 1977; Wright, 1989). Beyond these points of agreement lie fundamental philosophical and other differences that are reflected in the variety of labels applied to this tradition - from functionalism (implying theoretical coherence) to functional-structuralism (implying coherence of the system being analyzed) to functional analysis (suggesting a general philosophical stance). The importance of functionalism to mass communications, while often asserted, remains difficult to gauge, given the relatively scant attention paid to theoretical issues in historical treatments of the field. This neglect of theory has been traced to the fragmentation of interests in the field (Merton, 1957, p. 443),the desertion of seminal early theorists
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(Berelson, 1959), an obsession with methods (Nordenstreng, 1968, p. 208), and the pragmatic and practical beginnings of the discipline (Golding & Murdock, 1980, p. 60). Further obscuring functionalisms place in the field has been a tendency for discussions to remain framed by relatively narrow disciplinary, geographic, and temporal boundaries. Excluded from consideration, consequently, has been the European prehistory of the tradition, along with its specifically anthropological roots. The relative lack of attention to functionalism in particular may be traced to the radical realignment of mass communication theorizing during the 1980s, which drained interest away from functionalism and other elements of the ancient rtgime just as historical treatments of the field were increasing and becoming more explicit. Since few articles and scholars have taken functionalism as their exclusive focus (e.g., Klapper, 1963; Rothenbuhler, 1987; Wright, 1964, 1974, 1989), treatment of the approach remains sketchy, generally appearing as one element in broad discussions of theoretical or disciplinary history (e.g., Delia, 1987; Gitlin, 1981; Golding & Murdock, 1980; Hall, 1982; Hardt, 1979; Kline, 1972; McQuail, 1969; Rogers, 1983). Within the existing literature, the level of influence attributed to functionalism varies directly with the degree of homogeneity attributed to the field by various scholars as well as the theoretical allegiances of the beholder. Holist and structuralist critics of conventional research tend to direct their attack at the elementarist impulses of positivist, behaviorist effects research, thus effacing the functionalist components of communication theory (e.g, Blumler, 1985; Gitlin, 1981; Halloran, 1981; Hardt, 1989; Kim, 1988) while nonstructuralists present functionalism as one of several competing influences on the early discipline (e.g., Carey & Kreiling, 1974; Delia, 1987; Hardt, 1989). In contrast, the approach is credited as a constituent element of communications by those scholars who saw themselves working in the 1960s toward the creation of a unified discipline (e.g, Klapper, 1963; Wright, 1964) and later by those who viewed the field as divisible into at most two parts, a dominant and a challenging paradigm (e.g., Golding & Murdock, 1989; Kim, 1988; Rogers, 1983). If not the reigning paradigm, functionalism clearly held sway over a considerable portion of the intellectual terrain by the 1960s (Elliott, 1974; Golding & Murdock, 1989; Kline, 1972; Rothenbuhler, 1987; Wright, 1974). It pervaded the vocabulary, if not the analyses, of many early communication scholars including Klapper (1963), Lasswell (1971), Merton (1957), and Wright (1964). As a result of the radical realignment of communication theorizing during the 1980s (Blumler, 1985; Delia, 1987; Gitlin, 1981; Golding & Murdock, 1980; Halloran, 1981; Kim, 1988; Kline, 1972; Rosengren, 1985),2 functionalist assumptions and concepts disappeared as explicit concerns in communications, only to reemerge under some unlikely banners, especially cultural studies and cultural indicators research.

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Although McQuail (1969, p. 84) noted correctly that no one communication researcher has been outstandingly associated with the application of functional analysis, one individual - Charles R. Wright -disproportionately influenced the explicit formulation of functionalism in communication (Carey & Kreiling, 1974). Wrights formulation drew on an earlier tradition of functionalist research in communications (Lasswell, 1971; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1948; Wiley, 1942). In synthesizing this literature, Wright (1964) uncritically reproduced several of its weaknesses. In citing uncensored news as an example of potential disruptive media content (p. 102), for example, he followed Lazarsfeld & Mertons ( 1948) judgmental operationalization of dysfunction (Carey & Kreiling, 1974; for Mertons similar treatment of anomie, see Hilbert, 1989) while ignoring his own acknowledgment that only standardized (i.e., patterned and repetitive) items were appropriate for functional analysis (p. 94). In keeping with the dominant scientistic orientation of communication studies of that era, as well as the Parsonian concern with achieving theoretical closure on the set of primary functions of a social system (Parsons, 1977, p. 11l ) , the functions identified in earlier studies-and accepted by Wright -were transsystemic and transhistorical (i.e., surveillance, entertainment, and ethicizing). But functions like these, placed beyond the vagaries of culture and history, did not fulfill an important goal of earlier functionalisms, which was to explain the relationship of specific artifacts and institutions to each other within a given culture. Recent discussions of functionalism in communications have not often reflected the important differences within the tradition that have long been acknowledged in the broader social science literature, not least of all by functionalists themselves (Kuper, 1977, pp. 49-52; Malinowski, 1939; Merton, 1957; Parsons, 1977). Functionalists have shown a consistent tendency to bifurcate over major philosophical issues such as degree of systemness, outcome of functions and the level of synchronicity assumed to characterize social processes. Although an assumption of determinism has served to distinguish Durkheimian holism, this ernphasis came to be moderated with the transference of functionalism across the Atlantic due to an American propensity toward voluntarist theories as well as the intervening rise of Freudian psychology. Previously regarded as a theory (Radcliffe-Brown, 1968, pp. 117-132) or set of theories (Malinowski, 1945, pp. 41-51; Malinowski, 1977), in the sense of having a coherent set of assumptions wedded to a specific method, functionalism came increasingly to be regarded as aconceptua1 scheme (Parsons, 1977) or a research approach (Merton, 1957, p. 20) or even a slogan (Goody, 1973). At the point of functionalisms incorporation into communication studies, at least two strains existed: one systemic, the other contextualist. The former, identified most closely with Talcott Parsons, emphasized total systems as the appropriate framework of analysis, assumed stasis or systemic stabilization to be the outcome of functions, regarded human
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nature as largely structured, and was oriented toward nomothetic research, that is, the building of general laws. In contrast, Parsonss student Robert Merton advocated a contextualist approach that allowed analysts to select subsystems as their frameworks, acknowledged dysfunctions and unintended functions as possible outcomes, adopted an actionist view of human nature, and pursued a research program with an ideographic focus (i.e., geared toward the study of discrete phenomenon) (Hilbert, 1989; Parsons, 1977, pp. 108-111; Rose, 1960; Sztompka, 1986). These multiple origins and orientations of the tradition came to be obscured in communications, where the functionalist emphasis on sociality has been interpreted largely in sociological terms while its cultural roots were all but ignored. Functionalism, it is worth recalling, originated in anthropology in reference to c u l t ~ r ethe , ~ problematic that then had no name. The culture concept was implicit in Durkheims (19821 1896) use of social facts as well as in Radcliffe-Browns (1968) use of the social life of a people as a whole. In drawing from the contextualists and their emphasis on individual agency, cognition, and intentionality, communication scholars slighted the normative concerns of systemic functionalism. A failure to distinguish among variants of functionalism has led some scholars to propose throwing the Mertonian baby out with its Parsonian bath water.

Three Absences: Change, Culture, and Causality

Of the criticisms directed at functionalism, three proved decisive in its undoing in communications: problems of logic, mainly tautology, and an inappropriate appeal to teleological explanations; political conservatism, linked to an inadequate treatment of stratification and a tendency to ignore power; and a tendency to impose psychological and sociological analyses on specifically cultural materials. These criticisms came from three distinct sources. Problems of logic tended to be highlighted by positivists who held causal explanations as the model for both the natural and social sciences (e.g., Hempel, 1959; Jarvie, 1965; Levy, 1988). Charges of political bias and inadequate treatment of stratification have been raised mainly by radical critics (e.g., Golding & Murdock, 1980; Hall, 1982; Hardt, 1979; Mills, 1959), used here to include conflict theorists and neo-Marxists. The conservative charge, although formulated by Mills (1959) specifically in relations to Parsons grand theory, within communications has come to be indiscriminately applied to all functionalism (e.g., Hall, 1982, p. 88; Rogers, 1983, p. 222). Ironically, just as the charge of political conservatism was gaining ground, functionalism was changing in a contextual direction that accommodated endogenous change. The third criticism has been developed within communications mainly by humanists (e.g., Carey, 1978, 1989; Carey &
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Kreiling, 1974; Kreiling, 1978). A cumulative effect of these critics was a loss of nuance in discussions, a caricaturing of functionalism. In explaining functionalisms alleged conservatism, most scholars tend to highlight three factors: acceptance of the general framework of Western societies, especially the United States, as given and desirable (Golding & Murdock, 1980; Hardt, 1989; Mayhew, 1982); the political uses made of the theory, especially as an antidote to Marxism (Hardt, 1979); and an inherent conservative bias on the part of functionalists, stemming from their focus on routinization, consensus, and holism (Golding & Murdock, 1980; Hall, 1982; Hardt, 1979; Swingewood, 1984) while ignoring cultural stratification (Carey & Kreiling, 1974; Elliott, 1974; Golding & Murdock, 1980). To the extent that their political views were known, however, leading functionalists fell toward the left end of the Western political spectrum, ranging from Durkheim, who was moderate (Lukes, 1982), to the liberalism of Parsons, Merton, and Malinowski to the socialism of RadcliffeBrown (Goody, 1973). That this point of relative difference came to be emphasized by radical critics is not surprising since the two approaches fall at opposite ends of the change axis but share a holistic view of society, a rejection of utilitarian individualism and a concern with objectivism. The perception of political conservatism (i.e., being inherently disposed against endogenous social change) may be traced to the methods of early functionalist anthropologists, an emphasis on systematic synchronic data collection, which tended to yield the equivalent of still photographs (Goody, 1973, p. 205; Merton, 1957, p. 53). Those who charge functionalism generally with an inherent bias against endogenous change overlook subtle shifts in research designs and methodological choices brought about by application of the approach to modern societies. Critics also tend to efface philosophical and conceptual differences between systemic and nomothetic variants on the one hand and contextualist and ideographic forms on the other. For example, Parsonss emphasis on functions as coordinating adaptation to changes in the environment (Flanigan & Fogelman, 1965; Grimes, 1988; Rose, 1960; Sztompka, 1986) was not shared by Malinowski, whose last study was aptly and suggestively titled The Dynamic of Culture Change (1945);or Merton (1957, p.9), who considered his work as contributing to the development of a theory of class dynamics, which he regarded as one of the major tasks facing sociology; or Davis (1942, 1949), who expended considerable effort on the development of a theory of stratification. Even those functionalists who stressed structuration and stasis as an outcome of functions did not assume these qualities to characterize empirical societies (Wright & Hilbert, 1980, pp. 210-211) any more than radical critics who emphasize theories of change assume society to be devoid of structuration and continuities. In charging alleged conservative uses, critics have often overlooked
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the rich crop of functionalist-inspired reformist studies that have examined stratification and alienation in modern societies (e.g., Davis, 1942; Whyte, 1943). Even Parsons who is often made to stand in for orthodoxy was an ardent advocate of the extension of rights, opportunities, and participation to all social groups (Mayhew, 1982, p. 54). His works on intergroup conflicts and obstacles to full participation include The Problem of Polarization on the Axis of Color (1968), Racial and Religious Differences as Factors in Group Tensions ( 1 9 4 9 , Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movement (1 942), The Sociology of Modern Anti-Semitism (1942). These works may not contain radical indictments of the social order, but neither were they conservative calls for the preservation of past privilege. Both in content and timing, they placed the analytical skills and reputations of respected scholars in the service of social change. T o refute the charge of inherent conservatism, Merton attempted to offset functionalisms single-minded attention to system maintenance by accentuating the notion of dysfunctions, which laid undeveloped in the work of Durkheim. In doing so, he made four distinctive modifications to functionalist postulates. Merton argued that not all cultural items fulfill functions; that diverse items may fulfill the same function; that some items, which he labeled dysfunctional,may contribute adversely to the adjustment and adaptation of the system; and that the focus of empirical studies should be on the net balance of functional consequences. Those arguments went against the grain of accepted functionalist wisdom that all functions were positive, that all systems enjoyed a functional unity and that the removal of certain constituent elements-regarded as indispensable -would fundamentally alter the workings of each system. The cumulative result of these changes was a more dynamic, ideographic functionalism (Merton, 1957, pp. 30-37; also Rose, 1960; Swingewood, 1984; Sztompka, 1986). What is more important, Merton also presented an extended comparison of the contradictory charges leveled against functionalism on the one hand and Marxism on the other, viewed in the 1950s as ideological opposites. Since functionalism had been charged by some with being radical and by others as being conservative, he argued, it was methodologically neutral (Merton, 1957, pp. 37-41; also Flanigan & Fogelman, 1965, p. 119; Thomas, 1980). His point, regarding the relativist nature of political judgments of theory, was more fully developed by Splichal (1988, p. 624), who noted that ultimately all attempts at locating research approaches at fixed points on a political spectrum are bound to be ahistorical, essentializing, and inaccurate because the political role of a theory varies depending on the specific historical context. Of the critics charging functionalism with logical problems, the most influential was probably Hempel (1959, p. 277; also Jarvie, 1965, p. 22; Levy, 1988, p. 245), who cited a tautological use of concepts like adjustment and adaptation as well as an inappropriate use of teleological
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explanations. Both criticisms have subsequently been raised in communications, with reference to uses and gratification studies in particular. For example, Elliott (1974) criticized the argument that use leads to the gratification of need as at best circular and at worst imprisons research within a stable system of functional interdependence from which there is not escape (p. 253). Carey and Kreiling (1974) noted similarly that in functional analysis the primary emphasis is not upon determining the antecedents or origins of behavior but upon determining the import or consequences of behavior for the maintenance of systems of thought, activity, or social groups (p. 235; italics added). Although functionalists have acknowledged the tendency toward teleology evident in works influenced by their approach, they have generally rejected attempts by critics to locate the problem at the level of theory. Radcliffe-Brown (1968) sought to develop safeguards against that danger in systematic conceptualization while Merton ( 1957) turned to the development of a systematic method and of middle-range theories, between the extreme impulses of grand theories and what Mills called abstracted empiricism. As a guard against tautology, Hempel (1959) endorsed Mertons recommendation of more precise and testable hypotheses without which functionalist studies were likely to yield the trivial truth that any system will adjust itself to any set of circumstances (p. 295; also Martindale, 1965). For Martindale ( 1 9 6 9 , functionalisms alleged teleology could be traced to the antipositivist proclivities of the leading functionalists, and disproportional estimate of the role of closed systems in social life and an inadequate treatment of social change. While Hempels ideal was causal explanations of social phenomena, Andrkn (1984) leaned toward the defense of teleological ones:
Of course, there is a real distinction between the causes of an action and the agents reason for doing it; but it is also a matter of course that in many instances the agents reason for performing an act is also a cause of his performing that act. And many people will probably refer to ideas that form the premises of a practical inference that is the content of a collective teleological connection when asked why they performed a certain action. Especially when the action is an instance of a collective practice. . . . This means that teleological understanding of societal structures is relevant for anyone who wants to explain (causally) events therein. (pp. 67-68)

Even Hempel (1959) did not regard problems of logic posed by teleology as insurmountable. To be testable, he argued, teleological explanation would need to include a specification of the circumstances in which purposive agents would supervene established routines (laws); precisely indicate the observable effects likely to be produced by the intervention of purposive actions; and, most important, establish suitable hypotheses of self-regulation (pp. 277-278). This call for feedback loops
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offers the most promising resolution of the teleological problem, avoiding the danger of utilitarianism, while providing for the (re)coupling of the twin Durkheimian concern with normative order and the realm of action that were separated in the development of functionalism, with the normative being dropped upon the incorporation of the tradition into communications (resulting in uses and gratifications). A return to this earlier functional concern with rule making and rule breaking already is evident in the growing metatheoretical literature in the broader social sciences (e.g., Alexander, 1988, 1990; Giddens, 1984, especially pp. 169-185) and to a lesser extent, in communication studies (e.g., Andrkn, 1984). The culturalist criticism, although the most recent and perhaps most widely articulated within communications, is perhaps the easiest to reconcile t o the functionalist program. From the cultural perspective, Carey and Kreiling -writing together (Carey and Kreiling, 1974) and separately (Carey, 1978; Carey, 1989; Kreiling, 1978)- have offered some of the sharpest, yet most sympathetic, criticism of sociological functionalism. Kreiling (1978) specifically criticized the prevailing tendency among communication scholars to view cultural artifacts as reflections of firmer, more significant variables. The issue of the meaning and appeal of the cultural materials is bypassed as the subject is translated into psychological and sociological categories (p. 242). Drawing upon Durkheim and Gans, he proposed a perspective on culture that would make the conventions the problematic of cultural studies and attempt to chart their appearance and transformation (p. 253) and would regard popular culture as consisting of bodies of cultural materials that express the styles and tastes of groups that create and uphold them, and we should think of the groups as cultural groups (p. 249). Together, Carey and Kreiling (1974) urged communication scholars to link the function of mass media consumption with the symbolic context of the mass-communicated materials or with the actual experience of consuming them (p. 232). To accomplish this, they argued, uses and gratifications will have to undergo a triple conversion: an adoption of a cultural view of humans (in place of the current sociological and psychological models); an acceptance of the existence of multiple cultural realities (instead of the current assumptions that one hard reality exists beyond culture); and a knowledge of the existence of culturally constructed tastes that do not conform to the current means-end model of human behavior along with specifying of the relevant context. Taken as a whole, cultural studies calls for popular culture and other media artifacts to be studied for their meaning and appeal rather than as reflections of deeper psychological and sociological categories (Kreiling, 1978, p. 242). The radical reformation of the discipline implicit in this approach is encapsulated in the title of Careys (1989) book Communication as Culture. The culturalists criticisms, while valid in relation to systemic sociological functionalists, simply do not apply with equal va9s

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Theory

lidity to contextualists like Merton (1957) who have accommodated at the level of theory the existence of multiple systems or to Malinowski (1944, 1977), whose research focused explicitly upon the domain of culture. Thus, the critique of functionalism by cultural studies advocates is merely a call for a return to the source, to the road not taken (Alexander, 1988; Rothenbuhler, 1993).
The Return of Functionalist Concerns and Assumptions

Having lost the theoretical battles of the 1980s, functionalism has reemerged in other guises for the 1990s. As a major challenger during the 1980s to the dominant paradigm in general and functionalism in particular, cultural studies provides a surprising refuge for functionalist assumptions. Traveling under this name are such distinct approaches as the sociological analyses of Raymond Williams, rooted in the Marxist base-superstructure model; the structural analyses of popular cultural and hegemonic ideology undertaken by Stuart Hall and his colleagues at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham; and the pragmatic hermeneutics of James Carey and Albert Kreiling. Several fields of interest, now taken to be unique to cultural studies- including consensus maintenance (Corcoran, 1988; Hall, 1982; Hardt, 1989; Williams, 1961,1977) and ethnography and anthropology (Corcoran, 1988)- were earlier plowed by functionalists. In its search for linkages between the parts of a social system, furthermore, cultural studies often suggests the extreme holism for which systemic functionalism was rightly criticized (e.g., Corcoran, 1988, pp. 602, 605; Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott, 1982, p. 27; Hardt, 1989, pp. 586, 605; Splichal, 1988; Williams, 1961, p. 46, 1977, pp. 139-140). This holism is evident in the claim of Splichal (1988) that Cultural Studies relies upon a systemic concept of wholeness that presupposes the struggle between components of the whole, in which the role, significance, or function of any component ultimately results from the interaction of all components (p. 633). Having proposed articulation of parts as worthy of investigation, cultural studies researchers have often developed logical problems similar to their functionalist nemesis in explaining those articulations (Newcomb, 1991). In ignoring the structuring influence of the normative order, they follow uses and gratifications studies in a celebration of audience sovereignty and consumer choice (Golding & Murdock, 1991; Morley, 1992). In an ironic turnabout, the works of Hall and colleagues recently have come under attack for conservatism (Milliband, 1985). Cultural indicators (CI) studies, on the other hand, build on the contextual-functionalist hypothesis of integration of systems, using standardized instruments to measure individual symbolic elements, their

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linkages to each other as well as their geographic and temporal spread (Gerbner, 1969; Melischek, Rosengren, & Steppers, 1984; Namenwirth & Weber, 1987). These studies have proceeded along three distinct lines: the impact of differential exposure to a symbol system on viewers perceptions of the world, society, and self, as undertaken by Gerbner and his colleagues in the United States (e.g., Gerbner, 1969; Gross, 1984; Signorielli, 1984; Signorielli & Morgan, 1990); long-term cultural changes and their relationship to economic and social developments, as explored by Rosengren and his Swedish collaborators (e.g., Rosengren, 1981 , 1983b); and computer-based content analyses of political documents to uncover the dynamics of cultural systems, explored mainly by Namenwirth and associates (e.g., Namenwirth & Weber, 1987). CI researchers have developed research designs that overcome the extreme logical flaws identified by critics of the earlier tradition, incorporate concerns with stratification, and relate the genres and rituals they study first to each other and to the cultures of which they are a part, rather than to the social, political, and economic realms of society. For example, Gerbner (1969) examined the differential distribution of power, while discriminatory portrayal of gays, blacks, the elderly, and women in television programs geared toward mass audiences (Gross, 1984; Signorielli, 1984). Another set of studies charted the long-term dynamics of culture change by using the value dictionary developed by Lasswell & Namenwirth (1968), to trace the treatment of four fundamental functional problems -adaptation, goal attainment, interaction, and latency-in a series of American, British, and German political documents (Namenwirth 8c Weber, 1987). The latter studies are doubly influenced by Parsonian functionalism, through their use of the four basic functions and the value dictionary- both developed in that tradition. CI researchers also have restored attention to systems for the enforcement of norms as the nexus between culture and praxis ( A n d r h , 1984, p. 63), which Mertonian functionalism had deemphasized and uses and gratification scholars had all but ignored. This concern with the enforcement of norms is implicit in the mentions technique, a method for measuring the enforcement powers of literary critics developed by Rosengren (1981, 1983), and more explicit in the approach to televised violence as a dramatic cultural lesson, reflecting, demonstrating, and maintaining a hierarchy of social control and power relationships in the studies of Gerbner and associates (Morgan, 1984, p. 365; also Gross, 1984; Signorielli, 1984; Signorielli & Morgan, 1990). In a reversal of the usual political polarities in communications, the thoroughly empirical CI researchers have come under fire for alleged left-wing do-good-ism (Tannenbaum, 1984). In addition, with the notable exception of the Swedish CI researchers (e.g., Reimer, 1989; Rosengren, 1983), scholars in this tradition still show a greater penchant to relate cultural materials to sociological and economic categories (e.g. , Namenwirth & Weber,

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1987) than to the climates of tastes and feelings that would be expected to engage the attention of culturalist analyses (Carey & Kreiling, 1974; Kreiling, 1978).

Conclusion

As a search for commonalities in communication theory has recently displaced the divisive debates of the 1970s (e.g., Carey & Kreiling, 1974; Garnham, 1983; Rogers, 1983; Splichal, 1988; Vorderer & Groeben, 1992; White, 1983), attempts at rapprochement have focused in particular on the chasm between empiricist U.S. communications scholarship and holistic European communications studies (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1982; Gurevitch & Blumler, 1977; Nordenstreng, 1976; Rogers, 1983). Often overlooked in these discussions, given its collapse in 1980s, is functionalism, a cornerstone of earlier communication theorizing. Yet, in several of its incarnations the approach was developed explicitly to bridge various research traditions: Durkheimian sociology as a link between apriorist theorists and what Mills called abstracted empiricists, intended to unite the two rival theories without incurring their inconveniences (Durkheim, 1965, p. 32). Parsonian functionalism reflected an infusion of European intellectual traditions into American social thought (Mayhew, 1982, p. 3), while Merton (1957) offered his Social Theory and Social Structure as a step toward the consolidation of American sociology of mass communications and European sociology of knowledge, both being species of that genus of research which is concerned with the interplay between social structure and communications (p. 439). Given its proven heuristic value (Flanigan & Fogelman, 1965, p. 11 1, Jarvie, 1965, p. 31), functionalism has earned a place in the evolving theoretical heterodoxy called communications. Its pervasive spread through the social sciences, provides a basis for dialogue between communications and disciplines as diverse as anthropology, political science, sociology, linguistics, economics, and geography. However, the future of functionalism points neither toward the Mertonian strain advanced by Wright (1964) nor the Parsonian alternative once championed by Rothenbuhler (1987), but rather in the direction of a refashioned cultural variant that seeks to overcome the logical and political limitations of the tradition. The combined holistic and empiricist assumptions of contextual functionalism in particular provides an ideal bridge between U.S. and European communications traditions. If functionalism is to retain its vitality, however, it must draw upon more than its own past. It would benefit from a more explicit dialogue with the various other approaches that explore the hypothesis of systemic integration, particularly the C1 tradition, from within the functionalist approach, and cultural studies, which developed outside the tradition of not only functionalism but communication studies as well. To this evolv98

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ing partnership, contextual functionalism and CI offer rigorous methodological grounds for testing the important issues raised by critical cultural studies and systemic functionalism (Splichal, 1988, p. 621). If cultural studies cautions a sensitivity to culture and a greater concern for the maintenance and organization of hierarchies, functionalism focuses greater attention on the normative orders of society and brings a lengthy history filled with instructive setbacks and advances. Cultural indicators provides an integral model that could save critical cultural studies from the kind of eclectic and piratical use of empirical methods noted by Hall (1 982, p. 88; also Vorderer & Groeben, 1992). By addressing the flaws identified by cultural studies and other critics, the much-derided functionalist tradition could emerge from the heat of recent debates much strengthened. While details remain to be developed, a reformulated functionalism would build upon the integrative meaning of functional outcome rather than the stabilizing or maintenance connotation. Second, it would adopt a contextualist rather than systemic definition of subject matter, with analysts being responsible for defining and justifying the selected context. Third, it would involve a return to Durkheims concern with uncovering the grammar of social and cultural relations as embedded in patterned symbol manipulation and behavior. Although the number of scholars explicitly identifying their work as functionalist has declined drastically since the 1960s, several researchers influenced in varying degrees by the approach have proceeded to investigate the functionalist hypothesis of integration of cultural systems while explicitly incorporating concerns with stratification and multiple cultural systems into the design of their recent studies. Research along these lines will probably proceed under a variety of banners as scholars continue to dodge being labeled functionalist, but one certainty emerges from the smoke and ashes of recent incendiary debates: Any approach investigating the hypothesis of systemic interaction must confront the functionalist legacy or risk reproducing its weaknesses.

Carl Patrick Burrowes is Carter G. Woodson Distinguished Professor ofJournalism at Marshall University, Huntington, WV 25755. The author thanks Dr. Robert Craig, of the University of Colorado at Boulder, for urging him toward this line of inquiry, and the anonymous reviewers of Communication Theory for their helpful comments. These terms are used interchangeably in this paper with functionalism being used most often simply because it is shorter. In addition to these sources, at least two leading communication journals devoted special issues entirely to this shift: Hirsch & Carey (1978), Communication Research, 5(3) and Gerber (1983), the Journal of Communication, 3(33). Culture may be defined, following Kroeber and Kluckoln (1952), as consisting of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand,
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