Aging and Political Participatio in Japan

Aging and Political Participation in Japan: The Dankai Generation in a Political Swing Author(s): Yasuo Takao Source: Asian
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AGING AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN JAPAN

The Dankai Generation in a Political Swing
Yasuo Takao Abstract
Population aging is not just the socioeconomic issue of Japans future, but the political issue as well. The sharing of resources for an aging society will reshape policy strategies and democracy-building. This article will examine the direction and nature of participation by the elderly in the political process of Japanese society. Keywords: Japan, aging, elderly, political participation, intergenerational justice
Most people have heard the old saying, The older we get, the more conservative we tend to become. Is it true that the elderly are by nature resistant to change? In 2007, some 2.7 million Japanese company workers born between 1947 and 1949 retired or planned to retire in the near future.1 These company workers are the eldest of the first-wave of baby boomers, who are politically influential and have done much to bolster Japans economic growth. They are the most likely to emerge as the
Yasuo Takao is Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Asian Languages, Curtin University of Technology, Western Australia, Australia. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Masaharu Hori and Susan Takao. Email: <y.takao@ curtin.edu.au>. 1. The 2005 population census of Japan indicated that the population aged 65 and over was 25.8 million, accounting for 20.1% of the total (127.8 million). According to material provided by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC), as of 2007, there were 6.8 million people who were born between 1947 and 1949 and are still alive today. Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 5, pp. 852872, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2009 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.5.852.
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spearhead of socially mobilized senior citizens groups. It appears that retired baby boomers are already in the process of organizing and institutionalizing themselves as a social movement in major urban areas such as Tokyo and Osaka. In October 2005, Kan Naoto, a representative of the major opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), identified himself as a baby boomer when he proposed the formation of a new political party known as the Dankai (Baby Boomer) Party. There is a large body of literature on public policy toward old people in Japan, yet probably the single most important factor for explaining policy change, the elderly themselves, remains largely unexplored.2 A corollary of this omission is the assumption that Japanese elderly remain poorly organized for participating in policy making. This article examines the potential influence of elderly voters and socially mobilized elderly groups in Japan on the politics of the welfare state.3 Researchers in the field of general electorate studies have demonstrated the significance of generational differences in political attitudes and political participation.4 One common approach to examining changes in our political preferences over time is to apply the liberal-conservative political spectrum to generational cohorts.5 Some researchers suggest that the assumption that the older individuals are, the more likely they are conservative is not necessarily true. Rather, they argue, the generational differences may derive significantly from the varying ways in which a set of individuals born within the same time span experience historical events at similar life stages. In other words, those differences may be a reflection of environmental and social conditions that each generation experiences differently.6
2. See, for example, John Creighton Campbell, How Policies Change: The Japanese Government and the Aging Society (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Stephen John Anderson, Welfare Policy and Politics in Japan (New York: Paragon House, 1993). 3. It is easy to stereotype the elderly as conservative on the political spectrum, but the elderly are not necessarily resistant to change. There are significant findings in the literature that see the lives of older individuals as shaped by social contexts: culture, religion, state policies, and historical changes in family structures and economic markets. See, for example, Robert H. Binstock and Christine Day, Aging and Politics, in Handbook of Aging and Social Sciences, 4th ed., eds. Robert H. Binstock and Linda K. George (San Diego: Academic Press, 1996); John M. Cornman and Eric R. Kingson, Trends, Issues, Perspectives, and Values for the Aging of the Baby Boom Cohorts, The Gerontologist 36:1 (February 1996), pp. 1526. 4. Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 5. See, for example, Stephen J. Cutler, Attitudes, in The Encyclopedia of Aging, ed. George L. Maddox (New York: Springer, 1987). 6. Binstock and Day, Aging and Politics, pp. 36287.
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asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009
This generational hypothesis is an alternative to the life-cycle hypothesis,7 which suggests that the generational differences reflect life stages that involve age-related factors such as income, education, parental responsibilities, and physical mobility. According to the generational hypothesis, the Dankai cohort that came of age in the 1960s student movements and spearheaded the effort to reinvent Japan in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis should have been more strongly affected by those historical events than those born much earlier or later. This is not to say that life stages do not spawn significant differences. But the Dankai-specific socializing experiences reveal lifelong patterns of political participation, and deserve attention. Japans current population of 128 million is aging faster than that of any other industrialized nation.8 A rapidly growing body of retirees in Japan has good potential to shift from being purely reactive recipients of social services toward being more proactive participants in political processes. According to the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, by 2013 more than one-quarter of the countrys population will be 65 or older.9 Japan will reach a two-to-one ratio of its working age population (aged 15 to 64) to its elderly population (aged 65 or older) by 2015.10 The shrinking population of Japanese workers needs to support this growing pool of elderly as well as their own children. Irrespective of their financial preparedness for retirement, the massive numbers of these future pensioners will impose a heavy burden on Japanese society, particularly as everything they consume will need to be produced by the working population (unless it is acquired from outside Japan). However, birth rates are falling and the proportion of work-capable citizens is declining accordingly. The unprecedented, continued increase in the elderly population will not only place a heavy burden on the working
7. Lester W. Milbrath and M. L. Goel, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), pp. 13435; Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 139. Rosenstone and Hansen also suggest that as people grow older, they gain resources and experiences that promote participation. See Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America, p. 137. 8. Based on the results of the medium variant projection, the elderly population (aged 65 or over) as a percentage of the total population among more developed regions (Europe plus North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) will be an estimated 17.3% in 2015 and 26.1% in 2050. In contrast, Japans elderly as a percentage of the total population is expected to increase from 26.9% in 2015 to 39.6% in 2050. See Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospect: The 2006 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>, accessed November 3, 2007. 9. Japan, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Nihon no Shorai Suikei Jinko [Japans population projection for future dates], December 2006 (Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2006), p. 5. 10. Ibid.
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FIGURE
1 Changes in Population Structure by Age Groups, 19552055

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percentage of Total Population
Young Population (aged 0 to 14) Working Population (aged 15 to 64) Elderly Population (aged 65 or over)
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055
SOURCE: The figures are adapted from Japan, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Ippan Jinko Tokei [General population statistics], <http://www.ipss.go.jp/ syoushika/site-ad/index-tj.htm>, accessed January 10, 2008.
age population. It will also place retired people in a position to act as decision-making partners of the shrinking work force in Japanese politics. The elderly population as a percentage of Japans eligible voters (aged 20 or older) will increase from 21% in 1991 to an estimated 33% in 2025 and 40% by 2050 (see Figure 1).11 As the age of the median elector rises rapidly, the center of political gravity in Japan may shift away from taxpayers toward pensioners, with the expectation that the elderly will exert increasing political pressure as the population ages.12
11. Japan, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Ippan Jinko Tokei, accessed November 27, 2007. In Japan, the legal voting age is 20 for all elections at the national, prefectural, and municipal levels. 12. Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
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TABLE
1 Senior (65 and Older) Labor Force Participation Rates among Major OECD Countries, 2005
Nations Elderly Employed (in ten thousands) Labor Participation Rates (%) Total 19.4 14.5 7.9 6.3 3.4 3.1 1.3 Male 28.7 19.1 11.4 9.0 5.1 6.0 1.7 Female 12.6 11.1 4.6 4.3 2.2 1.1 1.0
Japan USA Canada UK Germany Italy France
495 509 31 58 52 35 13
SOURCE: Figures are adapted from the OECD, 2006 OECD Employment Outlook, except for Japans figures, which are provided by MIAC.
The following arguments are organized into four sections: (1) an examination of current generations of the Japanese elderly who are not optimally organized to represent their broad interests, (2) an investigation of the new generation of Japanese elderly who are expected to be more active in organizing their interests than previous generations, (3) an identification of the key political issues in interest representation for the aging Japanese population, and (4) an analysis of the nature and patterns of the political muscle exercised by the new generation of Japanese elderly.
Why Are the Japanese Elderly Not as Well Organized as Possible?

Well-organized senior-advocacy groups like the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) in the United States have yet to emerge in Japan. There are specific reasons why the Japanese elderly are not as well organized as they could be for interest representation. First, the task of organizing senior citizens into socially mobilized groups requires active members from 60 to 70 years of age who are mentally and physically fit. But Japanese men tend to work well beyond age 60, the official retirement age for those working in most medium and large companies. Elderly persons still active in labor markets, who tend to demonstrate strong group identification and obligations to their work place, do not necessarily support the group interests of retirees. The tendency of employed elderly to find security in belonging to a particular company prevents them from forming coalitions with elderly outside their firm. As Table 1 demonstrates, Japans elderly cohort has the highest labor participation rate among the Organization
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) group of major industrial countries. Approximately one-half of all Japanese men aged 60 to 70, and one-quarter of those aged 70 to 75, remain in the work force. Second, the importance of koenkai (personal support organizations), which are organized by politicians to mobilize voters at the local level, poses a barrier to the consolidation of elderly voters and groups. Elderly participation in the koenkai of individual politicians limits the potential for the elderly to organize their own interests. According to the Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai (Association for Promoting Fair Elections), koenkai participation rates of eligible voters peaked at 19.7% for national politicians in the 1979 lower house election and 30% for local politicians in the 1987 unified local election.13 Association surveys found that respondents are more likely to participate in koenkai as they get older. However, beginning around 1990, these participation rates began to decline continuously because of a series of events such as Japans decision to open its rice market, the Liberal Democratic Partys (LDP) loss of its lowerhouse majority in the 1993 general election, and the 1994 abolition of the koenkai-driven multi-seat constituency. These events provided less incentive to join koenkai where LDP politicians had distributed favors to constituents in the past. These support organizations are major channels through which senior citizens can request a politicians help in solving their problems and can seek personal favors.14 The basis of koenkai strategies can be found in the mobilization of chien (neighborhood ties), ketsuen (kinship ties), and kaishaen (company ties), the sources of favoritism and exclusiveness in traditional Japanese society.15 These ties tend to function as a rigidly closed system that excludes the elderly who are not linked to the population by the ties. Third, self-employed individuals such as farmers and shopkeepers, who have no mandatory retirement age, are more likely to encourage the interests of the producer rather than the consumer through their support of the probusiness LDP. The bulk of the demands voiced by elderly shopkeepers tends
13. See Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai, Senkyo no Ishiki Chosa [Survey on voters attitudes], <http://www.akaruisenkyo.or.jp/066search/index.html>, accessed November 2, 2007. 14. In 1994 a new electoral system of single member districts (SMD) for the lower house was introduced to create incentives for party/policy-centered elections rather than candidatecentered campaigns. Many findings suggest that the post-reform elections are still largely candidate-centered. See, for example, Ichiro Miyake, Senkyo Seido Henkaku to Tohyo Kodo [Electoral reform and voting behavior] (Tokyo: Mokutakusha, 2001); Motoshi Suzuki, Shugiin Shinsenkyo Seido ni okeru Senryakuteki Tohyo to Seito Shisutemu [Strategic voting and party systems in the new electoral system for the lower house], Leviathan 25 (Fall 1999), pp. 3251; Sadafumi Kawato, Takashi Yoshino, Koji Hirano, and Junko Kato, Gendai no Seito to Senkyo [Contemporary political parties and elections] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2001). 15. The term chien-ketsuen refers to ties of both neighborhood and kinship. Within neighborhood-based or kinship-based groups, members feel secure through tightly knit activities, but their security is often maintained at the expense of their individual autonomy.
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to be directed toward small-business protection. Elderly farmers hold opinions consonant with their keen interest in receiving agricultural subsidies. The interests of small business and farming often run counter to those of elderly consumers. Most elderly people living in rural areas belong to senior clubs for recreation and leisure; they are heavily dependent on agricultural associations, the strongest lobbying groups in Japan, to voice their political concerns. As of 2007, 7.8 million households (99% of farm households) belonged to the Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai (Nokyo), Japans Association of Agricultural Cooperatives. Nearly 60% of those who are engaged in farming are aged 65 or over.16 The membership of Nokyo is larger than that of any political organization in Japan. Members are kept in close contact with conservative national elites through the groups executives. Nokyo continues to lobby individual politicians and bureaucrats on agricultural legislation. It provides its members with help for a wide range of services such as financing, crop sales, purchases of production equipment, and insurance schemes.17 To the extent that Nokyo represents and promotes their interests, the elderly in farming households have less incentive to organize their interests. Fourth, Japans government-sponsored health insurance that covers all elderly persons also reduces the likelihood of senior citizens participation in public policy making. In the United States, a government health care system for the elderly has been a partial solution to the need for medical care, requiring them to purchase health care services in markets. This flaw in U.S. elderly policy explains the success of the AARPs political activities, including lobbying to address issues affecting elder Americans while providing services the government does not. In Japan, public demand for health services for the elderly has been relatively moderate because of two basic factors: the Japanese tradition of family care for the elderly, and a government health care program to cover everyone in the elderly population, which began in 1963.18 A decade later, the Japanese government made medical care virtually free for persons age 70 and older, although this was scaled back with the 1983 introduction of ichibu futan (coinsurance), which required the patient to pay a small portion of the costs.19
16. Japan, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Heisei Jukyu-nen Nogyo Kozo Dotai Chosa Hokoku [2007 report on changes in agricultural structure], <http://www.maff. go.jp/tokei.html>, accessed December 3, 2007. 17. In the 1990s, as the Nokyo had monopolized financing of all crop sales and purchases of production equipment, farming families began to increasingly drift away from the centralized Nokyos control and purchase such services in open markets. 18. William E. Steslicke, The Development of Health Insurance Policy in Japan, Journal of Health Policy, Politics, and Law 7:1 (Spring 1982), pp. 197226. 19. John Creighton Campbell, The Old People Boom and Japanese Policy Making, Journal of Japanese Studies 5:2 (Summer 1979), pp. 32157; John Creighton Campbell, Problems, Solutions, Non-Solutions, and Free Medical Care for the Elderly in Japan, Pacific Affairs 57:1 (Spring 1984), pp. 5364.
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Fifth, Japans service organizations for the elderly, which operate on a not-for-profit basis, have performed poorly in the market-oriented task of meeting their particular needs. Although pursuing a social mission driven by a commitment to shared values, these non-profit organizations (NPOs) often pay little attention to effective performance. Effectiveness requires the ability to act on information provided by the elderly, the availability of consumption choices, the efficient delivery of services, fund-raising expertise, accountability, and proximity to clients. Shakai fukushi hojin (social welfare corporations), which are private, non-profit service providers, are heavily regulated by the government and dependent on public funds, relying on such for 80%90% of their income.20 Bureaucrats tend to treat such organizations as an extension of the government for providing national government-defined services. In contrast, NPOs in the United States have historically distanced themselves from the state and have legal leeway in supporting and promoting the interests of the elderly. The AARP, for example, offers a range of health insurance and pharmacy products and provides counseling for investment, legal issues, and tax aid.21 As compared with Japans service organizations for the elderly, the AARP has effectively used the benefits of market economies, promoted consumption choices, and served the needs and interests of the elderly through legislative advocacy.22 Today, with more than 35 million members, the AARP is the second largest organization, after the Roman Catholic Church, in the United States.
Why Are the Japanese Elderly Now Expected to Organize More?

Several potential factors account for an expansion of elderly interest representation. The most general explanation sees the growth as a response to increased needs. Because of demographic shifts, the elderly have become acutely aware of greater needs; they are seeking more from the government on their own behalf. Another explanation can be found in the allocation of scarce resources. As tax revenues stagnate along with the demographic shift,
20. Their scope of activities is defined and audited under the Social Welfare Service Law of 1951. See Yasuo Takao, The Rise of the Third Sector in Japan, Asian Survey 41:2 (March/ April 2001), pp. 29398. 21. AARP, <http://www.aarp.org/>, accessed December 3, 2007. 22. Allan J. Cigar and Burdett Loomis, Interest Group Politics, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), p. 12; Robert H. Binstock, The Old-Age Lobby in a New Political Era, in The Future of Age-Based Public Policy, ed. Robert B. Hudson (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press 1997), pp. 5774; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Follow the Money, Fortune, December 6, 1999, p. 206.
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the elderly need to exert political pressures on the government to devote more resources to them. Even more fundamental is a change in the collective beliefs of the elderly. This explanation for their efforts at interest representation reflects a structural shift in basic values. Indeed, the elderly direct attention to the quality of life in post-industrial society. Increasing needs, stagnant resources, and changing beliefs all appear to be contributing to the growing efforts of the elderly to organize their interests.23 Apart from these fundamental factors that may be influential in the longer term, however, there are potential determinants that may be applied to a relatively short-term explanation of the expansion of elderly interest representation in Japan. First, the speed of aging of Japans population in urban areas is much faster than in rural areas. In the past, population aging took place in rural areas rather than urban areas. The Dankai generation left rural areas in the 1960s and early 1970s seeking a better life in urban areas, thereby creating the aged small population of villages and towns across the nation. Now the eldest cohort of the Dankai has reached 60 years of age in urban areas. As of 1995, the elderly population (i.e., aged 65 or older) as a percentage of Japans eligible voters was much higher in rural prefectures (22.6% in Shimane, 21.0% in Kochi, 20.5% in Yamagata, and 20.1% in Akita) than in urban ones (10.4% in Saitama, 11.3% in Chiba, 11.4% in Kanagawa, and 12% in Aichi).24 Only a decade later, in 2005, the major urban prefecture figures began to exceed the threshold of 20% (20.3% in Saitama, 21.5% in Chiba, 20.6% in Kanagawa, and 21.5% in Aichi).25 Now in the Tokyo metropolitan area, even after the youngest members of the Dankai generation reach 60 years of age in 2010, the large body of Dankai juniors (the second wave of baby boomers in post-World War Two Japan) born between 1971 and 1974 may slow down the expansion of elderly shares of votes. However, once the Dankai juniors reach 60 years of age or over in 2035, it is estimated that the elderly will account for about 35% of eligible voters in metropolitan areas. As discussed below, given that the elderly cohorts voter turnout has traditionally been much higher than in other age groups, as early as 2040 elderly votes may represent more than half of the total votes in Japans national elections. Second, the age group with the highest voter turnout in Japan has been shifting steadily toward an older cohort of eligible voters. As Figure 2
23. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equity; David Truman, The Government Process (New York: Knopf, 1953). 24. The figures are calculated from Japan, Statistical Bureau, MIAC, 1995 Population Census, <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/index.htm>, accessed January 10, 2008. 25. The figures are calculated from ibid., 2005 Population Census, <http://www.stat.go.jp/ english/data/kokusei/index.htm>, accessed January 10, 2008.
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FIGURE
2 Voter Turnouts by Age Groups in Lower House Elections, 19672005
100
90
80
70
60
Percentage
50
40
30
20
10
20s 50s
30s 60s
40s 70s
1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2005 Election Years
SOURCE: Japan, Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai, Shugiin Giin Senkyo Nenreibetsu Tohyoritsu no Suii [Trends of voter turnout rates in lower house elections], <http://www.akaruisenkyo.or. jp/070various/img/sg_nenrei.gif>, accessed January 10, 2008.
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indicates, Japanese eligible voters in their 50s had the highest turnout in lower house elections from 1967 to 1980. In the 1983 election, for the first time those in their 60s had the highest turnout rate. They have continued to do so. Since 1990, the turnout gap between those in their 50s and those in their 60s has gradually widened over a series of lower house elections. Even more interesting is the case of voters in their 70s. Their turnout rate was at the bottom in the 1967 election yet began to continually rise with the 1969 election, eventually reaching the second highest rate overall in the 2005 election. Among the most critical factors in understanding the generational differences of political participation are physical and mental limitations.26 In the 1950s and 1960s, although eligible voters aged 60 or older remained active, once they reached their 70s their voter turnout rates abruptly dropped. This would suggest that growing physical and mental limitations may have impaired their ability to vote. In contrast, their increased turnout in recent years suggests that eligible voters aged 70 or older may be more physically and mentally fit for political activity than in previous generations. A third reason for an expansion of elderly interest representation is that the aging of Japans population in urban areas is expected to increase the weight of elderly demand for providing individualized social services. In the past, Japanese public policy on national government aid concentrated on rural prefectures such as Shimane and Tottori. Depopulated rural prefectures need more money per capita to provide the same level of service as urban ones. This is because it is costly for rural prefectures to improve their infrastructure in depopulated areas. In 1995, for example, residents of 11 rural prefectures including Shimane and Tottori received national transfer payments of $2,891 each, seven times the $409 level for persons living in the urban prefectures Aichi, Osaka, or Tokyo. In the same fiscal year, the rural prefectures spent more than twice per capita ($3,545) the level of the urban prefectures ($1,445).27 However, as the population aged 65 and over has grown, individualized social services for the elderly have also expanded dramatically. Unlike public infrastructure development, which is relatively independent of population size, individualized service delivery in densely populated urban zones is much more expensive than in sparsely populated rural areas. Local public welfare expenditure as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) increased continuously from 1.9% in 1985 through 2.4% in 1995 to 3.1% in
26. Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York: Macmillan, 1993). 27. The figures are calculated from Japan, Ministry of Home Affairs, Chiho Zaisei Hakusho [White paper of local public finance], 1997 ed. (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1997).
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2004. As discussed below, the governments initial response to the demand of individualized social services was the 2000 introduction of public, mandatory long-term care insurance (LTCI). Yet, in recent years, cutbacks in grants-in-aid by the national government have hit social benefits particularly hard. This is especially the case for individualized social services, which represent over 90% of the affected amount.28 The elderly in Japans urban areas are expected to become quite vocal in decrying the lack of funds for individualized services. Fourth, the LTCI will politicize individualized care for the elderly: the program is designed to shift responsibility for care from the family to the state.29 This mandatory program will create new public pressures to bring the elderly together for interest aggregation. Under this scheme, everyone aged 40 and older drawing an income must contribute; all elderly, regardless of income or family situation, are eligible for nearly the full range of institutional or community-based care, depending on the level of physical and mental disability (functional and cognitive status). Half of total LTCI spending is subsidized by the government50% national, 25% prefectural, and 25% municipal. Another half comes from social insurance based on premiums paid by persons aged 40 to 64 and those aged 65 and older. The municipal government has its responsibility to implement the LTCI program, yet the same level of insurance premiums across Japan has produced different qualities of service delivery. This imbalance must withstand the scrutiny of both voters and emerging networks of elderly. With voter concern over possible increases in premiums and decreases in the minimum age of insurance contributors, care for the elderly has become a major political issue. In the past, Japanese social policy was formed within the framework of agendas, which are set by the state bureaucracy.30 Social welfare has been seen as the heart of bipartisan efforts in the Japanese party system, and thus was depoliticized in policy making. However, the case of LTCI legislation tells otherwise. At the early stage of the LTCI proposal, interest groupsrepresentatives of medical doctors, national associations of employers, and labor unionsbargained hard to protect their vested interests in the new system.31 Perhaps the
28. The figures are calculated from Japan, MIAC (formerly Ministry of Home Affairs), Chiho Zaisei Hakusho, various years. 29. John Creighton Campbell and Naoki Ikegami, Long-Term Care Insurance Comes to Japan, Health Affairs 19:3 (May/June 2000), pp. 2639. 30. Campbell, How Policies Change; Junko Kato, The Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 31. Mikitaka Masuyama, Kaigo Hoken no Seijigaku [The policy making process of the LTCI], Nihon Kokyo Seisaku Gakkai Nenpo [Annual report of Public Policy Studies Association Japan] (June 1998), pp. 126.
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single most important factor for Japans move toward socialization of care32 for the frail elderly was public support, evident in major opinion polls as the LTCI proposal became public. Nearly three-quarters of respondents were in favor of the LTCI.33 Fifth, senior citizens networking has been shifting the basis of mobilization from exclusive chien-ketsuen to inclusive voluntarism. Far from being a collective product of voluntary, individual decision making, senior citizens organizations historically derived from neighborhood-based networking. They became an integral part of state policy in post-World War Two Japan. One such organization is the Zenkoku Rojin Kurabu Rengokai (Japan Federation of Senior Citizens Clubs [JFSCC]), the largest senior citizens grouping in Japan. Its membership has remained at 8.8 million over the past decade. The federation consists of about 134,000 senior clubs, established in each neighborhood association across the nation.34 Since the 1963 enactment of the Elderly Welfare Law, the federation has received national and local operating subsidies. The presidents of the federation have been either former LDP parliamentarians or former welfare bureaucrats. The federation worked closely with the national government. However, participation rates in those senior clubs dropped significantly, to about one-third of those aged 60 and older in 2000 from more than one-half in the 1980s. In 1997, these rates were much higher in rural prefectures (e.g., 63.5% in Toyama) than in urban prefectures (e.g., 17.7% in Tokyo). This trend coincided with the LDPs reliance on rural votes.35 The motives that influenced senior citizens to join the senior clubs did not derive primarily from individuals proactive beliefs, but rather from social norms requiring acceptance as a community member in their neighborhood. By the mid-1980s, signs of attitude change began to appear amid the passive, reactive status quo. As existing welfare organizations found themselves unable to cope with the demand for individualized social services for the elderly, private voluntary organizations oriented toward self-help and advocacy were organized in increasing numbers to meet this need.36
32. The LTCI is aimed at the socialization (shakaika) of care through mandatory social insurance; all elderly, regardless of household income levels, are eligible for a wide range of institutional or community-based care. 33. Yomiuri Shinbun [Yomiuri News], Tokyo edition, September 14, 1996. 34. JFSCC, Zenkoku Rojin Kurabu Rengokai [Japan Federation of Senior Citizens Clubs, Inc.], <http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/~zenrou/>, accessed January 10, 2008. 35. Katsuyoshi Iwabuchi and Mitsuru Uchida, Eijingu no Seijigaku [Aging and politics] (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppankai, 1999), pp. 6667. 36. Japan, Economic Planning Agency (EPA), ed., Shimin Katsudo Repoto: Shimin Katsudo Dantai Kihon Chosa Hokoku [Report on citizens activities: Basic research report on citizens action groups] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1997), p. 6; Kansai Sogo Kenkyujo, ed.,
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One of the pioneering organizations is the Koreika Shakai o Yokusuru Josei no Kai (Womens Association for Better Aging Society), established in 1983.37 This organization is small, with about 1,500 members, but Chairperson Higuchi Keiko and other members have contributed significantly to national agenda-setting in public policy for the elderly and presented policy proposals from the viewpoint of women. A more inclusive organization is the Nihon Koreisha Seikatsu Kyodo Kumiai Rengokai (Japan Older Persons Co-operative Union),38 reorganized in 2001 by developing its 23 local unions across the nation. The national office has just launched a vigorous campaign to increase its membership from about 36,000 persons in 2008 to a target of one million members within several years. The union has grown as a service provider of senior citizens employment and individualized social help; it also promotes senior citizens social participation. Its board of directors has learned from the AARPs experience in the United States and aims to become an AARP for Japan. Perhaps the most singular organization is the Nihon Sekando Raifu Kyokai (Japan Association of Second-Life Service or JASS Club), created in 1992 to support retired company workers.39 Building on the existing networks among corporate firms rather than on community-based networks, the association has extended support for social participation of about 600,000 retired company workers in the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya areas and worked with voluntary enterprises of retired company workers. Many retirees who are still physically and mentally fit have utilized their expertise for enterprises such as recycling programs, pollution control, and social services for frail older people.
What Is the Main Political Issue in Managing Population Aging?

In aging Japan, a national consensus has yet to be formed in the policy area of social welfare: adequate levels of medical costs, equality of lifetime contributions and benefits among generations,40 and burden sharing
1996 NIRA Research Report: Chiiki Fukushi ni okeru NPO Shien Ikusei Hosaku no Teigen [Proposals for the ways to support and promote local welfare NGOs] (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 1996). 37. Global Action on Aging, The Womens Association for Better Aging Society, 2002, <http://www.globalaging.org/health/world/japanngo.htm>, accessed January 10, 2008. 38. Japan Older Persons Cooperative Union, Nihon Koreisha Seikatsu Kyodo Kumiai Rengokai [Japan Older Persons Co-operative Union], <http://kourei.roukyou.gr.jp/index. htm>, accessed January 10, 2008. 39. Iwabuchi and Uchida, Eijingu no Seijigaku, pp. 7879. 40. Such equality also needs to be ensured between rural and urban areas, the rich and poor, and the genders.
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among employees, employers, and the state. The point at issue is the sharing of resources. In particular, intergenerational justice needs to be entrenched, in the sense that each birth cohort takes responsibility in an effort to ensure that the next generation is no worse off.41 In Japans lowbirth-rate, aging society, if the current system of social security remains intact, the work-capable generation will continue to bear heavier burdens than ever and the inequality of net benefits (or net burdens) among generations will increase significantly. According to Cabinet Office figures as of 2002, generations aged 60 and older will receive net benefits of $510,000 ($1.82 million of lifetime benefits of social security and government consumption/investment, minus $1.31 million in lifetime contributions of taxes and social security). However, for those younger than 40 years old, the pattern will be reversed, with net burdens of $68,000 (aged 3039) and $127,000 (aged 2029).42 From the viewpoint of intergenerational justice, we would expect that present generations ought not to pursue policies that produce benefits for themselves yet impose costs on future generations. But Japans dependence on deficit-covering bonds tells another story. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare estimated that the per capita contribution to social security should be $5,900 in fiscal year 2006, but it ended up with the reduced amount of $5,200. This shortfall was mainly covered by government borrowing. Future generations in fiscal year 2015, for example, will not only need to make an estimated per capita contribution of $8,300 but may also bear an extra burden if they are expected to pay to help reduce the public debt.43 A sense of unfairness from one generation to another appears to be widespread and persistent in the future of Japan. The imbalanced burden sharing not only surpasses simple numbers but may result in a political battle among generations.
Will the Japanese Elderly Impose Unfair Consequences on Future Generations?

In the United States, many observers warn that the elderly are becoming more numerous and influential; some even suggest that their expanding
41. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 28493; Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, in Ethics and Population, ed. Michael D. Bayles (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1976), pp. 10015. 42. The figures were provided on February 15, 2005, Japan, Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. 43. Japan, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Shakai Hosho no Kyufu to Futan no Mitoshi [The prospect of benefits from and contributions to social security], May 2006, <http://www1.odn.ne.jp/hnakashima/syaho260506.pdf>, accessed January 10, 2008.
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political power must be curbed.44 The popular press increasingly describes U.S. welfare-state spending as benefiting the elderly unfairly at the expense of the young.45 Although the influence exerted by interest groups on such policy outcomes is extremely difficult to measure,46 the great fear that the elderly will garner unfair short-term interest for themselves may be groundless in the case of the Japanese welfare state. First, Japans LTCI will reduce the growing weight of self-interested elderly voters at the expense of younger generations, although the program will politicize care for the elderly as the state implements it. Japan is not the only country to implement a public LTC insurance policy, but eligibility in Japan is not a matter of income. Rather, it is defined purely in terms of age and physical/mental condition.47 In the United States, under Medicare and Medicaid, LTC benefits such as nursing-home care are provided to those with low incomes. Otherwise, privately provided LTC insurance is necessary for the American elderly to receive such benefits.48 Yet, private insurance providers are less interested in underwriting LTC policies because of the high risk levels within the elderly cohort.49 Both the limited provision of government programs for LTC and the lack of interest from private insurance providers are contributing to the political activism of the American elderly. The far greater inequality between those who can afford to purchase health insurance and those who cannot is also likely to make this issue more salient in the United States than in Japan. However, Japans move in 2000 toward socialization of care for the elderly is not fully age-inclusive but may become divisive among generations. In future, the financing of Japans LTC, which partly relies on social-insurance contributions levied on employers and employees, is uncertain to sustain the LTC program. As discussed earlier, increases in the starting age of financial contribution to the LTCI or in the minimum age for LTC benefits could become an issue of intergenerational justice.
44. See, for example, Phillip Longman, Born to Pay: The New Politics of Aging in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987); Alexi Bayer, Lets Give Parents an Extra Right to Vote, New York Times, May 4, 1997. 45. See, for example, Margot Hornblower, Gray Power, Time, January 4, 1988, pp. 3637. 46. Henry J. Pratt, The Gray Lobby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Christine L. Day, What Older Americans Think: Interest Groups and Aging Policy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). 47. Japan, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Long-Term Care Insurance in Japan, July 2002, <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/elderly/care/index.html>, accessed January 15, 2008. 48. See, for example, William J. Scanlon, Possible Reforms for Financing Long-Term Care, Journal of Economic Perspective 6:3 (Summer 1992), pp. 4358. 49. David Cutler, Why Doesnt the Market Fully Insure Long Term Care? NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper, no. 4301 (1993).
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Second, the Dankai generation plus those who were born in 1950 and 1951 accounts for more than 10 million of Japans population. Their participation in social networks is expected to bring different generations together across various social divides. According to a household survey conducted by the MIAC in 2004,50 the home ownership rate among the Dankai cohort is nearly 90%, and they have average current assets of $150,000. Members have or will soon receive lump-sum retirement allowances of $220,000, on average. There is a possibility that the Dankai generation will significantly change Japans patterns of household consumption and market investment. Equally important, this generation shows signs of activism in the public space of social and political participation as well as private marketplaces. A nationwide survey on the Dankai cohort, conducted by the National Institute for Educational Policy Research in 2007, found that its members are increasingly interested in developing networks for inclusive activities rather than exclusive ones.51 Dankai participation in organized voluntary activity, pursuing public purposes, is expected to increase at very high rates, reflecting the inclusive nature of the coming aged population. The nationwide survey on the cohort shows the percentage rates of change for various activities from past Dankai participation to their intended future participation. Activities such as volunteering to help with social welfare and natural disaster, school education support, and recycling projects represent more than a 10% increase over previous levels, while neighborhood association activities show only declining trends. Interestingly enough, about 5% of the respondents are active members of NPOs or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and more than half of these respondents are organizers. About one-third of the respondents who are not current members of NPOs or NGOs indicate that they wish to get involved in such groups in future. Figure 3, adapted from the 2004 Nippon Active Life Club (NALC) survey, corroborates this trend. After retirement, most Dankai company workers neither wish to join senior citizens clubs nor continue to participate in neighborhood association activities, which are seen as reflecting a net of obligations rather than being a voluntary act. Instead, they increasingly wish to
50. Japan, MIAC, Kakei Chosa Nenpo [Annual report of family income and expenditure survey], 2004, <http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kakei/2004np/index.htm>, accessed January 15, 2008. 51. Japan, National Institute for Educational Policy Research, Dankaisedai no Borantia Katsudo ni kansuru Chosa Kenkyu [Investigation on the volunteer activities by the Dankai generation], 2007, <www.nier.go.jp/05_kenkyu_seika/pdf/30.pdf>, accessed January 15, 2008; Shusuke Igarashi, Borantia Katsudo ni kansuru Chosa Kenkyu [Investigation on the volunteer activities], Shakai Kyoiku [Social Education] 62:11 (November 2007), pp. 4851.
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FIGURE 300
3 Senior Citizens Participation in Public Space
Volunteer Activities 250 Participants in Future Activities Sports
Cultural Activities
200
150 NPO/NGO 100 Neighborhood Associations
50
Senior Citizens Clubs Womens Associations 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Participants in Current Activities
350
400
SOURCE: NALC, Dankai no Sedai Teinengo no Seikatsu Ishiki Chosa [Survey of livelihood attitudes of the Dankai generation after retirement], May 2004. NOTE: In January 2004, the NALC conducted a nationwide survey of retired company workers and their spouses aged 5079. The data in this figure come from part of the sample: 681 respondents of the Dankai generation. The Participants in Future Activities indicates the number of the respondents who wish to participate in each activity area in future.
develop a social network of broad, citizen-based inclusiveness beyond the exclusive ties of their immediate neighborhood. Third, socially mobilized groups of the Dankai cohort have taken seriously the concerns that younger generations have that the Dankai generation might be bilking their pension bills. The Dankai groups have been seeking a solution through burden-sharing with other generations.52 In November 2006, three socially mobilized groups (the Dankai Party, Project Wild Boar, and the Dankai Policy Studies Network) formed a nationwide coalition known as Dankai Net, which began in 2007 to endorse and financially support Dankai candidates for local assemblies. Most local authorities applaud Dankai civic activism. According to a survey conducted
52. Dankai Net, Manifesuto [Manifesto], 2006, <http://e-janaika.net/dnet/html/manifesto. html>, accessed February 3, 2008.
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by Yomiuri Shimbun in August 2006, 97% of local chief executives wish to invite Dankai retirees to move into their communities, and 66% of those executives expect them to actively contribute to community revitalization.53 Some local authorities, such as Adachi and Nakano Wards in Tokyo and the city of Yokosuka, have started to implement policy measures and provide incentives to enhance Dankai participation in community development.54 Perhaps the most important principle is kyosei (the idea of conviviality) shared between those socially mobilized groups and government authorities. This idea focuses on human relationships in which all people, regardless of age, gender, race, or social status participate equally in all areas of society for the common good. All are given the opportunity to use their abilities at work.55 Kyosei has become a guiding principle of local governance in Japan, transcending social divides in local communities.56 Reflecting this principle, those socially mobilized groups tend to be better informed than the Dankai generation about the political feasibility of policy alternatives. Members of such groups often understand when cuts to elderly benefits are necessary for fiscal or political reasons in order to preserve programs for the elderly in the longer term. It is unlikely that those socially mobilized groups will pursue the benefits of elderly programs unfairly at the expense of youth.
Elderly Prospects in Japanese Politics

In coming years, the Japanese government will need to solve problems generated by the inevitable rapid growth in government consumption, particularly the increasing demands placed on the health care system, through policies that will incur tax increases and/or cuts in government programs. It is unlikely that the introduction of such policies will be popular with the electorate. Policymakers will also face close scrutiny, as well as organizing efforts by the elderly, whose electoral power will clearly grow in Japan as it
53. All prefectural governors and mayors of government-designated cities responded to this survey. Yomiuri Shinbun, August 9, 2006. 54. Japan Center for Cities, Dankai Sedai no Chiiki Sanga [Local participation by the Dankai generation] (Tokyo: Nihon Toshi Senta, 2007), chs. 3, 4. 55. The conceptualization of kyosei was pioneered in 1987 by Kisho Kurokawa, and embraced and expanded by other scholars. From 1998 to 2004, the Inquiry Committee on Kyosei Society, established in the House of Councillors, extensively investigated the problems between elderly and youth, men and women, and handicapped and non-handicapped people. The idea of kyosei has become an integral part of national policy. See Kisho Kurokawa, Kyosei no Shiso [The philosophy of kyosei] (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1987); Japan, Cabinet Office, Kyosei Shakai Seisaku Kanren Joho no Teikyo [Information dissemination with regard to kyosei society policies], <http://www8.cao.go.jp/souki/index.html>, accessed February 3, 2008. 56. Almost all Internet home pages of local governments in Japan are partly used to disseminate information with regard to their kyosei policy.
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has in many other countries. The Japanese elderly have yet to systematically organize themselves into groups and associations (which they will need to do to have their voices heard within the political arena), but organizational processes are now underway to represent their interests. In the past, high levels of Dankai labor force participation well beyond retirement age have combined with patron-client politics (implemented through Dankai membership of koenkai and the Nokyo) to prevent the Japanese elderly from organizing their generation-specific interests within political processes. In recent years, however, an upsurge of activity has been observed among the elderly in metropolitan areas to take part in organized voluntary activity and the creation of policy advocacy groups. In Japan, the elderly are living longer and wielding more disposable income than ever before. They are not only mentally and physically fit to remain politically active but have an increasing desire to develop a participatory lifestyle within local governance. The proliferation of these groups in future may significantly alter the relationship between the state and the elderly, between the youth and the elderly, and between taxpayers and pensioners. It is possible that the growing political power of elderly voters may prove counterproductive to a sustainable Japan, particularly if they adopt a traditional pressure-group focus in pursuit of entitlements for individuals or narrowly focused interests at the expense of collective needs. The relatively high numbers of senior citizens with political and social clout could also hamper much-needed welfare reform. Given Japans socialization of elderly care, however, elderly voters are likely to make more moderate demands about their entitlements. Well informed groups of the elderly are less likely to act unilaterally in their self-interest at the expense of other cohorts. The Dankai cohort of baby boomers, who collectively experienced turbulent events during their youth, may create a new social value in Japan. Indeed, as they get closer to retirement, they are increasingly interested in forming a social network of trust that brings people together across different social divides. It is a finding of this study that the socially mobilized groups of the Dankai generation actually help further voluntarism in Japan by forming coalitions and networks with other civil society groups. Together, they provide the necessary incentive to make decisions for the common good rather than for special or sectional interests alone. Such coalitions and networks may help to refine understandings of the empirical link between consumption and production, perhaps balancing the needs and entitlements of senior citizens with those of the existing work force (as the future recipients of retirement benefits). This includes the unpaid and largely unrecognized female work force based at home, which provides care for the elderly under Japans often patriarchal framework.
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The aging of the population will change the landscape of democracybuilding in 21st-century Japan. It is inevitable that people will rethink the existing practices of Japanese democracy. There will be simply too many senior voters, and their numbers will continue to grow. Many retired company workers are coming back to the urban communities, without their previous obligations to the work place. Whether they like it or not, the elderly residents will be poised to become frontrunners for reshaping the way in which Japans democracy is currently organized. The degree of support for the LTCI program and the old age pension system is strong among all age groups. It is hoped that the future of Japans democracy-building will tend toward embracing the principle of kyosei rather than on practicing blindly the principles of majority rule. Finally, the alarming increase in Japans aging population will affect a range of other issue areas including foreign policy and defense. The projected costs of an aging country are so high that Japan will have extreme difficulty in maintaining its allied military commitment and budget share with the United States. This adds yet another reason for Japan not to engage in large-scale remilitarization in the foreseeable future. The United States, whose population is moderately aging, will be placed in a position of having to pay for even more of the costs to maintain credible security. The problems associated with Japans population aging may thus be seen as a contributing factor in the loss of its credibility as a strong ally. Inward-looking foreign policy strategies will likely become more compelling for Japanese leaders in an aging world.
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Aging and Political Participatio in Japan

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Aging and Political Participation in Japan: The Dankai Generation in a Political Swing Author(s): Yasuo Takao Source: Asian

AGING AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN JAPAN

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

1 Changes in Population Structure by Age Groups, 19552055

Percentage of Total Population

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

Japan USA Canada UK Germany Italy France

Why Are the Japanese Elderly Not as Well Organized as Possible?

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

Why Are the Japanese Elderly Now Expected to Organize More?

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

2 Voter Turnouts by Age Groups in Lower House Elections, 19672005

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

What Is the Main Political Issue in Managing Population Aging?

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

Will the Japanese Elderly Impose Unfair Consequences on Future Generations?

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

3 Senior Citizens Participation in Public Space

Volunteer Activities 250 Participants in Future Activities Sports

150 NPO/NGO 100 Neighborhood Associations

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

Elderly Prospects in Japanese Politics

asian survey, vol. XliX, no. 5, september/october 2009

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen

1 Changes in Population Structure by Age Groups, 19552055

2 Voter Turnouts by Age Groups in Lower House Elections, 19672005