Stock Exe

INTERNATIONELLA HANDELSHÖGSKOLAN
HÖGSKOLAN I JÖNKÖPING
Value vs. Growth

A study of portfolio returns on the Stockholm Stock Exchange
based on the P/B- and P/E ratios
Bachelor’s thesis within Business Administration

Authors: Carlström, Anders
Karlström, Rikard
Sellgren, Jakob
Tutor: Österlund, Urban
Jönköping Dec 2005
JÖNKÖPING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS SCHOOL
Jönköping University
Värde kontra Tillväxt

En studie av portföljavkastning på Stockholmsbörsen baserad på P/B-
och P/E talen
Kandidatuppsats inom Företagsekonomi

Författare: Carlström, Anders
Karlström, Rikard
Sellgren, Jakob
Handledare: Österlund, Urban
Jönköping Dec 2005
Bachelor’s Thesis in Finance
Title: Value vs. Growth - A study of portfolio returns on the Stockholm Stock Ex-
change based on the P/B- and P/E ratios
Authors: Carlström Anders, Karlström Rikard, Sellgren Jakob

Tutor: Österlund Urban
Date: 2005-12-20
Subject terms: Finance, P/B, P/E, Portfolio theory, Efficient market hypothesis, Anomali-
ties.
Abstract
Research Questions:
• Will a portfolio based on value stocks, on a risk-adjusted basis, outperform a portfolio based on
growth stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange?
• Is the superior strategy able to generate abnormal risk adjusted returns by beating the OMXS in-
dex?
Purpose: The purpose is to investigate if an investor by purchasing a portfolio based on

value stocks will outperform a portfolio based on growth stocks. Furthermore the authors
aim to examine if the superior portfolio can beat the OMXS index and create abnormal re-
turns on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
Method: The quantitative research method is used when gathering information. To deter-
mine which stocks to include each year between 1993 to 2005 the price-to-book ratio
(P/B) is used. Based on this multiple the sample is divided into two extreme groups of low
and high P/B companies. These two groups are further divided according to their price-to-
earning ratios (P/E). This creates four portfolios, which symbolizes value and growth
stocks. Each portfolio’s return is recorded annually during the 12 year period. The returns
are risk-adjusted in order to find the superior portfolio. This portfolio is then compared
with the OMXS index for the same period to find out whether it has created an abnormal
return.
Conclusion: The superior and most extreme value portfolio, consisting of stocks with low
P/B and low P/E ratios generated a cumulative risk-adjusted return of 1908% between
1993-2005 and beat the most extreme growth portfolio consisting of high P/Bs and high
P/Es which generated a negative cumulative return. The superior portfolio was also able to
beat the OMXS index during the years of 1993-2005, generating an abnormal risk-adjusted
return of 7.77 times that of the OMXS index.
Kandidatuppsats inom Finansiering
Titel: Värde kontra Tillväxt - En studie av portföljavkastning på Stockholmsbörsen ba-
serad på P/B- och P/E talen
Författare: Carlström Anders, Karlström Rikard, Sellgren Jakob
Handledare: Österlund Urban
Datum: 2005-12-20
Ämnesord: Finansiering, P/B, P/E, Portföljteori, Effektiva marknads hypotesen, Abnor-

maliteter
Sammanfattning
Frågeställningar:
• Kommer en portfölj baserad på värdeaktier, på en riskjusterad basis att slå en portfölj baserad på
tillväxtaktier på Stockholmsbörsen?
• Kan den vinnande strategin skapa en riskjusterad överavkastning över OMXS index?
Syfte: Syftet är att undersöka om en investerare, genom att köpa en portfölj baserad på vär-
deaktier, kan slå en portfölj baserad på tillväxtaktier. Vidare har författarna som mål att un-
dersöka om den vinnande portföljen kan slå OMXS-index och skapa överavkastning på
den svenska aktiemarknaden.
Metod: Informationsinsamlingen till uppsatsen har en kvantitativ ansatts som grund. För
att avgöra vilka aktier som ska inkluderas i undersökningen mellan åren 1993 till 2005 har
författarna använt sig av nyckeltalet aktiekurs över eget kapital (P/B-tal). Med det här ny-
ckeltalet till grund har urvalet delats upp i två extremgrupper, lågt och högt P/B. Dessa två
grupper delades upp ytterligare efter dess aktiekurs över vinst (P/E-tal). Detta skapar fyra
portföljer som symboliserar värde- och tillväxtaktier. Avkastning på portföljerna mäts årli-
gen under 12 år och sedan riskjusteras för att hitta den mest lönsamma portföljen. Denna
portfölj jämförs sedan med OMXS-index för samma period för att se om portföljen har
skapat överavkastning.
Slutsats: Den bästa och mest extrema värdeaktieportföljen som bestod av lågt P/B och
lågt P/E skapade en kumulativ riskjusterad avkastning på 1908% och slog den mest extre-
ma tillväxtportföljen som genererade en negativ kumulativ avkastning. Den bästa portföljen
slog också OMXS-index under åren 1993 till 2005 och skapade en riskjusterad överavkast-
ning på 7.77 gånger OMXS.
Table of Content
1 Introduction............................................................................ 1
1.1 Background ................................................................................... 1
1.2 Problem Discussion....................................................................... 3
1.3 Purpose......................................................................................... 4
1.4 Perspective ................................................................................... 4
1.5 Delimitations.................................................................................. 4
1.6 Definitions ..................................................................................... 4
1.7 Methodological Approach.............................................................. 5
1.8 Methodological Overview .............................................................. 5
1.9 Literature Study ............................................................................. 7
1.10 Disposition..................................................................................... 8
2 Theoretical Framework ......................................................... 9
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)................................................ 9
2.2 Portfolio Theory ........................................................................... 10
2.2.1 Return............................................................................... 10
2.2.2 Portfolio risk and the relation to portfolio
performance ................................................................................ 11
2.2.3 Risk definition ................................................................... 11
2.2.4 Risk-free rate .................................................................... 12
2.2.5 Portfolio performance in relation to the market
benchmark .................................................................................. 12
2.2.6 Market Index ..................................................................... 12
2.2.7 Risk-adjusted measures ................................................... 12
2.3 Previous Research of Valuation Multiples ................................... 14
2.4 Value and Growth Definitions ...................................................... 15
2.5 Examples of value and growth companies .................................. 17
3 Methodology ........................................................................ 19
3.1 Quantitative research approach .................................................. 19
3.2 Secondary data ........................................................................... 19
3.3 Data collection and portfolio creation .......................................... 20
3.3.1 Sample size ...................................................................... 22
3.3.2 Break points for P/B.......................................................... 22
3.3.3 Systematic sampling ...................................................... 24
3.4 Portfolio Calculations................................................................... 24
3.5 Portfolio Analysis......................................................................... 26
3.6 Reliability and Validity ................................................................. 27
4 Empirical Findings and Analysis ....................................... 28
4.1 Empirical findings of the four portfolios........................................ 28
4.2 Portfolio comparison and analysis............................................... 30
4.2.1 Geometric average comparisons ...................................... 30
4.2.2 Cumulative return comparisons ........................................ 30
4.2.3 Reasons for return differences.......................................... 31
4.3 Low-Low vs. OMXS index ........................................................... 33
5 Conclusion and Final Remarks .......................................... 35
i
5.1 Conclusion .................................................................................. 35
5.2 The authors’ reflections ............................................................... 36
5.2.1 Reasons for over- and under valuation............................. 36
5.2.2 Reasons for abnormal return ............................................ 36
5.2.3 Implications for the EMH................................................... 36
5.2.4 Side remarks on β, P/E and the time period used ............ 37
5.3 Critique of method used .............................................................. 37
5.4 Suggestions for further studies.................................................... 39
References................................................................................. 40
Appendix I.................................................................................. 44
Appendix II................................................................................. 47
Appendix III................................................................................ 48
Appendix IV ............................................................................... 50
ii
Figures
Figure 1 Barra Value & Growth Index – a cumulative comparison ................. 2
Figure 2 Methodological Overview ................................................................ 6
Figure 3 Portfolio creation and composition ................................................. 21
Figure 4 The standard normal distribution.................................................... 23
Figure 5 Risk-adjusted portfolio performances each year 1993- 2004 ......... 29
Figure 6 Cumulative return........................................................................... 31
Figure 7 Actual returns, not risk-adjusted..................................................... 33
Tables
Table 1 Wilshire Style Index......................................................................... 17
Table 2 Portfolio performance per year 1993-2004...................................... 29
Table 3 Average geometric risk-adjusted return 1993-2005 ........................ 30
Table 4 Average portfolio beta and dividend payout 1993-2004 .................. 31
Table 5 Low-Low portfolio vs. OMXS ........................................................... 34
Formulas
Formula 1 Holding-period return .................................................................. 10
Formula 2 Geometric average...................................................................... 10
Formula 3 Treynor ratio................................................................................ 13
Formula 4 Jensen’s Measure ....................................................................... 13
Formula 5 Tail area ...................................................................................... 23
Formula 6 Table area................................................................................... 23
Formula 7 Break points for P/B .................................................................... 24
Formula 8 Systematic sampling ................................................................... 24
iii
Introduction
1 Introduction
“To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a stratospheric IQ, unusual business insights, or in-
side information. What is needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to
keep emotions from corroding that framework”.
- Warren Buffet, 1986
(Cited in Graham, 1973, revised 1986, p vii)
1.1 Background
Humans are by nature value and profit maximizers. In all we do, we implicitly calculate and
compare the expected gains with the risks involved. That is, we try to maximize our profit
with as low risk as possible.
A number of papers have dealt with methods showing evidence that markets are inefficient
and investors are able to achieve abnormal returns 1 , i.e. finding portfolios of companies
that will beat the market, by conducting different kinds of stock picking techniques. Some
of the common market irregularities are the January effect - that stocks generate abnor-
mally high returns in the month of January, the Monday effect - that Mondays are the
worst day of holding shares, the size effect - that small-cap firms outperform large-cap
firms, insider transactions - that insider transactions reveal a concealed message about the
company’s true market valuation, and lastly that value stocks outperform growth stocks.
(Damodaran, 2002; Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe 2005) The focus in this thesis will be on the
value versus growth perspective, since it is a common way for individuals and mutual funds
to classify and base their investment decisions on.
An example of a great value investor is Warren Buffett. According to Forbes Magazine
(Kroll & Goldman, 2005) Buffett is currently the second wealthiest person in the world
with a net worth of more than $44 billion. He has been able to create his fortune by using
the techniques of fundamental analysis in order to find value stocks, typically mature com-
panies found in the Manufacturing, Real-estate and Timber & Pulp industries, worth $1
selling for $0.5. His skills as an investor are evident when looking at the US holding com-
pany Berkshire Hathaway, where he is the chairman and CEO, increasing in value over 30
years from $290/share to more than $84 000/share. (Miles, 2004)
On the other hand, investing in growth companies, typically younger companies found in
the Healthcare and Technology-industries (Börsguide, 1993- 2005), can also create high re-
turns. An example of this is the Swedish IT-firm Framfab, increasing in share price by
1515% within nine months from its initial public offering in June of 1999. However six
years later Framfab’s stock price has dropped 90% compared to the introduction price.
(OMX Group - Stockholmsbörsen, 2005) This shows that an investor can make great prof-
its on both types of investments but returns might differ remarkably in the long-run.
Another support in favor of value stocks is the comparison of the Barra Value & Growth
Indexes 2 , based in the US. Figure 1 shows that value investors have beaten growth inves-
1 The excess return of a portfolio given the return of a market portfolio (Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe 2005)
2 Stock indexes categorized by the P/B ratio. Value implies low P/B ratios and Growth implies high P/B ra-
tios.
1
Introduction
tors by about the double, generating a cumulative return of more than 6 000%. (Barra,
2005)
7000%
6000%
5000%
4000%
Value
%
Growth
3000%
2000%
1000%
0%
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Year
Figure 1 Barra Value & Growth Index – a cumulative comparison
These examples show interesting signs that value investing in the long-run, i.e. using fun-
damental analysis to find value stocks, is generating higher returns compared to a strategy
based on buying growth stocks. The technique of finding undervalued 3 companies can be
traced back to 1934 and Benjamin Graham, the father of valuation and author of the book
Security Analysis (Graham & Dodd, 1934). He developed a majority of the ideas which fun-
damental analysts base their investment methods on. The underlying theme in fundamental
analysis is that the true value of the firm is not always reflected in its price and thus can in-
stead be related to its financial characteristics such as growth prospects, cash flows and
valuation multiples. This means that a stock should be picked depending on the company’s
financial situation. (Graham & Dodd, 1934; Graham, 1973; Damodaran, 2002)
The evidence above, that value stocks are outperforming growth stocks, are of interest to
all market participants since value maximization and creating abnormal returns are the ul-
timate goals when investing. Creating sustained abnormal returns is however inconsistent
with the well known Efficient Market Hypothesis which states that in a truly efficient mar-
ket at any point in time, the stock price is fully reflected by all available information. This
means that it should be impossible to find undervalued companies unless the market is in-
efficient. (Sharpe, Alexander & Baily, 1999) This thesis will nevertheless try to examine the
possibility to generate abnormal returns on the Stockholm Stock Exchange using strategies
focusing on either buying value or growth stocks.
3 When the market price of the company is lower than its intrinsic value. (Damodaran, 2002)
2
Introduction
1.2 Problem Discussion

There has been a long ongoing discussion among market participants whether growth
stocks are constantly being overvalued and hence generating less return on a risk-adjusted
basis 4 , than the more stable value stocks. Value stocks are usually defined as companies
with low valuation multiples (P/B 5 , P/E 6 ratios) and high dividend yield 7 while growth
stocks are defined as companies with high valuation multiples (P/B, P/E) and low divi-
dend yield. (Sharpe et al. 1999)
Most previous research, by for example Fama and French (1992), Chan, Hamao and La-
konishok (1991) and Basu (1977), shows that value stocks outperforms growth stocks. A
majority of these studies have been performed on the US stock market, the world’s largest
market for listed securities, and the authors have not found any studies that specifically fo-
cus on the Swedish stock market, which is relatively small – the eighth largest in Europe
based on equity trading. (Federation of European Securities Exchanges, 2005)
According to an article by Fuhrman in Wall Street Journal (2000) European investors are
not as fond of value stocks as US investors, meaning that Europeans tend to prefer growth
stocks. The author of the article argues this is because of the perception that growth stock’s
have seemingly limitless potential gains. With European’s dislike of value stocks in mind,
together with the fact that Swedes are very active investors, either directly or through mu-
tual funds, it is in their and the authors interest to answer the following questions:
• Will a portfolio based on value stocks, on a risk-adjusted basis; outperform a portfolio based on
Most interestingly, since investing is about value creation and preferably creating abnormal
returns:
dex?
4 Returns adjusted for the level of risk taken, a longer discussion is found in section 2.2.7
5 Price per share divided by book value per share
6 Price per share divided by earnings per share
7 Annual dividend per share divided by price per share
3
Introduction
1.3 Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if an investor by purchasing a portfolio based on
value stocks will outperform a portfolio based on growth stocks. Furthermore the authors
aim to examine if the superior portfolio can beat the OMXS index and create abnormal re-
turns on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
1.4 Perspective
This thesis is written from an investor perspective, investors being either individuals or lar-
ger institutions such as mutual funds. Investors interested in enhancing their portfolio re-
turns will have an interest in the result of this thesis.
1.5 Delimitations
The authors have not been able to find earlier studies about the anomality that value beats
growth, which specifically have been performed on the Swedish market. It is likely that
other studies have taken place, however these might be published in data bases and at uni-
versities not available for the authors.
This thesis will take into consideration the vast majority of the Stockholm Stock Exchange,
including the following lists: the A-list, O-list, Attract 40, NGM Equity, Nya Marknaden and
Aktietorget. Due to the lack of data from smaller lists such as beQuoted (inoff.) and Göte-
borgslistan they will not be included.
The time span for the research is from 1993 until 2005, this since there is no structured
data available before 1993 and due to time constraints the authors have not had the ability
to process older information.
Tax effects are not taken into consideration when selling stocks or when receiving divi-
dends which will cause profits to be higher and losses to be lower relatively to if returns
would have been adjusted for taxes.
Transaction costs will not be considered either, since this cost will differ significantly de-
pending on the type of investor and volume traded. The reader should be aware that each
transaction both buy and sell, will reduce the total profit. The authors have however inten-
tionally with the chosen method tried to reduce the number of transactions in order to
minimize the transaction costs.
Reasons for companies’ having either high or low valuation multiples are not considered,
nor if these extreme multiples only last temporarily. Purchasing decisions are only based on
raw data published once a year not taking any other factors into account that might be of
importance when evaluating stocks.
1.6 Definitions
The price-to-book ratio, henceforth referred to as P/B is a valuation multiple used to
measure the price paid for a share over the book value per share. The lower the ratio for
companies in the same industry the lower the valuation and vice versa. (Frykman &
Tolleryd 2003)
4
Introduction
The price-to-earnings ratio, henceforth referred to as P/E measures the market price per
share over earnings per share, in other words it shows how much investors are willing to
pay today for one unit of earnings. The lower the ratio for companies in the same industry
the lower the valuation and vice versa. (Sharpe et al. 1999)
Both ratios are frequently used in fundamental analysis when comparing companies’ valua-
tions within the same industry. In cases where companies have negative P/B and P/E ra-
tios they will be considered as being infinite large. For a more thorough discussion of nega-
tive valuation multiples and a numerical example, see appendix I.
1.7 Methodological Approach

What are you interested in as a researcher? Is it to understand how everything fits together
or is it a specific target or event? Within these questions lie basic philosophical thoughts
which every researcher has to reflect upon before he or she proceeds. The questions be-
hind the issue are the deductive method and the inductive method. These are two plat-
forms which a researcher can begin the investigation from.
The deductive method works by using statements which you then can deduct new hy-
pothesis from, that is, working with an already known formula, assumption or theory and
try to apply this to observations made in the real world and thereby explain the world
through the pre understood theories. These hypotheses can then be proven right or wrong
by using empirical studies. (Holme & Solvang, 1991) This thesis will tilt towards the deduc-
tive method since known formulas are being used, P/B and P/E, and then are applied to
observations made on the stock market. The empirical findings can then be tested through
statistical formulas in order to confirm or reject the previous conclusions on the US market
that value beats growth and see if this is applicable on the Swedish market as well.
The inductive method on the other hand works in the opposite way. It focuses on the ob-
servations made of the world and a specific occurrence and tries to work out a formula ex-
plaining the observations. The specific observation is made into a generalization about the
world (Losee, 2001). To some extent this thesis will also use the inductive method since the
sample of value- and growth companies and the conclusions drawn from these observa-
tions will be accepted as a description of the whole population of companies, i.e. the ran-
dom sample of value companies will be used as a description for all value companies and
the random sample of growth companies will be used as a description for all growth com-
panies.
1.8 Methodological Overview

This thesis starts out defining value and growth by certain financial multiples. Listed com-
panies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange will be divided into two groups: growth and
value companies based on their P/B ratios. To get the statistical framework the authors will
gather historical stock information based on annual data from the book Börsguide, explained
further bellow. From the first two groups four portfolios will be created, based on their
P/E ratios. All four portfolios’ return will be measured and compared each year, with re-
gards to their risk, in order to determine which portfolio that has created the highest return
on a risk-adjusted basis. The superior portfolio out of these four will lastly be compared to
the OMXS index to conclude if it has generated abnormal returns as well. A graphical
overview of the methodological steps can be seen in figure 2.
5
Introduction
Figure 2 Methodological Overview
6
Introduction
1.9 Literature Study

The authors have used two main sources in order to retrieve the information: research
journals and books. Research journals about previous research in the field of “value and
growth” investing were found through the database JSTOR. This database is made up of
several research magazines where The Journal of Finance was found to have the highest
density of relevant articles. Examples of search words used to narrow the amount of in-
formation when searching for applicable articles were “Value Investing”, “Growth Stocks”,
“Value”, “Growth”, “Value vs. Growth”, “P/B”, “P/E”, “Definition of value/growth”
and a combination of these. Besides explaining the results of previous studies these articles
also gave valuable help when defining value from growth stocks.
The type of literature most used in this thesis is books within the field of portfolio theory
and corporate finance. These books offer insights when laying out the stepping stones of
portfolio analysis, such as return on portfolios relative to their risk, which is of high impor-
tance in this thesis.
The historical stock information in the empirical study was obtained through the book
Börsguide which is found in the financial department of Jönköping International Business
School’s library. Börsguide is independent data published twice a year by Delphi Econom-
ics and it contains unbiased historical data such as stock prices, earnings, margins, valuation
multiples and major stock holders for all public companies in Sweden, except from smaller
lists such as beQuoted (inoff.) or Göteborgslistan. It is available in printed form on most librar-
ies. This book was the only source available where historical stock prices and valuation
multiples were grouped in an efficient way.
7
Introduction
1.10 Disposition
Chapter 1 An introduction to the value and growth concepts

which leads into a detailed background discussion and
problem statement of the thesis. The problem state-
Introduction ment will further be followed by the purpose and de-
limitations. It ends with a clarification of the philoso-
phical methods used to gather information for the the-
sis.
Chapter 2 This chapter clarifies the thesis’ theoretical framework

such as defining value and growth and explaining key
financial definitions. It will assist the authors in the
Frame of Reference analysis of the proposed research questions.
Chapter 3 The method used to conduct the empirical study will

be presented in this chapter. The process of gathering
information together with a detailed method used to
Methodology categorize and analyze the data will be explained. The
chapter ends with a critical overlook of the processes
used.
Chapter 4 The empirical findings of the data collection are pre-

sented and then analyzed with aid of the theoretical
Empirical Findings framework.
and Analysis
Chapter 5 The conclusion of the thesis, a discussion of the analy-

sis and the authors’ own reflections. The chapter ends
Conclusion & with criticism of the method used and a proposal for
Discussion further research.
8
Theoretical Framework
2 Theoretical Framework
The following chapter examines and outlines the theoretical framework which will support the thesis. The
chapter begins with a classification of the efficient market and the various measures used to classify and ana-
lyze portfolio performance. Furthermore, a summary on previous studies made by different financial scholars
are presented, and finally the concepts and characteristics of value- and growth companies are discussed.
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)

The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that at any point in time asset prices should
fully reflect all available information (Damodaran, 2002; Ross et al. 2005). Since the price
reflects all available information, investors cannot expect to make abnormal profits. Ab-
normal profits also called abnormal return, is the excess return of a portfolio given the re-
turn of a market portfolio (see section 2.2.6. for a discussion of the market portfolio). It is
the part of the return that is not due to systematic impacts, meaning; the difference be-
tween actual return and the expected return from market movements. Abnormal returns
can be positive, i.e. when the portfolio has beaten the market, or negative, i.e. when the
market has beaten the portfolio. (Ross et al. 2005)
The EMH does not state that the market price of an asset or investment must be equal to
the true value at any point in time, but merely that the errors in market price are unbiased,
i.e. that the stock price can actually be higher or lower than the true price as long as these
errors are random. This random error term implies that at any point in time, there is an
equal chance that the stock is under- or overvalued. So in an efficient market, stocks with
low P/E ratios should have an equal chance of being undervalued as stocks with high P/E
ratios. (Damodaran, 2002)
In 1970 Eugene Fama (1970) presented an influential article where he divided the efficient
market into three forms; weak, semi-strong and strong.
The weak form of market efficiency states that it is not possible for investors to make ab-
normal profits based on knowledge of past stock performance. This due to the fact that the
stock price follows a specific random process called a random walk, meaning that new in-
formation will affect the price through an error term and future prices cannot be predicted
from past prices. (Fama, 1970)
The semi-strong form of market efficiency states that, in addition to the rules of the weak
form, it is not possible for investors to make abnormal returns based on information that is
publicly known. This due to the fact that a semi-strong market quickly responds to publicly
announced information and will therefore adjust the stock price to a correct level. (Fama,
1970)
The strong form of market efficiency states that an investor will not be able to make ab-
normal profits based on any information, neither public nor private (such as insider infor-
mation). This is due to the fact that the stock price reflects all available information at all
times and no investor will have superior information that will not already been taken into
account. (Fama, 1070) This implicates that, even though trading on inside information is il-
legal in Sweden, this information is somehow leaking and is incorporated into stock prices
(Mandell & O’Brien, 1992).
9
One important implication of the EMH is that it does not state that no investors will be
able to beat the market, in fact, about half of the investors will beat the market at any given
time, and half of the investors will not. (Mandell & O’Brien, 1992)
The Swedish stock market is according to Wramsby and Österlund (2001) semi-strong.
However, it shows a lower degree of efficiency than larger foreign markets this because the
Swedish market is relatively small which makes it easier for large investors in Sweden to ef-
fect stock prices in their favor.
2.2 Portfolio Theory

Depending on the investor’s motive with his/her investments there will always, to some
degree, be a payoff between the return of the investment and the risk of that same invest-
ment. This means that the more uncertain the future returns of an investment are, the
higher should the expected return of that investment be (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2004;
Strong, 2000) i.e. the higher risk a portfolio has, the higher return it is excepted to generate
and vice versa. The factors that an investor has to consider before making a rational in-
vestment decision will be discussed in the coming paragraphs.
2.2.1 Return
A measure of a stock investment’s success is the rate at which the funds has grown from
one period to another, called the total holding-period return (HPR). The HPR depends on
both the capital gain/loss, i.e. the increase/decrease in share price during the period, and
any dividends paid. The percentage return the dividends have generated in relation to its
price is also called dividend yield. (Bodie et al. 2004)
The HPR formula is as follow:
Ending price − Beginning price
HPR = + DividendYield
Beginning price
Formula 1 Holding-period return (Bodie et al. 2004)

The return to use when dealing with multiple time periods is the cumulative return ap-
proach. The underlying assumption in this approach is that the return earned is re-invested
in the asset and hence each years return is compounded into a final, cumulative return.
(Bodie et al. 2004)
When measuring the average return over several periods of time it is appropriate to use a
geometric average, which, as in the case with cumulative return, takes into consideration
the compounding effect. (Bodie et al. 2004)
(1 + r1 )* (1 + r2 )...(1 + rn ) = (1 + R )n
Formula 2 Geometric average (Bodie et al. 2004)
rn = Return for period n
R = Geometric average return for period 1 to n
10
2.2.2 Portfolio risk and the relation to portfolio performance

In order to be able to determine which portfolio that is actually the most profitable, one
has to compare the returns on a risk-adjusted basis. This since the portfolios all have dif-
ferent risks and hence will have different returns. Without risk-adjusting for these differ-
ences, a comparison between them would not be objective. An objective comparison there-
fore demands that the portfolios are adjusted for the respective risk. In the next section the
various aspects to consider when doing this risk-adjusted comparison will be described.
2.2.3 Risk definition

The risk when investing is the likelihood of losing your invested capital and hence generate
a negative return. This risk is measured by the variability, the standard deviation 8 , of re-
turns. A risk-free asset has a standard deviation of zero. The total risk of a stock is made up
of unsystematic and systematic risk where the unsystematic risk is firm-specific risk, i.e. fac-
tors that only affect the single company and not the market as a whole. Unsystematic risk
can be lowered and actually eliminated by diversification. (Suhar, 2003) The reasoning be-
hind diversification is that if one asset is having a negative development, there will be other
assets in the investor’s portfolio that is doing well and hence will counteract the poor per-
forming asset. The classical expression, do not put all your eggs in one basket is a good
summary of the logic of diversification. (Bodie et al. 2004)
To tell whether a portfolio is diversified or not one must look at the number of securities
in the portfolio, the variance and the covariance of each security. The variance (risk) of a
portfolio consisting of only one security is, of course, the same as the variance of that secu-
rity. As more securities are added to the portfolio the variance drops, which is called the
diversification effect. The risk however cannot be fully reduced; this since the minimum
variance of a portfolio is the average covariance 9 of the each pair of securities. This means
that the variance of the portfolio becomes smaller and smaller for each security added until
it reaches the average covariance of the portfolio. This has implications for an investor who
is considering adding an additional security, instead of looking at the total risk of that secu-
rity, he will only look at the proportion that cannot be diversified away, i.e. how the secu-
rity correlate with the other securities in the portfolio. (Ross et al. 2005) According to Da-
modaran (2002), a well diversified portfolio, consists of 20 or more securities.
The systematic risk, also called market risk, can not be eliminated by diversification. This
risk is measured by the beta coefficient (β). The higher the beta the larger is the portfolio’s
volatility compared to the market, and vice versa. The market portfolio has a beta of 1
since the variability of returns with itself is always 1. A portfolio’s beta is the weighted av-
erage of the individual stocks. The more systematic risk someone is willing to take on the
higher is the expected return. (Suhar, 2003)
8The standard deviation is the square root of the variance and measures the spread or deviation of a particular
return from the mean return. (Azcel & Sounderpandian, 2002)
9
The covariance of a pair of stocks is simply how their movements relate to one another. If both stocks are
above or below its average, at a given time, they are positively related and have a positive covariance. If one is
above and the other one is below its average, at this time they are negatively related and have a negative co-
variance. (Ross et al. 2005)
11
2.2.4 Risk-free rate

The definition of the risk-free rate, denoted Rf, is the rate that an investor can earn with
certainty, without taking any risk. A risk-free asset, generating the risk-free rate, has a stan-
dard deviation of zero. The rate should match the expected holding period of the invest-
ment, i.e. a 10-year holding period should preferably use a 10-year risk-free rate, such as a
Treasury bond. The problem with long-term bonds however is that the greater the maturity
the more risky they become. (Voitle, 2002) If the inflation is greater than the interest rate,
the actual purchasing power will be lower in the future, thus the only true risk-free asset in
this case would be a price-indexed government bond. This because interest rates in real
terms are adjusted for inflation and government bonds can be assumed default free. In fi-
nance theory, the Treasury-bills (maturities less than 1 year) are considered as true risk-free
assets. (Bodie et al. 2004)
2.2.5 Portfolio performance in relation to the market benchmark

The return of the portfolio as shown in section 2.2.1 is a good measure of the performance
of the portfolio. By using the HPR you can easily see whether your portfolio has generated
a loss or a profit. However, the HPR solely might not be enough to conclude if the portfo-
lio has been successful or not. In order to determine the actual portfolio performance one
has to compare the return against a market portfolio, i.e. a market benchmark. The most
commonly used benchmarks are stock market indexes. (Damodaran, 2002; Bodie et al.
2004)
2.2.6 Market Index

According to Strong (2000) the theoretical market portfolio is a portfolio consisting of all
risky securities in proportion to each share’s market capitalization weight. Since it is impos-
sible to include all securities in one index, a simplification is to use a broad listed market
index. One frequently used index is the Standard & Poor’s 500 index which contains 500
stocks listed on the U.S. stock market (Friend & Blume, 1970). The broadest index on the
Stockholm Stock Exchange is the OMX Stockholm Index (OMXS), previously called SAX.
It contains all the listed stocks on the A- and O-list. According to OMX Group, the com-
pany behind the index, OMXS is tracking the overall Swedish stock market and its changes.
The index date is set to 100 at 1995-12-31. The index is weighted after value, meaning that
the individual stocks weights are in proportion to their total stock value. (OMX Group –
Stockholmsbörsen, 2005)
2.2.7 Risk-adjusted measures

According to Bodie et al. (2004) and Strong (2000) it is important to conduct portfolio
comparisons on a risk-adjusted basis. This since investors are risk-averse, meaning that if
facing two investments with the same expected return the one with the lowest risk will be
preferred and therefore they expect compensation for the level of risk of the portfolio.
(Bodie et al. 2004) That means that the returns on two different portfolios are compared
on a fair basis, adjusting for the fact that riskier portfolios should earn higher expected re-
turns than not so risky portfolios. There are a number of ways to calculate risk-adjusted re-
turns; all of them require data such as the portfolios’ standard deviation, rate of return,
overall market performance and the risk-free rate.
12
The three most commonly used methods are the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor ratio and Jen-
sen’s measure (Bodie et al. 2004; Strong, 2000). It is important to pick the appropriate risk
measure when making risk-adjusted comparisons. It all depends on the composition of the
portfolios to compare. This is because the ratios above measures return relative to risk in
different ways. The Sharpe ratio 10 can always be used since it measures risk by the standard
deviation, i.e. total risk, which all portfolios have. The Treynor- and Jensen measure can
however only be used on well diversified portfolios since they only take into account the
systematic risk, beta.
The Treynor ratio, seen in formula 3, measures the excess return per unit of systematic risk.
The higher the ratio, the better the portfolio has performed. The formula is:
(RP - Rf ) = Treynor ratio
βP
Formula 3 Treynor ratio (Bodie et al. 2004)

Rp = Portfolio Return
Rf = Risk Free Rate
βp = Portfolio’s Beta
Jensen measures the average return on a portfolio above the return predicted by the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, CAPM 11 . CAPM is used to predict the expected return based on the
risk, given the portfolio’s beta, average market return (OMXS) and the risk free rate. Given
CAPM, Jensen’s measure can be used to rate fund managers’ performance against a market
index to check if the risk was worth the reward. A positive Jensen’s measure implicates that
the portfolio has generated abnormal returns on a risk-adjusted basis. (Strong, 2000) The
formula is:
(RP - Rf ) − β P (RM - Rf ) = Jensen' s mesure

Formula 4 Jensen’s Measure (Bodie et al. 2004)
Rf = Risk Free Rate
RM = Market Return (Benchmark)
The factors explained in this chapter need to be considered before making an investment
decision. However, what is also important is how the investor builds the portfolio, how
he/she chooses the stocks to buy. In this thesis, the authors are focusing on value and
growth companies, hence it is crucial to first understand the concept of value and growth.
The authors will through previous research about these two concepts clarify and define
10 (R P - R f ) = Sharpe ratio
σ P
11 R s = R f + β s ⎛⎜⎝ R m − R f ⎞⎟⎠
Capital Asset Pricing Model
13
what valuation multiples that best describes the two and henceforth will be used in the the-
sis.
2.3 Previous Research of Valuation Multiples

There has been a lot of research done in the field of variables explaining stock returns;
most of them have based their samples on the US stock market. Many research papers
have included theories about size and calendar effects. These are not of interest in this the-
sis since it is only focusing on factors explaining valuation aspects, which in turn can iden-
tify growth from value stocks. None of the reports have explicitly focused on the value
versus growth aspect, but rather on the different multiples that help define these two.
Some examples of previous studies follow bellow.
Fama and French (1992) made a study on the US stock market between 1963 and 1990.
They described the relations between, market β, market capitalization, P/E, leverage and
P/B with average returns. Their conclusion was, firstly that β does not seem to explain av-
erage returns, hence rejecting the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model (that there is a positive rela-
tionship between β and average stock returns), secondly the combination of size and P/B
absorbs the role of leverage and P/E when describing average returns. Their final and main
conclusion was that market capitalization and the P/B multiple best describe average stock-
returns, where P/B is the most powerful explanatory variable of the two. A part of the re-
sult of their study is found in appendix I. The average returns, grouping companies with
regards to their P/B ratio, show a clear trend that the lower the P/B, the higher average re-
turns.
Fama and French (1998) also conducted an international study where they evaluated the
value premium in 13 countries from 1974 to 1994. They found that value stocks, i.e. shares
with low P/B, P/E and P/CF 12 , experienced higher returns than growth stocks. The dif-
ference in returns between the two groups was 7.68% per year.
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) described differences in expected returns on the
Japanese stock market between 1971 and 1988. They based their study on four variables:
P/E, market capitalization, P/B and P/CF. Their choice of predictor variables was moti-
vated by the fact that these variables were shown most applicable on the US stock market
and the practice of fundamental security analysts. A theoretical justification for these vari-
ables was, as the authors put it: “out of the scope of this paper” (Chan et al. 1991, p. 1740).
The size effect was, as earlier studies conclude, dependent on the specific model and time
period. Earnings yield did not seem to be related to stock returns in their study, but their
research showed a clear relationship between expected stock returns and the P/B multiple
and cash flow yield, where the companies with the lowest P/Bs posted the highest returns.
They also concluded that their variables are more or less correlated; low P/B companies
tend to have low P/CF. The second part of their study was to conduct a regression analysis
called Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with unadjusted fundamental variables (i.e.
variables were not adjusted for change in levels over time) and a SUR with adjusted fun-
damental variables. The regression results showed a negative relation between P/B, P/CF
and return, meaning that the lower the valuation multiples get, the higher returns were gen-
erated. In their regression both variables were significant, especially P/B, which was eco-
nomically and statistically most important. This is according to the authors interesting since
12 Price per share divided by the company’s total cash flow per share
14
P/B and P/CF had, compared to the P/E ratio, received little attention in the financial lit-
erature. They did point out though that the relationship found in their study would not for
certain hold in the future.
Basu (1977) conducted a study between 1957 and 1971 where he determined the relation-
ship between investment performance of US stocks and their P/E ratios. He grouped secu-
rities by their P/E ratios and formed portfolios out of these groups. The portfolios were
held for a year and then reinvested with the same criteria as before. This procedure takes
into account that stock prices and reported earnings fluctuate during a year, creating differ-
ent P/E ratios. He found that low P/E portfolios beat high P/E portfolios by about 4%
per annum and this was not due to levels of systematic risk. He concluded that investors
are able to profit from strategies based on buying low P/E companies; hence the US capital
market is not truly efficient.
Depending on the definition of value and growth stocks, the above studies show that the
premium earned by holding value stocks compared to growth stocks is evident during sev-
eral time periods on the US market and also internationally. This even though different
methods was used to perform the research. All studies confirm that the lower the valuation
multiples, the higher returns one can expect. The researchers above also conclude that the
most common risk measure beta, cannot explain the better performance of value stocks. It
also showed, perhaps to some surprise, that the more commonly used (in the financial
press), P/E ratio, even though explaining differences in stock returns, does not seem to do
it to the same extend as P/B does.
2.4 Value and Growth Definitions

Even though there is no clear definition of growth and value stocks according to theory
(Sharpe et al. 1999), it is seen in section 2.3 which multiples that are most significant and
that there are differences in the explanatory power of different valuation tools. By focusing
on these, the research done in the past has narrowed the field, especially down to two mul-
tiples, P/B and P/E. According to the following authors these two multiples can be used
when separating the growth from value stocks, since it is clear that they have the highest
explanatory power of all the multiples mentioned in the previous section.
According to Sharpe et al. (1999) a growth stock has high P/B and P/E ratios, the same
but inverse relation holds for value stocks 13 . This classification is also supported by Fama
and French (1998), but they also added the P/CF multiple when separating growth from
value.
Wall Street Journal classifies growth stocks as companies, which experience higher-than-
average gains in earnings or stock price during the past few years and are expected to con-
tinue to do so. It also states that these companies have high P/E ratios and pay little or no
dividends. Value stocks have low valuation measures, such as P/E or P/S 14 ratios. (Talley,
2003)
13 There are no precise definition of high and low P/B and P/E ratios, and by looking at the Stockholm
Stock Exchange one can see that the average P/B during the time period 1993-2005 has increased from 1,3
to 4,6 and the P/E has increased from 11,9 to 22 (Börsguide, 1993 & 2005)
14 Price per share divided by the sales per share
15
According to Ibbotson and Riepe (1997) growth managers invest in companies experienc-
ing rapid growth in earnings, sales or return on equity. These stocks tend to have the char-
acteristics of high P/B and high P/E ratios. Value oriented managers on the other hand,
look for less popular stocks (stocks in industries considered mature, with modest growth
prospects) and turn-around companies (stocks of companies experiencing problems but
that are expected to recover). These value stocks are, according to the authors, usually as-
sociated with low P/B, low P/E, low P/CF ratios and high dividend yields.
Morningstar, a provider of independent investment research in the United States, catego-
rize value stocks in the following way: 50% is based on the P/E ratio; the other 50% is
based on equally weights of P/S, P/B, P/CF and dividend yield. (David, 2004)
To shed further light on the classification issue, a description of two indexes, often used as
a benchmark when classifying growth and value stocks, will follow.
The first one is; Standard & Poor’s Barra Growth and Barra Value indexes created in 1992.
The classifications of these two indexes are based on William Sharpe’s, Eugene Fama’s and
Kenneth French’s thoughts that a growth stock has a high P/B and a value stock has a low
P/B ratio. The creators of Barra argue that even though there are no clear definitions of
growth and value stocks, the P/B multiple is most suitable to use since it is easy to under-
stand and captures the fundamental differences between value and growth companies. This
because the P/B ratio tends to be more stable over time, since the book value is not as
volatile compared to alternative ratios such as the P/E ratio, earning growth rates, and re-
turn on equity. Shares in the Barra Value index display characteristics, besides low P/B ra-
tios, also lower P/E ratios, higher dividend yields, and lower historical and predicted earn-
ings growth. While shares in the Barra Growth index have characteristics such as high P/B
and P/E and lower dividend yields. (Barra, 2005)
The second index; Wilshire, is another frequently used American stock index. It uses both
the P/B and the P/E multiples in order to define growth and value stocks. The P/B multi-
ple is given three times the weight of the P/E multiple because the former is believed to be
a more accurate identifier of growth and value stocks. As can be seen in table 1 the Wil-
shire Growth Index has higher P/B and P/E ratios than the Wilshire Value Index counter-
part, while the dividend yield for the Wilshire Growth Indexes is lower. (Wilshire Associ-
ates Incorporated, 2005)
16
Table 1 Wilshire Style Index (Wilshire Associates Incorporated, 2005)
To summarize the above discussion one can see that the P/B and the P/E multiples best
describe growth and value stocks, thus these will be used as explanatory variables in this
thesis. The most common method used out of these two, is the P/B multiple. It is the ratio
that best and easiest separates the two categories. Since the book value of equity is less
volatile than for example cash flow, this multiple becomes more stable and will not depend
as much on current business cycle or investment decisions.
The P/E ratio is probably the most popular valuation multiple in the financial press since
earnings are usually easily available, and from the above discussion it is a common method
to identify growth from value stocks.
Other valuation multiples such as P/S and P/CF are used by a few but always together
with P/B and P/E, hence they do not seem to be as important explanatory variables. Fac-
tors like “higher-than-average growth in earnings and cash flow” appear to be used by a
few, but not as frequently, because of the subjectivity in these measures.
2.5 Examples of value and growth companies

Value and growth companies tend to be found in different industries. Value stocks typically
come from consumer- and financial services, real estate and utilities industries, while
growth stocks have historically come from the healthcare and technology industries (Barra,
2005). Examples of value stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange are SKF (manufactur-
ing), Öresund (financial services) and Tornet (real estate). Examples of growth companies
are Ericsson (telecom), AstraZeneca (pharmaceuticals), and H&M (consumer goods).
(Börsguide, 1993-2005)
In this chapter the theories and previous research supporting the thesis was presented. The
reader is now familiar with the different concepts such as risk, risk-adjusted return, market
index and the two valuation multiples that defines value and growth companies, P/B and
P/E. In the following sections, the reader will understand how these concepts are used,
17
processed and analyzed in order to determine whether a portfolio based on value stocks
will outperform a portfolio based on growth stocks.
18
Methodology
3 Methodology
This chapter will in detail describe the procedure used to conduct the empirical research. This includes how
the data was collected, assumptions made, determination of the sample used and how the information will be
interpreted. The chapter ends with a discussion on the reliability and validity of the chosen methods.
3.1 Quantitative research approach

The philosophy of information gathering has concluded two different ways to gather in-
formation. The two classifications are named qualitative and quantitative method. The two
methods are, since they gather information differently, also used differently in research.
The qualitative method uses information where the source has had a great degree of free-
dom in forming its own opinion. This way of gathering information will give information
about a certain and very specific problem and is normally conducted during normal con-
versations or interviews. The information gathered will also be very specific and apply only
to that particular research question. (Holme & Solvang, 1991)
The quantitative approach on the other hand, bases information gathering on a more ob-
jective base, which means that the researcher should stand far away and observe the infor-
mation and not be apart of it, to be as neutral as possible (Holme & Solvang, 1991). This
can be done by using a random sample from the whole population, and from that draw a
conclusion which can be assumed true for the general population as well. This approach
will lead to conclusion of the more general type. Statistics is often used in this method to
prove hypothesis about the population sample (Ejvegård, 1993).
The method which best will fit the purpose of this thesis is the quantitative research
method. These since the authors are using historical unbiased data retrieved from inde-
pendent sources, and the conclusion is supposed to be true for all the following observa-
tions, hence a generalization although specific to value and growth companies. (Holme &
Solvang, 1991)
3.2 Secondary data

In the field of methodological research, data is classified into two distinct groups, primary
and secondary data. They differ in their closeness to the question being researched. Primary
data is collected specifically for the proposed research question, usually through interviews
or questionnaires, while secondary data is already existing data that has been collected for
other purposes.
The benefit of using primary data is that the researcher can adjust the data based on the
specifics of the research question and by that gather the information needed. The major
reasons to use secondary data is that it is cheaper and faster to collect than primary data
and that it, depending on the research question proposed, might provide the precise data
needed (Saunders, Lewis &Thornhill, 2003). As stated before, this thesis will be based on
the quantitative method and objective statistical data will be used, meaning that only sec-
ondary data will be used.
There are two types of secondary data, raw- and compiled data. Raw data is data where
there has been little, if any, processing, while compiled data is data that have received some
form of selection and processing (Kervin, 1999). This paper will only use raw data consist-
19
Methodology
ing of stock price returns and trailing twelve months P/B and P/E ratios, this in order to
avoid the subjectivity that otherwise might be present if using predicted future earnings
(see appendix I). This will further strengthen the validity and reliability of the thesis. The
secondary data used is evaluated on the basis of relevance to the research question pro-
posed.
3.3 Data collection and portfolio creation

In order to compare value and growth portfolios’ returns the authors need to set up port-
folios that clearly define them. The aim is to create four portfolios with appropriately 30
stocks in each, two of these will represent value stocks and the other two will represent
growth stocks.
The most important identifier of value from growth stocks, according to previous studies,
is the P/B multiple, and the second most important is the P/E ratio. Value stocks have low
P/B and P/E ratios and growth stocks have high P/B and P/E ratios (see section 2.3-2.4).
Due to the significance of the P/B multiple, each year’s sample is selected entirely on this
multiple and two categories, one value and one growth, are created by calculating so called
break points for the P/B multiple, explained in section 3.3.2. To only consider stocks be-
low the low break point and above the high break point ensure the authors that only com-
panies with “extreme” P/B multiples are chosen. This method will exclude the average
P/B companies leaving the authors with a clear sample of value and growth firms. The
method of selecting stocks is done by systematic sampling explained in section 3.3.3
The two categories with value and growth stocks are further split into two portfolios each
creating the final four portfolios. This is done by sorting the companies in each category
from the lowest to the highest P/E multiples and then put the bottom half and the top half
in separate portfolios. This is done in order to create four portfolios with different P/B and
P/E characteristics.
The four portfolios symbolize value and growth stocks where the two portfolios within the
low P/B group (Low-Low and Low-High) will contain value stocks and the two portfolios
within the high P/B group will contain growth stocks (High-Low and High-High). The
Low-Low portfolio contains “extreme” value stocks (companies with both low P/B and
low P/E ratios) and the High-High portfolio contains “extreme” growth stocks (companies
with both high P/B and high P/E ratios). Creating these four portfolios with different
characteristics makes it possible to test if for example a portfolio with high P/Bs and low
P/Es is generating higher returns than a portfolio invested only in low P/Bs and low P/Es.
Figure 3 shows graphically how the portfolio creation is carried out.
20
Methodology
Figure 3 Portfolio creation and composition

A numerical example of how the portfolio creation is done the first year in 1993 will fol-
low. There are 210 listed companies in 1993 on the lists covered by Börsguide (see appen-
dix III for details of included lists and sectors). Out of these 210 companies the aim is to
first of all sample 120 stocks (2 categories * 60 stocks in each). Since two extreme catego-
ries of value and growth stocks are wanted and no official break points between them exist
they need to be calculated. So in 1993, the calculated break points are 1.0 and 1.6 meaning
that stocks with P/B ratios below or equal to 1.0 will be considered as being value stocks
and stocks with P/B multiples above or equal to 1.6 will be considered as being growth
stocks 15 . Companies with P/Bs between 1.0 and 1.6 are excluded from the sample since
these according to the authors cannot be classified as value- nor growth stocks.
In 1993 the value category was invested in 60 value stocks while the growth category was
only invested in 47 stocks, this since there were not 60 growth stocks available with P/B
ratios above 1.6, hence all companies with a negative P/B or a P/B above 1.6 was chosen.
The 60 and 47 selected stocks in each category are, as mentioned previously, further di-
vided based on their P/E ratios. To clarify, the 60 stocks in the value category are split up
into a low P/E and a high P/E portfolio with 30 stocks in each (60 divided by 2) and the
47 growth stocks are also split up into a low P/E portfolio with 24 stocks and a high P/E
portfolio with 23 stocks (47 divided by 2). So for example the value category is split up in
one half that contains the 30 stocks with the lowest P/E ratios and another half that con-
tains the 30 shares with the 30 highest P/E ratios.
Due to the fact that the average market P/B ratio has increased from 1.6 in 1993 to 3.7 in
2004 (Börsguide, 1993 & 2005), the break points are adjusted and recalculated each year in
order to reflect this increase (see appendix III for calculations). The four portfolios are up-
dated each year, due to the changing P/B break points and since some stocks might no
15 Note that the data source Börsguide is using adjusted stockholders’ equity as book value when calculating
the P/B ratio. Adjusted stockholders’ equity is book value increased with 72% of the untaxed reserves,
where reserves are profits. (Börsguide, 2004)
21
Methodology
longer qualify to be in a certain category or get de-listed. By only replacing the non-
qualifying and de-listed stocks and not the whole portfolio the transaction costs are mini-
mized. The same sample process is used when selecting the new stocks, replacing the elimi-
nated ones, in order to reach our goal of 30 stocks in each portfolio.
It should be pointed out that reasons for companies’ having either high or low valuation
multiples are not considered, nor if these extreme multiples only last temporarily. The aim
is to create portfolios only based on raw data published once a year not taking any other
factors into account that might be of importance when evaluating stocks.
3.3.1 Sample size

According to Popper (1959), a theory can never be proven true by a finite number of ob-
servations because even if every observation that is made confirms the assertion put for-
ward by the theory, logically one can never be certain whether some future observation
might contradict the theory (Brannick & Roche, 1997). The general opinion is that the lar-
ger the sample the greater is the reliability of the statistical analysis. The reason for this is
that the sampling error is minimized by increasing the number of observations. (Brooks,
2002; Bryman & Bell, 2003; Cooper & Schindler, 2001).
According to Buglear (2005) the previous stated fact that the larger sample the better, does
not necessarily has to be true. Buglear argues that the larger the sample you have, the less is
the marginal advantage per increase in sample size. Using a sample of 30 observations
means that the standard normal distribution can be use in any statistical decision-making
and that the sample does not have to come from the normal population. To have 30 ob-
servations or stocks in each portfolio also fulfils the assumption that the portfolios are di-
versified, making it possible to use beta as a measure of risk (Strong, 2000).
3.3.2 Break points for P/B

Since the number of listed shares on the Stockholm Stock Exchange will exceed 30 in every
year from 1993 to 2005 (increases from 210 listed companies in 1993 to 338 in 2004) it can
be assumed that the distribution of the P/B ratios is normally distributed. (Aczel &
Sounderpandian, 2002) Given that a total of 120 shares, 60 value and 60 growth companies
are wanted each year, a new break point that defines these two categories is calculated an-
nually. In order to determine the break points the Z-value, found in a standard normal dis-
tribution table, must first be found (see appendix II for a standard normal distribution ta-
ble). This is done by first of all calculating the area of each tail in the standard normal dis-
tribution (see figure 4) by using formula 5. The left tail area represents the value stocks (the
lowest P/B stocks) and the right tail area represents the growth stocks (the highest P/B
stocks), and the area in between is the rest of the companies on the Stockholm Stock Ex-
change with average P/B multiples. (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)
22
Methodology
Figure 4 The standard normal distribution (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)
⎛ 120 ⎞
Tail area = ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ / 2
⎝ No. of listed shares ⎠
Formula 5 Tail area (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)

120 = Total sample size
No. of listed shares = Varying from 210 (1993) to 338 (2004)
2 = To make it a two-tailed test
When the tail area is calculated, one must, in order to derive the left-or right hand table
area, subtract this value from 0.5 (see formula 6). This is done since the table area is meas-
ured from the middle and out in the standard normal distribution figure and each side
represents 50% of the total area. The table area is the same for both the left and right hand
side, the only difference is that the left area is a negative number and the right area is a po-
sitive number. (Aczel & Sounderpandian 2002)
Table Area = 0.5 − Tail Area
Formula 6 Table area (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)

0.5 = Total left- or right side area under the standard normal distribution
The calculated table area is used to find the Z-value in a standard normal distribution table,
seen in appendix II. Once the Z-value is found along with the market’s average P/B ratio,
the break points can be calculated using formula 7 (Aczel & Sounderpandian 2002). The
standard deviation 16 of P/B is computed using each sector’s average P/B ratio, found in
Börsguide and also in appendix III. The average market P/B is not calculated but taken di-
rectly from Börsguide were the ratios are value-weighted. During the IT-boom around the
year 2000, a few sectors have abnormally high P/B ratios compared to the other sectors
that same year. To adjust for this, sectors with P/B ratios above 10 are temporarily reduced
16
N
( Xi − μ ) 2
S tan dard deviation = ∑
i =1 N
N=Total population
µ=Mean of population
i=Observation i
23
Methodology
to this number in order not to get the standard deviation too large, causing the lower break
point to become a negative number. This correction is only done when calculating the
break points, all companies keep their original P/Bs and none are excluded when sampling
for shares to include in the portfolios. Having negative and extremely high break points
makes it impossible to find any value companies since they must have P/Bs above 0 or to
find even five growth companies, hence makes it impossible to construct portfolios these
years. The number 10 is chosen because it is a relatively large number compared to the
lower valued sectors for the same years, but not large enough to cause the standard devia-
tion to be too high. It turned out that consistently correcting down abnormal sectors to 10
made it possible to come close to 30 stocks in each portfolio. It should be mentioned that
this correction only is done in three years for seven sectors out of the total number of
about 140 (12 years times about 12 sectors).
Break po int s = Market P/B ± (S tan dard deviation of P/B )* (Z-value )
Formula 7 Break points for P/B
3.3.3 Systematic sampling

Once the break points are determined for each year the portfolio must be created based on
the break points. The method used to select stocks is called systematic sampling. This is an
unbiased way to sample when data is arranged in a specific order, for example in alphabeti-
cal order as in Börsguide. It is easy to draw a random unbiased sample by using a system-
atic approach rather then using a random selection based on specific features within the
population (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002). The formula for the sampling is the follow-
ing;
N
=K
n
Formula 8 Systematic sampling (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)

N = Total population
n = Sample size (120)
K = Equidistant number from each observation
For the first year a number in the interval 1 – 120 is chosen. That number represents the
first observation. Onwards, every kth number is selected until the wanted sample size is
achieved. One advantage with this method is that the sample is spread evenly throughout
the population (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002).
3.4 Portfolio Calculations

The authors have used Microsoft Excel for all calculations and construction of tables. This
since it is a well-known program and it is easy to use. The pre-knowledge of this program
was good and results are easily presented, hence the choice of this program.
Once the four portfolios are created each year the following assumptions are made in order
to calculate the annual return and the risk-adjusted returns:
24
Methodology
• Dividends are assumed to be paid once a year at the end of the holding period
prices with a percentage equal to the last know dividend yield.
• Stock prices are adjusted for splits, stock dividends and new stock issues.
• Each company has the same weight in the portfolio when calculating returns and
betas. This means that the same amount of money is spent on each company, the
actual amount is not important it is the percentage returns that matter. This results
in the portfolios having more than one stock of companies with a low stock price
and less than one stock of companies with a high stock price. By doing this each
company will have the same total weight within each portfolio.
• Companies acquired during the holding period (marked * in appendix) without

known acquisition price will be assumed to have a 0% return, i.e. acquired for the
latest known stock price. The same holds for de-listed companies and these are
marked as *** in the appendix.
• Companies going bankrupt during the holding period are assumed to have a 100%
negative return. Bankrupt companies are marked with ** in the appendix.
• The constructed portfolios are, even though divided into different groups with
similar characteristics (P/B and P/E), assumed to be well diversified. This since
each portfolio consists of more than 20 securities from various industries. (Damo-
daran, 2002) Taken this into account, the Treynor ratio and the Jensen’s measure
will be used when risk-adjusting the portfolio returns.
• The betas for each stock are given in Börsguide. They are calculated over a 48 month
period and compared with “Affärsvärldens General Index”. (Börsguide, 1993) For
stocks where betas are not available an average portfolio beta is calculated by aver-
aging the accessible betas only. Portfolio betas are calculated by summing the indi-
vidual betas in each portfolio and then divide them by the number of stocks.
• For the portfolios’ average P/E the median is used. This in order to level out the
extreme values present during some years and make the result more comparable.
Again as a reminder, negative P/E ratios are considered as being infinite large (see
appendix I).
Total annual returns for each stock are calculated by dividing the capital gain/loss with the
initial purchase price and then adding the dividend yield. These returns are summed for all
four individual portfolios and then divided by the number of stocks in each portfolio in
order to get the total portfolio return.
25
Methodology
3.5 Portfolio Analysis

Once all the calculations for the period 1993-2005 are computed, the authors will compare
the risk-adjusted returns, using the Treynor ratio, between all four portfolios to determine
the superior portfolio based on both the geometric average return and cumulative return.
The Treynor ratio is used since, according to section 2.2.7, it measures the excess return
per unit of systematic risk and makes return comparisons for portfolios with different risk
fairer.
(RP - Rf ) = Treynor ratio
βP
Treynor ratio (Bodie et al. 2004)

Rf = Risk Free Rate
The superior portfolio based on cumulative return will then be compared to the broadest
market index in Sweden, the OMXS index, to find out if it will yield abnormal returns on a
risk-adjusted basis, using the Jensen’s measure. This measure predicts the expected return
based on the risk, given the portfolios’ beta, average market return (OMXS) and risk-free
rate. The risk-free rate should according to Friend and Blume (1970) be the average risk-
free rate over the holding period, hence in this thesis the risk-free rate in Sweden is equiva-
lent to the 3-month Treasury bill issued by the Swedish government. A government which
is assumed to be default-free, i.e. there is no risk of the state not being able to fulfill its loan
obligations. Jensen’s measure is used to rate the superior portfolio’s performance against
the market index to check if the risk was worth the reward.
(RP - Rf ) − β P (RM - Rf ) = Jensen' mesure

Jensen’s Measure (Bodie et al. 2004)
Rf = Risk Free Rate
26
Methodology
3.6 Reliability and Validity

Reliability and validity of any research is very important. Reliability tells us whether a result
is replicable or not and validity deals with whether the conclusions drawn from the data are
valid (Bryman & Bell 2003). Since the data required from the Stockholm Stock Exchange
before 1993 is not published in any book nor is available in any other easily accessible way,
the authors are limited to use data which is already compiled and printed. The data source
used is Börsguide by Delphi Economics. This is the only source of information for raw data.
Preferably, several sources of information are better, but since Börsguide consists of objec-
tively gathered data collected by an independent organization and all companies are pre-
sented in an equal and consistent manner, there is no need to doubt the reliability of this
information source.
Even though the Stockholm Stock Exchange is fairly small (varying from 210 companies in
1993 to 338 in 2004) the authors are, due to time constraints not able to use the entire
population for this thesis. This could cause a statistical problem called order statistics. The
problem connected to order statistics is present since the population on the Stockholm
Stock Exchange is fairly small, and since only a sample of this population is used in this
thesis, one can not be 100% certain whether another sample would yield the same result or
not. However, since this thesis is only focused on the “extreme” value and growth compa-
nies and since the sample taken each year from these “extremes” is close to the entire
population of applicable companies, the problem of order statistics is minimized. (David &
Nagraraja, 2003)
In order to get the extreme values of the P/B ratio in a consistent fashion, one assumption
made when calculating the break points for low and high P/B is that they are normally dis-
tributed. If this assumption would not be made, the selection process of extreme growth
and value stocks would be different (the thought behind the breakpoints is that the authors
only want the “extreme companies” of the stock exchange) and hence might have given a
different result.
Due to the immense amount of historical figures collected from our sample of approxi-
mately 120 stocks times 13 years, the authors realize that there is a possibility of error due
to human mistakes. Countless numbers and calculations have been used and there is of
course the risk of error. To limit this, each calculation and historical data will be checked
twice. By reading and repeating each figure, the authors believe that this (possible) error is
minimized and therefore do not affect the investigation mentionable.
27
Empirical Findings and Analysis
4 Empirical Findings and Analysis

This chapter will in detail present the results of the empirical study together with an analysis of the findings.
Previous chapters will be used as a support when analyzing the empirical data.
4.1 Empirical findings of the four portfolios

As stated earlier, the stock data needed for this thesis (P/E, P/B, beta, dividend yield and
return) was found in Börsguide for the period of 1993 to 2005. The data presented in this
section is a summary of the findings (the entire data set can be found in appendix IV).
Looking at table 2, the created portfolios all fulfill the authors’ goal of having different
valuation characteristics. By using the technique of calculating break points the authors
have created value portfolios with P/B ratios well below the market average 17 each year
and growth portfolios with P/B ratios with well above the market average, hence only “ex-
treme” P/B stocks are included . The reader can observe unusually high P/B and P/E val-
ues for some of the years (1994, 1997), this is explained mainly by stages in the business cy-
cle and macroeconomic factors. Nonetheless, the performance of each portfolio is evi-
dently affected by other factors as well.
Besides the P/B and P/E characteristics, table 2 also shows the risk-adjusted return for
each portfolio (i.e. Low-Low to High-High). The risk-adjusted return, which takes into ac-
count both the capital gain and the dividend payouts, is computed by using the Treynor
measure (explained in section 2.2.7). This since all the portfolios have different systematic
risk (different β-values) and to be able to compare them fairly each portfolio’s return needs
to be adjusted for this systematic risk. This creates a uniform base at which further tables
and analysis will be build on.
Risk-adjusted Risk-adjusted
Year Portfolio P/B P/E return Year Portfolio P/B P/E return
1993 Low-Low 0,6 11,6 76% 1996 Low-Low 1,1 7,6 50%
Low-High 0,6 Neg 119% Low-High 1,1 39,8 29%
High-Low 2,3 13,5 84% High-Low 4,0 10,5 40%
High-High 2,3 60,7 41% High-High 4,0 29,4 50%
Market average 1,3 11,9 Market average 2,0 13,9
1994 Low-Low 1,0 15,3 -2% 1997 Low-Low 1,1 15,8 23%
Low-High 1,0 80,4 -4% Low-High 1,1 29,1 -1%
High-Low 3,9 3,1 6% High-Low 46,4 13,3 23%
High-High 3,9 6,4 -13% High-High 46,4 53,6 7%
1995 Low-Low 1,1 9,7 4% 1998 Low-Low 1,0 11,3 -18%
Low-High 1,1 28,0 2% Low-High 1,0 42,2 -10%
High-Low 4,3 10,0 1% High-Low 16,3 23,3 7%
High-High 4,3 30,1 28% High-High 16,3 48,4 -21%
17 Market average found in Börsguide 1993-2004.
28
Risk-adjusted Risk-adjusted
Year Portfolio P/B P/E return Year Portfolio P/B P/E return
1999 Low-Low 0,9 9,8 36% 2002 Low-Low 0,9 8,1 -5%
Low-High 0,9 17,8 90% Low-High 0,9 29,8 -55%
High-Low 14,8 18,1 108% High-Low 8,7 23,6 -16%
High-High 14,8 38,5 210% High-High 8,7 84,0 -91%
2000 Low-Low 1,0 6,8 4% 2003 Low-Low 0,7 8,4 133%
Low-High 1,0 19,2 -5% Low-High 0,7 28,4 55%
High-Low 25,5 48,3 -66% High-Low 5,5 13,9 58%
High-High 25,5 Neg -107% High-High 5,5 46,0 39%
2001 Low-Low 0,8 5,1 45% 2004 Low-Low 1,1 10,7 63%
Low-High 0,8 12,6 11% Low-High 1,1 37,4 24%
High-Low 13,5 28,1 -37% High-Low 10,4 27,7 9%
High-High 13,5 65,3 -11% High-High 10,4 96,0 -34%
Table 2 Portfolio performance per year 1993-2004
As table 2 shows; the four portfolios have performed very differently in the case of risk-
adjusted return over the twelve-year period measured. This table and common trends be-
tween all portfolios can graphically be identified in figure 5. A note to the reader, the years
displayed in the figures below stands for the year the portfolios were created, hence 2004
measures the return over the period return between 2004 and 2005.
Portfolio Performance
250%
200%
150%
Risk-adjusted return
100%
Low-Low
50%
Low-High
0% High-Low
High-High
-50%
-100%
-150%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Figure 5 Risk-adjusted portfolio performances each year 1993- 2004
29
Furthermore, figure 5 shows that the return of the Low-Low portfolio is the least volatile
one and has, besides in 1998, displayed no severe drops. Even if the High-High portfolio
has drastically outperformed all other portfolios in 1999, it experiences the worst result on
average due to several periods of large negative return. This result is even more evident
when comparing on a geometric average return and on a total cumulative return basis, ex-
plained in the following section.
4.2 Portfolio comparison and analysis

The result of the compounding effect of the portfolio returns are displayed in the next sec-
tions.
4.2.1 Geometric average comparisons

To compare the average returns over the entire holding period, 1993 to 2005, the four
portfolios’ average geometric risk-adjusted return is calculated. This since it takes into ac-
count the compounding effect, described in section 2.2.1. As seen in table 3 the two port-
folios based on low P/Bs outperform the portfolios based on high P/Bs. Similarly, the
categorization of the portfolios into low/high P/Es displays the same result; low P/Es
beats high P/Es.
Portfolio Return
Low-Low 28,4%
Low-High 12,9%
High-Low 7,3%
High-High Neg
Table 3 Average geometric risk-adjusted return 1993-2005
4.2.2 Cumulative return comparisons

The comparison made on a cumulative basis shows the total return each portfolio has gen-
erated for the whole holding period. This measure is important to use since it is assumed
that all profits are reinvested in the assets for each year, hence leading to a compounding
effect of the returns, which in the end is a cumulative return (see section 2.2.1). By studying
figure 6 one can conclude that the Low-Low portfolio, taken the compounding affect into
account, is outperforming all other portfolios including the OMXS index.
The reason why the High-High portfolio in year 2000 created a negative return of more
than 100% is because this return is risk-adjusted; the actual return for the portfolio was
equal to -63%.
30
Cumulative Return
2000%
1800%
1600%
1400%
CumulativeReturn
1200%
Low-Low
1000% Low-High
High-Low
800% High-High
OMXS
600%
400%
200%
0%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
-200%
Year
Figure 6 Cumulative return
The outcome, that value beats growth based on both a geometric and cumulative return, is
in line with the previous studies conducted on the American and Japanese markets (e.g.
Fama & French 1992 & 1998; Chan, Hamao & Lakonishok, 1991; Basu, 1977) where
stocks with low P/B and low P/E yielded a higher risk-adjusted return than stocks with
high P/Bs and high P/Es.
4.2.3 Reasons for return differences

So far the authors have been able to conclude that value beats growth between 1993 and
2005. To further show the reasons behind this, the average risk (β) is compared with the
average dividend payout for each individual portfolio. This further strengthens the indica-
tions above that the best performing portfolio is the Low-Low portfolio.
Low-Low Low-High High-Low High-High Market average

Beta 0,74 0,98 1,05 1,28 1,00
Dividend 4,1% 1,6% 1,6% 0,6% 2,0%
Table 4 Average portfolio beta and dividend payout 1993-2004
31
To deepen the analysis of the portfolios, a summary of each portfolio’s features is pre-
sented below.
• Low-Low This portfolio displays, in addition to low P/B and P/E ratios,
the lowest average β and the highest average dividend payouts (see
table 4). This dividend payout is twice as high as the market aver-
age and the only portfolio yielding more than average during 1993
to 2005. These measures indicate that even though this portfolio
has the lowest systematic risk of all portfolios, it has generated the
highest average return.
• Low-High This portfolio possesses, besides low P/B and high P/E ratios,
the second lowest β (in line with the market risk with a β close to 1)
and the second highest dividend payout. In terms of return, the
Low-High portfolio is runner up.
• High-Low The High-Low portfolio has, in addition to high P/B and low P/E,
the second highest β (exceeds the market risk marginally), the sec-
ond highest dividend payout and the second lowest average return.
• High-High This portfolio, consisting of high P/B and P/E stocks has the
highest β, the lowest dividend payout of about 1/3 of the average
dividend and the lowest average total return.
As a summary; the Low-Low portfolio has generated an average annual return of 28.4%
(seen in table 3), which is more than twice the average return of the second best portfolio.
This return has been boosted by a high dividend yield (table 4), seven times larger than that
of the High-High portfolio. This result is in line with previous research conducted by e.g.
Fama and French (1992), who concluded that stocks with low P/B usually have higher
dividend payouts and generates higher returns. One factor that explains the low dividend
payout of the High-High portfolio is that growth companies usually retain their earnings in
order to fund new investments (Talley, 2003).
When studying the systematic risk of the four portfolios, it shows that the Low-Low port-
folio’s return is significantly less volatile than the market return (β<1) and thus possesses
the least risk, whereas the High-High portfolio is considerably more volatile (β>1) and
hence is the riskiest. The fact that the Low-Low portfolio has both the highest return and
the lowest β is according to theory a result of other multiples (such as low and stable P/Bs)
rather than β as an explanatory variable, i.e. the systematic risk should not be seen as a fac-
tor that solely affects the risk and return (Fama & French, 1992; Basu, 1977). However,
since investors wants to be compensated for the systematic risk they take on, the Low-Low
portfolio has performed well in relation to its β, while the High-High portfolio has under-
performed.
To conclude; based on above figures and tables it is clear that the Low-Low portfolio is the
superior one. This is even more evident when compared to the market index. As seen in
figure 6, the Low-Low portfolio is the only portfolio to beat the OMXS index on a cumula-
tive basis. A more detailed description and analysis of this will follow in the next section.
32
4.3 Low-Low vs. OMXS index

Since it is now determined that the Low-Low portfolio is the superior one, the analysis will
progress and investigate if this portfolio will actually generate a return which beats the
market index.
In real terms, i.e. without considering the risk level, the superior portfolio Low-Low has
beaten the OMXS index eight out of twelve times from 1993 to 2005, seen in figure 7. The
superiority of Low-Low is especially evident from 2000 and onwards, a period where par-
ticularly IT-companies usually categorized as growth companies went bust and the less
overvalued value companies survived and performed better.
100%
80%
60%
40%
Low-Low Return
20%
OMXS Return
0%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
-20%
-40%
-60%
Figure 7 Actual returns, not risk-adjusted
A more relevant comparison however, since investors are only rewarded for the systematic
risk in the portfolio, is to adjust the return on the Low-Low portfolio with regards to its
risk level. This will as mentioned before be done by using the Jensen’s measure, which ad-
justs for the level of systematic risk (Bodie et al. 2004). It captures the abnormal return of
the portfolio above the return of the OMXS index. A positive Jensen’s measure indicates
that abnormal returns has been achieved while a negative measure indicates the opposite,
i.e. that the portfolio has underperformed. As can be seen in table 5, the Low-Low portfo-
lio has generated abnormal returns seven years out of twelve, and generated returns in line
with the market one year. Another comparison between OMXS and Low-Low to make is
that for the whole holding period. The Jensen’s measure for this 12-year period, seen in ta-
ble 5, is 7.77, meaning that the Low-Low portfolio has generated an abnormal return of
7.77 times that of the OMXS index, hence the Low-Low portfolio is superior the market
index.
33
OMXS Jensen's measure for

Rf Beta Return Low-Low Return Low-Low
1993 7,7% 0,80 42% 69% 0,34
1994 7,7% 0,98 4% 5% 0,01
1995 8,6% 1,00 30% 12% -0,18
1996 4,9% 1,19 43% 64% 0,14
1997 4,2% 1,06 37% 29% -0,10
1998 3,9% 0,72 -1% -21% -0,21
1999 3,3% 0,77 76% 31% -0,28
2000 4,0% 0,52 -37% 6% 0,23
2001 4,0% 0,60 0% 30% 0,29
2002 4,0% 0,34 -40% -11% 0,00
2003 2,7% 0,44 54% 61% 0,36
2004 2,0% 0,45 14% 31% 0,24
1993-2005 4,7% 0,74 334% 1026% 7,77
Table 5 Low-Low portfolio vs. OMXS
The Low-Low portfolio was able to generate abnormal returns 7 out of 12 years, hence
outperforming the broadest market index in Sweden (OMXS) more than half of the peri-
ods and displayed a return of 7.77 times that of the OMXS index during the whole holding
period. The Efficient Market Hypothesis states that, on average, half of the portfolios will
beat the market at any given time, and half of them will not (Mandell & O’Brien, 1992).
This result is therefore challenging the EMH.
34
Conclusion and Final Remarks
5 Conclusion and Final Remarks

In this chapters, the posted research questions will be clearly answered with concluding remarks. The discus-
sion ends with the implications the result has on the efficient market hypothesis. Furthermore, the authors
will present suggestions for further research and reflections on the validity of the results reached.
The final section of this thesis will present the conclusion of the investigation. A reminder
of the purpose stated in chapter 1 is suitable since this will help the reader as a guide
through the following discussions.
“The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if an investor by purchasing a portfolio based on value stocks
will outperform a portfolio based on growth stocks. Furthermore the authors aim to examine if the winning
portfolio can beat the OMXS index and create abnormal returns on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.”
5.1 Conclusion
The thesis’ first objective was to answer the following question:
• Will a portfolio based on value stocks, on a risk-adjusted basis, outperform a portfolio based on
As the analysis shows, the two value portfolios, Low-Low and Low-High, are both outper-
forming the two growth portfolios, High-Low and High-High, and this by a large amount.
The two growth portfolios are both far from beating the OMXS index and investing in the
High-High portfolio has even been a loosing strategy. Always investing in growth compa-
nies due to for instance attractive growth prospects or the wish to make large and quick
gains has proven in the long-run to be a poor idea. Investors should therefore, if this re-
sults will hold in the future as well, preferably seek stocks with the lowest P/B and P/E
multiples, i.e. value stocks.
The second objective was to answer the following question:
dex?
As the analysis shows, the Low-Low portfolio is the superior portfolio over the period. It is
by far the most profitable portfolio of the four categories (seen over the 12 years). The au-
thors can also conclude that this portfolio has beaten index during this specific twelve year
period. Hence, the second research question is answered by the following concluding re-
marks. The superior portfolio, Low-Low, has on a risk-adjusted basis generated an abnor-
mal return of 7.77 times above the OMXS index. This is verified by figure 5, 6 and table 5
in chapter 4.
35
5.2 The authors’ reflections
5.2.1 Reasons for over- and under valuation

The reasons why the market underestimates value stocks’ potential and overestimates
growth stocks in the short-run are several and would require a thesis on its own to explain.
But in short the authors believe that;
The first reason might be that investors overrate growth companies’ growth prospects as a
result of these stocks being hot and new. Such was the case with the IT-companies during
the last years of the millennium, and therefore tended to pay too much for these shares
when the market was doing well. On the other hand value stocks might be viewed as slow
growing “boring” companies and therefore in good times will be forgotten by investors.
The second reason might be that investors extrapolate historic success or failure into the
future. Growth companies have for most parts seen their share prices increase in the past,
that is why the valuation multiples have become high, as a result of high growth rates and
investors believe this historical “success” will last. The opposite might hold for value stocks
that poor performing companies with low valuations will remain weak and thus perceived
to perform worse than other companies until proved differently.
The third reason is connected to the previous two, that investors tend overreact on both
good and bad news, causing poor performing companies to become undervalued and fast
growing companies to become overvalued. That is why a rational investor should go for
the winning strategy presented above and create a portfolio with the lowest multiples since
it has the most potential for a turnaround and increase in value.
5.2.2 Reasons for abnormal return

Reasons for the abnormal return for Low-Low are many; the companies within this group
(value companies) have in general a higher dividend payout (table 4), indicating that these
companies are more mature and instead of re-investing the profits in the organization dis-
tributes them to their stockholders. Also, after the IT-collapse in 2000 value companies re-
gained their reputation and increased in value. The sharp increase in profits for these com-
panies is most likely due to macro-economic factors.
The cumulative return (figure 6) which shows a rather remarkable risk adjusted return for
this category especially during the later years of the study is partly a consequence of the
compounding effect of the return previous years. Without this effect the increase would
not have been that extraordinary. However, even if one would disregard the cumulative ef-
fect, the fact remains that the return of the Low-Low portfolio is abnormal. This is con-
firmed in figure 7 (measures actual return) where the Low-Low portfolio has beaten index
2/3 of the times.
5.2.3 Implications for the EMH

As seen from the analysis of the returns on the whole period, abnormal return of 7.77
times that of the OMXS index is created, indicating that the market is not truly efficient
since it was possible to make profit significantly higher than the chosen benchmark. This
abnormal return is according to theory only possible in the long run if the market is to
some degree inefficient. However when looking at the individual years, the return is slightly
better than index, beating the benchmark index about 67% of the 12 years.
36
The authors believe that this indicates that the Stockholm Stock Exchange is in general ef-
ficient. This since we can see that the market follows the EMH during the years but there is
still a possibility to make abnormal return over the whole time period.
Since the author’s goal with this thesis is not to investigate the EMH but rather to realize
that the result of the thesis points to some direction regarding the EMH. Therefore, the au-
thors tilt towards the understanding that the market is most likely semi-strong since this in-
vestigation has shown that an investor most likely will make normal profit with elements of
abnormal profits. According to Wramsby & Österlund (2001), the Swedish market is semi-
strong, and this study has not provided any evidence to reject that statement.
5.2.4 Side remarks on β, P/E and the time period used

The authors have in the comparison between value and growth found an interesting obser-
vation about the beta values. The scientific discussion about the beta values as an explana-
tory variable is ongoing (see section 2.3). Noticeable in this thesis is that the return of the
portfolios, from the best to the worst have the lowest to the highest beta values. This is an
interesting result since it is in contradiction to CAPM which says that a higher systematic
risk should generate a higher expected return (Strong, 2000) and is left as an interesting eye
opener and suggestion for future research.
During the research the authors have come to realize that the P/B and P/E, during the
years of 1995 and 1996, might appear mixed up (see table 2). This since the low Value
group has larger P/Es compared to the Growth group, remember however that all stocks
are sampled based on the P/B multiple and later sorted based on the P/E multiple. This
means that by random chance low P/B companies can have high P/Es, nevertheless this is
an exception. However the authors have re-checked these figures and come to the conclu-
sion that this appearance is due to the fact that it these years seem to be no relation be-
tween high P/B values and high P/E values.
The time period covered in this thesis is interesting in terms of market trends, this since the
market from 1993 to 2005 has gone up in a decent pace, high pace and crashed as well. Us-
ing for example a shorter time span where the market has increased rapidly would have
been favoring the high beta stocks, found in the growth portfolios. This varying condition
is then not favoring any particular portfolio return which makes the result fair.
5.3 Critique of method used

The authors would like to point out that the methods used in order to conduct this study
have been chosen with great care in order to get the result as unbiased and unskewed as
possible. But a few notes are needed to clarify the chosen methods and the assumptions
made.
One influential assumption made when constructing the sample of stocks to be included in
the portfolios was that the P/B distribution on the Stockholm Stock Exchange is normally
distributed. The assumption was made since the number of companies on the stock ex-
change is well above 30, which according to Aczel & Sounderpandian (2002) is enough to
assume normal distribution. If this assumption however does not hold and the actual P/B
distribution is skewed in one way or another, for example if there are a majority of low P/B
stocks, then the calculated break points are off target. If the break points are wrong, for ex-
ample if they are too high compared to the true distribution, then stocks with P/B ratios
37
too high have been included in the value portfolios and P/B ratios too low have been in-
cluded in the growth portfolios. This will subsequently include incorrect stocks with per-
haps different returns in the portfolios, causing the return comparisons to be incorrect.
In connection with calculating the break points is the issue of scaling down the sectors with
extreme P/B multiples down to 10, such as the case with the IT-sector in the year of 2000
having a P/B of 21.5. Scaling down large observations of sector P/Bs reduces the spread
of these, which makes the standard deviation of the sectors’ P/B multiples to go down
which in turn causes the upper and lower break points to be narrower. This narrower
bound is necessary since it otherwise would be impossible to create portfolios at all during
the three years affected. As mentioned, scaling takes place seven out of 144 times (12 cre-
ated portfolios times about 12 sectors and indexes in each year) or in three out of twelve
years. And the scaling is only affecting the break points, not the individual stocks. See ap-
pendix III for details.
Since the wanted 60 stocks in each category is not reached in some years, this would impli-
cate that the result is less reliable (more observations generally produces a more reliable re-
sult). However the degree of reliability lost due to this fact is hard to determine in numbers.
The authors have in every year been able to gather at least 43 stocks, which the author be-
lieves is still large enough to validate the results reached in these years as well.
The method of only using annual returns has the flaw of not capturing the true variation of
stock returns. A stock increasing in price from for example SEK 100 to SEK 150 in six
month, followed by a drop back to SEK 100 in the next six month will be viewed as having
a zero annual return. This makes the reader miss out on information of semi-annually stock
returns also making portfolios with large return variations to look less volatile. The motive
was however to update the portfolios annually and calculate the period return on an annual
basis. Hence this method does not affect the result of the thesis but would only have pro-
vided more information to the reader of the intra-period variations. Nor does this method
of only including annual returns have an impact on the beta values since they are taken di-
rectly from Börsguide and not calculated manually.
De-listed stocks were assumed to have a zero return if nothing else was stated in Börs-
guide. The true price could actually have been higher or lower depending on the time at
which the stock was de-listed, which in turn would affect the total return on the portfolios.
A quick check makes it clear that the Value portfolio has more acquired firms than the
Growth portfolio. Since the authors believe most acquisitions are made at a premium
above the current market price this could mean that the Value portfolio actually has a larger
return taking the premiums into consideration. Since the Value portfolio already outper-
forms the Growth portfolio this does not affect the result significantly.
Taxes and transaction costs are not taken into account in this thesis. Not considering taxes
makes positive and negative returns inflated since individuals are taxed 30% on capital
gains in Sweden and receive a refund of 21% on net losses (Skatteverket, 2005). Taxes are
complex however and therefore not considered. Nor allowing for transaction costs makes
any portfolio return to look better than if subtracting the actual cost a broker would charge
in order to execute the trades. The amount of which transactions costs affect the total re-
turns depends for example on the broker used, the list where stock is located at and the
size of the trades, which therefore makes it hard to generalize a certain amount. To get an
understanding of the size of the transaction costs in Sweden they typically range from
0.07% to 0.3% of the total investment depending on the stock list (Finansportalen, 2005).
38
Furthermore, the reader should be aware that this result has not been tested statistically. A
statistical test would not have changed the finals result of this thesis but have made it pos-
sible to generalize the result for the sample on the whole population.
5.4 Suggestions for further studies

The period examined in this thesis is between 1993 and 2005 and it would be interesting to
perform a study for an even longer period of time, for example going all the way back to
the mid 1970’s. This was the time where the capital market in Sweden and the Stockholm
Stock Exchange really spurred and the amount of stock transactions increased significantly.
(Henrekson, Persson & Gleisner, 2005) The period between 1993 and 2005 is influenced
by the IT-boom during the millennium, where stock valuation reached enormous propor-
tions and rational investment decisions were rare. Using a longer time period will reduce
such extreme years and might generate a different outcome or strengthen this thesis’s re-
sult.
Secondly the authors believe it is important to study whether any other factors than the
beta can explain expected stock returns. Beta is the only risk measure in the CAPM, and
the assumption is that the larger the beta the larger the expected returns an investor can
expect. (Strong, 2000) The conclusion in this thesis is that the superior portfolio, contradic-
tory to CAPM, has the lowest beta out of the four portfolios, thus something else might
explain differences in stock returns. It could be the case that for instance historical returns
measured by valuation multiples and/or market capitalization size are more accurate ex-
planatory variables. The ultimate goal would then be to shape a model with these variables
that can be used by investors in order make portfolio constructions more efficient with re-
gards to the expected return and risk level.
A third aspect that would be of interest to study are the psychological aspects when invest-
ing, a field called behavioral finance (Shleifer, 2000). Conducting this study, and reading
previous studies made in the same field, the authors believe that few investors actually
make rational investing decisions. A study in relation to this thesis could be to conduct a
research to explain the reasons for value stocks beating growth stocks. What make inves-
tors to buy riskier growth stocks (measured by beta) even though these in the long-run are
being outperformed by value stocks? Is it the fact that investors overreact on news, accept-
ing positive news from “trendy”/new companies without using the same critical eye they
do on “regular” companies?
39
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43
Appendix I
Appendix I
Fama & French
Fama & French (1992) study of relation between P/B, P/E and return on the US stock
market between 1963 and 1990.
Portfolio num-
ber 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
P/B 3,33 1,49 1,15 1,03 0,96 0,85 0,77 0,69 0,67 0,63 0,52 0,55
Return 0,11% 0,22% 0,34% 0,47% 0,60% 0,73% 0,87% 1,03% 1,23% 1,52% 1,93% 2,77%
P/E 0,96 1,08 1,06 0,97 0,85 0,82 0,75 0,70 0,68 0,64 0,57 0,58
Return 0,01% 0,03% 0,05% 0,06% 0,08% 0,09% 0,11% 0,12% 0,14% 0,16% 0,20% 0,28%
Definition of Multiples P/B and P/E

Since P/B and P/E are the most frequently used ratios when separating value firms from
growth firms, this section will be an in-depth description and discussion of what the two
ratios actually mean and how they are used.
Price -to- book (P/B)

The price-to-book ratio (P/B) is a valuation multiple used to measure the price paid for a
share over the book value for the same company. P/B offers a reality check for investors
seeking growth at a reasonable price since great divergences between P/B and return on
equity, a key growth indicator, can be a warning signal that the valuation is too high. Over-
valued stocks tend to show high P/B ratios and low return on equity. (Frykman & Tolleryd
2003)
The simple formula most often used to calculate P/B is seen in formula 5, where the book-
value of stockholders’ equity is calculated by book value of total assets - book value of li-
abilities. (Sharpe et al. 1999) This formula is derived from a more comprehensive formula
assuming constant growth in earnings, also seen in formula 5, which reveals the key drivers
of the P/B ratio. This shows that a company with a high growth rate, high payout ratio,
low cost of equity but most importantly a high return on equity deserves a high P/B ratio
without being overvalued. (Frykman & Tolleryd 2003)
According to Frykman & Tolleryd (2003) the P/B ratio is constructed as following:
ROE(1 + g )(payout ratio ) Price per share
= = P/B
k−g Book value per share
Price/Book value (P/B ratio)

ROE=Return on equity
g=Earning’s growth rate in percent
payout ratio=Amount of earnings paid out as dividends
k=Cost of capital
44
Appendix I
Definitions of the P/B ratio are different how the book value is worded. As a clarification
of the authors would like to point out that the word “shareholders equity” is almost the
same as “book value of equity“. The meaning and how the multiple works remains un-
changed though.
The use of the term “shareholders’ equity” is a more narrow approach; however there are
more complications of using the more narrow view. It can for example be multiple classes
of shares outstanding and the price per share can be different for different classes, hence it
is not straight forward how the book equity should be calculated. By using book value of
equity you will leave out some of the problems connected with evaluating the precise book
value per share, therefore this is what will be used in this thesis. (Damodaran, 2002)
The P/B ratio has a number of benefits when measuring a company’s market valuation.
Some of them are that it is easily understood; it is stable over time and suitable for histori-
cal analysis; and when accounting standards are reasonable coherent between firms P/B ra-
tios can be compared easily to identify over- or under valuation. (Frykman & Tolleryd,
2003).
Some drawbacks with this measurement are that book values are affected by accounting
principals, book values may differ significantly between companies or countries and may
not be comparable; the book value in the balance sheet may not at all reflect the real eco-
nomic value of the asset and the P/B ratio only accounts, due to accounting standards, for
tangible assets only and intangible assets such as brand name and know-how will not be in-
cluded. This gives firms with large intangible assets such as Coca-Cola a larger P/B ratio
than it “deserves”, hence some companies might appear like growth companies when they
should actually be classified as value companies, which usually have a smaller P/B ratio.
(Frykman & Tolleryd, 2003)
Price -to- Earnings (P/E)

In general, the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) is the most commonly used valuation multiple
when evaluating stocks. It measures the market price per share over earnings per share, in
other words it shows how much investors are willing to pay today for one unit of earnings.
This is the only generally accepted view of how the definition should be stated. The for-
mula most often used, seen below, is the market capitalization divided by the total earnings.
(Sharpe et al. 1999) This formula is also derived from a more detailed formula assuming a
constant growth in earnings, also seen in formula 6, which exposes the key drivers of the
P/E ratio. This shows that a company with a high payout ratio, low cost of capital and
most importantly a high growth rate deserves a high P/E ratio without being overvalued.
(Frykman & Tolleryd, 2003)
According to Frykman & Tolleryd (2003) the P/E ratio is constructed as following:
(1 + g )(payout ratio ) = Price per share
= P/E
k−g Earnings per share
Price/Earnings (P/E ratio)

Payout ratio= Amount of earnings paid out as dividends
k=Cost of capital
g=Earning’s growth rate in percent
45
Appendix I
The P/E ratio can be calculated using either trailing twelve months earnings, i.e. the most
recently reported earnings, or forecasted annual earnings. Trailing twelve months earnings
are objective and most often presented in the financial press while forecasted earnings, also
called forward earnings, are subjective and depends on the analysts own ideas of earnings
growth which are not always presented in the press. (Sharpe et al 1999)
Some positive aspects of using the P/E ratio as a value multiple are that it is commonly
used and often mentioned in the business press. Drawbacks are that earnings are affected
by accounting standards and might be misleading, hence could be a bad measure of the op-
erations; variations in earnings per share can also make it troublesome to forecast it, thus
forward earnings are more subjective. (Frykman & Tolleryd, 2003)
A shortcoming of the P/E ratio is that a company which makes a loss in one year receives
a negative P/E, or most often it does not get a quoted P/E ratio at all in the press. Instead
of applying a negative P/E, it can be viewed as the company has an extremely large ratio,
similar to high growth companies. (Basu 1977)
Negative P/B and P/E Discussion

Companies with negative P/E ratios will be considered as being high P/E stocks, hence
growth stocks. The rationale behind this is that a negative P/E ratio, meaning that a com-
pany’s latest earnings are negative, can mathematically be viewed as being infinite large.
To see this, consider three companies all having market prices per shares of 100, and posi-
tive earnings, the lower the earnings per share the higher the P/E ratio. For example, com-
pany 1 with earnings equal to 100 gets a P/E of 1 (100/100), company 2 with earnings
equal to 50 gets a P/E of 2 (100/50) and company 3 with earnings equal to 0.01, hence
closest to being negative, gets a P/E of 10,000 (100/0.01). Therefore companies with even
lower (negative) earnings gets even higher P/E ratios and get classified as growth compa-
nies in this thesis.
A company performing so poorly that the entire stockholders’ equity account has been
eliminated receives a negative P/B multiple. These kinds of companies are on the verge of
being liquidated by the creditors and need according Swedish accounting laws to set up a
balance sheet for liquidation purposes. It is up to the board to determine if the company’s
operations should continue. (Hemström, 2005) The same example and rationale as with
negative P/E stocks is used for negative P/B companies, hence considered as being growth
stocks. Negative P/B multiples are included in the thesis since they might be able to sur-
vive and excluding them could bias the thesis’ result in an undetermined way.
Having negative earnings or negative stockholder’s equity is not sustainable in the long-run
for a company, if lasting too long creditors will for the company into liquidation. It should
be pointed out that reasons for companies’ having either high or low valuation multiples
will not be considered, nor if these extreme multiples only last temporarily. The aim is to
create portfolios only based on raw data published once a year not taking any other factors
into account that might be of importance when evaluating stocks.
46
Appendix II
Appendix II
47
Appendix III
Appendix III
48
Appendix III
49
Appendix IV
Appendix IV
50
Appendix IV
51
New Value portfolio in April of 1993 New Growth portfolio in April of 1993
P/B P/E Dividend Yield Beta Price P/B P/E Dividend Yield Beta Price
Active B 0,1 Neg 0,0% 1,1 3 Aga 2,4 16,4 2,5% 0,6 368
Almedahl B 0,6 12,9 6,0% 0,6 100 Alcatel 2,4 9,7 1,6% 0,9 915
Argonaut B 0,8 Neg 0,0% 1,0 19,5 Allgon B 2,4 36,4 1,1% 1,7 56,5
Asg 0,8 Neg 1,8% - 61 Asea 2,8 19,1 2,0% 0,9 449
Bastionen Syd 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 2,1 Astra A 9,4 22 0,8% 0,8 129,8
Bergaliden B 0,5 Neg 0,0% - 26 Atlas Copco 1,8 16,2 2,4% 1,1 328
Bongs B 0,5 21,2 4,5% 0,3 22 Bergman Beving 1,7 10,1 2,9% 0,7 120
BPA 0,3 Neg 0,0% 1,8 17 BK elektronik 1,9 31 0,0% 0,9 22
Byggfast 0 0,3 53,3% 0,8 0,75 BNL 8,1 53,5 0,0% 0,7 10
Catena 0,3 Neg 0,0% 0,7 23 Cardo Invest 2,5 24 2,7% 0,9 325
Celtica 0,6 4,9 0,0% - 37 Coronado B Neg Neg 0,0% - 0,05
Custos 0,9 Neg 1,8% 1,9 57 Diös 1,8 Neg 0,0% - 7,5
Elanders B 0,9 6,4 3,9% 0,4 64 Drummond Gate Kl 13 Neg 0,0% - 63
Eldon 0,7 17,3 4,2% 1,0 42 Ericsson B 3,4 51,9 1,3% 1,5 276
Enea B 1,1 6,8 1,5% - 65 Freia B (s) 5,6 21,2 0,6% - 450
Esselte B 1 17,4 2,7% 1,2 92 Gambro B 5,2 17,6 1,3% 0,5 338
Export Invest 1,1 7,2 4,2% 1,1 106 Garphyttan 1,6 16 3,2% 0,9 133
FFNS B 0,9 9,4 4,2% 0,7 33 Graninge 2,7 21,4 2,0% - 238
Finansrutin B 1 100 0,0% 1,0 11 Gullspång B 6,5 19,6 2,4% 0,5 90
Finnveden 0,1 Neg 0,0% 3,2 2,9 Hagströmer Qviberg 2,7 8,2 0,0% 0,8 155
Folkebolagen B 0,3 Neg 4,6% 0,9 12 Havsfrun K 10 11,3 0,0% 0,9 52
Grouten Oil 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 1,8 Hennes & Mauritz 4,8 10 2,0% 0,6 205
Hasselfors B 0,8 100 4,6% 0,9 120 Hoist Int B Neg Neg 0,0% 0,9 1,3
Itab B 0,8 Neg 1,7% 0,9 60 Hufvudstaden 3,3 67,2 3,8% 1,5 29
Jakobsson Wimark 0,5 Neg 0,0% 1,4 20 Incentive 1,5 15,1 3,0% - 197
Kinnevik 1 11,6 4,6% 0,6 108 Industrivärlden 1,5 60,6 5,2% 1,1 155
Kramo B 0,3 Neg 0,0% 1,0 19 Investor 3,4 15 4,6% 1,6 113
Källdata 0,8 Neg 0,0% 0,9 17 IPC 1,8 Neg 0,0% - 14
Leksells B 0 Neg 0,0% 1,4 0,7 Kvaerner A 1,5 9 3,2% - 175
Lundbergs B 0,9 10,1 4,2% 1,8 60 Linjebuss A 2,1 11,8 2,7% - 92
Lundgrens B 0,4 Neg 0,0% 1,0 10,5 Nolato 1,5 13,1 2,2% 0,3 160
Luxonen 0,8 11,6 4,5% 0,1 73 Norsk Data (s) Neg Neg 0,0% 3,2 2
Måldata B 0,4 Neg 0,0% 0,9 10 Norsk Hydro 2,1 83,9 1,8% 0,5 180
NCB 0,6 Neg 0,0% 1,4 1,3 OEM International 1,7 8,7 3,0% 0,3 117
NK 0,7 Neg 0,0% 1,1 11,5 OM Gruppen 1,6 12,2 4,8% 1,3 135
Nobel 1 37,1 0,0% 1,2 13 Orrefors 1,8 60,7 0,0% 0,8 60
Omi corp 1 12,8 0,0% - 40 Perstorp 1,8 29,3 2,3% 0,7 196
Piren B 0,2 Neg 0,0% 0,4 2,97 Procordia 2,5 13,3 2,0% 0,6 178
Prifast B 0,7 3,6 0,0% - 60 Sandvik 1,9 21,8 2,2% 0,9 85,6
Proventus B 0,7 16,8 4,0% 0,3 63 SCA 1,8 63,7 2,7% 1,2 117
Rottneros 0,2 Neg 0,0% 1,4 3,4 Seco Tools 2,4 25,7 2,6% - 98
Sanblom och Stohne 1 100 0,0% 0,3 22 Securitas 7,5 18,7 2,0% - 189
Scribona A 0,5 Neg 0,0% - 10,5 Skandigen A 2,2 Neg 0,0% - 27
Sealink 0,2 0,6 0,0% 0,8 4,3 Spendrups 2,3 12,4 2,0% 0,4 54
SEB 0,1 Neg 0,0% 0,9 3,95 Sydkraft 2,1 16,4 2,4% 0,3 123
Sifab B 0,3 Neg 0,0% - 18,5 Sydsvenska Dagbladet 1,7 16 0,0% 0,4 46
Skanska B 1,1 Neg 1,6% 1,6 94 WM data 2 6,9 3,6% 0,7 140
SKF 0,8 Neg 0,0% 1,2 77
Skåne Gripen B 0,6 5,2 4,1% 1,0 27 Total 47
Stora Enso 1 Neg 2,2% 1,5 292
Sydost Invest B 0,4 Neg 0,0% 0,9 2,3
Tivox 0,7 Neg 2,3% 0,4 17,5
Trustor AB B 0,5 7,4 4,7% - 22
Tryckeriindustri B 0,8 6,6 5,3% - 45
Trygg/ SPP B 0,8 Neg 0,0% - 98
Wallenstam 0,5 16,7 2,7% 1,3 15
VBB B 0,4 46,6 6,0% - 12,5
VBG B 0,4 Neg 2,2% 0,6 23
Wermlands Guldbrytning 0,5 Neg 0,0% - 5
Ångpanneföreningen B 0,5 Neg 2,5% 0,9 40
Total 60
Return of the 1993 Value portfolio Return of the 1993 Growth portfolio
P/B P/E Dividend Yield Beta P0 P1 Return Total return P/B P/E Dividend Yield Beta P0 P1 Return Total return
Active B 0,1 Neg 0,0% 1,1 3 2,6 -13% -13% Aga 2,4 16,4 2,5% 0,6 368 407 11% 13%
Almedahl B * 0,6 12,9 6,0% 0,6 100 100 0% 6% Alcatel 2,4 9,7 1,6% 0,9 915 885 -3% -2%
Argonaut B 0,8 Neg 0,0% 1,0 19,5 22 13% 13% Allgon B 2,4 36,4 1,1% 1,7 38 200 431% 432%
Asg 0,8 Neg 1,8% - 61 125 105% 107% Asea 2,8 19,1 2,0% 0,9 449 621 38% 40%
Bastionen Syd 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 2,1 1,7 -19% -19% Astra A 9,4 22,0 0,8% 0,8 130 155 19% 20%
Bergaliden B 0,5 Neg 0,0% - 26 22 -15% -15% Atlas Copco 1,8 16,2 2,4% 1,1 328 505 54% 56%
Bongs B 0,5 21,2 4,5% 0,3 22 66 200% 205% Bergman Beving 1,7 10,1 2,9% 0,7 60 140 133% 136%
BPA 0,3 Neg 0,0% 1,8 17 11,2 -34% -34% Elektronikgruppen. Former: BK Elektronik 1,9 31,0 0,0% 0,9 22 72 227% 227%
Byggfast ** 0,0 0,3 53,3% 0,8 0,75 0 -100% -47% BNL 8,1 53,5 0,0% 0,7 5 6,6 32% 32%
Catena 0,3 Neg 0,0% 0,7 23 59 157% 157% Cardo Invest 2,5 24,0 2,7% 0,9 325 414 27% 30%
Celtica 0,6 4,9 0,0% - 37 35 -5% -5% Coronado B *** Neg Neg 0,0% - 0,05 0,05 0% 0%
Custos 0,9 Neg 1,8% 1,9 57 110 93% 95% Diös 1,8 Neg 0,0% - 7,5 3,3 -56% -56%
Elanders B 0,9 6,4 3,9% 0,4 64 140 119% 123% Drummond Gate Kl * 13,0 Neg 0,0% - 63 63 0% 0%
Eldon 0,7 17,3 4,2% 1,0 42 93 121% 126% Ericsson B 3,4 51,9 1,3% 1,5 276 344 25% 26%
Enea B 1,1 6,8 1,5% - 65 215 231% 232% Freia B (s) *** 5,6 21,2 0,6% - 450 450 0% 1%
Esselte B 1,0 17,4 2,7% 1,2 92 110 20% 22% Gambro B 5,2 17,6 1,3% 0,5 317 353 11% 13%
Export Invest 1,1 7,2 4,2% 1,1 106 154 45% 49% Garphyttan 1,6 16,0 3,2% 0,9 133 207 56% 59%
FFNS B 0,9 9,4 4,2% 0,7 33 50 52% 56% Graninge 2,7 21,4 2,0% - 238 354 49% 51%
Finansrutin B * 1,0 100 0,0% 1,0 11 11 0% 0% Gullspång B 6,5 19,6 2,4% 0,5 90 101 12% 15%
Finnveden 0,1 Neg 0,0% 3,2 2,9 6,7 131% 131% Hagströmer Qviberg 2,7 8,2 0,0% 0,8 31 71 129% 129%
Folkebolagen B 0,3 Neg 4,6% 0,9 12 30 150% 155% Havsfrun K 10,0 11,3 0,0% 0,9 52 76 46% 46%
Grouten Oil** 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 1,8 0 -100% -100% Hennes & Mauritz 4,8 10,0 2,0% 0,6 205 383 87% 89%
Hasselfors B 0,8 100 4,6% 0,9 120 147 23% 27% Hoist Int B Neg Neg 0,0% 0,9 1,3 1,8 38% 38%
Itab B 0,8 Neg 1,7% 0,9 60 90 50% 52% Hufvudstaden 3,3 67,2 3,8% 1,5 29 53 83% 87%
Jakobsson Wimark 0,5 Neg 0,0% 1,4 20 58 190% 190% Incentive 1,5 15,1 3,0% - 197 306 55% 58%
Kinnevik 1,0 11,6 4,6% 0,6 108 178 65% 69% Industrivärlden 1,5 60,6 5,2% 1,1 155 216 39% 45%
Kramo B 0,3 Neg 0,0% 1,0 19 41 116% 116% Investor 3,4 15,0 4,6% 1,6 113 181 60% 65%
Källdata 0,8 Neg 0,0% 0,9 17 43 153% 153% IPC 1,8 Neg 0,0% - 14 8,5 -39% -39%
Leksells B** 0,0 Neg 0,0% 1,4 0,7 0 -100% -100% Kvaerner A 1,5 9,0 3,2% - 175 330 89% 92%
Lundbergs B 0,9 10,1 4,2% 1,8 60 92 53% 58% Linjebuss A 2,1 11,8 2,7% - 92 256 178% 181%
Lundgrens B 0,4 Neg 0,0% 1,0 10,5 26 148% 148% Nolato 1,5 13,1 2,2% 0,3 160 260 63% 65%
Luxonen 0,8 11,6 4,5% 0,1 73 71 -3% 2% Norsk Data (s) *** Neg Neg 0,0% 3,2 2 2 0% 0%
Måldata B 0,4 Neg 0,0% 0,9 10 31 210% 210% Norsk Hydro 2,1 83,9 1,8% 0,5 180 250 39% 41%
NCB 0,6 Neg 0,0% 1,4 1,3 2 54% 54% OEM International 1,7 8,7 3,0% 0,3 117 320 174% 177%
NK * 0,7 Neg 0,0% 1,1 11,5 11,5 0% 0% OM Gruppen 1,6 12,2 4,8% 1,3 135 251 86% 91%
Nobel * 1,0 37,1 0,0% 1,2 13 13 0% 0% Orrefors 1,8 60,7 0,0% 0,8 60 126 110% 110%
Omi corp 1,0 12,8 0,0% - 40 56 40% 40% Perstorp 1,8 29,3 2,3% 0,7 196 342 74% 77%
Piren B 0,2 Neg 0,0% 0,4 2,7 2,1 -22% -22% Pharmacia Former: Procordia 2,5 13,3 2,0% 0,6 178 113 -37% -35%
Prifast B 0,7 3,6 0,0% - 60 125 108% 108% Sandvik 1,9 21,8 2,2% 0,9 86 118 38% 40%
Proventus B 0,7 16,8 4,0% 0,3 63 61 -3% 1% SCA 1,8 63,7 2,7% 1,2 117 124 6% 9%
Rottneros 0,2 Neg 0,0% 1,4 3,4 7,9 132% 132% Seco Tools 2,4 25,7 2,6% - 98 148 51% 54%
Sanblom och Stohne 1,0 100 0,0% 0,3 22 25 14% 14% Securitas 7,5 18,7 2,0% 0,4 189 243 29% 31%
Scribona A 0,5 Neg 0,0% - 10,5 47 348% 348% Skandigen A 2,2 Neg 0,0% - 19,3 25 30% 30%
Sealink ** 0,2 0,6 0,0% 0,8 4,3 0 -100% -100% Spendrups 2,3 12,4 2,0% 0,4 54 49 -9% -7%
SEB 0,1 Neg 0,0% 0,9 4,0 52 1216% 1216% Sydkraft 2,1 16,4 2,4% 0,3 123 116 -6% -3%
Sifab B 0,3 Neg 0,0% - 18,5 52 181% 181% Sydsvenska Dagbladet 1,7 16,0 0,0% 0,4 46 91 98% 98%
Skanska B 1,1 Neg 1,6% 1,6 94 183 95% 96% WM data 2,0 6,9 3,6% 0,7 140 380 171% 175%
SKF 0,8 Neg 0,0% 1,2 77 147 91% 91%
Skåne Gripen B 0,6 5,2 4,1% 1,0 27 62 130% 134% No. Of stocks 47 Return 60%
Stora Enso 1,0 Neg 2,2% 1,5 292 396 36% 38% Avg Beta 0,9 Risk-adjusted return 60%
Rörviksgruppen Former: Sydost Invest B 0,4 Neg 0,0% 0,9 2,3 22 843% 843% Div. Yield 1,8%
Tivox 0,7 Neg 2,3% 0,4 10 22 120% 122% Median P/B 2,3
Trustor AB B 0,5 7,4 4,7% - 22 44 100% 105% Risk-free rate* 7,7%
Tryckeriindustri B 0,8 6,6 5,3% - 45 117 160% 165%
Trygg/ SPP B 0,8 Neg 0,0% - 98 105 7% 7%
Wallenstam 0,5 16,7 2,7% 1,3 15 54 260% 263% Explanations to *
VBB B 0,4 46,6 6,0% - 12,5 31 148% 154% Acquired by another company *
VBG B 0,4 Neg 2,2% 0,6 23 85 270% 272% Bankrupt **
Wermlands Guldbrytning 0,5 Neg 0,0% - 5 14 180% 180% Delisted ***
Ångpanneföreningen B 0,5 Neg 2,5% 0,9 40 101 153% 155%
The risk-free rate can be found at the end of this appendix
No. Of stocks 60 Return 113%
Avg Beta 1,0 Risk-adjusted return 104%
Div. Yield 2,5%
Median P/B 0,6
Risk-free rate* 7,7%
Return of the 1993 Low-Low portfolio Return of the 1993 Low-High portfolio
P/E P/B Dividend Yield Beta P0 P1 Return Total return P/E P/B Dividend Yield Beta P0 P1 Return Total return
Byggfast ** 0,3 0,0 53,3% 0,8 0,75 0 -100% -47% Active B Neg 0,1 0,0% 1,1 3 2,6 -13% -13%
Sealink ** 0,6 0,2 0,0% 0,8 4,3 0 -100% -100% Argonaut B Neg 0,8 0,0% 1,0 19,5 22 13% 13%
Prifast B 3,6 0,7 0,0% - 60 125 108% 108% Asg Neg 0,8 1,8% - 61 125 105% 107%
Celtica 4,9 0,6 0,0% - 37 35 -5% -5% Bastionen Syd Neg 0,4 0,0% - 2,1 1,7 -19% -19%
Skåne Gripen B 5,2 0,6 4,1% 1,0 27 62 130% 134% Bergaliden B Neg 0,5 0,0% - 26 22 -15% -15%
Elanders B 6,4 0,9 3,9% 0,4 64 140 119% 123% BPA Neg 0,3 0,0% 1,8 17 11,2 -34% -34%
Tryckeriindustri B 6,6 0,8 5,3% - 45 117 160% 165% Catena Neg 0,3 0,0% 0,7 23 59 157% 157%
Enea B 6,8 1,1 1,5% - 65 215 231% 232% Custos Neg 0,9 1,8% 1,9 57 110 93% 95%
Export Invest 7,2 1,1 4,2% 1,1 106 154 45% 49% Finnveden Neg 0,1 0,0% 3,2 2,9 6,7 131% 131%
Trustor AB B 7,4 0,5 4,7% - 22 44 100% 105% Folkebolagen B Neg 0,3 4,6% 0,9 12 30 150% 155%
FFNS B 9,4 0,9 4,2% 0,7 33 50 52% 56% Grouten Oil ** Neg 0,4 0,0% - 1,8 0 -100% -100%
Lundbergs B 10,1 0,9 4,2% 1,8 60 92 53% 58% Itab B Neg 0,8 1,7% 0,9 60 90 50% 52%
Kinnevik 11,6 1,0 4,6% 0,6 108 178 65% 69% Jakobsson Wimark Neg 0,5 0,0% 1,4 20 58 190% 190%
Luxonen 11,6 0,8 4,5% 0,1 73 71 -3% 2% Kramo B Neg 0,3 0,0% 1,0 19 41 116% 116%
Omi corp 12,8 1,0 0,0% - 40 56 40% 40% Källdata Neg 0,8 0,0% 0,9 17 43 153% 153%
Almedahl B * 12,9 0,6 6,0% 0,6 100 100 0% 6% Leksells B ** Neg 0,0 0,0% 1,4 0,7 0 -100% -100%
Wallenstam 16,7 0,5 2,7% 1,3 15 54 260% 263% Lundgrens B Neg 0,4 0,0% 1,0 10,5 26 148% 148%
Proventus B 16,8 0,7 4,0% 0,3 63 61 -3% 1% Måldata B Neg 0,4 0,0% 0,9 10 31 210% 210%
Eldon 17,3 0,7 4,2% 1,0 42 93 121% 126% NCB Neg 0,6 0,0% 1,4 1,3 2 54% 54%
Esselte B 17,4 1,0 2,7% 1,2 92 110 20% 22% NK * Neg 0,7 0,0% 1,1 11,5 11,5 0% 0%
Bongs B 21,2 0,5 4,5% 0,3 22 66 200% 205% Piren B Neg 0,2 0,0% 0,4 2,7 2,1 -22% -22%
Nobel * 37,1 1,0 0,0% 1,2 13 13 0% 0% Rottneros Neg 0,2 0,0% 1,4 3,4 7,9 132% 132%
VBB B 46,6 0,4 6,0% - 12,5 31 148% 154% Scribona A Neg 0,5 0,0% - 10,5 47 348% 348%
Finansrutin B * 100,0 1,0 0,0% 1,0 11 11 0% 0% SEB Neg 0,1 0,0% 0,9 4,0 52 1216% 1216%
Hasselfors B 100,0 0,8 4,6% 0,9 120 147 23% 27% Sifab B Neg 0,3 0,0% - 18,5 52 181% 181%
Sanblom och Stohne 100,0 1,0 0,0% 0,3 22 25 14% 14% Skanska B Neg 1,1 1,6% 1,6 94 183 95% 96%
SKF Neg 0,8 0,0% 1,2 77 147 91% 91%
Stora Enso Neg 1,0 2,2% 1,5 292 396 36% 38%
Rörviksgruppen Former: Sydost Invest B Neg 0,4 0,0% 0,9 2,3 22 843% 843%
Tivox Neg 0,7 2,3% 0,4 10 22 120% 122%
Trygg/ SPP B Neg 0,8 0,0% - 98 105 7% 7%
VBG B Neg 0,4 2,2% 0,6 23 85 270% 272%
Wermlands Guldbrytning Neg 0,5 0,0% - 5 14 180% 180%
Ångpanneföreningen B Neg 0,5 2,5% 0,9 40 101 153% 155%
No. Of stocks 26 Return 69% No. Of stocks 34 Return 146%

Avg Beta 0,8 Risk-adjusted return 76% Avg Beta 1,2 Risk-adjusted return 119%
Div. Yield 5,0% Div. Yield 0,6%
Median P/E 11,6 Median P/E Neg
Risk-free rate 7,7% Risk-free rate 7,7%
Return of the 1993 High-Low portfolio Return of the 1993 High-High portfolio
WM data 6,9 2,0 3,6% 0,7 140 380 171% 175% Freia B (s) *** 21,2 5,6 0,6% - 450 450 0% 1%
Hagströmer Qviberg 8,2 2,7 0,0% 0,8 31 71 129% 129% Graninge 21,4 2,7 2,0% - 238 354 49% 51%
OEM International 8,7 1,7 3,0% 0,3 117 320 174% 177% Sandvik 21,8 1,9 2,2% 0,9 86 118 38% 40%
Kvaerner A 9,0 1,5 3,2% - 175 330 89% 92% Astra A 22,0 9,4 0,8% 0,8 130 155 19% 20%
Alcatel 9,7 2,4 1,6% 0,9 915 885 -3% -2% Cardo Invest 24,0 2,5 2,7% 0,9 325 414 27% 30%
Hennes & Mauritz 10,0 4,8 2,0% 0,6 205 383 87% 89% Seco Tools 25,7 2,4 2,6% - 98 148 51% 54%
Bergman Beving 10,1 1,7 2,9% 0,7 60 140 133% 136% Perstorp 29,3 1,8 2,3% 0,7 196 342 74% 77%
Havsfrun K 11,3 10 0,0% 0,9 52 76 46% 46% Elektronikgruppen. Former: BK Elektronik 31,0 1,9 0,0% 0,9 22 72 227% 227%
Linjebuss A 11,8 2,1 2,7% - 92 256 178% 181% Allgon B 36,4 2,4 1,1% 1,7 38 200 431% 432%
OM Gruppen 12,2 1,6 4,8% 1,3 135 251 86% 91% Ericsson B 51,9 3,4 1,3% 1,5 276 344 25% 26%
Spendrups 12,4 2,3 2,0% 0,4 54 49 -9% -7% BNL 53,5 8,1 0,0% 0,7 5 6,6 32% 32%
Nolato 13,1 1,5 2,2% 0,3 160 260 63% 65% Industrivärlden 60,6 1,5 5,2% 1,1 155 216 39% 45%
Pharmacia Former: Procordia 13,3 2,5 2,0% 0,6 178 113 -37% -35% Orrefors 60,7 1,8 0,0% 0,8 60 126 110% 110%
Investor 15,0 3,4 4,6% 1,6 113 181 60% 65% SCA 63,7 1,8 2,7% 1,2 117 124 6% 9%
Incentive 15,1 1,5 3,0% - 197 306 55% 58% Hufvudstaden 67,2 3,3 3,8% 1,5 29 53 83% 87%
Garphyttan 16,0 1,6 3,2% 0,9 133 207 56% 59% Norsk Hydro 83,9 2,1 1,8% 0,5 180 250 39% 41%
Sydsvenska Dagbladet 16,0 1,7 0,0% 0,4 46 91 98% 98% Coronado B *** Neg Neg 0,0% - 0,05 0,05 0% 0%
Atlas Copco 16,2 1,8 2,4% 1,1 328 505 54% 56% Diös Neg 1,8 0,0% - 7,5 3,3 -56% -56% Explanations to *
Aga 16,4 2,4 2,5% 0,6 368 407 11% 13% Drummond Gate Kl * Neg 13 0,0% - 63 63 0% 0% Acquired by another company *
Sydkraft 16,4 2,1 2,4% 0,3 123 116 -6% -3% Hoist Int B Neg Neg 0,0% 0,9 1,3 1,8 38% 38% Bankrupt **
Gambro B 17,6 5,2 1,3% 0,5 317 353 11% 13% IPC Neg 1,8 0,0% - 14 8,5 -39% -39% Delisted ***
Securitas 18,7 7,5 2,0% 0,4 189 243 29% 31% Norsk Data (s) *** Neg Neg 0,0% 3,2 2 2 0% 0%
Asea 19,1 2,8 2,0% 0,9 449 621 38% 40% Skandigen A Neg 2,2 0,0% - 19,3 25 30% 30%
Gullspång B 19,6 6,5 2,4% 0,5 90 101 12% 15%

Median P/E 13,5 Median P/E 60,7
Acrimo 1,3 17,5 1,3% 0,7 112 73 -35% -34% Aga 2,6 17,9 2,5% 0,6 81,4 79 -3% 0%
Active B 0,4 Neg 0,0% 1,7 2,6 4,5 73% 73% Allgon B 11,3 26,4 0,5% 1,8 200 128 -36% -36%
Alcatel 1,8 10,1 3,3% 0,4 885 650 -27% -23% Arjo Neg Neg 0,0% - 124 117 -6% -6%
Argonaut B 1,3 Neg 0,0% 1,0 13,75 11,5 -16% -16% Asea 3,9 100,0 1,6% 0,8 621 593 -5% -3%
Aritmos * 1,0 Neg 0,0% 0,9 121 121 0% 0% Astra A 8,1 17,2 1,0% 0,7 155 203 31% 32%
Atle 0,9 7,3 3,6% - 35 35 0% 4% Atlas Copco 2,5 20,5 1,8% 1,0 505 96 -81% -79%
Avesta Sheffield 1,6 Neg 0,0% 1,2 41 73 78% 78% Bergman Beving 2,5 15,1 1,9% 0,7 140 154 10% 12%
Bastionen Syd * 0,9 Neg 0,0% 1,5 1,7 1,7 0% 0% BNL *** 4,3 1,7 0,0% 0,8 6,6 6,6 0% 0%
Bergaliden B * 0,6 12,7 0,0% - 22 22 0% 0% Cardo Invest 3,0 35,5 2,5% 0,8 414 80 -81% -78%
Bilspedition 1,6 Neg 0,0% 1,7 31 24 -23% -23% Cyncrona 3,0 10,3 0,0% 0,6 105 310 195% 195%
Bongs B 1,6 80,2 1,5% 0,5 66 55 -17% -15% Dala Hebi Neg Neg 0,0% - 1 0,57 -43% -43%
BPA 0,4 Neg 0,0% 2,1 11,2 12,6 13% 13% Doro 3,9 13,2 0,0% 1,5 25 21 -16% -16%
Bylock & Nord 1,5 17,4 2,3% 0,4 71 58 -18% -16% Elekta 5,1 25,9 0,0% 0,2 151 178 18% 18%
Catena 1,1 Neg 0,0% 1,1 59 50 -15% -15% Elektronikgruppen 6,3 8,7 0,0% 0,9 72 118 64% 64%
Celsius 1,7 11,3 3,2% 0,0 204 112 -45% -42% Enator * 4,0 35,4 0,0% 1,2 39 39 0% 0%
Celtica 0,4 33,1 0,0% 1,2 35 41 17% 17% Enea B 3,1 12,5 1,4% 0,8 72 77 7% 9%
Concordia 1,6 6,8 0,0% 1,1 28 13,8 -51% -51% Ericsson B 4,1 34,3 1,3% 1,4 344 471 37% 38%
Diös 1,6 23,9 0,0% 2,2 3,3 2,6 -21% -21% Fermenta *** 4,7 Neg 0,0% 0,8 1,2 1,2 0% 0%
Eldon 1,3 15,2 2,2% 1,0 93 144 55% 57% Finnveden 6,5 28,5 0,0% 3,4 6,7 6,4 -4% -4%
Errce 1,7 3,3 0,0% 1,8 6,7 34 410% 410% Forsheda 4,8 13,5 1,2% 0,5 106 175 65% 66%
Esselte B 1,7 17,9 2,5% 1,1 110 92 -16% -14% Gambro B 4,3 15,1 1,6% 0,5 88 94 7% 8%
Euroc 1,5 30,6 1,8% 1,2 123 147 20% 21% Garphyttan 2,4 17,7 2,3% 0,9 207 250 21% 23%
Export Invest * 1,5 19,1 3,2% 1,0 154 154 0% 3% Getinge 3,5 14,1 2,2% 0,6 186 205 10% 12%
FFNS B 1,2 13,9 3,0% 0,7 50 48 -4% -1% Graninge 3,8 23,2 1,6% - 354 318 -10% -9%
Folkebolagen B 1,0 Neg 0,0% 1,0 30 34 13% 13% Graphium 11,9 13,4 0,0% - 127 105 -17% -17%
Frontline 0,3 Neg 0,0% 1,3 18,5 18,7 1% 1% Hennes & Mauritz 6,7 18,0 1,6% 0,5 383 470 23% 24%
Geveko 1,3 16,7 4,2% 0,9 101 71 -30% -26% HL Display 7,4 13,7 1,3% 0,5 46 82 78% 80%
Hasselfors B 1,2 14,2 4,5% 0,9 147 145 -1% 3% Hoist Int B *** Neg Neg 0,0% 1,4 1,8 1,8 0% 0%
Havsfrun K 1,0 Neg 0,0% 0,9 76 69 -9% -9% Hufvudstaden 5,4 100,0 2,1% 1,7 53 41 -23% -21%
Hilab 1,1 Neg 0,0% 1,0 25 22 -12% -12% Kinnevik 4,8 17,4 2,8% 0,8 178 232 30% 33%
IPC 0,7 Neg 0,0% - 8,5 12,2 44% 44% Lindab 2,8 19,8 1,5% 0,7 103 140 36% 37%
Itab B 1,3 Neg 0,8% 0,9 90 86 -4% -4% Linjebuss A 5,0 25,6 1,4% - 128 107 -16% -15%
Jakobsson Wimark 1,6 16,0 0,0% 1,5 58 66 14% 14% Marieberg 2,4 20,7 1,1% 1,1 210 150 -29% -27%
Kramo B * 1,0 Neg 0,0% 1,0 41 41 0% 0% Martinsson 2,4 17,0 1,3% 1,0 75 70 -6% -5%
Källdata 0,6 1,9 0,0% 1,0 43 18,5 -57% -57% Munksjö 4,6 29,7 0,8% - 61 57 -7% -6%
Lundbergs B 1,4 31,2 3,3% 1,8 92 70 -24% -21% Måldata B 3,3 Neg 0,0% 1,1 31 24 -23% -23%
Lundgrens B 1,3 50,6 1,0% 1,0 26 25 -4% -3% Nobelpharma 2,9 Neg 0,0% - 74 86 16% 16%
Luxonen 0,5 11,9 0,0% 0,1 71 16 -77% -77% Nokia 3,8 Neg 0,7% 1,6 560 1100 96% 97%
NCB * 0,9 Neg 0,0% 1,4 2 2 0% 0% Nordiska Holding 3,3 15,3 0,0% 2,2 2,5 1,2 -52% -52%
Omi corp 1,2 Neg 2,1% 0,9 56 38 -32% -30% OEM International 4,0 11,1 1,6% 0,4 80 109 36% 38%
Pharmacia 1,4 10,7 1,9% 0,7 113 131 16% 18% Orrefors 3,8 17,6 1,6% 0,8 126 95 -25% -23%
Piren B 1,4 Neg 0,0% 1,3 2,1 1,6 -24% -24% Perstorp 2,7 35,2 1,4% 0,8 342 276 -19% -18%
Prifast B 1,5 55,5 0,4% - 125 120 -4% -4% Realia 7,4 Neg 0,0% 1,7 2 1 -50% -50%
Proventus B 0,7 20,1 4,5% 0,3 61 72 18% 23% Rottneros 4,4 Neg 0,0% 1,6 7,9 10,9 38% 38%
Rörviksgruppen 1,5 100,0 0,0% 1,0 22 19,5 -11% -11% Sandvik 2,4 35,6 1,9% 0,9 118 128 8% 10%
Sanblom & Stohne 1,6 100,0 2,3% 0,6 35 28 -20% -18% Scribona A 5,7 26,4 8,3% - 47 52 11% 19%
SCA 1,2 30,6 2,7% 1,1 124 120 -3% -1% Seco Tools 3,5 20,6 2,0% 0,8 148 138 -7% -5%
SEB 1,3 100,0 0,0% 1,6 52 37 -29% -29% Securitas 3,9 19,0 1,9% 0,4 243 197 -19% -17%
SHB 1,3 21,4 1,9% 1,4 108 86 -20% -18% Sintercast 16,6 Neg 0,0% - 185 205 11% 11%
Sifab B 1,2 66,2 0,0% - 52 33 -37% -37% Skandia 2,7 7,9 1,4% 1,2 132 117 -11% -10%
Skåne Gripen B 1,7 9,8 2,4% 1,0 62 63 2% 4% Skandigen A 3,4 Neg 0,0% 0,8 25 36 44% 44%
Stora Enso 1,1 62,9 1,6% 1,4 396 456 15% 17% Skanska B 3,2 30,8 1,8% 1,7 183 145 -21% -19%
Sydkraft 1,5 10,6 2,6% 0,3 81 96 19% 22% Storheden 3,5 Neg 0,0% 0,8 3,8 2,2 -42% -42%
Tivox 1,3 Neg 1,6% 0,2 22 19 -14% -12% Svedala 2,4 69,1 0,6% - 180 179 -1% 0%
Trustor AB B 1,0 31,0 4,5% - 44 42 -5% 0% Sydsvenska Dagbladet * 3,4 94,6 0,0% 0,7 91 91 0% 0%
Trygg/ SPP B 1,5 7,1 2,9% 2,0 105 66 -37% -34% Terra Mining 9,4 16,0 1,5% - 205 146 -29% -27%
VBB B 1,3 88,5 0,0% -1,6 31 23 -26% -26% Wallenstam 3,9 10,2 0,0% 1,6 54 38 -30% -30%
Wermlands Guldbrytning 1,5 Neg 0,0% 0,9 7 16,9 141% 141% WM data 4,5 16,0 1,6% 0,7 95 147 55% 56%
Ångpanneföreningen B 1,6 100,0 2,0% 1,0 101 114 13% 15%
Öresund 1,1 5,0 6,3% 0,9 123 111 -10% -3%

Avg Beta 1,0 Risk-adjusted return -3% Avg Beta 1,0 Risk-adjusted return -2%
Median P/B 1,3 Median P/B 3,9
Explanations to *
Acquired by another company *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Källdata 1,9 0,6 0,0% 1,0 43 18,5 -57% -57% Lundgrens B 50,6 1,3 1,0% 1,0 26 25 -4% -3%
Errce 3,3 1,7 0,0% 1,8 6,7 34 410% 410% Prifast B 55,5 1,5 0,4% - 125 120 -4% -4%
Öresund 5,0 1,1 6,3% 0,9 123 111 -10% -3% Stora Enso 62,9 1,1 1,6% 1,4 396 456 15% 17%
Concordia 6,8 1,6 0,0% 1,1 28 13,8 -51% -51% Sifab B 66,2 1,2 0,0% - 52 33 -37% -37%
Trygg/ SPP B 7,1 1,5 2,9% 2,0 105 66 -37% -34% Bongs B 80,2 1,6 1,5% 0,5 66 55 -17% -15%
Atle 7,3 0,9 3,6% - 35 35 0% 4% VBB B 88,5 1,3 0,0% -1,6 31 23 -26% -26%
Skåne Gripen B 9,8 1,7 2,4% 1,0 62 63 2% 4% Rörviksgruppen 100,0 1,5 0,0% 1,0 22 19,5 -11% -11%
Alcatel 10,1 1,8 3,3% 0,4 885 650 -27% -23% Sanblom & Stohne 100,0 1,6 2,3% 0,6 35 28 -20% -18%
Sydkraft 10,6 1,5 2,6% 0,3 81 96 19% 22% SEB 100,0 1,3 0,0% 1,6 52 37 -29% -29%
Pharmacia 10,7 1,4 1,9% 0,7 113 131 16% 18% Ångpanneföreningen B 100,0 1,6 2,0% 1,0 101 114 13% 15%
Celsius 11,3 1,7 3,2% 0,0 204 112 -45% -42% Active B Neg 0,4 0,0% 1,7 2,6 4,5 73% 73%
Luxonen 11,9 0,5 0,0% 0,1 71 16 -77% -77% Argonaut B Neg 1,3 0,0% 1,0 13,8 11,5 -16% -16%
Bergaliden B * 12,7 0,6 0,0% - 22 22 0% 0% Aritmos * Neg 1,0 0,0% 0,9 121 121 0% 0%
FFNS B 13,9 1,2 3,0% 0,7 50 48 -4% -1% Avesta Sheffield Neg 1,6 0,0% 1,2 41 73 78% 78%
Hasselfors B 14,2 1,2 4,5% 0,9 147 145 -1% 3% Bastionen Syd * Neg 0,9 0,0% 1,5 1,7 1,7 0% 0%
Eldon 15,2 1,3 2,2% 1,0 93 144 55% 57% Bilspedition Neg 1,6 0,0% 1,7 31 24 -23% -23%
Jakobsson Wimark 16,0 1,6 0,0% 1,5 58 66 14% 14% BPA Neg 0,4 0,0% 2,1 11,2 12,6 13% 13%
Geveko 16,7 1,3 4,2% 0,9 101 71 -30% -26% Catena Neg 1,1 0,0% 1,1 59 50 -15% -15%
Bylock & Nord 17,4 1,5 2,3% 0,4 71 58 -18% -16% Folkebolagen B Neg 1,0 0,0% 1,0 30 34 13% 13%
Acrimo 17,5 1,3 1,3% 0,7 112 73 -35% -34% Frontline Neg 0,3 0,0% 1,3 18,5 18,7 1% 1%
Esselte B 17,9 1,7 2,5% 1,1 110 92 -16% -14% Havsfrun K Neg 1,0 0,0% 0,9 76 69 -9% -9%
Export Invest * 19,1 1,5 3,2% 1,0 154 154 0% 3% Hilab Neg 1,1 0,0% 1,0 25 22 -12% -12%
Proventus B 20,1 0,7 4,5% 0,3 61 72 18% 23% IPC Neg 0,7 0,0% - 8,5 12,2 44% 44%
SHB 21,4 1,3 1,9% 1,4 108 86 -20% -18% Itab B Neg 1,3 0,8% 0,9 90 86 -4% -4%
Diös 23,9 1,6 0,0% 2,2 3,3 2,6 -21% -21% Kramo B * Neg 1,0 0,0% 1,0 41 41 0% 0%
Euroc 30,6 1,5 1,8% 1,2 123 147 20% 21% NCB * Neg 0,9 0,0% 1,4 2 2 0% 0%
SCA 30,6 1,2 2,7% 1,1 124 120 -3% -1% Omi corp Neg 1,2 2,1% 0,9 56 38 -32% -30%
Trustor AB B 31,0 1,0 4,5% - 44 42 -5% 0% Piren B Neg 1,4 0,0% 1,3 2,1 1,6 -24% -24%
Lundbergs B 31,2 1,4 3,3% 1,8 92 70 -24% -21% Tivox Neg 1,3 1,6% 0,2 22 19 -14% -12%
Celtica 33,1 0,4 0,0% 1,2 35 41 17% 17% Wermlands Guldbrytning Neg 1,5 0,0% 0,9 7 16,9 141% 141%

BNL *** 1,7 4,3 0,0% 0,8 6,6 6,6 0% 0% Graninge 23,2 3,8 1,6% - 354 318 -10% -9%
Skandia 7,9 2,7 1,4% 1,2 132 117 -11% -10% Linjebuss A 25,6 5,0 1,4% - 128 107 -16% -15%
Elektronikgruppen 8,7 6,3 0,0% 0,9 72 118 64% 64% Elekta 25,9 5,1 0,0% 0,2 151 178 18% 18%
Wallenstam 10,2 3,9 0,0% 1,6 54 38 -30% -30% Allgon B 26,4 11,3 0,5% 1,8 200 128 -36% -36%
Cyncrona 10,3 3,0 0,0% 0,6 105 310 195% 195% Scribona A 26,4 5,7 8,3% - 47 52 11% 19%
OEM International 11,1 4,0 1,6% 0,4 80 109 36% 38% Finnveden 28,5 6,5 0,0% 3,4 6,7 6,4 -4% -4%
Enea B 12,5 3,1 1,4% 0,8 72 77 7% 9% Munksjö 29,7 4,6 0,8% - 61 57 -7% -6%
Doro 13,2 3,9 0,0% 1,5 25 21 -16% -16% Skanska B 30,8 3,2 1,8% 1,7 183 145 -21% -19%
Graphium 13,4 11,9 0,0% - 127 105 -17% -17% Ericsson B 34,3 4,1 1,3% 1,4 344 471 37% 38%
Forsheda 13,5 4,8 1,2% 0,5 106 175 65% 66% Perstorp 35,2 2,7 1,4% 0,8 342 276 -19% -18%
HL Display 13,7 7,4 1,3% 0,5 46 82 78% 80% Enator * 35,4 4,0 0,0% 1,2 39 39 0% 0%
Getinge 14,1 3,5 2,2% 0,6 186 205 10% 12% Cardo Invest 35,5 3,0 2,5% 0,8 414 80 -81% -78%
Bergman Beving 15,1 2,5 1,9% 0,7 140 154 10% 12% Sandvik 35,6 2,4 1,9% 0,9 118 128 8% 10%
Gambro B 15,1 4,3 1,6% 0,5 88 94 7% 8% Svedala 69,1 2,4 0,6% - 180 179 -1% 0%
Nordiska Holding 15,3 3,3 0,0% 2,2 2,5 1,2 -52% -52% Sydsvenska Dagbladet * 94,6 3,4 0,0% 0,7 91 91 0% 0%
Terra Mining 16,0 9,4 1,5% - 205 146 -29% -27% Asea 100,0 3,9 1,6% 0,8 621 593 -5% -3%
WM data 16,0 4,5 1,6% 0,7 95 147 55% 56% Hufvudstaden 100,0 5,4 2,1% 1,7 53 41 -23% -21%
Martinsson 17,0 2,4 1,3% 1,0 75 70 -6% -5% Arjo Neg Neg 0,0% - 124 117 -6% -6%
Astra A 17,2 8,1 1,0% 0,7 155 203 31% 32% Dala Hebi Neg Neg 0,0% - 1 0,57 -43% -43%
Kinnevik 17,4 4,8 2,8% 0,8 178 232 30% 33% Fermenta *** Neg 4,7 0,0% 0,8 1,2 1,2 0% 0%
Orrefors 17,6 3,8 1,6% 0,8 126 95 -25% -23% Hoist Int B *** Neg Neg 0,0% 1,4 1,8 1,8 0% 0%
Garphyttan 17,7 2,4 2,3% 0,9 207 250 21% 23% Måldata B Neg 3,3 0,0% 1,1 31 24 -23% -23%
Aga 17,9 2,6 2,5% 0,6 81,4 79 -3% 0% Nobelpharma Neg 2,9 0,0% - 74 86 16% 16%
Hennes & Mauritz 18,0 6,7 1,6% 0,5 383 470 23% 24% Nokia Neg 3,8 0,7% 1,6 560 1100 96% 97%
Securitas 19,0 3,9 1,9% 0,4 243 197 -19% -17% Realia Neg 7,4 0,0% 1,7 2 1 -50% -50%
Lindab 19,8 2,8 1,5% 0,7 103 140 36% 37% Rottneros Neg 4,4 0,0% 1,6 7,9 10,9 38% 38%
Atlas Copco 20,5 2,5 1,8% 1,0 505 96 -81% -79% Sintercast Neg 16,6 0,0% - 185 205 11% 11%
Seco Tools 20,6 3,5 2,0% 0,8 148 138 -7% -5% Skandigen A Neg 3,4 0,0% 0,8 25 36 44% 44%
Marieberg 20,7 2,4 1,1% 1,1 210 150 -29% -27% Storheden Neg 3,5 0,0% 0,8 3,8 2,2 -42% -42%
No. Of stocks 29 Return 13% No. Of stocks 29 Return -3% Explanations to *

Avg Beta 0,84 Risk-adjusted return 6% Avg Beta 1,20 Risk-adjusted return -13% Acquired by another company *
Div. Yield 1,3% Div. Yield 0,9% Bankrupt **
Median P/E 15,3 Median P/E 94,6 Delisted ***
Acrimo 0,8 8,7 2,9% 0,9 73 60 -18% -15% ABU Garcia * 2,8 24,6 1,4% - 21 21 0% 1%
Alcatel 1,1 10,1 3,3% 0,3 650 570 -12% -9% Allgon B 9,3 28,6 0,5% 1,5 128 99 -23% -22%
Arcona 0,8 Neg 0,0% 2,4 5,1 5,2 2% 2% Arjo * 4,1 16,7 1,7% - 117 117 0% 2%
Argonaut B 0,9 Neg 0,0% 1,0 11,5 10,4 -10% -10% Asea 3,6 14,4 1,9% 0,6 593 690 16% 18%
Atlantica 1,5 19,1 0,0% 0,7 50 51 2% 2% Astra A 7,2 18,6 1,1% 0,7 203 306 51% 52%
Atle 0,8 6,9 5,7% - 35 47 34% 40% Autoliv 4,1 17,4 1,0% - 302 385 27% 28%
Bayer 1,5 10,9 3,6% 0,2 1710 2160 26% 30% Avesta Sheffield 2,6 10,5 2,2% 1,4 73 73 0% 2%
Bilspedition 1,5 Neg 0,0% 2,0 24 23 -4% -4% Clock 4,4 13,2 2,1% - 19 7,8 -59% -57%
Bongs B 1,2 9,6 2,5% 0,7 55 43 -22% -19% Consilium 11,6 14,1 2,0% - 63 59 -6% -4%
BPA 0,6 Neg 0,0% 2,6 12,6 13,7 9% 9% Cyncrona 6,4 11,3 1,9% 0,7 310 106 37% 39%
Brio 1,2 15,5 1,5% 0,8 65 58 -11% -9% Doro 3,3 9,6 2,4% 1,5 21 14,5 -31% -29%
Bure 0,8 6,4 6,6% 0,6 40 48 20% 27% Eldon 2,0 9,5 2,8% 1,1 144 124 -14% -11%
Bylock & Nord 1,1 12 3,5% 0,4 58 62 7% 10% Elekta 3,2 29,4 0,0% 0,2 178 221 24% 24%
Cardo Invest 0 20,6 0,0% - 80 143 79% 79% Elektronikgruppen 4,7 11,2 1,7% 0,9 118 105 -11% -9%
Catena 1,6 13,9 2,0% 1,2 50 52 4% 6% Enea B 2,7 9,7 2,3% 1,2 77 98 27% 30%
Celsius 0,9 5,1 6,3% - 112 185 65% 71% Ericsson B 4,8 26,1 1,2% 1,4 471 135 26% 27%
Celtica 0,5 Neg 0,0% 1,2 41 28 -32% -32% Errce 3,9 13,7 2,9% 2,0 34 40 18% 21%
Concordia 0,6 Neg 0,0% 1,3 13,8 14,1 2% 2% Finnveden 4,3 7,4 0,0% 4,5 6,4 73 14% 14%
Electrolux 1,5 5,9 3,5% 1,1 353 0,65 -3% 0% Forsheda 5,6 9,3 2,3% 0,7 175 126 -28% -26%
Esselte B 1,4 10,9 3,3% 1,1 92 341 32% 35% Fristads * 4,3 8,4 3,5% - 130 130 0% 4%
Euroc 1,6 10,3 2,4% 1,2 147 121 28% 30% Gambro B * 3,3 14,3 1,7% 0,5 94 94 0% 2%
Exab 1 31 0,7% 1,2 69 188 0% 70% Garphyttan 2,6 10,3 2,6% 0,5 250 93 49% 51%
FFNS B 1,1 10,6 4,8% 0,7 48 69 0% 5% Getinge 3,8 11,4 2,4% 0,6 205 344 68% 70%
Folkebolagen B 1 24,8 1,2% 1,0 34 48 -18% -16% Graninge 3,0 16,1 2,4% - 318 130 23% 25%
Frontline 0,5 Neg 0,0% 1,3 18,7 28 -4% -4% Hemstaden 4,8 100 0,0% - 6,5 6,4 -2% -2%
Geveko 0,9 15,4 5,9% 0,8 71 17,9 -13% -7% Hennes & Mauritz 6,5 17,5 1,6% 0,5 470 469 0% 1%
Hasselfors B * 1,1 10,8 4,8% 0,7 145 62 0% 5% HL Display 4,2 12,7 1,5% 0,5 82 73 -11% -9%
Havsfrun K 0,9 Neg 0,0% 0,5 69 145 16% 16% Hufvudstaden 4,0 42,6 3,0% 2,1 41 47 15% 18%
Hebi Health Care Former Dala Hebi 0,9 7,1 0,0% - 0,57 80 14% 14% Höganäs 6,6 14,8 2,4% 0,5 115 220 91% 94%
Hilab * 0,9 21,2 2,3% 1,3 22 22 0% 2% IMS Data 3,4 11,6 3,6% - 28 38 36% 39%
IPC 1,1 19,2 0,0% 0,7 12,2 19,5 60% 60% Kalmar Ind 4,0 10,2 3,1% - 98 118 20% 24%
Itab B 1,3 10,9 1,5% 1,0 86 100 16% 18% Kanthal 2,4 9,8 3,4% - 117 120 3% 6%
Jakobsson Wimark 1,6 6,6 4,5% 1,7 66 66 0% 5% Kinnevik 3,7 16,5 2,2% 0,6 232 251 8% 10%
JM B 1 14,2 2,7% 1,6 56 70 25% 28% Lindab 3,4 14,2 1,4% 1,0 140 143 2% 4%
Kvaerner 1,4 10,8 2,8% 1,0 240 220 -8% -6% Linjebuss A 2,9 16,3 2,1% - 107 53 -50% -48%
Källdata *** 0,2 Neg 0,0% 1,0 18,5 18,5 0% 0% Munksjö 2,4 10,5 2,6% - 57 54 -5% -3%
Lundbergs B 1 21,9 3,9% 2,1 70 79 13% 17% Måldata B 3,3 100 0,0% 1,2 24 47 96% 96%
Lundgrens B 1,2 18,2 2,9% 1,1 25 25 0% 3% Nobelpharma 4,8 23,6 1,2% - 86 105 22% 23%
Marieberg 1,5 18 3,0% 1,3 150 170 13% 16% Nokia 4,4 16,3 1,4% 1,7 1100 237 -14% -12%
Nordiska Holding 1,6 7,4 8,3% 2,4 12 10,6 -12% -3% Nolato 2,5 10,1 1,9% 0,6 65 52 -20% -18%
Omi corp 0,6 Neg 3,1% 0,6 38 50 32% 35% Nordictel 6,7 33,3 0,0% - 78 83 6% 6%
Piren B 1,4 31,2 0,0% 1,5 1,6 1,4 -13% -13% OEM International 4,0 7,7 2,3% 0,5 109 130 19% 22%
Prifast B 1,4 44,7 0,8% - 120 91 -24% -23% Orrefors 2,5 9,3 3,7% 0,7 95 98 3% 7%
Proventus B * 1 Neg 0,0% 0,4 72 72 0% 0% Owell * 3,1 23 0,0% - 105 105 0% 0%
Realia 0,6 Neg 0,0% 2,1 6,25 7,3 17% 17% Rottneros 7,9 2 0,8% 1,7 10,9 7,3 -33% -32%
Sanblom & Stohne 1,2 16,2 4,3% 0,6 28 33 18% 22% Sandvik 2,5 1,4 2,9% 0,9 128 150 17% 20%
SCA 1,2 35,3 3,1% 1,2 120 132 10% 13% Seco Tools 2,7 12,3 3,6% 0,6 138 158 14% 18%
SEB 0,8 Neg 4,1% 1,9 37 53 43% 47% Securitas 2,8 17,3 2,5% 0,4 197 384 95% 97%
SHB 1 7,5 3,5% 1,6 86 143 66% 70% Senea 2,7 29,7 1,6% 1,1 62 110 77% 79%
Sifab B 0,7 0,9 0,0% 1,5 33 29 -12% -12% Sintercast 4,5 Neg 0,0% - 205 460 124% 124%
Skandia 1,6 Neg 1,7% 1,1 117 157 34% 36% Skandigen A 15,9 100 0,0% 0,5 36 63 75% 75%
Skåne Gripen B 1,6 8,4 2,9% 1,1 63 63 0% 3% Skanska B 2,4 8,5 2,6% 2,1 145 214 48% 50%
Stora Enso 1,3 12,9 2,2% 1,6 91,2 93 2% 4% Synectics 2,9 17,1 1,1% - 185 292 58% 59%
Storheden 0,1 Neg 0,0% 1,0 2,2 1,8 -18% -18% Taurus Petroleum 2,5 Neg 0,0% 0,7 2,9 6 107% 107%
Sydkraft 1,5 11,9 3,4% 0,4 96 138 44% 47% Terra Mining 3,5 18,9 2,1% - 146 112 -23% -21%
Tivox 1,3 25,6 1,3% 0,3 19 14,5 -24% -22% TV4 3,8 18,2 3,7% - 135 125 -7% -4%
Trustor AB B 0,9 7,9 5,4% - 42 31 -26% -21% VBG 3,5 6,6 1,7% 0,4 174 94 62% 64%
Trygg Hansa 0,8 Neg 0,0% 2,3 66 108 64% 64% WM Data 5,6 15,3 1,7% 0,7 147 320 118% 119%
VBB B 1 61,4 0,0% 1,7 23 22 -4% -4%
Öresund 0,9 6,5 7,0% 0,9 111 109 -2% 5%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Sifab B 0,9 0,7 0,0% 1,5 33 29 -12% -12% Marieberg 18 1,5 3,0% 1,3 150 170 13% 16%
Celsius 5,1 0,9 6,3% - 112 185 65% 71% Lundgrens B 18,2 1,2 2,9% 1,1 25 25 0% 3%
Electrolux 5,9 1,5 3,5% 1,1 353 0,65 -3% 0% Atlantica 19,1 1,5 0,0% 0,7 50 51 2% 2%
Bure 6,4 0,8 6,6% 0,6 40 48 20% 27% IPC 19,2 1,1 0,0% 0,7 12,2 19,5 60% 60%
Öresund 6,5 0,9 7,0% 0,9 111 109 -2% 5% Cardo Invest 20,6 0 0,0% - 80 143 79% 79%
Jakobsson Wimark 6,6 1,6 4,5% 1,7 66 66 0% 5% Hilab * 21,2 0,9 2,3% 1,3 22 22 0% 2%
Atle 6,9 0,8 5,7% - 35 47 34% 40% Lundbergs B 21,9 1 3,9% 2,1 70 79 13% 17%
Hebi Health Care Former Dala Hebi 7,1 0,9 0,0% - 0,57 80 14% 14% Folkebolagen B 24,8 1 1,2% 1,0 34 48 -18% -16%
Nordiska Holding 7,4 1,6 8,3% 2,4 12 10,6 -12% -3% Tivox 25,6 1,3 1,3% 0,3 19 14,5 -24% -22%
SHB 7,5 1 3,5% 1,6 86 143 66% 70% Exab 31 1 0,7% 1,2 69 188 0% 70%
Trustor AB B 7,9 0,9 5,4% - 42 31 -26% -21% Piren B 31,2 1,4 0,0% 1,5 1,6 1,4 -13% -13%
Skåne Gripen B 8,4 1,6 2,9% 1,1 63 63 0% 3% SCA 35,3 1,2 3,1% 1,2 120 132 10% 13%
Acrimo 8,7 0,8 2,9% 0,9 73 60 -18% -15% Prifast B 44,7 1,4 0,8% - 120 91 -24% -23%
Bongs B 9,6 1,2 2,5% 0,7 55 43 -22% -19% VBB B 61,4 1 0,0% 1,7 23 22 -4% -4%
Alcatel 10,1 1,1 3,3% 0,3 650 570 -12% -9% Arcona Neg 0,8 0,0% 2,4 5,1 5,2 2% 2%
Euroc 10,3 1,6 2,4% 1,2 147 121 28% 30% Argonaut B Neg 0,9 0,0% 1,0 11,5 10,4 -10% -10%
FFNS B 10,6 1,1 4,8% 0,7 48 69 0% 5% Bilspedition Neg 1,5 0,0% 2,0 24 23 -4% -4%
Hasselfors B * 10,8 1,1 4,8% 0,7 145 62 0% 5% BPA Neg 0,6 0,0% 2,6 12,6 13,7 9% 9%
Kvaerner 10,8 1,4 2,8% 1,0 240 220 -8% -6% Celtica Neg 0,5 0,0% 1,2 41 28 -32% -32%
Bayer 10,9 1,5 3,6% 0,2 1710 2160 26% 30% Concordia Neg 0,6 0,0% 1,3 13,8 14,1 2% 2%
Esselte B 10,9 1,4 3,3% 1,1 92 341 32% 35% Frontline Neg 0,5 0,0% 1,3 18,7 28 -4% -4%
Itab B 10,9 1,3 1,5% 1,0 86 100 16% 18% Havsfrun K Neg 0,9 0,0% 0,5 69 145 16% 16%
Sydkraft 11,9 1,5 3,4% 0,4 96 138 44% 47% Källdata *** Neg 0,2 0,0% 1,0 18,5 18,5 0% 0%
Bylock & Nord 12 1,1 3,5% 0,4 58 62 7% 10% Omi corp Neg 0,6 3,1% 0,6 38 50 32% 35%
Stora Enso 12,9 1,3 2,2% 1,6 91,2 93 2% 4% Proventus B * Neg 1 0,0% 0,4 72 72 0% 0%
Catena 13,9 1,6 2,0% 1,2 50 52 4% 6% Realia Neg 0,6 0,0% 2,1 6,25 7,3 17% 17%
JM B 14,2 1 2,7% 1,6 56 70 25% 28% SEB Neg 0,8 4,1% 1,9 37 53 43% 47%
Geveko 15,4 0,9 5,9% 0,8 71 17,9 -13% -7% Skandia Neg 1,6 1,7% 1,1 117 157 34% 36%
Brio 15,5 1,2 1,5% 0,8 65 58 -11% -9% Storheden Neg 0,1 0,0% 1,0 2,2 1,8 -18% -18%
Sanblom & Stohne 16,2 1,2 4,3% 0,6 28 33 18% 22% Trygg Hansa Neg 0,8 0,0% 2,3 66 108 64% 64%

Sandvik 1,4 2,5 2,9% 0,9 128 150 17% 20% Asea 14,4 3,6 1,9% 0,6 593 690 16% 18%
Rottneros 2 7,9 0,8% 1,7 10,9 7,3 -33% -32% Höganäs 14,8 6,6 2,4% 0,5 115 220 91% 94%
VBG 6,6 3,5 1,7% 0,4 174 94 62% 64% WM Data 15,3 5,6 1,7% 0,7 147 320 118% 119%
Finnveden 7,4 4,3 0,0% 4,5 6,4 73 14% 14% Graninge 16,1 3,0 2,4% - 318 130 23% 25%
OEM International 7,7 4,0 2,3% 0,5 109 130 19% 22% Linjebuss A 16,3 2,9 2,1% - 107 53 -50% -48%
Fristads * 8,4 4,3 3,5% - 130 130 0% 4% Nokia 16,3 4,4 1,4% 1,7 1100 237 -14% -12%
Skanska B 8,5 2,4 2,6% 2,1 145 214 48% 50% Kinnevik 16,5 3,7 2,2% 0,6 232 251 8% 10%
Forsheda 9,3 5,6 2,3% 0,7 175 126 -28% -26% Arjo * 16,7 4,1 1,7% - 117 117 0% 2%
Orrefors 9,3 2,5 3,7% 0,7 95 98 3% 7% Synectics 17,1 2,9 1,1% - 185 292 58% 59%
Eldon 9,5 2,0 2,8% 1,1 144 124 -14% -11% Securitas 17,3 2,8 2,5% 0,4 197 384 95% 97%
Doro 9,6 3,3 2,4% 1,5 21 14,5 -31% -29% Autoliv 17,4 4,1 1,0% - 302 385 27% 28%
Enea B 9,7 2,7 2,3% 1,2 77 98 27% 30% Hennes & Mauritz 17,5 6,5 1,6% 0,5 470 469 0% 1%
Kanthal 9,8 2,4 3,4% - 117 120 3% 6% TV4 18,2 3,8 3,7% - 135 125 -7% -4%
Nolato 10,1 2,5 1,9% 0,6 65 52 -20% -18% Astra A 18,6 7,2 1,1% 0,7 203 306 51% 52%
Kalmar Ind 10,2 4,0 3,1% - 98 118 20% 24% Terra Mining 18,9 3,5 2,1% - 146 112 -23% -21%
Garphyttan 10,3 2,6 2,6% 0,5 250 93 49% 51% Owell * 23 3,1 0,0% - 105 105 0% 0%
Avesta Sheffield 10,5 2,6 2,2% 1,4 73 73 0% 2% Nobelpharma 23,6 4,8 1,2% - 86 105 22% 23%
Munksjö 10,5 2,4 2,6% - 57 54 -5% -3% ABU Garcia * 24,6 2,8 1,4% - 21 21 0% 1%
Elektronikgruppen 11,2 4,7 1,7% 0,9 118 105 -11% -9% Ericsson B 26,1 4,8 1,2% 1,4 471 135 26% 27%
Cyncrona 11,3 6,4 1,9% 0,7 310 106 37% 39% Allgon B 28,6 9,3 0,5% 1,5 128 99 -23% -22%
Getinge 11,4 3,8 2,4% 0,6 205 344 68% 70% Elekta 29,4 3,2 0,0% 0,2 178 221 24% 24%
IMS Data 11,6 3,4 3,6% - 28 38 36% 39% Senea 29,7 2,7 1,6% 1,1 62 110 77% 79%
Seco Tools 12,3 2,7 3,6% 0,6 138 158 14% 18% Nordictel 33,3 6,7 0,0% - 78 83 6% 6%
HL Display 12,7 4,2 1,5% 0,5 82 73 -11% -9% Hufvudstaden 42,6 4,0 3,0% 2,1 41 47 15% 18%
Clock 13,2 4,4 2,1% - 19 7,8 -59% -57% Hemstaden 100 4,8 0,0% - 6,5 6,4 -2% -2% Explanations to *
Errce 13,7 3,9 2,9% 2,0 34 40 18% 21% Måldata B 100 3,3 0,0% 1,2 24 47 96% 96% Acquired by another company *
Consilium 14,1 11,6 2,0% - 63 59 -6% -4% Skandigen A 100 15,9 0,0% 0,5 36 63 75% 75% Bankrupt **
Lindab 14,2 3,4 1,4% 1,0 140 143 2% 4% Sintercast Neg 4,5 0,0% - 205 460 124% 124% Delisted ***
Gambro B * 14,3 3,3 1,7% 0,5 94 94 0% 2% Taurus Petroleum Neg 2,5 0,0% 0,7 2,9 6 107% 107%

Acrimo 0,7 20,4 3,6% 0,9 60 136 127% 130% ABB Former Asea 3,7 11,0 2,3% 0,5 690 847 23% 25%
Alcatel 1,0 39,0 3,7% 0,3 570 760 33% 37% Active 3,1 9,2 0,0% 1,8 73 160 119% 119%
Argonaut B 1,2 Neg 0,0% 1,1 10,4 13,1 26% 26% AGA 3,3 13,9 2,5% 0,6 109 115 6% 8%
Atlantica 1,4 11,9 0,0% 0,5 51 78 53% 53% Allgon B 4,5 29,2 0,9% 1,4 99 220 122% 123%
Atle 1,0 8,2 5,7% - 47 100 113% 118% Althin Medical 2,5 14,0 1,4% - 142 138 -3% -1%
Bongs B 0,8 6,7 3,8% 0,6 43 55 28% 32% Assa Abloy 4,7 33,5 1,2% - 61 134 120% 121%
BPA 1,2 23,9 0,0% 2,4 13,7 22 61% 61% Astra A 8,1 22,3 1,0% 0,7 306 352 15% 16%
Brio 0,9 6,6 3,0% 0,7 58 78 34% 37% Atlas Copco 2,3 10,7 2,3% 0,8 131 183 40% 42%
BTL Former Bilspedition 1,7 20,6 0,0% 2,0 23 29 26% 26% Autoliv 4,2 10,7 2,3% - 192,50 313 63% 65%
Bure 0,9 7,0 6,8% 0,6 48 95 98% 105% BT Industries 3,4 8,0 3,3% - 87 158 82% 85%
Bylock & Nord 1,1 9,9 6,5% 1,0 62 86 39% 45% Caran 7,6 15,4 2,1% - 48 68 42% 44%
Catena 1,6 25,9 3,8% 1,2 52 90 73% 77% Cardo Invest 2,7 10,7 2,8% - 143 235 64% 67%
Celsius 1,3 Neg 0,0% - 185 145 -22% -22% Consilium 2,3 10,0 2,5% - 59 69 17% 19%
Celtica 0,4 Neg 0,0% 1,4 28 33 18% 18% Cyncrona 5,1 8,1 2,8% 0,5 106 132 25% 27%
Cloetta 1,1 9,0 3,6% - 90 232 158% 161% Elekta 3,4 29,1 0,9% 0,2 221 236 7% 8%
Concordia 1,0 Neg 0,0% 1,3 14,1 17,4 23% 23% Enea B 2,5 21,6 2,0% 1,2 98 173 77% 79%
Doro 1,4 9,9 3,4% 1,5 14,5 13,5 -7% -3% Ericsson B 3,8 17,8 1,5% 1,3 135 254 88% 90%
Eldon 1,3 6,1 3,6% 0,8 124 185 49% 53% Forsheda * 2,6 6,9 3,6% 0,7 126 126 0% 4%
Electrolux 1,2 9,1 3,7% 1,2 341 471 38% 42% Frontec 8,6 45,0 0,0% - 59 77 30% 30%
Esselte B 1,6 8,5 3,3% 1,1 121 178 47% 50% Garphyttan 2,8 7,0 2,7% 0,6 93 94 1% 4%
Evidentia Former Arcona 0,7 11,2 0,0% 2,3 5,2 4,3 -17% -17% Getinge 6,5 24,8 1,7% 0,6 115 132 15% 17%
FFNS B 1,0 8,2 5,4% 0,7 48 77 60% 66% Graninge 3,3 19,5 2,3% 0,6 130 133 2% 5%
Finnveden 1,7 5,5 4,1% 4,5 73 141 93% 97% Heba 4,1 16,8 3,3% - 54 75 39% 42%
Folkebolagen B 0,8 5,4 5,4% 0,8 28 33 18% 23% Hennes & Mauritz 5,2 21,0 1,7% 0,5 469 1010 115% 117%
Frontline 0,7 44,2 0,0% 1,4 17,9 25 40% 40% HL Display 2,8 13,3 1,7% 0,5 73 185 153% 155%
Geveko 0,8 100,0 7,3% 0,8 62 91 47% 120% Hufvudstaden 4,3 42,4 2,9% 2,0 47 53 13% 16%
Havsfrun K 1,0 31,9 0,0% 0,3 80 85 6% 6% Höganäs 6,4 16,0 1,8% 0,5 220 240 9% 11%
Hebi Health Care *** 0,9 10,6 0,0% 0,9 0,65 0,65 0% 0% IMS Data 2,6 14,1 2,7% - 38 58 53% 55%
Hemstaden * 0,8 Neg 0,0% - 6,4 6,4 0% 0% Investor 2,4 13,4 3,2% 1,5 282 341 21% 24%
Itab B 1,4 6,5 2,3% 1,0 100 214 114% 116% Iro 3,0 8,3 2,9% - 70 83 19% 21%
Jakobsson Wimark 1,4 100,0 0,0% 1,8 66 40 -39% -39% Kalmar Ind 2,7 9,4 3,4% - 118 125 6% 9%
JM B 1,1 6,8 2,5% 1,5 70 120 71% 74% Lap Power 3,4 26,9 0,0% 1,3 9,3 21 126% 126%
Kvaerner 1,1 5,3 3,1% 1,0 220 350 59% 62% Lindab 2,5 9,4 1,7% 1,0 71,5 92 29% 30%
Linjebuss A 1,5 16,2 2,4% - 53 77 45% 48% Lindex 2,9 16,4 1,8% 1,3 84 151 80% 82%
Lundbergs B 1,1 15,3 3,8% 2,0 79 132 67% 71% Måldata B 6,1 28,9 1,1% 1,2 31 100 219% 220%
Lundgrens B 1,1 16,0 4,0% 1,1 25 37 48% 52% Nobel BioCare Former Nobelpharma 4,7 88,4 1,1% - 105 125 19% 20%
M2 Former Exab 0,9 33,9 1,1% 1,1 69 114 65% 66% Nokia 3,6 21,4 1,9% 1,5 237 463 95% 97%
Marieberg 1,4 14,5 3,2% 1,2 170 200 18% 21% Nordictel 4,2 Neg 0,0% - 83 151 82% 82%
Munksjö 1,4 5,6 4,1% - 54 65 20% 24% OEM International 2,4 6,7 2,3% 0,4 65 134 106% 108%
Nolato 1,3 7,0 2,9% 0,6 52 208 300% 303% OM Gruppen 2,4 13,4 5,0% 1,4 140 242 73% 78%
Nordiska Holding 1,0 9,1 9,4% 2,1 10,6 14,3 35% 44% Pharmacia Upjohn 3,1 19,1 0,0% - 262 285 9% 9%
Omi corp 1,2 Neg 0,0% 0,7 50 70 40% 40% Rottneros 3,3 2,9 6,8% 1,5 7,3 8,8 21% 27%
Orrefors * 1,7 7,2 4,3% 0,7 98 98 0% 4% Sandvik 2,6 11,2 4,0% 1,0 150 191 27% 31%
Piren B 1,1 67,0 0,0% 1,5 0,7 1,23 75% 75% Seco Tools 2,8 10,3 5,1% 0,7 158 193 22% 27%
Prifast B 1,1 100,0 1,9% 0,9 91 172 89% 91% Securitas 5,2 24,1 1,6% 0,2 128 208 63% 64%
Provobis Hotel&Rest Former Clock 0,8 100,0 5,1% - 7,8 14 79% 85% Senea 3,1 24,0 1,4% 1,1 110 135 23% 24%
Realia 0,7 Neg 0,0% 1,9 7,3 10 37% 37% Sintercast 6,5 Neg 0,0% - 460 166 -64% -64%
Sanblom & Stohne 1,4 9,4 6,8% 0,5 33 58 76% 83% Skandigen A 7,2 Neg 0,0% 1,1 63 43 -32% -32%
SCA 1,3 7,1 2,5% 1,2 132 166 26% 29% Skanska B 2,5 17,0 2,3% 2,1 214 330 54% 57%
Scancem Former Euroc 1,7 9,5 2,4% 1,1 188 302 61% 63% Synectics * 3,8 29,9 0,8% - 292 292 0% 1%
SEB 1,1 8,8 2,9% 1,9 53 83 57% 60% Taurus Petroleum 5,1 Neg 0,0% 0,8 6 15,1 152% 152%
SHB 1,4 9,0 2,6% 1,6 143 222 55% 58% Terra Mining * 3,3 4,7 0,9% - 112 112 0% 1%
Sifab B 0,3 Neg 0,0% 1,5 29 42 45% 45% Tricorona 2,6 49,4 0,0% 0,8 16 23 44% 44%
Skåne Gripen B * 1,4 6,4 3,5% 1,0 63 63 0% 4% Trygg Hansa 2,3 6,3 1,9% 2,1 108 145 34% 36%
Stora Enso 1,0 4,9 4,0% 1,6 93 105 13% 17% TV4 3,3 13,3 4,0% 0,2 125 151 21% 25%
Storheden 0,1 33,3 0,0% 0,6 36 42 17% 17% VBG 3,5 32,3 1,6% 0,5 94 125 33% 35%
Tivox 0,9 10,1 3,4% 0,5 14,5 12,9 -11% -8% Vermation 4,4 29,2 1,5% - 120 95 -21% -19%
Trustor AB B 0,7 Neg 0,0% 1,0 31 36 16% 16% WM Data 9,5 21,3 1,3% 0,7 320 630 97% 98%
VBB B 0,9 9,1 2,3% 1,6 22 37 68% 70%
Öresund 0,8 5,3 9,8% 0,9 109 204 87% 97%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Stora Enso 4,9 1,0 4,0% 1,6 93 105 13% 17% Hebi Health Care *** 10,6 0,9 0,0% 0,9 0,65 0,65 0% 0%
Kvaerner 5,3 1,1 3,1% 1,0 220 350 59% 62% Evidentia Former Arcona 11,2 0,7 0,0% 2,3 5,2 4,3 -17% -17%
Öresund 5,3 0,8 9,8% 0,9 109 204 87% 97% Atlantica 11,9 1,4 0,0% 0,5 51 78 53% 53%
Folkebolagen B 5,4 0,8 5,4% 0,8 28 33 18% 23% Marieberg 14,5 1,4 3,2% 1,2 170 200 18% 21%
Finnveden 5,5 1,7 4,1% 4,5 73 141 93% 97% Lundbergs B 15,3 1,1 3,8% 2,0 79 132 67% 71%
Munksjö 5,6 1,4 4,1% - 54 65 20% 24% Lundgrens B 16,0 1,1 4,0% 1,1 25 37 48% 52%
Eldon 6,1 1,3 3,6% 0,8 124 185 49% 53% Linjebuss A 16,2 1,5 2,4% - 53 77 45% 48%
Skåne Gripen B * 6,4 1,4 3,5% 1,0 63 63 0% 4% Acrimo 20,4 0,7 3,6% 0,9 60 136 127% 130%
Itab B 6,5 1,4 2,3% 1,0 100 214 114% 116% BTL Former Bilspedition 20,6 1,7 0,0% 2,0 23 29 26% 26%
Brio 6,6 0,9 3,0% 0,7 58 78 34% 37% BPA 23,9 1,2 0,0% 2,4 13,7 22 61% 61%
Bongs B 6,7 0,8 3,8% 0,6 43 55 28% 32% Catena 25,9 1,6 3,8% 1,2 52 90 73% 77%
JM B 6,8 1,1 2,5% 1,5 70 120 71% 74% Havsfrun K 31,9 1,0 0,0% 0,3 80 85 6% 6%
Bure 7,0 0,9 6,8% 0,6 48 95 98% 105% Storheden 33,3 0,1 0,0% 0,6 36 42 17% 17%
Nolato 7,0 1,3 2,9% 0,6 52 208 300% 303% M2 Former Exab 33,9 0,9 1,1% 1,1 69 114 65% 66%
SCA 7,1 1,3 2,5% 1,2 132 166 26% 29% Alcatel 39,0 1,0 3,7% 0,3 570 760 33% 37%
Orrefors * 7,2 1,7 4,3% 0,7 98 98 0% 4% Frontline 44,2 0,7 0,0% 1,4 17,9 25 40% 40%
Atle 8,2 1,0 5,7% - 47 100 113% 118% Piren B 67,0 1,1 0,0% 1,5 0,7 1,23 75% 75%
FFNS B 8,2 1,0 5,4% 0,7 48 77 60% 66% Geveko 100,0 0,8 7,3% 0,8 62 91 47% 120%
Esselte B 8,5 1,6 3,3% 1,1 121 178 47% 50% Jakobsson Wimark 100,0 1,4 0,0% 1,8 66 40 -39% -39%
SEB 8,8 1,1 2,9% 1,9 53 83 57% 60% Prifast B 100,0 1,1 1,9% 0,9 91 172 89% 91%
Cloetta 9,0 1,1 3,6% - 90 232 158% 161% Provobis Hotel&Rest Former Clock 100,0 0,8 5,1% - 7,8 14 79% 85%
SHB 9,0 1,4 2,6% 1,6 143 222 55% 58% Argonaut B Neg 1,2 0,0% 1,1 10,4 13,1 26% 26%
Electrolux 9,1 1,2 3,7% 1,2 341 471 38% 42% Celsius Neg 1,3 0,0% - 185 145 -22% -22%
Nordiska Holding 9,1 1,0 9,4% 2,1 10,6 14,3 35% 44% Celtica Neg 0,4 0,0% 1,4 28 33 18% 18%
VBB B 9,1 0,9 2,3% 1,6 22 37 68% 70% Concordia Neg 1,0 0,0% 1,3 14,1 17,4 23% 23%
Sanblom & Stohne 9,4 1,4 6,8% 0,5 33 58 76% 83% Hemstaden * Neg 0,8 0,0% - 6,4 6,4 0% 0%
Scancem Former Euroc 9,5 1,7 2,4% 1,1 188 302 61% 63% Omi corp Neg 1,2 0,0% 0,7 50 70 40% 40%
Bylock & Nord 9,9 1,1 6,5% 1,0 62 86 39% 45% Realia Neg 0,7 0,0% 1,9 7,3 10 37% 37%
Doro 9,9 1,4 3,4% 1,5 14,5 13,5 -7% -3% Sifab B Neg 0,3 0,0% 1,5 29 42 45% 45%
Tivox 10,1 0,9 3,4% 0,5 14,5 12,9 -11% -8% Trustor AB B Neg 0,7 0,0% 1,0 31 36 16% 16%

Rottneros 2,9 3,3 6,8% 1,5 7,3 8,8 21% 27% Heba 16,8 4,1 3,3% - 54 75 39% 42%
Terra Mining * 4,7 3,3 0,9% - 112 112 0% 1% Skanska B 17,0 2,5 2,3% 2,1 214 330 54% 57%
Trygg Hansa 6,3 2,3 1,9% 2,1 108 145 34% 36% Ericsson B 17,8 3,8 1,5% 1,3 135 254 88% 90%
OEM International 6,7 2,4 2,3% 0,4 65 134 106% 108% Pharmacia Upjohn 19,1 3,1 0,0% - 262 285 9% 9%
Forsheda * 6,9 2,6 3,6% 0,7 126 126 0% 4% Graninge 19,5 3,3 2,3% 0,6 130 133 2% 5%
Garphyttan 7,0 2,8 2,7% 0,6 93 94 1% 4% Hennes & Mauritz 21,0 5,2 1,7% 0,5 469 1010 115% 117%
BT Industries 8,0 3,4 3,3% - 87 158 82% 85% WM Data 21,3 9,5 1,3% 0,7 320 630 97% 98%
Cyncrona 8,1 5,1 2,8% 0,5 106 132 25% 27% Nokia 21,4 3,6 1,9% 1,5 237 463 95% 97%
Iro 8,3 3 2,9% - 70 83 19% 21% Enea B 21,6 2,5 2,0% 1,2 98 173 77% 79%
Active 9,2 3,1 0,0% 1,8 73 160 119% 119% Astra A 22,3 8,1 1,0% 0,7 306 352 15% 16%
Kalmar Ind 9,4 2,7 3,4% - 118 125 6% 9% Senea 24,0 3,1 1,4% 1,1 110 135 23% 24%
Lindab 9,4 2,5 1,7% 1,0 71,5 92 29% 30% Securitas 24,1 5,2 1,6% 0,2 128 208 63% 64%
Consilium 10,0 2,3 2,5% - 59 69 17% 19% Getinge 24,8 6,5 1,7% 0,6 115 132 15% 17%
Seco Tools 10,3 2,8 5,1% 0,7 158 193 22% 27% Lap Power 26,9 3,4 0,0% 1,3 9 21 126% 126%
Atlas Copco 10,7 2,3 2,3% 0,8 131 183 40% 42% Måldata B 28,9 6,1 1,1% 1,2 31 100 219% 220%
Autoliv 10,7 4,2 2,3% - 192,5 313 63% 65% Elekta 29,1 3,4 0,9% 0,2 221 236 7% 8%
Cardo Invest 10,7 2,7 2,8% - 143 235 64% 67% Allgon B 29,2 4,5 0,9% 1,4 99 220 122% 123%
ABB Former Asea 11,0 3,7 2,3% 0,5 690 847 23% 25% Vermation 29,2 4,4 1,5% - 120 95 -21% -19%
Sandvik 11,2 2,6 4,0% 1,0 150 191 27% 31% Synectics * 29,9 3,8 0,8% - 292 292 0% 1%
HL Display 13,3 2,8 1,7% 0,5 73 185 153% 155% VBG 32,3 3,5 1,6% 0,5 94 125 33% 35%
TV4 13,3 3,3 4,0% 0,2 125 151 21% 25% Assa Abloy 33,5 4,7 1,2% - 61 134 120% 121%
Investor 13,4 2,4 3,2% 1,5 282 341 21% 24% Hufvudstaden 42,4 4,3 2,9% 2,0 47 53 13% 16%
OM Gruppen 13,4 2,4 5,0% 1,4 140 242 73% 78% Frontec 45,0 8,6 0,0% - 59 77 30% 30%
AGA 13,9 3,3 2,5% 0,6 109 115 6% 8% Tricorona 49,4 2,6 0,0% 0,8 16 23 44% 44%
Althin Medical 14,0 2,5 1,4% - 142 138 -3% -1% Nobel BioCare Former Nobelpharma 88,4 4,7 1,1% - 105 125 19% 20%
IMS Data 14,1 2,6 2,7% - 38 58 53% 55% Nordictel Neg 4,2 0,0% - 83 151 82% 82% Explanations to *
Caran 15,4 7,6 2,1% - 48 68 42% 44% Sintercast Neg 6,5 0,0% - 460 166 -64% -64% Acquired by another company *
Höganäs 16,0 6,4 1,8% 0,5 220 240 9% 11% Skandigen A Neg 7,2 0,0% 1,1 63 43 -32% -32% Bankrupt **
Lindex 16,4 2,9 1,8% 1,3 84 151 80% 82% Taurus Petroleum Neg 5,1 0,0% 0,8 6 15,1 152% 152% Delisted ***

Avesta Sheffiled 1,4 58 2,6% 1,6 77 32 -58% -56% Allgon B 8,1 31 0,5% 1,3 220 108 -51% -50%
Bong Ljungdahl Former: Bongs B 1,0 23 3,3% 0,8 55 68 24% 27% Array 63,6 Neg 0,0% - 63 58 -8% -8%
Brio 1,2 21 2,3% 0,7 78 58 -26% -23% Artim Medical 10,4 21 0,0% - 53 60 13% 13%
Celsius 1,2 16 2,4% - 145 168 16% 18% Astra A 7,1 20 1,0% 0,7 132 172 30% 31%
Celtica 0,4 Neg 0,0% 1,2 33 48 45% 45% Benima Feartor 8,6 11 4,8% - 42 32 -24% -19%
Concordia 1,3 30 0,0% 1,0 17,4 22 26% 26% Biocore 26,8 27 0,0% - 136 71 -48% -48%
Custos 1,4 77 2,9% 2,0 171 208 22% 25% Biora 210,0 Neg 0,0% - 81 94 16% 16%
Doro 1,3 16 4,4% 1,5 13,5 39 189% 193% Biosyn 9,1 0 0,0% - 64 51 -20% -20%
Empire 1,1 29 4,7% - 32 30 -6% -2% Caran 8,3 19 1,8% - 68 73 7% 9%
Evidentia Former Arcona 0,6 Neg 0,0% 2,7 43 30 -30% -30% Daydream 638,7 0 0,0% 1,34 37 19,5 -47% -47%
Fabege * 1,0 Neg 0,0% 2,1 1,5 1,5 0% 0% Diffschamb 9,8 43 0,0% - 37 31 -16% -16%
Facit 0,7 Neg 0,0% - 2,5 0,3 -88% -88% Duroc 11,5 100 0,0% - 199 214 8% 8%
Fastighetspartner 0,6 Neg 0,0% 0,3 9,5 9,3 -2% -2% Enator 25,4 27 0,6% - 169 194 15% 15%
Folkebolagen B 1,1 29 4,7% 1,3 33 34 3% 8% Entra 10,4 20 0,7% - 202 389 93% 93%
Föremingssparb. 1,4 10 1,8% - 132 275 108% 110% Ericsson B 7,1 28 1,0% 1,0 254 381 50% 51%
Geveko 1,0 18 5,5% 1,0 91 122 34% 40% Europolitan Former:Nordictel 7,6 31 0,0% - 151 411 172% 172%
Gotlandsbolaget 0,8 13 1,9% 0,9 80 84 5% 7% Frontec 9,3 0 0,0% - 77 63 -18% -18%
Havsfrun K 1,2 35 0,0% 0,2 85 81 -5% -5% Getinge 7,5 15 2,1% 0,6 132 150 14% 16%
Heba 1,0 21 2,9% - 75 77 3% 6% Hennes & Mauritz 9,8 26 1,3% 0,8 202 413 104% 106%
ICB Shipping 1,2 60 3,0% 0,1 75 87 16% 19% HL Display 7,0 19 1,2% 0,5 185 160 -14% -12%
Investor 1,2 17 3,5% 1,3 341 431 26% 30% Hoist 11,1 17 2,4% 1,2 16,5 33 100% 102%
Jakobsson Wimark 0,8 33 3,8% 1,1 40 30 -25% -21% Höganäs 7,0 19 1,7% 0,5 240 289 20% 22%
JM B 1,3 37 1,7% 1,3 120 141 18% 19% Intentia 94,0 100 0,0% 1,8 96 245 155% 155%
JP Bank 1,2 13 5,3% 0,7 43 57 33% 38% Lap Power 7,5 60 1,0% 1,4 21 13,4 -36% -35%
Kabe 1,2 23 0,9% 1,0 35 35 0% 1% Mandator 7,8 21 0,0% 3,2 102 245 140% 140%
Klippan 0,8 Neg 2,9% 0,1 35 31 -11% -9% Medivir 11,3 100 0,4% 1,1 141 142 1% 1%
Korsnäs 0,8 6 0,0% 0,6 115 112 -3% -3% Minidoc 15,9 Neg 0,0% - 112 34 -70% -70%
Ljungberggruppen 1,0 45 1,7% 0,2 60 82 37% 38% Modul1 14,5 16 0,0% 2,5 66 174 164% 164%
Lundbergs B 1,3 23 2,7% 1,5 132 126 -5% -2% Måldata B 12,6 22 1,0% 2,4 100 122 22% 23%
Modo 1,3 14 3,6% 1,3 237 247 4% 8% Netcom Systems 76,5 100 0,0% - 111 217 95% 95%
NCC 1,1 20 1,4% 1,2 103 99 -4% -2% Optima Batt 421,5 0 0,0% - 27 23 -15% -15%
Nolato 0,0 Neg 0,0% 0,0 208 223 7% 7% Ortivus Former: Medical Invest 18,8 100 0,0% 1,1 240 270 13% 13%
Nordiska Holding 1,3 13 7,0% 1,4 14,3 22 54% 61% Oxygen 25,0 Neg 0,0% 1,5 259 121 -53% -53%
Nordström Thulin *** 1,0 Neg 0,0% 0,7 18 18 0% 0% Peak Performance 41,2 22 0,8% - 199 145 -27% -26%
Norrporten 1,0 16 5,1% - 107 126 18% 23% Pricer 19,2 Neg 0,0% 1,6 272 48 -82% -82%
Peab 1,3 15 1,7% 1,7 18 19,7 9% 11% Resco 9,6 28 1,5% - 74 122 65% 66%
Piren B 1,3 100 0,0% 2,5 49 57 16% 16% Securitas 8,5 32 1,2% 0,4 208 260 25% 26%
Prifast B 1,0 41 2,0% 1,4 172 80 -53% -51% Sigma 54,4 16 0,0% - 74 179 142% 142%
Ratos 1,1 52 2,4% 1,2 73 86 18% 20% Skandigen A 4,5 0 0,0% 0,6 43 28 -35% -35%
Realia 0,9 56 0,0% 3,0 10 9,4 -6% -6% Swedish Match 8,2 11 4,6% -0,2 27 27 0% 5%
Rottneros 1,3 26 3,4% 1,4 8,8 6,8 -23% -19% Taurus Petroleum 12,5 Neg 0,0% 0,6 15,1 8,8 -42% -42%
SAS 1,3 7 4,1% 1,0 86 123 43% 47% Turnit 7,9 10 0,0% 1,3 42 83 98% 98%
SCA 1,1 12 2,9% 0,9 166 211 27% 30% WM Data 9,5 25 0,9% 0,7 630 219 -65% -64%
Siab * 1,3 34 1,7% - 58 58 0% 2%
Sifab B 0,7 Neg 0,0% 1,3 42 58 38% 38%
Skandia 0,8 14 0,9% 1,1 223 532 139% 139%
Skoogs * 0,9 Neg 1,5% 0,8 67 67 0% 2%
Solitaer 1,0 52 0,0% - 7,3 8,4 15% 15%
Spendrups 1,4 10 3,3% 0,8 45 68 51% 54%
Spira * 1,4 34 1,9% - 209 209 0% 2%
Stadshypotek * 1,3 11 5,0% - 190 190 0% 5%
StenaLine 0,8 Neg 0,0% 1,1 36 29 -19% -19%
Stora Enso 1,1 17 3,6% 1,2 105 127 21% 25%
Storheden 0,9 18 2,9% 1,0 42 36 -14% -11%
Svensk Brand 0,7 11 2,8% - 90 124 38% 41%
Svolder 1,4 100 8,6% 0,9 128 148 16% 24%
Tivox 0,7 Neg 0,0% 0,9 12,9 21 63% 63%
Trustor AB B 0,9 Neg 0,0% 1,1 36 53 47% 47%
United Tankers * 1,0 14 2,9% 0,5 41 41 0% 3%
Öresund 1,1 7 5,3% 1,2 204 249 22% 27%

Explanations to *
Acquired by another compa*
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Korsnäs 6 0,8 0,0% 0,6 115 112 -3% -3% Folkebolagen B 29 1,1 4,7% 1,3 33 34 3% 8%
SAS 7 1,3 4,1% 1,0 86 123 43% 47% Concordia 30 1,3 0,0% 1,0 17,4 22 26% 26%
Öresund 7 1,1 5,3% 1,2 204 249 22% 27% Jakobsson Wimark 33 0,8 3,8% 1,1 40 30 -25% -21%
Föremingssparb. 10 1,4 1,8% - 132 275 108% 110% Siab * 34 1,3 1,7% - 58 58 0% 2%
Spendrups 10 1,4 3,3% 0,8 45 68 51% 54% Spira * 34 1,4 1,9% - 209 209 0% 2%
Stadshypotek * 11 1,3 5,0% - 190 190 0% 5% Havsfrun K 35 1,2 0,0% 0,2 85 81 -5% -5%
Svensk Brand 11 0,7 2,8% - 90 124 38% 41% JM B 37 1,3 1,7% 1,3 120 141 18% 19%
SCA 12 1,1 2,9% 0,9 166 211 27% 30% Prifast B 41 1,0 2,0% 1,4 172 80 -53% -51%
Gotlandsbolaget 13 0,8 1,9% 0,9 80 84 5% 7% Ljungberggruppen 45 1,0 1,7% 0,2 60 82 37% 38%
JP Bank 13 1,2 5,3% 0,7 43 57 33% 38% Ratos 52 1,1 2,4% 1,2 73 86 18% 20%
Nordiska Holding 13 1,3 7,0% 1,4 14,3 22 54% 61% Solitaer 52 1,0 0,0% - 7,3 8,4 15% 15%
Modo 14 1,3 3,6% 1,3 237 247 4% 8% Realia 56 0,9 0,0% 3,0 10 9,4 -6% -6%
Skandia 14 0,8 0,9% 1,1 223 532 139% 139% Avesta Sheffiled 58 1,4 2,6% 1,6 77 32 -58% -56%
United Tankers * 14 1,0 2,9% 0,5 41 41 0% 3% ICB Shipping 60 1,2 3,0% 0,1 75 87 16% 19%
Peab 15 1,3 1,7% 1,7 18 19,7 9% 11% Custos 77 1,4 2,9% 2,0 171 208 22% 25%
Celsius 16 1,2 2,4% - 145 168 16% 18% Piren B 100 1,3 0,0% 2,5 49 57 16% 16%
Doro 16 1,3 4,4% 1,5 13,5 39 189% 193% Svolder 100 1,4 8,6% 0,9 128 148 16% 24%
Norrporten 16 1,0 5,1% - 107 126 18% 23% Celtica Neg 0,4 0,0% 1,2 33 48 45% 45%
Investor 17 1,2 3,5% 1,3 341 431 26% 30% Evidentia Former Arcona Neg 0,6 0,0% 2,7 43 30 -30% -30%
Stora Enso 17 1,1 3,6% 1,2 105 127 21% 25% Fabege * Neg 1,0 0,0% 2,1 1,5 1,5 0% 0%
Geveko 18 1,0 5,5% 1,0 91 122 34% 40% Facit Neg 0,7 0,0% - 2,5 0,3 -88% -88%
Storheden 18 0,9 2,9% 1,0 42 36 -14% -11% Fastighetspartner Neg 0,6 0,0% 0,3 9,5 9,3 -2% -2%
NCC 20 1,1 1,4% 1,2 103 99 -4% -2% Klippan Neg 0,8 2,9% 0,1 35 31 -11% -9%
Brio 21 1,2 2,3% 0,7 78 58 -26% -23% Nolato Neg 0,0 0,0% 0,0 208 223 7% 7%
Heba 21 1,0 2,9% - 75 77 3% 6% Nordström Thulin *** Neg 1,0 0,0% 0,7 18 18 0% 0%
Bong Ljungdahl Former: Bongs B 23 1,0 3,3% 0,8 55 68 24% 27% Sifab B Neg 0,7 0,0% 1,3 42 58 38% 38%
Kabe 23 1,2 0,9% 1,0 35 35 0% 1% Skoogs * Neg 0,9 1,5% 0,8 67 67 0% 2%
Lundbergs B 23 1,3 2,7% 1,5 132 126 -5% -2% StenaLine Neg 0,8 0,0% 1,1 36 29 -19% -19%
Rottneros 26 1,3 3,4% 1,4 8,8 6,8 -23% -19% Tivox Neg 0,7 0,0% 0,9 12,9 21 63% 63%
Empire 29 1,1 4,7% - 32 30 -6% -2% Trustor AB B Neg 0,9 0,0% 1,1 36 53 47% 47%

Avg Beta 1,06 Risk-adjusted return 23% Avg Beta 1,15 Risk-adjusted return -1%
Biosyn 0 9,1 0,0% - 64 51 -20% -20% WM Data 25 9,5 0,9% 0,7 630 219 -65% -64%
Daydream 0 638,7 0,0% 1,34 37 19,5 -47% -47% Hennes & Mauritz 26 9,8 1,3% 0,8 202 413 104% 106%
Frontec 0 9,3 0,0% - 77 63 -18% -18% Biocore 27 26,8 0,0% - 136 71 -48% -48%
Optima Batt 0 421,5 0,0% - 27 23 -15% -15% Enator 27 25,4 0,6% - 169 194 15% 15%
Skandigen A 0 4,5 0,0% 0,6 43 28 -35% -35% Ericsson B 28 7,1 1,0% 1,0 254 381 50% 51%
Turnit 10 7,9 0,0% 1,3 42 83 98% 98% Resco 28 9,6 1,5% - 74 122 65% 66%
Benima Feartor 11 8,6 4,8% - 42 32 -24% -19% Allgon B 31 8,1 0,5% 1,3 220 108 -51% -50%
Swedish Match 11 8,2 4,6% -0,2 27 27 0% 5% Europolitan Former:Nordictel 31 7,6 0,0% - 151 411 172% 172%
Getinge 15 7,5 2,1% 0,6 132 150 14% 16% Securitas 32 8,5 1,2% 0,4 208 260 25% 26%
Modul1 16 14,5 0,0% 2,5 66 174 164% 164% Diffschamb 43 9,8 0,0% - 37 31 -16% -16%
Sigma 16 54,4 0,0% - 74 179 142% 142% Lap Power 60 7,5 1,0% 1,4 21 13,4 -36% -35%
Hoist 17 11,1 2,4% 1,2 16,5 33 100% 102% Duroc 100 11,5 0,0% - 199 214 8% 8%
Caran 19 8,3 1,8% - 68 73 7% 9% Intentia 100 94,0 0,0% 1,8 96 245 155% 155%
HL Display 19 7,0 1,2% 0,5 185 160 -14% -12% Medivir 100 11,3 0,4% 1,1 141 142 1% 1%
Höganäs 19 7,0 1,7% 0,5 240 289 20% 22% Netcom Systems 100 76,5 0,0% - 111 217 95% 95%
Astra A 20 7,1 1,0% 0,7 132 172 30% 31% Ortivus Former: Medical Invest 100 18,8 0,0% 1,1 240 270 13% 13%
Entra 20 10,4 0,7% - 202 389 93% 93% Array Neg 63,6 0,0% - 63 58 -8% -8% Explanations to *
Artim Medical 21 10,4 0,0% - 53 60 13% 13% Biora Neg 210,0 0,0% - 81 94 16% 16% Acquired by another company *
Mandator 21 7,8 0,0% 3,2 102 245 140% 140% Minidoc Neg 15,9 0,0% - 112 34 -70% -70% Bankrupt **
Måldata B 22 12,6 1,0% 2,4 100 122 22% 23% Oxygen Neg 25,0 0,0% 1,5 259 121 -53% -53% Delisted ***
Peak Performance 22 41,2 0,8% - 199 145 -27% -26% Pricer Neg 19,2 0,0% 1,6 272 48 -82% -82%
Taurus Petroleum Neg 12,5 0,0% 0,6 15,1 8,8 -42% -42%

Avesta Sheffiled 1 34 1,8% 1,3 32 29 -9% -8% Arete 12,2 32 0,0% - 114 128 12% 12%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt Former Bylock & Nord 0,5 8 13,9% 0,5 32 16 -50% -36% Array 15,5 Neg 0,0% - 58 26 -55% -55%
Biora 0 Neg 0,0% - 94 58 -38% -38% Assa Abloy 7,8 37 0,8% - 255 363 42% 43%
Borås Wäfveri 1 8 2,5% 0,2 61 48 -21% -19% Astra A 7,4 25 1,2% 1,0 172 173 1% 2%
Brio 0,9 13 3,0% 0,9 58 45 -22% -19% Autodiagnos 18,7 Neg 0,0% - 125 58 -54% -54%
Castellum 1,2 21 3,2% - 87 81 -7% -4% Biolight 26 Neg 0,0% 1,1 8 2,5 -69% -69%
Celtica 0,7 13 0,0% 0,8 48 49 2% 2% Biosyn *** 10,1 Neg 0,0% - 51 51 0% 0%
Concordia 1,5 5 4,5% 0,4 22 11,1 -50% -45% CTT systems 70,3 Neg 0,0% 1,8 67 55 -18% -18%
Custos 1,4 51 3,4% 1,0 208 156 -25% -22% Daltek 15,4 23 0,0% - 68 35 -49% -49%
Dilligentia 0,8 30 0,9% - 117 63 -46% -45% Diffschamb 7,5 31 0,0% - 31 22 -29% -29%
Elekta 1,1 Neg 2,3% 0,6 99 30 -70% -67% Duroc 12,3 Neg 0,0% - 214 75 -65% -65%
Empire 1,2 12 5,0% - 30 21 -30% -25% Enator 7,5 31 0,8% - 194 244 26% 27%
Evidentia Former Arcona 0,7 Neg 0,0% 0,1 33 40 21% 21% Enea 9 27 0,9% 1,5 106,3 142 34% 35%
Facit *** 0,2 Neg 0,0% - 0,3 0,3 0% 0% Entra 7 22 0,4% - 97,25 167 72% 72%
Fagerlid 1,5 19 4,5% - 44 13,9 -68% -64% Ericsson B 7,1 22 1,0% 1,2 192 194 1% 2%
Fastighetspartner 0,6 28 0,0% 0,8 7,44 7,3 -2% -2% Europolitan 14,8 48 1,0% - 411 790 92% 93%
Folkebolagen B 1 54 2,9% 0,2 34 23 -32% -29% Fagerhult 13,6 14 2,9% - 68 86 26% 29%
Geveko 1,3 25 5,7% 0,8 122 103 -16% -10% Hemköpskedjan 18 20 3,1% - 96 68 -29% -26%
Gotlandsbolaget 0,8 8 2,4% 0,2 84 52 -38% -36% Hennes & Mauritz 16,6 41 1,1% 1,1 430 621 44% 46%
Graphium 1,2 10 3,5% 1,0 85 69 -19% -15% HL Display 9,6 23 0,8% 0,6 160 159 -1% 0%
Handelsbanken Hyp 0,6 7 0,0% - 200 209 4% 4% Höganäs 7 18 2,1% 0,5 192,7 127 -34% -32%
Havsfrun K 0,7 Neg 0,0% 0,9 81 90 11% 11% IBS 6,7 68 1,7% 1,2 88,3 138 56% 58%
Heba 0,9 17 2,9% - 77 85 10% 13% IFS 10,5 Neg 0,0% - 34,56 54 56% 56%
Humlegården fastigh. Former Sweco 0,6 47 3,3% 0,6 78 61 -22% -18% Ind.Med.Grp 15,2 23 0,0% - 32 19 -41% -41%
ICB Shipping 1,2 12 3,4% 0,7 87 41 -53% -49% Intentia 10,6 Neg 0,0% 1,8 245 175 -29% -29%
Investor 1,3 34 2,8% 1,1 431 343 -20% -18% KnowIT 35,5 67 0,0% - 170 115 -32% -32%
Jakobsson Wimark 0,9 27 5,0% 0,1 30 48 60% 65% Lindex 7,4 29 1,0% 1,3 292 240 -18% -17%
Kabe 1,5 5 1,7% 0,8 35 25 -29% -27% Luxonen 10,7 4 0,0% 1,0 17,2 13,5 -22% -22%
Korsnäs *** 0,8 6 0,0% 1,0 112 112 0% 0% Mandator 11,8 32 1,2% 3,2 49 48 -2% -1%
Kvaerner 1 6 2,9% 1,0 250 140 -44% -41% Modul1 9,1 25 0,7% 2,5 174 239 37% 38%
Ljungberggruppen 1,2 19 2,4% 0,2 82 80 -2% 0% Multiq 46,8 Neg 0,0% - 38 25 -34% -34%
Lundbergs B 1 9 3,0% 1,0 126 108 -14% -11% Munters 7 15 1,8% - 84 72 -14% 166%
Modo 1,3 10 4,0% 1,5 247 229 -7% -3% Måldata B 6,6 18 1,6% 1,4 122 120 -2% 0%
NCC 1,2 26 1,5% 0,9 99 74 -25% -24% Netcom Systems 8,4 53 0,0% - 217 266 23% 23%
Norrporten 1,1 17 4,7% - 126 126 0% 5% Nokia 10,5 23 0,8% 1,6 431,5 1203 179% 180%
Näckebro * 0,8 33 1,4% - 122 122 0% 1% Norditube 10,9 Neg 0,0% - 8,9 3,3 -63% -63%
Pandox 1,2 29 0,0% - 58 58 0% 0% Novacast 14,9 91 0,0% - 188 14,5 -92% -92%
Pc-Express 0 40 0,0% - 14,5 8,5 -41% -41% Optima Batt 8,3 Neg 0,0% - 23 7,1 -69% -69%
Peab 1 16 2,0% 0,6 19,7 18,1 -8% -6% Ortivus 8,1 Neg 0,0% 1,1 135 65 -52% -52%
Piren B 1,2 38 0,0% 0,5 57 52 -9% -9% Proact 16,3 27 0,0% 1,2 167 206 23% 23%
Prifast B 1,4 38 6,3% 0,7 80 74 -8% -1% Pronyx 6,8 32 0,0% - 25 26 4% 4%
Ratos 1,1 56 2,3% 0,8 86 60 -30% -28% Prosolvia ** 86,9 59 0,8% - 359 0 -100% -99%
Realia 0,9 14 0,0% 0,6 9,4 6,6 -30% -30% Provbis 13,3 30 0,0% - 15,4 17,5 14% 14%
Rottneros 1,2 51 7,4% 0,9 6,8 5 -26% -19% Resco 6,9 38 0,9% - 122 103 -16% -15%
Sifab B * 1,1 57 0,0% 0,4 58 58 0% 0% Scandic Hotels 6,6 38 0,8% - 250 242 -3% -2%
Sintercast 1,5 Neg 0,0% 0,5 85 69 -19% -19% Scandinavian PC 28,4 29 1,4% - 140 90 -36% -34%
Solitaer *** 1 9 0,0% 0,5 8,4 8,4 0% 0% Securitas 9,3 37 1,2% 0,4 65 130 100% 101%
StenaLine 0,7 9 0,0% 0,8 29 8,7 -70% -70% Segersten & Svensson 12,4 17 1,2% - 64,8 30 -54% -52%
Stora Enso 1,4 13 3,1% 1,3 127 84 -34% -31% Semcom 34,2 22 0,0% - 62 80 29% 29%
Storheden *** 1 19 3,6% 0,2 36 36 0% 4% Sigma 47,9 28 1,4% - 44,8 63 41% 42%
Svensk Brand 1 15 3,0% - 124 137 10% 13% Ticket 17,2 23 3,4% - 117 115 -2% 2%
Svenska Orientlinjen 0,9 6 0,0% - 12,9 3,7 -71% -71% Wedins Norden 9,5 29 1,3% - 80 60 -25% -24%
Svolder 1,1 90 7,4% 0,9 148 108 -27% -20% WM Data 13,6 37 0,8% 1,0 219 315 44% 45%
Säki 1,3 99 0,0% - 106 187 76% 76%
Tornet 1 20 3,2% - 118 114 -3% 0%
Trelleborg 1,4 13 3,5% 1,4 116 73 -37% -34%
Verimation *** 1,1 Neg 0,0% - 34 34 0% 0%
Wihlborg 0,9 13 0,0% 0,2 12,8 9,1 -29% -29%
VostockNafta 1,1 Neg 0,0% - 64 23 -64% -64%
Öresund 0,9 9 6,0% 0,9 249 205 -18% -12%
No. Of stocks 60 Return -16% No. Of stocks 53 Return 1%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Concordia 5 1,5 4,5% 0,4 22 11,1 -50% -45% Tornet 20 1 3,2% - 118 114 -3% 0%
Kabe 5 1,5 1,7% 0,8 35 25 -29% -27% Castellum 21 1,2 3,2% - 87 81 -7% -4%
Korsnäs *** 6 0,8 0,0% 1,0 112 112 0% 0% Geveko 25 1,3 5,7% 0,8 122 103 -16% -10%
Kvaerner 6 1 2,9% 1,0 250 140 -44% -41% NCC 26 1,2 1,5% 0,9 99 74 -25% -24%
Svenska Orientlinjen 6 0,9 0,0% - 12,9 3,7 -71% -71% Jakobsson Wimark 27 0,9 5,0% 0,1 30 48 60% 65%
Handelsbanken Hyp 7 0,6 0,0% - 200 209 4% 4% Fastighetspartner 28 0,6 0,0% 0,8 7,44 7,3 -2% -2%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt Former Bylock & Nord 8 0,5 13,9% 0,5 32 16 -50% -36% Pandox 29 1,2 0,0% - 58 58 0% 0%
Borås Wäfveri 8 1 2,5% 0,2 61 48 -21% -19% Dilligentia 30 0,8 0,9% - 117 63 -46% -45%
Gotlandsbolaget 8 0,8 2,4% 0,2 84 52 -38% -36% Näckebro * 33 0,8 1,4% - 122 122 0% 1%
Lundbergs B 9 1 3,0% 1,0 126 108 -14% -11% Avesta Sheffiled 34 1 1,8% 1,3 32 29 -9% -8%
Solitaer *** 9 1 0,0% 0,5 8,4 8,4 0% 0% Investor 34 1,3 2,8% 1,1 431 343 -20% -18%
StenaLine 9 0,7 0,0% 0,8 29 8,7 -70% -70% Piren B 38 1,2 0,0% 0,5 57 52 -9% -9%
Öresund 9 0,9 6,0% 0,9 249 205 -18% -12% Prifast B 38 1,4 6,3% 0,7 80 74 -8% -1%
Graphium 10 1,2 3,5% 1,0 85 69 -19% -15% Pc-Express 40 0 0,0% - 14,5 8,5 -41% -41%
Modo 10 1,3 4,0% 1,5 247 229 -7% -3% Humlegården fastigh. Former Sweco 47 0,6 3,3% 0,6 78 61 -22% -18%
Empire 12 1,2 5,0% - 30 21 -30% -25% Custos 51 1,4 3,4% 1,0 208 156 -25% -22%
ICB Shipping 12 1,2 3,4% 0,7 87 41 -53% -49% Rottneros 51 1,2 7,4% 0,9 6,8 5 -26% -19%
Brio 13 0,9 3,0% 0,9 58 45 -22% -19% Folkebolagen B 54 1 2,9% 0,2 34 23 -32% -29%
Celtica 13 0,7 0,0% 0,8 48 49 2% 2% Ratos 56 1,1 2,3% 0,8 86 60 -30% -28%
Stora Enso 13 1,4 3,1% 1,3 127 84 -34% -31% Sifab B * 57 1,1 0,0% 0,4 58 58 0% 0%
Trelleborg 13 1,4 3,5% 1,4 116 73 -37% -34% Svolder 90 1,1 7,4% 0,9 148 108 -27% -20%
Wihlborg 13 0,9 0,0% 0,2 12,8 9,1 -29% -29% Säki 99 1,3 0,0% - 106 187 76% 76%
Realia 14 0,9 0,0% 0,6 9,4 6,6 -30% -30% Biora Neg 0 0,0% - 94 58 -38% -38%
Svensk Brand 15 1 3,0% - 124 137 10% 13% Elekta Neg 1,1 2,3% 0,6 99 30 -70% -67%
Peab 16 1 2,0% 0,6 19,7 18,1 -8% -6% Evidentia Former Arcona Neg 0,7 0,0% 0,1 33 40 21% 21%
Heba 17 0,9 2,9% - 77 85 10% 13% Facit *** Neg 0,2 0,0% - 0,3 0,3 0% 0%
Norrporten 17 1,1 4,7% - 126 126 0% 5% Havsfrun K Neg 0,7 0,0% 0,9 81 90 11% 11%
Fagerlid 19 1,5 4,5% - 44 13,9 -68% -64% Sintercast Neg 1,5 0,0% 0,5 85 69 -19% -19%
Ljungberggruppen 19 1,2 2,4% 0,2 82 80 -2% 0% Verimation *** Neg 1,1 0,0% - 34 34 0% 0%
Storheden *** 19 1 3,6% 0,2 36 36 0% 4% VostockNafta Neg 1,1 0,0% - 64 23 -64% -64%
No. Of stocks 30 Return -21% No. Of stocks 30 Return -10%

Luxonen 4 11 0,0% 1,0 17,2 13,5 -22% -22% Mandator 32 12 1,2% 3,2 49 48 -2% -1%
Fagerhult 14 14 2,9% - 68 86 26% 29% Pronyx 32 6,8 0,0% - 25 26 4% 4%
Munters 15 7 1,8% - 84 72 -14% 166% Assa Abloy 37 7,8 0,8% - 255 363 42% 43%
Segersten & Svensson 17 12 1,2% - 65 30 -54% -52% Securitas 37 9,3 1,2% 0,4 65 130 100% 101%
Höganäs 18 7 2,1% 0,5 193 127 -34% -32% WM Data 37 14 0,8% 1,0 219 315 44% 45%
Måldata B 18 6,6 1,6% 1,4 122 120 -2% 0% Resco 38 6,9 0,9% - 122 103 -16% -15%
Hemköpskedjan 20 18 3,1% - 96 68 -29% -26% Scandic Hotels 38 6,6 0,8% - 250 242 -3% -2%
Entra 22 7 0,4% - 97 167 72% 72% Hennes & Mauritz 41 17 1,1% 1,1 430 621 44% 46%
Ericsson B 22 7,1 1,0% 1,2 192 194 1% 2% Europolitan 48 15 1,0% - 411 790 92% 93%
Semcom 22 34 0,0% - 62 80 29% 29% Netcom Systems 53 8,4 0,0% - 217 266 23% 23%
Daltek 23 15 0,0% - 68 35 -49% -49% Prosolvia ** 59 87 0,8% - 359 0 -100% -99%
HL Display 23 9,6 0,8% 0,6 160 159 -1% 0% KnowIT 67 36 0,0% - 170 115 -32% -32%
Ind.Med.Grp 23 15 0,0% - 32 19 -41% -41% IBS 68 6,7 1,7% 1,2 88,3 138 56% 58%
Nokia 23 11 0,8% 1,6 432 1203 179% 180% Novacast 91 15 0,0% - 188 14,5 -92% -92%
Ticket 23 17 3,4% - 117 115 -2% 2% Array Neg 16 0,0% - 58 26 -55% -55%
Astra A 25 7,4 1,2% 1,0 172 173 1% 2% Autodiagnos Neg 19 0,0% - 125 58 -54% -54%
Modul1 25 9,1 0,7% 2,5 174 239 37% 38% Biolight Neg 26 0,0% 1,1 8 2,5 -69% -69%
Enea 27 9 0,9% 1,5 106 142 34% 35% Biosyn *** Neg 10 0,0% - 51 51 0% 0%
Proact 27 16 0,0% 1,2 167 206 23% 23% CTT systems Neg 70 0,0% 1,8 67 55 -18% -18%
Sigma 28 48 1,4% - 44,8 63 41% 42% Duroc Neg 12 0,0% - 214 75 -65% -65%
Lindex 29 7,4 1,0% 1,3 292 240 -18% -17% IFS Neg 11 0,0% - 34,6 54 56% 56%
Scandinavian PC 29 28 1,4% - 140 90 -36% -34% Intentia Neg 11 0,0% 1,8 245 175 -29% -29%
Wedins Norden 29 9,5 1,3% - 80 60 -25% -24% Multiq Neg 47 0,0% - 38 25 -34% -34%
Provbis 30 13 0,0% - 15,4 17,5 14% 14% Norditube Neg 11 0,0% - 8,9 3,3 -63% -63% Explanations to *
Diffschamb 31 7,5 0,0% - 31 22 -29% -29% Optima Batt Neg 8,3 0,0% - 23 7,1 -69% -69% Acquired by another company *
Enator 31 7,5 0,8% - 194 244 26% 27% Ortivus Neg 8,1 0,0% 1,1 135 65 -52% -52% Bankrupt **
Arete 32 12 0,0% - 114 128 12% 12% Delisted ***
No. Of stocks 27 Return 13% No. Of stocks 26 Return -11%

Assi Domän 1,2 20 3,5% 1,0 156 135 -13% -10% ACSC 7,8 12 2,4% - 41 85 107% 110%
Autodiagnos 1,5 25 1,7% - 58 239 312% 314% Arete 6,1 14 3,5% - 128 231 80% 84%
Avesta Sheffiled 0,6 Neg 0,0% - 29 35 21% 21% Array 6,9 Neg 0,0% - 26 98 277% 277%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt 0,4 85 9,4% 0,4 16 11,6 -28% -18% Assa Abloy 9,5 41 0,8% 0,5 83 175 112% 113%
Borås Wäfveri 0,8 6 3,1% 0,4 48 50 4% 7% Astra Zeneca Former: Astra A 6,2 23 1,2% 0,9 343 385 12% 13%
Brio 0,8 36 0,4% 0,5 45 54 20% 20% Cell Network Former: Linné Data 72,3 24 0,0% - 50 326 552% 552%
Castellum 1,1 14 4,9% - 81 81 0% 5% Citymail 14 Neg 0,0% - 46 48 4% 4%
Celtica 0,6 13 0,0% 0,5 49 55 12% 12% CTT systems 24,5 Neg 0,0% 1,8 55 137 149% 149%
Concordia 0,5 9 4,5% 0,5 11,1 12,4 12% 16% Daltek 8 8 2,8% - 35 69 97% 100%
Custos 0,7 4 7,4% 0,8 156 230 47% 55% Doro 6,7 14 4,2% 0,6 72 126 75% 79%
Dilligentia 0,4 22 4,8% - 63 87 38% 43% Enea 9,8 31 0,8% 1,7 142 1875 1220% 1221%
Elekta 0,4 Neg 0,0% 0,2 15 28 87% 87% Entra 23,6 24 0,9% - 167 329 97% 98%
Empire 1 57 6,0% - 21 70 233% 239% Ericsson B 6,1 25 1,5% 1,4 194 866 346% 348%
Fagerlid ** 0,5 Neg 0,0% 0,9 13,9 0 -100% -100% Europolitan 26,7 32 1,4% 0,4 79 180 128% 129%
Fastighetspartner 0,6 28 0,0% 0,6 7,3 13,6 86% 86% Evidentia 8,1 10 2,5% 2,3 40 90 125% 128%
FB Industrie Hold 1,5 6 7,0% - 28 25 -11% -4% Fagerhult 8,6 15 2,3% - 86 66 -23% -21%
Folkebolagen B 0,7 Neg 0,0% 0,0 23 32 39% 39% Hemköpskedjan 6,4 13 4,4% - 68 70 3% 7%
Geveko 1,3 10 3,4% 1,5 103 180 75% 78% Hennes & Mauritz 19,9 43 0,8% 0,7 155 228 47% 48%
Gotlandsbolaget 0,4 3 3,8% 0,2 52 56 8% 11% HL Display 6,1 22 0,9% 0,5 159 115 -28% -27%
Graphium 1,6 10 2,2% 0,7 69 124 80% 82% IBS 7 14 1,1% 1,0 138 310 125% 126%
Gunnebo 1,4 9 5,2% 0,7 77 126 64% 69% Intentia 8,2 40 0,0% - 175 209 19% 19%
Handelsbanken Hyp 0,6 5 5,7% - 209 202 -3% 2% Magic House 18,5 Neg 0,0% - 30 11 -63% -63%
Havsfrun K 0,8 Neg 2,2% 0,9 90 125 39% 41% Mandator 8,7 25 1,0% 3,2 48 195 306% 307%
Heba 1 19 4,7% 0,2 42,5 45 6% 11% Maxim Pharamceutical 8,3 Neg 0,0% 1,9 92 440 378% 378%
Humlegården fastigh. * 1,5 58 2,1% 0,3 61 61 0% 2% Meditieam 6,9 Neg 0,0% - 57 96 68% 68%
ICB Shipping * 0,5 9 4,9% 0,5 41 41 0% 5% Minidoc 6,1 Neg 0,0% - 33 59 79% 79%
Ind.Med.Grp 1,5 19 2,6% - 19 98 416% 418% Modul1 12,5 18 1,3% 2,5 48 127 166% 167%
Investor 0,9 16 4,1% 1,5 85,75 130 52% 56% MTG 10,4 Neg 0,0% 1,5 148 461 211% 211%
Jakobsson Wimark 1,4 18 0,0% 0,1 48 130 171% 171% Netcom Systems 8,7 42 0,6% - 266 787 196% 196%
Kabe 0,7 8 3,1% 0,7 25 35 40% 43% Nokia 15 36 0,9% 1,0 1203 1933 61% 62%
Kvaerner * 0,6 Neg 0,0% 1,0 140 140 0% 0% Prevas 11,4 23 2,2% - 67 162 142% 144%
Ljungberggruppen 1,1 17 2,5% 0,2 80 125 56% 59% Proact 6,1 20 0,0% 1,2 34 193 462% 462%
Lundbergs B 0,9 8 3,9% 1,2 108 119 10% 14% Probi 10 Neg 0,0% 0,5 11 26 148% 148%
Luxonen 0,6 3 0,0% 1,6 13,5 31 130% 130% Provobis 9,1 11 0,9% 0,7 18 19 9% 9%
Modo 1,1 12 4,4% 1,2 229 256 12% 16% Reculture 8,9 Neg 0,0% - 28 17 -39% -39%
NCC 0,9 15 3,4% - 74 100 35% 39% Scandic Hotels 6,4 21 1,7% - 81 97 20% 22%
Norditube 1,5 Neg 0,0% - 3,3 7,5 127% 127% Securitas 7,9 65 0,8% 0,5 130 208 60% 61%
Norrporten 1,1 15 4,8% 0,3 126 107 -15% -10% Semcom 13,7 19 2,1% - 80 168 110% 112%
Novacast 1,4 Neg 0,0% - 14,5 32 121% 121% SendIT * 20,7 Neg 0,0% - 175 175 0% 0%
Pandox 1 16 3,5% - 58 81 40% 43% Sifogroup 13,1 33 0,9% - 54 130 141% 142%
Peab 1 11 2,8% 0,5 18,1 18,9 4% 7% Sigma 14,5 24 1,4% - 63 260 313% 314%
Piren B 1 23 2,9% 0,5 52 71 37% 39% Softtronic 16,5 17 1,3% - 76 399 425% 426%
Prifast B * 1,6 25 2,7% 0,4 74 74 0% 3% Switchcore 94,4 Neg 0,0% 2,1 50 677 1260% 1260%
Ratos 0,9 20 6,7% 0,7 60 85 42% 48% Telelogic 37 Neg 0,0% 2,2 57 855 1400% 1400%
Realia 0,5 7 6,0% 0,5 6,6 7,6 15% 21% Ticket 15,1 20 4,3% - 58 68 18% 23%
Rottneros 0,9 Neg 0,0% 1,0 5 9,8 96% 96% Tieto Enator Former: Enator 7,7 30 1,0% - 244 560 130% 131%
SCA 1,2 9 4,0% 0,7 173 206 19% 23% WM Data 15,6 30 0,8% 0,9 315 476 51% 52%
Sintercast 1,6 Neg 0,0% 0,5 69 68 -1% -1%
SKF 1,1 19 1,7% 2,8 117 187 60% 62%
SSAB 0,9 13 5,1% 0,9 88 104 18% 23%
StenaLine 0,2 Neg 0,0% 0,9 8,7 7,1 -18% -18%
Stora Enso 1,3 24 4,5% - 84 91 8% 13%
Svenska Brand 1 8 2,2% - 137 144 5% 7%
Svenska Orientlinjen 0,2 Neg 0,0% - 3,7 2,3 -38% -38%
Svolder 0,8 10 7,4% - 108 172 59% 67%
Tornet 0,9 18 3,5% - 114 119 4% 8%
Trelleborg 0,8 14 4,1% 1,1 73 65 -11% -7%
Wihlborg 0,4 14 2,2% 0,2 9,1 11,3 24% 26%
Volvo 1,6 12 3,7% 1,0 215 226 5% 9%
Öresund 0,7 4 7,3% 0,8 205 345 68% 76%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Gotlandsbolaget 3 0,4 3,8% 0,2 52 56 8% 11% Ljungberggruppen 17 1,1 2,5% 0,2 80 125 56% 59%
Luxonen 3 0,6 0,0% 1,6 13,5 31 130% 130% Jakobsson Wimark 18 1,4 0,0% 0,1 48 130 171% 171%
Custos 4 0,7 7,4% 0,8 156 230 47% 55% Tornet 18 0,9 3,5% - 114 119 4% 8%
Öresund 4 0,7 7,3% 0,8 205 345 68% 76% Heba 19 1,0 4,7% 0,2 42,5 45 6% 11%
Handelsbanken Hyp 5 0,6 5,7% - 209 202 -3% 2% Ind.Med.Grp 19 1,5 2,6% - 19 98 416% 418%
Borås Wäfveri 6 0,8 3,1% 0,4 48 50 4% 7% SKF 19 1,1 1,7% 2,8 117 187 60% 62%
FB Industrie Hold 6 1,5 7,0% - 28 25 -11% -4% Assi Domän 20 1,2 3,5% 1,0 156 135 -13% -10%
Realia 7 0,5 6,0% 0,5 6,6 7,6 15% 21% Ratos 20 0,9 6,7% 0,7 60 85 42% 48%
Kabe 8 0,7 3,1% 0,7 25 35 40% 43% Dilligentia 22 0,4 4,8% - 63 87 38% 43%
Lundbergs B 8 0,9 3,9% 1,2 108 119 10% 14% Piren B 23 1,0 2,9% 0,5 52 71 37% 39%
Svenska Brand 8 1,0 2,2% - 137 144 5% 7% Stora Enso 24 1,3 4,5% - 84 91 8% 13%
Concordia 9 0,5 4,5% 0,5 11,1 12,4 12% 16% Autodiagnos 25 1,5 1,7% - 58 239 312% 314%
Gunnebo 9 1,4 5,2% 0,7 77 126 64% 69% Prifast B * 25 1,6 2,7% 0,4 74 74 0% 3%
ICB Shipping * 9 0,5 4,9% 0,5 41 41 0% 5% Fastighetspartner 28 0,6 0,0% 0,6 7,3 13,6 86% 86%
SCA 9 1,2 4,0% 0,7 173 206 19% 23% Brio 36 0,8 0,4% 0,5 45 54 20% 20%
Geveko 10 1,3 3,4% 1,5 103 180 75% 78% Empire 57 1,0 6,0% - 21 70 233% 239%
Graphium 10 1,6 2,2% 0,7 69 124 80% 82% Humlegården fastigh. * 58 1,5 2,1% 0,3 61 61 0% 2%
Svolder 10 0,8 7,4% - 108 172 59% 67% B&N Nordsjöfrakt 85 0,4 9,4% 0,4 16 11,6 -28% -18%
Peab 11 1,0 2,8% 0,5 18,1 18,9 4% 7% Avesta Sheffiled Neg 0,6 0,0% - 29 35 21% 21%
Modo 12 1,1 4,4% 1,2 229 256 12% 16% Elekta Neg 0,4 0,0% 0,2 15 28 87% 87%
Volvo 12 1,6 3,7% 1,0 215 226 5% 9% Fagerlid ** Neg 0,5 0,0% 0,9 13,9 0 -100% -100%
Celtica 13 0,6 0,0% 0,5 49 55 12% 12% Folkebolagen B Neg 0,7 0,0% 0,0 23 32 39% 39%
SSAB 13 0,9 5,1% 0,9 88 104 18% 23% Havsfrun K Neg 0,8 2,2% 0,9 90 125 39% 41%
Castellum 14 1,1 4,9% - 81 81 0% 5% Kvaerner * Neg 0,6 0,0% 1,0 140 140 0% 0%
Trelleborg 14 0,8 4,1% 1,1 73 65 -11% -7% Norditube Neg 1,5 0,0% - 3,3 7,5 127% 127%
Wihlborg 14 0,4 2,2% 0,2 9,1 11,3 24% 26% Novacast Neg 1,4 0,0% - 14,5 32 121% 121%
NCC 15 0,9 3,4% - 74 100 35% 39% Rottneros Neg 0,9 0,0% 1,0 5 9,8 96% 96%
Norrporten 15 1,1 4,8% 0,3 126 107 -15% -10% Sintercast Neg 1,6 0,0% 0,5 69 68 -1% -1%
Investor 16 0,9 4,1% 1,5 85,75 130 52% 56% StenaLine Neg 0,2 0,0% 0,9 8,7 7,1 -18% -18%
Pandox 16 1,0 3,5% - 58 81 40% 43% Svenska Orientlinjen Neg 0,2 0,0% - 3,7 2,3 -38% -38%

Daltek 8 8 2,8% - 35,0 69 97% 100% Tieto Enator Former: Enator 30 7,7 1,0% - 244,0 560 130% 131%
Evidentia 10 8,1 2,5% 2,29 40,0 90 125% 128% WM Data 30 15,6 1% 0,88 315,0 476 51% 52%
Provobis 11 9,1 0,9% 0,7 17,5 19 9% 9% Enea 31 9,8 0,8% 1,66 142,0 1875 1220% 1221%
ACSC 12 7,8 2,4% - 41,0 85 107% 110% Europolitan 32 26,7 1,4% 0,41 79,0 180 128% 129%
Hemköpskedjan 13 6,4 4,4% - 68,0 70 3% 7% Sifogroup 33 13,1 0,9% - 54,0 130 141% 142%
Arete 14 6,1 3,5% - 128,0 231 80% 84% Nokia 36 15 0,9% 0,95 1203,0 1933 61% 62%
Doro 14 6,7 4,2% 0,59 72,0 126 75% 79% Intentia 40 8,2 0,0% - 175,0 209 19% 19%
IBS 14 7 1,1% 1,02 138,0 310 125% 126% Assa Abloy 41 9,5 0,8% 0,52 82,5 175 112% 113%
Fagerhult 15 8,6 2,3% - 86,0 66 -23% -21% Netcom Systems 42 8,7 0,6% - 266,0 787 196% 196%
Softtronic 17 16,5 1,3% - 76,0 399 425% 426% Hennes & Mauritz 43 19,9 0,8% 0,67 155,3 228 47% 48%
Modul1 18 12,5 1,3% 2,5 47,8 127 166% 167% Securitas 65 7,9 0,8% 0,45 130,0 208 60% 61%
Semcom 19 13,7 2,1% - 80,0 168 110% 112% Array Neg 6,9 0,0% - 26,0 98 277% 277%
Proact 20 6,1 0,0% 1,17 34,3 193 462% 462% Citymail Neg 14 0,0% - 46,0 48 4% 4%
Ticket 20 15,1 4,3% - 57,5 68 18% 23% CTT systems Neg 24,5 0,0% 1,8 55,0 137 149% 149%
Scandic Hotels 21 6,4 1,7% - 80,7 97 20% 22% Magic House Neg 18,5 0,0% - 30,0 11 -63% -63%
HL Display 22 6,1 0,9% 0,46 159,0 115 -28% -27% Maxim Pharamceutical Neg 8,3 0,0% 1,9 92,0 440 378% 378%
Astra Zeneca Former: Astra A 23 6,2 1,2% 0,85 342,9 385 12% 13% Meditieam Neg 6,9 0,0% - 57,0 96 68% 68%
Prevas 23 11,4 2,2% - 67,0 162 142% 144% Minidoc Neg 6,1 0,0% - 33,0 59 79% 79%
Cell Network Former: Linné Data 24 72,3 0,0% - 50,0 326 552% 552% MTG Neg 10,4 0,0% 1,45 148,0 461 211% 211% Explanations to *
Entra 24 23,6 0,9% - 167,0 329 97% 98% Probi Neg 10 0,0% 0,47 10,5 26 148% 148% Acquired by another company *
Sigma 24 14,5 1,4% - 63,0 260 313% 314% Reculture Neg 8,9 0,0% - 28,0 17 -39% -39% Bankrupt **
Ericsson B 25 6,1 1,5% 1,41 194,0 866 346% 348% SendIT * Neg 20,7 0,0% - 175,0 175 0% 0% Delisted ***
Mandator 25 8,7 1,0% 3,2 48,0 195 306% 307% Switchcore Neg 94,4 0,0% 2,1 49,8 677 1260% 1260%
Telelogic Neg 37 0,0% 2,15 57,0 855 1400% 1400%

Assidomän 1,0 18 4,4% 0,5 135 209 55% 59% A-com 90,3 41 0,0% - 190 23 -88% -88%
Avesta Polarit Former Avesta Sheffield 0,8 31 0,0% 0,8 35 27 -23% -23% Array 20,1 0 0,0% - 98 5,3 -95% -95%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt 0,3 12 12,9% 0,2 11,6 12,5 8% 21% Artimplant 18,2 Neg 0,0% 2,3 178 70 -61% -61%
Borås Wäfveri 0,8 6 3,0% 0,3 50 45 -10% -7% Assa Abloy 10,3 64 0,6% 0,7 175 140 -20% -19%
Brio 0,9 14 0,7% 0,6 54 40 -26% -25% Astra Zeneca 8,5 29 1,8% - 385 491 28% 29%
Broström 0,3 47 13,0% - 11,5 22 91% 104% Autodiagnos * 9,3 52 0,8% - 239 240 0% 1%
Castellum 1,1 13 6,1% - 81 100 23% 30% Cell Network 50,9 0 0,0% - 326 6,9 -98% -98%
Concordia 0,5 0 4,0% 0,6 12,4 21 69% 73% Celtica Neg 22 0,0% 0,2 55 75 36% 36%
Custos 0,7 4 5,0% 0,6 230 260 13% 18% Cherry 17,0 96 80,0% - 65 13 -80% 0%
Dilligentia * 0,9 17 4,0% - 87 87 0% 4% Confidence 35,0 Neg 0,0% - 27 5,1 -81% -81%
Esselte 0,6 5 8,6% 0,7 58 56 -3% 5% CTT systems 39,9 Neg 0,0% 1,8 137 48 -65% -65%
Evidentia * 1,6 15 1,1% 0,2 90 91 1% 2% Daydream 25,9 Neg 0,0% 1,3 35 9,5 -73% -73%
Fast Partner Former fastighetspartner 1,0 69 0,0% 1,4 13,6 6,6 -51% -51% Diamyd 16,2 Neg 0,0% 0,9 190 38 -80% -80%
FB Industrie Hold 1,2 6 8,0% - 25 30 20% 28% Drax 38,4 Neg 0,0% - 12 0,42 -96% -96%
Folkebolagen B * 1,1 50 0,0% 0,2 32 43,5 36% 36% Enea Neg 0 0,1% 3,0 68 12,5 -82% -82%
Geveko 1,3 7 2,2% 1,0 180 140 -22% -20% Entra * 14,3 46 0,6% - 329 329 0% 1%
Gorthon Lines 0,8 5 12,2% - 20 14,5 -28% -15% Ericsson B 26,8 98 0,3% 1,9 217 57 -74% -73%
Gotlandsbolaget 0,4 4 3,6% 0,2 56 91 63% 66% Europolitan 59,0 73 0,6% 0,9 180 76 -58% -57%
Handelsbanken Hyp 0,5 4 5,9% - 202 203 0% 6% Feelgood 12,4 Neg 0,0% 0,9 41 24 -41% -41%
Havsfrun K 0,4 4 4,8% 0,8 125 115 -8% -3% Frango 12,5 62 0,3% 1,3 170 155 -9% -9%
Hexagon 1,6 9 3,8% 0,7 145 130 -10% -7% Friluftsbolaget 39,8 Neg 0,0% - 22 9,4 -57% -57%
Holmen Former Modo 1,2 12 4,5% 1,2 256 175 -32% -27% Hennes & Mauritz 18,3 47 0,7% 0,7 228 146 -36% -35%
Investor 0,7 10 2,7% 0,9 130 118 -9% -7% IBS 9,8 33 0,3% 1,0 62 22 -65% -64%
Kabe 1,0 6 3,8% 0,4 35 30 -14% -10% Icon MediaLab 44,0 Neg 0,0% - 222 12,1 -95% -95%
Kungsleden 1,6 7 10,1% - 84 89 6% 16% Infinicom 13,6 Neg 0,0% 2,3 31 4,5 -85% -85%
Latour 1,6 21 1,4% 0,7 182 152 -16% -15% Karo Bio 15,0 Neg 0,0% 1,0 400 285 -29% -29%
Ljungberggruppen 1,6 23 2,4% 0,2 125 169 35% 38% Konftel 23,3 Neg 0,0% - 52 21 -60% -60%
Lundbergs B 0,9 7 4,2% 0,6 119 142 19% 24% Lightlab 11,4 Neg 0,0% 0,7 5 3,3 -31% -31%
Lundin Oil 1,4 Neg 0,0% 0,5 23 19,2 -17% -17% Mandator * 24,7 83 0,3% 3,2 195 195 0% 0%
Luxonen 1,1 Neg 0,0% 1,7 31 29 -6% -6% Maxim Pharamceutical 51,2 Neg 0,0% 1,9 440 65 -85% -85%
Matteus 1,4 11 10,3% 0,9 29 13,4 -54% -43% Medirox 10,6 23 1,1% - 90 23 -74% -73%
Meda 1,6 25 2,8% 0,1 72 58 -19% -17% Meditieam dental 26,5 Neg 0,0% - 48 13,5 -72% -72%
Midway 1,1 7 8,0% 0,4 23 15,2 -34% -26% Minidoc 12,0 81 0,0% - 59 23 -61% -61%
NCC 1,1 12 4,5% 0,5 100 73 -27% -23% MNW Records 23,0 Neg 0,0% - 272 8 -97% -97%
Nea 1,6 13 5,3% 0,3 75 98 31% 36% Modul1 22,5 47 0,8% 2,5 127 14 -89% -88%
Nordifa 0,8 9 10,4% -0,3 14,4 1,6 -89% -78% Mogul.com Former Optosof 9,6 Neg 0,0% - 220 8,5 -96% -96%
Norrporten * 0,9 11 6,5% 0,2 107 140 31% 37% MTG 28,4 Neg 0,0% 1,5 461 250 -46% -46%
Pandox 1,4 17 3,7% - 81 84 4% 7% Netcom Systems 25,0 78 0,3% - 787 510 -35% -35%
Peab 1,0 5 5,3% 0,3 18,9 32 69% 75% Nokia 48,3 93 0,3% 1,2 483 246 -49% -49%
Piren B * 1,4 35 2,1% 0,4 71 69,6 -2% 0% Observer AB Former Sifogroup 29,5 0 0,4% - 130 98 -25% -24%
Ratos 0,8 28 4,7% 0,7 85 83 -2% 2% Oxigene 8,5 Neg 0,0% 1,9 191 62 -68% -68%
Realia 0,7 5 6,6% 0,6 76 82 8% 14% PC Express * 45,1 Neg 0,1% - 78 78 0% 0%
Reculture ** 0,6 Neg 0,0% - 17 0 -100% -100% Precise Biometric 58,0 Neg 0,0% - 280 102 -64% -64%
Rottneros 1,6 37 2,5% 0,8 9,8 6,9 -30% -27% Prevas 14,9 80 0,3% - 162 68 -58% -58%
Salus Ansvar 0,9 19 2,7% 0,5 18,4 13 -29% -27% Proact 20,1 0 0,0% 1,2 193 92 -52% -52%
SAS 0,7 7 6,3% 0,5 72 95 32% 38% Probi 24,6 Neg 0,0% - 26 11,1 -57% -57%
SCA 1,4 8 4,6% 0,6 206 212 3% 8% Q-Med 52,4 Neg 0,0% - 115 197 71% 71%
Scanmining 1,6 Neg 0,0% - 8,4 5 -40% -40% Sec * 18,7 Neg 0,0% - 75 11,5 -85% -85%
SSAB 1,2 21 4,8% 0,7 104 84 -19% -14% Securitas 12,6 71 0,6% 0,7 208 173 -17% -16%
StenaLine * 0,2 Neg 0,0% 0,8 7,1 7,1 0% 0% Semcom 21,5 35 1,2% - 168 90 -46% -45%
Stora Enso 1,4 8 4,6% - 91 98 8% 12% Sigma 26,4 75 0,4% - 260 126 -52% -51%
Svenska Brand 1,2 9 2,1% 0,0 144 79 -45% -43% Softtronic 33,4 59 0,5% - 100 15 -85% -84%
Svenska Orientlinjen 0,3 Neg 0,0% - 2,3 1,3 -43% -43% SPCS 9,9 25 1,8% - 23 13,9 -40% -38%
Svolder 1,2 6 4,7% 0,5 172 70 -59% -55% Strand 42,7 Neg 0,0% - 122 13 -89% -89%
Tornet 0,7 13 5,2% - 119 151 27% 32% Switchcore Neg Neg 0,0% 2,1 120 25 -79% -79%
Trelleborg 0,7 11 4,7% 0,7 65 69 6% 11% Telelogic Neg Neg 0,0% 2,2 86 33 -61% -61%
Wallenstam 0,5 7 4,6% 0,7 43 63 47% 51% Ticket 9,1 45 4,5% - 45 15,6 -66% -61%
Wihlborg 0,7 10 5,3% 0,3 11,3 13,4 19% 24% Tieto Enator 14,3 49 0,0% - 560 246 -56% -56%
Volvo 1,4 14 3,5% 0,5 226 161 -29% -25% Vision Park 8,7 Neg 0,0% - 59 8,3 -86% -86%
Öresund 0,9 6 5,2% 0,7 345 291 -16% -10% WM Data 16,9 39 0,6% 0,9 95 37 -61% -61%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Concordia 0,0 0,5 4,0% 0,6 12,4 21 69% 73% B&N Nordsjöfrakt 12,0 0,3 12,9% 0,2 11,6 12,5 8% 21%
Custos 4,0 0,7 5,0% 0,6 230 260 13% 18% Holmen Former Modo 12,0 1,2 4,5% 1,2 256 175 -32% -27%
Gotlandsbolaget 4,0 0,4 3,6% 0,2 56 91 63% 66% NCC 12,0 1,1 4,5% 0,5 100 73 -27% -23%
Handelsbanken Hyp 4,0 0,5 5,9% - 202 203 0% 6% Castellum 13,0 1,1 6,1% - 81 100 23% 30%
Havsfrun K 4,0 0,4 4,8% 0,8 125 115 -8% -3% Nea 13,0 1,6 5,3% 0,3 75 98 31% 36%
Esselte 5,0 0,6 8,6% 0,7 58 56 -3% 5% Tornet 13,0 0,7 5,2% - 119 151 27% 32%
Gorthon Lines 5,0 0,8 12,2% - 20 14,5 -28% -15% Brio 14,0 0,9 0,7% 0,6 54 40 -26% -25%
Peab 5,0 1,0 5,3% 0,3 18,9 32 69% 75% Volvo 14,0 1,4 3,5% 0,5 226 161 -29% -25%
Realia 5,0 0,7 6,6% 0,6 76 82 8% 14% Evidentia * 15,0 1,6 1,1% 0,2 90 91 1% 2%
Borås Wäfveri 6,0 0,8 3,0% 0,3 50 45 -10% -7% Dilligentia * 17,0 0,9 4,0% - 87 87 0% 4%
FB Industrie Hold 6,0 1,2 8,0% - 25 30 20% 28% Pandox 17,0 1,4 3,7% - 81 84 4% 7%
Kabe 6,0 1,0 3,8% 0,4 35 30 -14% -10% Assidomän 18,0 1,0 4,4% 0,5 135 209 55% 59%
Svolder 6,0 1,2 4,7% 0,5 172 70 -59% -55% Salus Ansvar 19,0 0,9 2,7% 0,5 18,4 13 -29% -27%
Öresund 6,0 0,9 5,2% 0,7 345 291 -16% -10% Latour 21,0 1,6 1,4% 0,7 182 152 -16% -15%
Geveko 7,0 1,3 2,2% 1,0 180 140 -22% -20% SSAB 21,0 1,2 4,8% 0,7 104 84 -19% -14%
Kungsleden 7,0 1,6 10,1% - 84 89 6% 16% Ljungberggruppen 23,0 1,6 2,4% 0,2 125 169 35% 38%
Lundbergs B 7,0 0,9 4,2% 0,6 119 142 19% 24% Meda 25,0 1,6 2,8% 0,1 72 58 -19% -17%
Midway 7,0 1,1 8,0% 0,4 23 15,2 -34% -26% Ratos 28,0 0,8 4,7% 0,7 85 83 -2% 2%
SAS 7,0 0,7 6,3% 0,5 72 95 32% 38% Avesta Polarit Former Avesta Sheffield 31,0 0,8 0,0% 0,8 35 27 -23% -23%
Wallenstam 7,0 0,5 4,6% 0,7 43 63 47% 51% Piren B * 35,0 1,4 2,1% 0,4 71 69,6 -2% 0%
SCA 8,0 1,4 4,6% 0,6 206 212 3% 8% Rottneros 37,0 1,6 2,5% 0,8 9,8 6,9 -30% -27%
Stora Enso 8,0 1,4 4,6% - 91 98 8% 12% Broström 47,0 0,3 13,0% - 11,5 22 91% 104%
Hexagon 9,0 1,6 3,8% 0,7 145 130 -10% -7% Folkebolagen B * 50,0 1,1 0,0% 0,2 32 43,5 36% 36%
Nordifa 9,0 0,8 10,4% -0,3 14,4 1,6 -89% -78% Fast Partner Former fastighetspartner 69,0 1,0 0,0% 1,4 13,6 6,6 -51% -51%
Svenska Brand 9,0 1,2 2,1% 0,0 144 79 -45% -43% Lundin Oil Neg 1,4 0,0% 0,5 23 19,2 -17% -17%
Investor 10,0 0,7 2,7% 0,9 130 118 -9% -7% Luxonen Neg 1,1 0,0% 1,7 31 29 -6% -6%
Wihlborg 10,0 0,7 5,3% 0,3 11,3 13,4 19% 24% Reculture ** Neg 0,6 0,0% - 17 0 -100% -100%
Matteus 11,0 1,4 10,3% 0,9 29 13,4 -54% -43% Scanmining Neg 1,6 0,0% - 8,4 5 -40% -40%
Norrporten * 11,0 0,9 6,5% 0,2 107 140 31% 37% StenaLine * Neg 0,2 0,0% 0,8 7,1 7,1 0% 0%
Trelleborg 11,0 0,7 4,7% 0,7 65 69 6% 11% Svenska Orientlinjen Neg 0,3 0,0% - 2,3 1,3 -43% -43%
No. Of stocks 30 Return 6% No. Of stocks 30 Return -3,7%

Array 0 20 0,0% - 98 5,3 -95% -95% Artimplant Neg 18,2 0,0% 2,3 178 70 -61% -61%
Cell Network 0 51 0,0% - 326 6,9 -98% -98% Confidence Neg 35,0 0,0% - 27 5,1 -81% -81%
Enea 0 Neg 0,1% 3,0 68 12,5 -82% -82% CTT systems Neg 39,9 0,0% 1,8 137 48 -65% -65%
Observer AB Former Sifogroup 0 30 0,4% - 130 98 -25% -24% Daydream Neg 25,9 0,0% 1,3 35 9,5 -73% -73%
Proact 0 20 0,0% 1,2 193 92 -52% -52% Diamyd Neg 16,2 0,0% 0,9 190 38 -80% -80%
Celtica 22 Neg 0,0% 0,2 55 75 36% 36% Drax Neg 38,4 0,0% - 11,5 0,42 -96% -96%
Medirox 23 11 1,1% - 90 23 -74% -73% Feelgood Neg 12,4 0,0% 0,9 40,9 24 -41% -41%
SPCS 25 9,9 1,8% - 23 13,9 -40% -38% Friluftsbolaget Neg 39,8 0,0% - 22 9,4 -57% -57%
Astra Zeneca 29 8,5 1,8% - 385 491 28% 29% Icon MediaLab Neg 44,0 0,0% - 222 12,1 -95% -95%
IBS 33 9,8 0,3% 1,0 62 22 -65% -64% Infinicom Neg 13,6 0,0% 2,3 31 4,5 -85% -85%
Semcom 35 22 1,2% - 168 90 -46% -45% Karo Bio Neg 15,0 0,0% 1,0 400 285 -29% -29%
WM Data 39 17 0,6% 0,9 95 37 -61% -61% Konftel Neg 23,3 0,0% - 52 21 -60% -60%
A-com 41 90 0,0% - 190 23 -88% -88% Lightlab Neg 11,4 0,0% 0,7 4,8 3,3 -31% -31%
Ticket 45 9,1 4,5% - 45 15,6 -66% -61% Maxim Pharamceutical Neg 51,2 0,0% 1,9 440 65 -85% -85%
Entra * 46 14 0,6% - 329 329 0% 1% Meditieam dental Neg 26,5 0,0% - 48 13,5 -72% -72%
Hennes & Mauritz 47 18 0,7% 0,7 228 146 -36% -35% MNW Records Neg 23,0 0,0% - 272 8 -97% -97%
Modul1 47 23 0,8% 2,5 127 14 -89% -88% Mogul.com Former Optosof Neg 9,6 0,0% - 220 8,5 -96% -96%
Tieto Enator 49 14 0,0% - 560 246 -56% -56% MTG Neg 28,4 0,0% 1,5 461 250 -46% -46%
Autodiagnos * 52 9,3 0,8% - 239 240 0% 1% Oxigene Neg 8,5 0,0% 1,9 191 62 -68% -68%
Softtronic 59 33 0,5% - 100 15 -85% -84% PC Express * Neg 45,1 0,1% - 78 78 0% 0%
Frango 62 13 0,3% 1,3 170 155 -9% -9% Precise Biometric Neg 58,0 0,0% - 280 102 -64% -64%
Assa Abloy 64 10 0,6% 0,7 175 140 -20% -19% Probi Neg 24,6 0,0% - 26 11,1 -57% -57%
Securitas 71 13 0,6% 0,7 208 173 -17% -16% Q-Med Neg 52,4 0,0% - 115 197 71% 71%
Europolitan 73 59 0,6% 0,9 180 76 -58% -57% Sec * Neg 18,7 0,0% - 75 11,5 -85% -85%
Sigma 75 26 0,4% - 260 126 -52% -51% Strand Neg 42,7 0,0% - 122 13 -89% -89%
Netcom Systems 78 25 0,3% - 787 510 -35% -35% Switchcore Neg Neg 0,0% 2,1 120,4 25 -79% -79% Explanations to *
Prevas 80 15 0,3% - 162 68 -58% -58% Telelogic Neg Neg 0,0% 2,2 85,5 33 -61% -61% Acquired by another company *
Minidoc 81 12 0,0% - 59 23 -61% -61% Vision Park Neg 8,7 0,0% - 59 8,3 -86% -86% Bankrupt **
Mandator * 83 25 0,3% 3,2 195 195 0% 0% Delisted ***
Nokia 93 48 0,3% 1,2 483 246 -49% -49%
Cherry 96 17 0,8% - 65 13 -80% 0%
Ericsson B 98 27 0,3% 1,9 217 57 -74% -73%

A-com 0,9 Neg 0,0% - 23 6 -74% -74% Araccel Former Minidoc 6,5 49 0,0% 0,5 23 7,5 -67% -67%
Array 1,0 Neg 0,0% 1,5 5,3 0,74 -86% -86% Artimplant 7,5 Neg 0,0% 2,3 70 38 -46% -46%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt 0,4 11,0 12,0% 0,1 12,5 15,2 22% 34% Astra Zeneca 9,9 30 1,1% - 491 510 4% 5%
Borås Wäfveri 0,7 9,0 3,3% 0,2 45 46 2% 6% Audiodev 17,9 16 1,1% - 45 40 -11% -10%
Brio 0,6 32,0 1,0% 0,3 40 55 38% 39% Avestapolarit Neg 89 0,6% - 27 48 78% 78%
Broström 0,7 3,0 6,8% - 22 49 123% 130% Axis 10,6 Neg 0,0% - 16 20 25% 25%
Castellum 1,2 10,0 6,0% - 100 116 16% 22% Beijer Electronics 12,2 13 2,1% - 71 17 -76% -74%
Cell Network 0,9 6,0 7,2% 2,4 3,45 1,5 -57% -49% Biacore 7 43 0,0% 1,2 310 261 -16% -16%
Celtica 0,9 12,0 0,0% 0,0 75 84 12% 12% Boss Media 18,2 23 1,5% - 33 11,7 -65% -63%
Columna 0,3 5,0 0,0% - 0,27 0,39 44% 44% C Technologies 7,1 Neg 0,0% - 79 38 -52% -52%
Concordia 0,8 3,0 4,8% 0,4 21 15,2 -28% -23% Capio 11,5 17 0,0% - 70 73 4% 4%
Consilium 1,0 9,0 6,0% 0,2 25 37 48% 54% Cashguard 22 49 0,0% 1,6 14,7 16,7 14% 14%
Custos 1,0 4,0 6,9% 0,3 260 201 -23% -16% Clas Ohlson 8,7 28 1,3% 0,6 375 172 -54% -53%
Empire 0,5 4,0 0,0% - 10 8 -20% -20% CTT systems 40,7 Neg 0,0% 1,8 48 46 -4% -4%
Esselte 0,7 13,0 8,9% 0,5 56 62 11% 20% Daydream 7,1 42 0,0% 1,2 9,5 1,2 -87% -87%
Fast Partner 0,5 18,0 0,0% 1,1 6,6 6,8 3% 3% Diffchamb 7,7 Neg 0,0% 0,1 30 28 -7% -7%
Geveko 0,6 6,0 9,3% 0,9 140 133 -5% 4% Digital Illusion 7,5 Neg 0,0% - 25 39 56% 56%
Gorthon Lines 0,6 13,0 6,9% - 14,5 17,5 21% 28% Dimension 12,5 12 2,6% - 57 17,1 -70% -67%
Gotlandsbolaget 0,6 8,0 2,2% 0,0 91 170 87% 89% Ecovision 8,11 10 0,0% - 58 58 0% 0%
Handelsbanken Hyp 0,6 4,0 5,9% - 203 199 -2% 4% Eniro Neg 76 0,0% 0,9 106 86 -19% -19%
Havsfrun K 0,3 4,0 6,1% 0,4 115 143 24% 30% Europolitan 13,8 26 1,9% 0,8 76 48 -37% -35%
Hexagon 1,3 8,0 4,2% 0,4 130 173 33% 37% Facile & Co 10 Neg 0,0% 0,5 30 26 -13% -13%
Holmen 0,9 8,0 6,7% 0,8 175 254 45% 52% FB Industrie Hold * 1,4 11 3,3% - 30 30 0% 3%
Icon MediaLab 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 12,1 3 -75% -75% Focal Point 7,4 18 0,0% 0,2 7 1,7 -76% -76%
Investor 0,6 9,0 4,8% 0,7 118 117 -1% 4% Frango 10,5 33 0,8% 1,3 155 79 -49% -48%
Kabe 0,8 5,0 4,9% 0,4 30 59 97% 102% Hennes & Mauritz 10,1 31 1,2% 0,9 146 208 42% 44%
Kungsleden 1,0 5,0 11,2% - 89 142 60% 71% HIQ International 30,6 43 11,4% 2,5 44 16 -64% -52%
Latour 0,9 7,0 3,3% 0,6 152 206 36% 39% Infinicom Neg 43 0,0% 2,3 4,5 0,7 -84% -84%
Lundbergs B 0,7 8,0 4,2% 0,4 142 188 32% 37% Intentia 7 28 1,0% 1,2 82 84 3% 4%
Lundin Oil * 1,1 9,0 0,0% 0,4 19,2 36,5 90% 90% Jobline * 6,8 Neg 0,0% - 11,5 11,5 0% 0%
Luxonen 0,6 1,0 0,0% 1,2 29 42 45% 45% Karo Bio 12,5 Neg 0,0% 1,0 285 286 0% 0%
Matteus * 0,2 5,0 22,4% 0,9 13,4 13,4 0% 22% Lightlab 43,4 Neg 0,0% 0,7 3,3 2 -39% -39%
Maxim Pharamceutical 0,7 Neg 0,0% 1,9 65 56 -14% -14% MTG 13,4 52 0,0% 1,5 250 265 6% 6%
Midway 0,8 5,0 7,9% 0,4 15,2 14,9 -2% 6% NAN 6,7 Neg 0,0% - 9,3 12 29% 29%
Mogul.com 0,5 Neg 0,0% - 8,5 7,3 -14% -14% NeoNet 10,1 28 0,0% - 22 16,9 -23% -23%
Music Network 0,2 3,0 0,0% - 8 3,4 -58% -58% NetOnNet 10,3 Neg 0,0% - 10 35 250% 250%
NCC 0,8 3,0 6,9% 0,4 73 69 -5% 1% Nobel Biocare 6,8 64 0,6% 0,2 355 550 55% 56%
Nordifa ** 0,4 Neg 0,0% 0,1 1,6 0 -100% -100% Nokia 12,7 17,6 0,7% 1,1 246 206 -16% -16%
Pandox 1,2 11,0 4,5% - 84 84 0% 5% Nordnet old Teletrade Fin.serv 6,4 Neg 0,0% 2,4 5 2,9 -42% -42%
Peab 1,3 5,0 4,0% 0,1 32 48 50% 54% Orc Software 17,9 50 1,1% - 178 222 25% 26%
Prosolutions old Drax 0,6 17,0 0,0% - 0,42 1,2 186% 186% Poolia 14,6 Neg 0,3% 1,5 100 51 -49% -49%
Ratos 0,7 3,0 7,2% 0,5 83 107 29% 36% Precise Biometric 10,1 Neg 0,0% - 102 71 -30% -30%
Realia 0,7 14,0 6,1% 0,3 82 95 16% 22% Probi 10,6 Neg 0,0% - 11,1 5,2 -53% -53%
Rottneros 1,1 2,0 10,1% 0,9 6,9 10,8 57% 67% Protect Data 8,6 61 1,4% 2,1 73 34 -53% -52%
Salus Ansvar 0,7 13,0 3,8% 0,3 13 7,8 -40% -36% Pyrosequencing 20,4 Neg 0,0% - 63 29 -54% -54%
SAS 1,0 7,0 5,3% 0,3 95 78 -18% -13% Q-Med 14,3 Neg 0,0% - 197 157 -20% -20%
SCA 1,2 8,0 3,8% 0,5 212 331 56% 60% Readsoft 7,8 Neg 1,3% 0,8 38 13,9 -63% -62%
Scanmining 1,1 Neg 0,0% 0,5 5 1,8 -64% -64% Sectra 12,9 65 1,4% - 43 61 42% 43%
SKF 1,2 8,0 3,7% 0,7 145 231 59% 63% Semcom 10 28 6,0% - 90 42 -53% -47%
SSAB 1,0 9,0 6,0% 0,6 84 110 31% 37% Sensys Traffic 31,9 20 0,0% - 2,2 0,34 -85% -85%
Stora Enso 1,2 6,0 7,5% - 98 135 38% 45% SignOn 49,3 Neg 0,0% - 38 39 3% 3%
Svenska Brand * 0,8 9,0 0,0% -0,1 79 81 3% 3% Strand 8,4 Neg 0,0% 4,9 13 5,1 -61% -61%
Svenska Orientlinjen 0,7 Neg 0,0% - 13 14,9 15% 15% Switchcore 23,8 29 4,0% 2,1 25 10 -60% -56%
Svolder 0,7 13,0 8,6% 0,3 70 64 -9% 0% Teleca old Sigma 9,4 30 1,2% 1,8 126 47 -63% -61%
Tornet 0,9 14,0 3,0% 0,1 151 160 6% 9% Telelogic 24,4 Neg 0,0% 2,2 22 9,5 -57% -57%
Trelleborg 0,9 10,0 4,3% 0,4 69 106 54% 58% Tieto Enator 6,5 31 1,9% - 246 253 3% 5%
Wallenstam 0,4 10,0 3,2% 0,2 63 86 37% 40% TV-4 6,4 20 2,5% 0,7 240 207 -14% -11%
Wihlborg 0,9 11,0 6,7% 0,2 13,4 15,4 15% 22% Vostok Oil Neg 46 0,0% - 5 14,8 196% 196%
Volvo 0,8 13,0 6,2% 0,5 161 202 25% 32%
Öresund 0,9 5,0 8,6% 0,5 291 334 15% 23%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Luxonen 1 0,6 0,0% 1,2 29 42 45% 45% Borås Wäfveri 9 0,7 3,3% 0,2 45 46 2% 6%
Rottneros 2 1,1 10,1% 0,9 6,9 10,8 57% 67% Consilium 9 1,0 6,0% 0,2 25 37 48% 54%
Broström 3 0,7 6,8% - 22 49 123% 130% Investor 9 0,6 4,8% 0,7 118 117 -1% 4%
Concordia 3 0,8 4,8% 0,4 21 15,2 -28% -23% Lundin Oil * 9 1,1 0,0% 0,4 19,2 36,5 90% 90%
Music Network 3 0,2 0,0% - 8 3,4 -58% -58% SSAB 9 1,0 6,0% 0,6 84 110 31% 37%
NCC 3 0,8 6,9% 0,4 73 69 -5% 1% Svenska Brand * 9 0,8 0,0% -0,1 79 81 3% 3%
Ratos 3 0,7 7,2% 0,5 83 107 29% 36% Castellum 10 1,2 6,0% - 100 116 16% 22%
Custos 4 1,0 6,9% 0,3 260 201 -23% -16% Trelleborg 10 0,9 4,3% 0,4 69 106 54% 58%
Empire 4 0,5 0,0% - 10 8 -20% -20% Wallenstam 10 0,4 3,2% 0,2 63 86 37% 40%
Handelsbanken Hyp 4 0,6 5,9% - 203 199 -2% 4% B&N Nordsjöfrakt 11 0,4 12,0% 0,1 12,5 15,2 22% 34%
Havsfrun K 4 0,3 6,1% 0,4 115 143 24% 30% Pandox 11 1,2 4,5% - 84 84 0% 5%
Columna 5 0,3 0,0% - 0,27 0,39 44% 44% Wihlborg 11 0,9 6,7% 0,2 13,4 15,4 15% 22%
Kabe 5 0,8 4,9% 0,4 30 59 97% 102% Celtica 12 0,9 0,0% 0,0 75 84 12% 12%
Kungsleden 5 1,0 11,2% 0,2 89 142 60% 71% Esselte 13 0,7 8,9% 0,5 56 62 11% 20%
Matteus * 5 0,2 22,4% 0,9 13,4 13,4 0% 22% Gorthon Lines 13 0,6 6,9% - 14,5 17,5 21% 28%
Midway 5 0,8 7,9% 0,4 15,2 14,9 -2% 6% Salus Ansvar 13 0,7 3,8% 0,3 13 7,8 -40% -36%
Peab 5 1,3 4,0% 0,1 32 48 50% 54% Svolder 13 0,7 8,6% 0,3 70 64 -9% 0%
Öresund 5 0,9 8,6% 0,5 291 334 15% 23% Volvo 13 0,8 6,2% 0,5 161 202 25% 32%
Cell Network 6 0,9 7,2% 2,4 3,45 1,5 -57% -49% Realia 14 0,7 6,1% 0,3 82 95 16% 22%
Geveko 6 0,6 9,3% 0,9 140 133 -5% 4% Tornet 14 0,9 3,0% 0,1 151 160 6% 9%
Stora Enso 6 1,2 7,5% - 98 135 38% 45% Prosolutions old Drax 17 0,6 0,0% - 0,42 1,2 186% 186%
Latour 7 0,9 3,3% 0,6 152 206 36% 39% Fast Partner 18 0,5 0,0% 1,1 6,6 6,8 3% 3%
SAS 7 1,0 5,3% 0,3 95 78 -18% -13% Brio 32 0,6 1,0% 0,3 40 55 38% 39%
Gotlandsbolaget 8 0,6 2,2% 0,0 91 170 87% 89% A-com Neg 0,9 0,0% - 23 6 -74% -74%
Hexagon 8 1,3 4,2% 0,4 130 173 33% 37% Array Neg 1,0 0,0% 1,5 5,3 0,74 -86% -86%
Holmen 8 0,9 6,7% 0,8 175 254 45% 52% Icon MediaLab Neg 0,4 0,0% - 12,1 3 -75% -75%
Lundbergs B 8 0,7 4,2% 0,4 142 188 32% 37% Maxim Pharamceutical Neg 0,7 0,0% 1,9 65 56 -14% -14%
SCA 8 1,2 3,8% 0,5 212 331 56% 60% Mogul.com Neg 0,5 0,0% - 8,5 7,3 -14% -14%
SKF 8 1,2 3,7% 0,7 145 231 59% 63% Nordifa ** Neg 0,4 0,0% 0,1 1,6 0 -100% -100%
Scanmining Neg 1,1 0,0% 0,5 5 1,8 -64% -64%
Svenska Orientlinjen Neg 0,7 0,0% - 13 14,9 15% 15%

Ecovision 10 8,1 0,0% - 58 58 0% 0% Orc Software 50 18 1,1% - 178 222 25% 26%
FB Industrie Hold * 11 1,4 3,3% - 30 30 0% 3% MTG 52 13 0,0% 1,5 250 265 6% 6%
Dimension 12 12,5 2,6% - 57 17,1 -70% -67% Protect Data 61 8,6 1,4% 2,1 73 34 -53% -52%
Beijer Electronics 13 12,2 2,1% - 71 17 -76% -74% Nobel Biocare 64 6,8 0,6% 0,2 355 550 55% 56%
Audiodev 16 17,9 1,1% - 45 40 -11% -10% Sectra 65 13 1,4% - 43 61 42% 43%
Capio 17 11,5 0,0% - 70 73 4% 4% Eniro 76 Neg 0,0% 0,9 106 86 -19% -19%
Nokia 18 12,7 0,7% 1,1 246 206 -16% -16% Avestapolarit 89 Neg 0,6% - 27 48 78% 78%
Focal Point 18 7,4 0,0% 0,2 7 1,7 -76% -76% Artimplant Neg 7,5 0,0% 2,3 70 38 -46% -46%
Sensys Traffic 20 31,9 0,0% - 2,2 0,34 -85% -85% Axis Neg 11 0,0% - 16 20 25% 25%
TV-4 20 6,4 2,5% 0,7 240 207 -14% -11% C Technologies Neg 7,1 0,0% - 79 38 -52% -52%
Boss Media 23 18,2 1,5% - 33 11,7 -65% -63% CTT systems Neg 41 0,0% 1,8 48 46 -4% -4%
Europolitan 26 13,8 1,9% 0,8 76 48 -37% -35% Diffchamb Neg 7,7 0,0% 0,1 30 28 -7% -7%
Clas Ohlson 28 8,7 1,3% 0,6 375 172 -54% -53% Digital Illusion Neg 7,5 0,0% - 25 39 56% 56%
Intentia 28 7,0 1,0% 1,2 81,67 84 3% 4% Facile & Co Neg 10 0,0% 0,5 30 26 -13% -13%
NeoNet 28 10,1 0,0% - 22 16,9 -23% -23% Jobline * Neg 6,8 0,0% - 11,5 11,5 0% 0%
Semcom 28 10,0 6,0% - 90 42 -53% -47% Karo Bio Neg 13 0,0% 1,0 285 286 0% 0%
Switchcore 29 23,8 4,0% 2,1 25 10 -60% -56% Lightlab Neg 43 0,0% 0,7 3,3 2 -39% -39%
Astra Zeneca 30 9,9 1,1% - 491 510 4% 5% NAN Neg 6,7 0,0% - 9,3 12 29% 29%
Teleca old Sigma 30 9,4 1,2% 1,8 126 47 -63% -61% NetOnNet Neg 10 0,0% - 10 35 250% 250%
Hennes & Mauritz 31 10,1 1,2% 0,9 146 208 42% 44% Nordnet old Teletrade Fin.serv Neg 6,4 0,0% 2,4 5 2,9 -42% -42%
Tieto Enator 31 6,5 1,9% - 246 253 3% 5% Poolia Neg 15 0,3% 1,5 100 51 -49% -49%
Frango 33 10,5 0,8% 1,3 155 79 -49% -48% Precise Biometric Neg 10 0,0% - 102 71 -30% -30%
Daydream 42 7,1 0,0% 1,2 9,5 1,2 -87% -87% Probi Neg 11 0,0% - 11,1 5,2 -53% -53%
Biacore 43 7,0 0,0% 1,2 310 261 -16% -16% Pyrosequencing Neg 20 0,0% - 63 29 -54% -54%
HIQ International 43 30,6 11,4% 2,5 44 16 -64% -52% Q-Med Neg 14 0,0% - 197 157 -20% -20% Explanations to *
Infinicom 43 Neg 0,0% 2,3 4,5 0,7 -84% -84% Readsoft Neg 7,8 1,3% 0,8 38 13,9 -63% -62% Acquired by another company *
Vostok Oil 46 Neg 0,0% - 5 14,8 196% 196% SignOn Neg 49 0,0% - 38 39 3% 3% Bankrupt **
Araccel Former Minidoc 49 6,5 0,0% 0,5 23 7,5 -67% -67% Strand Neg 8,4 0,0% 4,9 13 5,1 -61% -61% Delisted ***
Cashguard 49 22,0 0,0% 1,6 14,7 16,7 14% 14% Telelogic Neg 24 0,0% 2,2 22 9,5 -57% -57%

A-com 0,3 Neg 0,0% - 6 1,5 -75% -75% ABB 5,2 Neg 0,0% - 91 22 -76% -76%
Array 0,2 Neg 0,0% 1,2 0,74 0,31 -58% -58% Acsc 4,4 13 0,2% - 68 43 -37% -37%
Avestapolarit * 1,5 14 1,5% - 48 53 10% 12% Addera 9,9 Neg 0,0% - 1,4 0,28 -80% -80%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt 0,5 10 6,5% 0,1 15,2 8,9 -41% -35% Akzo Nobel *** 6,2 15 2,3% 0,53 475 475 0% 2%
Borås Wäfveri 0,7 Neg 2,2% 0,2 46 27 -41% -39% Aqua Terrena 50,7 Neg 0,0% - 2 1,1 -45% -45%
Brio 0,9 44 0,5% 0,1 55 40 -27% -27% Astra Zeneca 8,7 30 1,4% - 510 297 -42% -40%
Broström 1,0 5 8,2% - 49 40 -18% -10% Axfood 6,4 18 1,7% 0,1 145 157 8% 10%
Castellum 1,3 12 5,6% 0,2 116 113 -3% 3% Beijer Electronics 5,5 14 3,2% - 17 51 200% 203%
Cell Network 0,1 Neg 0,0% 3,0 1,5 0,41 -73% -73% Biacore 5,1 36 0,0% 1,43 261 161 -38% -38%
Celtica 0,9 11 0,0% -0,1 84 49 -42% -42% Bioinvent INT 6,5 Neg 0,0% - 37 10 -73% -73%
Columna *** 0,6 6,8 0,0% 0,0 0,39 0,39 0% 0% Boliden 15,1 Neg 0,0% - 45 45 0% 0%
Concordia 0,4 3 3,8% 0,5 15,2 11,5 -24% -21% Boss Media 4,4 33 0,0% - 11,7 4,1 -65% -65%
Custos 0,9 2 7,2% 0,1 201 141 -30% -23% Cartesia 5,5 Neg 0,0% - 2,9 1,45 -50% -50%
Daydream 0,2 Neg 0,0% 1,6 1,2 0,42 -65% -65% Cashguard 21,5 Neg 0,0% 2,16 16,7 3,1 -81% -81%
Empire 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 8 5,8 -28% -28% Cell point ** 15,5 Neg 0,0% - 5,9 0 -100% -100%
Esselte *** 0,8 14 1,7% 0,5 62 62 0% 2% Clas Ohlson 12,5 34 1,2% 0,55 172 145 -16% -14%
Fast Partner 0,5 17 0,0% 1,0 6,8 6,6 -3% -3% Conpharm 4,6 Neg 0,0% - 3,3 1,4 -58% -58%
Geveko 0,9 5 6,8% 0,9 133 106 -20% -14% CTT systems 5,7 Neg 0,0% 1,83 46 20 -57% -57%
Gorthon Lines 0,8 47 5,8% 0,3 17,5 18,3 5% 10% Diamyd med 4,0 Neg 0,0% 0,9 32 20 -38% -38%
Gotlandsbolaget 0,8 4 1,0% -0,1 170 225 32% 33% Digital Illusion 7,1 Neg 0,0% 1,06 39 28 -28% -28%
Handelsbanken Hyp *** 0,5 4 6,0% 0,0 199 199 0% 6% Eniro 5,4 36 0,8% 0,94 86 57 -34% -33%
Havsfrun K 0,4 4 5,2% 0,1 143 130 -9% -4% Ericsson 4,9 78 0,0% 2,16 21 6 -71% -71%
Hexagon 1,5 15 2,8% 0,4 173 135 -22% -19% Europolitan * 6,4 15 2,9% 0,88 48 48 0% 3%
Holmen 1,4 15 3,9% 0,6 254 201 -21% -17% Frango 4,3 26 0,0% 1,27 79 23 -71% -71%
Icon MediaLab 0,2 Neg 0,0% - 2 1,5 -25% -25% Getinge 4,9 15 0,2% 0,16 191 158 -17% -17%
Infinicom 0,2 Neg 0,0% 2,3 0,7 0,22 -69% -69% Heba 5,8 20 3,2% 0,15 79 78 -1% 2%
Investor 0,8 9 4,7% 0,6 117 51 -56% -52% Hennes & Mauritz 11,2 35 0,8% 0,83 208 180 -13% -13%
Kabe 1,3 8 3,0% 0,3 59 66 12% 15% HL display 4,0 18 1,1% 0,23 148 72 -51% -50%
Kungsleden 1,4 9 7,4% 0,2 142 142 0% 7% HQ.se fonder 36,7 30 0,0% - 80 71 -11% -11%
Latour 0,9 6 3,9% 0,6 206 101 -51% -47% Human care HC 7,6 20 2,2% 0,39 91 69 -24% -22%
Lundbergs B 1,0 10 3,1% 0,3 188 185 -2% 2% Höganäs 4,0 19 2,4% 0,62 190 144 -24% -22%
Luxonen 0,9 1 0,0% 1,0 42 41 -2% -2% Karo Bio 3,9 Neg 0,0% 1 286 34 -88% -88%
Maxim Pharamceutical 0,7 Neg 0,0% 2,7 56 27 -52% -52% Kraftkommisionen 4,7 Neg 0,0% - 13,5 3 -78% -78%
Midway 0,7 5 5,3% 0,4 14,9 15,3 3% 8% Lightlab 19,5 Neg 0,0% - 2 0,43 -79% -79%
Minidoc Former Araccel 0,7 Neg 0,0% 0,7 7,5 0,5 -93% -93% Meda 4,7 19 0,0% 0,26 82 85 4% 4%
Mogul AB old Mogul.com 0,4 21 0,0% 1,8 7,3 2,8 -62% -62% Micronic Laser system 5,2 Neg 0,0% 1,97 184 30 -84% -84%
Music Network 0,4 1 0,0% - 3,4 4 18% 18% MTG 7,2 50 0,0% 1,18 265 66 -75% -75%
NCC 1,0 10 3,2% 0,5 69 48 -30% -27% Munters 7,0 16 1,3% 0,46 230 183 -20% -19%
Nobel Biocare 1,7 Neg 0,0% 0,5 550 478 -13% -13% NAN 8,6 Neg 0,0% 0,64 12 10,8 -10% -10%
Nordnet 0,8 Neg 0,0% 2,4 2,9 1,7 -41% -41% Net Insight 3,9 Neg 0,0% 2 2,5 1,2 -51% -51%
Pandox 1,2 11 4,8% 0,1 84 61 -27% -23% Nokia 8,6 30 1,2% 1,25 206 128 -38% -37%
Precise Biometric 1,6 Neg 0,0% - 47,3 5,2 -89% -89% Oden Cont. 13,3 46 0,0% - 30 17 -43% -43%
Protect Data 1,6 Neg 0,0% 2,8 34 9,7 -71% -71% Orc Software 22,4 47 1,0% - 222 63 -72% -71%
Pyrosequencing 1,3 Neg 0,0% - 29 5,8 -80% -80% Pricer 5,6 Neg 0,0% 1,34 1 0,5 -50% -50%
Ratos 1,0 3,5 5,8% 0,5 107 97 -9% -4% Proffice 7,3 Neg 0,6% - 43 18 -58% -58%
Realia 0,7 17 5,3% 0,2 95 39 -59% -54% Q-Med 8,8 77 0,0% - 157 86 -45% -45%
Rottneros 1,2 22 3,2% 0,8 10,8 7,6 -30% -26% SBT 7,8 5 0,0% 1,23 0,4 0,2 -50% -50%
Salus Ansvar 0,9 8 0,0% 0,3 7,8 6 -23% -23% Seco Tools 3,9 14 5,2% 0,27 273 225 -18% -12%
SAS 0,6 Neg 0,0% - 78 34 -56% -56% Sectra 14,8 68 0,5% - 61 33 -46% -45%
SCA 1,7 15,1 2,6% 0,4 331 265 -20% -17% Securitas 6,2 41 0,8% 0,73 205 86 -58% -57%
Scanmining 0,4 Neg 0,0% 0,5 1,8 3 67% 67% Semcom 4,9 30 0,0% 1,39 42 7,5 -82% -82%
Sensys Traffic 0,2 Neg 0,0% - 0,34 0,4 18% 18% Senea 4,0 Neg 0,0% 1,53 3,9 4,3 10% 10%
SSAB 1,3 19 4,5% 0,6 110 101 -8% -4% SignOn 9,7 Neg 0,0% - 19,5 2 -90% -90%
Stora Enso 1,5 16 3,1% - 135 81 -40% -37% Swedish Match 6,2 17 2,1% -0,18 69 64 -7% -5%
Strand 0,8 Neg 0,0% - 5,1 0,33 -94% -94% Switchcore 4,6 Neg 0,0% 2,1 10 2,6 -74% -74%
Svenska Orientlinjen 1,2 8 0,0% 0,4 14,9 6,8 -54% -54% Tieto Enator 4,7 21 3,7% - 253 119 -53% -49%
Svolder 1,0 10 5,5% 0,4 64 28 -56% -51% Translink *** 4,5 100 0,0% 1,29 0,2 0 -100% -100%
Teleca 1,0 33 0,0% 2,2 47 24 -49% -49% Tricorona 9,7 Neg 0,0% 1,41 1,2 1,8 47% 47%
Tornet 1,2 12 2,5% 0,1 160 143 -11% -8% TV-4 4,5 16 3,6% 0,61 207 102 -51% -47%
Trelleborg 1,3 16 3,8% 0,3 106 71 -33% -29% WM data 3,9 25 0,8% 1,28 26 8,8 -66% 14%
Wallenstam 0,5 14 2,3% 0,2 86 95 10% 13%
Wihlborg 0,9 12 5,2% 0,3 61,6 66 7% 12%
Volvo 1,1 56 4,0% 0,5 202 155 -23% -19%
Vostok Oil 1,4 64 0,0% - 14,8 1,9 -87% -87%
Öresund 0,9 5 7,0% 0,4 334 271 -19% -12%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
P/E P/B Dividend Yield Beta P0 P1 Return Total return P/E P/Bdend Yield Beta P0 P1 Return Total return
Luxonen 1 0,9 0,0% 1,0 42 41 -2% -2% SCA 15,1 1,7 2,6% 0,4 331 265 -20% -17%
Music Network 1 0,4 0,0% - 3,4 4 18% 18% Stora Enso 16 1,5 3,1% - 135 81 -40% -37%
Custos 2 0,9 7,2% 0,1 201 141 -30% -23% Trelleborg 16 1,3 3,8% 0,3 106 71 -33% -29%
Concordia 3 0,4 3,8% 0,5 15,2 11,5 -24% -21% Fast Partner 17 0,5 0,0% 1,0 6,8 6,6 -3% -3%
Ratos 4 1,0 5,8% 0,5 107 97 -9% -4% Realia 17 0,7 5,3% 0,2 95 39 -59% -54%
Gotlandsbolaget 4 0,8 1,0% -0,1 170 225 32% 33% SSAB 19 1,3 4,5% 0,6 110 101 -8% -4%
Handelsbanken Hyp *** 4 0,5 6,0% 0,0 199 199 0% 6% Mogul AB old Mogul.com 21 0,4 0,0% 1,8 7,3 2,8 -62% -62%
Havsfrun K 4 0,4 5,2% 0,1 143 130 -9% -4% Rottneros 22 1,2 3,2% 0,8 10,8 7,6 -30% -26%
Broström 5 1,0 8,2% - 49 40 -18% -10% Teleca 33 1,0 0,0% 2,2 47 24 -49% -49%
Geveko 5 0,9 6,8% 0,9 133 106 -20% -14% Brio 44 0,9 0,5% 0,1 55 40 -27% -27%
Midway 5 0,7 5,3% 0,4 14,9 15,3 3% 8% Gorthon Lines 47 0,8 5,8% 0,3 17,5 18,3 5% 10%
Öresund 5 0,9 7,0% 0,4 334 271 -19% -12% Volvo 56 1,1 4,0% 0,5 202 155 -23% -19%
Latour 6 0,9 3,9% 0,6 206 101 -51% -47% Vostok Oil 64 1,4 0,0% - 14,8 1,9 -87% -87%
Columna *** 7 0,6 0,0% 0,0 0,39 0,39 0% 0% A-com Neg 0,3 0,0% - 6 1,5 -75% -75%
Kabe 8 1,3 3,0% 0,3 59 66 12% 15% Array Neg 0,2 0,0% 1,2 0,74 0,31 -58% -58%
Salus Ansvar 8 0,9 0,0% 0,3 7,8 6 -23% -23% Borås Wäfveri Neg 0,7 2,2% 0,2 46 27 -41% -39%
Svenska Orientlinjen 8 1,2 0,0% 0,4 14,9 6,8 -54% -54% Cell Network Neg 0,1 0,0% 3,0 1,5 0,41 -73% -73%
Investor 9 0,8 4,7% 0,6 117 51 -56% -52% Daydream Neg 0,2 0,0% 1,6 1,2 0,42 -65% -65%
Kungsleden 9 1,4 7,4% 0,2 142 142 0% 7% Empire Neg 0,4 0,0% - 8 5,8 -28% -28%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt 10 0,5 6,5% 0,1 15,2 8,9 -41% -35% Icon MediaLab Neg 0,2 0,0% - 2 1,5 -25% -25%
Lundbergs B 10 1,0 3,1% 0,3 188 185 -2% 2% Infinicom Neg 0,2 0,0% 2,3 0,7 0,22 -69% -69%
NCC 10 1,0 3,2% 0,5 69 48 -30% -27% Maxim Pharamceutical Neg 0,7 0,0% 2,7 56 27 -52% -52%
Svolder 10 1,0 5,5% 0,4 64 28 -56% -51% Minidoc Former Araccel Neg 0,7 0,0% 0,7 7,5 0,5 -93% -93%
Celtica 11 0,9 0,0% -0,1 84 49 -42% -42% Nobel Biocare Neg 1,7 0,0% 0,5 550 478 -13% -13%
Pandox 11 1,2 4,8% 0,1 84 61 -27% -23% Nordnet Neg 0,8 0,0% 2,4 2,9 1,7 -41% -41%
Castellum 12 1,3 5,6% 0,2 116 113 -3% 3% Precise Biometric Neg 1,6 0,0% - 47,3 5,2 -89% -89%
Tornet 12 1,2 2,5% 0,1 160 143 -11% -8% Protect Data Neg 1,6 0,0% 2,8 34 9,7 -71% -71%
Wihlborg 12 0,9 5,2% 0,3 61,6 66 7% 12% Pyrosequencing Neg 1,3 0,0% - 29 5,8 -80% -80%
Avestapolarit * 14 1,5 1,5% - 48 53 10% 12% SAS Neg 0,6 0,0% - 78 34 -56% -56%
Esselte *** 14 0,8 1,7% 0,5 62 62 0% 2% Scanmining Neg 0,4 0,0% 0,5 1,8 3 67% 67%
Wallenstam 14 0,5 2,3% 0,2 86 95 10% 13% Sensys Traffic Neg 0,2 0,0% - 0,34 0,4 18% 18%
Hexagon 15 1,5 2,8% 0,4 173 135 -22% -19% Strand Neg 0,8 0,0% - 5,1 0,33 -94% -94%
Holmen 15 1,4 3,9% 0,6 254 201 -21% -17%

P/E P/B Dividend Yield Beta P0 P1 Return Total return P/E P/Bdend Yield Beta P0 P1 Return Total return
SBT 5 7,8 0,0% 1,2 0,4 0,2 -50% -50% Orc Software 47 22,4 1,0% - 222 63 -72% -71%
Acsc 13 4,4 0,2% - 68 43 -37% -37% MTG 50 7,2 0,0% 1,2 265 66 -75% -75%
Beijer Electronics 14 5,5 3,2% - 17 51 200% 203% Sectra 68 14,8 0,5% - 61 33 -46% -45%
Seco Tools 14 3,9 5,2% 0,3 273 225 -18% -12% Q-Med 77 8,8 0,0% - 157 86 -45% -45%
Akzo Nobel *** 15 6,2 2,3% 0,5 475 475 0% 2% Ericsson 78 4,9 0,0% 2,2 21 6 -71% -71%
Europolitan * 15 6,4 2,9% 0,9 48 48 0% 3% Translink *** 100 4,5 0,0% 1,3 0,2 0 -100% -100%
Getinge 15 4,9 0,2% 0,2 191 158 -17% -17% ABB Neg 5,2 0,0% - 91 22 -76% -76%
Munters 16 7,0 1,3% 0,5 230 183 -20% -19% Addera Neg 9,9 0,0% - 1,4 0,28 -80% -80%
TV-4 16 4,5 3,6% 0,6 207 102 -51% -47% Aqua Terrena Neg 50,7 0,0% - 2 1,1 -45% -45%
Swedish Match 17 6,2 2,1% -0,2 69 64 -7% -5% Bioinvent INT Neg 6,5 0,0% - 37 10 -73% -73%
Axfood 18 6,4 1,7% 0,1 145 157 8% 10% Boliden Neg 15,1 0,0% - 45 45 0% 0%
HL display 18 4,0 1,1% 0,2 148 72 -51% -50% Cartesia Neg 5,5 0,0% - 2,9 1,45 -50% -50%
Höganäs 19 4,0 2,4% 0,6 190 144 -24% -22% Cashguard Neg 21,5 0,0% 2,2 16,7 3,1 -81% -81%
Meda 19 4,7 0,0% 0,3 82 85 4% 4% Cell point ** Neg 15,5 0,0% - 5,9 0 -100% -100%
Heba 20 5,8 3,2% 0,2 79 78 -1% 2% Conpharm Neg 4,6 0,0% - 3,3 1,4 -58% -58%
Human care HC 20 7,6 2,2% 0,4 91 69 -24% -22% CTT systems Neg 5,7 0,0% 1,8 46 20 -57% -57%
Tieto Enator 21 4,7 3,7% - 253 119 -53% -49% Diamyd med Neg 4,0 0,0% 0,9 32 20 -38% -38%
WM data 25 3,9 0,8% 1,3 26 8,8 -66% 14% Digital Illusion Neg 7,1 0,0% 1,1 39 28 -28% -28%
Frango 26 4,3 0,0% 1,3 79 23 -71% -71% Karo Bio Neg 3,9 0,0% 1,0 286 34 -88% -88%
Astra Zeneca 30 8,7 1,4% - 510 297 -42% -40% Kraftkommisionen Neg 4,7 0,0% - 13,5 3 -78% -78%
HQ.se fonder 30 36,7 0,0% - 79,5 71 -11% -11% Lightlab Neg 19,5 0,0% - 2 0,43 -79% -79%
Nokia 30 8,6 1,2% 1,3 206 128 -38% -37% Micronic Laser system Neg 5,2 0,0% 2,0 184 30 -84% -84%
Semcom 30 4,9 0,0% 1,4 42 7,5 -82% -82% NAN Neg 8,6 0,0% 0,6 12 10,8 -10% -10%
Boss Media 33 4,4 0,0% - 11,7 4,1 -65% -65% Net Insight Neg 3,9 0,0% 2 2,45 1,2 -51% -51%
Clas Ohlson 34 12,5 1,2% 0,6 172 145 -16% -14% Pricer Neg 5,6 0,0% 1,3 1 0,5 -50% -50% Explanations to *
Hennes & Mauritz 35 11,2 0,8% 0,8 208 180 -13% -13% Proffice Neg 7,3 0,6% - 43 18 -58% -58% Acquired by another company *
Biacore 36 5,1 0,0% 1,4 261 161 -38% -38% Senea Neg 4,0 0,0% 1,5 3,9 4,3 10% 10% Bankrupt **
Eniro 36 5,4 0,8% 0,9 86 57 -34% -33% SignOn Neg 9,7 0,0% - 19,5 2 -90% -90% Delisted ***
Securitas 41 6,2 0,8% 0,7 205 86 -58% -57% Switchcore Neg 4,6 0,0% 2,1 10 2,6 -74% -74%
Oden Cont. 46 13,3 0,0% - 30 17 -43% -43% Tricorona Neg 9,7 0,0% 1,4 1,2 1,76 47% 47%

ABB 1,2 Neg 0,0% - 22 46 109% 109% Addnode old Adera 3,6 Neg 0,0% - 28 19,2 -31% -31%
A-com 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 1,13 0,89 -21% -21% Alfa Laval 5,7 31 2,6% - 74 103 39% 42%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt 0,3 Neg 0,0% 0,1 8,9 17,2 93% 93% Approach ** 3,6 Neg 0,0% - 0,07 0 -100% -100%
Bioinvent INT 0,8 Neg 0,0% - 10 11,5 15% 15% Aqua Terrena 24,0 Neg 0,0% 1,0 1,1 0,91 -17% -17%
Biotage Old Pyrosequencing 0,3 Neg 0,0% - 5,8 10,7 84% 84% Astra Zeneca 5,2 22 2,0% - 297 363 22% 24%
Boliden 0,6 26 0,0% - 30 33 10% 10% Axfood 4,9 12 3,2% 0,2 157 178 13% 17%
Borås Wäfveri 0,3 Neg 0,0% 0,2 27 33 22% 22% Beijer Electronics 3,6 11 5,4% - 51 67 31% 37%
Brio 0,6 10 0,0% 0,2 40 47 18% 18% Biacore 2,9 15 1,8% 1,5 161 188 17% 19%
Broström 0,8 9 7,4% 0,3 40 85 113% 120% Biora * 5,1 Neg 0,0% 1,4 12,1 17 40% 40%
Castellum 0,6 5 6,6% 0,2 113 188 66% 73% Cashguard 3,0 77 0,0% 2,5 3,1 8 158% 158%
Celtica * 0,8 Neg 0,0% 0,0 49 49 0% 0% Clas Ohlson 8,2 22 1,4% 0,6 145 195 34% 36%
Concordia 0,3 Neg 0,0% 0,6 11,5 19,1 66% 66% CTT systems 2,9 Neg 0,0% 1,9 20 20 0% 0%
Custos 0,8 6 8,9% 0,0 141 143 1% 10% Diffchamb * 3,7 39 0,0% 0,4 42 42 0% 0%
Empire *** 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 5,8 5,8 0% 0% Digital Illusion 2,6 32 0,0% 1,2 28 83 196% 196%
Fast Partner 0,5 16 0,0% 0,8 6,6 13,4 103% 103% Doro 3,2 12 0,0% 1,2 7,8 11 41% 41%
Geveko 0,7 4 8,5% 1,0 106 177 67% 75% Facial & Co 6,9 Neg 0,0% - 13 17 31% 31%
Gorthon Lines 0,8 6 4,5% 0,1 18,3 22 20% 25% Getinge 2,7 10 2,7% 0,3 39,5 84 113% 115%
Gotlandsbolaget *** 1,1 7 0,7% -0,1 225 225 0% 1% Glocalnet 5,0 Neg 0,0% 3,0 1,8 3,79 111% 111%
Havsfrun K 0,6 4 5,8% 0,4 130 310 138% 144% Heba 5,0 20 3,1% 0,2 78 91 17% 20%
Hexagon 1,2 9 3,4% 0,4 135 252 87% 90% Hennes & Mauritz 7,8 19 3,3% 0,8 180 206 14% 18%
Holmen 1,0 7 5,5% 0,5 201 218 8% 14% HQ.se fonder 7,1 10 7,0% - 71 103 45% 52%
Icon MediaLab 1,0 Neg 0,0% 2,8 1,5 3,6 140% 140% Human care HC 4,1 16 3,4% 0,4 69 69 0% 3%
Investor 0,3 55 6,7% 0,8 51 79 55% 62% Höganäs 2,8 11 3,5% 0,4 144 175 22% 25%
Kraftkommisionen 0,4 Neg 0,0% - 3 6 100% 100% Infinicom 13,6 1 0,0% 2,9 0,22 0,35 59% 59%
Kungsleden 0,8 9 8,7% - 142 214 51% 59% Jeeves 7,2 12 0,0% 1,9 15,3 30 96% 96%
Latour 0,4 3 5,4% 0,7 101 159 57% 63% LifeAssays 6,3 Neg 3,0% - 0,29 0,3 3% 6%
Lightlab 0,8 Neg 0,0% 1,1 0,4 0,7 63% 63% Meda 2,9 13 0,0% 0,5 85 190 124% 124%
Lundbergs B 0,9 9 3,2% 0,2 185 224 21% 24% Munters 4,5 11 1,9% 0,2 183 186 2% 4%
Luxonen 0,8 2 0,0% 0,5 41 56 37% 37% NAN 4,6 34 0,0% 0,6 10,8 20 85% 85%
Mandator old Cell Network 0,8 Neg 0,0% 3,5 1,4 1,38 1% 1% NetOnNet 2,9 Neg 0,0% - 41 115 180% 180%
Micronic Laser system 0,9 Neg 0,0% - 15 69 360% 360% Nibe Industries 3,1 12 2,1% 0,4 63,5 117 84% 86%
Midway 0,7 15 6,5% 0,4 15,3 19,5 27% 34% Nobel Biocare 6,3 27 1,0% - 478 1059 122% 123%
Mogul AB * 0,7 Neg 0,0% 2,2 2,8 2,8 0% 0% Nokia 4,7 14 2,0% 1,4 128 128 0% 2%
NCC 0,7 7 5,7% 0,6 48 57 19% 24% Obducat 10,9 Neg 0,0% 2,9 1,1 3,6 227% 227%
Pandox * 0,8 7 7,0% 0,3 61 108 77% 84% Oden Cont. 7,6 Neg 0,0% - 17 15,5 -9% -9%
Precise Biometric 0,7 Neg 0,0% - 5,2 0 -100% -100% Orc Software 3,9 9 4,7% - 63 85 35% 40%
Protect Data 0,8 Neg 0,0% 2,7 9,7 44 354% 354% Perbio Science * 3,2 13 1,5% - 101 101 0% 2%
Ratos 0,9 3 7,0% 0,5 97 116 20% 27% Persea * 2,7 9 3,1% - 12,7 12,7 0% 3%
Realia 0,6 Neg 5,2% 0,0 39 40 3% 8% Pharmacia Corp * 3,9 29 1,9% - 392 403 3% 5%
Rottneros 0,9 17 3,9% 0,7 7,6 10,4 37% 41% PowerIT PS 2,6 Neg 0,0% 1,4 2,4 2,5 4% 4%
Salus Ansvar 0,6 6 0,0% 0,3 6 16,9 182% 182% Pricer 2,8 Neg 0,0% 1,3 0,5 1,5 200% 200%
SAS 0,3 11 0,0% - 34 71 109% 109% Proffice 3,2 70 1,4% - 18 22 22% 24%
SCA 1,1 10 3,6% 0,3 265 308 16% 20% Q-Med 4,8 Neg 0,0% - 86 224 160% 160%
Scanmining 1,0 Neg 0,0% 0,2 3 8,6 187% 187% Riddarhyttan Res 3,2 Neg 0,0% 1,0 4,5 6,4 42% 42%
Semcom 0,9 17 0,0% 1,8 7,5 27 260% 260% Sardus 2,8 12 5,4% 0,3 84 113 35% 40%
SSAB 1,1 14 5,9% 0,6 101 138 37% 43% SBT 21,1 Neg 0,0% 1,2 0,2 0,25 25% 25%
Stora Enso 0,9 14 5,1% 0,4 81 98 21% 26% Scandiaconsult * 2,9 10 10,7% 0,4 47 47 0% 11%
Strand 0,3 Neg 0,0% 4,0 0,33 1,2 264% 264% Seco Tools 3,2 11 6,1% 0,3 225 298 32% 39%
Strålfors 0,7 15 5,1% 0,4 35 48 37% 42% Sectra 6,7 25 1,2% 1,2 33 58 76% 77%
Svenska Orientlinjen 0,6 Neg 0,0% 0,2 6,8 7 3% 3% Securitas 2,7 16 2,3% 0,9 86 114 33% 35%
Switchcore 1,2 Neg 0,0% 3,0 2,6 4,5 73% 73% Senea 6,2 Neg 0,0% 1,6 4,3 4,3 0% 0%
Svolder 0,7 Neg 5,3% 0,8 28 43 54% 59% Sensys Traffic 3,8 Neg 0,0% - 0,4 0,42 5% 5%
Teleca 1,0 15 3,1% 2,1 24 45 88% 91% SignOn 17,8 Neg 0,0% - 0,3 1,1 230% 230%
Tornet 0,9 5 3,1% 0,2 143 217 52% 55% Sintercast 8,1 Neg 0,0% 0,3 47 54 15% 15%
Trelleborg 0,8 11 6,0% 0,4 71 143 101% 107% Stille 3,9 56 0,0% 1,6 0,4 0,25 -38% -38%
Tricorona 0,3 Neg 0,0% 0,7 1,76 1,5 -15% -15% Swedish Match 5,8 15 2,5% -0,2 64 81 27% 29%
Wihlborg 0,8 10 6,8% 0,3 66 99 50% 57% TITE old Aurex 3,8 Neg 0,0% 0,3 0,15 0,24 60% 60%
Volvo 0,9 27 5,4% 0,6 155 258 66% 72% Wallenstam 2,6 14 4,2% 0,2 95 200 111% 115%
Vostok Oil 0,2 Neg 0,0% - 1,9 1,3 -32% -32%
Öresund 0,9 4 7,4% 0,4 271 442 63% 70%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Delisted
Luxonen 2 0,8 0,0% 0,5 41 56 37% 37% Rottneros 17 0,9 3,9% 0,7 7,6 10,4 37% 41%
Latour 3 0,4 5,4% 0,7 101 159 57% 63% Semcom 17 0,9 0,0% 1,8 7,5 27 260% 260%
Ratos 3 0,9 7,0% 0,5 97 116 20% 27% Boliden 26 0,6 0,0% - 30 33 10% 10%
Geveko 4 0,7 8,5% 1,0 106 177 67% 75% Volvo 27 0,9 5,4% 0,6 155 258 66% 72%
Havsfrun K 4 0,6 5,8% 0,4 130 310 138% 144% Investor 55 0,3 6,7% 0,8 51 79 55% 62%
Öresund 4 0,9 7,4% 0,4 271 442 63% 70% ABB Neg 1,2 0,0% - 22 46 109% 109%
Castellum 5 0,6 6,6% 0,2 113 188 66% 73% A-com Neg 0,4 0,0% - 1,125 0,89 -21% -21%
Tornet 5 0,9 3,1% 0,2 143 217 52% 55% B&N Nordsjöfrakt Neg 0,3 0,0% 0,1 8,9 17,2 93% 93%
Custos 6 0,8 8,9% 0,0 141 143 1% 10% Bioinvent INT Neg 0,8 0,0% - 10 11,5 15% 15%
Gorthon Lines 6 0,8 4,5% 0,1 18,3 22 20% 25% Biotage Old Pyrosequencing Neg 0,3 0,0% - 5,8 10,7 84% 84%
Salus Ansvar 6 0,6 0,0% 0,3 6 16,9 182% 182% Borås Wäfveri Neg 0,3 0,0% 0,2 27 33 22% 22%
Gotlandsbolaget *** 7 1,1 0,7% -0,1 225 225 0% 1% Celtica * Neg 0,8 0,0% 0,0 49 49 0% 0%
Holmen 7 1,0 5,5% 0,5 201 218 8% 14% Concordia Neg 0,3 0,0% 0,6 11,5 19,1 66% 66%
NCC 7 0,7 5,7% 0,6 48 57 19% 24% Empire *** Neg 0,4 0,0% - 5,8 5,8 0% 0%
Pandox * 7 0,8 7,0% 0,3 61 108 77% 84% Icon MediaLab Neg 1,0 0,0% 2,8 1,5 3,6 140% 140%
Broström 9 0,8 7,4% 0,3 40 85 113% 120% Kraftkommisionen Neg 0,4 0,0% - 3 6 100% 100%
Hexagon 9 1,2 3,4% 0,4 135 252 87% 90% Lightlab Neg 0,8 0,0% 1,1 0,4 0,7 63% 63%
Kungsleden 9 0,8 8,7% - 142 214 51% 59% Mandator old Cell Network Neg 0,8 0,0% 3,5 1,4 1,38 1% 1%
Lundbergs B 9 0,9 3,2% 0,2 185 224 21% 24% Micronic Laser system Neg 0,9 0,0% 2,0 15 69 360% 360%
Brio 10 0,6 0,0% 0,2 40 47 18% 18% Mogul AB * Neg 0,7 0,0% 2,2 2,8 2,8 0% 0%
SCA 10 1,1 3,6% 0,3 265 308 16% 20% Precise Biometric Neg 0,7 0,0% - 5,2 0 -100% -100%
Wihlborg 10 0,8 6,8% 0,3 66 99 50% 57% Protect Data Neg 0,8 0,0% 2,7 9,7 44 354% 354%
SAS 11 0,3 0,0% - 34 71 109% 109% Realia Neg 0,6 5,2% 0,0 39 40 3% 8%
Trelleborg 11 0,8 6,0% 0,4 71 143 101% 107% Scanmining Neg 1,0 0,0% 0,2 3 8,6 187% 187%
SSAB 14 1,1 5,9% 0,6 101 138 37% 43% Strand Neg 0,3 0,0% 4,0 0,33 1,2 264% 264%
Stora Enso 14 0,9 5,1% 0,4 81 98 21% 26% Svenska Orientlinjen Neg 0,6 0,0% 0,2 6,8 7 3% 3%
Midway 15 0,7 6,5% 0,4 15,3 19,5 27% 34% Switchcore Neg 1,2 0,0% 3,0 2,6 4,5 73% 73%
Strålfors 15 0,7 5,1% 0,4 35 48 37% 42% Svolder Neg 0,7 5,3% 0,8 28 43 54% 59%
Teleca 15 1,0 3,1% 2,1 24 45 88% 91% Tricorona Neg 0,3 0,0% 0,7 1,76 1,5 -15% -15%
Fast Partner 16 0,5 0,0% 0,8 6,6 13,4 103% 103% Vostok Oil Neg 0,2 0,0% - 1,9 1,3 -32% -32%

Infinicom 1 13,6 0,0% 2,9 0,22 0,35 59% 59% Pharmacia Corp * 29 3,9 1,9% - 392 403 3% 5%
Orc Software 9 3,9 4,7% - 63 85 35% 40% Alfa Laval 31 5,7 2,6% - 74 103 39% 42%
Persea * 9 2,7 3,1% - 12,7 12,7 0% 3% Digital Illusion 32 2,6 0,0% 1,2 28 83 196% 196%
Getinge 10 2,7 2,7% 0,3 39,5 84 113% 115% NAN 34 4,6 0,0% 0,6 10,8 20 85% 85%
HQ.se fonder 10 7,1 7,0% - 71 103 45% 52% Diffchamb * 39 3,7 0,0% 0,4 42 42 0% 0%
Scandiaconsult * 10 2,9 10,7% 0,4 47 47 0% 11% Stille 56 3,9 0,0% 1,6 0,4 0,25 -38% -38%
Beijer Electronics 11 3,6 5,4% - 51 67 31% 37% Proffice 70 3,2 1,4% - 18 22 22% 24%
Höganäs 11 2,8 3,5% 0,4 144 175 22% 25% Cashguard 77 3,0 0,0% 2,5 3,1 8 158% 158%
Munters 11 4,5 1,9% 0,2 183 186 2% 4% Addnode old Adera Neg 3,6 0,0% - 28 19,2 -31% -31%
Seco Tools 11 3,2 6,1% 0,3 225 298 32% 39% Approach ** Neg 3,6 0,0% - 0,07 0 -100% -100%
Axfood 12 4,9 3,2% 0,2 157 178 13% 17% Aqua Terrena Neg 24 0,0% 1,0 1,1 0,91 -17% -17%
Doro 12 3,2 0,0% 1,2 7,8 11 41% 41% Biora * Neg 5,1 0,0% 1,4 12,1 17 40% 40%
Jeeves 12 7,2 0,0% 1,9 15,3 30 96% 96% CTT systems Neg 2,9 0,0% 1,9 20 20 0% 0%
Nibe Industries 12 3,1 2,1% 0,4 63,5 117 84% 86% Facial & Co Neg 6,9 0,0% - 13 17 31% 31%
Sardus 12 2,8 5,4% 0,3 84 113 35% 40% Glocalnet Neg 5,0 0,0% 3,0 1,8 3,79 111% 111%
Meda 13 2,9 0,0% 0,5 85 190 124% 124% LifeAssays Neg 6,3 3,0% - 0,29 0,3 3% 6%
Perbio Science * 13 3,2 1,5% - 101 101 0% 2% NetOnNet Neg 2,9 0,0% - 41 115 180% 180%
Nokia 14 4,7 2,0% 1,4 128 128 0% 2% Obducat Neg 11 0,0% 2,9 1,1 3,6 227% 227%
Wallenstam 14 2,6 4,2% 0,2 95 200 111% 115% Oden Cont. Neg 7,6 0,0% - 17 15,5 -9% -9%
Biacore 15 2,9 1,8% 1,5 161 188 17% 19% PowerIT PS Neg 2,6 0,0% 1,4 2,4 2,5 4% 4%
Swedish Match 15 5,8 2,5% -0,2 64 81 27% 29% Pricer Neg 2,8 0,0% 1,3 0,5 1,5 200% 200%
Human care HC 16 4,1 3,4% 0,4 69 69 0% 3% Q-Med Neg 4,8 0,0% - 86 224 160% 160%
Securitas 16 2,7 2,3% 0,9 86 114 33% 35% Riddarhyttan Res Neg 3,2 0,0% 1,0 4,5 6,4 42% 42%
Hennes & Mauritz 19 7,8 3,3% 0,8 180 206 14% 18% SBT Neg 21 0,0% 1,2 0,2 0,25 25% 25%
Heba 20 5,0 3,1% 0,2 78 91 17% 20% Senea Neg 6,2 0,0% 1,6 4,3 4,3 0% 0% Explanations to *
Astra Zeneca 22 5,2 2,0% - 297 363 22% 24% Sensys Traffic Neg 3,8 0,0% - 0,4 0,42 5% 5% Acquired by another*
Clas Ohlson 22 8,2 1,4% 0,6 145 195 34% 36% SignOn Neg 18 0,0% - 0,33 1,1 230% 230% Bankrupt **
Sectra 25 6,7 1,2% 1,2 33 58 76% 77% Sintercast Neg 8,1 0,0% 0,3 47 54 15% 15% Delisted ***
Nobel Biocare 27 6,3 1,0% - 478 1059 122% 123% TITE old Aurex Neg 3,8 0,0% 0,3 0,15 0,24 60% 60% Delisted
No. O 29 Return 44% No. O 29 Return 57%

Avg B 0,72 Risk-adjusted return 58% Avg B 1,38 Risk-adjusted return 39%
Div. Y 2,9% Div. Y 0,3%
Media 12,0 Media Neg
Risk-f 2,8% Risk-f 2,8%
A-com 0,9 Neg 0,0% 1,2 0,89 0,58 -35% -35% Aqua Terrena 9,4 Neg 0,0% 1,2 0,91 0,21 -77% -77%
Addnode 1,2 47 0,0% 2,3 19,2 18,9 -2% -2% Astra Zeneca 6,4 24 1,6% 0,3 363 284 -22% -20%
Autoliv 1,9 14 1,0% 1,0 323 344 7% 8% Boss Media 8,3 54 0,0% 2,6 21 33 57% 57%
B&N Nordsjöfrakt 0,6 Neg 0,0% 0,4 17,2 24 40% 40% Carnegie & Co 5,4 17 3,4% - 93 89 -4% -1%
Ballingslöv 1,8 10 3,7% - 77 130 69% 73% Cashguard 8,3 Neg 0,0% 1,8 8 10,1 26% 26%
Beijer Alma 1,7 43 1,5% 1,2 86 122 42% 43% Cherry Företagen 8,9 Neg 0,0% 1,8 21 33 57% 57%
Bilia 1,7 8 4,8% 0,4 88 133 51% 56% Clas Ohlson 8,7 22 1,6% 0,6 97,5 150 54% 55%
Bioinvent INT 0,9 Neg 0,0% - 11,5 12,5 9% 9% Countermine 30,5 Neg 0,0% 1,8 5,1 3 -41% -41%
Biotage 0,6 Neg 0,0% - 10,7 11,8 10% 10% CTT systems 5,9 Neg 0,0% 1,6 20 13,5 -33% -33%
Boliden 1,4 Neg 0,0% 1,4 33 34 3% 3% Diamyd Med 15,2 Neg 0,0% 1,0 78 48 -38% -38%
Bong Ljungdal 0,7 Neg 0,0% 0,3 33 43 30% 30% Digital Illusion 7,1 23 1,1% 1,2 83 61 -27% -25%
Borås Wäfveri 0,5 Neg 0,0% 0,1 33 30 -9% -9% Ericsson 6,2 Neg 0,0% 3,1 23 21 -9% -9%
Brio 0,7 Neg 0,0% 0,0 47 72 53% 53% Flyme 10,2 Neg 0,0% 1,8 0,89 0,15 -83% -83%
Broström 1,8 12 5,3% 0,6 85 118 39% 44% Framfab 7,7 Neg 0,0% 2,8 0,91 0,5 -45% -45%
C F Berg 0,7 11 1,5% 0,1 16,2 17,5 8% 10% Getinge 5,3 18 1,6% 0,6 84 99 18% 19%
Castellum 1,0 14 4,5% 0,3 188 231 23% 27% Getupdated 25,2 Neg 0,0% -0,4 0,62 0,1 -84% -84%
Concordia 0,8 9 2,6% 0,6 19,1 35 83% 86% Gexco 6,7 Neg 0,0% - 0,26 0,18 -31% -31%
Custos * 1,0 4 0,0% - 143 143 0% 0% Glocalnet 9,8 25 0,0% 2,3 3,79 3 -21% -21%
Duroc 0,5 Neg 0,0% 0,9 14,5 17,6 21% 21% Heba 5,9 19 2,6% 0,3 91 115 26% 29%
Fast Partner 0,7 33 3,7% 0,2 13,4 20 49% 53% Hennes & Mauritz 8,9 22 2,9% 0,7 206 233 13% 16%
Finnveden * 1,7 19 0,0% 1,4 63 63 0% 0% HQ.se fonder 9,0 13 5,3% - 103 124 20% 26%
Geveko 1,1 7 5,6% 1,0 177 193 9% 15% Inac 7,1 Neg 0,0% 0,4 7,9 4,3 -46% -46%
Gorthon Lines 1,0 14 4,6% 0,3 22 24 9% 14% Jeeves 8,0 25 1,3% 2,1 30 49 63% 65%
Havsfrun K 0,7 9 4,8% 0,3 310 297 -4% 1% LB Icon Former:Icon MediaLab 10,8 Neg 0,0% 2,5 36 32 -11% -11%
Hexagon 2,1 17 1,8% 0,7 252 380 51% 53% LifeAssays 6,1 Neg 0,0% - 0,3 0,24 -20% -20%
Holmen 1,1 13 18,3% 0,7 218 228 5% 23% Lightlab 6,3 Neg 0,0% 0,7 0,7 0,19 -73% -73%
Infinicom 0,6 Neg 0,0% 2,6 0,35 0,26 -26% -26% Lundin Petrolium 8,9 23 0,0% - 33 54 64% 64%
Investor 0,7 87 2,8% 1,0 79 98 24% 27% Mandator 7,4 Neg 0,0% 3,3 1,38 1,5 9% 9%
JC 0,7 Neg 0,0% - 34 110 224% 224% Meda 6,7 38 1,1% 0,7 136 283 109% 110%
Kungsleden 1,1 11 6,1% 0,2 214 273 28% 34% Micro Sys 18,7 16 0,0% 1,7 1,8 1,7 -6% -6%
Latour 1,1 21 3,8% 0,7 159 175 10% 14% Multiq 6,0 96 0,0% 1,4 6,3 4,8 -24% -24%
Lundbergs B 1,0 11 2,9% 0,2 224 318 42% 45% NAN 5,3 17,4 0,0% 0,6 20 13,3 -34% -34%
Luxonen 0,9 2 0,0% 0,1 56 76 36% 36% NetOnNet 6,7 Neg 0,0% - 115 85 -26% -26%
Midway 1,0 19 6,4% 0,5 19,5 34 74% 81% Netwise 5,5 16 0,0% - 38 41 8% 8%
NCC 1,0 29 5,0% 0,6 57 114 100% 105% Nobel Biocare 13,7 41 0,7% - 1059 1475 39% 40%
Nilörngruppen 1,0 Neg 0,0% 0,4 57 41 -28% -28% Nocom 7,9 22 0,0% 2,7 5,7 4,6 -19% -19%
Nobia 1,6 8 3,1% - 73 133 82% 85% Novacast 16,8 Neg 0,0% 0,5 20 35 75% 75%
PEAB 1,5 22 4,7% 0,3 46 77 67% 72% Obducat 41,0 Neg 0,0% 1,1 3,6 1,6 -56% -56%
Ratos 1,1 4 6,3% 0,5 116 169 46% 52% Oden Control 5,3 25,5 0,0% - 15,5 9 -42% -42%
Realia 0,8 17 0,0% -0,3 40 61 53% 53% Orc Software 5,3 18 4,0% - 85 54 -36% -32%
Rottneros 1,1 16 2,9% 0,8 10,4 7,5 -28% -25% Paynova 9,0 Neg 0,0% - 6,7 7,6 13% 13%
Salus Ansvar 1,6 17 4,1% 0,5 16,9 29 72% 76% Pricer 6,1 Neg 0,0% 1,6 1,5 0,94 -37% -37%
SAS 0,8 Neg 0,0% - 71 73 3% 3% Proffice 5,6 41 0,0% 1,5 22 14,2 -35% -35%
SCA 1,3 13 3,4% 0,4 308 262 -15% -12% Q-Med 13,4 26 0,0% 1,1 224 192 -14% -14%
SSAB 1,4 13 4,4% 0,6 138 177 28% 33% Raysearch Lab 18,4 30 0,0% 0,7 41 62 51% 51%
Stora Enso 0,9 32 4,2% 0,7 98 105 7% 11% Readsoft 6,8 86 0,0% 1,7 14,3 21 47% 47%
Strand 1,1 Neg 0,0% 4,9 1,2 0,95 -21% -21% Sectra 9,4 38 0,9% 0,5 58 80 38% 39%
Strålfors 1,0 94 3,6% 0,5 48 66 38% 41% Senea 7,0 30 0,0% 1,1 4,3 2,8 -35% -35%
Studsvik 1,7 20 0,0% - 95 96 1% 1% SignOn 9,9 Neg 0,0% - 1,1 1,2 9% 9%
Svolder 1,0 5 5,8% 0,8 43 47 9% 15% Sintercast 5,6 Neg 0,0% 0,5 54 61 13% 13%
Teleca 1,4 29 0,0% 1,8 45 40 -11% -11% Stille Neg Neg 0,0% 1,1 0,25 0,24 -4% -4%
TITE 1,1 2 0,0% 0,3 0,24 0,15 -38% -38% Swedish Match 7,3 17 2,1% -0,2 81 81 0% 2%
Tornet * 1,2 16 2,5% 0,3 217 190 -12% -10% Switchcore 6,6 Neg 0,0% 2,1 3,75 1,7 -55% -55%
Trelleborg 1,8 13 3,1% 0,8 143 127 -11% -8% Tanganyika 45,6 Neg 0,0% - 38 46 21% 21%
Tricorona 0,5 Neg 0,0% 0,5 1,5 2,2 47% 47%
Wallenstam 1,1 14 3,0% 0,3 200 366 83% 86%
West Siberian Oil Ltd Former: Vostok Oil 0,6 Neg 0,0% - 1,3 1,59 22% 22%
Wihlborg 0,9 10 6,1% 0,3 99 149 51% 57%
Volvo 1,5 29 3,1% 0,9 258 319 24% 27%
Öresund 1,1 7 4,8% 0,4 147,33 185 26% 30%

Explanations to *
Bankrupt **
Delisted ***
Delisted
Luxonen 2 0,9 0,0% 0,1 56 76 36% 36% Finnveden * 19 1,7 0,0% 1,4 63 63 0% 0%
TITE 2 1,1 0,0% 0,3 0,24 0,15 -38% -38% Midway 19 1,0 6,4% 0,5 19,5 34 74% 81%
Custos * 4 1,0 0,0% - 143 143 0% 0% Studsvik 20 1,7 0,0% - 95 96 1% 1%
Ratos 4 1,1 6,3% 0,5 116 169 46% 52% Latour 21 1,1 3,8% 0,7 159 175 10% 14%
Svolder 5 1,0 5,8% 0,8 43 47 9% 15% PEAB 22 1,5 4,7% 0,3 46 77 67% 72%
Geveko 7 1,1 5,6% 1,0 177 193 9% 15% NCC 29 1,0 5,0% 0,6 57 114 100% 105%
Öresund 7 1,1 4,8% 0,4 147 185 26% 30% Teleca 29 1,4 0,0% 1,8 45 40 -11% -11%
Bilia 8 1,7 4,8% 0,4 88 133 51% 56% Volvo 29 1,5 3,1% 0,9 258 319 24% 27%
Nobia 8 1,6 3,1% - 73 133 82% 85% Stora Enso 32 0,9 4,2% 0,7 98 105 7% 11%
Concordia 9 0,8 2,6% 0,6 19,1 35 83% 86% Fast Partner 33 0,7 3,7% 0,2 13,4 20 49% 53%
Havsfrun K 9 0,7 4,8% 0,3 310 297 -4% 1% Beijer Alma 43 1,7 1,5% 1,2 86 122 42% 43%
Ballingslöv 10 1,8 3,7% - 77 130 69% 73% Addnode 47 1,2 0,0% 2,3 19,2 18,9 -2% -2%
Wihlborg 10 0,9 6,1% 0,3 99 149 51% 57% Investor 87 0,7 2,8% 1,0 79 98 24% 27%
C F Berg 11 0,7 1,5% 0,1 16,2 17,5 8% 10% Strålfors 94 1,0 3,6% 0,5 48 66 38% 41%
Kungsleden 11 1,1 6,1% 0,2 214 273 28% 34% A-com Neg 0,9 0,0% 1,2 0,89 0,58 -35% -35%
Lundbergs B 11 1,0 2,9% 0,2 224 318 42% 45% B&N Nordsjöfrakt Neg 0,6 0,0% 0,4 17,2 24 40% 40%
Broström 12 1,8 5,3% 0,6 85 118 39% 44% Bioinvent INT Neg 0,9 0,0% - 11,5 12,5 9% 9%
Holmen 13 1,1 18,3% 0,7 218 228 5% 23% Biotage Neg 0,6 0,0% - 10,7 11,8 10% 10%
SCA 13 1,3 3,4% 0,4 308 262 -15% -12% Boliden Neg 1,4 0,0% 1,4 33 34 3% 3%
SSAB 13 1,4 4,4% 0,6 138 177 28% 33% Bong Ljungdal Neg 0,7 0,0% 0,3 33 43 30% 30%
Trelleborg 13 1,8 3,1% 0,8 143 127 -11% -8% Borås Wäfveri Neg 0,5 0,0% 0,1 33 30 -9% -9%
Autoliv 14 1,9 1,0% 1,0 323 344 7% 8% Brio Neg 0,7 0,0% 0,0 47 72 53% 53%
Castellum 14 1,0 4,5% 0,3 188 231 23% 27% Duroc Neg 0,5 0,0% 0,9 14,5 17,6 21% 21%
Gorthon Lines 14 1,0 4,6% 0,3 22 24 9% 14% Infinicom Neg 0,6 0,0% 2,6 0,35 0,26 -26% -26%
Wallenstam 14 1,1 3,0% 0,3 200 366 83% 86% JC Neg 0,7 0,0% - 34 110 224% 224%
Rottneros 16 1,1 2,9% 0,8 10,4 7,5 -28% -25% Nilörngruppen Neg 1,0 0,0% 0,4 57 41 -28% -28%
Tornet * 16 1,2 2,5% 0,3 217 190 -12% -10% SAS Neg 0,8 0,0% - 71 73 3% 3%
Hexagon 17 2,1 1,8% 0,7 252 380 51% 53% Strand Neg 1,1 0,0% 4,9 1,2 0,95 -21% -21%
Realia 17 0,8 0,0% -0,3 40 61 53% 53% Tricorona Neg 0,5 0,0% 0,5 1,5 2,2 47% 47%
Salus Ansvar 17 1,6 4,1% 0,5 16,9 29 72% 76% West Siberian Oil Limited Former: Vostok Oil Neg 0,6 0,0% - 1,3 1,59 22% 22%

HQ.se fonder 13 9 5,3% - 103 124 20% 26% Multiq 96 6,0 0% 1,4 6,3 4,8 -24% -24%
Micro Sys 16 18,7 0,0% 1,7 1,8 1,7 -6% -6% Aqua Terrena Neg 9,4 0,0% 1,2 0,91 0,21 -77% -77%
Netwise 16 5,5 0,0% - 38 41 8% 8% Cashguard Neg 8,3 0,0% 1,8 8 10,1 26% 26%
Carnegie & Co 17 5,4 3,4% - 93 89 -4% -1% Cherry Företagen Neg 8,9 0,0% 1,8 21 33 57% 57%
Swedish Match 17 7,3 2,1% -0,2 81 81 0% 2% Countermine Neg 30,5 0,0% 1,8 5,1 3 -41% -41%
NAN 17 5,3 0,0% 0,6 20 13,3 -34% -34% CTT systems Neg 5,9 0,0% 1,6 20 13,5 -33% -33%
Getinge 18 5,3 1,6% 0,6 84 99 18% 19% Diamyd Med Neg 15,2 0,0% 1,0 78 48 -38% -38%
Orc Software 18 5,3 4,0% - 85 54 -36% -32% Ericsson Neg 6,2 0,0% 3,1 23 21 -9% -9%
Heba 19 5,9 2,6% 0,3 91 115 26% 29% Flyme Neg 10,2 0,0% 1,8 0,89 0,15 -83% -83%
Clas Ohlson 22 8,7 1,6% 0,6 98 150 54% 55% Framfab Neg 7,7 0,0% 2,8 0,91 0,5 -45% -45%
Hennes & Mauritz 22 8,9 2,9% 0,7 206 233 13% 16% Getupdated Neg 25,2 0,0% -0,4 0,62 0,1 -84% -84%
Nocom 22 7,9 0,0% 2,7 5,7 4,6 -19% -19% Gexco Neg 6,7 0,0% - 0,26 0,18 -31% -31%
Digital Illusion 23 7,1 1,1% 1,2 83 61 -27% -25% Inac Neg 7,1 0,0% 0,4 7,9 4,3 -46% -46%
Lundin Petrolium 23 8,9 0,0% - 33 54 64% 64% LB Icon Former:Icon MediaLab Neg 10,8 0,0% 2,5 36 32 -11% -11%
Astra Zeneca 24 6,4 1,6% 0,3 363 284 -22% -20% LifeAssays Neg 6,1 0,0% - 0,3 0,24 -20% -20%
Glocalnet 25 9,8 0,0% 2,3 3,79 3 -21% -21% Lightlab Neg 6,3 0,0% 0,7 0,7 0,19 -73% -73%
Jeeves 25 8 1,3% 2,1 30 49 63% 65% Mandator Neg 7,4 0,0% 3,3 1,38 1,5 9% 9%
Oden Control 26 5,3 0,0% - 15,5 9 -42% -42% NetOnNet Neg 6,7 0,0% - 115 85 -26% -26%
Q-Med 26 13,4 0,0% 1,1 224 192 -14% -14% Novacast Neg 16,8 0,0% 0,5 20 35 75% 75%
Raysearch Lab 30 18,4 0,0% 0,7 41 62 51% 51% Obducat Neg 41,0 0,0% 1,1 3,6 1,6 -56% -56%
Senea 30 7 0,0% 1,1 4,3 2,8 -35% -35% Paynova Neg 9,0 0,0% - 6,7 7,6 13% 13%
Meda 38 6,7 1,1% 0,7 136 283 109% 110% Pricer Neg 6,1 0,0% 1,6 1,5 0,94 -37% -37% Explanations to *
Sectra 38 9,4 0,9% 0,5 58 80 38% 39% SignOn Neg 9,9 0,0% - 1,1 1,2 9% 9% Acquired by another*
Nobel Biocare 41 13,7 0,7% - 1059 1475 39% 40% Sintercast Neg 5,6 0,0% 0,5 54 61 13% 13% Bankrupt **
Proffice 41 5,6 0,0% 1,5 22 14,2 -35% -35% Stille Neg Neg 0,0% 1,1 0,25 0,24 -4% -4% Delisted ***
Boss Media 54 8,3 0,0% 2,6 21 33 57% 57% Switchcore Neg 6,6 0,0% 2,1 3,75 1,7 -55% -55% Delisted
Readsoft 86 6,8 0,0% 1,7 14,3 21 47% 47% Tanganyika Neg 45,6 0,0% - 38 46 21% 21%

Listed companies not qualifying
Stocks from previous years' portfolios that due to changing break points were eliminated
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Asg Active B Avesta Sheffield Althin Medical Allgon B Biolight ACSC Assa Abloy Artimplant Acsc ABB
Custos Aga Bayer Argonaut B Artim Medical Biora Arete Assidomän Audiodev Array Alfa Laval
Elanders B Atlas Copco Sydkraft Assa Abloy Benima Feartor Diffschamb Citymail Cherry Axis Boss Media Axfood
Gullspång B Bergman Beving Skandia Atlantica Biocore Duroc Daltek Confidence C Technologies Daydream Beijer Electronics
Hagströmer Qviberg Diös Kanthal Atlas Copco Bongs B Höganäs Doro Diamyd Capio Diamyd med Biacore
Incentive Graphium Kinnevik Atle Caran IFS Elekta Enea Consilium Eniro Doro
Industrivärlden Luxonen IPC Autoliv Celsius KnowIT Empire Ericsson B Diffchamb Ericsson Human care HC
Investor Martinsson Errce BPA Daydream Lindex Fagerhult Feelgood Dimension Frango Höganäs
Kvaerner A Perstorp Elektronikgruppen BT Industries Doro Multiq Graphium Friluftsbolaget Ecovision HL display Kraftkommisionen
Nolato Pharmacia BTL Former Bilspedition Frontec Munters Gunnebo IBS Facile & Co Kabe Micronic Laser system
Norsk Hydro Rörviksgruppen Bure Föreningssparb. Måldata B Heba Konftel Focal Point Karo Bio Munters
OM Gruppen Scribona A Bylock & Nord Getinge Optima Batt Hemköpskedjan Ljungberggruppen HIQ International Maxim Pharamceutical Nibe Industries
SKF Svedala Cardo Invest Hoist Ortivus HL Display Meda Intentia MTG Nokia
Spendrups Wallenstam Catena JM B Pc-Express Ind.Med.Grp Medirox NeoNet Music Network PowerIT PS
Tryckeriindustri B Wermlands Guldbrytning Cloetta JP Bank Pronyx Intentia Meditieam dental NetOnNet Net Insight Precise Biometric
VBG B Ångpanneföreningen B Consilium Lap Power Resco Jakobsson Wimark Modul1 Peab Nordnet Protect Data
Cyncrona Medivir Scandinavian PC Magic House Nea Poolia Tieto Enator Riddarhyttan Res
Eldon Minidoc Segersten & Svensson Norditube Observer Probi TV-4 Sardus
Electrolux Nolato Säki Novacast Oxigene Prosolutions old Drax WM data SBT
Elekta Nordiska Holding Wedins Norden Provobis Prevas Readsoft Scanmining
Enea B Taurus Petroleum VostockNafta Scandic Hotels Proact SKF Seco Tools
Esselte B Tivox Sintercast Securitas Telelogic Securitas
FFNS B Trustor AB B SKF Softtronic Semcom
Finnveden Turnit SPCS Sensys Traffic
Garphyttan Swedish Match Tele2 Former: Netcom Systems
Graninge SAS Ticket
Hufvudstaden SCA Vision Park
IMS Data Skandia WM Data
Iro Skandigen A
Itab B Oxygen
Kalmar Ind Peak Performance
Kvaerner Pricer
Lindab Spendrups
Lindex
Linjebuss A
Lundgrens B
M2 Former Exab
Marieberg
Munksjö
Nobel BioCare Former Nobelpharma
Nokia
OEM International
OM Gruppen
Omi corp
Pharmacia Upjohn
Provobis Hotel&Rest Former Clock
Sanblom & Stohne
Sandvik
Scancem Former Euroc
SEB
Seco Tools
Senea
SHB
Sintercast
Skanska B
Tricorona
Trygg Hansa
TV4
VBB B
VBG
Vermation
Year Average 3-month rate
1993 7,7%
1994 7,7%
1995 8,6%
1996 4,9%
1997 4,2%
1998 3,9%
1999 3,3%
2000 4,0%
2001 4,0%
2002 4,0%
2003 2,7%
2004 2,0%
The 3-month Swedish Treasury-bill rate

issued by the government

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INTERNATIONELLA HANDELSHÖGSKOLAN

Value vs. Growth

Bachelor’s thesis within Business Administration

Värde kontra Tillväxt

Kandidatuppsats inom Företagsekonomi

Authors: Carlström Anders, Karlström Rikard, Sellgren Jakob

Purpose: The purpose is to investigate if an investor by purchasing a portfolio based on

Ämnesord: Finansiering, P/B, P/E, Portföljteori, Effektiva marknads hypotesen, Abnor-

Figure 1 Barra Value & Growth Index – a cumulative comparison

1.2 Problem Discussion

5 Price per share divided by book value per share

6 Price per share divided by earnings per share

7 Annual dividend per share divided by price per share

1.7 Methodological Approach

1.8 Methodological Overview

Figure 2 Methodological Overview

1.9 Literature Study

Chapter 1 An introduction to the value and growth concepts

Chapter 2 This chapter clarifies the thesis’ theoretical framework

Chapter 3 The method used to conduct the empirical study will

Chapter 4 The empirical findings of the data collection are pre-

Chapter 5 The conclusion of the thesis, a discussion of the analy-

2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)

2.2 Portfolio Theory

Formula 1 Holding-period return (Bodie et al. 2004)

2.2.2 Portfolio risk and the relation to portfolio performance

2.2.3 Risk definition

2.2.4 Risk-free rate

2.2.5 Portfolio performance in relation to the market benchmark

2.2.6 Market Index

2.2.7 Risk-adjusted measures

Formula 3 Treynor ratio (Bodie et al. 2004)

(RP - Rf ) − β P (RM - Rf ) = Jensen' s mesure

Capital Asset Pricing Model

2.3 Previous Research of Valuation Multiples

2.4 Value and Growth Definitions

Table 1 Wilshire Style Index (Wilshire Associates Incorporated, 2005)

2.5 Examples of value and growth companies

3.1 Quantitative research approach

3.2 Secondary data

3.3 Data collection and portfolio creation

Figure 3 Portfolio creation and composition

3.3.1 Sample size

3.3.2 Break points for P/B

Figure 4 The standard normal distribution (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)

Formula 5 Tail area (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)

Formula 6 Table area (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)

Break po int s = Market P/B ± (S tan dard deviation of P/B )* (Z-value )

Formula 7 Break points for P/B

3.3.3 Systematic sampling

Formula 8 Systematic sampling (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002)

3.4 Portfolio Calculations

• Companies acquired during the holding period (marked * in appendix) without

3.5 Portfolio Analysis

Treynor ratio (Bodie et al. 2004)

(RP - Rf ) − β P (RM - Rf ) = Jensen' mesure

3.6 Reliability and Validity

4 Empirical Findings and Analysis

4.1 Empirical findings of the four portfolios

17 Market average found in Börsguide 1993-2004.

Figure 5 Risk-adjusted portfolio performances each year 1993- 2004

4.2 Portfolio comparison and analysis