The Art of War

By Sun Tzu
Translated by Lionel Giles I. Laying Plans 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. 2. It is a matter of life and death a road either to safety or to ruin. !ence it is a sub"ect of in#uiry which can on no account be ne$lected. %. The art of war then is $overned by five constant factors to be ta&en into account in one's deliberations when see&in$ to determine the conditions obtainin$ in the field. (. These are: )1* The +oral Law, )2* !eaven, )%* -arth, )(* The .ommander, )/* +ethod and discipline. / 0. The +oral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler so that they will follow him re$ardless of their lives undismayed by any dan$er. 1. !eaven si$nifies ni$ht and day cold and heat times and seasons. 2. -arth comprises distances $reat and small, dan$er and security,open $round and narrow passes, the chances of life and death. 3. The .ommander stands for the virtues of wisdom sincerely benevolence coura$e and strictness.

14. 5y method and discipline are to be understood the marshalin$ of the army in its proper subdivisions the $raduations of ran& amon$ the officers the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army and the control of military e6penditure. 11. These five heads should be familiar to every $eneral: he who &nows them will be victorious, he who &nows them not will fail. 12. Therefore in your deliberations when see&in$ to determine the military conditions let them be made the basis of a comparison in this wise:77 1%. )1* 8hich of the two soverei$ns is imbued with the +oral law9 )2* 8hich of the two $enerals has most ability9 )%* 8ith whom lie the advanta$es derived from !eaven and -arth9 )(* :n which side is discipline most ri$orously enforced9 )/* 8hich army is stron$er9 )0* :n which side are officers and men more hi$hly trained9 )1* In which army is there the $reater constancy both in reward and punishment9 1(. 5y means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. 1/. The $eneral that hear&ens to my counsel and acts upon it will con#uer: let such a one be retained in command; The $eneral that hear&ens not to my counsel nor acts upon it will suffer defeat:77let such a one be dismissed; 10. 8hile headin$ the profit of my counsel avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. 1

11. <ccordin$ as circumstances are favorable one should modify one's plans. 12. <ll warfare is based on deception. 13. !ence when able to attac& we must seem unable, when usin$ our forces we must seem inactive, when we are near we must ma&e the enemy believe we are far away, when far away we must ma&e him believe we are near. 24. !old out baits to entice the enemy. =ei$n disorder and crush him. 21. If he is secure at all points be prepared for him. If he is in superior stren$th evade him. 22. If your opponent is of choleric temper see& to irritate him. >retend to be wea& that he may $row arro$ant. 2%. If he is ta&in$ his ease $ive him no rest. If his forces are united separate them. 2(. <ttac& him where he is unprepared appear where you are not e6pected. 2/. These military devices leadin$ to victory must not be divul$ed beforehand. 20. ?ow the $eneral who wins a battle ma&es many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fou$ht. The $eneral who loses a battle ma&es but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all; It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is li&ely to win or lose.

II. Waging War 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots as many heavy chariots and a hundred thousand mail7clad soldiers with provisions enou$h to carry them a thousand li the e6penditure at home and at the front includin$ entertainment of $uests small items such as $lue and paint and sums spent on chariots and armor will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raisin$ an army of 144 444 men. 2. 8hen you en$a$e in actual fi$htin$ if victory is lon$ in comin$ then men's weapons will $row dull and their ardor will be damped.If you lay sie$e to a town you will e6haust your stren$th. %. <$ain if the campai$n is protracted the resources of the State will not be e#ual to the strain. (. ?ow when your weapons are dulled your ardor damped your stren$th e6hausted and your treasure spent other chieftains will sprin$ up to ta&e advanta$e of your e6tremity. Then no man however wise will be able to avert the conse#uences that must ensue. /. Thus thou$h we have heard of stupid haste in war cleverness has never been seen associated with lon$ delays. 0. There is no instance of a country havin$ benefited from prolon$ed warfare. 1. It is only one who is thorou$hly ac#uainted with the evils of war that can thorou$hly understand the profitable way of carryin$ it on. 2

2. The s&illful soldier does not raise a second levy neither are his supply7wa$ons loaded more than twice. 3. 5rin$ war material with you from home but fora$e on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enou$h for its needs. 14. >overty of the State e6che#uer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. .ontributin$ to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. 11. :n the other hand the pro6imity of an army causes prices to $o up, and hi$h prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. 12. 8hen their substance is drained away the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy e6actions. 1% 1(. 8ith this loss of substance and e6haustion of stren$th the homes of the people will be stripped bare and three7tenths of their income will be dissipated, while $overnment e6penses for bro&en chariots worn7out horses breast7plates and helmets bows and arrows spears and shields protective mantles drau$ht7o6en and heavy wa$ons will amount to four7tenths of its total revenue. 1/. !ence a wise $eneral ma&es a point of fora$in$ on the enemy. :ne cartload of the enemy's provisions is e#uivalent to twenty of one's own and li&ewise a sin$le picul of his provender is e#uivalent to twenty from one's own store. 10. ?ow in order to &ill the enemy our men must be roused to an$er, that there may be advanta$e from defeatin$ the enemy they must have their rewards.

11. Therefore in chariot fi$htin$ when ten or more chariots have been ta&en those should be rewarded who too& the first. :ur own fla$s should be substituted for those of the enemy and the chariots min$led and used in con"unction with ours. The captured soldiers should be &indly treated and &ept. 12. This is called usin$ the con#uered foe to au$ment one's own stren$th. 13. In war then let your $reat ob"ect be victory not len$thy campai$ns. 24. Thus it may be &nown that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril. III. Attack by Stratagem 1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war the best thin$ of all is to ta&e the enemy's country whole and intact, to shatter and destroy it is not so $ood. So too it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it to capture a re$iment a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. 2. !ence to fi$ht and con#uer in all your battles is not supreme e6cellence, supreme e6cellence consists in brea&in$ the enemy's resistance without fi$htin$. %. Thus the hi$hest form of $eneralship is to bal& the enemy's plans, the ne6t best is to prevent the "unction of the enemy's forces, the ne6t in order is to attac& the enemy's army in the field, and the worst policy of all is to besie$e walled cities. (. The rule is not to besie$e walled cities if it can possibly be %

avoided. The preparation of mantlets movable shelters and various implements of war will ta&e up three whole months, and the pilin$ up of mounds over a$ainst the walls will ta&e three months more. /. The $eneral unable to control his irritation will launch his men to the assault li&e swarmin$ ants with the result that one7 third of his men are slain while the town still remains unta&en. Such are the disastrous effects of a sie$e. 0. Therefore the s&illful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fi$htin$, he captures their cities without layin$ sie$e to them, he overthrows their &in$dom without len$thy operations in the field. 1. 8ith his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the -mpire and thus without losin$ a man his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attac&in$ by strata$em. 2. It is the rule in war if our forces are ten to the enemy's one to surround him, if five to one to attac& him, if twice as numerous to divide our army into two. 3. If e#ually matched we can offer battle, if sli$htly inferior in numbers we can avoid the enemy, if #uite une#ual in every way we can flee from him. 14. !ence thou$h an obstinate fi$ht may be made by a small force in the end it must be captured by the lar$er force. 11. ?ow the $eneral is the bulwar& of the State, if the bulwar& is complete at all points, the State will be stron$, if the bulwar& is defective the State will be wea&.

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can brin$ misfortune upon his army:77 1%. )1* 5y commandin$ the army to advance or to retreat bein$ i$norant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobblin$ the army. 1(. )2* 5y attemptin$ to $overn an army in the same way as he administers a &in$dom bein$ i$norant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. 1/. )%* 5y employin$ the officers of his army without discrimination throu$h i$norance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This sha&es the confidence of the soldiers. 10. 5ut when the army is restless and distrustful trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply brin$in$ anarchy into the army and flin$in$ victory away. 11. Thus we may &now that there are five essentials for victory: )1*!e will win who &nows when to fi$ht and when not to fi$ht. )2* !e will win who &nows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.)%* !e will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throu$hout all its ran&s. )(* !e will win who prepared himself waits to ta&e the enemy unprepared. )/* !e will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the soverei$n. 12. !ence the sayin$: If you &now the enemy and &now yourself you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you &now yourself but not the enemy for every victory $ained you will also suffer a defeat. If you &now neither the enemy nor yourself you will succumb in every battle. (

IV. Tactical Dis ositions 1. Sun Tzu said: The $ood fi$hters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat and then waited for an opportunity of defeatin$ the enemy. 2. To secure ourselves a$ainst defeat lies in our own hands but the opportunity of defeatin$ the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. %. Thus the $ood fi$hter is able to secure himself a$ainst defeat but cannot ma&e certain of defeatin$ the enemy. (. !ence the sayin$: :ne may &now how to con#uer without bein$ able to do it. /. Security a$ainst defeat implies defensive tactics, ability to defeat the enemy means ta&in$ the offensive. 0. Standin$ on the defensive indicates insufficient stren$th, attac&in$ a superabundance of stren$th. 1. The $eneral who is s&illed in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, he who is s&illed in attac& flashes forth from the topmost hei$hts of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves, on the other a victory that is complete. 2. To see victory only when it is within the &en of the common herd is not the acme of e6cellence. 3. ?either is it the acme of e6cellence if you fi$ht and con#uer and the whole -mpire says @8ell done;@

14. To lift an autumn hair is no si$n of $reat stren$th, to see the sun and moon is no si$n of sharp si$ht, to hear the noise of thunder is no si$n of a #uic& ear. 11. 8hat the ancients called a clever fi$hter is one who not only wins but e6cels in winnin$ with ease. 12. !ence his victories brin$ him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for coura$e. 1%. !e wins his battles by ma&in$ no mista&es. +a&in$ no mista&es is what establishes the certainty of victory for it means con#uerin$ an enemy that is already defeated. 1(. !ence the s&illful fi$hter puts himself into a position which ma&es defeat impossible and does not miss the moment for defeatin$ the enemy. 1/. Thus it is that in war the victorious strate$ist only see&s battle after the victory has been won whereas he who is destined to defeat first fi$hts and afterwards loo&s for victory. 10. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law and strictly adheres to method and discipline, thus it is in his power to control success. 11. In respect of military method we have firstly +easurement, secondly -stimation of #uantity, thirdly .alculation, fourthly 5alancin$ of chances, fifthly Aictory. 12. +easurement owes its e6istence to -arth, -stimation of #uantity to +easurement, .alculation to -stimation of #uantity, 5alancin$ of chances to .alculation, and Aictory to 5alancin$ of chances. /

13. < victorious army opposed to a routed one is as a pound's wei$ht placed in the scale a$ainst a sin$le $rain. 24. The onrush of a con#uerin$ force is li&e the burstin$ of pent7up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. V. !nergy 1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a lar$e force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a #uestion of dividin$ up their numbers. 2. =i$htin$ with a lar$e army under your command is nowise different from fi$htin$ with a small one: it is merely a #uestion of institutin$ si$ns and si$nals. %. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attac& and remain unsha&en77 this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. (. That the impact of your army may be li&e a $rindstone dashed a$ainst an e$$77this is effected by the science of wea& points and stron$. /. In all fi$htin$ the direct method may be used for "oinin$ battle but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. 0. Indirect tactics efficiently applied are ine6haustible as !eaven and -arth unendin$ as the flow of rivers and streams, li&e the sun and moon they end but to be$in anew, li&e the four seasons they pass away to return once more.

1. There are not more than five musical notes yet the combinations of these five $ive rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. 2. There are not more than five primary colors )blue yellow red white and blac&* yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. 3. There are not more than five cardinal tastes )sour acrid salt sweet bitter* yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. 14. In battle there are not more than two methods of attac&77the direct and the indirect, yet these two in combination $ive rise to an endless series of maneuvers. 11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is li&e movin$ in a circle77you never come to an end. 8ho can e6haust the possibilities of their combination9 12. The onset of troops is li&e the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones alon$ in its course. 1%. The #uality of decision is li&e the well7timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to stri&e and destroy its victim. 1(. Therefore the $ood fi$hter will be terrible in his onset and prompt in his decision. 1/. -ner$y may be li&ened to the bendin$ of a crossbow, decision to the releasin$ of a tri$$er. 10. <mid the turmoil and tumult of battle there may be seemin$ disorder and yet no real disorder at all, amid confusion 0

and chaos your array may be without head or tail yet it will be proof a$ainst defeat. 11. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline simulated fear postulates coura$e, simulated wea&ness postulates stren$th. 12. !idin$ order beneath the cloa& of disorder is simply a #uestion of subdivision, concealin$ coura$e under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent ener$y, mas&in$ stren$th with wea&ness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. 13. Thus one who is s&illful at &eepin$ the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances accordin$ to which the enemy will act. !e sacrifices somethin$ that the enemy may snatch at it. 24. 5y holdin$ out baits he &eeps him on the march, then with a body of pic&ed men he lies in wait for him. 21. The clever combatant loo&s to the effect of combined ener$y and does not re#uire too much from individuals. !ence his ability to pic& out the ri$ht men and utilize combined ener$y. 22. 8hen he utilizes combined ener$y his fi$htin$ men become as it were li&e unto rollin$ lo$s or stones. =or it is the nature of a lo$ or stone to remain motionless on level $round and to move when on a slope, if four7cornered to come to a standstill but if round7shaped to $o rollin$ down. 2%. Thus the ener$y developed by $ood fi$htin$ men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in hei$ht. So much on the sub"ect of ener$y.

VI. Weak Points an" Strong 1. Sun Tzu said: 8hoever is first in the field and awaits the comin$ of the enemy will be fresh for the fi$ht, whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive e6hausted. 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. %. 5y holdin$ out advanta$es to him he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord, or by inflictin$ dama$e he can ma&e it impossible for the enemy to draw near. (. If the enemy is ta&in$ his ease he can harass him, if well supplied with food he can starve him out, if #uietly encamped he can force him to move. /. <ppear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend, march swiftly to places where you are not e6pected. 0. <n army may march $reat distances without distress if it marches throu$h country where the enemy is not. 1. Bou can be sure of succeedin$ in your attac&s if you only attac& places which are undefended. Bou can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attac&ed. 2. !ence that $eneral is s&illful in attac& whose opponent does not &now what to defend, and he is s&illful in defense whose opponent does not &now what to attac&.

3. : divine art of subtlety and secrecy; Throu$h you we learn to be invisible throu$h you inaudible, and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. 14. Bou may advance and be absolutely irresistible if you ma&e for the enemy's wea& points, you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. 11. If we wish to fi$ht the enemy can be forced to an en$a$ement even thou$h he be sheltered behind a hi$h rampart and a deep ditch. <ll we need do is attac& some other place that he will be obli$ed to relieve. 12. If we do not wish to fi$ht we can prevent the enemy from en$a$in$ us even thou$h the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the $round. <ll we need do is to throw somethin$ odd and unaccountable in his way. 1%. 5y discoverin$ the enemy's dispositions and remainin$ invisible ourselves we can &eep our forces concentrated while the enemy's must be divided. 1(. 8e can form a sin$le united body while the enemy must split up into fractions. !ence there will be a whole pitted a$ainst separate parts of a whole which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few. 1/. <nd if we are able thus to attac& an inferior force with a superior one our opponents will be in dire straits. 10. The spot where we intend to fi$ht must not be made &nown, for then the enemy will have to prepare a$ainst a possible attac& at several different points, and his forces bein$ thus distributed in many directions

the numbers we shall have to face at any $iven point will be proportionately few. 11. =or should the enemy stren$then his van he will wea&en his rear, should he stren$then his rear he will wea&en his van, should he stren$then his left he will wea&en his ri$ht, should he stren$then his ri$ht he will wea&en his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere he will everywhere be wea&. 12. ?umerical wea&ness comes from havin$ to prepare a$ainst possible attac&s, numerical stren$th from compellin$ our adversary to ma&e these preparations a$ainst us. 13. Cnowin$ the place and the time of the comin$ battle we may concentrate from the $reatest distances in order to fi$ht. 24. 5ut if neither time nor place be &nown then the left win$ will be impotent to succor the ri$ht the ri$ht e#ually impotent to succor the left the van unable to relieve the rear or the rear to support the van. !ow much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anythin$ under a hundred LI apart and even the nearest are separated by several LI; 21. Thou$h accordin$ to my estimate the soldiers of Bueh e6ceed our own in number that shall advanta$e them nothin$ in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. 22. Thou$h the enemy be stron$er in numbers we may prevent him from fi$htin$. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the li&elihood of their success. 2%. Douse him and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.=orce him to reveal himself so as to find out his vulnerable spots. 2

2(. .arefully compare the opposin$ army with your own so that you may &now where stren$th is superabundant and where it is deficient. 2/. In ma&in$ tactical dispositions the hi$hest pitch you can attain is to conceal them, conceal your dispositions and you will be safe from the pryin$ of the subtlest spies from the machinations of the wisest brains. 20. !ow victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tacticsEthat is what the multitude cannot comprehend. 21. <ll men can see the tactics whereby I con#uer but what none can see is the strate$y out of which victory is evolved. 22. Fo not repeat the tactics which have $ained you one victory but let your methods be re$ulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. 23. +ilitary tactics are li&e unto water, for water in its natural course runs away from hi$h places and hastens downwards. %4. So in war the way is to avoid what is stron$ and to stri&e at what is wea&. %1. 8ater shapes its course accordin$ to the nature of the $round over which it flows, the soldier wor&s out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facin$. %2. Therefore "ust as water retains no constant shape so in warfare there are no constant conditions. %%. !e who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winnin$ may be called a heaven7born captain.

%(. The five elements )water fire wood metal earth* are not always e#ually predominant, the four seasons ma&e way for each other in turn. There are short days and lon$, the moon has its periods of wanin$ and wa6in$. VII. #aneu$ering 1. Sun Tzu said: In war the $eneral receives his commands from the soverei$n. 2. !avin$ collected an army and concentrated his forces he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitchin$ his camp. %. <fter that comes tactical maneuverin$ than which there is nothin$ more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuverin$ consists in turnin$ the devious into the direct and misfortune into $ain. (. Thus to ta&e a lon$ and circuitous route after enticin$ the enemy out of the way and thou$h startin$ after him to contrive to reach the $oal before him shows &nowled$e of the artifice of deviation. /. +aneuverin$ with an army is advanta$eous, with an undisciplined multitude most dan$erous. 0. If you set a fully e#uipped army in march in order to snatch an advanta$e the chances are that you will be too late. :n the other hand to detach a flyin$ column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its ba$$a$e and stores.

1. Thus if you order your men to roll up their buff7coats and ma&e forced marches without haltin$ day or ni$ht coverin$ double the usual distance at a stretch doin$ a hundred LI in order to wrest an advanta$e the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. 2. The stron$er men will be in front the "aded ones will fall behind and on this plan only one7tenth of your army will reach its destination. 3. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy you will lose the leader of your first division and only half your force will reach the $oal. 14. If you march thirty LI with the same ob"ect two7thirds of your army will arrive. 11. 8e may ta&e it then that an army without its ba$$a$e7train is lost, without provisions it is lost, without bases of supply it is lost. 12. 8e cannot enter into alliances until we are ac#uainted with the desi$ns of our nei$hbors. 1%. 8e are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country77its mountains and forests its pitfalls and precipices its marshes and swamps. 1(. 8e shall be unable to turn natural advanta$e to account unless we ma&e use of local $uides. 1/. In war practice dissimulation and you will succeed. 10. 8hether to concentrate or to divide your troops must be decided by circumstances.

11. Let your rapidity be that of the wind your compactness that of the forest. 12. In raidin$ and plunderin$ be li&e fire is immovability li&e a mountain. 13. Let your plans be dar& and impenetrable as ni$ht and when you move fall li&e a thunderbolt. 24. 8hen you plunder a countryside let the spoil be divided amon$st your men, when you capture new territory cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. 21. >onder and deliberate before you ma&e a move. 22. !e will con#uer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuverin$. 2%. The 5oo& of <rmy +ana$ement says: :n the field of battle the spo&en word does not carry far enou$h: hence the institution of $on$s and drums. ?or can ordinary ob"ects be seen clearly enou$h: hence the institution of banners and fla$s. 2(. Gon$s and drums banners and fla$s are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point. 2/. The host thus formin$ a sin$le united body is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handlin$ lar$e masses of men. 20. In ni$ht7fi$htin$ then ma&e much use of si$nal7fires and drums and in fi$htin$ by day of fla$s and banners as a means of influencin$ the ears and eyes of your army. 14

21. < whole army may be robbed of its spirit, a commander7in7 chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. 22. ?ow a soldier's spirit is &eenest in the mornin$, by noonday it has be$un to fla$, and in the evenin$ his mind is bent only on returnin$ to camp. 23. < clever $eneral therefore avoids an army when its spirit is &een but attac&s it when it is slu$$ish and inclined to return. This is the art of studyin$ moods. %4. Fisciplined and calm to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amon$st the enemy:77this is the art of retainin$ self7possession. %1. To be near the $oal while the enemy is still far from it to wait at ease while the enemy is toilin$ and stru$$lin$ to be well7fed while the enemy is famished:77this is the art of husbandin$ one's stren$th. %2. To refrain from interceptin$ an enemy whose banners are in perfect order to refrain from attac&in$ an army drawn up in calm and confident array:77this is the art of studyin$ circumstances. %%. It is a military a6iom not to advance uphill a$ainst the enemy nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. %(. Fo not pursue an enemy who simulates fli$ht, do not attac& soldiers whose temper is &een. %/. Fo not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Fo not interfere with an army that is returnin$ home.

%0. 8hen you surround an army leave an outlet free. Fo not press a desperate foe too hard. %1. Such is the art of warfare. VIII. Variation in Tactics 1. Sun Tzu said: In war the $eneral receives his commands from the soverei$n collects his army and concentrates his forces 2. 8hen in difficult country do not encamp. In country where hi$h roads intersect "oin hands with your allies. Fo not lin$er in dan$erously isolated positions. In hemmed7in situations you must resort to strata$em. In desperate position you must fi$ht. %. There are roads which must not be followed armies which must be not attac&ed towns which must be besie$ed positions which must not be contested commands of the soverei$n which must not be obeyed. (. The $eneral who thorou$hly understands the advanta$es that accompany variation of tactics &nows how to handle his troops. /. The $eneral who does not understand these may be well ac#uainted with the confi$uration of the country yet he will not be able to turn his &nowled$e to practical account. 0. So the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varyin$ his plans even thou$h he be ac#uainted with the =ive <dvanta$es will fail to ma&e the best use of his men. 1. !ence in the wise leader's plans considerations of advanta$e and of disadvanta$e will be blended to$ether. 11

2. If our e6pectation of advanta$e be tempered in this way we may succeed in accomplishin$ the essential part of our schemes. 3. If on the other hand in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advanta$e we may e6tricate ourselves from misfortune. 14. Deduce the hostile chiefs by inflictin$ dama$e on them, and ma&e trouble for them and &eep them constantly en$a$ed, hold out specious allurements and ma&e them rush to any $iven point. 11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the li&elihood of the enemy's not comin$ but on our own readiness to receive him, not on the chance of his not attac&in$ but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. 12. There are five dan$erous faults which may affect a $eneral: )1*Dec&lessness which leads to destruction, )2* cowardice which leads to capture, )%* a hasty temper which can be provo&ed by insults,)(* a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame, )/* over7solicitude for his men which e6poses him to worry and trouble. 1%. These are the five besettin$ sins of a $eneral ruinous to the conduct of war. 1(. 8hen an army is overthrown and its leader slain the cause will surely be found amon$ these five dan$erous faults. Let them be a sub"ect of meditation. I%. The Army on the #arch

1. Sun Tzu said: 8e come now to the #uestion of encampin$ the army and observin$ si$ns of the enemy. >ass #uic&ly over mountains and &eep in the nei$hborhood of valleys. 2. .amp in hi$h places facin$ the sun. Fo not climb hei$hts in order to fi$ht. So much for mountain warfare. %. <fter crossin$ a river you should $et far away from it. (. 8hen an invadin$ force crosses a river in its onward march do not advance to meet it in mid7stream. It will be best to let half the army $et across and then deliver your attac&. /. If you are an6ious to fi$ht you should not $o to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. 0. +oor your craft hi$her up than the enemy and facin$ the sun. Fo not move up7stream to meet the enemy. So much for river warfare. 1. In crossin$ salt7marshes your sole concern should be to $et over them #uic&ly without any delay. 2. If forced to fi$ht in a salt7marsh you should have water and $rass near you and $et your bac& to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt7marches. 3. In dry level country ta&e up an easily accessible position with risin$ $round to your ri$ht and on your rear so that the dan$er may be in front and safety lie behind. So much for campai$nin$ in flat country. 14. These are the four useful branches of military &nowled$e which enabled the Bellow -mperor to van#uish four several soverei$ns. 12

11. <ll armies prefer hi$h $round to low and sunny places to dar&. 12. If you are careful of your men and camp on hard $round the army will be free from disease of every &ind and this will spell victory. 1%. 8hen you come to a hill or a ban& occupy the sunny side with the slope on your ri$ht rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advanta$es of the $round. 1(. 8hen in conse#uence of heavy rains up7country a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flec&ed with foam you must wait until it subsides. 1/. .ountry in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents runnin$ between deep natural hollows confined places tan$led thic&ets #ua$mires and crevasses should be left with all possible speed and not approached. 10. 8hile we &eep away from such places we should $et the enemy to approach them, while we face them we should let the enemy have them on his rear. 11. If in the nei$hborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country ponds surrounded by a#uatic $rass hollow basins filled with reeds or woods with thic& under$rowth they must be carefully routed out and searched, for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are li&ely to be lur&in$. 12. 8hen the enemy is close at hand and remains #uiet he is relyin$ on the natural stren$th of his position.

13. 8hen he &eeps aloof and tries to provo&e a battle he is an6ious for the other side to advance. 24. If his place of encampment is easy of access he is tenderin$ a bait. 21. +ovement amon$st the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancin$. The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thic& $rass means that the enemy wants to ma&e us suspicious. 22. The risin$ of birds in their fli$ht is the si$n of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attac& is comin$. 2%. 8hen there is dust risin$ in a hi$h column it is the si$n of chariots advancin$, when the dust is low but spread over a wide area it beto&ens the approach of infantry. 8hen it branches out in different directions it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. < few clouds of dust movin$ to and fro si$nify that the army is encampin$. 2(. !umble words and increased preparations are si$ns that the enemy is about to advance. Aiolent lan$ua$e and drivin$ forward as if to the attac& are si$ns that he will retreat. 2/. 8hen the li$ht chariots come out first and ta&e up a position on the win$s it is a si$n that the enemy is formin$ for battle. 20. >eace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. 21. 8hen there is much runnin$ about and the soldiers fall into ran& it means that the critical moment has come. 1%

22. 8hen some are seen advancin$ and some retreatin$ it is a lure. 23. 8hen the soldiers stand leanin$ on their spears they are faint from want of food. %4. If those who are sent to draw water be$in by drin&in$ themselves the army is sufferin$ from thirst. %1. If the enemy sees an advanta$e to be $ained and ma&es no effort to secure it the soldiers are e6hausted. %2. If birds $ather on any spot it is unoccupied. .lamor by ni$ht beto&ens nervousness. %%. If there is disturbance in the camp the $eneral's authority is wea&. If the banners and fla$s are shifted about sedition is afoot. If the officers are an$ry it means that the men are weary. %(. 8hen an army feeds its horses with $rain and &ills its cattle for food and when the men do not han$ their coo&in$7pots over the camp7fires showin$ that they will not return to their tents you may &now that they are determined to fi$ht to the death. %/. The si$ht of men whisperin$ to$ether in small &nots or spea&in$ in subdued tones points to disaffection amon$st the ran& and file. %0. Too fre#uent rewards si$nify that the enemy is at the end of his resources, too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. %1. To be$in by bluster but afterwards to ta&e fri$ht at the enemy's numbers shows a supreme lac& of intelli$ence.

%2. 8hen envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths it is a si$n that the enemy wishes for a truce. %3. If the enemy's troops march up an$rily and remain facin$ ours for a lon$ time without either "oinin$ battle or ta&in$ themselves off a$ain the situation is one that demands $reat vi$ilance and circumspection. (4. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy that is amply sufficient, it only means that no direct attac& can be made. 8hat we can do is simply to concentrate all our available stren$th &eep a close watch on the enemy and obtain reinforcements. (1. !e who e6ercises no forethou$ht but ma&es li$ht of his opponents is sure to be captured by them. (2. If soldiers are punished before they have $rown attached to you they will not prove submissive, and unless submissive then will be practically useless. If when the soldiers have become attached to you punishments are not enforced they will still be unless. (%. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity but &ept under control by means of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. ((. If in trainin$ soldiers commands are habitually enforced the army will be well7disciplined, if not its discipline will be bad. (/. If a $eneral shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders bein$ obeyed the $ain will be mutual. 1(

%. Terrain 1. Sun Tzu said: 8e may distin$uish si6 &inds of terrain to wit: )1* <ccessible $round, )2* entan$lin$ $round, )%* temporizin$ $round,)(* narrow passes, )/* precipitous hei$hts, )0* positions at a $reat distance from the enemy. 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible. %. 8ith re$ard to $round of this nature be before the enemy in occupyin$ the raised and sunny spots and carefully $uard your line of supplies. Then you will be able to fi$ht with advanta$e. (. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re7occupy is called entan$lin$. /. =rom a position of this sort if the enemy is unprepared you may sally forth and defeat him. 5ut if the enemy is prepared for your comin$ and you fail to defeat him then return bein$ impossible disaster will ensue. 0. 8hen the position is such that neither side will $ain by ma&in$ the first move it is called temporizin$ $round. 1. In a position of this sort even thou$h the enemy should offer us an attractive bait it will be advisable not to stir forth but rather to retreat thus enticin$ the enemy in his turn, then when part of his army has come out we may deliver our attac& with advanta$e. 2. 8ith re$ard to narrow passes if you can occupy them first let them be stron$ly $arrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.

3. Should the army forestall you in occupyin$ a pass do not $o after him if the pass is fully $arrisoned but only if it is wea&ly $arrisoned. 14. 8ith re$ard to precipitous hei$hts if you are beforehand with your adversary you should occupy the raised and sunny spots and there wait for him to come up. 11. If the enemy has occupied them before you do not follow him but retreat and try to entice him away. 12. If you are situated at a $reat distance from the enemy and the stren$th of the two armies is e#ual it is not easy to provo&e a battle and fi$htin$ will be to your disadvanta$e. 1%. These si6 are the principles connected with -arth. The $eneral who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. 1(. ?ow an army is e6posed to si6 several calamities not arisin$ from natural causes but from faults for which the $eneral is responsible. These are: )1* =li$ht, )2* insubordination, )%* collapse, )(* ruin,)/* disor$anization, )0* rout. 1/. :ther conditions bein$ e#ual if one force is hurled a$ainst another ten times its size the result will be the fli$ht of the former. 10. 8hen the common soldiers are too stron$ and their officers too wea& the result is insubordination. 8hen the officers are too stron$ and the common soldiers too wea& the result is collapse.

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11. 8hen the hi$her officers are an$ry and insubordinate and on meetin$ the enemy $ive battle on their own account from a feelin$ of resentment before the commander7in7chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fi$ht the result is ruin. 12. 8hen the $eneral is wea& and without authority, when his orders are not clear and distinct, when there are no fi6es duties assi$ned to officers and men and the ran&s are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner the result is utter disor$anization. 13. 8hen a $eneral unable to estimate the enemy's stren$th allows an inferior force to en$a$e a lar$er one or hurls a wea& detachment a$ainst a powerful one and ne$lects to place pic&ed soldiers in the front ran& the result must be rout. 24. These are si6 ways of courtin$ defeat which must be carefully noted by the $eneral who has attained a responsible post. 21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally, but a power of estimatin$ the adversary of controllin$ the forces of victory and of shrewdly calculatin$ difficulties dan$ers and distances constitutes the test of a $reat $eneral. 22. !e who &nows these thin$s and in fi$htin$ puts his &nowled$e into practice will win his battles. !e who &nows them not nor practices them will surely be defeated. 2%. If fi$htin$ is sure to result in victory then you must fi$ht even thou$h the ruler forbid it, if fi$htin$ will not result in victory then you must not fi$ht even at the ruler's biddin$. 2(. The $eneral who advances without covetin$ fame and retreats without fearin$ dis$race whose only thou$ht is to

protect his country and do $ood service for his soverei$n is the "ewel of the &in$dom. 2/. De$ard your soldiers as your children and they will follow you into the deepest valleys, loo& upon them as your own beloved sons and they will stand by you even unto death. 20. If however you are indul$ent but unable to ma&e your authority felt, &ind7hearted but unable to enforce your commands, and incapable moreover of #uellin$ disorder: then your soldiers must be li&ened to spoilt children, they are useless for any practical purpose. 21. If we &now that our own men are in a condition to attac& but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attac& we have $one only halfway towards victory. 22. If we &now that the enemy is open to attac& but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attac& we have $one only halfway towards victory. 23. If we &now that the enemy is open to attac& and also &now that our men are in a condition to attac& but are unaware that the nature of the $round ma&es fi$htin$ impracticable we have still $one only halfway towards victory. %4. !ence the e6perienced soldier once in motion is never bewildered, once he has bro&en camp he is never at a loss. %1. !ence the sayin$: If you &now the enemy and &now yourself your victory will not stand in doubt, if you &now !eaven and &now -arth you may ma&e your victory complete. %I. The &ine Situations 10

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war reco$nizes nine varieties of $round:)1* Fispersive $round, )2* facile $round, )%* contentious $round,)(* open $round, )/* $round of intersectin$ hi$hways, )0* serious $round, )1* difficult $round, )2* hemmed7in $round, )3* desperate $round. 2. 8hen a chieftain is fi$htin$ in his own territory it is dispersive $round. %. 8hen he has penetrated into hostile territory but to no $reat distance it is facile $round. (. Ground the possession of which imports $reat advanta$e to either side is contentious $round. /. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open $round. 0. Ground which forms the &ey to three conti$uous states so that he who occupies it first has most of the -mpire at his command is a $round of intersectin$ hi$hways. 1. 8hen an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country leavin$ a number of fortified cities in its rear it is serious $round. 2. +ountain forests ru$$ed steeps marshes and fens77all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult $round. 3. Ground which is reached throu$h narrow $or$es and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a lar$e body of our men: this is hemmed in $round.

14. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fi$htin$ without delay is desperate $round. 11. :n dispersive $round therefore fi$ht not. :n facile $round halt not. :n contentious $round attac& not. 12. :n open $round do not try to bloc& the enemy's way. :n the $round of intersectin$ hi$hways "oin hands with your allies. 1%. :n serious $round $ather in plunder. In difficult $round &eep steadily on the march. 1(. :n hemmed7in $round resort to strata$em. :n desperate $round fi$ht. 1/. Those who were called s&illful leaders of old &new how to drive a wed$e between the enemy's front and rear, to prevent co7operation between his lar$e and small divisions, to hinder the $ood troops from rescuin$ the bad the officers from rallyin$ their men. 10. 8hen the enemy's men were united they mana$ed to &eep them in disorder. 11. 8hen it was to their advanta$e they made a forward move, when otherwise they stopped still. 12. If as&ed how to cope with a $reat host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marchin$ to the attac& I should say: @5e$in by seizin$ somethin$ which your opponent holds dear, then he will be amenable to your will.@

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13. Dapidity is the essence of war: ta&e advanta$e of the enemy's unreadiness ma&e your way by une6pected routes and attac& un$uarded spots. 24. The followin$ are the principles to be observed by an invadin$ force: The further you penetrate into a country the $reater will be the solidarity of your troops and thus the defenders will not prevail a$ainst you. 21. +a&e forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. 22. .arefully study the well7bein$ of your men and do not overta6 them. .oncentrate your ener$y and hoard your stren$th. Ceep your army continually on the move and devise unfathomable plans. 2%. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape and they will prefer death to fli$ht. If they will face death there is nothin$ they may not achieve. :fficers and men ali&e will put forth their uttermost stren$th. 2(. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refu$e they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it they will fi$ht hard. 2/. Thus without waitin$ to be marshaled the soldiers will be constantly on the #ui vive, without waitin$ to be as&ed they will do your will,without restrictions they will be faithful, without $ivin$ orders they can be trusted. 20. >rohibit the ta&in$ of omens and do away with superstitious doubts.Then until death itself comes no calamity need be feared.

21. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money it is not because they have a distaste for riches, if their lives are not unduly lon$ it is not because they are disinclined to lon$evity. 22. :n the day they are ordered out to battle your soldiers may weep those sittin$ up bedewin$ their $arments and those lyin$ down lettin$ the tears run down their chee&s. 5ut let them once be brou$ht to bay and they will display the coura$e of a .hu or a Cuei. 23. The s&illful tactician may be li&ened to the shuai7"an. ?ow the shuai7"an is a sna&e that is found in the .hGn$ mountains. Stri&e at its head and you will be attac&ed by its tail, stri&e at its tail and you will be attac&ed by its head, stri&e at its middle and you will be attac&ed by head and tail both. %4. <s&ed if an army can be made to imitate the shuai7"an I should answer Bes. =or the men of 8u and the men of Bueh are enemies, yet if they are crossin$ a river in the same boat and are cau$ht by a storm they will come to each other's assistance "ust as the left hand helps the ri$ht. %1. !ence it is not enou$h to put one's trust in the tetherin$ of horses and the buryin$ of chariot wheels in the $round %2. The principle on which to mana$e an army is to set up one standard of coura$e which all must reach. %%. !ow to ma&e the best of both stron$ and wea&77that is a #uestion involvin$ the proper use of $round. %(. Thus the s&illful $eneral conducts his army "ust as thou$h he were leadin$ a sin$le man willy7nilly by the hand. 12

%/. It is the business of a $eneral to be #uiet and thus ensure secrecy,upri$ht and "ust and thus maintain order. %0. !e must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances and thus &eep them in total i$norance. %1. 5y alterin$ his arran$ements and chan$in$ his plans he &eeps the enemy without definite &nowled$e. 5y shiftin$ his camp and ta&in$ circuitous routes he prevents the enemy from anticipatin$ his purpose. %2. <t the critical moment the leader of an army acts li&e one who has climbed up a hei$ht and then &ic&s away the ladder behind him.!e carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. %3. !e burns his boats and brea&s his coo&in$7pots, li&e a shepherd drivin$ a floc& of sheep he drives his men this way and that and nothin$ &nows whither he is $oin$. (4. To muster his host and brin$ it into dan$er:77this may be termed the business of the $eneral. (1. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of $round,the e6pediency of a$$ressive or defensive tactics, and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are thin$s that must most certainly be studied. (2. 8hen invadin$ hostile territory the $eneral principle is that penetratin$ deeply brin$s cohesion, penetratin$ but a short way means dispersion. (%. 8hen you leave your own country behind and ta&e your army across nei$hborhood territory you find yourself on

critical $round. 8hen there are means of communication on all four sides the $round is one of intersectin$ hi$hways. ((. 8hen you penetrate deeply into a country it is serious $round.8hen you penetrate but a little way it is facile $round. (/. 8hen you have the enemy's stron$holds on your rear and narrow passes in front it is hemmed7in $round. 8hen there is no place of refu$e at all it is desperate $round. (0. Therefore on dispersive $round I would inspire my men with unity of purpose. :n facile $round I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army. (1. :n contentious $round I would hurry up my rear. (2. :n open $round I would &eep a vi$ilant eye on my defenses. :n $round of intersectin$ hi$hways I would consolidate my alliances. (3. :n serious $round I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. :n difficult $round I would &eep pushin$ on alon$ the road. /4. :n hemmed7in $round I would bloc& any way of retreat. :n desperate $round I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of savin$ their lives. /1. =or it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded to fi$ht hard when he cannot help himself and to obey promptly when he has fallen into dan$er. /2. 8e cannot enter into alliance with nei$hborin$ princes until we are ac#uainted with their desi$ns. 8e are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the 13

countryEits mountains and forests its pitfalls and precipices its marshes and swamps. 8e shall be unable to turn natural advanta$es to account unless we ma&e use of local $uides. /%. To be i$nored of any one of the followin$ four or five principles does not befit a warli&e prince. /(. 8hen a warli&e prince attac&s a powerful state his $eneralship shows itself in preventin$ the concentration of the enemy's forces. !e overawes his opponents and their allies are prevented from "oinin$ a$ainst him. //. !ence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry nor does he foster the power of other states. !e carries out his own secret desi$ns &eepin$ his anta$onists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their &in$doms. /0. 5estow rewards without re$ard to rule issue orders without re$ard to previous arran$ements, and you will be able to handle a whole army as thou$h you had to do with but a sin$le man. /1. .onfront your soldiers with the deed itself, never let them &now your desi$n. 8hen the outloo& is bri$ht brin$ it before their eyes,but tell them nothin$ when the situation is $loomy. /2. >lace your army in deadly peril and it will survive, plun$e it into desperate straits and it will come off in safety. /3. =or it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is capable of stri&in$ a blow for victory. 04. Success in warfare is $ained by carefully accommodatin$ ourselves to the enemy's purpose.

01. 5y persistently han$in$ on the enemy's flan& we shall succeed in the lon$ run in &illin$ the commander7in7chief. 02. This is called ability to accomplish a thin$ by sheer cunnin$. 0%. :n the day that you ta&e up your command bloc& the frontier passes destroy the official tallies and stop the passa$e of all emissaries. 0(. 5e stern in the council7chamber so that you may control the situation. 0/. If the enemy leaves a door open you must rush in. 00. =orestall your opponent by seizin$ what he holds dear and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the $round. 01. 8al& in the path defined by rule and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fi$ht a decisive battle. 02. <t first then e6hibit the coyness of a maiden until the enemy $ives you an openin$, afterwards emulate the rapidity of a runnin$ hare and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. %II. The Attack by 'ire 1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attac&in$ with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp, the second is to burn stores, the third is to burn ba$$a$e trains, the fourth is to burn arsenals and ma$azines, the fifth is to hurl droppin$ fire amon$st the enemy.

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2. In order to carry out an attac& we must have means available.The material for raisin$ fire should always be &ept in readiness. %. There is a proper season for ma&in$ attac&s with fire and special days for startin$ a confla$ration. (. The proper season is when the weather is very dry, the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve the 8all the 8in$ or the .ross7bar, for these four are all days of risin$ wind. /. In attac&in$ with fire one should be prepared to meet five possible developments: 0. )1* 8hen fire brea&s out inside to enemy's camp respond at once with an attac& from without. 1. )2* If there is an outbrea& of fire but the enemy's soldiers remain #uiet bide your time and do not attac&. 2. )%* 8hen the force of the flames has reached its hei$ht follow it up with an attac& if that is practicable, if not stay where you are. 3. )(* If it is possible to ma&e an assault with fire from without do not wait for it to brea& out within but deliver your attac& at a favorable moment. 14. )/* 8hen you start a fire be to windward of it. Fo not attac& from the leeward. 11. < wind that rises in the daytime lasts lon$ but a ni$ht breeze soon falls.

12. In every army the five developments connected with fire must be &nown the movements of the stars calculated and a watch &ept for the proper days. 1%. !ence those who use fire as an aid to the attac& show intelli$ence,those who use water as an aid to the attac& $ain an accession of stren$th. 1(. 5y means of water an enemy may be intercepted but not robbed of all his belon$in$s. 1/. Gnhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attac&s without cultivatin$ the spirit of enterprise, for the result is waste of time and $eneral sta$nation. 10. !ence the sayin$: The enli$htened ruler lays his plans well ahead,the $ood $eneral cultivates his resources. 11. +ove not unless you see an advanta$e, use not your troops unless there is somethin$ to be $ained, fi$ht not unless the position is critical. 12. ?o ruler should put troops into the field merely to $ratify his own spleen, no $eneral should fi$ht a battle simply out of pi#ue. 13. If it is to your advanta$e ma&e a forward move, if not stay where you are. 24. <n$er may in time chan$e to $ladness, ve6ation may be succeeded by content. 21. 5ut a &in$dom that has once been destroyed can never come a$ain into bein$, nor can the dead ever be brou$ht bac& to life. 21

22. !ence the enli$htened ruler is heedful and the $ood $eneral full of caution. This is the way to &eep a country at peace and an army intact.

0. Cnowled$e of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men. 1. !ence the use of spies of whom there are five classes: )1* Local spies, )2* inward spies, )%* converted spies, )(* doomed spies, )/*survivin$ spies. 2. 8hen these five &inds of spy are all at wor& none can discover the secret system. This is called @divine manipulation of the threads.@It is the soverei$n's most precious faculty. 3. !avin$ local spies means employin$ the services of the inhabitants of a district. 14. !avin$ inward spies ma&in$ use of officials of the enemy. 11. !avin$ converted spies $ettin$ hold of the enemy's spies and usin$ them for our own purposes. 12. !avin$ doomed spies doin$ certain thin$s openly for purposes of deception and allowin$ our spies to &now of them and report them to the enemy. 1%. Survivin$ spies finally are those who brin$ bac& news from the enemy's camp. 1(. !ence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. ?one should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should $reater secrecy be preserved. 1/. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sa$acity.

%III. The (se of S ies 1. Sun Tzu said: Daisin$ a host of a hundred thousand men and marchin$ them $reat distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily e6penditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad and men will drop down e6hausted on the hi$hways. <s many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. 2. !ostile armies may face each other for years strivin$ for the victory which is decided in a sin$le day. This bein$ so to remain in i$norance of the enemy's condition simply because one $rud$es the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the hei$ht of inhumanity. %. :ne who acts thus is no leader of men no present help to his soverei$n no master of victory. (. Thus what enables the wise soverei$n and the $ood $eneral to stri&e and con#uer and achieve thin$s beyond the reach of ordinary men is fore&nowled$e. /. ?ow this fore&nowled$e cannot be elicited from spirits, it cannot be obtained inductively from e6perience nor by any deductive calculation.

22

10. They cannot be properly mana$ed without benevolence and strai$htforwardness. 11. 8ithout subtle in$enuity of mind one cannot ma&e certain of the truth of their reports. 12. 5e subtle; be subtle; and use your spies for every &ind of business. 13. If a secret piece of news is divul$ed by a spy before the time is ripe he must be put to death to$ether with the man to whom the secret was told. 24. 8hether the ob"ect be to crush an army to storm a city or to assassinate an individual it is always necessary to be$in by findin$ out the names of the attendants the aides7de7camp and door7&eepers and sentries of the $eneral in command. :ur spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. 21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sou$ht out tempted with bribes led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service. 22. It is throu$h the information brou$ht by the converted spy that we are able to ac#uire and employ local and inward spies. 2%. It is owin$ to his information a$ain that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidin$s to the enemy. 2(. Lastly it is by his information that the survivin$ spy can be used on appointed occasions. 2/. The end and aim of spyin$ in all its five varieties is &nowled$e of the enemy, and this &nowled$e can only be

derived in the first instance from the converted spy. !ence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality. 20. :f old the rise of the Bin dynasty was due to I .hih who had served under the !sia. Li&ewise the rise of the .hou dynasty was due to Lu Ba who had served under the Bin. 21. !ence it is only the enli$htened ruler and the wise $eneral who will use the hi$hest intelli$ence of the army for purposes of spyin$ and thereby they achieve $reat results. Spies are a most important element in water because on them depends an army's ability to move. T)! !&D 7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777 .opyri$ht statement: The Internet .lassics <rchive by Faniel .. Stevenson 8eb <tomics. 8orld 8ide 8eb presentation is copyri$ht ).* 133(72444 Faniel .. Stevenson 8eb <tomics. <ll ri$hts reserved under international and pan7<merican copyri$ht conventions includin$ the ri$ht of reproduction in whole or in part in any form. Firect permission re#uests to classicsHclassics.mit.edu. Translation of @The Feeds of the Fivine <u$ustus@ by <u$ustus is copyri$ht ).* Thomas 5ushnell 5SG. Fownloaded from http:IIclassics.mit.eduITzuIartwar.html 2%