MARISA BACATAN WILLIAMS vs. ATTY. RODRIGO ICAO, A.C. No.

6882, 12/24/2008 FACTS: Complainants claim that Respondent notarized a Declaration of Heirship and Partition making it appear that three of the signatories thereto signed it in his presence when in truth they did not. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 1 year from practice of law and from his commission as a notary public; WARNED that commission of same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The document does not bear the residence certificate number of one of the signatories. In subsequently notarizing the document, Respondent violated the Notarial Law then effective which required the notary public to certify that a party to the instrument which was acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate. This formality is mandatory and cannot be neglected, failure to comply with which results in the revocation of a notarys commission. By Respondents admission, the signatories to the document did not personally sign it in his presence. He, however, claims that they appeared before him and confirmed their identities and acknowledged that the signatures appearing thereon were theirs. If indeed the heirs-signatories and their witnesses had personally appeared before respondent, it is beyond comprehension why he did not ask them to affix their signatures in his presence. By such omission, he failed to heed his duty as a notary public to demand that the document for notarization be signed in his presence. BARRIENTOS 8/31/2004 FACTS: In September 2000, the lawyer issued several Equitable PCIBank Checks in favor of Barrientos and Mercado for the payment of a pre-existing debt. The checks bounced due to insufficient funds, Yhus, charges for violation of B.P. 22 were filed. The lawyer asked for deferment of the criminal charges and promised to pay her debt several times, but failed to pay the full amount, even after a complaint for disbarment was filed against her. ISSUE: Whether gross misconduct HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are the instruments for the administration of justice and the vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealings so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral or not respondent is guilty of VS. LIBIRAN-METEORO, AC#6408,

character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem. Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures. LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO vs. ATTY. PEPITO C. PREQUITO, A.C. No. 4762, 6/28/2004 FACTS: Complainants husband sold a piece of land to Respondent who issued 8 post-dated checks as payment and which checks however subsequently bounced prompting Complainant and her husband to make repeated demands but to no avail. Complainant alleged that Respondents unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly triggered the death of her husband, who died disillusioned and embittered. Respondent countered that, Complainant did not know the real story, and that the non-payment of the checks was justified by the unresolved problem of right-of-way which Complainants husband supposedly had guaranteed. He also alleged that he was entitled to set-off what he owed for the land acquisition against advances made by Complainants husband and for cost incurred when he defended Complainants son in a criminal case. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED. Respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without regard to its deleterious effects to public interest and public order. The issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyers moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar. He not only sets himself liable for a serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the CPR, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for law. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that, A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01); a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession Rule (7.03). ISIDRA TING-DUMALI vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, A.C. No 5161, 4/4/2004 FACTS: Respondent who is Complainants brother-in-law, participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against the perjury committed by his wife and his sister-in-law in a deed of extrajudicial settlement which made it appear that the two were the sole heirs of their deceased parents. Complainant also charged that (a) Respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against the forgery of Complainants signature in a second deed of extrajudicial settlement despite knowledge that Complainant was working abroad at that time, and (b) Respondent made gross misrepresentation and 1

offered false testimony in a petition for judicial reconstitution of title to the effect that his wife and his sister-in-law Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of their deceased parents which ultimately resulted in the issuance of a new title in the name only of his wife and Felicisima. RULING: Respondent DISBARRED. Respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. The Lawyers Oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice. Canon 1 provides that a lawyer, bound to uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes, shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01) , shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02), shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar (CANON 7), shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03), owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court (CANON 10), shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice (Rule 10.01). JOVITA ALEJANDRO vs. ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO & MARICRIS A. VILLARIN, A.C. No. 4256, 2/13/2004 FACTS: Respondents were administratively charged with bigamy and concubinage. Complainant married Respondent in 1971 and has three sons with him. He abandoned her and their family in 1990 to live with his mistress, Respondent Villarin with whom he had a son. Complainant claimed that her husband, nominated as RTC judge is not fit for said position because he, and co-respondent Atty. Villarin, do not even possess the basic integrity to remain as members of the Philippine Bar. RULING: Respondent Alejandro DISBARRED for gross immorality; complaint against Respondent Villarin (was never served summons) REFERRED BACK to the IBP for further appropriate proceedings. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides that, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court has disciplined members of the Bar found guilty of misconduct demonstrating lack of good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so.

Though evidence presented was not sufficient to prove bigamy, the evidence sufficiently showed that Respondent Alejandro, while being lawfully married to Complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with another woman, coRespondent Villarin. Respondent Alejandro exhibited by his conduct a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011 MAXIMO A.

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and GLINDO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (Omaa). The Antecedent Facts Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads: REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS BAYAN NG GUMACA LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod: 1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanyakanya ng aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kayat bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay; 2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si 2

Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena; 3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pagaaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirahan; 4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon; 5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina; 6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito; 7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal. BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon. (Sgd) ELENA MARANTAL Nagkasundo (Sgd) RODOLFO ESPINOSA Nagkasundo

persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. Omaa presented Marantals "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority. Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaa arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office when the contract was notarized. The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosas desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBPCBD stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found: Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment. The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as a notary public. In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaas motion for reconsideration. The Issue The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay." The Ruling of this Court We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.1avvphi1

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA Notary Public PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97 Gumaca, Quezon Doc. No. 482; Page No. 97; Book No. XI; Series of 1997. Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during their union. Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.8 We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her parttime office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his staff. We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaa knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.10 WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. SO ORDERED.

place outside ones commission. Respondent acknowledged that from February 1, 1996 to September 30, 2001, within which period the questioned document was notarized, his notarial commission then issued was for Quezon City, yet the document was notarized in Pasig City. To compound matters, he admitted having notarized hundreds of documents in Pasig City, where he used to hold office, during the period that his notarial commission was only for and within Quezon City. While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, Respondents act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual. For all legal intents and purposes, Respondent, by performing through the years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized, has indulged in deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public, respondent likewise violated Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all

JESSICA UY vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL SAO, A.C. No. 6505, 9/11/2008. FACTS: Complainant charged Respondent of notarizing several documents despite the expiration of his notarial commission. Respondent admitted the act complaint of, but claimed that the office aide assigned had represented to him that his commission had already been renewed. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED from law practice for 6 months; present notarial commission REVOKED; DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as notary public for 2 years; WARNED that any similar act/infraction would be dealt with more severely. Practice of law, not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, qualifications required by law for conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public as such act converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Respondents alleged reliance upon the representation of the office aide shows disregard of the requirements for issuance of a notarial commission. To be sure, the requirements for the issuance of a notarial commission must not be treated as a mere casual formality. A LAWYERS ACT OF NOTARIZING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT THE REQUISITE COMMISSION THEREFOR IS REPREHENSIBLE, CONSTITUTING AS IT DOES, NOT ONLY MALPRACTICE, BUT ALSO THE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission 4

TAN TIONG BIO vs. ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES, A.C. No. 6634, 8/23/2007 FACTS: Complainant made a purchase for a real property from the vendor, Fil-Estates Property, Inc., represented by Alice Bondco. The deed of sale therefore was notarized by Respondent (with notarial commission for the jurisdiction of Quezon City). When the vendor failed to deliver the title to a second property purchased by Complainant, he instituted estafa charges and a complaint for disbarment against Respondent for having notarized a deed of sale in Pasig City (at vendors headquarter) and for not having required the presence of the parties to the deed of sale. RULING: Respondent PERMANENTLY BARRED from being commissioned as Notary Public; SUSPENDED from law practice for 2 years. There can be quibbling that Respondent breached the injunction against notarizing a document in a

to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action, being a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Also, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, is indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. DOLORES DELA CRUZ vs. ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR., A.C. No. 7781, 9/12/2008. FACTS: Complainants alleged that Respondent notarized a deed of extrajudicial settlement which allowed their sister (Navarro) to assume full ownership of their deceased parents estate. Complainants alleged that the signatures in the said deed are forged, that they never appeared and acknowledged the same before Respondent. Respondent explained that, having known, and being neighbors with Navarro for a long time, he believed she would not lie to him and that he relied on her representation that the signatures and community tax certificates appearing in the document were true and correct. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 1 year; notarial commission REVOKED; DISQUALIFIED from being a commission as notary public for 2 years. Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before them to attest to the truth of what are stated therein. Without such appearance, notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or deed. Further, notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented the proper residence certificate while the Notarial Law requires the party to the instrument to present competent proof of identity. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Notarization is not a mere routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, RESPONDENT. The Facts Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Dionisio, Paraaque City covered by TCT of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a resident of the USA, he entrusted the administration of the subject property to respondent, together with the corresponding owner's duplicate title. Unknown to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious SPA, mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto Ho . As a result, TCT in the name of complainant was cancelled , replaced and issued in favor of Ho. Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed an administrative complaint against respondent for having violated his oath as a lawyer, causing him damage and prejudice. In his counter-affidavit, respondent denied any formal lawyer-

client relationship between him and the complainant, claiming to have merely extended his services for free. He also denied receiving money from the complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate taxes on the property. Further, he averred that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque and one Danilo Diaz, who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to having confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor already annotated at the back of TCT under the complainants name upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he was also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage and received his proportionate share of P130,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully settled. He denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a forgery. Nonetheless, he sought complainant's forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the subject property. The Court resolved to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In its Report , it was found that respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the property of his client without the latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA. Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that respondent violated various provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and accordingly recommended that he be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of Commissioner De Mesa . The Issue whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent. The Court's Ruling The Court concurred with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors that respondent acted with deceit when, through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client's property for his personal benefit. Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors correctly recommended his disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 1, 1.01, 16, 16.01, 16.03 and 17 In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up to the exacting standards demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that [t]he practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the 5

penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

259001 on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco. Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar. In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo. Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the person of Claire JueleAlgodon(Algodon), to see him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him. Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Lincoasked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along with the witnesses. However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same. On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003. During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003.7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died.8 On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty. Lincopersonally came and appeared before me is false. This act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath to obey the laws and do no falsehood.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. FLORITA LINCO,Complainant,

S.

A.C. No. 7241 [Formerly CBD Case No. 051506] Present:

- versus -

ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL, Respondent.

D.

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, MENDOZA, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: October 17, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION PERALTA, J.: The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property. The antecedent facts are as follows: Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village,Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001. Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2allegedly executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainants husband died on July 29, 2003.3 Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No.

The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that hisnotarial commission be revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years. On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11 On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file her comment.12 In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions. On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication. RULING The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken. There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Lincoshould have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation. However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.15

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.16 For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.17 Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of his notarialcommission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same penalty. WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent. SO ORDERED. CORAZON RODOLFO Facts Nevada is the principal stockholder of C.T. Nevada & Sons, Inc., a family corporation which operates the Mt. Crest Hotel located at Legarda Road, Baguio City. Complainant alleged that she and Casuga are members of the One in Jesus Christ Church, a religious group which counts the latter as one of its elders. According to Nevada, she has 7 T. NEVADA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. D. CASUGA, RESPONDENT.

allowed the use of one of the Hotels functions rooms for church services. And in time, Casuga was able to gain her trust and confidence. Nevada further alleged that unknown to her, Casuga, sometime in 2006, started to represent himself as the administrator of the Hotel. On March 1, 2006, he entered into a contract of lease with a certain Jung Jong Chul covering an office space in the Hotel. Casuga signed the lease contract over the printed name of one Edwin T. Nevada and notarized the document himself. Upon contract signing, the amount of PhP 90,000 as rental deposit for the office space. The amount thus deposited, so Nevada claims, was never turned over to her or to C.T. Nevada & Sons, Inc. Nevada adds that, in the course of their acquaintanceship, Casuga was able to acquire from her several pieces of jewelry with an aggregate value of PhP 300,000 and a solid gold Rolex watch with diamond dials valued at USD 12,000. Casuga took possession of the valuables purportedly with the obligation of selling them and to remit any proceeds to Nevada. However, despite repeated demands by Nevada for Casuga to return the valuables or otherwise remit the proceeds of the sale, no jewelry or money was ever returned. Casuga submitted an Affidavit stating that Nevada informally instituted him as the administrator of the Hotel in a limited capacity but denied receiving the PhP 90,000 from Chul. With regard to the pieces of jewelry and the Rolex watch, Casuga stated that Nevada actually pawned them in a pawnshop and that she later asked his wife to redeem them using their own money. Thereafter, Nevada asked Casugas wife to sell the valuables and reimburse herself from the proceeds of the sale. Mandatory conference were set but Casuga never appeared. Report of the Commission through Nevadas position paper was submitted for resolution and Casuga was suspended for one (1) year for gross misconduct, violation of the notarial law and infidelity in the custody of monies, jewelries and a Rolex watch which pertain to the complainant and the family corporation. . The Issues Whether or not respondent is guilty for the charges detailed or implied in the basic complaint; and the propriety of the return to Nevada of the items, or their money value, and the amount subject of the case. The Courts Ruling The SC agreed with the CBDs inculpatory findings, as endorsed by the IBP Board of Governors, and the recommended upgrading of penalties, as shown in Resolution No. XIX-2010-461, but subject to the modification as follows: 1.Casuga is guilty of gross misconduct for misrepresenting himself The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance under Philippine law are two: (1) Serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. The latter ground is not involved in these proceedings. As to the first, the law provides that sufficient cause must exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court involving serious misconduct. The word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error or judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Respondent Casuga represented himself as a duly-authorized representative of Nevada when in fact he was not. Plainly enough, Casuga is guilty of misrepresentation, when he

made it appear that he was authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of Nevada when, in fact, he was not. Following the principle laid down in Tan, Casugas misrepresentation properly constitutes gross misconduct for which he must be disciplined.Notably, in Tan, the respondent lawyer was held guilty of misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. Casuga also violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Casugas failure to return such property or remit the proceeds of the sale is a blatant violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). The Codes Canon 16 and Rule 16.3 From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. Thus, the same penalty should be imposed upon Casuga. Casuga violated the Notarial Rules The Notarial Rules, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, provides in its Rule IV, Section 1(c) and Sec. 3(a) when a notary public may sign a document in behalf of another person None of the requirements contained in Rule IV, Sec. 1(c), as would justify a notary signing in behalf of a contracting party, was complied with in this case. Moreover, Casugas act of affixing his signature above the printed name Edwin T. Nevada, without any qualification, veritably made him a party to the contract of lease in question. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of the aforequoted Rule which he can be disciplinarily sanctioned provided under Rule XI, Sec. 1(b)(10) of the Notarial Rules WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga GUILTY of gross misconduct for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Rules. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of four (4) years from the practice of law. The notarial commission of Atty. Casuga, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as Notary Public also for four (4) years. Additionally, he is ordered to return the amount of PhP 90,000, the pieces of jewelry subject of this case or their equivalent of PhP 300,000, and the Rolex watch valued at USD 12,000 or its equivalent in Philippine Peso to Corazon T. Nevada within thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision; otherwise, he shall be cited for contempt. Lastly, Atty. Casuga is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, A.C. No. 7136, 8/1/2007 FACTS; Complainant first met Respondent in 2000 when Irene, his then fiance (later that year became his wife) introduced Respondent as her friend who was married and with three children. After their wedding, Complainant noticed his wife receiving calls and text messages (some read, I love you or I miss you) from Respondent. Also, his wife started coming home either late or early in the morning at other times, did not go home at all. A confrontation ensued after Complainant saw his wife with Respondent, thereafter, his wife left the conjugal house. Complainant later found a love letter from Respondent bearing the date of their wedding day. Still later, Complainant learned that Respondent and his wife had been seen on various occasions in public, and that they were already living together, and in fact, already had a child of their own. In answer to the disbarment complaint, Respondent posited that, his special friendship with Irene was low-profile and not scandalous (as Complainant claimed), and 8

that, he had damaged the institution of marriage as he was still civil and in good terms with his wife who supposedly knew of his relationship with Irene. RULING: Respondent DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct in violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the CPR. From his answer, Respondent does not deny his adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery defined in Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void. What Respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. Respondents denial is a negative pregnant a denial with admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between Respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer. Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides the ground for disbarment/suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 (Concubinage) of the Revised Penal Code. On the charge of immorality, Respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. While the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family), that, Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the Family Code, echoing this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Respondent then violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. That the marriage between Complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void. As a lawyer, Respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extramarital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that

her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite Respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. Bautista vs 12, 1990] FACTS: In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondents motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts: 1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation. xxx 4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorneys fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City; xxx Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads: We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract. HELD: YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months. RATIO: The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to 9 Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February

respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the clients rights is champertous [citation omitted]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [citation omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions. FLORENCE MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO MACARRUBO, A.C. No. 6148, 2/27/2004 L.

Respondent has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple marriages and then leaving them behind by the mere expedient of resorting to legal remedies to sever them. The impact of respondents conduct is incalculable upon his exwives as well as the children he had by them, their lives having been dislocated beyond recall. Such pattern of misconduct by Respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. Julieta B. Narag vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag (291 SCRA 451) Facts: Atty. Narags spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of spite. IBP disbarred him, hence, this petition. Held: Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards. ROSARIO MECARAL vs. ATTY. AC#8392, EN BANC, 6/29/10 DANILO VASQUEZ,

FACTS: Complainant, by herself and her two children sought to disbar Respondent for having deceived her into marrying him by representing that his previous marriage with a certain Helen Esparza was void. Respondent later abandoned Complainant and their children and then entered a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino. Respondent denied employing deception in marrying Complainant and insisted that she, despite full knowledge of his prior marriage, dragged him against his will to a sham wedding to protect her and her familys reputation because she was 3-months pregnant. Respondent presented a court decision declaring the nullity of his marriage to Complainant for being a sham, vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation, barred by legal impediment and want of a valid marriage license. RULING: Respondent DISBARRED and his name STRICKEN OFF from Roll of Attorneys due to gross immorality. Respondent breached the following precepts of the CPR, that: a lawyer shall not engage in A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01); a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar (CANON 7); and, a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03). While Respondents marriage to Complainant has been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. Having lived with Complainant as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, makes him liable for concubinage his first marriage having been only annulled on August 21, 1998. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Even assuming that, Complainant coerced him into marriage, the duress, by his own admission ceased after their wedding day, yet, Respondent freely cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her. In both his marriages to his first wife and to Complainant, Respondent claimed having entered into the marital union against his will. That claim is an affront to the intelligence of the members of this Court to distinguish fact from fiction, reality from fantasy. It is not easy to believe that a lawyer like Respondent could easily be cowered to enter into any marriage. One incident of a shotgun marriage is believable, but two such in succession would tax ones credulity. And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T. Constantino which is again the subject of another annulment case. It would not come as a surprise if in that pending case, he would again put blame on his third wife in order to send the marriage to oblivion.

FACTS: Complainant was Respondents secretary (in 2002), later she became his lover and common-law wife. Still later, Respondent brought her to a mountainous part in Biliran where he left her with the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, a religious group which Respondent headed. Thereafter, and upon Respondents instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected Complainant with drugs. She remained in captivity until her mother aided by the Provincial Welfare Development and the police, rescued her. Complainant sought Respondents disbarment alleging as well that Respondent contracted a bigamous marriage in marrying Leny Azur despite the subsistence of a prior marriage to Ma. Shirley Yunzal. RULING: Respondent DISBARRED for violating Canon 1 (A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land

10

and promote respect for law and legal processes) and Rule 7 (A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession) of the CPR; his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondents acts of converting his secretary into a mistress, contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. Complainants subsequent detention and torture is gross misconduct which only a beast may be able to do. Canon 1 of the CPR When a lawyers moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys. In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct, Respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer. WILSON CHAM vs. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, A.C. No. 7494, 6/27/2008 FACTS: Respondent leased an apartment unit from Greenville Realty and Development Corp. represented by Complainant as its president and general manager. Her total unpaid account reached P71,1007.88. Despite repeated demands, Respondent failed to pay her account and even vacated the leased premises without notifying Complainant. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 1 month; WARNED that repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Having incurred just debts, Respondent had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they became due. Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid obligations, and without the complainants knowledge and consent. Respondents abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I (a lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes) and Rule 1.01 (a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct). Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial and legal system is ensured. ALFREDO ROA vs. ATTY. JUAN MORENO, AC#8382, 4/21/10 FACTS: Complainant paid Respondent P70T for the purchase of a piece of land. Instead of a deed of sale, Respondent issued a temporary receipt and a certificate of land occupancy assuring Complainant that he could already use the lot. Complainant, upon learning that the certificate could not be registered with the Register of Deeds, then confronted Respondent who admitted that the real owner was a certain Rubio and that the lot was still pending litigation. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED from law practice for 2 years. Respondents credibility is highly questionable he even issued a bogus certificate of land occupancy to Complainant whose only fault was that he did not know better. To the unlettered, said certificate could have easily passed off as a document evidencing title. In fact,

Complainant actually tried, but failed, to register the Certificate of Land Occupancy in the Register of Deeds. Complainant readily parted with P70T because of the false assurance afforded by the sham certificate. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 (not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct) of the CPR. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Respondent acted in his private capacity, misrepresented that he owned the lot he sold to Complainant, later refused to return his money. As a final blow, he denied having any transaction with complainant. It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. JUANITA MANOIS vs. ATTY. VICTOR DECIEMBRE, A.C. No. 5364, 8/20/2008 FACTS: Complainant loaned P20,000.00 from Respondent and delivered to him blanks checks to be accordingly filled out by Respondent with the agreed monthly installments. Despite full payment, Respondent refused to return the remaining blank checks supposedly because the loan had not yet been fully paid as payments made were allegedly credited to interest on the loan. Respondent thereafter filled out the blank checks to an amount of P287,500.00 and later used this checks as basis in filing cases against Complainant for estafa and violation of B.P. 22. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY for gross misconduct and violation of Rule 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes (Canon 1); lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01). The CPR likewise mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. Respondent failed to comply with the foregoing canons. Complainant had supplied Respondent with blank personal checks as security for the P20,000 loan contracted and which Respondent later deceitfully filled out with various amounts they had not agreed upon and with full knowledge that the loan had already been paid. After the filled-out checks had been dishonored upon presentment, Respondent even imprudently filed multiple lawsuits against Complainant. Verily, Respondent is guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from and highly unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The fact that the conduct pertained to Respondents private dealings with complainant is of no moment. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but also a continuing qualification for all members of the Bar. MARJORIE F. SAMANIEGO vs. ATTY. FERRER, A.C. No. 7022, 6/18/2008 ANDREW V.

11

FACTS: Complainant was Respondents client. The lawyerclient relationship became intimate, they lived together as husband and wife (1996-1997) and had a daughter. In 2000, the affair ended and since then Respondent failed to give support to their daughter. As it so happened, Respondent prior to his cohabitation with Complainant was already married with 10 children (Complainant claimed that he did not know that Respondent was already married; Respondent insists that Complainant was complacent, knowing well that he was a married man). RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 6 months for gross immorality; WARNED that the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. Respondent did not abandon Complainant, he simply returned to his family. On another point, we may agree with respondents contention that complainant was not entirely blameless. She knew about his wife but blindly believed him to be unmarried. However, that one complicit in the affair complained of immorality against her co-principal does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether Ms. Samaniego is in pari delicto. We must emphasize that this Courts investigation is not about Ms. Samaniegos acts but Atty. Ferrers conduct as one of its officers and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and all members of the bar of the following norms under the CPR: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01); A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar (Canon 7); and A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03). Respondent ought always to keep in mind the responsibilities of a father to all his children. If there be a resultant hardship on them because of this case, let it be impressed on all concerned that the direct cause thereof was his own misconduct. MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ET. AL. vs. ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, A.C. No. 6288, 2006. FACTS: Respondent executed a deed assigning all his rights and interest over a townhouse unit and lot in favor of Complainant for the price of P1.5M. Complainant paid P750,000 with the balance to be paid on staggered basis covered by post-dated checks with Respondents undertaking to deliver to Complainant a copy of his contract to sell with the townhouse developer and to have the latter execute a deed of absolute sale in Complainants favor. After Respondent encashed the first check, Complainant learned from the developer that Respondent had not paid the townhouse in full when he assigned it to Complainant. Complainant stopped payment for the second check and demanded, alternatively for Respondent to deliver a deed of absolute sale in her favor or the return of her money. Respondent asked for time to comply but never did so. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 3 years. Respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with Complainant representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, Respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR. It cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from Complainant. He did not inform Complainant that he has not yet paid in full the price for the subject property and therefore, had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property

at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to P937,500.00, despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him. Respondents adamant refusal to return to Complainant the money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally reprehensible. By his actuations, Respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. RTJ-99-1448 April 6, 2000

SAPHIA M. MAGARANG, complainant, vs. JUDGE GALDINO B. JARDIN, SR., respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: The case is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Saphia M. Magarang on January 06, 1999, with the Court Administrator, Supreme Court charging respondent Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 05, Butuan City with corruption, incompetence, ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. The complaint was subscribed under oath before a notary public.1 On February 04, 1999, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the complaint to respondent judge, requiring him to answer within ten (10) days from receipt.2 On March 10, 1999, respondent Judge submitted his answer to the complaint. He denied the charges against him as false and fabricated.3 On June 23, 1999, the Court referred the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, for investigation, report and recommendation.4 Justice Magtolis scheduled the case for hearings in September and October, 1999. Except for the main parties who were required to appear in person, the investigator allowed the testimonies of witnesses residing in Butuan City to be taken through deposition.5 The facts may be related as follows: On July 22, 1998, the President of the Philippines appointed complainant's husband, Nuruddin-Ali M. Magarang, Director III for Caraga of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) vice Alexander Mama-O.6On July 30, 1998 he took his oath of office before Secretary Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. On August 6, 1998, Alexander P. Mama-O filed with the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, assigned to Branch 05 a petition for quo warranto with injunction, damages, attorney's 12

fees and temporary restraining appointment of Magarang.7

order,

questioning

the

On August 10, 1998, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), good for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining Nuruddin Magarang from assuming the office of Director III. On August 13, 1998, respondent judge extended the TRO for seventeen (17) days. After the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction on August 28, 1998, complainant went to the house of respondent judge to request the latter to fairly decide the application for injunction and to deny the preliminary injunction. Respondent judge expressed his willingness to help complainant, but said that he had to return the P200,000.00 he received from petitioner Mama-O. The complainant committed herself to pay the said amount to respondent judge at a later date, to which respondent judge replied "O sige, tingnan natin bukas." The next day, August 29, 1998, respondent judge granted a writ of preliminary injunction against Nuruddin Magarang, enjoining the latter from entering the DOTC office at Capitol Drive, Butuan City and from further assuming the Office of Director III until further orders from the court.8 On September 7, 1998 Nuruddin Magarang's lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting preliminary injunction.9 During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, on October 1, 1998, complainant went to respondent judge's office at the Butuan Hall of Justice. She handed him P80,000.00 and committed to give P200,000.00 later, in exchange for a favorable action on her husband's motion for reconsideration. Respondent judge asked the complainant when she could give the P200,000.00, and further instructed her to return the following day. Complainant returned the next day, October 2, 1998, a Friday. Respondent judge told her that he had yet to finish his "decision" on the motion for reconsideration, and told complainant to come back in the afternoon. At around 4:00 p. m. of that same day, respondent judge told complainant that he might not be able to finish the "decision" as no one was willing to report on a Saturday to type it. Complainant then offered that if respondent judge could convince one of his staff to do the typing on a Saturday, she would be the one to pay for his overtime work. Respondent judge acceded and told complainant to make the request directly to the employee concerned. Complainant then asked a lady staff member who expressed willingness to work, but respondent judge did not want her to do the job. The lady staff member told respondent judge that she could do it, and then the two (2) talked in the Visayan dialect which complainant did not understand. After that conversation, respondent judge told complainant to return the following day, October 3, 1998, a Saturday. The next day (October 3, 1998), complainant returned to the Hall of Justice but the security guard told her to wait downstairs. She saw respondent judge before noon, and the latter said he would just take his lunch. At about 3:00 p.m., respondent judge's secretary came to tell the complainant that copy of the resolution of the motion for reconsideration had been delivered to her counsel. Complainant proceeded to the house of her lawyer, Atty. Dollfuss Go who showed her a resolution dated October 3, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration. 10

On November 3, 1998, complainant went to respondent judge's office to recover the P80,000.00 she gave him. A heated argument ensued between complainant and respondent judge, with the latter uttering unsavory words tending to malign complainant's marital fidelity. Angered, complainant poked her index finger at respondent judge's mouth to stop him from further hurling invectives at her. Respondent judge bit complainant's finger, causing her to forcibly pull it off, which caused respondent judge's tooth to fall off. On November 11, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 29 and October 3, 1998 orders (granting the preliminary mandatory injunction and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively); 11 however, on December 9, 1998, respondent judge denied the motion. 12 The Solicitor General thereafter filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the August 29 and October 3, 1998 orders of respondent judge in Spl. Civil Case No. 887. On March 24, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision nullifying and setting aside the orders of respondent judge in Spl. Civil Case No. 887. 13 On his part, respondent judge denied receiving P80,000.00 from the complainant, or that there was a commitment for her to give him P200,000.00 in consideration of the denial of the application for writ of preliminary injunction. To prove his good moral character, respondent judge presented several citations/awards given by private organizations, viz: 1. Concerned Media, Inc. a plaque for "Golden Leadership National Award" on March 7, 1999; 2. Jesus Nazareno Parish of Cagayan de Oro City plaque of recognition for diplomatic and dedicated service as President of the Parish Pastoral Council: Development of Filipino Youth a letter informing that the respondent has been selected to receive the "Dakilang Haligi ng Tahanan Award" on June 29, 1999. (Pls. Note: a Sponsorship Agreement is attached to the letter, asking the supposed awardee to sign a sponsorship agreement for the price P50,000.00); 3. Philippine Experimental Educational Research Society, Inc., with address at 451-A Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Ave, cor. Soler St., Sta. Cruz, Manila letter dated May 3, 1999, informing the respondent of his selection as "Outstanding RTC Judge of the Year"; 4. The Philippine Media Research and Progress Report, Inc., likewise with address at Rm. 541-A Republic Supermarket Building, notifying the respondent that he was chosen to receive an award as Outstanding Judge of the Year; and 5. Holy Redeemer Parish a letter dated June 30, 1999, expressing gratitude to the respondent for his love offering to the parish. 6. Plaque of Appreciation given by the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental for his exemplary service during his term as mayor of the municipality. 14 Further, respondent judge presented three (3) of his cojudges in Butuan City to attest to his character. Judge 13

Rosarito Dabalos of Regional Trial Court, Branch 02 testified that respondent had been serving as "sacristan" or acolyte in their parish at Bukidnon. He had no personal knowledge of any derogatory remarks about respondent Judge. He saw the respondent judge after he was attacked on November 3, 1998, and his mouth was bloodied. Judge Cipriano Alviso, Jr., of Branch 04 testified that he was one of those consulted by respondent judge about the application for a TRO, and he advised him to issue one to preserve the status quo. As to respondent's reputation as a judge, he stated, ". . . he works, he tries to dispose of his cases as early as possible." 15 When he heard of the commotion on November 3, 1998, he went to Branch 05, where the trouble was. He saw complainant Magarang about to go out of respondent judge's chamber. He asked her not to leave. He also asked the Security Guard who followed him to look for the man mentioned by Judge Jardin as the one who attacked him, because he saw respondent's mouth bloody. He ordered an investigation because he considered the Hall of Justice as sacred. Judge Victor A. Tomaneng of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 testified that he had known respondent judge since May 1996 when he came in as a new judge. He looked up to respondent not only as a brother but also as a father, being the eldest among them. As to respondent's reputation, he is fatherly, very humble and very soft-spoken. He also saw respondent after the incident on November 3, 1998 when he came to the judge's chamber at Branch 05, and he saw respondent's mouth bleeding, and there were also bloodstains inside the toilet. When he asked what happened respondent judge answered that a woman and her brother who appeared to be a hunchback assaulted him. He asked why, and respondent answered that they wanted him (respondent) to reconsider his order in Spl. Civil Case No. 887. When he (witness) came, the persons who assaulted respondent judge were no longer there.1wphi1.nt "The career of a judge, as required in the Code of Judicial Conduct, entails the highest degree of competence, integrity and independence, because a judge ought to be the embodiment of all that is good, efficient, competent, honest and reliable. Woe unto the magistrate who is wanting in any of these virtues. In view of the adversarial nature of our system of administering justice, a judge is almost always the object of hate, venom, and contempt and of administrative or criminal charges feigned or illusory. It is thus the policy of this court that administrative charges against a judge must be heard with utmost care and circumspection." 16 After careful scrutiny of the records, we find respondent judge guilty of corruption in office. The corruption consists in respondent judge's receiving P200,000.00 from petitioner Mama-O in Spl. Civil Case No. 887 and P80,000.00 from complainant Magarang in consideration of favorable action on complainant's request for "justice" for her husband in the same case. Complainant and her witness, Naima Capangpangan, proved these facts vividly and convincingly.1a\^/phi1 The latter is a simple woman who reached only the fourth grade. She drew a clear picture of what transpired on August 28, 1998, when she went with complainant to respondent judge's house, and on October 1, 1998, when she saw complainant prepare and count P80,000.00 and later accompanied complainant to respondent judge' office at the Hall of Justice in Butuan City which amount complainant personally brought to respondent judge's chambers. The witness withstood the rigors of a thorough cross-examination conducted by respondent judge's

counsel. 17 Moreover, there was no evidence showing that witness Naima Capangpangan had been impelled by ill motive to adversely testify against him. On the other hand, the defense interposed by respondent judge is denial and alibi. He claimed that on August 28 and October 2, 1998 (both dates were a Friday), he went home to Cagayan de Oro City, a distance of more than two hundred kilometers and returned the next day (Saturday) to sign the orders. The investigating justice found this incredible. 18 She also found the testimonies of complainant and witness Naima Capangpangan to be credible. We agree. The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. 19 The alibi of respondent judge necessarily crumbles in the face of his positive identification by complainant and her witness Naima Capangpangan. 20 It is worthy to note that none of the colleagues of respondent judge categorically and positively testified that he was a man of integrity and probity. When asked about the character and reputation of the respondent judge, all that they said were the following: Judge Dabalos: "Well, I would rather not make an opinion regarding his person because as a judge it is improper for me to make an opinion on what we hear or what we see. But so far I have no personal knowledge on the basis of which I can say some derogatory remarks about him." 21 Judge Tomaneng: "Well, I look at him as not only a brother of the profession, not only as a member of the PJA but look at him as our father here in Butuan he being the eldest among the RTC judges." 22 Judge Alvizo: "Well, as a judge, he works, he tries to dispose of his cases as early as possible." 23 Obviously, all of them avoided saying that respondent judge was a man of unquestioned or unblemished integrity and probity. "While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice." 24 Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 25 A judge's conduct must be above reproach. 26 Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. 27 A judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach. 28 In Vedaa vs. Valencia,
29

the Court held:

The code of judicial ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private 14

morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. Respondent judge miserably failed to measure up to stringent judicial standards. 30 Complainant has sufficiently established the corrupt acts of respondent judge in connection with Spl. Civil Case No. 887. He received a bribe from both sides, "lagaring hapon". He has no place in the judiciary. 31 He dishonored the judicial robe he wore. His acts could even be criminal in nature. 32 We have unhesitatingly removed from office judges and court employees for less serious transgressions. 33 We removed a deputy sheriff from office for asking a bribe of only P1,500.00.34 We have no reason to depart from this ruling. Respondent judge's acts of corruption clearly show his unfitness to remain any minute longer in his judicial robe. We are disappointed with the recommendation of the investigating justice to impose on respondent judge only suspension from office for one (1) year despite her finding that respondent judge committed acts of corruption in office by receiving a bribe of P80,000.00 from complainant and P200,000.00 from the other party to the case before him. Surely, she could not be unaware of extant jurisprudence that such corrupt acts, no matter how minimal the amount involved, deserve not less than outright removal from office. 35 "Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges." 36 WHEREFORE, we DISMISS respondent Judge GALDINO B. JARDIN, SR., Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Branch 05 from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government including government owned or controlled corporations. Judge Jardin shall immediately vacate his position as Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 05, Butuan City as well as any position in the judiciary to which he may be presently assigned, and desist from deciding or resolving any case or incidents therein upon receipt of notice hereof. SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO FACTS A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree

within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published. An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isnt served in any way by the prohibition. ISSUE: Whether Rule3.01. HELD: Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyers name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar. LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO Facts: A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached respondents calling card: Front NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821 Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719 or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 &

15

Back SERVICES OFFERED: CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD. In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said calling card. Issue: services Held: Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession in the publics estimation). With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes ambulance chasing (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry and champertry. As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) lawyers name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number and (e) special branch of law practiced. Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession. MANUEL G. VILLATUYA v. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012 Case Digest FACTS: Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation. W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his

In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers. In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women On January 9, 2006, Copies of 3 Marriage attached the certified referred to in the complainant filed a Motion to Admit Contracts of respondent wherein he true copies of the Marriage Contracts Certification issued by the NSO.

On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending outcome of petition for nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution. On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of 16

client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondents disbarment. ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant; 2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and 3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. RULING: First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees. Supreme Court affirmed the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter. Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services. Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code. Third charge: Bigamy. The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido: Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSOcertified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus: [W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high 17

degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him. Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58 The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

18