Copyright 2004, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.

This paper was prepared for presentation at The Seventh SPE International Conference on
Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production held in Calgary,
Alberta, Canada, 2931 March 2004.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE Program Committee following review of
information contained in a proposal submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper, as
presented, have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers and are subject to
correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any
position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, its officers, or members. Papers presented at
SPE meetings are subject to publication review by Editorial Committees of the Society of
Petroleum Engineers. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper
for commercial purposes without the written consent of the Society of Petroleum Engineers is
prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to a proposal of not more than 300
words; illustrations may not be copied. The proposal must contain conspicuous
acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper was presented. Write Librarian, SPE, P.O.
Box 833836, Richardson, TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435.

Abstract
Protection of pressurized process equipment against fire and
thus reducing the risk of fire escalation is a key concern for all
process plants both offshore and onshore.

Guideline for Protection of Pressurized Systems Exposed to
Fire, referred to as the guideline, was developed by Norsk
Hydro, Statoil and Scandpower Risk Management in 2002.
The guideline has been applied in offshore development
projects. Based in the experiences gained from users, the
guideline is being revised December 2003. The procedures set
forward in the guideline, has pointed out several areas/topics
where further research and testing should be implemented.
One such topic is behavior of flanged connection during
realistic hydrocarbon fire scenarios. Therefore, large scale
experiments on jet fire exposed flange connections under
pressurized conditions are carried out during the winter
2003/2004.

The guideline is under continuous development and will be
updated when new knowledge is gained and available.

Introduction
The development of this guideline was initiated by the need
for a comprehensive approach including all the main aspects
related to optimizing fire protection of pressurized process
equipment and systems. The results from the recent years fire
research on hydrocarbon fires in offshore like environments,
also indicated that such fires can expose equipment more
severely than recognized in other guidelines that are
commonly used.
The guideline defines the principles and a methodology
that should be adopted for design, construction and operation
of systems and arrangements for fire protection of pressurized
process piping and equipment.
The guideline is valid for on- and offshore process
facilities.
The guideline has been developed in line with the
principles outlined in ISO 13702, Ref. /1/, and hence, also
represents an important contribution to the establishment of a
Fire and Explosion Strategy, FES.
The guideline is applicable throughout the conceptual,
basic and detailed engineering stages of new plants. The
guideline may also be used for modification projects of
existing plants. When key operational parameters affecting the
fire safety are to be modified on an existing plant, the
principles in the guideline should be applied. It is important to
use this guideline as early as possible in a project
development.
The intention of the first version of the guideline was to
develop an effective design tool mainly based on a
deterministic approach disregarding the fact that fire exposure
of process plants is probalistic in nature.
The Guideline for Protection of Pressurized Systems
Exposed to Fire was first issued in 2002. It was made
available to the industry on the Scandpower web site
www.scandpower.com .
The development of the guideline was funded by Norsk
Hydro and Statoil. The guideline has been used by these
companies in development of new projects and modifications
to existing installations.
In total nearly 400 persons have visited the web site and
downloaded the guideline.
The responsible party for updating and maintaining the
guideline is Scandpower Risk Management AS in close co-
operation with Norsk Hydro and Statoil.

Objective of the Guideline
The objective of this guideline is to achieve a safe and cost
efficient design of pressurized systems that may be exposed to
fire. This means a focus on fast depressurization instead of
using passive fire protection (PFP). PFP is considered as an
effective measure that reduces the consequences of a fire.
However, PFP also introduce problems relating to corrosion
and ultimately possible hydrocarbon leaks, reduced
possibilities for inspection, space and cost. The guideline
directs the design to take full advantage of other measures
such as proper material selection, pressure rating, wall
thickness etc. that may reduce the need for PFP. The guideline

SPE 86601
Optimizing Fire Protection of pressurized Process Equipment
J an Reier Huse,Scandpower Risk Management AS; Paul Skulstad Scandpower Risk Management AS;
Bjrn Hekkelstrand; Scandpower Risk Mangement AS
2 SPE 86601
provides a procedure that may be applied and supporting
background information pertaining to hydrocarbon fire
characteristics, material data and failure criteria.
The content of the guideline is divided into three
main parts.

- First part establish the main principles
- Second part discusses the key parameters
- Third part introduces a specific procedure.

The application of this procedure is considered to result in
adequate protection against realistic hydrocarbon fires. A
supplement to the procedure is to use a risk based approach
for the fire scenarios, the heat loads and acceptance criteria for
rupture. It must be documented that the chosen solution is
within the risk acceptance criteria. This approach is not
followed any further in the current version of the guideline.

Description of the guideline
The guideline starts with establishing and discussing the main
principles for achieving an optimum fire protection of the
process system. These are

- Maximum utilisation of the flare system
- Selection of material quality
- Selection of material thickness/pressure classes
- Sizing of process segments/location of sectionalising
valves (inventory/volume)
- If necessary, application of passive fire protection
- Active fire protection systems.

An illustration of the procedure outlined in the guideline is
given by the flowchart presented in Figure 1.

The guideline has a strong focus on fast depressurisation in
order to meet the objective of minimized use of PFP, and this
is also reflected in the second part of the guideline that
discusses the key parameters of relevance.

- Depressurisation
- Passive fire protection
- Deluge/water spray systems
- Pressure safety valves
- Selection of process equipment/materials
- Limitation of process inventories
- Fire scenarios (dependent on layout, ventilation,
drainage, nature of combustible fluids, and nature of
release (time dependent leaks/duration)).

The third part of the guideline introduces a specific
procedure that should be applied for achieving an optimum
fire protection. The procedure requires that rigorous
calculations should be performed including thermodynamics,
heat and mass transfer etc. Figure 3 shows the detailed
iteration procedure that summaries the procedure.

System and
scenario
information
Estimate size
of
depressurization
orifice
Calculate P(t)
for the process
segment and T(t)
for the steel
Will
equipment/pipe
rupture
?
Failure
criteria
Are the
consequence
of the rupture
acceptable
?
Improve
design/apply PFP
OK
Yes
Yes No
No
Is
flare
capacity
utilised
?
Yes
Increase
orifice size
No


Figure 1: Simplified Procedure for optimising Design of the
Depressurising and Passi ve Fire Protection Systems for Process
Equipment

The guideline discusses several hydrocarbon fire scenarios
that can occur and suggest typical initial incident heat fluxes
to be used for the different fires (initial means toward a cold
segment). The proposed initial incident heat fluxes from jet
fires are significantly higher (350 kW/m
2
) than earlier applied,
at least by the Norwegian industry. The higher heat loading is
justified from the findings from recent years of fire research
on hydrocarbon fires in offshore like environments.
The transient variation of the fire is of importance for jet
fires. The transient behaviour due to decreasing leak rates will
both influence the size of the fire exposed area, the total heat
flux to the process segment and also the varying heat load to
any specific point on the process segment. The guideline
discusses and presents simplified formulas for calculation of
jet-fire duration from leaking segments with immediate or
delayed depressurisation. For a more accurate calculation of
jet-fire duration, a depressurisation simulation tool should be
used.
The guideline refers and discusses acceptance criteria that
are widely used in offshore design in terms of:
- Hydrocarbon quantity that will be released as a result
of the rupture
- Hydrocarbon leakage rates
- Whether the released hydrocarbons are in gas or
liquid form
- Pressure in the system at the time of the rupture (risk
of missiles, risk of critical damage to neighboring
pipe when a pipe bursts)
- Location of the rupture compared to systems/
equipment/functions at risk
- Risk of endangering personnel outside the immediate
vicinity of the area of the initial fire
- Time to rupture.
SPE 86601 3
The guideline focuses on minimising the use of PEP, i.e.
the prime focus should be to design a depressurisation system
with capacity to reduce the pressure in the system fast enough
to avoid critical escalation of the fire. The main concerns
relating to the use of PEP are increased corrosion of materials
covered by PEP, reduced possibilities for inspection and
maintenance of equipment covered with PEP, increased
weight, increased need for space, increased need for
maintenance of the PEP and increased cost.
The guideline also focuses on the importance of keeping
the integrity of the flare system during a fire situation. Rupture
of parts of the flare system during a fire might result in
massive release of hydrocarbons (e.g. due to an ongoing
depressurisation) and, hence, cause a severe escalation of the
accident. If fire exposed, the flare piping is most vulnerable to
rupture just after start of depressurisation due to high mass
rates/highest pressure in the system. Delayed depressurisation
should therefore be avoided.

Further development of the Guideline
It was acknowledged early in the development of the guideline
that although considerable efforts and large budgets have been
spent on research during the last years, there are still dark and
grey areas to be further investigated.
Figure 2 illustrates some recognized issues that need further
investigation. Some of these have materialized in ongoing
research/test programs. Others will be addressed at a
later stage.



Figure 2: Illustration of issues for further development of
the Guideline

Large scale fire tests of flanged connections
One area of particular importance to the guideline is the
behavior of process piping systems exposed to high fire loads.
Most efforts in this respect has been on the piping itself,
whereas e.g. the flanged connections have been less focused
by the industry.
A research program was defined where the flanges in
particular were focused. The test program started in November
2003. As the tests are carried out at the time this paper is
written, the results can not be included. The intention is to
present some result at the conference.
The flange connection is in the test exposed to a propan jet
fire. The fire is designed to give a high heat loading (>250
kw/m
2
), as uniform as possible over the test object. In order to
achieve this high heat loading the environment for the test is
based on the jet fire test procedure developed by the
Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory.
The first part of the test program comprises a 10
pipesegment, with an ANSI RTJ flange connection being
exposed to the propane jet fire. The pipe segment is
pressurized to 150 barg with methane prior to the tests. The
pressure is maintained during the tests until an eventual
leakage starts and continues as long as practicable possible.
The temperatures, pressures and displacements are
measured in the pipe itself, flanges, and the bolts.
The first tests indicate that, when exposed to a gas-jet fire
a flange connection is a weak link in a piping system.
The tests are carried out at Norwegian Fire Laboratory,
Trondheim, Norway.

Material tests
Another aspect is material behavior during fires. Most data
from steel manufactures are verified through material testing
at ambient or relatively low temperatures compared to
material temperatures plausible in a fire situation (up to 1000-
1100 deg C.). Material data for steel at temperatures above
500 deg. C are normally not verified from representative tests.
The objective of the material testing is to establish reliable
high temperature data (tensile strength and yield stress) for all
commonly used steel materials in the oil and gas industry.
Material tests at elevated temperatures are on the program
for further research.
The objective is to define material rupture criteria based on
material tests at temperatures that may occur during a
hydrocarbon fire.

Probabilistic method for determining dimensioning
fire scenarios
The current approach in the fire protection design is deter-
ministic. A fire is defined as a jet fire or a pool fire, open or
enclosed and then the ruleset of fire loads (heat flux values)
is applied.
It is evident that for a plant, the maximum fire load will be
much higher than the average, and that there are arguments for
not always designing for the maximum.
Scandpower is developing a method for a probabilistic
approach to meet this design challenge. The method also
includes introduction of advanced simulation tools (CFD-
codes) for prediction of heat loading and fire exposed areas
based on selected fire-scenarios.
There are some parallels to the probabilistic methods now
being applied for explosion load determination. These
methods were developed as a necessity as it was evident that
there is not practicable possible to design against the
maximum explosion pressure on typical large offshore
production installation.
The probalistic fire analysis is subject to further
development by Scandpower Risk Management. This
development is funded by Statoil and Scandpower Risk
Management.

Effect of deluge
water spray
Probabilistic
handling of fire
and leakage
Acceptance
criteriafor pipe
rupture
Material
strength at high
temperature
Flanged
connection
without PFP

The guideline version 1
issued J une 2002

4 SPE 86601
Conclusion
The guideline issued in 2002 provides a comprehensive
approach for optimum fire protection of pressurized process
equipment. The guideline introduces a specific procedure for
design of fire protection with focus on fast depressurization as
a key factor for minimizing the need for PFP.
The guideline realize that there are lack of knowledge on
several topics, and has therefore initiated research programs
and testing to start closing these gap. Large scale fire
experiments are carried out to determine the effect on flanged
connections under realistic conditions. Material data at high
temperatures will be established through material testing in
fire situations.
The guideline is under continuous development, and when
new knowledge is available new versions will be issued.
Results from experiments will be implemented in new
versions.
References
/1/ ISO 13702: "Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Control
and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production
Installations - Requirements and Guidelines", 1999.

/2/ Norsk Hydro: "Best Practice Depressurization and Fire Relief
Design", NHT-0101512, December 2001

/3/ NORSOK Standard S-001: "Technical Safety", Rev. 3, J anuary
2000.

/4/ ASME VIII: "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes".

/5/ NPD: "Forskrift om utforming og utrasting av innretninger med
mer i petroleumsvirksomheten (Innretningsforskriften)",
3 September 2001.


SPE 86601 5
Reduse the size
of the orifice
Is the
blowdown rate less
than maximum
I-dP/dt.I
Is the flare
systemcapacity
utilized (when adding all of the
simultaneous blowdown
rates together)?
Step 2:
Evaluate to increase the depres-
surisation rate, preferrably for the
most hazardous process segment.
Step 2:
Add insulation if required. Calculate the process
segment pressure profile. Use the fire with largest
heat input (kW).
Tip: Do several calculations with varying amount
of fire insulation.
Step 8:
Calculate the wall temperature profile for all pipes
and equipment.
Use the local peak heat load (kW/m
2
).
Step 3:
Use the temperature profiles from step 3 to calculate the rupture
pressure for all pipes and equipment.Compare with the pressure
profile fromstep 1 or 8.
Step 4:
Estimate the size of all orifices and calculate the
pressure profile and flare rates for all segments.
Use the global average heat load with the largest
heat input (kW). No PFP in this initial iteration.
Step 1:
- Pipe burst pressure
- Equipment burst pressure
- Released flammable
fluid at rupture
- Time to rupture
- No rupture
Acceptancecriteria:
Step 2:
Step 5:
Is the
acceptance criteria
for rupture
met ?
Decide which pipe/equipment to fire insulate OR
increase orifice diameter if available capacity in
the flare system OR reduce systemvolume by
relocation of sectionalisation valves OR increase
the flare system capacity OR change material
quality OR increase wall thickness.
Step 6:
Step 7
Calculate the minimumdesign temperature of
the blowdown section and the flare systemtail pipe.
Is the
minimum
design temperature
acceptable?
The design of this section's blowdown orifice and fire insulation requirements is finished
Define start depressurisation
at a higher temperature
(or change material).
Required information prior to depressurisation iteration
- Description of the fire scenarios (type of fire, duration, heat fluxes, size)
- Process segment geometry (system volume, area, weight etc.)
- Ultimate tensile strength at elevated temperature of materials
in the process segment
- Manual or automatic depressurisation, i.e. time delay for
start of depressurisation
- Acceptance criteria for rupture
YES NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
Step 2:
In case
of any of
the "OR's"


Figure 3: Flowchart for specific procedure for optimizing fire
protection of pressurized systems exposed to fire