SY F: private respondent Jaime Sahot5 started working as a truck helper for petitioners family-owned trucking business named Vicente

Sy Trucking. he became a truck driver of the same family business, renamed T. Paulino Trucking Service, later 6Bs Trucking Corporation (SBT Trucking Corporation). Throughout all these changes in names and for 36 years, private respondent continuously served the trucking business of petitioners when Sahot was already 59 years old. He had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected the performance of his task as a driver. He inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with the SSS but discovered that his premium payments had not been remitted by his employer. He filed a leave of absence and extension for treament of EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy, HPM, UTI, Osteoarthritis and heart enlargement. petitioners allegedly threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to work. Sahot found himself in a dilemma. He was facing dismissal if he refused to work, but he could not retire on pension because petitioners never paid his correct SSS premiums. The fact remained he could no longer work as his left thigh hurt abominably. Petitioners ended his dilemma. by dismissing him from work Sahot filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal and prayed for the recovery of separation pay and attorneys fees. petitioners contend that SAhot was not illegally dismissed as a driver because he was in fact petitioners industrial partner. They add that it was not until the year 1994, when SBT Trucking Corporation was established, and only then did Sahot become an employee of the company. Petitioners further claimed that after the expiration of private respondents leave, the latter never reported back to work nor did he file an extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the trucking company and its owners.Petitioners add that due to Sahots refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized leave of absence, he should be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his work. The NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, ruled in favor of SBT stating that there was no illegal dismissal in Sahots case. Moreover, petitioners and private respondent were industrial partners before January 1994. On appeal, the NLRC modified the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. It declared that private respondent was an employee, not an industrial partner, since the start. That he did not abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of his illness, pursuant to Article 2849 of the Labor Code.

Petitioners assailed the decision of the NLRC before the CA. CA reaffirmed the decision with modification Hence this petition Issue:(1) Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and respondent Sahot; (2) Whether or not there was valid dismissal; and 3 separation pay R/D 1. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employees conduct. The most important element is the employers control of the employees conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. As found by the appellate court, petitioners owned and operated a trucking business since the 1950s and by their own allegations, they determined private respondents wages and rest day.20 Records of the case show that private respondent actually engaged in work as an employee. During the entire course of his employment he did not have the freedom to determine where he would go, what he would do, and how he would do it. He merely followed instructions of petitioners and was content to do so, as long as he was paid his wages. Indeed, said the CA, private respondent had worked as a truck helper and driver of petitioners not for his own pleasure but under the latters control. Article 176721 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Not one of these circumstances is present in this case. No written agreement exists to prove the partnership between the parties. Private respondent did not contribute money, property or industry for the purpose of engaging in the supposed business. There is no proof that he was receiving a share in the profits as a matter of course, during the period when the trucking business was under operation. Neither is there any proof that he had actively participated in the management, administration and adoption of policies of the business. 2.In termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination was for lawful cause and validly made.28 Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer, without distinction whether the employer admits or does not admit the dismissal.29 For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.30 Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an employee on the ground of disease, viz:

Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination- An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees: xxx However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires: Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his coemployees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. (Italics supplied). As this Court stated in Triple Eight integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC,31 the requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor. In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahots dismissal was effected. Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employees dismissal. It is therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified. it clearly appears that procedural due process was not observed in the separation of private respondent by the management of the trucking company. The employer is required to furnish an employee with two written notices before the latter is dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge; and (2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense.33 These, the petitioners failed to do, even only for record purposes. What management did was to threaten the employee with dismissal, then actually implement the threat when the occasion presented itself because of private respondents painful left thigh.

All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahots dismissal is tainted with invalidity. 3.sewparatuon pay On the last issue, as held by the Court of Appeals, respondent Jaime Sahot is entitled to separation pay. The law is clear on the matter. An employee who is terminated because of disease is entitled to "separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to onehalf month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater xxx." JARDIN F: Petitioners were drivers of private respondent, Philjama, a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of "Goodman Taxi." Petitioners used to drive private respondent's taxicabs every other day on a 24-hour work schedule under the boundary system. private respondent admittedly regularly deducts from petitioners(apostrophe) daily earnings the amount of P30.00 supposedly for the washing of the taxi units. Believing that the deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect their rights and interests. Upon learning about the plan of petitioners, private respondent refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs when they reported for work .Petitioners suspected that they were singled out because they were the leaders and active members of the proposed union. Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint against private respondent for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees. the labor arbiter dismissed said complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the judgment of the labor arbiter. The labor tribunal declared that petitioners are employees of private respondent, and, as such, their dismissal must be for just cause and after due process. Private respondent's first motion for reconsideration was denied. second motion for reconsideration was granted. It ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over the case as petitioners and private respondent have no employer-employee relationship. It held that the relationship of the parties is leasehold. Hence, the instant petition. I: employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and respondent RDIn a number of cases decided by this Court,19 we ruled that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. We explained that in the lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor.

In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the business is in the owner's hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the abovestated doctrine to the relationships between bus owner/operator and bus conductor,20 auto-calesa owner/operator and driver,21 and recently between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers.22 Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer. SEVILLa F:in a contract entered into by and between Mrs. Noguera, and the Tourist World Service, Inc., represented by Mr Canilao the latter leased the premises belonging to the former at Mabini St., Manila for use as a branch office. When the branch office was opened, the same was run by the herein appellant Una 0. Sevilla payable to Tourist World Service Inc. by any airline for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Lina Sevilla, 4% was to go to Lina Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the Tourist World Service, Inc. the Tourist World Service, Inc. appears to have been informed that Lina Sevilla was connected with a rival firm, the Philippine Travel Bureau, and, since the branch office was anyhow losing, the Tourist World Service considered closing down its office. two resolutions of the board of directors of Tourist World was agreed upon, first, abolishing the office of the manager and vicepresident of Tourist World, Ermita Branch, and second,authorizing the corporate secretary to receive the properties of the Tourist World then located at the said branch office. To comply with the mandate of the Tourist World, corporate secretary Gabino Canilao went over to the branch office, and, finding the premises locked, and, being unable to contact Lina Sevilla, he padlocked the premises to protect the interests of the Tourist World Service. When neither Lina Sevilla nor any of her employees could enter the locked premises, a complaint wall filed with a prayer for the issuance of mandatory preliminary injunction. For apparent lack of interest of the parties therein, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice. Noguera sought reconsideration of the order dismissing her counterclaim while Sevilla refiled her case against the herein appellees and after the issues were joined, the reinstated counterclaim of Segundina Noguera and the new complaint of appellant Lina Sevilla were jointly heard following which the court a quo ordered both cases dismiss for lack of merit, on the basis of which was elevated the instant appeal.

The trial court 2 held for the private respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc., being the true lessee, it was within its prerogative to terminate the lease and padlock the premises. 3 It likewise found the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to be a mere employee of said Tourist World Service, Inc. and as such, she was bound by the acts of her employer. 4 The respondent Court of Appeal 5 rendered an affirmance. I :employee er relnshp rd :In this jurisdiction, there has been no uniform test to determine the evidence of an employer-employee relation. In general, we have relied on the so-called right of control test, "where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end." 10 Subsequently, however, we have considered, in addition to the standard of right-of control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The records will show that the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private respondent Tourist World Service, Inc., either as to the result of the enterprise or as to the means used in connection therewith. In the first place, under the contract of lease covering the Tourist Worlds Ermita office, she had bound herself in solidum as and for rental payments, an arrangement that would be like claims of a master-servant relationship. True the respondent Court would later minimize her participation in the lease as one of mere guaranty, 12 that does not make her an employee of Tourist World, since in any case, a true employee cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance of his employer's business, or otherwise, assume any liability thereof. In that event, the parties must be bound by some other relation, but certainly not employment. In the second place, and as found by the Appellate Court, '[w]hen the branch office was opened, the same was run by the herein appellant Lina O. Sevilla payable to Tourist World Service, Inc. by any airline for any fare brought in on the effort of Mrs. Lina Sevilla. 13 Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Sevilla was under the control of Tourist World Service, Inc. "as to the means used." Sevilla in pursuing the business, obviously relied on her own gifts and capabilities. It is further admitted that Sevilla was not in the company's payroll. For her efforts, she retained 4% in commissions from airline bookings, the remaining 3% going to Tourist World. Unlike an employee then, who earns a fixed salary usually, she earned compensation in fluctuating amounts depending on her booking successes. The fact that Sevilla had been designated 'branch manager" does not make her, ergo, Tourist World's employee. As we said, employment is determined by the right-of-control test and certain economic parameters. But titles are weak indicators.

In rejecting Tourist World Service, Inc.'s arguments however, we are not, as a consequence, accepting Lina Sevilla's own, that is, that the parties had embarked on a joint venture or otherwise, a partnership. GLOBAL F:petioner PhilCom), is a corporation engaged in the business of communication services and allied activities. respondent Ricardo De Vera is a physician by profession whom petitioner enlisted to attend to the medical needs of its employees. At the crux of the controversy is Dr. De Veras status when the latter terminated his engagement. De Vera offered his services to the petitioner, proposing his plan of works required of a practitioner in industrial medicine. The parties agreed and formalized respondents proposal in a document denominated as RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT Philcom, thru a letter6 bearing on the subject boldly written as "TERMINATION RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT", informed De Vera of its decision to discontinue the latters "retainers contract with the Company because management has decided that it would be more practical to provide medical services to its employees through accredited hospitals near the company premises. De Vera filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before (NLRC), alleging that he had been actually employed by Philcom as its company physician and was dismissed without due process. Labor arbiter came out with a decision7 dismissing De Veras complaint for lack of merit, on the rationale that as a "retained physician" under a valid contract mutually agreed upon by the parties, De Vera was an "independent contractor" and that he "was not dismissed but rather his contract with [PHILCOM] ended when said contract was not renewed". On De Veras appeal to the NLRC, the latter, reversed that of the Labor Arbiter, on a finding that De Vera is Philcoms "regular employee" and accordingly directed the company to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with full backwages from the date of his dismissal until actual reinstatement. CA rendered a decision,modifying that of the NLRC by deleting the award of traveling allowance, and ordering payment of separation pay to De Vera in lieu of reinstatement. hence this a[[eal I whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and respondent RD the Court, in determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship, has invariably adhered to the four-fold test, to wit: [1] the selection and engagement of the employee; [2] the payment of wages; [3] the power of dismissal; and [4] the power to control the employees conduct, or the so-called "control test", considered to be the most important element.

Applying the four-fold test to this case, we initially find that it was respondent himself who sets the parameters of what his duties would be in offering his services to petitioner. The tenor of the letter written by dr. de vera indicates that the complainant was proposing to extend his time with the respondent and seeking additional compensation for said extension. This shows that the respondent PHILCOM did not have control over the schedule of the complainant as it [is] the complainant who is proposing his own schedule and asking to be paid for the same. This is proof that the complainant understood that his relationship with the respondent PHILCOM was a retained physician and not as an employee. If he were an employee he could not negotiate as to his hours of work. The labor arbiter added the indicia, not disputed by respondent, that from the time he started to work with petitioner, he never was included in its payroll; was never deducted any contribution for remittance to the Social Security System (SSS); and was in fact subjected by petitioner to the ten (10%) percent withholding tax for his professional fee, in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code, matters which are simply inconsistent with an employer-employee relationship. In the precise words of the labor arbiter: Clearly, the elements of an employer-employee relationship are wanting in this case. the court note too, that the power to terminate the parties relationship was mutually vested on both. Either may terminate the arrangement at will, with or without cause.Finally, remarkably absent from the parties arrangement is the element of control, whereby the employer has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished.21 Here, petitioner had no control over the means and methods by which respondent went about performing his work at the company premises. He could even embark in the private practice of his profession, not to mention the fact that respondents work hours and the additional compensation therefor were negotiated upon by the parties.22 In fine, the parties themselves practically agreed on every terms and conditions of respondents engagement, which thereby negates the element of control in their relationship. The appellate courts premise that regular employees are those who perform activities which are desirable and necessary for the business of the employer is not determinative in this case. For, we take it that any agreement may provide that one party shall render services for and in behalf of another, no matter how necessary for the latters business, even without being hired as an employee. This set-up is precisely true in the case of an independent contractorship as well as in an agency agreement. Indeed, Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted by the appellate court, is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship. As it is, the provision merely distinguishes between two (2) kinds of employees, i.e., regular and casual. It does not apply where, as here, the very existence of an employment relationship is in dispute.

COCA COLA F: The special civil action of certiorari at bar concerns seven (7) cases against petitioner Coca-Cola Bottling, Phils., Inc. instituted in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Cebu City over a period of four years or so, by eleven (11) persons claiming to be employees of the company's Tagbilaran City plan. COCA-COLA is a corporation duly organized under Philippine laws with principal offices at Ace Building, Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, engaged in the bottling, distribution and sale of soft drink products. 1 It maintains, among others, a bottling plant in Tagbilaran City, with sales offices and bodegas in strategic places to serve the surrounding areas in Bohol Province. Pioneer Multi-Services Co. (PIONEER) and Lipercon Services, Inc. (LIPERCON), are manning companies with which COCA COLA successively entered into contracts for the supply of the manpower needs of its plant in Tagbilaran. COCA-COLA's contract with PIONEER The seven (7) cases against COCA COLA were heard together after issues had been joined; and judgment thereon was handed down by the Executive Labor Arbiter. The judgment found that complainants were supplied as workers to COCA-COLA first by PIONEER, and later, by LIPERCON; that whereas LIPERCON was an independent contractor, PIONEER was not; that in any case, "(w)hen Lipercon entered into the picture. complainants were already regular employees of the respondent firm," and hence the subsequent "coming in of Lipercon did not deprive ** (them of) the right to claim separation pay. complainants appealed from the Decision of the Arbiter imputing reversible error to the latter "when he merely awarded separation pay instead of reinstatement with backwages, despite his finding of illegal dismissal, without even explaining in his decision why complainants could not be reinstated." In its decision, NLRC affirmed w/ modification that of labor arbiterssss. Both COCA-COLA and the complainants moved for reconsideration of the Decision. Only the latter was granted. COCA COLA thereupon commenced the present certiorari action. XXXXXXXXCOCA-COLA is a corporation duly organized under Philippine laws with principal offices at Ace Building, Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, engaged in the bottling, distribution and sale of soft drink products. 1 It maintains, among others, a bottling plant in Tagbilaran City, with sales offices and bodegas in strategic places to serve the surrounding areas in Bohol Province. Pioneer Multi-Services Co. (PIONEER) and Lipercon Services, Inc. (LIPERCON), are manning companies with which COCA COLA successively entered into contracts for the supply of the manpower needs of its plant in Tagbilaran.

COCA-COLA's contract with PIONEER was executed on May 28, 1983, and that with LIPERCON, five (5) years later, on December 17, 1988. The seven (7) cases against COCA COLA were heard together after issues had been joined; and judgment thereon was handed down by the Executive Labor Arbiter on February 7, 1995. 2 The judgment found that complainants were supplied as workers to COCA-COLA first by PIONEER, and later, by LIPERCON; that whereas LIPERCON was an independent contractor, PIONEER was not; that in any case, "(w)hen Lipercon entered into the picture, ** complainants were already regular employees of the respondent firm," and hence the subsequent "coming in of Lipercon did not deprive ** (them of) the right to claim separation pay ** as reinstatement is no longer feasible." COCA-COLA was therefore sentenced "to pay the complainants the sum of Seventy One Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Six (P71,656.00) Pesos in concept of separation pay" in differing amounts. The complaint was dismissed as regards Godofredo Bagares (COCA COLA's Branch Manager at Tagbilaran), his liability not having been established. The eleven complainants appealed from the Decision of the Arbiter imputing reversible error to the latter "when he merely awarded separation pay instead of reinstatement with backwages, despite his finding of illegal dismissal, without even explaining in his decision why complainants could not be reinstated." The appeal was filed only by Hingpit who represented that he was taking the appeal also in behalf of the other complainants. In its Decision of February 28, 1996, the Fourth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (Cebu City) "AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION" the appealed judgment, commanding COCA-COLA to pay to complainants an increased amount of P2,022,076.94 representing full back wages and "13th month pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, cost of living allowance and rest day pay." 3 Both COCA-COLA and the complainants moved for reconsideration of the Decision. By Resolution of October 3, 1996, 4 COCA-COLA's motion for reconsideration was denied, while that of the complainants was granted in the sense that COCA-COLA was additionally "ordered to reinstate ** (them) to their former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges." COCA COLA thereupon commenced the present certiorari action on December 11, 1996 through which it seeks the setting aside of the Commission's Decision of February 28, 1996 and its Resolution of October 3, 1996. The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and, upon a bond of P2,022,076.94, issued a temporary restraining order stopping execution of the Commission's challenged dispositions. 5 On February 4, 1997, a pleading traversing the petition, entitled "Comments/Objection to Temporary Restraining Order, " was filed by ten (10) of the complainants themselves: Hingpit, Francisco, Pinar, Manluluyo, Zamora, Gabines, Bangalao, Apat, Pandan, Umali; 6 and on February 12, 1997, another pleading, "Private Respondents' Supplemental Comment," was submitted by the same ten (10) parties. 7 On March 26, 1997, a COMMENT on behalf of the National

Labor Relations Commission was filed by the Solicitor General's Office. 8 On June 13, 1997, COCA COLA filed its "REPLY (to Private Respondents' Supplemental Comment)," and on August 27, 1997, its "REPLY (To Public Respondent's Comment)." It appears that all the complainants, except Delfin Hingpit and Gabriel Francisco, were originally recruited by PIONEER which detailed them, under its contract with COCA COLA, in the latter's Tagbilaran Plant, some being assigned as utility workers, and others, as bottling crew members. 9 Three years afterwards, they were absorbed by LIPERCON when it replaced PIONEER as COCA-COLA's labor supplier. It appears that Hingpit was recruited by LIPERCON for the Tagbilaran COCA-COLA plant, and first assigned as bottling crew member on November 24, 1984. Sometime in 1988, Hingpit, being then involved in a labor case against his employer, sent a letter to then President Corazon C. Aquino asking that she help him obtain permanent employment in COCA COLA. This brought about a conciliation conference in the Bohol Labor Extension Office in Tagbilaran City; and there, an agreement was reached between Hingpit and COCA COLA, represented by its Tagbilaran Personnel Officer, Ms. Suzette Gotera. According to Hingpit, 10 Ms. Gotera had offered him "the position of driver-helper or security guard if I possess the necessary qualifications for the aforesaid position," and he had "accepted her offer as a truck-helper in the meantime that I have not secured a driver's license." On the basis of this amicable agreement, and after obtaining a clearance from Lipercon Services, Inc., Hingpit was hired by COCA COLA on a probationary basis for a period of six (6) months effective May 16, 1988. Hingpit was then required, among other things, to take examinations to qualify for permanent placement and to submit a police clearance. He submitted a police clearance issued by the Integrated National Police Command of Bohol which stated that he was a resident of Batuan, Bohol, and that he had no criminal record thereat. Unfortunately for him, not only did he obtain failing marks in the qualifying examinations, but the police clearance submitted by him was shortly afterwards revealed to be false, belied by a certification of the Office of the City Fiscal of Tagbilaran City to the effect that he was then facing charges of physical injuries in no less than three (3) cases. As a result, his services considered temporary or probationary were terminated on July 22, 1988, on the ground that he had (1) failed to measure up to the standards of the firm, having flunked the required qualifying tests, and (2) been shown to be dishonest, for not disclosing that he had been charged with 3 counts of physical injuries. 11 Gabriel Francisco originally worked as bottling crew member of San Miguel Corporation at its Tagbilaran Plant from 1971 until 1976. He was re-employed in 1979, and assigned to the beer department of COCA-COLA. In 1980, he was hired by PIONEER, which as aforestated had concluded a contract to supply COCA-COLA's manpower needs. He worked under this arrangement until PIONEER was replaced by LIPERCON, in December 1986. He continued working as bottling crew member until he was separated from employment on December 15, 1988. 12

The other complainant-employees Cecilio Pinar, Jr., Abundio Balatero, Narito Manluluyo, Secero Zamora, Medardo Gabines, Enrique Bangalao, Julito Apat, Sotero Pandan, Nelson Umali were, as already stated, found by the Labor Arbiter to have been first placed in the COCA COLA Tagbilaran plant by their recruiter, PIONEER, and after the latter's contract expired, were recruited by LIPERCON and again assigned at the same Tagbilaran plant. The Executive Labor Arbiter's decision of February 7, 1995 13 found that while PIONEER was a "labor only contractor," 14 LIPERCON which had also undertaken to provide COCA COLA with manpower for such services as the repair and maintenance of machines, activities related to projects, yard cleaning, utility jobs; loading and unloading of full and empty bottles 15 was a legitimate labor contractor. It had substantial capital of its own; paid its recruited employees regularly even before receiving its stipulated fees from COCA COLA; had control over complainants-workers who could not get inside the premises of COCA COLA without its written authority; attended to providing route helpers with requisition slips; kept the signed daily time records of its recruited employees; monitored their hours of work, and saw to it that they were at their places of work at the appointed hours; and could receive, and act with finality on, complaints concerning its recruited workers presented by COCA COLA's regular employees or supervisors. 16 The Executive Labor Arbiter's decision declared that when the complainants were discharged from LIPERCON, they signed documents of quitclaim and release, a fact "not refuted" by them. 17 Consequently, LIPERCON was absolved from liability. The judgment was quick to point out, however, that "when LIPERCON entered into the picture" after the lapse of COCA COLA's earlier contract with PIONEER said complainants ** were already regular employees of the respondent firm (COCA COLA). Its entry, even if viewed as a consequence of a legitimate business of a manpower servicing firm, resulted to (sic) the illegal termination of the complainants who at that point in time had already acquired regular status. The coming in of Lipercon did not deprive the complainants of the right to claim separation pay. Their severance from respondent firm, it appears, was forced upon them. It is only fair, thus, that they be given the benefits that they deserve while placed under Pioneer Multi-Services, Inc. Considering that their termination was not legal and valid, they should be paid one month pay for every year of service as reinstatement is no longer feasible. 18 For this reason, COCA-COLA was sentenced "to pay the complainants the sum of Seventy One Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Six (P71,656.00) Pesos in concept of separation pay" in differing amounts. Respondent Commission saw the case differently. It opined that (1) LIPERCON was a labor-only, not an independent labor contractor; and (2) COCA COLA not having presented evidence to establish any just cause for the termination of complainants' employment, such termination must be held illegal; and having, as well, failed to submit the payrolls corresponding to the complainants, its monetary liability to them should be increased.

In this special civil action of certiorari, COCA COLA submits that respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion 1) in completely ignoring the fact that Hingpit had no capacity to take an appeal in behalf of the other complainants;2) in not ruling that the Labor Arbiter's decision had long become final and executory because the complainants, except Hingpit, had already lost their right of appeal;3) in disregarding the Labor Arbiter's findings that complainants were not regular employees of COCA COLA;4) even granting arguendo that complainants were employees of COCA COLA, in requiring the latter to pay the former even when they did nothing;5) in awarding complainants "rest day pay" despite their admission that they did not work seven days a week;6) in holding complainants to be entitled to holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, cost of living allowance, 13th month pay, without any factual basis and contrary to the evidence on record;7) in not allowing Hingpit to raise the issue of his alleged employment with COCA COLA although the same was already subject of a compromise agreement; and8) in not ruling that Hingpit had been validly dismissed, having failed to meet the company standards for a probationary employee. The Court will deal with Delfin Hingpit first. It seems fairly evident from the record that his services were validly terminated. As already narrated, on the basis of his compromise agreement with the Tagbilaran Personnel Officer of COCA COLA (entered into under the auspices of the Bohol Labor Extension Office), and after obtaining a clearance from LIPERCON, Hingpit was employed by COCA COLA on a probationary basis for a period of six (6) months effective May 16, 1988. However, Hingpit subsequently flunked the qualifying examinations for regular employment, and was later discovered to have misled COCA COLA by submitting a police clearance contradicted by the records of the Fiscal's Office of Tagbilaran City showing that he was then facing three (3) charges of physical injuries. Upon the facts, therefore, there can be no question: first, of the propriety of his contract or probationary employment not only executed before Labor officials, but also admitted by him as freely and voluntarily entered into and second, of the fact that he had not only failed the qualifying examinations, but had also presented a false clearance. Hence, his services were properly terminated on July 22, 1988, for (1) failing to qualify for the job, and (2) for dishonesty. Turning to another point, respondent Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that LIPERCON was an independent labor contractor. It declared it instead to be a mere "labor-only" contractor, as the term is defined and described in the Labor Code 20 and the Omnibus Rules Implementing said Code. 21 On this basis, it held that complainants were not employees of LIPERCON, but of COCA COLA. In so ruling respondent Commission unaccountably ignored the evidence on which the Labor Arbiter had based his contrary conclusion. That evidence, consisting chiefly of the testimony of Filomena Legaspi, Head of LIPERCON's Accounting Division, is summarized by the Arbiter as follows: The Lipercon has indeed substantial capital of its own is proven by the testimony of its personnel-in-charge in Tagbilaran City, Filomena

Legaspi. Legaspi affirmed the fact that Lipercon paid its employees (the complainants herein) regularly even before it is paid of its billing (TSN. p. 49, September 2, 1992). She also testified that she had control over the complainants. Without her signature, they cannot get inside the premises of respondent firm. She signed their daily time records and monitored their hours of work. She saw to it that they were in their positions and places of work. And if the regular employees of CCBPI or their supervisors complain, they notify and inform her of these complaints. With regard to the route helpers, these were covered by requisition slips (TSN, p. 47, Sept. 2, 1992). In fact, after Lipercon's contract with respondent expired in December 1988, it was she who assigned some workers like Cecilio Pinar, Jr. and Abundio Balatero to SMC (TSN, pp. 34, 35, 42-49, September 2, 1992). The payrolls of Lipercon (Exhs. "1" and "2" for CCBPI) and the resignation letter addressed to Ms. Perla Caete (Exh. "4") by Gabriel Francisco, Jr. points out that complainants were indeed employees of Lipercon. The aforecited facts were not refuted by the complainants.xxx xxx xxx ** Lipercon proved to be an independent contractor. Aside from hiring its own employees and paying the workers their salaries, it also exercised supervision and control over them which is the most important aspect in determining employer-employee relations (Mafinco Trading Corp. v. Ople, 70 SCRA 139; Rosario Brothers Inc. vs. Ople, 131 SCRA 72). That it indeed has substantial capital is proven by the fact that it did not depend upon its billing on respondent regarding payment of workers' salaries. And when complainants were separated from Lipercon, they signed quitclaim and release documents. **. While it is within respondent Commission's competence, as an appellate agency reviewing decisions of Labor Arbiters, to disagree with and set aside the latter's findings, it stands to reason that it should state an acceptable cause therefor. It would otherwise be a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, illogical, unreasonable exercise of quasi-judicial prerogative, subject to invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. But that, regrettably, is precisely what respondent Commission appears to have done. It overturned the Labor Arbiter's factual determination regarding LIPERCON's being a legitimate independent contractor without stating the reason therefor, without any explanation whatever as to why the Arbiter's evidentiary premises were not worthy of credit, or why the inferences drawn therefrom were unacceptable, as a matter of law or logic. Respondent Commission grounded its reversal of the Arbiter's adjudgment solely on a 1989 judgment of this Court, Guarin et al. v. Lipercon 23 in which LIPERCON had also been involved as a labor contractor of another company. 24ehere the Court held LIPERCON to be a "labor-only" contractor; and declared that the NLRC's finding that it "was not a mere labor-only contractor because it has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, ** " was "based on insubstantial evidence, as the NLRC (had merely) pointed out that 'it (LIPERCON) claims to be possessed among others, of substantial capital and equipment essential to carry out its business as a general

independent contractor' **." In other words, in Guarin, LIPERCON was held to have failed to discharge its burden of proof that "it has substantial capital, investment, tools, etc." Not so in the case at bar. Here, there is substantial evidence, detailed by the Labor Arbiter, to establish LIPERCON's character as an independent contractor in the real sense of the word, 25 which makes the Labor Arbiter's ruling more acceptable than respondent Commission's on the same matter, being founded solely on an inapplicable precedent. Also more deserving of assent is said Labor Arbiter's conclusion that the complainants' acceptance of employment in LIPERCON in December, 1986 lasting for a period of some two years effectively operated as a cessation of the prior relationship they had with PIONEER and COCA COLA in consequence of which they became entitled to separation pay from COCA COLA, PIONEER being merely its hiring agent. The evidence therefore satisfactorily establishes that complainants were employees of LIPERCON. It was LIPERCON that terminated their services at which time, as found by the Labor Arbiter, the complainants "signed quitclaim and release documents" in favor of LIPERCON. COCA COLA was not privy either to that act of employment-termination or execution of "quitclaim and release documents," or to the earlier act of creation of the employment relationship between the complainants and LIPERCON. COCA COLA was in no position to intervene in any manner in the creation or termination of the relationship between complainants and LIPERCON. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to demand that COCA COLA present proof of just cause for the termination of the services of complainants, the latter not being its employees, but LIPERCON's. For the same reason, it was erroneous for the NLRC to expect COCA COLA to present its payrolls to show the salaries and wages of the complainants although, it must be mentioned, COCA COLA did cause presentation of LIPERCON's payrolls relative to its employees, including complainants. And it was grave error for respondent Commission to conclude that because proof of just cause for complainants' removal from their employment in LIPERCON was not presented by COCA COLA, said complainants had been dismissed without just cause and due process. What has been said makes it unnecessary to address the other substantive issues raised by COCA COLA. 26 And the adjective issue that it sets up respecting the validity of Hingpit's having attempted to appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision in behalf of the other complainants appears to be too unsubstantial to merit consideration. All things considered, and except as regards Delfin Hingpit, the Court is satisfied that the Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter fairly and reasonably disposed of the controversy, and is worthy of adoption as the ultimate adjudgment of this case. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the challenged Decision of the Fifth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated on February 28, 1996 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of

the Executive Labor Arbiter, Cebu City, dated February 7, 1995 is REINSTATED and hereby AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that the complaint of DELFIN HINGPIT is dismissed, for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. ORDERED. NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner, This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision 1 rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage. At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital. Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent. The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads: August2, 1990 Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya. Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling kamay.Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:Emergency and doctor fee P715.00Medecines (sic) and others 317.04Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng AgostoSa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.(Sgd.) Roberto CapiliRoberto Capili

On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. 4Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits. On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims dismissed for lack of merit. The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial assistance. SO ORDERED. 5 Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper training. 6 On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.SO ORDERED. 7 The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus: As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain "apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution. The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent, pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed. 8On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's representative was present.

On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads: NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. The issues raised before us are the followingIWHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.IIWHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT. We find no merit in the petition. Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was executed.Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employer-apprentice relationship.Petitioner's argument is erroneous.The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides: Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied) In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.

Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship. Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and nongovernment agencies" and "to establish apprenticeshipstandards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased. Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code: Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." 9 Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.

There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11 As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12 The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]). The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate. Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante").He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part. WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, ththe appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.