OH CHO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS G.R. No.

L-48321 August 31, 1946 Facts Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo a parcel of land which has been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of their predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. On June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). Rodolfo Tiquia, inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness of the government, stated that the land, notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted, is agricultural in accordance with an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice, whereby Secretary Jose Abad Santos penned that under Section 1, Article 12, of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition. The Director of Lands opposed the application because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or private agricultural lands. The Solicitor General appearing for the appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question and that the purchase of the land and that of the purchase made in 1938 is null and void. Issues Whether or not Oh Cho has title to the lot. Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration. Ruling The applicant failed to show that he has title that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decreed promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify

the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. The applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. The most that Oh Cho has was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over the public land by prescription. In addition, under the concurring opinion of Justice Perfecto, he stated that the applicant, being a Chinese Citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire private agricultural land. The phrase private agricultural land can only mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural, residential, commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so, because the phrase agricultural land used in the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the same uniform meaning to wit, any land of the public domain or any land of private ownership, which is neither mineral or forestral. The residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by hereditary succession.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 Facts Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., acquired parcels of land from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, who are both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities. The possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to member of non-christian tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral land, whether within the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain. Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,possession over the land was continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial. Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than 45M worth of improvements. The ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela during their special session on November 22, 1979. The Director of Lands questions the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was

reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Issues Whether or not the land is already a private land. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition by private corporations or associations applies in this case. Ruling The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply. That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi: .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935

Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands. Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982 Facts The Manila Electric Company (Meralco), a domestic corporation, had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land of Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio, because of this, the Piguing spouses sold the lots to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. Meralco filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title of the lots. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application. The Meralco contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land. The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land. Issues Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person is allowed to hold lands of the public domain. Whether or not Meralco can apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Ruling The Supreme Court held that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed. This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious or quintessential prcis of a pervasive principle of public land law and land registration law, that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,

belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-ininterest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." Until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution sale of the land were void. The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land in its name, there being no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land to the Meralco? This Court is disposing of that same contention in the Oh Cho case said: The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning the confirmation of an imperfect title under section 48[b]) for applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate predecessors-ininterest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. The applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest (meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors-in-interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.

VALENTIN SUSI vs ANGELA RAZON AND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS G.R. No. L-24066 Facts The Director of Lands, alleging that the land in dispute is a property of the US Government under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands, sold the said land to Angela Razon. A Certificate of Title was then issued in favor of Razon by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. Razon, armed with the said title, asked valentine Susi to vacate the said land. A case of forcible entry was then filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guagua, Pampanga. Valentin Susi is in possession of the land in question was possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of memory". It was also alleged that the original owner of the land, Nemesio Pinlac, sold the same to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, who, thereafter, sold the said property to Valentin Susi on September 5, 1989 in consideration of P12.00. said facts belied the allegation that Razon has been in possession of the property prior to her application of grant before the Director of Lands on August 15, 1954. Issue Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct in granting the application of Angel Razon, thereby making her the rightful possessor of the land in question. Ruling No. It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act December 9, 1925

No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.

E. W. McDANIEL vs. Honorable GALICANO APACIBLE and JUAN CUISIA G.R. No. L-17597 Facts On the 7th day of June, 1916, Mcdaniel (plaintiff) entered upon and located three petroleum placer mineral claims, each of an area of 64 hectares, on an unoccupied public land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas. On the 15th day of July, 1916, Mcdaniel recorded in the office of the mining recorder in the municipality of Lucena, Province of Tayabas , notices of location of the aforesaid three placer claims under the names of Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No. 2, and Maglihi No. 3 Plaintiff, at all times since the 7th day of June, 1916, has remained in open and continuous possession of said three mineral placer claims. In 1918, plaintiff drilled five wells on the said three mineral claims, and made discoveries of petroleum on each of the said three claims. On the 18th day of June, 1921, respondent Juan Cuisia made an application to the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which said parcel of land included within its boundaries the three said mineral claims Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No. 2, and Maglihi No. 3, which said three mineral placer claims had therefore been located and held by the plaintiff. Upon the filing of the said application for lease, the petitioner herein protested in writing to the respondent Galicano Apacible against the inclusion in the said lease of the said three mineral claims Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No. 2, and Maglihi No. 3, located and held by him. However, respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied petitioners said protest. Plaintiff was informed that the respondent Galicano Apacible is about to grant the application for the said lease of the respondent Juan Cuisia, and to place him (Juan Cuisia) in possession of the said three mineral claims located and held by the petitioner. Hence, this action for the writ of prohibition. Its purpose is to prohibit the respondent Honorable Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, from granting a lease of a parcel of petroleum land in favor of Juan Cuisia.

Petitioner contends that under Act No. 2932, in so far as it purports to declare open to lease, lands containing petroleum oil on which mineral claims have been validly located and held, and upon which discoveries of petroleum oil have been made, is void and unconstitutional, in that it deprives the petitioner of his property without due process of law and without compensation, and that the defendant Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is without jurisdiction to lease to the respondent Juan Cuisia the following mineral claims Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No. 2, and Maglihi No. 3. Issues Whether or not Act No. 2932 is unconstitutional. Whether or not the petitioner had acquired a property right in said claims. Ruling Yes, said law is unconstitutional and petitioner had acquired a property right in said claims. The Court held that inasmuch as the petitioner had located, held and perfected his location of the mineral lands in question, and had actually discovered petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims; that said Act No. 2932, which deprives him of such right, without due process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones Law, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession of the lands located. And even though the locator may obtain a patent to such lands, his patent adds but little to his security. (18 Ruling Case Law, p. 1152 and cases cited.) Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Forbes vs. Jarcey, 94 U.S., 762; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279; Del Monte Mining Co. vs. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U.S., 55; Elver vs. Wood, 208 U.S., 226, 232.)

Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based upon discovery, is not essential to the preservation of the possessory right. The right is lost only by abandonment as by nonperformance of the annual labor required. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Farrell vs. Lockhart, 210 U.S., 142; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U.S., 389.) The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and his location not only against third person, but also against the Government. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may be sold and conveyed, and will pass by descent, and is not therefore subject to the disposal of the Government. (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279, 283; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S., 431; Consolidated Mutual Oil Co. vs. United States, 245 Fed. Rep., 521; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131, 136, 137.) The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the Government itself. Where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator. The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

REAVIS vs FIANZA, 40 PHIL 1017 (1909) Facts Reavis, et. al (appellees) brought an action to restrain Fianza (appellant) from setting up title to certain gold mines in the province of Benguet, or interfering with the same, and to obtain an account of the gold heretofore taken from the mines. The trial court rendered a judgment or decree granting an injunction as prayed. The appellees are Igorrots, and it is found that, for fifty years, and probably for many more, Fianza and his ancestors have held possession of these mines. He now claims title under the Philippine act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 45, 32 Stat. at L. 691. This section reads as follows: 'That where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this act, in the absence of any adverse claim; but nothing in this act shall be deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any way whatever prior to the issuance of a patent.' Fianza testified, in terms, that his grandfather and father had owned the mines in question, and that he and the other appellees owned them in their turn; that they had all worked the mines, that no one else had claimed them, and that the appellant had interfered with his possession, and, when he put up a sign, had torn it down. Fianza said that the claim is larger than is allowed by 22. But the limitation of that section applies only to claims 'located after the passage of this act.' He refiled a location in October, 1902, but he did not and could not make the required affidavit because of the prior occupation. However, Reavis, in 1900, illegally entered and deprived the appellees of their mines, and that he still continues to maintain his unjust claim. But further on it alleges that, in the spring of 1902, Reavis was directed by the governor of Benguet not to molest the appellees; that he then waited in Manila, and, after the promulgation of the law, 'again entered,' set stakes, and filed a notice of location.

Issue Whether or not there was adverse claim that would have prevented the appellees from getting a patent under Section 45 of the Philippine act of July 1, 1902. Ruling No. It is suggested that the possession of Fianza was not under a claim of title, since he could have no title under Spanish law. But, whatever may be the construction of Rev. Stat. 2332, the corresponding 45 of the Philippine act cannot be taken to adopt from the local law any other requirement as to the possession than the length of time for which it must be maintained. The section, of itself, confers no right other than to apply for a patent. But a right to an instrument that will confer a title in a thing is a right to have the thing. That is to say, it is a right of the kind that equity specifically enforces. It may or may not be true that, if the objection had been taken at the outset, the plaintiffs would have been turned over to another remedy, and left to apply for a patent; but, after a trial on the merits, the objection comes too late. See Perego v. Dodge, 163 U. S. 160, 164, 41 L. ed. 113, 116, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 971; Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, 395, 32 L. ed. 934, 945, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486. It cannot be said that there was no evidence of the facts found, for the plaintiff Fianza testified, in terms, that his grandfather and father had owned the mines in question, and that he and the other appellees owned them in their turn; that they had all worked the mines, that no one else had claimed them, and that the appellant had interfered with his possession, and, when he put up a sign, had torn it down. No doubt his working of the mines was slight and superficial according to our notions, and the possession may not have been sharply asserted as it would have been with us, whether from Igorrot habits or from the absence of legal title under Spanish law. But it sufficiently appears that the appellee's family had held the place in Igorrot fashion, and to deny them possession in favor of Western intruders probably would be to say that the natives had no rights under the section that an American was bound to respect. Whatever vagueness there may have been in the boundaries, it is plain that the appellant attempted to locate a claim within them, and Fianza testified that the plan to which we have referred followed the boundaries that his father showed to him. It is said that the claim is larger than is allowed by 22. But the limitation of that section applies only to claims 'located after the passage of this act.' It is to be assumed, then, that the appellees and their ancestors had held possession and had worked their claims for much more than the period required

by 45, before the moment when the statute went into effect. It is to be assumed that the possession and working continued down to within two months of that moment. But the appellant says that he entered and staked his claims before that time, and then was in possession of them. On this ground, as well as others that are disposed of by the findings below, he contends that there was an adverse claim within the meaning of the act. But the ground in question was not unoccupied, and therefore he could not make a valid claim under 28. We are of opinion that there was no adverse claim that would have prevented the appellees from getting a patent under 45. The decree granting the injunction is affirmed.

CASE DIGESTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS

Submitted by: Galindez, Dante H. Magalgalit, Roy Ramos, John Paul V.

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada