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A Survey on Visual Cryptography Methods in Biometric Data

A.Arockia Abins1 A.Arivuchselvam2

Assistant professor1, PG Student2, Department of CSE, elammal en!ineerin! colle!e, Anna "niversit#, $ndia arockia%abins& 'arivuselvamvecse&!

Abstract: (iometric data )e.!. fin!er print, face ima!e* stored in database s#stem, this +ork mainl# discuss about
preserve the privac# of human face ima!e, i.e. biometric is ph#siolo!ical and behavioural characteristics. $n case of face ima!es, private face ima!e is split into t+o shares )i.e. t+o la#ered ima!e* and stored in database server. isual Cr#pto!raph# is secret sharin! method +here a secret face ima!e is encr#pted into the t+o shares +hich independentl# disclose no information about the ori!inal secret face ima!e. ,he private face ima!e can be retrieve onl# +hen both t+o shares are available durin! the content retrieval process. Content retrieval deal +ith identif#in! secret face ima!e based on biometric information )fin!er print*, durin! this process fin!er print ima!e are needed to retrieve ori!inal secret face ima!e )De-identification*, isual cr#pto!raph# Provide !reat securit# needs as +ell as e.tra la#er of authentication. $n this paper different visual cr#pto!raph# method is used

Keywords- Private face ima!e, /in!er print, Privac#, isual Cr#pto!raph#, De-identification

! "#$%D&C# %"
(iometrics is the automated use of ph#siolo!ical or behavioral characteristic to determine or verif# identit# 011. Ph#siolo!ical biometric is based on direct measurement of a part of the human bod#, such as fin!er-scan, facial-scan, irisscan, hand-scan and retina-scan. (ehavioral biometric is based on measurements and data derived from an action and therefore indirectl# measure characteristic of the human bod# such as voice-scan and si!nature-scan. $dentit# is an individual is a sin!ular, "ni2ue entit#, collo2uiall# or Person, +hich can have more than one identit#. /or E.ample, 3ohn Doe 4i!ht has an email identit# and a +ork identit#. (iometric benefit consists of increasin! the securit# and convenience, reducin! the fraud )or* deliver# of enhanced services. A biometric authentication process operates b# ac2uirin! ra+ biometric data from a sub5ect )e.!. private face ima!e*6 the template of a person in the database is !enerated durin! enrollment process. Protectin! privac# of individual enrolled in a biometric database storin! a transformed biometric template instead of the ori!inal biometric template in the database ,his +as referred to as a private template 021 or a cancelable biometric 071 and three step h#brid approach 081 that combined advanta!e of cr#ptos#stem and cancellable biometric. Apart from these methods various ima!e hidin! approach 091, 0:1, 0;1 have been su!!ested b# researcher to provide anon#mit# to the stored biometric data. Privac# to face ima!es present in surveillance videos0<1.A face de-identification al!orithm 0=1 that minimi>ed the chances of performin! automatic face reco!nition +hile preservin! details of the face such as e.pression, !ender and a!e. A h#brid transformation approach has a !ood cancelable abilit#, but the dra+back of this approach is that a trade-off bet+een performance and securit# is normall# re2uired. ?aive De-identification method is no !uarantee of privac# of people visible in the ima!e. ?either preserves privac# nor data utilit#. /ace s+appin! techni2ue and a!!ressive de-identification the ori!inal face ima!e can be lost 01@1. Proposed method to perform secure face identification b# representin! a private face ima!e +ith inde.ed facial components e.tracted from a public face database. ,he rest of the paper is or!ani>ed as follo+s. $n Section $$ deals +ith visual cr#pto!raph# and its e.tensions are presented. $n Section $$$, +e deal +ith h#brid approach and Section $ , +e deal +ith De-identification method for securin! fin!erprint, and face ima!es and +e conclude this paper in Section .

! V S&A' C$()#%*$A)+(
isual Cr#pto!raph# is a secret-sharin! method that encr#pts a secret ima!e into several shares but re2uires neither computer nor calculations to decr#pt the secret ima!e as sho+ in /i!. 1. $nstead, the secret ima!e is reconstructed visuall#A simpl# b# overla#in! the encr#pted shares the secret ima!e becomes clearl# visible. isual cr#pto!raph# techni2ue for black and +hite ima!es )(asic1* introduced b# ?aor and Shamir 0111. An# visual secret information )pictures, te.t, etc* is considered as ima!e and encr#ption is performed usin! simple al!orithm to !enerate n copies of shares dependin! on t#pe of access structure schemes.





,igure-! a. %riginal mage b. Share- c. Share/ d. Stac0ing the shares reveal the secret isual Cr#pto!raph# scheme represented in computer usin! n . m (asis matrices. 1/2/. ModelA 1. Construct t+o 2*2 basis matrices asA s@B 1 @ @ 1 s1B 1 1 @ @

2. "sin! the permutated basis matrices, each pi.el from the secret ima!e +ill be encoded into t+o sub pi.els on each participantCs share. A black pi.el on the secret ima!e +ill be encoded on the ith participantCs share as the ith ro+ of matri. S1, +here a 1 represents a black sub pi.el and a @ represents a +hite sub pi.el. Similarl#, a +hite pi.el on the secret ima!e +ill be encoded on the ith participantCs share as the ith ro+ of matri. S0. 7. (efore encodin! each pi.el from the secret ima!e onto each share, randoml# permute the columns of the basis matrices S0 and S1. ,his CS ) isual Cr#pto!raph# Scheme* divides each pi.el in the secret ima!e into mB2 sub pi.els. $t has a contrast of (m).mB1 and a relative contrast of (m)B1'2. (asic visual cr#pto!raph# is e.pansion of pi.els. /irst Continuous ima!e )Gra# scale* is converted into halftone ima!e )(inar#* usin! an# halftone techni2ue as error diffusion, thresholdin!, ordered ditherin!, etc. ,he error diffusion !ives better half tone. Each pi.el of half tone is broken into some sub-pi.els as sho+n in ,able 1. #able - Construction o3 /-out-o3-/ scheme

/!- Visual Cryptography Scheme A

A isual Cr#pto!raph# Scheme ) CS* on a set of n participants is a method of encodin! a CsecretC ima!e into n shares such that ori!inal ima!e is obtained onl# b# stackin! specific combinations of the shares onto each other.

/!/ *ray 'evel 42tended Visual Cryptography Scheme:

CS allo+ encodin! a secret ima!e into n sheet ima!es, each revealin! no information about the ori!inal. A theoretical method to appl# e.tended visual cr#pto!raph# on !ra# scale ima!es )GE CS*. ,he GE CS operates b# chan!in! the d#namic ran!e of the ori!inal and host ima!es, transformin! the !ra# level ima!es into meanin!ful binar# ima!es and then appl#in! a (oolean operation on half toned pi.els of the t+o hosts and the ori!inal ima!e.

! #+$44 S#4) +(B$ D M4#+%D

(ased on three step h#brid approach, /ace template is secure. $n this approach three step are used, $n the first step, random pro5ection is emplo#ed as a cancelable transform to pro5ect the ori!inal template into a subspace and !enerate a cancelable template. $f it is compromised, the pro5ection matri. can be chan!ed in order to issue ane+ template. $n the second step, +e appl# the class distribution preservin! )CDP* transform 0181 to enhance the cancelable template discriminabilit# and convert the real value cancelable template into a binar# template. $n the third step, a hash function 0191 is emplo#ed in the third step to encr#pt the binar# face template, as sho+n in /i!. 2.

5!- $andom )ro6ection:

Dandom pro5ection is a popular dimension reduction techni2ue and has been successfull# applied to man# computer vision and pattern reco!nition applications. Decentl#, it has also been emplo#ed as a cancelable transform 0121 for face biometric. Ehile random pro5ection provides a !ood cancellable abilit#, there is a trade-off bet+een the s#stem performance and the template securit#

5!/ Class Distribution )reserving #emplate:

Class distribution preservin! )CDP* transform 0171, 0181 enhances the template discriminabilit# and converts a real value template into a binar# template. ,he basic idea is to make use of a set of distin!uishin! points, a distance function and thresholdin!. /or each template, the distances bet+een the template and each distin!uishin! point are calculated. $f the distance is belo+ the threshold, a bit F@G is !enerated6 other+ise, a bit F1G is !enerated.the CDP transform can enhance the template discriminabilit# and improve the s#stem performance.

5!5 +ash ,unction

,he hash function 0191 is applied for biometric data protection. $t encr#pts the ori!inal template s to a hashed code+ord Hash(s) +hich is stored in the database6 the matchin! process is done in hash space. Ehile hash function is not considered to be !ood for biometrics because of its sensitivit# to facial variations due to illumination, pose and facial e.pression, the use of CDP transform increases the template discriminative po+er enablin! the use of hash function for face biometric. $n our CDP transform, the templates are +ell classified. $n most of the cases, the binar# strin!s transformed via CDP transform are identical if the# belon! to the same class.

V! ,AC4 D4- D4"# , CA# %" M4#+%D

7!- Multi - ,actor ,ace De- denti3ication:
(ased on face de-identification method 0=1, factori>e input ima!es into identit# and non-identit# factors usin! a !enerative multi-factor model. Ee then appl# a de-identification al!orithm on the combined factori>ed data before usin! the bases of the multi-factor model to reconstruct de-identified ima!es, as sho+ in /i!.7. ,he resultin! identit# parameters could be used for face reco!nition )red arro+s* or, to!ether +ith the non-identit# parameters for face de-identification )blue arro+s*. After de-identification, the bases of the multi-factor model are used to produce de-identified ima!es.

4nrollment #hree step hybrid method /eature E.traction

Dandom Pro5ection

CDP ,ransform



/eature E.traction Authentication

Dandom Pro5ection Cancelability

CDP ,ransform Discriminability



Security Biometric Cryptosystem Approach Decision

#rans3orm-based Approach

,igure/! Bloc0 Diagram o3 #hree step hybrid Approach

$nput $ma!es


?on-$dentit# /actors

$dentit# /actors

Generative 4ulti-/actor 4odel




Figure 1
De-$dentified $ma!es

,igure5! %verview Combined ,ace De-identi3ication

7!/ )reserving )rivacy o3 Biometric )rivate ,ace mage:

$n this approach, the use of visual cr#pto!raph# is e.plored to preserve the privac# of biometric data b# decomposin! the ori!inal ima!e into t+o ima!es in such a +a# that the ori!inal ima!e can be revealed onl# +hen both ima!es are simultaneousl# available 01:16 further, the individual component ima!es do not reveal an# information about the ori!inal ima!e. Durin! the enrollment process, the private biometric data is sent to a trusted third-part# entit#. Ince the trusted entit# receives it, the biometric data is decomposed into t+o ima!es and the ori!inal data is discarded. ,he decomposed components are then transmitted and stored in t+o different database servers such that the identit# of the private data is not revealed to either server. Durin! the authentication process, the trusted entit# sends a re2uest to each server and the correspondin! sheets are transmitted to it. /or private face ima!e, as sho+n in /i!. 8, each private face ima!e is decomposed into independent public host ima!es. $n this approach, the private ima!e can be vie+ed as bein! encr#pted into t+o host face ima!es. /irst, the demo!raphic attributes of the private face ima!es such as a!e, !ender, ethnicit#, etc. can be retained in the host ima!es thereb# preservin! the demo!raphic aspects of the face +hile perturbin! its identit#. Second, a set of public face ima!es )e.!., those of celebrities* ma# be used to host the private face database. $n essence, a small set of public ima!es can be used to encr#pt the entire set of private face ima!es. ,hird, usin! non-face ima!es as hosts ma# result in visuall# revealin! the e.istence of a secret face. /ourth, +hile decomposin! the face ima!e into random noise structures ma# be preferable, it can pi2ue the interest of an eavesdropper b# su!!estin! the e.istence of secret data.

,igure!7!De-identi3ying and storing a 3ace image!

V! C%"C'&S %"S
$n this paper, surve#s of isual Cr#pto!raph# and /ace De-identification methods have been presented. (ased on the above summar#, three step h#brid approach consists of three parts are namel# cancelable transform, discriminabilit# enhancement transform and template protection. Each part provides the cancelable abilit#, discriminabilit# and securit#, respectivel#. $n /ace De-identification method, multi factor model preservin! data utilit# and multi-factor de-identification al!orithm described here operates on sin!le ima!es. (ut biometric private face ima!e method to protect the privac# of a face database b# decomposin! an input private face ima!e into t+o independent sheet ima!es such that the private face ima!e can be reconstructed onl# +hen both sheets are simultaneousl# available. GE CS is then used to encr#pt the private ima!e in the selected host ima!es. $t is observed that the reconstructed ima!es are similar to the ori!inal private ima!e. Since the# have respective advanta!es and ma# complement each other. 4an# research need to be done in isual Cr#pto!raph#.

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