Dupré (1998) - Kant's Theory of History and Progress

Kanl's TIeov oJ Hislov and Fvogvess
AulIov|s) Louis Bupv

Souvce TIe Beviev oJ MelapIsics, VoI. 51, No. 4 |Jun., 1998), pp. 813-828
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KANT'S THEORY OF HISTORY AND PROGRESS
LOUIS DUPR?
HE HAD DONE with other branches of
philosophy,
In his
theory
of
history
Kant combined various strands of
eighteenth-century thought
and
gave
them a new
interpretation.
A
lifelong supporter
of the En
lightenment,
he nevertheless resisted the uncritical
optimism
of the
philosophes.
The notion of
unqualified
rational and moral
progress,
so evident to
them,
remained
highly problematic
to him: it had no "in
tuitional content" and seemed to conflict with
experience.
All too of
ten
history
seems "woven
together
from
folly,
childish
vanity,
even
from childish malice and destructiveness."1
Nonetheless,
Kant con
ceded,
human behavior shows a certain
consistency,
as the existence
of actuarial tables confirms.
Despite prolonged interruptions
of irra
tionality,
Kant's
own time
suggested
that our
species
was
finally
be
coming
more reasonable. The fact that some
ascending pattern
of ra
tionality emerged
from individual erratic acts indicated the
presence
of "a definitive natural
plan
for creatures who have no
plan
of their
own."2 The
Critique of Judgment,
the
writing
of which coincided
with that of several of Kant's
essays
on
history,
declared the
ideologi
cal
principle indispensable
for
any
kind of
methodological knowledge,
though
that
principle
itself remained
beyond
rational
proof.
In the
natural
sciences,
the form and structure of
organic beings
cannot be
understood without
assuming
some
teleological
orientation of the
parts
to the whole.
A similar orientation toward a rational end seems to rule the be
havior of
intelligent beings.
What
distinguishes
the natural
ordering
of
As
Correspondence
to:
Department
of
Religious Studies,
Yale
University,
New
Haven,
CT 06520.
1
Immanuel
Kant,
"Idea for a Universal
History
from a
Cosmopolitan
Point of
View," (1784)
in Kant on
History,
ed. and trans. Lewis White Beck
(New
York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1963),
12. For the German see vol. 7 of Kants Ge
sammelte
Schriften. Ausgabe
der
k?niglich preussischen
Akademie der
Wissenschaften (hereafter
"AK"
given
with volume and
page number), (Ber
lin: Walter de
Gruyter
&
Co., 1900-),
18.
2
"Universal
History," 12; AK7,
18.
The Review
of Metaphysics
51
(June 1998):
813-828.
Copyright
? 1998
by
The Review
of
Metaphysics
814
LOUIS DUPRE
humans from that of other
organic creatures, however,
is that their
end
surpasses
mere survival or the satisfaction of
organic
needs and
desires. Over a sufficient
length
of time it
appears
evident that their
capacities
aim at a
goal
that lies
beyond
the
organic
coordination of
the
species.
In one
lifetime
no
individual can
hope
to
accomplish
measurable
progress
toward the attainment of this
goal.
A
develop
ment toward full
humanity requires generations. However,
is what we
call "the end" more than the random effect of random actions? Nature
does
nothing
in
vain,
Kant
responds.3 Why
would the human animal
be endowed with
reason,
if not for
climbing beyond
the
optimal
main
tenance of its
physical
existence? Readers
acquainted
with Darwin's
theory
of natural selection
may
not find that answer
sufficient. Still
Kant
carefully
avoids
presenting
the
teleology
of
history
as the con
clusion of a scientific
proof.
It remains a
postulate, though
one that
he considers in
principle,
if not in its
specific application,
needed for
the
understanding
of rational
beings.
The
question remains, however,
whether the
teleological princi
ple, indispensable
for the scientific
knowledge
of
nature, may
be used
to
justify
the idea that the human race
progresses morally
and ratio
nally.
Is Kant entitled to extend the
teleological principle beyond
the
study
of the individual
organism?
The idea of a
teleological progres
sion of
humanity
toward a state of reason is not essential for the
knowledge
of human nature in the
way
final
causality
is for under
standing
an
organic
nature. In Kant's defense it must be said that he
does more than extend the
teleological principle
as he had formulated
it in the Third
Critique.
He combines that
principle
with the
postu
lates of
practical
reason as
they appear
in the Groundwork
of
the
Metaphysics of
Morals
(1795)
and in the
Critique of
Practical Reason
(1788). According
to those
works,
reason
provides
the
object
of
moral
obligation
with a content and
conveys
to it an absolute charac
ter. For finite rational individuals even an entire lifetime does not suf
fice for
achieving
the
morally good. (In
the Second
Critique
this fact
supported
the
postulate
of the
immortality
of the
soul.)
It takes
many
generations
to build
up
an
objective
realm of moral
goodness.
The
task
may
forever remain
unfinished, yet
the moral
imperative
does
not relent its demand. Human
nature, then,
must be
capable
of
ap
proaching
ever more
closely
to an ideal that it cannot attain in a
lim
3
"Universal
History," 13;
AK
7,19.
Non
estende
semplicem
ente
teleologia
a storia
KANTS THEORY OF HISTORY AND PROGRESS 815
ited time
span,
if the
categorical imperative
is indeed the
imperative
of
reason.
To this
postulate
of the
possibility
of moral
progress
in time we
must add Kant's conclusion
concerning
the
purpose
of the universe in
the Third
Critique.
Without moral
progress
the universe loses its
meaning altogether.
The historical ascent to a moral ideal
thereby
be
comes an
integral part
of the
teleology
of nature as a whole. Kant's ar
gument, then,
combines a moral
postulate
with a
regulative
idea
needed for
thinking
of the world as a whole. He neither shows nor
proves
the actual
presence
of
design
or of historical
progress.4
He
merely postulates
its
necessity.
The
earlier,
historical
writings
do not
elaborate these
presuppositions. However,
he alludes to the link of
the moral realm with that of
physical teleology
when he
asks,
"Is it
reasonable to assume a
purposiveness
in all
parts
of nature and to
deny
it to the whole?"5 Neither the
teleological
directedness of human
nature toward a moral
ideal,
as
presented
in the Third
Critique,
nor
the
postulate
in the Second
Critique
of an extended time for the fulfill
ment of the moral
imperative adequately justify
the idea of moral
progress through history.
The extension in time
postulated by
the
moral
imperative
concerns
only
the lifetime of the
individual,
while
the moral
purpose
of the universe does not entail the
necessity
of his
torical
progress:
the
very
existence of moral
beings,
however
imper
fect,
would seem to
satisfy
this demand.
Does Kant in his
writings
on
history, especially
"The Idea of a Uni
versal
History"
and
"Conjectural Beginning
of Human
History" (1786),
add the element that was
missing
to make the
argument
in favor of a
development
of the moral
principle cogent?
The
answer,
to the extent
that it is an
answer,
must be found in the second thesis of the "Idea for
a Universal
History":
"In man those natural
capacities
which are di
rected to the use of his reason are to be
fully developed only
in the
race,
not in the individual."6
Reason, according
to
Kant,
does not
work
instinctively
but
requires trial, practice,
and instruction. One
life,
or even a short succession of lives does not suffice to
bring
an in
dividual
person
to rational
maturity.
A full
development
of the moral
capacities
of the human race takes centuries and even millennia. We
must not
forget, however,
that
morality
differs from reason in this
4
Critique of Judgment,
trans. J. H. Bernard
(New
York: Hafner
Press,
1953), 311;
AST
5,335-6.
5
"Universal
History," 20;
AK
7,25.
6
"Universal
History," 13;^iT7,18.
816 LOUIS DUPRE
respect, that, regardless
of
a
person's
mental
limitations,
he or she is
capable
of a
good intention,
at
any
level of
rationality,
and hence of
fully
moral action.
Assuming
that Kant has made a case for
progress
at least with re
spect
to the rational
development
of the human
race,
a
problem ap
pears
to
emerge
with
respect
to Kant's moral reason:
Does it not fol
low from this notion of
progress
that earlier
generations, indeed,
all
those that
preceded
the
age
of
reason,
merely
exist for the benefit of
the later ones who
bring
that
goal
to its full realization? Kant
recog
nizes the
problem
himself: "It remains
strange
that the earlier
genera
tions
appear
to
carry
through
their toilsome labor
only
for the sake of
later,
to
prepare
for them a
foundation on which the later
generations
could erect the
higher
edifice which was nature's
goal,
and
yet
that
only
the latest of the
generations
should have the
good
fortune to in
habit the
building
on which a
long
line of their ancestors had
(uninten
tionally)
labored-"7 He
justifies
this
apparent inequity by declaring
reason more
important
than the fate of those who
promote
it. This
conclusion
may
seem
surprising
in the
light
of Kant's
categorical
im
perative
as formulated in the Groundwork
of
the
Metaphysics of
Mor
als: "Act in such a
way
that
you always
treat
humanity,
whether in
your
own
person
or in the
person
of
any other,
never
simply
as a
means,
but
always
at the same time as an
end."8 In
subordinating
thousands of
generations
to the
perfection
of
reason, history certainly
appears
to follow a
different course.
One
might
answer that Kant's moral
theory merely prescribes
what humans
ought
to do with
respect
to other humans. It articulates
a code of conduct for the relations
among
members of the same ratio
nal
species.
What remains
disconcerting, though,
is Kant's
suggestion
that the
history
of these free
beings
is determined
by
a
super-human
cause that acts for an
end that lies
beyond
them. Of
course,
with re
spect
to Providence the distinction of means and end does not
really
apply;
it is
merely
an
anthropomorphic way
of
speaking.
All
epochs
are
equally
near to
God,
as
Leopold
von
Ranke wrote.
Moreover,
Kant
usually
refers to the
impersonal
"Nature" rather than to
Providence,
thereby reducing
at least the
impression
of a
superhuman being
that
intentionally
interferes with human decisions. Nor would
a
subordi
7
"Universal
History," 14;
AK
7,
20.
8
Groundwork
of
the
Metaphysics of Morals,
trans. H. J. Paton
(London:
Hutchinson and
Co., 1956; reprint,
New York:
Harper
and
Row, 1963), 96;
AK
4,
429.
Rif. a
natura
per
non
rende
pi
facili le
cose.
KANT'S THEORY OF HISTORY AND PROGRESS 817
nation of earlier
generations
to the
goals
of later ones
necessarily
con
flict with the moral
imperative.
For the rule forbids
treating
a
person
merely
as a means in a
way
that excludes him or her
being
an end as
well. Even if the subservience of earlier
generations
to later
ones,
be
yond being
the inevitable result of a
rationality
bound
by
the limits of
time,
resulted from a divine
choice,
it need not follow that Providence
uses the older as a mere means for
advancing
the interests of the
younger.
The
tension, however,
between a
present
viewed as a means and
a future as an end increases in the
following
thesis
(IV)
from "The Idea
for a Universal
History":
"The means
employed by
Nature to
bring
about the
development
of all
capacities
of men is their
antagonism
in
society,
so far as this
is,
in the
end,
the cause of all lawful order
among
men."9 The
development
of reason
requires
a social state of
living:
"The
highest
purpose
of
Nature,
which is the
development
of all ca
pacities
which can be achieved
by mankind,
is attained
only
in soci
ety."10
Yet human behavior seems to conflict with man's social
nature,
as is
amply
evidenced
by
the fact that humankind lives in
permanent
strife and
competition.
For
Kant,
this
antagonism
itself forms
part
of
Nature's
design. Only
an "unsocial
sociability"
that stimulates humans
to
conquer
and
compete
with one another
prevents
them from
settling
down in an Arcadian
lethargy.
Without
vainglory,
lust for
power,
and
greed
humans would seldom strive to
develop
their full
potential:
"Thus are taken the first
steps
from barbarism to
culture,
which con
sists in the social worth of
man;
thence
gradually develop
all
talents,
and taste is
refined; through
continued
enlightenment
the
beginnings
are laid for a
way
of
thought
which can in time convert the
coarse,
nat
ural
disposition
for moral discrimination into definite
practical princi
ples,
and
thereby change
a
society
of men driven
together by
their ac
tual
feelings
into a moral whole."11 To reach the
purpose
of a
peaceful
and harmonious
society
millions and millions first have to be sacri
ficed in wars. Two
years later,
in his
"Conjectural Beginning
of Hu
man
History,"
Kant
repeated that, though
war is the
greatest
evil
(in
one of his latest
essays
he calls it "the source of all evil and
corruption
in
morals"12),
it is nonetheless
indispensable
for the
development
of
9
"Universal
History," 15;
AK
7,
20.
10
"Universal
History," 16;
AK
7,
22.
11
"Universal
History," 15;
AK
7,
21.
12
"An Old
Question
Raised
Again:
Is the Human Race
Constantly
Pro
gressing?"
in Kant on
History, 140-41;
AK
7,
82.
societ
la
realizzaz
ione
delluma
nit.
Parados
salmente
solo
NELLA
societ
si
raggiung
e ne
natura.
818 LOUIS DUPR?
human culture.13 This is indeed a
disturbing
view. But this view
should not be taken to
imply
that Kant advocates the use of immoral
means for the
purpose
of
establishing
a moral world. He
merely
claims that evil
itself,
while
remaining
evil and
intrinsically rejectable,
may
still have
meaning
in the
justification
of
history
as it
surpasses
the lives of individuals and their moral
responsibility.
In the "Idea of a Universal
History"
Kant claims that a
peaceful
society
does not exclude
competition,
as
long
as it does not interfere
with the freedom of others. To
keep competition, especially
eco
nomic
competition,
within
acceptable boundaries, however, requires
a strict
authority.
Yet in a free
society
that
authority
must come from
weithin,
not from above: it must be based
upon
a
mutual,
free consent.
Moreover, nothing
is
gained
until nations reach also
among
them
selves a state of
harmony
that allows even the weakest to live in secu
rity
with
powerful neighbors.14
For that
purpose
a
league
of nations is
needed,
the
concept
of which Kant
developed
in his later
essay
on
perpetual peace.
II
Kant assumes that the
goal
of
history
consists in the
highest
pos
sible moral
perfection
of the human race. Under the
impact
of Herder
he came to see moral
growth
as a
steady
realization of the ideal of Hu
manit?t. His review of the text in which Herder
developed
this
ideal,
namely,
Ideas Toward a
Philosophy of
the
History of
the Human
Race
(1784)
had been
quite
critical. As
presented by Herder,
"human
ity"
is
merely
"the bud of a future
flower,"
"the intermediate
stage
be
tween two worlds"15 that was to
prepare
a
different, totally spiritual
condition of the human race. Kant frowned
upon
this
analogy
be
tween the
growth
of an
organic being
and the
development
to what he
interpreted
to be a
higher species:
"There is not the least resemblance
between the
gradient progression
in the same man who is ever as
cending
to a more
perfect
structure in another life and the ladder
which one
may
conceive
among completely
different
types
and indi
viduals in the realm of nature."16
13
"Conjectural Beginning,"
in Kant on
History, 67;
AK
7,
121.
14
"Universal
History," 22-23;
AK
7,
28.
15
"Review of Herder's Ideas
for
a
Philosophy of
the
History of
Man
kind" in Kant on
History, 34-35;
AK
7,
51.
Interest
ing.
Nonetheless,
in his next
essay
on
history,
Kant himself came to
interpret
Humanit?t as a
comprehensive
moral ideal. In his
"Conjec
tural
Beginning
of Human
History" (1786)
he traces the
emergence
of
the human race from an animal state to one of
genuine humanity.
He
now dismisses the
question
whether the human race
universally
progresses
as
lying beyond responsible conjecture. Instead,
he fo
cuses on the one form of
progress
of which we
possess empirical
evi
dence, namely,
the transition from the state of nature to a
civilized
o{ie.
A
comparison
of the
present
condition of
European peoples
with
that of
primitives
enables us to make a
"responsible conjecture"
con
cerning
the transformation that released humans from "the womb of
nature."17 Fortunate as this
awakening
of reason
was,
it also
implied
a
violent
expulsion
from the state of
nature,
as the biblical
story
of the
exile from
paradise suggests.
Nor shall we ever
unchallengedly pos
sess our
civilized
state,
since nature continues to lure us back to her
protective
womb.
Still,
culture conceived as moral
development (not
as mere advance of
learning)
may
eventually
raise the human race to
full Humanit?t. However that
process
has
barely begun.
In "Idea for
a
Universal
History"
Kant had written: "To a
high degree
we
are,
through
art and
science,
cultured.
We,
are
civilized?perhaps
too
much for our own
good?in
all sorts of social
graces
and decorum.
But to consider ourselves as
having
reached
morality?for
that much
is
lacking.
The ideal of
morality belongs
to
culture;
its use for some
simulacrum of
morality
in the love of honor and outward decorum
constitutes mere civilization."18
For Herder
also,
the term
Humanit?t had
possessed
a moral con
notation, though
not
exclusively
a
moral
meaning.
It had
implied
a
de
velopment
and
integration
of all human
capacities.
Civilization in all
aspects?arts, letters,
and social refinement?had formed
part
of it.
For
Kant,
the term more
narrowly
referred to the moral
aspect
of
per
sonhood,
more
precisely,
to that
quality whereby
a
person
is
by
nature
an end and never a mere means.
Humanit?t, then,
was a
moral fact
as well as a moral ideal. As a
fact, personhood surpasses
all other
forms of
being.
It constitutes the
ground
of all moral
obligation.
In
Kant's Groundwork
of
the
Metaphysics of
Morals
(1785),
the fact of
humanity
functions as the
ground
of the moral
imperative:
"Act in
16
"Universal
History," 37;
AK
7,
53.
17
in Kant on
History, 59;
AK
7,114.
18
"Universal
History," 21;
AK
7,
26.
820
LOUIS DUPRE
such
a
way
that
you always
treat
humanity,
whether in
your
own
per
son or in the
person
of
any other,
never
simply
as a
means,
but
always
at the
same time as an
end."19 The moral
obligation
to
respect persons
as
absolute ends
applies
to all
humans,
whether
primitive
or
cultured,
educated
or
uneducated,
criminal
or moral. Their absolute worth de
pends
not on cultural
or moral
achievements,
but on the moral and ra
tional
capacities
of the
species. Humanity
as such is to be
respected
in each
individual,
whatever his or her
degree
of
participation
in it.
"This
principle
of
humanity,
and in
general
every
rational
agent
as an
end in
itself.
. .
is not borrowed from
experience; firstly,
because it is
universal, applying
as it does to all rational
beings
as such and no ex
perience
is
adequate
to determine
universality; secondly,
because in it
mankind is conceived not as an end of man
(subjectively)?that
is,
as
an
object
which,
as a matter of
fact, happens
to be made an end?but
as an
objective
end?one
which,
be our ends what
they may,
must as a
law constitute the
supreme limiting
condition of all
subjective
ends."20
In
respecting humanity
we
pursue
no ulterior
good
nor do we
obey
a
higher
command;
we
merely express
the
respect
due to the intrinsic
worth of
humanity.21
The moral worth of the
person
is
fully present
from the start and is not
subject
to
any
discrimination based
on the
stage
of cultural
development.
In another
sense, however, humanity
for Kant remains a moral
ideal still to be
pursued.
The fact of
being
human
implies
the
obliga
tion to strive toward the moral and intellectual fullness of
humanity.
That fullness
appears only
at the end of a
long
and slow
process;
rea
son and
morality
are
by
their
very
nature
capable
and needful of de
velopment.
Culture mediates
humanity
as a moral fact with
humanity
as a
moral ideal. But has culture achieved actual
progress?
In the
"Conjectural Beginning"
Kant still considered
any
answer to that
ques
tion
"illegitimately conjectural,"22
except
for one crucial event. When
the human
race,
or
any part thereof,
moved from a natural to a civil
state,
it
unquestionably progressed
to a
higher
condition. In the
essay
on
Enlightenment
Kant claimed that the culture of the
Enlightenment
had
definitively
taken the road of irreversible
progress.
Once reason
19
Groundwork
of
the
Metaphysics of Morals, 96;
AK
4,
429.
20
Groundwork
of
the
Metaphysics of Morals, 98; A??4,
431.
21
See Allen
Wood, "Humanity
as End in
Itself,"
in
Proceedings of
the
Eighth
International Kant
Congress (Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1995),
311.
22
53;
AK
7,
109.
has become
enlightened
and freedom
emancipated
a return to a more
primitive stage
becomes
impossible.23
No
political
or
religious
author
ity
is
capable
of
halting humanity
on its course to ever
greater enlight
enment. Nor would it have the
right
do so: "A contract made to shut
off all further
enlightenment
from the human race is
absolutely
null
and
void,
even if confirmed
by
the
supreme power, by parliaments,
and
by
the most ceremonious of
peace
treaties."24
However,
does the
removal of the obstacles to human
enlightenment
mean
that we
have
become
enlightened?
Kant denies that the
progress,
which the En
lightenment
created the
possibility for,
has
actually
been achieved.
We do not
yet
live in an
enlightened age,
he
insists,
but we do live in an
age
of
enlightenment.25
Moral
progress
has not
kept pace
with the un
deniable intellectual advances of the modern
age.
Yet without moral
improvement
we do not come closer to the ideal of Humanit?t.
In one of his last
writings,
"An Old
Question
Raised
Again:
Is the
Human Race
Constantly Progressing?"
Kant
finally gives
a
fully
affir
mative answer to the
question
whether we have
actually progressed,
yet
still without
embracing
the universal
optimism
of the French
phi
losophes.
He continues to claim that their thesis of an
unrestricted
progress
of
history
cannot be
proven.
Even if we have
progressed,
what assures us that we shall continue to do so in the future? The
pes
simistic view
is,
of
course, equally
vulnerable and
morally
untenable.
Kant now
decisively
dismisses the
hypothesis
that
history
moves back
and forth between
good
and evil.
Though logically irrefutable,
that
hy
pothesis
must be
rejected
on moral
grounds.
In a constant alternation
of
good
and
evil,
he
argues,
life would be no more than "a farcical
comedy,"
a
hopeless
effort to roll "the stone of
Sisyphus."26
The
pessi
mistic view rules out what the moral
imperative requires, namely,
that
moral life follow an
ascending
line in the human
community
as well as
in the individual. We
may
be unable to establish the state of actual
progress
at
any
given period
of
history
and we
shall never be able to
penetrate
the motives of free
beings
or to
predict
their future actions.
Nevertheless if conditions conducive to moral behavior
improve,
we
are
allowed to claim that the moral situation itself is
improving.
We
still
may
not
predict
when and how actual moral
progress
will
occur,
23
"What is
Enlightenment?"
in Kant on
History, 3-10;
AK
7,
35-42.
24
"Enlightenment,"
in Kant on
History, 7;
AK
7,
39.
25
"Enlightenment," 8;
AK
7,40.
26
"An Old
Question," 140-41;
AK
7,
82.
822
LOUIS DUPRE
but
we are
justified
in
assuming that,
over a
sufficiently long period
of
time,
it will occur.
One would
expect
Kant then to
stipulate
which conditions would
increase the
possibility
of moral
progress. Instead,
he reverses the
terms of the
argument
and
proposes
that
we
seek
an
empirical
event
that indicates the
presence
of such conditions.27 Kant finds it in the
disinterested
sympathy
that his
contemporaries spontaneously
feel
for the side of freedom when it becomes a
subject
of
public dispute.
Whatever the success or failure of the French revolution
may
be
(1795
was indeed
a time to raise that
question),
all
enlightened
persons,
he
claims, applaud
the French
people
for
liberating
themselves from
tyr
anny
and
consolidating
their
emancipation
in a democratic constitu
tion. A
surprising argument
to use at the time when the French
armies had
begun
to create havoc all over Western
Europe
and were
on their
way
to abolish the
sovereignty
of several
European
states!
Nor had Kant's claim of
a universal
sympathy
for the
revolutionary
cause remained
unchallenged.
In his
Reflections
on the Revolution in
France,
Edmund Burke
forcefully opposed
it. Nonetheless Kant
con
fidently
declared: "Now I claim to be able to
predict
to the human
race
even without
prophetic insight?according
to the
aspects
and omens
of our
day,
the attainment of this
goal.
That
is,
I
predict
its
progress
toward the better
which,
from now
on,
turns out to be
no
longer
com
pletely retrogressive.
For such
a
phenomenon [as
the French revolu
tion]
is not to be
forgotten."28
And,
even more
apodictically:
"The hu
man race has
always
been in
progress
toward the better and will
continue to be so henceforth."29
Kant never abandoned his thesis that the
progress
of
morality,
which resides
entirely
in the
intention,
cannot be measured. He
readily passed judgment,
however,
on the
objective
conditions that fa
vor or obstruct the
objective practice
of
morality, regardless
of the
subjective
intentions.
By
that norm the measure of
progress
in Kant's
moral worldview consists in the social and
legal
conditions conducive
to the attainment of a
superior
level of freedom. Thus he
applauded
the
age
of
Enlightenment,
however
poor
it was in actual achieve
ments,
for
having accomplished
an irreversible
breakthrough
toward
freedom. Once
a
people
has
begun
to rule
itself,
it vrill never voluntar
27
"An Old
Question," 143;
AK
8,
84.
28
Ibid., 147;
AST
8,
88.
29
Ibid.
ily
return the reins of
government
to a
despotic
monarch or to an arro
gant aristocracy.
Ill
The
Enlightenment
was a
project,
more than an achievement.
The human race remains far from
having
created the ideal
public
con
ditions for a moral life. None of Kant's
writings
expresses
more dis
tinctly
what he
regarded
as the
political
ideal of the nations than his
essay,
Toward
Perpetual
Peace: A
Philosophical Project (1795),
writ
ten at the conclusion of the war between the French
Republic
and the
armies of the
League
of
European
monarchies. Kant
adopted
some of
the ideas of Abb? de Saint-Pierre's
Projet pour
rendre la
paix perp?
tuelle en
Europe (1713).
Yet
writing
at the end of the
Enlightenment,
he considered
peace
not
only
desirable but
historically possible
and
even
probable.
He resumed the thesis he had stated in his "Idea for a
Universal
History,"
that the human race combines a
propensity
to so
cial life with
socially disruptive
tendencies toward
vanity, envy,
and
unmitigated competition.
Both
opposites
were needed for the initial
development
of culture. But as cultural
capacities grow,
so does their
destructive
power.
In his
"Conjectural Beginning"
Kant had claimed
that war
inevitably
enters human
history
as "an
indispensable
means
to the still further
development
of human culture."30 At a time of con
flict a nation rallies all its available
powers,
becomes inventive in its
attempt
to outwit the
adversary,
and
produces
at maximum
capacity.
In a
developed civilization, however,
this brutal means toward cultural
increase turns
against
itself. The nation's
resources,
instead of
being
used for the benefit of its
citizens,
are wasted on the
preparation
and
conduct of war. Freedom becomes restricted and moral values
jeop
ardized.
Moreover,
this hazardous method for
acquiring political
su
periority
has
proven
to be a most uncertain
way
for
tipping
the bal
ance in one's favor.31 With remarkable
foresight
Kant had therefore
concluded
that,
at an advanced
stage,
culture
required peace
for its
survival. In "Toward
Perpetual Peace,"32
he showed how a
permanent
renunciation of war is both
possible
and
necessary.
30
"Conjectural Beginning," 67;
AK
7,121.
31
"Idea for a Universal
History," 23;
AK
7,
28.
32
"Perpetual Peace,"
in Kant on
History, 85-135;
AK
8,
343-86.
824
LOUIS DUPRE
A first condition for
attaining
a state of
lasting
peace
consists in
empowering
the entire
citizenry,
rather than a
single
ruler or an aris
tocratic
group,
with the
authority
for
concluding
international con
tracts.
Many
nations have made the transition from a state of nature
to a civil state
through
a contract
whereby
individuals either surren
der their freedom
(Hobbes)
or
delegate part
of its exercise
(Rous
seau)
to an
appointed authority.
But nations
among
themselves re
main in a state of nature. The
peril
of war will continue to threaten
them as
long
as
political authority
remains beholden to
particular
in
terests.
Only
a
republican constitution,
that
is,
one in which
political
power
rests with the
people (whatever
the form of
sovereignty may
be?monarchic, aristocratic,
or
democratic) presents
a realistic
possi
bility
for
contracting
a
lasting
peace.
When the
people
themselves
control the nation's
policy,
Kant
thinks,
no
State will choose war. In
stead all will
eventually agree
to form a
league
of nations with an in
ternational
peace-keeping
force rather than
standing
national armies.
Kant
foresaw,
and later
experience confirmed,
that nations
would be reluctant to surrender their
right
of defense or of defensive
aggression
and
thereby place
their national
sovereignty
at risk. In the
end, however,
even the
stronger
nations will come to see that a viola
tion of the
integrity
of the weaker ones
damages
their own
interests as
well. The interests of each nation are served better
by
a
federation of
States than
by
the
gain
to be obtained
by
unilateral action. Its founda
tion in nature
gives
Kant the confidence that
peace
will
inevitably pre
vail in the end.
The movement toward
peaceful collaboration, then,
receives its
impulse
from a natural source. Nature drives
peoples irresistibly
to
ward conditions favorable to moral
improvement.
The
morally supe
rior state of affairs thus
emerges
from
natural,
even
selfish
propensi
ties,
more than from
disinterested,
moral attitudes:
A
good
constitution is not to be
expected
from
morality, but,
con
versely,
a
good
moral condition of a
people
is to be
expected only
under
a
good
constitution. Instead of
genuine morality,
the mechanism of na
ture
brings
it to
pass
through
selfish
inclinations,
which
naturally
con
flict
outwardly
but which can be used
by
reason as a means for its own
end,
the
sovereignty
of
law, and,
as concerns the
state,
for
promoting
and
securing
internal and external
peace.33
A stable
political
order
requires
more than
good
intentions. It
may
be
the outcome of selfish
motives,
but it must be so structured that "al
33
"Perpetual Peace," 112-13; AK8,
366-67.
though [the citizens'] private
intentions
conflict, they
check each
other,
with the result that their
public
conduct is the same as if
they
had no such intentions."34
Kant,
no less than Vico and
Herder,
knew
what
Hegel
was to call the
cunning
of reason in
history.
He allows
that the
teleology
of nature described in the "Idea for a
Universal His
tory"
may
be
regarded
as the
design
of Providence.35
Yet,
unlike his
predecessors,
he avoids
attributing
it to a direct intervention of Provi
dence. A
providentia gubernatrix
may
well direct the
"cunning
con
trivances of
nature,"36
but since such a transcendent cause falls be
yond
human
cognizance,
he considers Nature a more
fitting
term for a
process
that occurs
entirely
within the natural order.
The
argument
that nature drives
history
to its moral end
by
means of a
politics
of self-interest raises the
question
whether
politics
is ever more than self-interested and hence whether it can be consid
ered moral in the Kantian
sense at all. Does the art of the
possible
not
inevitably
entail the
practice
of
compromise?
Should the
politician
be
resigned
to the
disjunction
of effectiveness and
morality?
Granted
that
history
increases the social conditions
favoring
moral conduct re
gardless
of the moral intentions of those who made
them,
does that
exempt politicians
from
obeying
the moral
imperative,
"So act that
your
maxim could become a universal law
regardless of
the endVTi
Kant concedes that the
pragmatics
of
policy making
often conflicts
with the norms set
by
the moral
imperative, but,
he
insists,
even the
most
pragmatic politician
is forced to
pay
homage
to the moral ideals
of his
age.
When
violating
the
rights
of
opposing political groups
or of
other nations he still must
appeal
to some rule of natural or interna
tional law.38 Thus the
practice
of false maxims
indirectly upholds
the
validity
of moral
principles. Hypocrisy
testifies to the truth.
The indirectness
by
which
history
must realize a moral world or
der
is,
of
course,
not the
only problem
inherent in the Kantian
theory
of
progress.
Far more
complex
is the
question
how
objective
condi
tions can
effectively
favor or obstruct moral
progress. Apparently
Kant
perceived
no conflict between his thesis that
improved
social
conditions
promote
moral
practice, and,
on
the other
side,
his
general
principle
of moral
autonomy.
In an
appendix
to Eternal Peace he con
34
Ibid., 112;
AK
8,
366.
35
"Universal
History," 25;
AK
8,30.
36
"Perpetual Peace," 107;
AK
8,
362.
37
Ibid., 124;
A?T
8,
377.
38
Ibid., 123-4; A?"8,
376.
Astuzia
della
ragione.
(Gi
Kant).
Ma come
darne
una
interpret
azione
benevola
? Non
metasic
amente
carica?
Realizza
zione
indiretta
dei ni.
Question
e del
progress
o
826 LOUIS DUPRE
cedes that the
external,
social order
directly
neither facilitates nor ob
structs the internal moral attitude. In the
legal order, however,
moral
ity
and the
social-political reality
touch one another. The laws in
which the moral attitudes that have
shaped
the
legal
order
(the pure
form of
legality)
became
concretely expressed
induce citizens to
adopt
attitudes similar to those embodied in the laws. Thus Kant con
siders social institutions
morally progressive
if
they encourage
citi
zens to convert moral ideals into
practice. Legality
is the
public
arena
where
private
virtue and
public practice
meet. In this arena
justice
as
sumes that
objective
external
expression
which its
very
nature de
mands. To be
sure, morality
remains restricted to the intention. The
intention
itself, however,
to be sincere
must,
to the extent that it is
possible,
be executed in
external,
social action.
Legality
makes this
possible.
It mediates the moral
imperative
with the
very
idea of law.
Crucial in the transfer from
private
intention to social order is the
"public"
nature of the form of law. Kant
applies
the moral
imperative
to the social order
through
the
primary requirement
that the
legal
or
der to be moral at all must be
public:
"All actions
relating
to the
right
of other men are
unjust
if their maxim is not consistent with
public
ity."39 Indeed, legality provides
the
public
arena where
private
inten
tions, good
and
bad,
are
forced to become
public
in external action.
Any attempt
to contain the
imperative
within the
private
order of in
ternal intentions
inevitably
results in
public inequity.
If it were not for
the
public
domain of
legality,
each claim made on the basis of one
per
son's intention would be countered
by
an
opposite
claim advanced
by
another
person.
The moral
obligation, then,
is
partly
but
essentially
linked to the existence of a
legal
order.
Legality, though
not moral in
itself, provides
the
space
for intentions to be converted into a coher
ent
system
of
justice.
Does it
follow, then,
that international law as it exists suffices to
realize moral ideals into a
global
order of
peaceful
coexistence? Kant
denies this. In its
present
form international law does not
express
the
general
will of all
peoples
or even of those who
accept
it. It has
merely
frozen
existing
international relations into
law;
it has
legalized
the
inequality strong
nations have inflicted
upon
the weak. The exist
ing
law of nations?the outcome of war?far from
being
a
step
toward
eternal
peace, perpetuates
the state of nature
among
nations. It lacks
the
principal
condition for
moving
nations from a natural to a civil
39
"Perpetual Peace," 127;
AS"
8,381.
Socialit
(nel
senso di
pubblicit
)
diventa
marchio
caratteris
tico
dellinten
zione gi
in Kant.
Anche se
pi
criterio.
(autocont
raddittori
et).
Vero
che la
pubblici
t
incarna
(anzi,
la
forma
irklich)
dellluni
versalit
.
state, namely,
a common
ground
for
peace.
For a federation of na
tions to become effective all
participants
must have reached within
themselves a consensus on the
overriding
need for a
permanent
peace.
The law of
nations,
as Kant knew
it,
still fell far short of that. It
aimed at
preventing
forms of conflict
directly
detrimental to
any
na
tion, large
or
small, yet
did not abolish the
existing inequalities. Only
a
status
juridicus
that
grants
all nations
equal rights
establishes the
possibility
for
permanent peace.
A federation for the maintenance of
peace
should
legislate
in ac
cordance with the moral law. Yet in their relations with
others,
na
tions have
persistently
flaunted that law. In time of
war,
citizens com
mit acts
totally opposed
to its
injunction.
The
arguments
used
by
the
accused in trials for war crimes after World War II have shown how
such a moral
discrepancy
between a national and an
international
code of behavior continues to exist.
Indeed,
Kant's own
morality
of
intention bears some
responsibility
for the schizoid rule to which war
criminals
appealed.
In the
legal
order the moral attitude consists in
obeying
the
political authorities,
whatever
they may
order
against
the
well-being
of other
nations,
as
long
as one
keeps
one's intention
"pure."
But the treatise on
perpetual peace proves
that Kant
himself,
far from
consenting
to such a
duplicity, vigorously
strove to overcome
it. As
long
as the moral intention has not
penetrated public
life
by
cre
ating
rules of
public
conduct conformable to the moral
law,
the
age
of
reason had not
yet truly begun.
To be
sure,
as Kant had stressed in
Religion
Within the Limits
of
Reason Alone
(1793),
neither international
peace
nor
republican gov
ernments can realize the moral end of
history. Indeed,
there is no
"moral end" of
history,
but
only
a moral aim.
History
as the external
process
of human
development
never enters the moral
sanctuary
it
self. The
struggle
to realize the moral ideal
begins
for each
person
anew and will not be concluded before the end of time. With
respect
to that
struggle history
remains an external
process,
the moral success
of which can never be
fully
assessed or
predicted.
However much his
tory may
increase conditions favorable to the
development
of human
kind's moral
capacities,
the actual success of the moral
development
remains uncertain. Inner attitudes never
become
fully
manifest and
history only
deals with
public
deeds and behavior. Does this funda
mental distinction still allow us to
speak
of moral
progress?
The
paradox
of
history
is that it never
intrinsically
affects that which none
theless defines its
meaning
and
purpose.
Nevertheless,
the link with
828 LOUIS DUPRE
the moral
realm, though external,
is real and the
urge
toward the cre
ation of
a
public
realm of freedom is not
only possible
but
necessary.
The internal and the external side of
practical
reason are
obviously
re
lated, though
not
intrinsically
united. The conditions
favoring
the
practice
of
morality
and freedom follow a
progressive
course,
accord
ing
to
Kant,
and do so
necessarily.
Do
they
also
indirectly
affect the
internal
morality
of intentions? Kant does not
say so,
and some texts
lead us to doubt it.40 He
agrees
with the French
philosophes
that rea
son has reached a
point
of
development
that renders the
progress
of
knowledge
and of civilization
irreversible,
and has created conditions
favorable to moral
practice.
But advances in civilization do not coin
cide with moral
progress.
Intentions remain
purely
internal and nei
ther
political emancipation
nor scientific
progress guarantee
moral
improvement.41
Yale
University
40
"Universal
History," 11;
?ff
8,17;
and "Conflict of the
Faculties,"
AK
7,
91-92.
411 am much
obliged
to Allen Wood for his
suggestions
for
improving
this
paper.
Le
inten
zioni
resta
no
inter
ne
Saggio un riassunto (a grandi linee) delle vedute di Kant sulla storia.
Interessante in contrasto tra prospettiva del singolo (dovere morale, massime) e invece prospettiva
della storia, la quale in parte sembra agire dietro le spalle del singolo. Questo crea una tensione
interna al pensiero di Kant. Colui che da p.v. singolo morale, da p.v. storia pu invece essere
meno morale di qualcun altro, il quale si trova a vivere in un epoca in cui la natura umana (Hegel
direbbe, lo spirito) risulta maggiormente progredito, o moralmente pi elevato.
Contrasto p.v. personale e invece pv. storia.
Analogia ancora con KdU, ((vedi Kant, quando parla di spettatore in Conitto), per allo stesso tempo
lelemento morale complica il quadro. (Vedi parte iniziale saggio).

Dupré (1998) - Kant's Theory of History and Progress

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Dupré (1998) - Kant's Theory of History and Progress

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Kanl's TIeov oJ Hislov and Fvogvess

AulIov|s) Louis Bupv

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