RISK-BASED COMPONENT LIFE MANAGEMENT IN FOSSIL POWER PLANTS

A. Jovanovic, MPA Stuttgart, Germany

Dr. Aleksandar Jovanovic

Head of Life Management Department
MPA Stuttgart
Over 20 years of experience in the area of applied research for
power plants, working in manufacturing, operation and research
internationally
jovanovic@mpa.uni-stuttgart.de

Abstract

The paper provides review of current practices and trends in the area of risk-based inspection
(RBI) and risk-based life management (RBLM), primarily by looking at the current European
work. It highlights the background and needs of industry in the area of RBI/RBLM and indicates
some current solutions and results yet to be achieved in the new European project RIMAP. The
project is aimed at developing European guidelines in the area of risk-based inspection and
maintenance. The paper also shows how the principles of RBLM are practically applied in a
European power plant, including the implementation aspects in the “non-ideal situation” (lack of
data, uncertainties, need to combine experts’ opinions with results of engineering analysis, etc.). It
has been shown through an example that the risk-based approach to life management can help
optimize the inspection and maintenance programs and simultaneously promote plant economy and
safety.

1 Introduction

The interest in risk and risk-based approaches in inspection, maintenance and management in
power and process plants has undoubtfully increased in Europe and elsewhere. Technical risk has
become economic, public relation and political issue. Risk is now a days also an economic
category, “merchandise” in a way, having its price, its market(s), its traders… Who invests in risk
mitigation or reduction, expects an economically measurable benefit too. This change of paradigm
means in the practice that it is more important to know and manage the risk, than to reduce
or eliminate it "by all means...”. This is also the starting point for considerations made here – to
examine how this change in paradigms applies to life management of critical components in power
and process plants, where possible failures of these components can appear as the main source of
risk. The European views on these issues will be presented in more detail, those from European
research project RIMAP in particular.
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2 RISK and the maintenance concepts

The conventional “classic” approaches to risk propose solutions requiring to:
• assess risk/cost (statically, i.e. for one given set of conditions)
• establish the “distance” between the current level of risk/cost and the limit one, and
• propose/introduce measures for risk/cost reduction.
In the case that the measures have been successful, the plant can be kept in operation for longer
time. Much of the consideration in this classical approach is devoted actually only to the internal
plant costs, e.g. those of maintenance. Therefore, the main issue appears to be to find the right
balance between gain/profit obtained by risk-reduction measures (e.g. life extension, higher
availability and similar), and cost of the risk reduction measures. In the conditions of the liberalized
market, the above approach is not sufficient, because it does not take into account the fluctuation
of market prices. Therefore, the new market-oriented approaches advocate on-line dynamic
analysis of the price cost ratio.

Including risk considerations into the daily practice of maintenance was not a straightforward and
easy process. In order to come to its current state, the practice has passed through a number of
phases, which can, generally, be described as
• corrective (“repair upon failure”) maintenance
• scheduled (“time-based”) maintenance and
• condition-based maintenance, leading nowadays to concepts known as
reliability-centered maintenance, risk-aware maintenance and similar.
The latter includes the new concepts like condition-based maintenance, reliability-centered
maintenance (RCM) and risk-aware maintenance, risk-based inspection (RBI), risk-based life
management (RBLM) and others.

These risk-aware solutions mean that it is necessary to move away from the traditional (officially
prescribed) and time based practices, and to adopt strategies based on the condition state of the
component and related risk. Thus, the overall safety, reliability and economy of the plant can be
improved and the resources optimally used by ensuring that inspection is focused onto the critical
components. Two elements of risk have to be assessed separately: probability (likelihood) of
occurrence and nature of consequences. To derive the probability, a detailed knowledge of the
continuing degradation mechanisms, which can affect each item of equipment, is required. This
must be based on a thorough evaluation of the component itself (“condition assessment”), its
operating conditions and the process in the plant. Similarly, assessment of the consequence
requires a full understanding of the mode of failure and its consequent effect.
One of the main goals of the current practice is to concentrate on critical components. A “critical”
component in the sense of this work (and it is consistent with the position of e.g. API 580/581,
Seveso II guidelines, IEC 61508 and similar documents) is a component “mostly contributing to
the risk”, where risk, again, has to be understood as defined in this work, later on. This practically
means, that the components that can lead to the extreme, but only hypothetically possible “critical
situations” (e.g. disastrous accidents) are not necessarily the most “critical components”. As
pointed out by Koppen1 (1998), in most of the plants only about 20% of the components
contribute to the virtually the whole risk in a plant (~80% of the risk). Practically, it means that it is
Risk-Based Life Management OMMI (Vol. 1, Issue 1) April 2002 -3-

generally enough to concentrate on the critical 10 or 20% of components in order to eliminate

most of the risk, achieving, thus, two seemingly incompatible goals, namely:
• savings (inspections concentrate on say only 20% of components, scope
of inspection can be drastically reduced on the remaining 80% of
components) and
• increased reliability, safety and availability (as the risk-bearing components
are now those on which the inspection concentrate, the probability of
unexpected failure decreases).

This approach is often misunderstood by people working in the area of safety, who,
correspondingly, tend to create their scales of criticality based primarily on the possible/imaginable
consequences (e.g. those of the most severe possible accident).

3 European approach

An inquiry into the goal to establish needs of European industry in the area of RBI/RBLM was
performed by MPA Stuttgart during 1999 and in early 2000 within the framework of EPERC
(European Pressure Equipment Research Council and PLAN – Plant Life Assessment Network).
Furthermore, the inquiry has used direct contacts and interviews to establish this collection of case
studies. For each interviewed company the following information has been collected:
• Regulatory basis: codes, norms, standards, guidelines
• Corporate policies: acceptance and expectations
• Practical implementation
• Future: "under construction", planned, expected
In projects led by large companies like Shell or research and other organizations (e.g. KINT2
project led by TNO, or project leading to API 5813) the risk-based approach in inspections
evolved from an "interesting alternative" into official company policies, sometimes even national
policies. Although the idea of risk as an optimizing measure for in-service inspection was accepted
in principle by many, the first real tangible results appeared only in late 1980s with appearance in
the USA the concept of risk based in-service inspection resulting in first published documents in
early 1990s (ASME4 1991). Further, the NRC carried out verification and validation exercises
while in Europe, a Working Group on risk-based in-service inspection has been set up within the
European Network on Inspection Qualification (ENIQ).
When compared to the situation in the USA, the situation in Europe, in the term of regulation of
RBI, is characterized by the following features:
• Single European documents are usually comparable to corresponding US ones,
some of them, e.g. PED 97/23 and/or Seveso II guideline, can even be
considered as a “European advantage”, but the consistency among single
European documents is generally lower that in the US documents.
• Generally, the overall “coverage” of RBI is better in the US set of documents. In
European documentation significant gaps appear, some of the issues are often
not tackled at all and often there is no “central document”, which would link the
existing pieces and create a consistent and comprehensive “RBI system” like the
one of , e.g. API 581.
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• In terms of “general deregulation” Europe has still a way to go – US

organizations like PVRC, ASME, API and similar are often capable to react in a
more flexible and, often, more efficient way than their European counterparts .

Much of the RBI issue in the USA is “profit driven” and much of it in Europe is “regulation
driven”.
Practically, an overall concept of RBI/RBLM had to be specified and the available methods, tools,
codes, standards, etc. embedded into it, developing additional methods, tools, documents, etc. if
and where needed. These are some of the main goals of the RIMAP project of the EU (Figure 1).

2 years 1 year

RIMAP RIMAP
RIMAP RTD
RTD Project Demonstra RIMAP
Coordinator DNV tion
Lead Partner DNV Network
Project
Project
Coordinator DNV
Lead Partner Coordinator MPA
Lead Partner MPA
EnBW
Development of Operating agent:
European RBI/RBLM Applications of JRC Petten
Guidelines / European RBI /
Application RBLM Guidelines / Dissemination of
Workbooks Application information and
Workbooks results of work on
the European RBI /
RBLM Guidelines /
Application
Workbooks

4 years

Figure 1: European R&D project RIMAP (www.mpa-lifetech.de/rimap)

4 Sample Application of the Approach

The applications showing direct consequences of the application of RIMAP project outcome (e.g.
the RIMAP procedure) are yet to come, e.g. in the RIMAP pilot power plant of EnBW in
Heilbronn, Germany, but applications of the general approach preceding RIMAP, are available.
So, for instance, the solution proposed by Jovanovic 5, “risk – informed” life management (RBLM)
foresees the following main elements:

• RBLM procedure
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• Risk assessment methodology

• Decision-making methodology:
(a multi-criteria decision making methodology) used for ranking of risks
(criticalities!) and, hence, for determination of critical components and locations
and for choosing the right life management alternative (e.g. run, inspect, replace…)
• The software tool (ALIAS):
for implementation and practical application of the RBLM approach, combining
the above elements and providing the necessary supporting elements like
databases, analytical tools, etc.

The RBLM procedure has been modified in order to fit the requirements of RIMAP, in which the
current basic (draft) representation is shown in Figure 2. Besides the procedure, RIMAP also
foresees the “RIMAP framework”, Figure 3.

Figure 2: Basic representation of the current draft of RIMAP procedure

Risk-Based Life Management OMMI (Vol. 1, Issue 1) April 2002 -6-

WP2 (RIMAP Framework)

RIMAP
RIMAP
Framework Workprocess

RIMAP Guideline
D2.2
Subchapter 7.6 from
Chapter 9
RIMAP
Procedure
(covers RIMAP WP3.1
Framework) (Proba-
bility of
Appendix of the Guideline,
RIMAP Procedure, at different
Failure)
levels/steps
D2.1

WP4 (Application) RIMAP Application

Workbooks

DEMO2 RIMAP Procedure Application Reports

from RIMAP Demo Project

Figure 3: RIMAP Framework consisting of RIMAP Procedure and RIMAP Work Process, and
the hierarchy of the documents being produced in RIMAP: From the Generic Guideline on RBIM
to the RIMAP Application Reports

A sample application in Finland was placed in the broader framework of improving current
practice of plant life management, focused on condition-based risk assessment of boiler and piping
components in a thermal power plant (Finland, emphasis on replica and strain inspections). A
coal-fired power station with two blocks has been selected as the sample plant. The details of the
overall project (1995-1998) are reported in the work of McNiven6 (2000). The risk-based
approach has been introduced gradually and on two selected items (boiler and main steam line).
Further data about RBLM aspects are given in the paper of Jovanovic, Auerkari, Brear7. The
procedure has been implemented in the following way.
Decision to do RBLM and the objectives were defined by operator in consultancy with
subcontractors. The objectives were:
• to ensure operability until the target year
• to agree on the necessary action and investment
• to agree on the targets with the authorities.

The target systems were the boiler and the main steam line from headers to turbine inlet flanges.
The plant and the systems (Figure 4) have been correspondingly modelled in ALIAS system.
Risk-Based Life Management OMMI (Vol. 1, Issue 1) April 2002 -7-

Figure 4: Boiler components modeled in ALIAS

The following data have been collected (in paper folders first):
• design and manufacturing documentation, QA acceptance docs – as available in
the plant (limited amount available)
• operating history data in the form of (handwritten) temperature and pressure logs,
and, after 1990 on paper rolls, including records on startups (hot/warm/cold/total)
– no computerized data acquisition data were available, additional data have been
taken by sampling
• maintenance history including primarily inspection results and repair/replacement
records

Generally, data before 1990 were very scarce. Only a minor part of the collected data has been
stored electronically and a subset of these in ALIAS: mainly the RBLM-related data from the
boiler (economizer) and the main steam line data, including inspections. Altogether, data for over
400 components in the piping system and over 250 components in the boiler were collected and
stored in ALIAS.

Assessment of data included primarily assessment of completeness and uncertainties, for:

§ design/manufacturing data
component geometry (dimensions), material properties (e.g.
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conservative/optimistic strength values), influence of manufacturer’s heat treatment;

data on these were insufficient in 1960’s
§ operational history
exhaustion due to creep and fatigue was calculated deterministically and the
uncertainty related to past and future operating history taken as a factor assessed
by experts
§ maintenance history
limited records before 1990’s were partly compensated by the amount of data
(primarily strain measurements and replica results, over 800 stored in ALIAS)
available after 1990; no significant repairs before 1990, some bends (mostly on
one leg of the piping) have been replaced due to high strains (max. 6-8% over
diameter
Uncertainties, leading to determination of PoF-values were derived either from the data (e.g.
measured NDT data, Material data, Figure 5) or from the models (assessed uncertainties in model
parameters yielding uncertainty in results – e.g. creep damage development, Figure 6). The
calculation is performed for different damage methods for each scenario considered (Figure 7).
For the identification of possible hazards the following has been considered/done:
§ HAZOP analysis has been considered, but eventually not done (economic
reasons and lack of personnel/tools)
§ expert identification of possible damage mechanisms: in current mode of
operation primarily creep, also corrosion in the boiler part.

Note: A new concept of combined event – consequence tree “The Bow Tie Scenario” is
currently considered in RIMAP (Figure 7).

For assessment of probabilities two options have been considered:

§ the quantitative assessment (e.g. PSA-like) and
§ the qualitative (expert-based) one.
For the similar reasons as for HAZOP, the quantitative analysis has not been done. The qualitative
analysis has been made by four experts, three from one plant and one from another plant.
Evaluation sheets containing questions as those shown in Table 1 were given to all of them
The assessment of consequences has followed the very same principle as the above evaluation of
probabilities. The consequences considered have included:
§ technical (engineering) consequences
including e.g. pressure loss, steam releases/leaks; potentially catastrophic
consequences due to failure of bends were evaluated qualitatively
§ financial consequences
like repair/replacement cost and business loss
§ environmental and other consequences
like possible fatalities, injury of personnel and loss of reputation.
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Uncertainty in material properties

modeled on the base of test data:
Here distribution of creep test
results (time to rupture)

Material
10CrMo 9 10 in
ALIAS database

Figure 5: Taking uncertainties in material data (here test results in creep testing) as the basis for
determination of PoF

Figure 6: Creep damage development, model based on statistical analysis of data, determining
PoF on the basis of the reached damage level =1
Risk-Based Life Management OMMI (Vol. 1, Issue 1) April 2002 -10-

Figure 7: Combined Event – Consequence tree, “Bow Tie” scenario, basic principle

Table 1: Excerpt from the risk factor evaluation sheets

Seriousness of
Shutown time
Probability of

Availabity of

damage if it
spare parts
Availability

happens

Label Economizer (2NA01/02)

damage

Z001 Econ inlet header 1 4 2 2 3

Z002 connecting tubes Eco 1:to 1 4 3 4.5 4
Z003 Eco 1 and Eco 2 1 2 3 4.5 4
Z004 Eco 1 and Eco 2 1 2 3 4.5 4
Z005 Eco 1 and Eco 2 1 2 3 4.5 4
Z006 branching pipes 1 2 3 3.5 4
Z007 Eco back wall and roof tubes 1 3 2 5 4
Z008 Eco back wall and roof tubes 1 3 2 5 4
Z009 connecting tubes 1 4 3 5 4
Z010 Front wall hanger tubes 1 4 3 3 3
Z011 connecting tubes 1 4 3 5 4
Z012 connecting tubes 1 4 3 5 4
Z013 connecting tubes 1 4 3 5 4
Z014 Hanger tubes of superheater and the roof 1 3 3 4.5 3
Risk-Based Life Management OMMI (Vol. 1, Issue 1) April 2002 -11-

Risk assessment has been done using the ALIAS-RBLM module. Its main results are shown as a
risk map (Figure 8). The components have been classified in five risk classes (negligible, low,
medium, high or extreme risk).

superheater 2 inlet header

connecting pipes
attemperator 3

attemperator 2

triflux HP

superheater 2 lower part

Figure 8: Risk map for boiler components (as applied in ALIAS system)

Risk assessment results provide basis for identification of critical components (e.g. the
attemperator 3). The user-defined link between the risk level and the level of inspection (Figure 9)
produced the inspection plan directly. The inspection plan has been embedded into the normal
(MS Project based) planning of overhaul and other regular maintenance actions. It has also been
compared with previous inspection plans and re-discussed with experts. An excerpt from experts’
evaluation sheets used for the risk map in Figure 8 is shown in Table 1.

The inspections have broadly followed the above inspection plan. Approximately at 20 locations,
additional inspections (replica, magnetic particle, deformation/displacement, wall thickness) were
performed.
Life assessment and fitness for purpose analyses included:
Risk-Based Life Management OMMI (Vol. 1, Issue 1) April 2002 -12-

• strain analysis according to the SP249 Generic Guideline 4, implemented in the

corresponding ALIAS module
• analysis of replica results using the corresponding ALIAS module.

Figure 9: Link between risk and inspection level (attaching the action level to the level of risk)

The results of NDT and strain measurements at a steam mixer have been evaluated outside the
ALIAS system. This particular component was found to be underdimensioned. Inappropriate
original heat treatment leading to the observed high strains at some bends could not have been
improved.

The final step of RBLM involved reporting of the analysis results to agree on overall plans.
Improved insight into the state of the plant and into the rationale of risk-based plant maintenance
and life management have been achieved. The most important outcome of the RBLM and
corresponding maintenance actions, after the RBLM exercise, has been that recently there have
been no unplanned incidents in this plant and no further RBLM consultant services have been
necessary. With due credit to those responsible for plant maintenance, this is not a trivial
achievement for a CHP plant originating from 1960’s and remaining in continuous operation
(mission critical regional supply of district heating, industrial steam and electricity).
Risk-Based Life Management OMMI (Vol. 1, Issue 1) April 2002 -13-

5 Conclusions
Creating a successful RBI/RBLM guideline leading to successful applications is not an easy task.
Despite large past and current efforts in Europe, the final shape of standardized practice in the
area of RBI/RBLM has not been fully achieved yet. Current projects like RIMAP (www.mpa-
lifetech.de/rimap) and other activities of e.g. EPERC-TTF3 and PLAN 8, involving at the European
and world level a very significant number of interested parties (more than 40 in the case of
RIMAP) promise to deliver the desired level of European RBI/RBLM consolidated practice in
foreseeable future (two to three years). The application example from a Finnish power plant
successfully demonstrates the applicability and application of RBLM procedure like the one
currently being developed in RIMAP project.

Acknowledgments
The support of the European Commission to the project RIMAP (Contract GROWTH
Project G1RD-CT-2001-03008 “RIMAP”) is gladly acknowledged and appreciated
here. Furthermore, many of the results presented were obtained thanks to precious help of
partners in RIMAP RTD/Demo project: Bureau Veritas, Corus, Det Norske Veritas
DNV (Coordinator), DOW Benelux N.V., EnBW GmbH, Exxon Mobil, Hydro Agri
Sluiskil, JRC, Mitsui-Babcock, MPA Stuttgart, Siemens AG, Solvay S.A., TNO, TÜV
Süd and VTT, as well as those of RIMAP-TN project: MPA Stuttgart (Coordinator),
AIB - Vincotte, Allianz, Bureau Veritas, Bay Zoltán Foundation, CorrOcean, ASA,
Corus, Det Norske Veritas, EDF, EnBW Ingenieure GmbH, ERA Technology Ltd.,
Electricity Supply Board, Exxon Chemical Company, FORCE Institute, Geodeco,
Hydro Agri Sluiskil, Health and Safety Executive, IEC Israel, ISQ, Joint Research
Centre, Laborelec - Electrabel, Norwegian Marine Technology Research Institute,
METALogic, MIT Management Intelligenter Technologien GmbH , Monition Ltd.,
Petrobras S/A Petroleo Brasileiro, Siemens AG (KWU), Solvay, Technologica Group
c.V., TNO Industrial Technology, Total Fina Elf, TÜV Süddeutschland, TWI,
University of Wales Swansea and VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. The
application example was made possible thanks to the collaboration contract involving
FORTUM (ex-IVO), its power plant Naantali and VTT, all from Finland.

References

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van Steen, PMP Apeldoorn, The Netherlands
Risk-Based Life Management OMMI (Vol. 1, Issue 1) April 2002 -14-

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