G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946 OH CHO, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for appellant. Vicente Constantino for appellee. Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae. PADILLA, J.: This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant. The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain. The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940. The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant. The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880. As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141). As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the sought to be registered. It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee. Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs. Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of their predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. on June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the application because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or private agricultural lands. One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that the land in question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or garden. Rodolfo Tiquia, inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the government, stated that the land, notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted, is agricultural land in accordance with an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows: 1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition. 1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term "agricultural public lands" had, therefor, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase "agricultural public lands" means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil., 572, 574; Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't., 12, Phil., 593; Ibaes de Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't., 13 Phil., 159; Ins. Gov't., vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, 516 Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175, 181; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.) Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural. Viewed from the another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524; Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190, p.,129). Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on August 15, 1940, overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the registration prayed for the applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision, and the Solicitor General appearing for appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question and that the purchase made in question and that the purchase made in 1938 is null and void. This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although reversing the lower court's decision and dismissing the application with we agree, abstained from the declaring null and void the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for the appellant. We deem it necessary to state our opinion on the important question raised, it must be squarely decided. The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows: I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic. (a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in the Public Land Act includes residential lots. In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are considered agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural public lands" has well settled judicial definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. Its means those public lands acquired form Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibaes de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme Court, in defining the meaning and scope of that phrase from the context of the sections 13 and 15 of that Act, said: The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926) means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral timber lands. xxx xxx xxx "We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after careful consideration of the question we are satisfied that only definition which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 say that the Government shall "make and rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other dispositions of public lands other than timber or mineral lands," To our minds that is only definition that can be said to be given agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. . . ." Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178, 182, emphasis added.) "This phrase "agricultural public lands" was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is the first public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly given by the Philippine Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as interpreted in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra. This is a self-evident from a reading of section 1, 10, 32, and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase "agricultural public lands" is used in any of said sections, it is invariably by the qualification "as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two." "More specially, in the case of Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is agricultural land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of agriculture for the simple reason that it is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into a rural estate, and because when a land is not mineral or forestal in its nature it must necessarily be included within the classification of a agricultural land. Because of the special applicability of the doctrine laid down in said case, we quote at some length from the decision therein rendered: "The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or corporations. . . .

xxx xxx xxx "Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation ; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agriculture land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides the Act of Congress (of July 1, 1902) contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban land that have ceased to be agricultural land. . . . xxx xxx xxx "From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destine to the use of public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which they are accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urbans lands and building lots being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates." (Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161, 163 164, 165, 166; emphasis added.). (b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), the phrase (Public Land Act), the phrase "public agricultural land" includes lands of the public domain suitable for residential purposes . "Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows: "All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated . . ." (Emphasis added.). "Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or utilization of the natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain is limited to citizens of the Philippines or to the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It also clearly appears from said provision that natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, are not subject to alienation. "On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this Act the lands of the public have been classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands designated alienable or disposable correspond to lands designated in the Constitution as public agricultural lands, because under section 1, Article XII, public agricultural lands are the only natural resources of the country which are the only natural resources of the country which are subject to alienation or deposition. "Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or disposable public lands shall be classified, according to use or purposes to which they are destined, into a agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that under this classification residential land is different from agricultural land. The difference however, is more apparent than real. 'Public agricultural land ' as that phrase is used in the Constitution means alienable lands of the public domain and therefore this phrase is equivalent to the lands classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as alienable or disposable. The classification provided in section 9 is only for purposes administration and disposition, according to the purposes to which said lands are especially adopted. But notwithstanding this of all said lands are essentially agricultural public lands because only agricultural public lands are subject to alienation or disposition under section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary view would necessarily create a conflict between Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, and such conflict should be avoided , if possible, and said Act construed in the light of the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony therewith. "Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional question is, that an Act will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, although such a construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. "The Court may resort to an implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it." But the courts cannot go beyond the province of legitimate construction, in order to save a statute; and where the meaning is plain, words cannot to be read into it or out of it for that purpose." ( 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.) "In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the Constitution the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, which a compilation of the laws relative to the lands of the public domain and the amendments thereto, form to the Constitution. "Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102; emphasis added.) "By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has been classified pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by reason of this classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural public land, it will no longer be subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the constitutional provision that only agricultural lands are alienable; and yet such residential lot is alienable under section 58, 59, and 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations mentioned in section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. Therefore, the classification of public agricultural lands into various subdivisions is only for purposes of administration, alienation or disposition, but it does not destroy the inherent nature of all such lands as a public agricultural lands. "(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling. "The judicial interpretation given to the phrase "public agricultural land" is a sufficient authority for giving the same interpretation to the phrase as used in subsequent legislation, and this is especially so in view of the length of time during which this interpretation has been maintained by the courts. On this point Sutherland has the following to say:

"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a vague manner by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself to be sufficient authority for adopting the same construction. Buller J., said: "We find solemn determination of these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that now put another construction has since prevailed, there is no reason why we should now put another construction of the act on account of any suppose change of convenience." This rule of construction will hold good even if the court be opinion that the practical erroneous; so that if the matter were res integra the court would adopt a different construction. Lord Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes ... it is desirable not so much that the principle of the decision should be capable at all times of justification, as that the law should be settled, and should, when once settled, be maintained without any danger of vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial usage and practice will have weight, and when continued for a long time will be sustained though carried beyond the pair purport of the statute."(II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 892, 893.) . "An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial construction is the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great force from being adopted, soon after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is presumed, that the legislative sense of its policy, and of its true scope and meaning, permeates the judiciary and controls its exposition. Having received at that time a construction which is for the time settled, accepted, and thereafter followed or acted upon, it has the sanction of the of the authority appointed to expound the law, just and correct conclusions, when reached, they are, moreover, within the strongest reasons on which founded the maxim of stare decisis. Such a construction is public given, and the subsequent silence of the legislature is strong evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive. . . . (II Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.) "Furthermore, when the phrase "public agricultural land" was used in section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning therefor given to it and therefor the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution, includes residential lands and another lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral and timber lands. "Adoption of provisions previously construed ad. Previous construction by Courts. Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of the last resort has been reenacted in same, or substantially the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar with its construction, and to have adopted it is part of the law, unless a contrary intent clearly appears, or a different construction is expressly provided for; and the same rule applies in the construction of a statute enacted after a similar or cognate statute has been judicially construed. So where words or phrases employed in a new statute have been construed by the court to have been used in a particular sense in a previous statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are presumed, in the a absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used in the same sense in the statute as in the previous statute." (59 C.J., 1061-1063.). "Legislative adoption of judicial construction. In the adoption of the code, the legislature is presumed to have known the judicial construction which have been placed on the former statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or general revision of provisions substantially the same as those contained in the former statutes is a legislative adoption of their known judicial constructions, unless a contrary intent is clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated statutory language after it had been judicially construed shows that they had such construction in view." (59 C. J., 1102.) "II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to the appellant (appellee). "Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public domain by reason of the long continuous,, public adverse possession of the applicant's predecessors in interest, and that the latter had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and were entitled to a certificate of title under section 48, subsection ( b), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the sale of said land of December 8, 1938, to the applicant as evidenced by Exhibits B and C, was null and void for being contrary to section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, which reads as follows: "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain of the Philippines." "The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ), and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire private agriculture land. "In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land,' as hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase 'private agricultural land,' as used in the above quoted provision, can only mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural, residential, commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so, because the phrase 'agricultural land used in the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the same uniform meaning to wit, any land of the public domain or any land of private ownership, which is neither mineral or forestal. "A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. ... Where words have being long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction., p. 758.) . "This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution. "A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair and defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual, steady, and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our patrimonial estates, to the detriment of our national solidarity, stability, and independence. Nothing could prevent the acquisition of a great portion or the whole of a city by subjects of a foreign power. And yet a city or urban area is more strategical than a farm or rural land. "The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible be so read as to conform to the spirit

of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a liberal interpretation of such words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.) "We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by hereditary succession." The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the real intent of the Constitutional Convention. One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said: The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired goal are; (1) the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the nationalization of our commerce and industry compatible with good international practices. With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. ... Lands and natural resources are immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.). From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote: The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflict with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence. xxx xxx xxx . . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources said; "International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of land and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that aliens should be restricted in the acquisition of land and other natural resources. An example is afforded by the case of Texas. This state was originally province of Mexico. In order to secure its rapid settlements and development, the Mexican government offered free land to settlers in Texas. Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon they organized a revolt against Mexican rule, and then secured annexation to the United States. A new increase of alien landholding in Mexico has brought about the desire a prevent a repetition of the Texas affair. Accordingly the Mexican constitution of 1917 contains serious limitation on the right of aliens to hold lands and mines in Mexico. The Filipinos should profit from this example." xxx xxx xxx It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed principle of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines. For the same reasons the Convention approved equally readily the proposed principle of prohibiting the transfer of assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in the case of hereditary succession. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605, 606.). All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention, agree with Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we would go as far as the outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null and void.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents. D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent. NARVASA, J.: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe. The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise: 1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959; 2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'Ml'); 3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities; 4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962; 5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel; 6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial. 7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain; 8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982; 9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood

& Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979. The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to. Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply. In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipinoowned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that: ..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
1

disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed. Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644). The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 thru Susi in 1925 4 down to Herico in 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein, The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that: It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ... That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi: .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and 6 the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 9 10 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, Miguel vs. Court of Appeals and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence. Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
11 7 8 5 2 3

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. .... xxx xxx xxx As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal

sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and 13 duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands. Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights. We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law. xxx xxx xxx The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78). xxx xxx xxx In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy. Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be 15 deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919). <re||an1w> The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate. The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
14

already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco: 6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao) The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco. While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question. WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance. SO ORDERED. Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here. TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: 1 I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, which is herein 2 upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino through 3 4 the 1925 case of Susi and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the 5 application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi. Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any 6 other person]. " The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.") Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved. It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation. In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further 7 extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) 8 and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to 9 decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private 10 corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and

lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: (a) ... (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) ... Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides: SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares .... It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case. The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows: (a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case. (b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME. (c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME. The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]). To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied) The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351). It has also been said that: In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423) The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy. In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the CFI of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellees. AQUINO, J.:p This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private coporation or associaiton may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed on ethousand hectares in area". * That prohibition is not found in the 1935 Constitution. The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-50801). The Republic of the Philippines opposed theh application on the grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application (pp. 65-66, Rollo).

After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots, Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E.Quirino Streetsin the town of Tanay. The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war which broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and MInerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing sapouses constructed a house therereon. Because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The said land was included in the1968 cadastral survey made in Tanacy by the Bureau of Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two street serving as the land's eastern and southern boundaries. The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and taxes had been paid thereon up to 1977. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is not included in any military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable portion of the public domain. After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial confirmationof their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land. From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. In contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land. The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land. In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not private land because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L28144, November 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177; 195; Lee Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs. Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600, 603). The Public Land Law provides: CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. xxx xxx xxx SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.) xxx xxx xxx SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in possession of the qualifications specified in the last preceding section may apply for the benefits of this chapter.

We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed. This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land law and land registration law, that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain . An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132). The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public" and becomes private property. That ruling is based on the Cario case which is about the possession of land by an Igorot and his ancestors since time immemorial or even before the Spanish conquest. The land involved in the Susi case was possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of memory". That is not the situation in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial. In the Susi case, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title. On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it was held that while occupants of public land, who have applied for the confirmation of their title, "teian asimismo a su favor la presuncion juris et de jure de que habian cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el titulo se expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser los verdaderos dueos del terreno in este dejo de pertenecer a los terrenos publico del Estado susceptibles de enajenacion." That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a pice of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution sald of the land were void. For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed are governed by the Public Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were already private lands. The occupants' right to the said lands is characterized in the Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but as derecho dominical incoativo. The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land in its name, there being no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land to the Meralco? This Court is disposing of that same contention in the Oh Cho case said: The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning the confirmation of an imperfect title under section 48[b]) for applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest (meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant . The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors-in-interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. (75 Phil. 890, 893.)

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644). The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's application is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J.: concurring: I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. However, the petitioner is relying on Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act for the confirmation of its title and Mr. Justice Aquino is correct in holding that said provision cannot be availed by juridical entities. FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting: I concur in the ruling of the Court that Meralco "as a juridical person" is disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48(b).. 1 I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in 2 Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By 3 legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solutionwould be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability. DE CASTRO, J., dissenting: 1 Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of herico vs. Dar, the decision in which I am the ponente, as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose under the public lands laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one 2 thousand hectares." I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation 3 of incomplete or imperfect title. This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved is undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents. It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be a public land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence. The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." As previously stated, by express provisions of the Constitution, no corporation or association may hold 4 alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed, 1,000 hectares in area. Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the

land in question is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to its owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious it may not. If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it may not. This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I was impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in this separate opinion, which I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia in Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications). This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cario and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and "by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporation holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applicatins for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted. The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (1) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World Warr II which broke out in the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the Meralco had instealled the "anchor guy" of its stell posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. The land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the application, holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the public land. On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant ]Iglesia] and its predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land . . . under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended. Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing 1 principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case of 2 Herico vs. Dar that the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may thus be stated: It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be 3 entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain part of

the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of title? 1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property. (At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45(b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at present, as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par.(b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case, this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions 4 essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. 5 Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion and quotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application.") Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, that: . . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal function, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption , of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had 6 no longer any title or control, and the sake thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right." 2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows: 7 In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)." and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in natural and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim." 8 In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine. 9 In Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus: The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof. If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it. 10 In Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, the Court again held that where possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption juris et de jure that all necessary conditions for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424). 11 In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: . . . As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands

to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent." 3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon a showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for registration of the private property duly acquired by it. 4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-ininterest had possessed and occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed 12 the same until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law." The law does not provide that one acquires ownership of a land by prescriptio n only after his title thereto is judicially 13 confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in Cario vs. Insular Government , wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title." 5. Since the public land because private property upon completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio for it is not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them. 6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals as the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. 14 (See Francisco vs. City of Davao ) The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the application for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. 7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest. 8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public

lands and natural resources by corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public. 9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of Cario and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpretated in several cases . . . the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The and, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent." In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land, is, however, entirely pointless or an idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations or associations' within the meaning of the aforecited provisions of the New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments of the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the 15 express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application.

G.R. No. L-24066

December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant. Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant. Monico R. Mercado for appellee. VILLA-REAL, J.: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs. For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law. After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands. The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action. With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of error. lawphi1.net It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the 1 United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 ), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and

physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it. For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-17597 December 29, 1922 E. W. McDANIEL, petitioner, vs. GALICANO APACIBLE, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and JUAN CUISIA, respondents. Ross and Lawrence for petitioner. Acting Attorney-General Tuason and Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents. STATEMENT This is an original proceeding by the petitioner for a writ of prohibition against the respondents. A demurrer, which was filed to the 1 petition argued and submitted, was overruled on February 7, 1922, in an opinion written by Justice Johnson, after which the plaintiff amended his petition to read as follows: I. That plaintiff is of legal age, a citizen of the United States of America, and a resident of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands. II. That the defendant, Rafael Corpus, is the duly appointed and acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Philippine Islands, and that the defendant Juan Cuisia is a citizen of the Philippine Islands, of legal age, and a resident of the City of Manila; III. That on the 7th day of June, 1916, the plaintiff, as attorney-in-fact and agent of an association of persons composed of plaintiff and E. E. Elser, Ida M. Elser, E. E. Calvin, J. C. Calvin, Mateo Cia, E. A. McDaniel and Enrique Pelegrin, all citizens of the United States of America or of the Philippine Islands, entered upon the located, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, three "association" petroleum placer claims, each of an area of sixty-four hectares, on unoccupied public land situated in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands; that on the 5th day of July, 1916, the plaintiff, as attorney-infact and agent of the aforesaid association of persons, recorded in the office of the Mining Recorder, in the municipality of Lucena, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, notices of location of the aforesaid three "association" petroleum placer claims under the names of "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3;" IV. That the said association of persons remained in open and continuous possession of the said three "association" petroleum placer claims from the said 7th day of June, 1916, until the 17th day of October, 1917; that on the said 17th day of October, 1917, by an instrument in writing duly executed, acknowledged, and delivered, the said E. E. Elser, Ida M. Elser, E. E. Calvin, J. C. Calvin, Mateo Cia, E. A. McDaniel and Enrique Pelegrin sold and transferred to the plaintiff all of their right, title, and interest in and to the said three "association" petroleum placer claims; V. That the plaintiff at all times since the said 17th day of October, 1917, has remained in open and continuous possession of the aforesaid three "association" petroleum placer claims, and that plaintiff, in the year 1917, and in each year thereafter, has performed not less than two hundred pesos (P200) worth of labor on each of the said three "association" petroleum placer claims; VI. That in the year 1918 plaintiff drilled five wells on the said three petroleum placer claims, and by means of such wells, in the said year, made discoveries of petroleum on each of the said three claims; VII. That on or about the 18th day of January, 1921, the defendant Juan Cuisia made application to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, under the provisions of Act No. 2932 of the Philippine Legislature, for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land in the municipality of San Narciso, province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which said parcel of land included within its boundaries the three said petroleum placer claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," held by plaintiff. VIII. That, upon the filing of the said lease application by the defendant Juan Cuisia, plaintiff protested in writing to the said Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources against the inclusion in the said lease of the said three mineral claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," held by plaintiff as aforesaid; that the said Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on or about the 9th day of March, 1921, denied plaintiff's said protest; IX. That plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief aver, that the defendant Rafael Corpus, under the supposed authority of Act No. 2932, is about to grant the lease application of the defendant Juan Cuisia, and to place the said defendant Juan Cuisia in possession of the said three petroleum placer claims held by plaintiff. X. That Act No. 2932 of the Philippine Legislature, in so far as it purports to declare open to lease lands containing petroleum oil on which mineral claims have been validly located and held, and upon which discoveries of petroleum oil have been made, is void and unconstitutional, in that it deprives plaintiff of his property without due process of

law and without compensation, and that the defendant Rafael Corpus is without jurisdiction to lease to the defendant Juan Cuisia the petroleum placer claims described in paragraph III hereof; XI. That plaintiff has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy against the defendants in the ordinary course of law. For answer, the defendants Admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the amended complaint, but they deny each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 6, 10 and 11 of the said amended complaint. This, without prejudice to the agreed statement of facts prepared and filed by both parties in this case. The following facts were stipulated: I. That the three association claims in question, of sixty-four (64) hectares each, Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No. 3 and Maglihi No. 3, are contiguous. On October 17, 1917, the seven other members of the association of which the plaintiff was a member and for which the said three claims were previously located, transferred their interests to the plaintiff for the sum of P100, following the failure of the said seven other members to contribute to the expenditures for the annual assessment work for that year. II. That during the latter part of the year 1917 and subsequent to October 17th of that year, plaintiff erected a welldrilling outfit on claim Maglihi No. 2 and drilled to a depth of twenty-four (24) feet, the well being cased part way with an eight (8) inch-diameter casing; that four (4) feet of oil was accumulated in the well at this depth; that drilling on the well was resumed during the year 1918 and carried to a depth of ninety-three (93) feet, forty-two (42) feet of which was cased with a six (6) inch-diameter pipe; that oil and gas were encountered in appreciable quantity during the drilling, a water stratum being finally encountered that flooded out the oil stratum; that later, adjustment of that casing and packing with clay during 1919 and 1920 partially remedied this water seepage and eight (8) feet of oil and a small amount of water thereupon accumulated in the well; that observations made by the plaintiff in the year 1921 showed that a landslide had developed in close proximity to the well, which caused water to come in from a different level; that small quantities of oil thereafter continued to accumulate, together with a brisk water seepage. III. That during the year 1917, and subsequent to October 17th of that year, plaintiff erected a well drilling outfit on claim Maglihi No. 3 and drilled to a depth of twenty-six (26) feet, at which depth a four (4) foot column of oil accumulated in the well during twelve (12) hours; that drilling on the said well was resumed in the year 1918 and carried to a depth of ninety-three (93) feet, of which forty-two (42) feet was cased with a six (6) inch diameter pipe, the water being entirely shut off in this well by the first twenty (20) feet of casing; that oil was recovered all the way down during drilling operations; that a short time after drilling operation were suspended on this well, in May, 1918, oil accumulated to a depth of forty (40) feet in the well, with no water seepage. IV. That in the month of July, 1918, plaintiff erected a well drilling outfit on claim Maglihi No. 1 and carried down the well to a depth of ninety-four (94) feet, cased to ninety (90) feet with five (5) inch diameter casing; that a showing of oil and some gas was encountered at this depth, but water was not entirely shut off; that drilling was resumed in November, 1919, and carried down to one hundred and twelve (112) feet, at which depth a heavy gas flow was struck, with more showing of oil; that later adjustment to the casing and cementing shut off the water seepage and an oil column of fifteen (15) feet accumulated in the well. V. That all drilling operations referred to herein were made and completed prior to the 31st day of August, 1920. VI. That in effecting the drilling operations herein referred to plaintiff expended the sum of approximately twelve thousand pesos (12,000). VII. That Exhibit A, attached hereto and made a part of this stipulation, is based upon the result of the investigation and examination of the three claims and tests of the three wells made by a party composed of the plaintiff, Vicente Mills, in charge of the Division of Mines, Bureau of Lands, and Victoriano Elicao, a geologist employed in the Bureau of Science; that all information contained in the said Exhibit A as to the relative position of the three claims and their respective wells, and the present depth of the latter, and the quantity of oil obtained, are hereby made a part of this stipulation; that the quality of oil obtained from the said three wells is shown by the analysis thereof made by the Bureau of Science and contained in its certificate of May 9, 1922, Laboratory No. 142489, marked Exhibit B and made a part of this stipulation. VIII. That at no time since the year 1917 has any one of the three wells produced oil in substantial commercial quantities nor has any one of the three wells produced more than one barrel of oil a day; that plaintiff up to the present time has had no occasion to pay any internal revenue tax on the same as required by section 1534 and section 1535 of the revised Administrative Code; neither has plaintiff attempted to sell any of said oil; that said three claims are situated in a comparatively uninhabited district four (4) miles from the nearest port, and that no roads, other than mountain trails maintained by the plaintiff, exist between the said three claims and the nearest port. IX. That the amended complaint filed herewith by the plaintiff shall be substituted for the original complaint and the answer of the defendants is made to the said amended complaint. X. That the answer filed by the defendants shall be considered as having been filed in due time, not only by agreement of the parties, but also in accordance with the order of this Honorable Court of March 7, 1922; that the delay in the

filing of the answer as well as this stipulation of facts is due to the fact that the parties hereto were awaiting the report of the party sent to examine and investigate the claims as well as the analysis of the oil made by the Bureau of Science. JOHNS, J.: The answer is dated July 6, 1922, and was filed on July 7, 1922. The stipulation of facts is dated and filed on July 7, 1922. After making the admissions and denial above stated, the answer says: This, without prejudice to the agreed statement of facts prepared and filed by both parties in this case. From their analysis, it appears that there is no real conflict between the admissions made in the pleadings and the stipulation of facts upon any one of the material facts. The real purpose of pleadings is to settle and define the issues between the parties, so that the court may be advised as to the questions in dispute. Where there is no material conflict between the admissions made in the pleadings and the stipulation of facts in the absence of an amended pleading, any facts admitted in the answer must be deemed and treated as admitted for the purpose of the trial. By analyzing the pleadings, it will be noted that all the allegations of the amended petition are admitted, except paragraph 6, in which it is alleged that in the year 1918, the plaintiff built five wells on the claims and made discoveries of petroleum on each of them, and paragraph 10, in which it is alleged that Act No. 2932 of the Philippine Legislature is void and unconstitutional in so far as it pertains to mineral locations which were made at the time of its passage, and paragraph 11, in which it is alleged that the plaintiff has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Upon the question of the constitutionality of the statute as it relates to valid existing mineral locations, the former opinion of this court is conclusive. It was there held: Inasmuch as the petitioner had located, held and perfected his location of the mineral lands in question, and had actually discovered petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims; that said Act No. 2932, which deprives him of such right, without due process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones Law, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. If the facts alleged in the petition are true, the plaintiff does not have any plain, speedy or adequate remedy, hence there is no merit in defendants' denial of paragraph 11.lawphil.net Hence, the only remaining issues are the allegations made in paragraph 6 of the complaint and defendants' denial. For the purposes of this opinion, all other material facts are admitted by the answer. It is admitted by the pleadings that on June 7, 1916, the plaintiff and his associates located, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, three association petroleum placer claims, each of an area of 64 hectares on the public domain in the Philippine Islands, and that such locations were duly recorded in the office of the Mining Recorder as "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2" and "Maglihi No. 3." Also, that the plaintiff and his associates remained in the open and continuous possession of the three petroleum placer claims from June 7, 1916, until the 17th day of October, 1917, at which time his associates conveyed their respective interests in the claims to the plaintiff. That ever since October 17, 1917, the plaintiff has remained in the open and continuous possession of the claims and that in the year 1917 and each year thereafter, he has performed not less than P200 worth of labor on each of them. It is stipulated that on October 17, 1917, the plaintiff's associates conveyed their interests in the claims to him for P100. The pleadings admit that the locations by plaintiff and his associates of the petroleum placer claims were made in accord with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission. Such acts specify and point out how and by whom and the conditions under which a mineral location can be made, and, hence, it must follow that any mineral location made in accord with those provisions is a valid location. This legally carries with it the existence of every element, prerequisite and condition necessary or required for the making of a mineral location. Hence, we must assume that the plaintiff and his associates made a good and valid mineral location upon the public domain of the Philippine Islands. The respondents have cited numerous authorities holding that a location made by an association of persons and the subsequent conveyances of all of them to one of such persons is void ab initio. Under the pleadings, such authorities are not in point. There is no evidence of any corrupt agreement or that at the time of the original location was made there was any understanding or agreement that his associates would convey their interests to the plaintiff. The record shows that the locations were made on June

7, 1916, and the conveyances to the plaintiff were made on October 17, 1917, fifteen months after the locations were made, and it is stipulated that the conveyances were made for a valuable consideration. If it be a fact that at the time the original locations were made there was an agreement among the locators that they would convey all of their interests to one of their number, and that the original locations were made for his use an benefit, under all the authorities, the locations would be void. In the instant case, there is no evidence of any such an agreement, and the record tends to show that all of the original locations were made in good faith. Again, it having been admitted that the original locations were valid, under all the authorities, it devolved upon the defendants to both allege and prove their forfeiture. Bishop vs. Baisley (41 Pac., 936), in which the court says: A mining claim, subsequent to a valid location, is property, in the highest sense of the term. It may be bought and sold, and will pass by descent. It carries with it the "exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines" of location. The right is a valuable one, and is protected by law. It continues until there shall be a failure to represent the claim; that is, to do the requisite amount of work within the prescribed time. The right of possession and enjoyment acquired by location is kept alive by the representation prescribed by law, but, when not thus kept alive, the right is forfeited, and the claim is thereafter open for relocation. In order, therefore, to secure a valid location, it must be established that rights acquired under a prior one upon the same claim have been forfeited. The affirmative of this proposition is always cast upon the party seeking to establish it, and hence, under the rules of pleading, it must be specially pleaded, where opportunity is offered, before a party can be heard to support it with evidence. (Renshaw vs. Switzwer [Mont.], 13 Pac., 127; Hammer vs. Milling Co., 130 U. S., 291; 9 Sup. Ct., 548; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279; Morenhaut vs. Wilson, 52 Cal., 263; Wulff vs. Manuel [Mont.], 23 Pac., 723; Quigley vs. Gillett [Cal.], 35 Pac., 1040; Matingly vs. Lewisohn [Mont.] Id., 114.) Furthermore, "a forfeiture cannot be established, except upon clear and convincing proof of the failure of the former owner to have work performed, or to have improvements made, to the amount required by law." Hammer vs. Milling Co., supra.) Lindley on Mines, vol. 2, 3d ed., sec. 643, says: Forfeiture as a defense to an action must be specially pleaded. (Citing numerous decisions from the mining states of the 2 United States, including 152 U. S., 505.) Where, however, either abandonment or forfeiture are relied upon, the burden of proof rests with the party asserting it. (Citing numerous decisions, both State and Federal.) As stated, no affirmative defense is alleged in the answer, and the only questions before this court are the allegations made in paragraph 6 of the complaint. Again, Act No. 2932 of the Philippine Legislature is entitled: An Act to provide for the exploration, location and lease of lands containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas in the Philippine Islands. Section 2 of the Act provides that "All such lands may be leased by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the manner and subject to the rules prescribed by the Council of State. It is alleged and admitted that the defendant Juan Cuisia has made an application under this Act "for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which said parcel of land included within its boundaries the three said petroleum placer claims 'Maglihi No. 1,' 'Maglihi No. 2' and 'Maglihi No. 3.' " It is also alleged and admitted that the defendant Rafael Corpus "is about to grant the lease application of the defendant Juan Cuisia, and to place the said defendant Juan Cuisia in possession of the said three petroleum placer claims held by plaintiff." Under the provisions of this Act, the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to make such a lease is confined to lands "containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas in the Philippine Islands." The legal effect of such allegations and admissions in the pleadings is to carry with it and to imply that the lands in question contain petroleum and other mineral oils. Otherwise the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources would not have any authority to make such a lease, and the defendant Juan Cuisia would not want to lease the lands unless they did contain petroleum and other mineral oils. The growth and development of minerals add new resources and undiscovered wealth to a country, and provide employment for labor. For such reasons, it has always been the policy of the mining law to encourage the prospector. He has been the pioneer in the discovery of minerals in all countries, and often his task had been sad and lonely, and he has had many bitter disappointments.

In the instant case, the stipulation shows that the mining claims are situated in a comparatively uninhabited district four miles from any port, and that they can only be reached over mountain trails which have been maintained at the expense of the plaintiff. If it be a fact that the claims do contain petroleum in paying quantities, it would be of immense value to the commercial interests of the Philippine Islands. As evidence of his good faith, the plaintiff has expended P12,000 in the development of the property, and has found evidence tending to show that the claims do contain petroleum and other mineral oils. At this time and under such circumstances, it would be a gross injustice to deprive him of his property rights through forms and technicalities. The locations were made upon the unappropriated public domain, and to maintain them, and as evidence of good faith, the law requires the performance of the annual assessment work, and that question is not disputed or presented in the record. To deny the writ would, in legal effect, take from and give to another the P12,000 which the plaintiff has expended in good faith in the development of the property. A number of important questions have been raised and discussed in the briefs of opposing counsel which, under the pleadings, are unnecessary to the decision of this case. It having been admitted, in legal effect, that the original locations were valid, and that P12,000 have been expended in development, and there being no plea of forfeiture for failure to do the annual assessment work, and the record tending to show that the original locations were made in good faith, and that the lands in question do contain "petroleum and other mineral oils," it must follow that the plaintiff is entitled to the writ prayed for in his petition, and it is so ordered. Many of the authorities cited by the defendants are good law, but this decision is based upon, and confined to, the stipulated facts and the admissions made in the pleadings, and for such reasons the authorities are not in point. Justice Johnson has pointed out that the language in his opinion above quoted may be misleading. The purpose and intent of that decision was to hold that Act No. 2932 was void in so far as it applies to valid mineral locations, which were made prior to the time that Act became a law, and upon which the annual assessment work has been performed after the law was enacted. In the instant case, we hold that, even though a valid mineral location was made prior to the passage of Act No. 2932 and the annual assessment work had not been performed since the passage of the Act, and that question is raised and presented by an appropriate plea and sustained by the proof, any prior rights under the location would then be forfeited, and such lands would then be subject to, and come under, the provisions of Act No. 2932. Let the writ issue as prayed for, and without costs to either party. Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Malcolm, Avancea Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 2940 March 6, 1907 JOSE FIANZA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. J. F. REAVIS, defendant-appellant. Coudert Brothers for appellant. Kinney, Odlin & Laurence for appellees. WILLARD, J.: The plaintiffs brought this action in the court below to enjoin the defendant from interfering with two gold mines alleged to be the property of the plaintiffs. A temporary injunction was granted as prayed for in the complaint; the case was tried in the court below and the injunction made perpetual. The defendant moved for a new a trial, which was denied, and he has brought the case here by bill of exceptions. the court below found, among other things, substantially as follows: More than fifty years prior to the commencement of this suit one Toctoc, an Igorot, and the grandfather of Jose Fianza, one of the plaintiffs, was in the sole and exclusive possession of certain mineral lands containing gold quarts, situated in Antamoc, in the jurisdiction of Itogon, in the province of Benguet. These lands, being the same in dispute in this case, were of irregular boundaries and contained about 183,000 square meters, and were situated on the slope of the mountain or hill called " Antamoc Mountain," and were divided into two parts by a small arroyo called Antamoc, the mine on one side being known as "Antamoc" and on the other as "Ampasit." The two mines were connected and formed one tract. These lands or mines during the lifetime of Toctoc were opened and developed mines and worked from year to year after the style and manner of Igorot miners and their customs of mining; the said Toctoc claiming the ownership of said mines, and his title and ownership thereto were generally known and recognized by the people of the community and the vicinity, Toctoc had no paper title to said mines under the Spanish Government. No title or concession was ever granted to Toctoc or his heirs and successors, and the plaintiffs have no such paper title thereto. On the death of Toctoc his son, Dominguez, succeeded him in the possession and ownership of said mines, in all respects as his father had held and claimed them, and continued to so hold and claim and work them to the exclusion of any and all others, and without dispute, interference, or interruption until the date of his death, which occurred about ten years prior to the commencement of this suit. Upon the death of Dominguez, the plaintiff, Jose Fianza, and his coplaintiffs, as heirs at law of the said Toctoc and Dominguez, came into the possession of said mines under like claims of title and ownership, possessing, working, and claiming them as owners, to the exclusion of any and all other claimants, and without interference or adverse claims of any kind, and continued to do so up to the date of the commencement of this suit, except as stated thereafter in said decision. The court further found that as in the case of Toctoc and Dominguez, the ownership of these heirs and claimants to these mines was well known and understood among the natives and residents generally of the province, including the Spanish officials, and generally recognized and their possession respected. For more than fifty years these mines were held and worked in this Igorot family, and at the time of the American occupation were well-known, discovered, improved, and developed mines, and had produced gold for many years, and were still producing gold. During all the time covered by the disputes that have arisen between the parties to this suit, some of the parties have been living upon and next to the lands in dispute, and holding possession thereof and working the same for themselves and their coclaimants. Three of the plaintiffs were there living in possession of said mines prior to the arrival of the defendant Reavis. They

have continued since that time to so live upon and possess the same up to the date of the commencement of the suit, and without interruption, save by the acts of the defendant Reavis as therein after stated in said decision. The court further found that in the month of March, 1901, the defendant Reavis entered upon the lands embraced in and next to the mines of the plaintiffs and upon the alleged information that said mines of the plaintiffs had been located under the Spanish Mining Law by one Hans Holman in the year 1896, and that the said lands and mines were abandoned by the said Holman and were vacant mineral and public lands, proceeded to stake and locate three claims under the mining laws in force in the United States, and including the mines of the plaintiffs, which claims were named by the said Reavis the "Otek," the "Texas," and the "Clayton." Immediately after this act of Reavis, the plaintiff, Fianza, for himself and his coplaintiffs, protested against the placing by Reavis of the stakes upon his mines, and made a formal protest to H. P. Whitmarsh, then governor of Benguet. In May, 1902, the plaintiff, Fianza, again made a formal protest to William F. Pack, then governor of the Province of Benguet, of the trespass and usurpation of Reavis upon the mines in question. A hearing was had before the governor, in which Reavis took part, and it was agreed between the plaintiffs and Reavis that Reavis would not interfere with the actual possession of the plaintiffs and their working of the mines, and that the plaintiffs should not prevent Reavis from coming upon the land from time to time for the purpose of doing assessment work, and that this should continue until the question in dispute between them could be submitted to the Court of First Instance for decision. A few days after this, and before July 1, 1902, the plaintiffs caused the boundaries of their claims and mines to be distinctly marked by substantial posts and monuments. These posts were placed by the plaintiffs prior to the locations under which the defendant Reavis now claims. Prior to July 1, 1902, Fianza placed upon a building standing upon the property in question a wooden sign with a printed notice thereon stating that they were his mines. A few days thereafter Reavis removed the sign and broke it up. On the 10th day of October, 1902, Reavis made and caused to be recorded in the office of the provincial secretary of Benguet three several declarations for claims or mines named by him "Otek," "Clayton," and "Texas," covering the same ground as his three previous attempts to locate under the United States mining laws. Reavis having presented evidence to show that Vicente Carrera in the year 1896, and Hans Holman in the same year, denounced these mines in accordance with the Spanish mining laws, the court found that neither of these alleged denouncements were in fact made at any time, and that no denouncement, location, or entry upon the lands in question had ever been made by any person under the Spanish mining laws in force in these Islands. The court further found that Reavis entered upon the mines in the year 1901 and staked out his three claims in the honest, though mistaken, belief that the same were included in an abandoned and forfeited Spanish grant of Holman's, and that at the time of his entry thereon and the setting of his stakes he had no actual knowledge that the Igorots, who were then living upon the lands, claimed the ownership of said mines, but that within a few days after this entry he received notice of the plaintiffs' claim of ownership and before he had expended any considerable amount of either time, labor, or money thereon. When he made his locations and filed the declarations, under which he now claims, he had full knowledge of the claims of the ownership of the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs were at that date, and for a long time prior thereto, and before the passing and approval of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, had been in the actual possession and working of said mines. Up to the month of May, 1902, Reavis was not in the actual and continuous possession of the lands embraced in his attempted locations and his only possession was when he entered thereon from time to time to do assessment and development work, and his possession for such purposes was maintained by threats and intimidation and against the protest of the plaintiffs. In the year 1901 the plaintiffs took from the said mines gold of the weight of 40 silver pesos; in the year 1902, the weight of 70 silver pesos; and in the year 1903, the weight of 90 silver pesos. The above statement of facts found by the court below is not complete, but it is sufficient, we think, for the purposes of this decision. The first defense to the action is, according to the brief of the appellant, that the land sued for is not described in the complaint with sufficient certainty or definiteness to support a judgment for the plaintiff. During the trial in the court below, the complaint was, by leave of the court and against the objection and exception of the defendant, amended so that the first paragraph should read as follows: First. For many years, the number of which is unknown to your orators, they and their ancestors have owned, possessed, and worked two gold mines lying in the barrio of Antamoc, in the township of Itogon, Province of Benguet, the description of which mines appears in plaintiff's Exhibit C, which is hereby made a part of this complaint, the boundaries of which mines are marked by posts set in the ground, which boundaries are all well known to all of your orators' neighbors, said mines being well developed, open mines called "Antamoc" and "Ampasit." Exhibit C which is thus made a part of the complaint is a plan made by a surveyor. It gives the courses and distances of the boundary lines, the boundaries by reference to natural objects, and the relation of such objects by distances to lines of the survey. According to the brief of the defendant, the land described in this plan is 1,542 feet on one side, 1,075 feet on the second side, 887 feet on another side,

and 742 feet on the fourth side, and there can be no doubt that the tract of land described in this Exhibit C can be accurately located upon the ground. There is, therefore, no doubt that the description contained in the amended complaint is sufficient. The real objection is that the court erred in allowing the amendment. In view of the provisions of sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to amendments, this objection can not be sustained. The second defense, according to the appellant's brief, is that the record does not disclose how or in what way the land claimed by plaintiffs conflicts with defendants locations. More or less evidence was offered to show where the defendant's claims were. It is apparent that all or nearly all of the defendant's "Otek" is outside of the land claimed by the plaintiffs. It is also proven that some if not all of the other two locations are within the land claimed by the plaintiffs. We do not see how it is important to determine exactly the location of the defendant's claims. The location of the plaintiffs' land is determined with accuracy and the judgment of the court below prohibits the defendant from interfering with that well-defined and well-ascertained tract of land, and there can be no trouble in enforcing that judgment so far as the description of the property is concerned. The third defense, according to the appellant's brief, is that the plaintiffs have never possessed or mined any particular tract of ground under claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others. It will be noticed that the court below found to the contrary of what is stated in this defense. We can not reverse the judgment unless it appears that this and other findings of fact, made by the court below, are plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. {De La Rama vs. De La Rama, 201 U S., 303.} We are entirely satisfied that no such conclusion can be reached and we are also satisfied that the evidence not only is not contrary to the findings, but that the latter are supported by the preponderance of proof. So much stress is laid upon this point by the appellant that it seems necessary to consider in some detail the evidence. The appellant upon this point claims, first, that there never were any mines, as that word is properly understood, on the land in question, but merely slight excavations which were abandoned practically as soon as made, and, second, that plaintiffs have not, in any event, been in the continuous possession of the mines. Upon the first question, as to whether these were real mines or not, it appears from the record that on the 31st of January, 1901, and before Reavis ever appeared in Antamoc, Fianza, one of the plaintiffs, made written declarations "relatives a las dos partidas de Minas de Oro, que radican en Antamoc, de esta jurisdiccion, las cuales venian disfrutando desde mas de veintedos aos, habiendolas recibido como herencia, de sus antepasados." These declarations were made for the purposes of taxation, and on the 11th of February, 1901, he paid the taxes on this and other property, as he did also in 1902 and 1903. That these were certain, definite, and well-known mines is proved by the evidence of the defendants witnesses. Vicente Carrera, who said that he had denounced the mines, testified: "I denounced the mines which are situated at the eastern part of the houses named Antamoc and I also denounced the mines situated on the western part of the houses which were called Ampasit." xxx xxx xxx Q. What work, if any, did you ever do on that ground after you denounced them? A. Nothing, because they were not ceded to us, with the exception of the road we made which goes to the mines. . . . We had to build a road from the main trail to the mouth of the mine. He testified also that he bought gold from Dominguez, and when asked where Dominguez got this golf he said: A. I don't know, but I think he got it from Antamoc, because I know the nature of the fineness of the gold from these mines. Q. And then the people were already working these mines you denounced? A. Yes. . . . Q. Do you know who, according to public rumor was the owner of those mines? A. Public rumor among the Igorots was that they were the mines and property of Dominguez. Robiera, another witness for the defendant testified: I have seen the excavations from a distance. From a distance I saw where dirt had been thrown up out of the excavations, but I never have been up to the mines. Francisco Valencio, another witness for the defendant, testified: Q. How many times did you see Fianza and his father go up to these mines in Antamoc? A. I saw his father going up there often. Q. How often did you see Fianza going up to the mines? A. Sometimes I saw him in the mines at Antamoc. Hans Holman, another witness for the defendant, on whose adverse claim to this same property the defendant relies to defeat the prescription alleged by the plaintiffs, shows the existence of well-defined mines. He testified:

A. We denounced that mine and the papers which we made out were burnt up in the comandancia during the Spanish Government. We commenced the denouncement of that mine in 1896. H. P. Whitmarsh, a witness for the defendant, testified: A. Yes. The first trip I made up to the Trinidad I went over to Antamoc. I went there to get information about the mines and the country. I was a newspaper reporter then. . . . Q. Did you have any talk with him (Fianza) in reference to mines in Antamoc? A. All about the mines in the vicinity. He advised me to go over to Antamoc to look at them. J. E. Kelly, a witness for the defendant, testified that he became acquainted with the property now claimed by Reavis in January, 1901, when he first arrived in Benguet; that having learned that Holman had an interest therein he went to Manila to see him in March or April of the same year "with a view to purchasing his Antamoc holdings." Holman then told him that he had a mine there. Reavis knew of Holman's claim, and before he did anything at all upon the property went to see him and was told by Holman that he, Holman, had a certain number of meters there and that anyone could tell him where the property was. Reavis made no further investigation, and a few days thereafter, and in March, 1901, made his first entry upon the land. The following question was asked Reavis by his counsel: Q. What induced you to locate upon land which had been pointed out to you as Holman's grant? A. Because I had learned previously that there were no grants in this part of the country, and thinking that Mr. Holman had not complied with any of the laws and didn't intend to, I thought I would go into it and see what chance I had with it. Commenting apparently upon this answer, the court below in its decision said: He went to Antamoc to stake out land for himself that he believed was then claimed by another in the vernacular of the miner, to "jump Hans Holman's claim." He was not prospecting for a mine and for hidden minerals; he went to locate a mine already discovered and mineral uncovered and worked for more than a half a century. He found honest American miners and prospectors already there with claims staked all about the land that they believed was claimed by another and for the protection of which the opened, developed, and worked mine the rumor of an owner was amply sufficient to protect it from invasion and trespass. Reavis was asked this question: Q. How long did you prospect at Antamoc before you discovered a mine? A. About half an hour or an hour; I discovered that it was a mineral country. William Knouber, another witness for the defendant, testified that while a soldier in the American Army at Bautista he became acquainted with a Spaniard, Teodoro Miguel, who had been in Benguet. He brought Miguel to Manila and afterwards took him to Baguio and was at Antamoc on the 9th of January, 1900. He was asked this question: Q. Did you make any inquires as to whether or not there were any mining claims in Antamoc? A. Yes, sir. That is mostly what I went there for. xxx xxx xxx A. The Spaniard and I went down to Itogon. We looked for the president or someone that knew of this mine or property, who it belonged to, and who was supposed to own it. This man Fianza said he knew the property and knew it belonged to Mr. Holman. . . . Of course we couldn't do anything, so when I went back to Manila I went to see Mr. Holman about it and he showed me maps and papers of the different pieces of property. Knouber testified that he went out to the property with Fianza, who pointed out Holman's stakes, and that he then saw men digging upon the land included within the stakes. That this claim of Holman's is the same land now claimed by the plaintiffs is proved by the testimony of Holman himself. Exhibit C having been shown him, he stated: Q. Is this paper, plaintiffs' Exhibit C, the plan of the ground you located? A. It is. Q. How do you know this is the same land you denounced? A. I went there myself. Q. By what mark do you recognize that as the same land? A. It is the same upon which I placed stakes. Q. Were your stakes placed in the same position as the stakes indicated on this map? A. Yes. Fianza testified that he pointed out to the surveyor the boundaries indicated by the posts and designated on the plan, and added that they were the same boundaries which were shown to him by his father. It is, thereafter, well established by the evidence that Holman's claim related to well-known mines and that these are the same mines which are now claimed by the plaintiffs. Nearly every witness interested in mining presented by the defense, upon arrival in Benguet went at once to Antamoc and made inquiries about this precise mines, and Kelly, Reavis himself, and Knouber saw Holman, apparently for the purpose of making some contract with him in reference thereto.

The defendant relies very much upon the testimony of certain American miners who at the time of the trial had been in the country about three years, and who undertook to testify as to the mining customs of the Igorots, saying that they mined one day in one place and that if they found no gold they mined somewhere else, and that they never made any claim to the exclusive ownership of any tract of land. All of these witnesses had mining claims similar to that of Reavis. The claim of Clyde adjoins that of Reavis. It is to be observed that in their testimony they made no reference to this particular tract of land. They did not say that, as to this particular tract of land, there never had been any claim made by an Igorot to exclusive ownership. But in no event could this general testimony overcome the positive testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses, many having been presented who testified that the land was worked exclusively by Fianza and his ancestors, and that other people were kept off. Fianza's statement, quoted by the appellant, to the effect that "our custom is if we do not find gold in 1 fathom or 2 fathoms, we make another place until we do find something" is entirely consistent with his claim to the exclusive ownership of this property. The fact that he and his ancestors moved around and dug holes in different places upon this property appears from the evidence. The witnesses testified that on the property there were a great many excavations. The property in question being certain well-known and well-defined mines, the next question is, Did the plaintiffs and their ancestors have the exclusive possession and control of the same? The testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses is positive and direct that Toctoc and Dominguez worked these mines and that no one else did, and that since the death of Dominguez, Fianza has worked them in the same way. The defendant claims, however, that this possession had been interrupted. The first interruption relied upon, apparently, is what was done by Vicente Carrera in 1896, but it is apparent from the testimony of Carrera, already quoted, that whatever he might have done in relation to filing papers in the government office at Baguio, he never did anything upon the land itself. The building of his trail, 1 meter wide, up to the mines could in no sense be called an interruption of the possession of Fianza and his associates. It was a mere casual trespass. Neither did the claim of Holman interrupt this possession of the plaintiffs. He never obtained any concession from the Government. None of the acts required by the law, then in force, were done by him except perhaps the presentation of one paper in the office at Baguio, and the payment of certain fees. Under the said laws, these acts could not in any way interrupt the possession then held by Fianza. If in pursuance of this attempt he had actually entered upon the land and had ousted Fianza and kept the possession himself, it might be claimed that there had been an interruption of the latter's possession, but his own evidence shows that nothing of that kind was ever done. The only thing which he did do was to survey the land and place stakes thereon. This act was not an interruption of the 1 possession of Fianza. (Balpiedad vs. Insular Government, 4 Off. Gaz., 390.) Just what Holman did appears from his own testimony. He said: Q. Did you buy these gold mines from the Igorots or anyone else? A. No; I only denounced them to the Spanish Government. xxx xxx xxx Q. What is the reason you didn't continue your denuncia? A. I was afraid. I left that mine because I am not a miner. Q. Was it in 1898 or 1899 when you suit the mines then? A. No, I didn't work the mines. I didn't care to. I only bought the gold. Q. Did you ever hire any work done on these mines? A. No; no one. Q. Did anyone pay for the work for you? A. They worked for me. I didn't pay for their work, but the gold. Q. In what capacity did you make contracts with the Igorots to work those mines? A. I didn't make any contracts. Q. Didn't I understand you to say that you made contracts with certain Igorots to mine there and they gave you a certain part of the gold as owner of the mine? A. No. Q. Did you have any contracts with Igorots at all? A. No. Q. I mean after you denounced the mines of Antamoc? A. Yes; I told the Igorots that were working there that they must give the gold to me and not sell to any other one. That was the contract. It is very clear that these acts constituted no interruption of the possession of Fianza. And so Fianza's possession continued up to the time of Reavis. Reavis entered upon the land and staked the claims in March, 1901. Fianza at once protested to Governor Whitmarsh. Governor Whitmarsh testified that Fianza "came and said that some American had taken up property which he claimed and he wanted me to throw the American off. I told him, as far as I knew, there was no law under which he could do anything at that time and I advised him to put the matter off until something more definite was provided. At that time I was the governor under the Civil Government and very little was done under the laws."

Whitmarsh having refused to do anything, when Governor Pack arrived, Fianza, in 1902, made a written protest to him. Reavis was summoned before the governor, a hearing was had, and an agreement was made as stated in the findings of the court. On the 9th of May, 1902, Fianza's claim was taken by Wagner, who testified that he found there old stakes, evidently those of Holman's, and Wagner then made out for Fianza a written claim to the mines, which was filed in Baguio. Fianza posted a notice on the property, which Reavis tore down and broke to pieces. While Reavis says in several places that none of the Igorots made any protest, yet having testified that he did not know the Igorot language, he was asked: Q. Then, if you couldn't understand him, you didn't know whether he ever protested to you about the Igorot mines which you claim? A. I think he did. Yes. That Fianza and his associates were in possession of the mines in 1901, 1902, and 1903 is proved by the fact that during those years they took therefrom gold to the amount indicated in the findings of the court in that respect. We have not been able to find any evidence to the effect that Reavis took any gold at all from this property during those years. The work that Reavis did was evidently that which he thought was required by the law. Most of it appears from the evidence to have been done on the claim called "Otek," which is outside of the boundaries of the plaintiffs' claim. The fact that some of the Igorots worked for Reavis is not important, because that work might have been and probably was done upon the claim "Otek," upon which was situated Reavis' house, and where, as said before, the principal part of his work was done. A great many witnesses for the defendant testified that they had talked with Fianza and that he did not make any claim to this land, and said that it was Holman's. Evidence of these admissions is not sufficient to show that the findings of the court below as to plaintiffs' ownership is plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Fianza denied the making of such admissions. Most of the witnesses did not speak or understand Igorot, and under such circumstances no great weight can be given to such alleged admissions. For example, Reavis testified: Q. If you don't know his language and he doesn't know yours, how, then, could you understand him? A. I believe that a man can understand a word or two. It would seem to me that he could explain it by saying 'vamoose' or something like that and I could understand it. The essential findings of fact made by the court below being sustained by the evidence, it remains to consider what, in view of such facts, are the legal rights of the parties. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant ever acquired any title to this property by virtue of the provisions of the Spanish law. It was, therefore, at the time the Islands were ceded to the United States, public property, and these lands are public lands to which the provisions of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, are applicable. (32 U. S. Stat. L., 691.) Section 45 of that act is as follows: SEC. 45. That where such person or association, they and their grantors have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this act, in the absence of any adverse claim; but nothing in this act shall be deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any way whatever prior to the issuance of a patent. This is the provision of law upon which the court below decided the case in favor of the plaintiffs. This view of that court must, in our opinion, be sustained. The statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands in force on July 1, 1902, was ten years. According to the evidence and the findings, the plaintiffs had held and worked these claims for more than that length of time prior to the 1st of July, 1902. They had for more than forty years prior to that date been in the possession thereof. That possession had been open, notorious, continuous, and under a claim of ownership. That possession has not been interrupted. It is certain that neither Carrera nor Holman nor Reavis ever dispossessed the plaintiffs. They remained in possession and worked these mines during all the years 1901, 1902, and 1903 while Reavis was in Antamoc. Whatever he did upon the land was done while the plaintiffs still remained in the actual possession thereof. As before stated, the court found that Reavis's only possession was when he entered on the land from time to time to do assessment and development work, and his possession for such purposes was maintained by threats and intimidation, and against the protests of the plaintiffs. It is claimed by the appellant that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of this section 45 because they made no location of the property ten years before the passing of the act. We do not understand that such a location is required by the terms of that section. In the case of Belk vs. Meagher (104 U. S., 279) the court said, at page 287: Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes relied on, Belk could not get a patent for the claim he attempted to locate unless he secured what is here made the equivalent of a valid location by actually holding and working for the requisite time. Whether the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, took effect in these Islands at the time it was signed by the President (Gardner vs. The Collector, 6 Wall., 499) or when it was promulgated, it is not necessary to determine, for in either case the rights of the plaintiffs were fixed by that act before Reavis, in October, 1902, took any proceedings thereunder. When the act took effect the plaintiffs became entitled to a patent thereto from the Government. It is suggested by the defendant that section 45 does not apply because it relates to cases in which there is no adverse claim, and that in the present case there exist the adverse claim of Reavis. It is evident that if a person is otherwise entitled to a tract of land in accordance with the provisions of said section 45, his right can not be taken away by the mere fact that some other person makes a claim adverse to

his. If such were the construction to be placed upon the section, its object might be entirely defeated, for in every case adverse claims, entirely unfounded, could be presented for that purpose only. It is plain that that provision in section 45 indicates merely that the proceedings for the delivery of the patent shall be delayed until the validity of the adverse claim is determined in the courts of justice. When locations are regularly made under the act and adverse claims are filed thereto, section 39 provides that all proceedings "shall be stayed until the controversy shall have been settled or decided by a court of competent jurisdiction or the adverse claim waived." The provisions of section 39 undoubtedly are in this respect applicable to such adverse claim as is mentioned in section 45. It appears from the evidence and the findings of the court that some time in the spring of 1901 four or five American miners living in Benguet undertook to establish the "Antamoc mining district," and to appoint a mining recorder. With this mining recorder Reavis filed certain locations on a part of the property in question. These steps were taken and these proceedings were had in accordance with what the organizers of this district thought to be the laws in force in the United States in regard to mines. These laws were not in force in the Philippine Islands at that time and the proceedings of the persons who thus organized the "Antamoc mining district" were entirely null and avoid. The locations made by Reavis in accordance with the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, were not made until October of that year. They were made after the rights of the plaintiffs had become vested in accordance with the provisions of said section 45, and therefore such locations can not prejudice the plaintiffs. The court below held that even these locations were invalid, in accordance with the said act. It is not necessary, however, to determine this question. The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions JOHNSON, J., dissenting: This was an action begun in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet by the plaintiffs for the purpose of enjoining, restricting, and inhibiting the defendant from entering upon two certain gold mines lying and being in the barrio of Antamoc, in the township of Itogon, Province of Benguet; no certain description of said mines could be given at the time of the commencement of the action according to the complaint of the plaintiffs. Upon the filing of the complaint the court granted a temporary injunction to prevent the defendant from entering upon this indefinite, unlocated, indescribable tract or parcel of land. By computation it was found that this indefinite, unlocated parallelogram contained about 70,000 square meters. After the beginning of the trial of said cause, the plaintiff caused a survey of the alleged mines to be made by one Balpiedad; the result of said survey is represented in Exhibit C, presented in evidence by the plaintiffs, which represents the parallelogram or mines to be in the following form: {bmc 007631.bmp} This exhibit or survey, showing the limits of said land in question, was not completed or offered in evidence until after practically all of the witnesses for the plaintiffs had been examined. After the admission of the said exhibit, the plaintiffs asked that they be allowed to amend their pleadings to conform to said exhibit, which request was granted. The court in its decision found that "the land included in the said Exhibit C was the land in dispute, was of irregular boundaries, contained about 183,000 square meters, was situated on the slope of a mountain called 'Antamoc Mountain,' and under the statute of limitations, act of Congress of July 1, 1902, that the Government of the Philippine Islands holds the title in trust for the plaintiffs," thereby holding that the title to this indefinite, irregular tract of land, somewhere on the mountain, poorly described, was being held by the Government of the Philippine Islands for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged, in their petition, that "they, their fathers, and his father and his grandfather had worked said mines for many years." We have, therefore, the following conditions: (1) That the plaintiffs, their fathers and grandfathers had been in possession of land for many years, the exact number being unknown, of a parcel of lands or mines, which at the beginning of the action could not be definitely described. (2) That in the attempt to describe it, it was designated as a parallelogram containing about 70,000 square meters. (3) That the lower court at the beginning of the action enjoined the defendant from entering upon the tract of land not located nor described, and admittedly a tract which could not be definitely located nor described. (4) That the lower court, at the conclusion of the trial, made such temporary injunction perpetual after it had been clearly proved that the land reffered to in the first injunction was not the same land which the plaintiff claimed in said Exhibit C. (5) That the plaintiffs, at the beginning of the action, were not the owners of the said tract of land, but that the same belonged to the Government of the Philippine Islands and was being held in trust by said Government for the plaintiffs. (6) That they were unable to definitely locate the lines of said mines until after the beginning of the trial of said cause, and when it was definitely described it was not a parallelogram, and contained nearly three times as much area as that described in the petition of the plaintiffs. It would seem but reasonable to believe that if the plaintiffs, their fathers and grandfathers had been in the possession of a definite, well-known tract or parcel of land for so many years, to the exclusion of all other persons whomsoever, its limits might in some way have been definitely described, or at least it might have been described in a way to have included more than one-third of a tract of land which "they, their fathers and grandfathers" had occupied for many years to the exclusion of all other persons. We assert in the beginning that these facts engender suspicion of the exclusive right of the plaintiffs to any well-defined tract of land. We are also of the opinion that until it is proved (a) that the plaintiffs have an absolute and exclusive right to a particular tract of land; and (b) that said tract of land has well-defined metes and bounds, the court had no right or authority to issue an injunction prohibiting or restraining the defendant from entering thereon. The court had no authority to issue an injunction to prevent the defendant from entering upon any parcel of land until that parcel of land was

well-defined by metes and bounds, for otherwise the defendant would be unable to know when, or how, or in what manner he would be violating such injunction. It will be noted that upon the filing of the petition of the plaintiffs herein, when the petition upon its face alleged that no particular description of the mines in question could be given, the court enjoined the defendant from entering thereon. Entering upon what lands? Lands somewhere in the Province of Benguet somewhere on the mountain called Antamoc. This temporary injunction, at the conclusion of the trial, was made perpetual. After the decision was rendered, the defendant, through his attorneys, made a motion for a new trial, basing the same upon the following reasons: 1. That the findings of fact were openly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. 2. That the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision. 3. That the decision and judgment of the court were against the law. This motion for a new trial was denied. This motion being based expressly upon the provisions of paragraph 3 of section 497 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, we are justified in examining the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the conclusions of the lower court were justified by such evidence. We, therefore, purpose to examine the evidence adduced during the trial of said cause upon each of the respective questions of fact presented, and allow the record to speak for itself. Our first proposition is, that neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessors occupied any definite piece or parcel of land or mines in the Province of Benguet or elsewhere for any period, to the exclusion of all other persons; that the plaintiffs and their predecessors were Igorots; that they lived in tribes much as the American Indians did; that they never asserted their rights to any well-defined parcel of land nor occupied any well-defined parcel of land to the exclusion of other persons, either strangers or members of the particular tribe. Upon this proposition we refer to the record for the answer. The petition alleges that the said mines are in the barrio of Antamoc. What is Antamoc? Madarang (Igorot) said (Rec., p. 18) : "The whole mountain is known as Antamoc." Bisguey (Igorot and one of the plaintiffs), in answer to the question, "What is Antamoc?" said (Rec., p. 21) : It is a barrio, and is a place called Antamoc. On page 22, the same witness, in reply to the question, "Are the barrios of Tecop, Ampasit, and Antamoc situated in the mountain called Antamoc?" said, "Yes, sir." Emigdio Octaviano said (Rec., p. 27) : "He knew the place called Antamoc." Mateo Cario (Igorot) said (Rec., p. 27) : "That Antamoc was a mountain and that there are places called Ampasit, Antamoc, Niug, and Loacan." From the foregoing testimony of the witnesses, all of whom resided in the vicinity of the land in question, it appears clearly that Antamoc was a mountain; therefore any description of a parcel of land described simply as being in Antamoc would certainly be too indefinite and uncertain upon which to grant an injunction to prevent trespass upon such undefined parcel of land. With the reference to the exact location of said mines in said mountain, we have the following proof in the record: Jose Fianza (Igorot and one of the plaintiffs), in answer to the question, "Where were those mines?" said (Rec., p.2), "They were in Antamoc and Ampasit." The same witness further said (Rec., p. 7) that "Wagner (Governors Pack's clerk) put in the stakes where his (Fianza's) claims were." With reference to the specific and exact location of the land in question, the said Wagner (Rec., p.65) testified as follows: Q. Who indicated to you the place where the posts you have referred to, should be put? A. Fianza. Q. Did he name these posts to you as the boundary or boundaries of his claim or claims? A. If I remember correctly it was the boundaries of his claim a single claim. I asked him when he first started out if that was his boundary and he told me 'yes.' Now, whether he was including any one claim or claims I can not say. Q. To the best of your recollection were these dimensions the correct ones as shown by Fianza? A. Approximately, yes. Wagner further stated that the claims pointed out to him by Fianza, and as staked out by him, were approximately 15,000 feet by 600 feet. (Rec., p. 65.) As to the posts on the claim placed by Wagner, he (Wagner) made the following statement (Rec., p. 64) : From the post No. 1 or 2, I don't remember which, we proceeded to the post on the north center part of the claim, thence to the post on the northeastern corner, and thence to the post on the southern corner. Wagner further says (Rec., p.67), in answer to the question as to the particular posts he (Wagner) placed upon said claims: Q. There were four posts there then? A. Yes, sir. As to this Wagner survey, therefore, from the record the following facts appear: The said survey was made on the 9th of May, 1902; it was of the mines as claimed by Fianza; said claim was marked by four posts and the claim was approximately 15,000 feet by 600 feet. It further appears from the testimony of Wagner that he changed his plans after the survey was made (Rec., p.68), which plan, it will be noted, was not made a part of the record. Madarong (Igorot), in speaking of the specific location of the mines in question, said (Rec., p. 16), "That Dominguez (father of one of the plaintiffs) had mines in Itogon and in Antamoc;" and (Rec., p. 18) "That the whole mountain was considered mineral land." Bisguey (Igorot and one of the plaintiffs) said (Rec., p. 20), referring to the exact location of the mines in question, "That his father, Toto, owned mines in Antamoc," without any further or definite description. Picarte (Igorot) said (Rec., p. 25) "That he knew by reference that Dominguez claimed to be the owner of some mines called Antamoc and Ampasit." It will be noted that this is merely hearsay. Emigdio Octaviano said (Rec., p. 27) that "He knew the place called Antamoc and that there were mines there; and that (Rec., p. 28) he had heard from a man called Caballes that Dominguez claimed said mines; and that (Rec., p. 29) he did not know anything as to their extent." Juan Cario (Igorot) in reply to the question (Rec., p. 34), "Do you know whether these mines were the private property of Dominguez or whether he only held them for the people?" answered, "I only heard that Dominguez was the owner of these mines and I never heard that he had any associates in the mines with him." Hearsay again.

The same witness further said that the holes were in the mountain called Antamoc and that Dominguez had holes in three places in the mountain called Antamoc. Chap-Day, Balbadines, Miampis, Lorenzo, Pasio, Tongapel, Tongay, Cateb, and Bitabio, all Igorots, testified (Rec., pp. 40, 43, 45, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, and 57) that "Dominguez had mines in Antamoc," without giving any further description. Amey (Igorot), one of the plaintiffs, said (Rec., p.47) "that her father, Toto, had mines in Antamoc." without any further description. It will be noted that none of these witnesses, except Wagner, (and he simply placed the stakes according to the direction of Fianza, one of the plaintiffs), in any way attempted to more definitely describe the lands in question than to say that they were in the mountain of Antamoc. It is contented that even Wagner's description does not definitely locate any land. He does not state that said tract was on one side or the other of said mountain. His description has neither starting point nor end. Fianza, one of the plaintiffs, with reference to the definite location of the mines in question, testified as follows (Rec., p.7): Q. Did Mr. Wagner measure the claim? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did he put in the stakes? A. Yes, sir; he placed those pine stakes or posts. Q. Did you go with Mr. Wagner? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you show him where your claims are? A. Yes, sir. Q. And he put the stakes in as you showed us this morning here and marked the place? A. Yes, sir. It will be remembered that Wagner placed four stakes only. Bearing in mind that the measurements, made by Wagner, being made on the 9th of May, 1902, and that said posts included a parcel or tract of land in the form of a parallologram, 15,000 by 600 feet somewhere in a mountain, without beginning or end; that the preliminary injunction was granted by the court on the 18th day of January, 1904, to prevent the plaintiff from entering upon this unknown tract of land, a description of which could not at that time be made, and that the Balpiedad survey (Exhibit C) was made February 10, 1904, we quote the testimony of the said Balpiedad for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the and claimed by Fianza at the time that Wagner made a survey of the same was the same land which he (Fianza) claimed about two years later, at the time the said Balpiedad made his survey. The witness, Balpiedad, testified, as follows (Rec., p. 73): Q. Have you made a plan showing the measurements and boundaries of the mines claimed by Jose Fianza, in the barrio of Antamoc? A. Yes; I made a sketch plan, except I have not run out the boundary lines, they being direct lines from post to post. Q. When did you make this measurement? A. During the month of February. . . . It was on the 10th of February, 1904. Q. I present you a plan marked "plaintiff's Exhibit C," and ask you if it is the plan you have referred to? A. Yes, sir. Q. Who showed you the lands and measurements and corners to make this measurement and plan? A. Jose Fianza. Q. How many posts did you find there? A. Fourteen posts in addition to some posts that were inside and outside posts of Mr. Reavis which do not appear in the plan. The COURT (p. 74): Q. How many of these posts did you find on the boundary line? A. Fourteen posts. Q. How many of these posts were marked in any way? A. Some of the posts that I saw were marked with the name of Jose Fianza. Q. How many had his name? A. I know there was one. Q. How did the lines pass through the posts did you run a line from one post to another? A Yes, sir; the line ran exactly from one corner post to the other, to the interim posts made solely for a line. Q. How many of these posts (Rec., p. 83) which refer to did you place there? A. I did not place a single post. Q. They were already there when you got there, were they? A. Yes, sir; according to what Fianza said they had been there a long time for some time. It will be noted that prior to the Wagner survey (May 9, 1902), according to the testimony of Fianza, no attempt had ever been made by him or by his predecessors in any way to definitely marked out the mines which the plaintiffs claim. It must be remembered also that Wagner placed four posts including a parcel of land in the form of a parallelogram. Balpiedad, at the time of his survey (February 10, 1904) found fourteen posts, and the form of the parcel of land included in his survey is seen by reference to Exhibit C, which is not a parallelogram. He found fourteen posts instead of four. By reference to the testimony of Fianza and Balpiedad it will be seen that these two witnesses attempted to make it appear that the survey, made by the latter, was simply a measurement from post to post set by Wagner. The testimony can not be believed for the reasons: (a) That Wagner placed but four posts and Balpiedad's measurement included fourteen posts; and (b) That in said Exhibit C, presented by the plaintiff, it will be noticed in the lower right hand corner of the same that one of the posts placed by Wagner was within and not on the lines of the boundaries of the land surveyed by Balpiedad. This latter fact alone would seem to be proof positive that the land which Fianza, one of the plaintiffs, claimed in May, 1902, was not the same land claimed by him in February, 1904.

The fact is further demonstrated by the appearance of the fourteen posts represented in Exhibit C, and the one post in the lower right hand corner of said Exhibit C, that between the months of May, 1902, and February, 1904, the plaintiffs had made up their minds to include a different and larger portion of the said mountain of Antamoc. It is apparent also from this same testimony that in the interim the four posts placed by Wagner had been increased in number by some interest party so as to include nearly three times the original claim, as well as to change the configuration of the land claimed by the plaintiffs. One can not read the record in this case without reaching the conclusion that Fianza is in fact the only one of the plaintiffs who has any interest in the land in question, or without reaching the conclusion that he is a sort of a chief of that particular tribe of Igorots. From his testimony he is put in the position of claiming in May, 1902, without any opposition or interference from anyone, a particular tract of land in the form of a parallelogram, and in February, 1904, two years later, of claiming another and larger portion of land in a different form. Is this testimony and this claim conformable to the claim of the plaintiffs that they, their fathers and grandfathers had been in possession of a distinct, well-defined parcel or tract of land anywhere, to the exclusion of all other persons? The claim by the plaintiff Fianza, and by Balpiedad that the posts marking the perimeter of the lands in Exhibit C marked by the boundaries of the land originally claimed by Fianza, is in direct conflict with the testimony of Wagner. With reference to these posts we have the testimony also a Reavis, the defendant, who had lived in the vicinity of Antamoc from the month of February, 1901. He said (Rec., p. 90) in answer to a question with reference to the time when the fourteen posts were placed upon the land represented by Exhibit C: They represent stakes set in the ground after the injunction was served on me in this case. Q. Do you know who put them there? A. Fianza told me that he put them there. Q. This was after the injunction was served upon you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Was there any survey made on that land? If so, when? A. A short time after the posts were put there Fianza came there with a Filipino surveyor and had him to go round these posts. It is the same surveyor who made the plat on the paper. Q. Were these the stakes referred to by a witnesses as the fourteen stakes pointed out to you by Wagner, Lawrence, and Fianza; were those stakes there before the injunction was issued? A. Not that I saw. Q. Where you around the land so as to see them if they had been there? A Yes, sir. Q. So when Wagner placed these posts there in 10-2, did you see them up to three days ago when they went to them? A. They were not there. Q. Did you see any stakes that Wagner testified to as having been placed there by him on the 9th of May, 1902? A. Yes, sir; when we went over there I saw them, about three days ago. Q. How many did he show you that he had placed there? A. He showed me than he was positive of having placed there. This testimony, together with that of Fianza, Balpiedad, and Wagner, seems to make it clear beyond peradventure of doubt that the land claimed in Exhibit C is not the land which Fianza pointed out to Wagner as his land in the month of May, 1902. It will be remembered that all of the witnesses of the plaintiffs who attempted in any way to designate a particular tract of land gave their testimony before the Balpiedad survey was offered in evidence, and none of them made a more definite or special description of the land in question than to say that the said land was in the mountain of Antamoc. The only testimony, therefore, which attempts in any way to describe the particular land in question is that of Fianza, Balpiedad, and Wagner, and it must be remembered that Wagner and Balpiedad each received whatever information they had concerning the identity of the land in question from Fianza himself. Referring again to the testimony of Fianza and to the fourteen posts as marking the perimeter of the land in question, he testified (Rec., p. 84) that such boundaries are the same as the land which his father owned. This same witness also stated (Rec., p. 7) that the four posts place by Wagner on the 9th of May, 1902, marked the perimeter of his claim. Neither will it be forgotten that according to the finding of the court Balpiedad survey included nearly three times the area which the Wagner plan included. The Wagner plan was a parallelogram; the Balpiedad plan is octagonal in form, four of whose dimensions are 1,542, 1,075, 8,887, and 742 feet, one side being without any dimension whatsoever. These surveys represented entirely different tracts of land, both sworn to by the plaintiff Fianza as representing his mines. Which of these contradictory statements must the court accept? When it appeared during the trial of the said cause that the tract of land marked by Wagner and that surveyed by Balpiedad were different tracts of land, the attorney for the defendant attempted to ascertain which of the two tracts the plaintiff Fianza actually claimed and to that end asked the following question: Q. What mines do you claim? That which you claim by this suit (Wagner's plan) or that which was measured by Balpiedad?" Apparently, in view of the conflict between the lands pointed out by Fianza to Wagner and the lands pointed out to Balpiedad, a perfectly proper question, and one which, had the plaintiff been permitted to answer, might have made clear this conflict. However, the attorney for the plaintiff objected to the question and the court refused to allow Fianza to answer the same. The trial court and the majority opinion in this court for some reason have accepted the Balpiedad plan as representing the mines claimed by the plaintiffs. The fact is to be clearly borne in mind that all of plaintiffs' witnesses, with the exception of Fianza, who pretended to testify as to the mine claimed by Dominguez and Fianza, testified before the Balpiedad plan was presented. Aside from the fact that their declarations refer to mines in Antamoc, such declaration could not, under any theory of the case, serve to identify the tract described in the Balpiedad survey. As to Fianza himself he pretended to identify the land claimed by his father with the Balpiedad survey. We have already noted that there is a hopeless conflict in his statements, as he identifies in one place the Wagner plan and in another place the Balpiedad plan as being the land claimed. And, moreover, in view of the testimony of Wagner and Reavis, we are of the opinion that Fianza deliberately perjured himself (Rec., p. 85) in testifying that the posts appearing on the Balpiedad plan were placed there by Wagner. He admitted to Reavis that he had placed the posts there himself.

We feel justified in the conclusion, therefore, that the only testimony in the whole record identifying the lands claimed by the plaintiffs with the land decreed by the court is the following question and answer, asked of Fianza (Rec., p. 84): Q. Where the boundaries that you showed Balpiedad the same that were the boundaries of the land when your father owned it? A. Yes, sir; the boundaries were the same that my father showed me. If it is true that the father of Fianza had shown the boundaries of the Balpiedad plan to him and these were the real boundaries of his claim, why did not he, Fianza, point out these same boundaries to Wagner in May, 1902, nearly two years prior to the Balpiedad survey? It results, therefore, that the decision is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs upon the testimony of one witness, whose declarations are conflicting and who has deliberately perjured himself. It is contended further that even accepting Exhibit C as representing the lands in question, even then the demarcation of the tract of land is not sufficient upon which to issue an injunction to prevent trespass. There is nothing in the description of the lands marked in Exhibit C by which even a surveyor might go upon that part of the world and locate it exactly, so as to be able to say all comers: This is the particular tract of land of the defendant and all others are enjoined from entering thereon. It is contended that Exhibit C does not constitute a sufficient description to locate this property. The plan itself is not accompanied by a technical description of any kind; the only description appears in the testimony of Balpiedad (Rec., p. 74-78). The vital point in any plan is the starting point. the only evidence of record showing the starting point of this plan is as follows (Rec., 74): Q. Where did you commence the measurements? A. We followed the Ampasit road and started from the post we found near the road, within a distance of ten meters of the side of the road towards the summit of the mountain. Q. Can you describe more specifically the point of departure? A. Yes, sir. Q. Well, describe it, then. A. This post is held in place by stones piled about its base, and if it has not been removed there is another longer post, which Fianza placed there so that it would be seen from a distance. No surveyor, much less a layman, could locate with certainty the starting point from this description. It appears further that the notes from which the plan (Exhibit C) was made and testimony given were not the original notes. The following appears of record (Rec., p. 80): Q. Why did you destroy the date which you made in this particular case when it was your custom to keep all data within your trunk? A. Because they were not exact and besides they were all transferred to this paper and therefore I tore them up. From this it expressly appears by the testimony of Balpiedad, that the notes which he made on the ground at the time of the survey "were not exact" and that these (inexact notes) were all transferred to this paper. We must conclude, then, that even Exhibit C, according to the testimony of Balpiedad himself (Rec., p. 84), is not a correct plan. Both the trial court and the majority opinion of this court found that the tract owned by Fianza is of irregular boundaries and contains about 183,000 square meters. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record giving even approximately the ares of Exhibit C. We are of the opinion that the foregoing excerpts from the record clearly show that the plaintiffs failed to prove that they occupied for any period any well-defined, ascertainable tract of land in the mountain of Antamoc, to the exclusion of all other persons. The testimony of all of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, except Fianza himself, refer to the land in question simply as the mines of Antamoc. Several witnesses testified that Antamoc was a mountain and that the whole mountain was knows as Antamoc and that all the land in said mountain was mineral land. It being clearly established, therefore, that Antamoc is a mountain and is mineral land, a declaration that Dominguez or Fianza claimed mines in Antamoc, no more identifies the location of such mines with the particular mines now claimed by the plaintiffs than would a declaration, that "John Doc" claimed mines in the mountains of China or in the gold fields of Colorado, authorize said "John Doe" to claim title to a particular mine within such district, or to receive the aid of the strong arm of the law to prevent all comers from entering upon any particular square foot of said land. There might be some reason for so holding if the particular tract of land claimed constituted the only mines in Antamoc; it appears, however, that the whole mountain of Antamoc is mineral bearing, and that there are many mines there. Evidence that the plaintiffs claim mines "in Antamoc" is absolutely no proof of ownership of any particular tract within the limits of said mountain. If the plaintiffs can claim the lands described in Exhibit C today, to the exclusion of all other persons whomsoever, then they can, under the same proof, contest the right of any other mine now open or hereafter to be opened in said mountain. It appears from the testimony that Clyde and other American miners also located claims in Antamoc; some of them adjoining the alleged lands in dispute, while many witnesses testified that there are Igorot excavations over the whole of Antamoc mountain. It is believed that if the plaintiff Fianza can claim this particular tract of land in question that he can then successfully contest the right of any locater of a mine in the mountain of Antamoc, for the reason that the testimony of all of the witnesses was that Fianza had mines in Antamoc, with no further or more definite description. The majority opinion (p. 14), in referring that the testimony of the American minders as to the mining customs of the Igorots, says: In no event could this general testimony overcome the positive testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, man having been presented who testified that the land was worked exclusively by Fianza and his ancestors and that other people were kept off. We have examined the record in vain to find even a shred of evidence supporting this statement. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record, which we have found, to show that Fianza and his predecessors ever kept anybody off of this alleged tract of land or of any other in the mountain of Antamoc. Aside from the fact that these witnesses did not identify and land claimed in this suit, they did not state that Dominguez claimed the exclusive right to the land in Antamoc, or that he kept other people off . They made their statements no stronger than that whether such mines were in one part or another part of said mountain. The only evidence in the whole record which purports to identify the land claimed by the plaintiffs and their predecessors with that surveyed by Wagner and Balpiedad is the testimony of one witness, Fianza, an interested part, and it has been shown that he perjured himself. Upon the question of the exclusive occupation by the plaintiffs of any particular tract of land, it is confidently asserted that the plaintiff, Fianza, never attempted to exclude anyone from the use and occupation of any portion not only of the small tract of land here in question but of any part of said mountain of Antamoc. We will allow the record to support this statement: Reavis testified Q. How long have you lived in Antamoc?

A. Since February, 1901. Q. When did you arrive in the Philippine Islands? A. In 1900; I believe in December. Q. What experience have you had as a prospector? A. Now about ten year or a little more. Q. In what part of the United States did you prospect? A. In New Mexico principally, Arizona, Colorado, and along the Rio Grande River in Texas. Q. When did you arrive in this Province of Benguet? A. I believe on the 1st of December 1900 that is, in Baguio. Q. Did you go to Antamoc? A. Yes, sir. Q Did you do any prospecting? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where? A. I commenced and went to Bataan creek and I prospected the country all about. Q. When did you arrive at Antamoc? A. February, 1901. Q. What, if anything, did you do there in reference to prospecting? A. I went over the country, broke up rocks, and looked up in the gulches. Q. Where? A. All over the Antamoc Mountain and in the river and all about. Q. Did you make any location? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where? A. In Antamoc. Q. What if anything, did you do after locating claims at Antamoc. A. I located other claims, put up stakes, made out location papers, got them recorded by the recorder, Clyde, who lived in Antamoc. Q. How was he made recorder? A. By election of the miners. Q. Where? A. In Antamoc what they called the Antamoc district. Q. Now, Mr. Ravies, what claims were located by you in March, 1901; what where the names of the locations? A. Arizona, Texas, Mexico, New Mexico, Otec, and Apex. Q. State to the court just what you did when you went to Antamoc in the early part of 1901. A. We went to Antamoc and found ground which to my judgment was mineral; I put up my stakes; as I said before, I had them put in record and proceeded to do my assessment work as we would have done in the United States according to our rules. Q. Was there anyone about the place when you located? A. Yes, sir; Igorots and some Americans on the river. Q. Did you make any injury in regard to the land around there? A. I learned when we went to the creek that it was all located on the west side of the creek and down to the bank on the south side of the river and the prospectors all believe that the other side of the river was the ground and land owned by Mr. Holman. Q. What inquiries, if any, did you make of the natives that were there? A. I made no inquiries of any of them, because I could not speak the language, but they told me voluntarily that mountain belonged to Mr. Holman. Q. Referring to what mountain? A. Antamoc Mountain. Q. Have you been in possession of the ground located by you in March, 1901, since that time? A. Yes, sir. Q. Have your performed work thereon since that time continually? A. Yes, sir. Q. State whether or not you employed natives to assist in the development? A. Yes, sir. Q. How many? A. All of the natives that were living around me at the time. Q. Was there any objection made by any one to your possession and developing these claims? A. None at all. Q. When was the first objection, if any, made to your possessing and developing these claims? A. The firs objection coming directly to me was when I got a paper from Governor Pack to come into Baguio in 1902. Q. At any time prior to that date did the plaintiff Fianza or any of the other plaintiffs in any manner object to you possession of said claims or to your development of them? A. No, sir. Q. Did the plaintiff, Fianza, or any of the other plaintiffs ever inform you or give you any information that they claimed any part of the claims which you had located and were in possession of? A. They did not.

Q. What stakes, if any, were upon the claims, when you located them? A. I found one small stake with "H. Holman, registered 1896," written in blue pencil on it. Q. Did you find any other stakes? A. I did not. The Igorot who showed me that one took me over to show me the others and when we got to where he said they were, they were gone. He said that the fire had burned them up. Q. Did you make a sufficient investigation of that ground to be able to state as to whether there were any other posts on that ground located by you? A. I have been over the ground more thoroughly than and Igorot in all his lives and I never say any stakes. Q. These stakes were placed there by Holman? A. Yes, sir; from what the Igorot showed me it would indicate that the post I had come to was the southwest corner post of Holman's claim. William Knauber, upon the question of the claim of Fianza to any particular tract of land in Antamoc, says: Q. What is your occupation? A. Engineer. Q. Did you follow your occupation as a land engineer? A. Yes, sir; but in Colorado I was minning most of the time. Q. How many years experience have you had in minning? A. Five years. Q. Where you ever in Benguet Province before? A. Yes, sir. Q. When? A. January, February, and March, 1900. Q. For what purpose? A. Mining and prospecting. Q. Do know the mining district of Antamoc? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where you there? A. Yes, sir. Q. When. A. On the 9th day of January, 1900, at the Antamoc mining claims. Q. Did you do any prospecting? A. Not to amount to anything; I was just looking around; that was all. Q. Did you make any inquiries as to whether or not there were any mining claims in Antamoc? A. Yes, sir. Q. How did you make the inquiries? A. From the president of Itogon. Q. Do you remember the president by name? A. No, sir. Q. Do you know him by sight? A. If I should see him. Q. I will get you to look at Jose Fianza and get you to state if he was the president of Itogon? A. Yes, sir; he is the man; he was supposed to be the president; he went with us to the mining property. Q. Who was with you at the time you were at Antamoc inquiring for claims? A. It was a Spaniard by the name of Teodoro Miguel. He had lived around in this country for nine years. Q. What was said and done there [referring to the time when Fianza went with the witness to the mining property]? A. The Spaniards and I went to Itogon; we looked for the president or some one who knew about this mining property; who it belonged to, and who was supposed to own it. This man Fianza said he knew the property and knew it belonged to Mr. Holman. I asked him where it was and if he would go with us; so we went up there with Fianza; I asked Fianza to show us Mr. Holman's stakes or lines; then he said; Go over there further,' and he pointed over the ravine and we went across the river and up to the top of the hill where the slide was and from up there be showed us the stake and pointed to other different points down the river; one was up near the river and another off a ways from the ravine which runs up the slide, as he pointed north of northeast to the different stakes there; then I asked him if Mr. Holman was supposed to own all this property as a mining claim and he said yeas; it was all Mr. Holman's property.' Q. Do you remember the date of that conversation? A. On the 9th of January, 1900. Q. This property was at Antamoc? A. Yes, sir; from the top of the hill above the slide. Q. Did Fianza in that conversation make an claim to that property to you? A. No, sir. Q. Did he make any claim to you of any mining claims? A. No, sir. Q. Did the Igorot Fianza tell you that he had mining property in that part of Antamoc? A. No, sir. Q. What was the reason for going up there, then? A. To show us the property that belonged to Holman.

Q. Did you pay him anything for going up there? A. No, sir. Antonio Robiera testifying with reference to the ownership of the mines in Antamoc, said (p. 113): Q. Where do you live? A. La Trinidad. [This is a town located a few miles from Baguio in the Province of Benguet.] Q. How long have you lived in Trinidad? A. Since 1890. Q. What is your nationality? A. Spanish. Q. Are you acquainted with the Antamoc mining district? A. Yes, sir; I have been there several times (p. 115). Q. During any of your trips to the Antamoc mines or during your residence in Benguet Province, did you ever hear of Fianza owning any mines or claiming to own any mines? A. No, sir. Q. State if you know what was the general understanding among the inhabitants of Benguet Province as to the ownership of the mines at Antamoc? A. I never heard any rumors about the ownership of those mines. Q. State whether or not it was generally understood in this province that any persons was free to go to these mines and obtain gold from them upon his own account. A. I did not hear that the mines were worked by anyone in particular, but what I do know is that everyone went there and worked and got gold that is, everyone who wanted to. Continuing upon the same question, Francisco Velancio testified as follows: That he was 76 years old and had lived in the Province of Benguet since 1880; that he was secretary of the province. Q. Do you know Fianza? A. Yes, I know him. Q. Did you ever lived in Antamoc? A. Yes, sir. Q. When were you living in Antamoc? A. Since 1894. Q. Do you know whether there are many mines in Antamoc? A. Yes, sir; there are. Q. Did you ever hear or know of Fianza claiming to be the owner of any mines at Antamoc during Spanish times? A. I never heard. Q. Who worked in those mines during Spanish times? A. The Igorots who lived there and any other Igorots who wanted to work there. Q. Could any Igorot who wanted to work there in those mines to take out gold for his own use do so? A. Some Igorots from Tublay and Kaybayan also go there to get gold; I think they come because I never heard that anyone prohibited them from doing so. Q. During Spanish times did any one person claim to own these mines? A. I never observed any one person prohibiting it. Q. Do you know Mr. Hans Holman? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did he make any claim to any mines in Antamoc? A. I have been told so by him; yes, sir. Q. When. A. Before the arrival of the Americans. Q. State whether or not any papers were prepared by you for Mr. Holman relating to any mining claims before the Americans arrived here. A. Some papers Mr. Holman wanted me to give Fianza for signature. Q. Did you sign any papers for Mr. Holman? A. Yes, sir. Q. Were these papers taken to Fianza for his signature? A. Yes, sir; Mr. Holman took these papers himself to get Fianza's signature. Q. Did you see this papers after he had taken them to Fianza's signature? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know what those papers were about? A. Yes, sir. Q. State if you know what the said papers related to. A. It related to mines. Q. Do you know what mines it related to? A. The Antamoc mines. Q. Did you buy any gold in Antamoc when you were living there? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know whether the mines in Antamoc had any particular owners during Spanish times or not? A. I never heard of any owners of those mines.

Q. Did you ever hear of Fianza being the owner of or claiming to be the owner of those mines during Spanish times? A. No, sir. Q. Did you ever hear of Fianza's father, Dominguez, claiming to be the owner of these mines during Spanish times? A. No, sir; no one that I know of. Q. Did you buy gold of the Antamoc mines? A. Yes, sir; I bought gold. Q. From whom did you buy gold? A. I can not fix the names of the Igorots who sold me gold; if any Igorot wanted to pa me 5 or 10 cents in gold. I exchanged salt and clothing with them for their gold. Q. Did they get that gold from the mines of Antamoc? A. Some Igorots get it from that mine and sometimes they got it from the rivers. Q. Did you buy any gold from the father of Fianza? A. No, sir. Q. Did you buy any gold from Fianza? A. No, sir. Q. What office have you held since 1894 under the Government? A. I was secretary in Atoc in 1894, '95, and '96. Q. Where you ever secretary of Baguio? A. Yes, sir. Q. When? A. In 1898. Holman testified upon this question as follows: Q. How long did you lived in the Philippine Islands? A. Ten years. Q. Did you ever live in Benguet Province? A. Yes, sir. Q. When did you go to Benguet Province? A. In 1895. Q. Do you know the Antamoc mining district in this province? A. We denounced that mine; the papers which we made out were burned up in the comandancia during the Spanish government; we commenced the document of that mine in 1896. Q. What property did you denounce and how much of it and where in Antamoc? A. One hundred and twenty square meters is what we denounced. Q. What part of Antamoc Mountain did your claim cover? A. On the side of the mountain, on the steep slope where there many holes. Q. Do you know where the barrio of Antamoc is? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know where the barrio of Ampasit is? A. Yes sir. Q. Do you know the place on the side of the hill called the slide? A. Yes sir. Q. Did your claim include the whole of that slide? A. Yes sir. Q. Do you know the plaintiff Fianza? A. Yes, sir. Q. How long you have known him? A. It has been ten years. Q. Do you know whether or not he knew that you had commenced denunciation proceedings in regard to that mine at Antamoc? A. Yes sir; because he himself signed the papers saying it was mine. Q. When did he signed the papers? A. I don't remember what date it was, because my father has taken the papers away with him; the witness who was just on the stand also signed the same here in the old tribunal in the room corresponding to this one. Q. Did Fianza pretend to be the owner of those mines at the time? A. No, sir; he never did say that; whoever liked could gold from that mine; anyone could get gold from that mine; when I arrived there he did not complain; he only said they were mine (Holman's). You may go to Itogon and to Antamoc and everyone everywhere will tell you that they are mine. Q. I hand you plaintiffs Exhibit C. which purports to be plan of the mine claimed in this suit by Fianza at Antamoc, which purports include the place referred to by you as the slide. State to what extent your denunciation took this in. A. All above the river [placing his hand on the map]. The stakes are there yet if have not been torn down. The same people there at Antamoc put them there. Q. Did you put up any stakes of any kind? A. We changed these stakes in 1898; I went there three times.; I went there in 1902; we have measured these mines three times and we took Herman, the engineer, with us; it is possible he has the plan with him. Q. Did Igorots generally know that you had denounced mines at Antomoc?

A. I should say so because they themselves say so. Q. Do you know when the engineer Herman measured your claimed? A. I don't remember the year, but it was a long time ago. Q. Who helped you to lay off these mines? A. Herman. Q. How many excavations did you find in the mine when you went there? A. I think five or six holes. Q. When you were there the first time, was it, that Fianza signed the papers stating that you were the owner of the mines individually? A. No sir afterwards. Q. How long after was it that Fianza signed these papers? A. In 1897. Q. Did any other Igorot sign that paper or a similar paper besides? A. Two chiefs rich men. Q. Who else signed the documents? A. Jose Cario, A coup; I dont remember the others. Q. Is this paper, plaintiffs' Exhibit C, the plan of the ground you located? A. It is. Q. How do you know it is the same land that you denounced? A. I went there myself. Q. By what mark do you recognize that as the same land? A. It is the same on which I placed stakes. Q. Were your stakes placed in the same places as the stakes indicated on this map? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you remember Mr. Reavis going to you before he made a location in the Antamoc property and asking you whether or not you had claims on that property? A. Yes, sir; I remember. Q. What did you tell him? A. Take care, whether you want to work or not, If you like to work, you work; I dont care about the mines. Q. Did you put the stakes on the Antamoc Mountain yourself or did an official do this for you? A. No, sir; I myself with the Igorots of Antamoc. H. Clay Clyde, in testifying as to the exclusive use by the plaintiff of the land in question, said: Q. When did you first go to the Antamoc mining district? A. July, 1900. Q. For what purpose? A. To prospect. Q. Did you prospect generally over the Antamoc district? A. Yes, sir; I looked around quite a bit. The Igorots told me that I belonged to Mr. Holman, so I looked around and as they had all the land I came back to my camp; and afterwards in December of the same year I went there to look it over again and I made some locations in January, 1901. Q. [Handing witness paper marked for identification "J."] Assuming this to be an approximately accurate diagram of the Antamoc mining district, state whether or not you saw a post with a cow's head on it near the junction of the trails leading to Gamoc, Itogon, and Baguio. A. Yes, sir; I saw that stake there. Q. When did you first see that? A. The first time I went there in July, 1900. Q. State whether or not you saw any other mark in the way of a tree with some stones in the branches of it. A. The Igorots showed me that mark in December, 1900; it was a tree on the side of the hill, perhaps a little south of east from my house. I marked my house with the letter "C." Q. What did the Igorot say they presented? A. He said it represented the limits of Holman's claim and pointed off in the direction eastward toward another stake, so I never interfered upon that ground. Q. At the time the Igorot pointed out these marks to you, he stated that they were Holman's claims. Did you believe it belonged to Holman? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that the reason you didn't locate claims there? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know where the claims of the defendant Reavis were located? A. Yes, sir. Q. State whether or not the claims claimed by the defendant Reavis were within the boundaries of the ground described to you by the Igorot as being the claim of Holman? A. Yes, sir. Q. When did you first know the plaintiff Fianza claimed any mining laws came out. A. About the latter part of June or July, 1902, just before the mining property in the vicinity? Q. Were you in the neighborhood of these mines prior to that time?

A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you hear any Igorot or any person say or intimate that Fianza had any claims there? A. No; I never heard of anyone. Q. Do you know whether or not the defendant Reavies has been in possession of the mining claim staked out by him, as testified to by you, in March, 1901? A. Yes, sir. Q. Has he worked these mines since then? A. Yes, sir. Q. Does he live on any of them? A. Yes, sir. Perry Iams testified upon the same question as follows: Q. When did you first visit the district when the Americans attempted to organize what is known as the Antamoc mining district? A. The latter part of December, 1900. Q. Do you know where the defendant Reavis has located claims there? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you prospect over that country? A. I went over the country but I did not prospect it. Q. Why not? A. The secretary of the barrio there, when we went over the first time, told me that the property there belonged to Mr. Holman, so I didn't waste any time prospecting there. Q. Did you make any attempt to find out what property Holman claimed there? A. Yes, sir; I asked the secretary to show me the extent of Holman's claim and he sent an Igorot with me to show me the stakes which Holman had placed up there. Q. Do you know what the ground was pointed out to you as being claimed by Holman at the time? A. Yes, sir; I remember very distinctly that ground. Q. Point out to the court the ground that was pointed out to you as being Holman's claim, with reference to the claim as now held and claimed by the defendant Reavis. A. Well, Mr. Reavies's claim would be inside the lines that they claimed belonged to Mr. Holman at the time. Q. The whole of his claim be inside? A. Yes, sir; all of his claim would be inside the lines. Q. Did you see any work done there south of the river, near the junction of the trails that run to Gamoc, Itogon, and Baguio? A. Yes, sir. Q. What kind of a post did you see there? A. The post was 7 or 8 feet high, with a cow's head fixed onto it. Q. Was there any other sign seen by you? A. Yes, sir; a tree north of there, or a little west of north, and locked up in the branches of the tree were some stones, and they told me it was the other corner of Mr. Holman's ground. Q. Who called your attention to these points? A. The Igorot who had showed to me Mr. Holman's claim. Q. Did he indicate any other point? A. He showed me there stakes and then pointed to where the other corner was. Q. Do you know when Mr. Reavis located there? A. Yes, sir. Q. When? A. I think he located his first claim there in March, 1901? Q. Do you know whether or not he staked that out in 1901? A. Yes, sir. Q. How do you know? A. I saw his stakes there. Q. Did any Igorot, during the time you were there, ever claim any mining property? A. No, sir. Q. When did you first learn that Fianza claimed any mining property in that district? A. I dont remember the exact date; it was quite a long time after I had been living at Antamoc about a year after before I knew he ever claimed any mining land there. Q. Was Mr. Reavis in possession of mining claims there many months before you heard of Fianza claiming any interest in that property? A. Yes, sir. Q. During the time did you see any Igorots working for Mr. Reavis? A. Yes, sir. Q. How long did you work for him (Mr. Reavis)? A. About two weeks. Q. What kind of work were you doing for Mr. Reavis? A. Driving tunnels. Q. Where?

A. On his claim in Antamoc. Q. Can you state whether or not that the work was done on the same property which he now claims? A. No, sir. Q. Did anyone object to you did Mr. Reavis or any of his other employees working on said claim? A. No, sir. Q. You were working during the daytime? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where you living at that time? A. In Antamoc. Q. Where was Mr. Reavis living at that time? A. On his claim in the same house he is living in now. Fred Steuber testified upon the same question as follows: Q. Have you been down to the Antamoc district? A. I came there in October, 1901. Q. What did you do there in 1901? A. I was working for Mr. Reavis in the mine at the gold mines. Q. Where was Mr. Reavis mining at the time? A. Antamoc. Q. How long did you work for him? A. About three months. Q. Where there any other persons working for him while you were working for him? A. Yes, sir; Igorots. Q. Do you know the claims he is now claiming? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that the same ground that you were working in 1901? A. Yes, sir. Q. During the time you were working for Mr. Reavis did anyone object to his working those claims? A. No, sir; not to my knowledge. Q. During that time did you hear any Igorot claiming any part of those mines or claims? A. From what I understood from the Igorots there, they said that Mr. Reavis was foolish to work those mines as they belonged to Holman; I did not know Holman at the time; I did not hear them say that they belonged to any Igorots there. Nelson Peterson, testifying upon the same question, said: Q. Are you acquainted with the district known as the Antamoc mining district? A. Yes, sir. Q. When did you go there? A. In the year 1901, in February. Q. What were you doing there? A. Prospecting; locating claims. Q. While you were prospecting there was any mention made of any property interests there? A. Yes, sir; I understood that Holman had some property interests there. Q. Do you know whether Mr. Reavis has any mining claims at the present time? A. Yes, sir. Q. State where the property is which was pointed out to you as Holman's property, with reference to the claims owned by Reavis. A. It covers practically the same property. Q. Do you know where Reavis lives? A. Yes, sir. Q. Does he live on any part of the claims he stacked out in the early part of 1901? A. Yes, sir. H. P. Whitmarsh testified upon the same question as follows: Q. What official position, if any, did you ever occupy in the Province of Benguet? A. First governor under American occupation. Q. Were you Benguet Province before you were appointed governor? A. Yes, sir; nearly a year before. Q. State as near as you can when you first came to Baguio? A. The later part of December, 1899, or the beginning of January, 1900. Q. Do you know the district known as the Antamoc mining district? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you ever go there? A. Yes, sir; I went there to get information about the mines of the country. Q. Do you know the plaintiff Fianza? A. Yes, sir. Q. State whether or not you saw him when you first came to this province. A. I stayed with him in Antamoc when I first went there. Q. What position did he occupy at that time?

A. I understood he was president. Q. Did you ever talk with him in reference to the mines in Antamoc A. All about the mines in the vicinity; he advised me to go to Antamoc to look at them. Q. What did he say in reference to the Antamoc mines? A. He said that Holman owned the place where they were. Q. Did Fianza at that time tell you that he owned any part of that mine? A. No. sir. Q. Did you go to him for the purpose of obtaining information regarding these miens? A. I asked him about them the time I came back to Itogon; I went there first and then came back and stayed with Fianza and then he told me that Holman had denounced some claims there. Q. Did you hear any other person say that Holman had held mining property there or had denounced some claims? A. His father wrote me about it and some Igorot whom I met in Antamoc pointed out the hill of Antamoc as belonging to Holman, and Holman told me so himself. Q. Did they point out that hill on your first trip there? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know the defendant Reavis? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you remember when he first came to Baguio? A. Yes, sir; in the fall of 1900. Q. Have you any personal knowledge of his locating any mines at Antamoc? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know when they were located? A. In the beginning of 1901. Q. When did you first learn of Fianza making claim to mines in Antamoc? A. When he came to the tribunal and spoke of it. Q. When was that? A. As I remember some time about June or July, 1901, I should say while I was governor. Q. After you had seen the stakes pointed out to you by Mr. Reavis as his claim? A. Yes, sir. J. E. Kelly testified upon the same question as follows: Q. What is your occupation? A. Mining. Q. How long have you resided at Bua? A. Three years. Q. Have you been engaged in the occupation of mining during all that time? A. Yes, sir. Q. When did you first enter the Province of Benguet? A. About January, 1901. Q. For what purpose did you go there at that time? A. To mine. Q. And to what particular parts of the province did you go? A. Pretty much all over the province. Q. Are you familiar with the district known as Antamoc? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you visit that district on that trip in January, 1901? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you become familiar with the mining conditions at Antamoc at that time? A. Yes, sir. Q. Are you familiar with the property that is now claimed by J. F. Reavis under the mining location staked by him? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you become familiar with the property in January, 1901? A. Yes, sir. Q. Will you state what was the condition of that property when you first became familiar with it ? A. When I first became familiar with it there were some natives working there who were, as I was told, working for Holman; that is, the gold they recovered was to be turned over to Holman and they were to receive so much per ounce for every ounce they recovered. Q. Do you know Mr. Holman? A. I know his father. Q. When did you become acquainted with his father? A. In March or April, 1901. Q. In relation to what matter did you become acquainted with him? A. I went to see Mr. Holman with a view to purchasing his Antamoc holdings. Q. What, if anything, transpired at that conference with Holman? A. I asked him with referrence to his holdings in the Antamoc district, and he told me that he had a mine there that his brother had been looking after for him no, not his brother, his son rather. I asked him if the property was for sale and he said that it was;

when I asked him what the price was I don't remember now just what figure he did place on it, but it was out of the question and I told him I couldn't consider it. Some time later he sent for me and gave me a more reasonable price. I question him then in regard to the title; he told me that he had secured his first papers on the mines and would have had the final papers had it not been for the Spanish-American war. He also showed me the report made by Mr. Herman, the German mining engineer, who was in Manila at that time. In this report Herman advised Holman to raise $100,000 gold for prospecting purposes on the Antamoc mines. I learned that the property had been restaked by the Americans, after that, so I dropped it and had nothing more to do with it. Q. Are you familiar with the location of the lands concerning which you negotiated with Mr. Holman? Do you know what mines they were that he was offering you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know what they are? Do you know just where they lie? that is what I mean by being familiar with their location. A. Yes, sir. Q. Where do they lie with reference to the mining lands which are claimed by Mr. Reavis? A. Practically the same ground. Q. So far as you know, then, Mr. Holman was the undisputed owner of the mines in question? A. Yes, sir; so far as I learned in the district. Q. Do you know Jose Fianza? A. Yes, sir. Q. How long have you known him? A. Three years, Q. Did you meet him during your trip in January, 1901? A. No, sir. I did not. Q. When did you first meet him? A. I may have met him later on in January, 1901 no; I met him in November, 1902. Q. Then Fianza was not in possession of the Antamoc mines in January, 1901? A. Not that I ever heard of; I never knew anything of it. Q. When you met Jose Fianza, between that time and the present time, have you discussed mining matters in the province of Benguet with him? A. Not anything further than that Mr. Fianza, when Governor Pack sent his private secretary to locate this claim of Reavis, they came to my place. They went down and located the ground, staked it out, and returned to Baguio to the recorder's office to have it recorded. Fianza, on his way home, came by my place and stopped and offered me the claim that he had just located or did not offer it to me; he told me it was for sale for $25,000. Q. Was that the first time that you knew of Fianza having a claim on any mine at Antamoc? A. Yes, sir. Q. When was this, with reference to the location of Reavis's claim? Was it before or after? A. I should judge it was a year or such a matter after. Q You are positive it was after and before? A I am very positive Q. Had you known Fianza previous to this time? A. Yes, sir. Q. Had ever claimed to be the owner of these Antamoc mines to this time? A. Never. It is confidently contended that a careful reading of the testimony of the witnesses quoted above will justify the following propositions: First. That the plaintiff Fianza prior to the commencement of this action did not claim or pretended to claim the exclusive right to occupy any particular tract or parcel of land in the mountain of Antamoc. Second. That he made no effort to prevent the working and occupation by alone mine in said mountain. Third. That Holman took possession of a well-defined tract of land in said mountain, covering the present claims of the defendant, in the year 1896, without any objection or protest from the plaintiff Fianza or any of the other coplaintiffs. Fourth. That the defendant, Reavis, found the lands or claims now in question unoccupied by anyone in the early part of the year 1901, and that he took possession of the same peaceably, without protest or objection from the plaintiffs or any one of them. Fifth. That neither the plaintiff Fianza nor any of the other plaintiffs attempted to occupy the particular tract or parcel of land in question or any other tract of parcel of land in the mountain of Antamoc for mining purposes, or for any other purposes, to the exclusion of all other persons. The defendant did not dispossess the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not in possession of the particular tract or parcel of land at the time the defendant took possession. The lower court, upon this question, made the following finding of fact (bill of exception, p. 33): "The court finds that the defendant, John F. Reavis, entered upon the mines owned and claimed by the plaintiffs in the year 1901, and staked out his three claims therefrom, under the honest belief that the game was included in an abandoned, forfeited Spanish grant of one Hans Holman, and that at that time of his first entry thereon, and the setting of his stakes he had no actual knowledge that the Igorots, who were then living upon the lands, claimed the ownership of said mines." The lower court makes the further finding of fact in reference to the entry of the defendant upon the lands in question (bill of exceptions, p. 24): "In the month of March, 1901, the defendant entered upon the lands embraced in and next to the mines of the said plaintiff, upon the information that said mines of the plaintiffs, had been located under the Spanish Mining Law by one Hans Holman, in the year 1896, and that this mine and mines were abandoned by said Hans Holman, and that they were vacant mineral and mining lands, proceeded to stake and located these claims under the mining laws in force in the United States." The lower court makes the statement that the plaintiff immediately protested to the defendant against his occupation of said mines. It is confidentially asserted that there is not a single word of proof in the record to support this finding of fact. The defendant states in his testimony that the plaintiff never made a protest to him personally in reference to his occupancy of the said mines. The plaintiff, Fianza, states in more than one instance that he

protested to other; he does not state that he made a protest to the defendant. The lower court in its decision (bill of exceptions, p. 25) attempts to make it appear that in May, 1902, the defendant, by an agreement entered into before the governor of the Province of Benguet, recognized the rights of the plaintiff to the possession of said lands. The attorney for the plaintiffs, however, in this court makes no such contention. He says: "The agreement of May, 1902, did not, and was not intended to , affect the rights of either party." A reading of the agreement entered into between the parties hereto before said governor fully justifies the statement of the attorney for the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the conclusions of the lower court, that the plaintiff had occupied the particular tract of land to the exclusion of all others for so many years, it finds (bill of exceptions, p. 36) "that the plaintiffs in this case, during the entire time of the occupancy of these Islands by Spain and up to the date of the transfer of sovereignty to the United States (April 11, 1899), did not gain, nor could they gain under the laws then in force, and right, title, or interest to the mines in question nor the minerals therein by virtue of their possession, and the working of the same. The doctrine of prescription as against the Crown of Spain never applied to the mineral lands of the Philippine Islands." It is clear, therefore, that any right of the plaintiff herein must have its origin in legislation had subsequent to the American occupation. The plaintiff had done nothing at any time up to the time of the conclusion of this action in the court below to comply with the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which act was extended to the Philippine Islands on August 14, 1902, while upon the other hand, the defendant, honestly and in good faith, took peaceable possession of the lands which he claims, and attempted and did comply with the rules and regulations applicable to mineral lands in the United States, and immediately upon the promulgation of the act of Congress took all of the steps required in said act to locate and record his claims. It is insisted that one who claims mineral land under the act of Congress in force in these Islands must define the site of the ground with such certainty as may be necessary to prevent mistake on the part of the Government and on the part of citizens who may be asking a like benefit. This requirement placed upon all persons claiming mineral lands is but a reasonable and necessary requirement in order to justify administer the law, and therefore a description of the location of mineral lands which is indefinite and uncertain, for the purposes of holding a particular tract of land, is void. (Faxon vs. Bernard, 4 Fed. Rep., 702,) The lower court in its decision (bill of exceptions, p. 19) admitted that the description of the lands in question was so indefinite and uncertain that the court could not determine the exact nature of the conflict of lines and boundaries. If the court, while it had the witnesses in its presence, could not be determine the "exact nature of the conflict of lines and boundaries" of the lands in dispute, how can it justify its perpetual injunction which it granted against the defendant to prevent him from entering upon and lands? The court further says, in discussing the question of the title to the lands (bill of exceptions, p. 34:: and definite in all respects,, save one; that one exceptions relates to the exact boundary lines of the opposing claimants in reference to the their relations with each other." It is submitted, therefore, that the evidence produced during the trial in said cause was not sufficient to show that the plaintiff had occupied a definite, well-defined tract of land to the exclusion of all others. The plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the extraordinary, equitable remedy of the injunction until he had proved that he was the owner of, or entitled to the possession, of, a well defined tract of land or mine, marked certain lines and limits. He must first show that he had a right of the possession of the said tract, not only against the Government of the Philippine Islands but was well against the defendant (Gwillim vs. Donnellan, 115, U.S., 45.) It is admitted that the defendant, some time after the promulgation of the act of Congress in these Islands, attempted to comply with the requirements thereof, in locating and recording his claims and that the plaintiffs did nothing toward complying with the said law. It is also admitted that the plaintiffs, at the time of the transfer of Spanish sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States, had no right, title, nor interest in the lands in question. Bearing these facts in mind, it is contended that the mere naked possession of a mining claim upon public land is not sufficient to hold such claim as against subsequent location, made in the pursuance of the law, and kept alive by a compliance therewith. In the present case the plaintiffs attempted to stand upon the bare possession, without a location or record against the defendant, who had a location and record. Under such circumstances there is no presumption of title in favor of the party in possession; but, if there was, he who shows a valid location as against naked possession has the better right. (Noyes vs. Black, 4 Montana, 534, 2 Pac. Rep., 769; Hopkins vs. Noyes, 2 Pac. Rep., 280; Le Landle vs. McDonald, 13 Pac. Rep., 349.) The case of Belk vs. Meagher (104 U.S., 279) is cited by the majority opinion to support the doctrine laid down in its decision. A careful reading of that decision supports rather the contention of the defendant. The court in that case said: "Under the provisions of the Revised Status relied on, Belk could get a patent for the claim attempted to locate unless he secured what is here made the equivalent of a valid location by actually holding and working for the requisite time. If he actually held possession and worked the claim long enough and kept all others out his right to a patent would be complete. He had no grant of any right of possession. His ultimate right to a patent depended entirely on his keeping himself in and all others out, and if he was not actually in, he was in law, out." In the same case the court continues: "A peaceful adverse entry, coupled with a right to hold the possession, which was thereby acquired, operated as an ouster which broke the continuity of his (Belk's) holding and deprived him of that title he might have got if he had kept for the requisite length of time. He had made no such location as prevented the lands from being, in law, vacant. Others had the right to enter for the purpose of taking them up if it could be done peaceably and without force." The following facts are admitted in the present case: First, that the plaintiffs up to the time of the trial of said cause in the lower court, even though the law had been in force in these Islands for nearly two years, had made no attempt to definitely located or record their claims; second, that the defendant entered upon the lands he claims peaceably and without opposition; third, that the defendant continued in possession of said land until the injunction was granted by the lower court; fourth, that immediately upon being informed of the requirements under the said act of Congress he complied therewith; fifth, that about eighteen months prior to the date of the said act of Congress the defendant had located the mines in question and performed the work upon them as required by the statutes of the United States. Our next proposition is, that it was not the custom of the Igorots, a mountain tribe occupying the hills of the Province of Benguet, to occupy any parcel or tract of land, either of mining or for farming purposes, to the exclusion of other members of the same tribe. The majority opinion says that the plaintiff had worked the particular mines in question for fifty years or more. There is no better proof of the fact that this statement is false than the fact that no excavations were found upon the said land at the time the defendant went there, which a half a dozen men might not have made in one day's operation. As to the custom of the Igorots to move from one place to plane and not to abide permanently in or occupy any particular place, we desire to record the answer. Fianza himself (record, p.4) states: "The excavations were not the same; there were many different classes of excavations some of 1 fathom depth and some 2 fathoms deep. Our custom is if we do not find gold in 1 fathom or 2 fathoms, we work another place until we do find some." Mateo Cario (Igorot) (record, p. 40) said that the Igorots moved the holes to find the veins. Reavis (record, p. 34) stated that the character of the mining done by the Igorots was what is called in the United States "gophering."

Clyde (record, p. 147) said: "The custom among the Igorots was to dig little holes and follow up little stringers where they could see a little free gold, and then they would put rocks on rocks and grind them out and sell it for what they could go for it. They never located an claims to property. They would go into the ground and work as long as any gold and was there and then another Igorot would come along and find a little gold and he would continue and an of them that came along would work at any place they wanted to; they never claimed ownership for any length of time; they would work in one place and may be for one week; they would work in one place a week and the next place they might be working would be a mile from there in another entirely different place." Iams (record, p. 158) said as to the custom of the Igorots: "As near as I could find out the Igorot miners mine wherever they can find any gold, regardless of any claims; they never claim any mining property. From what I have seen there they hunt for rich stringers; when they find one they follow it and work it out like we call "gophering" in the United States." Fred Stenber (record, p. 165) said: "There were some small holes all over the country." Kelly said (record, pp. 6, 7, and 8), in answering to the question. "What would you say concerning the custom of the Igorots with reference to the ascertain of exclusive property right over mining claims?" Igorots go to mining, as a rule, every year, after the rainy season, and maybe a certain Igorot will mine on one river this year and the next year he will be off on some other stream or on some other quartz lode, just the same; he will find a small little stringer, as we call them, where you can see some free gold. He will work that out until he gets tired of it and then he will go to some other place and another one; maybe some other Igorot will come along and go into the one that he has left and work that a while in that way and then run over the whole country and work in a little hole here and a little hole there, and they work it until they are tired of it and then go to some place else. Q. While an Igorot is working his discovery of a pocket, or stringer as you term, it, for how great a distance does he exclude other Igorots from working? A. Well, very often he allows several of them to go in with him and he gives them an equal interest in what they recover; he will allow several of his friends to go in and help him to work and give them all equal interest in what they recover. Q. In the same pocket? A. Yes, sir; he don't exclude then at all; he just claims the little hole he is in, 2 by 4, just big enough to crawl in. Q. And when you speak of admitting other persons on equal shares with him, you mean admit them to the same little hole in which he is working? A. Yes, sir; the same place Q. Now, for how long does he claim ownership of that particular hole or pocket? A. Well, it depends a good deal on how far this little streak of pay, as they call it, will extend; maybe they will work a month and maybe a week. Q. Then I understand you to say he claims it only during such time as he is working it? A. Yes, sir. Q. He does not exercise any claim of ownership over it after he has ceased work? A. No. sir. Q. Have you known Jose Fianza to have conducted any mining operations upon these Antomoc mines? A. No, sir; I have not any more than the natives who recover gold any place in the district; that are supposed to take it to Fianza. Q. Take it him for what purpose? A. To pay their indebtedness or to sell it to him for whatever he had a mind to pay for it. I have been told by some of the oldest Igorots in that district that Fianza at one time used to pay a medio peso for what was considered an ounce of gold. Q. By virtue of what did this arrangement exist? A. As near as I can learn he is the high chief of the barrio (or tribe) and they all looked up to him as such. Q. Did it exist because of any ownership or claim of ownership on the part of Fianza of these or any particular mines? A. Not to my knowledge. Robiera, a Spaniard who had lived in the Province of Benguet for ten or twelve years, testified as to this custom as follows: Q. Do you know that custom that was in vogue in Spanish times with referrence to mining in Antamoc mining district? A. The custom that they had for working those mines was that any Igorot who wanted to went there and worked and then sold the gold, but I never heard or knew of anyone claiming to be the owner of the mines. Q. State to the court how you learned that custom. A. I learned it by going over it selling goods; I saw that all the Igorots sold me gold and that it was the custom of everyone who wanted to go there and get out gold from those mines. Francisco Valencio, who had lived in the Province of Benguet for many years and had been an official there under the Spanish Government, testified as to the custom of the Igorots as follows: Q. Who worked in those mines during Spanish times? A. The Igorots who lived there and any other Igorots who wanted to work there. Q. Could any Igorots who wanted to work there in those mines, to take out gold for his own use, do so? A. Some Igorots from Tublay and Kaybayan also go there to get gold. I think they could because I never heard that anyone prohibited them from so doing. Q. During Spanish times they did any person claim to own these mines? A. I never observed any one person prohibiting any other person from working there. The foregoing excerpts from the record from the testimony of men who had been in the district, who had studied the conditioned there, and became acquainted with the customs of the Igorots certainly justify the conclusions that the Igorots never occupied a mine anywhere to the exclusion of all of any other persons. The majority opinion (p. 14) attempts to discredit the testimony of these witnesses, particularly the American miners, by the following statement: "All these witnesses had mining claims similar to that of Reavis."

Notwithstanding this attempt to discredit these witnesses, whose testimony was not attacked during the trial of said cause, it will be observed that this custom is corroborated by Fianza himself, by Juan Cario, Mateo Cario, Robiera and Francisco Valencio, who were not American miners and who have no reason to misstate the facts by reason of personal interest. The majority opinion, in an effort evidently to reflect upon the registry and honest purpose of the defendant, Reavis, in taking up this particular land, refers to the miners." This imputation as to the honesty of the defendant is not justified by the record. It is confidently believed that one can not read the testimony of the defendant himself without reaching the conclusion that he is stating the truth. It is admitted (p. 18 of the majority opinion) that the plaintiff never acquired any title to the property in question by virtue of the provisions of the Spanish law, and that said property was, at the time of the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States, public property and that these lands are public lands to which the provisions of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, are applicable; the right of the plaintiff, therefore, if he has any; is not of prescription only. Section 45 of said act of Congress provides that where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations in the Philippine Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish the right to a patent thereto under this act, in the absence of any adverse claim. This provision of the act of Congress makes applicable to mining claims the statute of prescription in force in the Philippine Islands at that time. The statute of prescription in force in the Philippine Islands on the 1st of July, 1902, are sections 38, 40, and 41, of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, known as Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission. It is very questionable the whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the period of prescription provided for in these sections. Said section 38 expressly provides that "this chapter shall not apply to actions has already commenced or to cases wherein the right of action has already accrued, but the statute in force when the action or right of action accrued shall be applicable to such cases." Section 40 provides that the period of prescription as to real property shall be ten years, or, in other words, that an action for the recovery of title to or possession of real property or a case thereunder can only be brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues. The plaintiff claim that he and his ancestors have been in possession of such land for fifty or more years. If that be true, had not the cause of action in favor of the plaintiff "already accrued" before the date of the act of Congress or the when said act of the Philippine Commission went into fore? If, then, the cause of action had actually "already accrued prior to the date of these respective acts, the question is, Does said provisions of the act of the Commission apply to the plaintiff or must he rely upon the prescriptive rights given them, existing in the Philippine Islands prior to that date? We make no finding upon the answer to this question for the reason that we believe that even granting that the provisions of said act of the Philippine Commission are applicable to the claims of the plaintiff here, has not shown his right to the possession of said land under said act of the Philippine Commission. Said section 40 provides that "ten years" actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy . . . shall vest in that actual occupant or possessor of such land, a full and complete title;" but order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant . . . must have been actual, open, public, continuos, under a claim of titles exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants." We contend that the testimony adduced in this case and quoted above clearly demonstrated that the plaintiff had not been in the actual, open, public, continuos possession, under a claim of title adverse to all other claimants not only not for ten years, but for no period at all. We call attention to the testimony quoted above relating to the actual possession of said property in support of this statement. The majority opinion treats the provisions of this prescriptive law as though an actual dispossession of the property was necessary to interrupt the running of the statute in their favor. The provisions of the law provide, however, in addition to the fact that the possession must have been actual, that it shall have been open and public, exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants whatsoever. The actual and continuos possession of the plaintiff was interrupted certainly by Holman six or eight years before the commencement of the action of the plaintiff; and by the defendant more than two years before the commencement of his action; if not also by Francisco Valencio ten or twelve years before the beginning of the action by the plaintiff. One of the conditions of prescriptive title under section 41 is that the claim to title must be a public. A large majority of the witnesses both for the plaintiffs and the defendant testified that they understood and believed the mines in question, at the time Reavis took possession of the same, belonged to Holman. The trial court even found that Reavis located his claims believing the land belonged to Holman. This belief was so strong in the minds of some of the witnesses who were attempting to locate mines in the Province of Benguet (Knouber, Reavis, and Kelly) that they visited Holman and negotiated with him for the purchase of said mines. Why did they do this? Because it was a matter of public rumor and public knowledge in Antamoc and vicinity that the mines at that time belonged to Holman and not to Fianza. The record also discloses that Fianza himself told some of the American miners, who went into said province, that said mines belonged to Holman. We respectively submit as a proposition of law, even admitting that the plaintiffs had actual possession of a well-defined, described parcel of land in the mountain of Antamoc, that such actual possession had been interrupted on at least three different occasions prior to the commencement of their action and that such interruption of the actual possession, though it was unlawful, had the effect of stopping the running of the statute of prescription in favor of the plaintiffs. If the possessor of land permits his possession to be interrupted, although unlawfully, his possession can not be called continuos for the purpose of applying the provisions of said section 41. The majority opinion (p. 11) quotes the following from the opinion of the trial court: He (Reavis) went to Antamoc to stake out land for mines that the believed was claimed by another in the vernacular of the miner, to jump Hans Holman's claim. He was not prospecting for a mine and for hidden minerals; he went to locate a mine already discovered and mineral uncovered and worked for more than half a century. He found honest American prospectors already there with claims stated at all about the land that they believed was claimed by another, for the protection of which opened, developed, and worked mine the rumor of an owner was amply sufficient to protect it from invasion and trespass. This statement has the effect: (1) To convict Reavis of bad faith and to hold him up to the scorn of honest men by saying that he "jumped" a claim which had therefore been respected by all honest American miners; and (2) To show that what he did was to locate an open, develop mine. The statements in the above quotation are absolutely false and do an injustice to an honest American miner and should be corrected. It appears from the record that Reavis, after being told by the Igorots that this mine belonged to Holman, went to Holman to see him about such claims. This act of the defendant demonstrates that he acted in absolute good faith.

The statement in the majority opinion to the effect that the ownership of these claimants (plaintiffs) to these mines was well known and understood generally among the natives and residents of the Province of Benguet, including the Spanish officials, is absolutely unsupported by a scintilla of evidence in the record. There is not a word of evidence in the record that the Spanish officials ever recognized or understood that Fianza or his ancestors were the owners of any mines whatsoever. It is alleged that the plaintiff Fianza claimed the possession of the particular parcel of land in question by a statement made on the 31st of January, 1901, for the purposes of taxation before the secretary of the pueblo, which shows that he was then in possession of said land. This statement is found in Exhibit A of the plaintiffs. An examination of this statement of the plaintiffs neither shows that he was in possession of said land nor the location of the same. His statement there is just as indefinite and uncertain, relating to the specific tract of land, as his statement made before the court during the trial of said cause. The record fully shows that the defendant, Reavis, early in the year 1901, took possession without protest of the land which he claims and which is definitely described in the record, under the custom and in conformity with the laws of the United States relating to mines, recorded his claims, performed work upon said mines, and continued in possession of the same up to and including the time when he received notice of the provisions of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902; that immediately upon receiving notice of the provisions of said act he complied with the conditions thereof with reference to making affidavits and filing a record of his claims and staking the same out marking them outso that any person traveling in that part of the mountain might become aware of the exact location of his claims. The plaintiffs, even at the time of the commencement of their action (1904), had taken not steps to comply with the said act of Congress. The record shows that until the time the injunction was granted in this case by the lower court the defendant had performed work upon his respective claims in conformity with the provisions of said act of Congress; that he had done everything required of him by the law; that the plaintiffs had done nothing to comply with the provisions of the said act of Congress. It is not denied that the defendant had complied with the provisions of the said act of Congress. We agree with the majority opinion that this court can not reverse the decision of the lower court until it appears that the finding made by the trial court is " plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence." We agree with this doctrine, but firmly submit that there is nothing in the record, beyond the declaration of Fianza himself, which shows that the plaintiffs ever occupied the particular tract of ground now claimed, while there is absolutely no evidence of any character to show that they occupied any land to the exclusion of all other persons. The evidence is all to the contrary. The court finds that the plaintiffs and their ancestors have been working these mines for generations. Fianza, have been working these miens for generations. Fianza, himself, testified that if they did not find gold in 1 or 2 fathoms they made another place until they did find something. The lower court attempted to defeat the claim of the defendant by the statement that the defendant had not complied with the act of Congress providing for the location and operation of mineral claims within the Philippine Islands. It is asserted that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause does not support this finding of fact, but, even granting that the defendant did not comply with every detail of the act of Congress with exactness, it was not in the mouth of the plaintiff to raise this objection, for the reason that he had made no attempt to comply with the law himself. Furthermore, section 29 of the said act provides that "failure on the part of a locator of mineral claims to comply with any of the foregoing provisions of said section shall not be deemed to invalidate such location if upon the facts it shall appear that such locater has actually discovered mineral in place upon such location, and that there has been, upon his part, a bona fide attempt to comply with the provisions of this act, and if the no-observance of the formalities hereinbefore referred to is not of a character calculated to mislead other persons desiring to locate claims in the vicinity," One can not read the record of what the defendant did in his attempt to locate and record his claim without reaching the conclusion that there has been, upon his part, a bona fide attempt to comply with the provision of the act, and that , if there was a failure, which is not admitted, such failure is not "of a character calculated to mislead other persons desiring to locate claims in the vicinity." From all the foregoing statement of facts, and from through examination of the evidence adduced at the trial of said cause, we reach the following conclusions: First. That the lands claimed by the plaintiffs are not described in their complaint with sufficient certainty or definiteness to support a judgment in their favor, nor to justify the court in granting an injunction to prevent the defendant from entering upon the lands which they claim. Second. that the evidence adduced at the trial of the cause does not disclose how or in what manner the lands claimed by the plaintiffs conflict with the lands occupied by the defendant. Third. That the evidence adduced does not show that the plaintiffs or any one of them have ever possessed or mined any particular tract of land under claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others. Fourth. That the possession of the plaintiffs has not been actual, open, public, continuous, uninterrupted, under claim of title exclusive of any other right, and adverse to all other claims. Fifth. That the evidence does not disclose that the possession off the plaintiffs, if any exclusive possession at all proved, is that possession, nor does it constitute that exclusive holding and working contemplated by section 45 of the Philippine Bill or by the statutes of prescription in force in the Philippine Islands. Sixth. That the evidence does not disclose that possession of the mines claimed by the plaintiffs was continuous and exclusive of all other persons, and that such possession had been uninterrupted, without interference or adverse claim of any kind. Seventh. That the evidence does not disclose that the plaintiffs made any protest against the occupation of said land to the defendant, to Holman, or to Valencio. Eighth. that the evidence does not disclose that the plaintiffs ever made any attempt, prior to the commencement of this action in this court below, to definitely mark the boundaries of the land included in Exhibit C. Ninth. that there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record which shows that the said lands are held in trust by the Government of the Philippine Islands for the plaintiffs. The judgment of the lower court should be reversed. TRACEY, J., dissenting: Since the writing of the two principal opinion in this case, and since the signing of the prevailing opinion by a majority of the court, but before it was filed or the decision was entered thereon, the Philippine Commission in Act No. 1596 apparently did away with the rule in the De la Rama case and made it our duty to review the evidence and retry the questions of facts, even where the judgment of the Court of First Instance is not plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

Read anew, without regard to the findings of the trial judge, except in so far as they are founded upon his view of the witnesses, I do not think that all the testimony before us establishes such a holding and working of any property identified with that described in the complaint, as constitutes a possession thereof under section 45 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitling the plaintiff to a patent thereon. The plaintiff occupying the property claimed by him, immediately prior to the commencement to the action, had in his power to describe in detail the condition of the workings on the land and narrate his own acts in relation thereto. Upon him rested the burden of proof on this important point, so hotly contested at the trial, and on him, rather than on his adversary, should fall the consequences of the lack of decisive and satisfactory evidence in relation to it. For this reason only I feel constrained to dissent from the opinion of the majority.

December 13, 1923 G.R. No. L-20875 VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL., applicants-appellants, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., opponents-appellees. Turner and Rheberg for appellants. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Director of Lands. , J.: From the record it appears that in the year 1884 a number of Bagos or Igorots or non-Christians, numbering at that time about thirty, were invited by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the then town of Alava, now the municipality of Sison, of the Province of Pangasinan, and a tract of land which in the present complaint is alleged to have a superficial area of 77 hectares, 40 ares, and 50 centiares, in order that they might cultivate the same and increase the population of the said municipality; that said Bagos entered upon said land, took possession of it and have continued to live upon the same and have cultivated it since that date; that the appellants herein are some of the original thirty who entered upon the land, and the others are their legitimate descendants. On or about the 28th day of February, 1919, said appellants presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan to have said parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. Accompanying said petition there was an official plan prepared by the Bureau of Lands presented (Exhibit A). Various oppositions were presented to the registration of said parcel of land. Finally a judgment by default was entered and the cause was set down for trial. During the trial, for reasons which it is unnecessary to state here, it was discovered that it was necessary to present a new plan and a new technical description of the land, and the petitioners were ordered to present an amended plan of the land. In compliance with that order of the court, a new plan was presented (Exhibit A-1) and finally the cause was set down for hearing and a number of witnesses were presented by the petitioners to prove their right to have said parcel of land, as described in the amended petition and plan, registered under the Torrens system in their names. Immediately after the close of the presentation of proof by the petitioners, the oppositors presented a motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground that the petitioners had not presented proof sufficient to show that they are entitled to the registration of the land in question, which motion, after extensive argument pro and con, was granted, and the petition was dismissed without any pronouncement as to costs. From that decision the petitioners, after having presented a motion for a new trial and an exception duly presented to the overruling of said motion, appealed. In addition to the facts above stated, the record shows that at the time of the delivery of said parcel of land to the petitioners, it was unoccupied and unimproved public land; that since their entry upon the possession of the land in the year 1884, they and their ancestors have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same, believing in good faith that they were the owners; that the petitioners had cleared, improved, and cultivated the land and have constructed and maintained their homes thereon, exercising every requisite act of ownership, for a period of more than thirty-nine years, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation, without any interruption whatsoever; that the land in question was never partitioned among the petitioners because it was the custom of the Bagos, Igorots, or non-Christians to occupy and possess their land in common; that the petitioners believed, and had a right to believe, from the fact that the land was given by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the municipality, that they thereby became the owners, to the exclusion of all others, and are now justified in their petition to have the said land registered under the Torrens system in their names, as the owners in fee simple, pro indiviso. No suggestion is made that the gobernadorcillo and the principalia of the town of Alava, now municipality of Sison, were not authorized in 1884, as representatives of the then existing Government, to give and to deliver the land in question to the petitioners and their ancestors for the purposes for which the land was so given. Neither was it denied that the land in question is agricultural

land. No pretension is made that the land in question might not be registered under the Torrens system had the petitioners invoked the benefits of the public land law. No contention is made on the part of the petitioners that they were ever given a paper title to the land. Their contention is simply that they were given the land; that they accepted the same; that they lived upon the land, and cultivated it, and improved it, and occupied it to the exclusion of all others for a period of about thirty-nine years, and that therefore they are entitled to have the same registration under the Torrens system; that they have occupied and cultivated the same for a period sufficient to give them title and to have the same registered under the Torrens system. The present case is not altogether unlike the case of Cario vs. Insular Government (7 Phil., 132), which was decided by this court in 1906, went to the Supreme court of the United States and was there decided in 1909 (212 U.S. 449 1). In the course of that decision, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said: The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by the Spanish law. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native, who had not a paper title, a trespasser and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. Whatever the law upon these points may be, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in the case like the present. Mr. Justice Holmes adds: If there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. If we were to look into the Royal Decrees of Spain, as the attorney for the appellants has done, we will find that Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers of the land which they occupy, or even into tenants at will. (Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias.) In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, we find the following: Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that anc ient possession as a valid title by prescription. We may add that every presumption of ownership under the public land laws of th e Philippine Islands is in favor of one actually occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of subsequently enacted registration land act. In view of the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Insular Government, we are forced to the conclusion that the lower court committed the errors complained of by the appellants in dismissing the petition. As was said by this court in the case of Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands (31 Phil., 272, 279): . . . only under exceptional circumstances should an application for registry in the court of land registration be dismissed over the objection of the applicant, and without giving him an opportunity by the grant of new trial, or otherwise . . . to submit additional evidence in support of his claim of title, when there are strong or reasonable grounds to believe that he is the owner of all or any part of the land described in his application. This is specially true when the only ground for the dismissal of the application is the lack of formal or perhaps even substantial proof as to the chain to title upon which applicant relies, etc. Without a further detailed discussion of the assignments of error of the appellants, we are of the opinion, and so decide that the judgment entered in the court below, dismissing the petition of the applicants, should be reversed and the record remanded to the court a quo, with permission on the part of the petitioners to make such amendment to their petition as they may deem wise and necessary and to present such additional evidence as they may desire; and that the oppositors be permitted to present whatever evidence they may have in opposition, with the understanding that the evidence which has heretofore been adduced shall stand as a part of the evidence of the main trial. And without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered. Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907 MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee. Coudert Brothers for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee. ARELLANO, C.J.: Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and Mayengmeng. By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition. The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresion from the State. After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in these terms: Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cario constructed the house now there that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.) The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the following: From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question, property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . .. In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)

1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned. 2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands. 3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4. The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law." 5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law. 6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say, civil law remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894. 7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the 1 act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine 2 Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648, herein mentioned by the petitioner, in 3 connection with Act No. 627, which appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded. 8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.

9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws. By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err: 1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial; 2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.) Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered. Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. L-68533 May 23, 1986 DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR, HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE and IAC (Third Civil Cases Division), respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent court which affirmed the adjudication by the land registration court of a parcel of land in Mulanay, Quezon in favor of the private respondents. In 1972, Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, and the Heirs of Felipe Rocete applied for the registration of a parcel of land described in PSU-215779, with an area of 226,773 square meters. Unrebutted testimonial evidence established that the land was part of the property originally belonging to one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until 1936 when she died. (Tsn., August 6, 1976, Testimony of Florencio Marquez, Exhibit "U"). The present applicants are the grandchildren of Candida Fernandez. In 1936, after the death of Candida Fernandez, her real property was declared in the name of the "Heirs of Candida Fernandez under Tax Declaration No. 9622, with an area of thirty (30) hectares. Subsequently, sometime in 1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was forfeited in favor of the government for failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same was redeemed in 1942 by Vitaliano Aguirre, one of the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was then the administrator of the property. A final deed of sale (Exhibit "N") was executed by the Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas in 1944 in favor of Vitaliano Aguirre. It had been agreed among the heirs that the property would first be held by Vitaliano in trust for the others until such time that partition among them was effected. The evidence shows Vitaliano's public and continuous possession. The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property among themselves. The particular lot now disputed in this petition was adjudicated in favor of the applicants-respondents. Shortly after the partition, in 1948, the new owners declared their share for taxation purposes. Tax Declaration 91 for that year indicated the land as 12 hectares. This declaration was followed by another one, Tax Declaration No. 2021, in 1958. In 1965, the private respondents caused a survey of their property to be made. The property was found to actually contain an area of 22.6773 hectares. This corrected area was reflected in subsequent tax declarations. The last one submitted in evidence is dated 1974.

An ocular inspection conducted by the trial court found more than one hundred (100) coconut trees with ages over thirty (30) years old, out of a total of more or less one thousand four hundred (1,400) coconut trees on the land. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filed an opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. Donaciano Pumarada, with three others also filed an opposition alleging that they have registrable title on account of their possession since time immemorial. Rafael M. Morales filed a separate opposition, alleging that there was no actual survey of the land applied for; and that he is entitled to registration on account of his occupation and that of his predecessor. The spouses Dominador Lacson and Esperanza Lacson likewise filed their opposition with respect to "the portion of land embraced by points 22 to 24 to 25 to 26 to 27 and by a straight line drawn between point 27 to point 23 of Plan Psu-215779" in answer to which the applicants-respondents agreed to relinquish or quitclaim whatever right, title, and interest they might have over the above specified portion in favor of oppositors Lacson. In view thereof, the oppositor spouses withdrew their opposition in the land registration case. On November 26, 1982, the trial court rendered its decision adjudicating the land to applicants as follows: WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the applicants, namely MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR and the HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE are hereby declared owners proindiviso of the parcel of land described according to Plan Psu-215779, with an area of 22.6773 square meters, subject to the claim of oppositors Dominador Lacson and Esperanza Lacson as per agreement with the applicants and when the decision becomes final and executory, let a final decree be issued for the issuance of title as provided by Act 496. The Government alone, represented by the Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development, filed its appeal with the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision now under review dated August 24, 1984 states: xxx xxx xxx According to the government oppositors, the land in question was certified as alienable and disposable only on September 3, 1953, They, therefore, conclude that herein applicants could not have been in possession of said land for more than 30 years. There is no evidence presented by the government, however, that said land in question was part of the forest zone. For that matter, during the hearing, the Director of Forestry and the Director of Lands manifested in writing that they have no evidence in support of their opposition. They have not presented plans or sketches to show that the land in question is part of the communal forest. Under the foregoing circumstances, We do not find any merit in the appeal of the Government. It has been ruled on this issue that the Director of Forestry has the burden of proving that a piece of land belongs to the forest zone (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; de Villa vs. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 5847-R, June 13, 1952). ... It has been ruled that the inclusion of portions of said lands within the reservations declared by the Director of Forestry in 1928 cannot affect the vested rights of applicants and her predecessors who have been continuously occupying and profiting from the land since time immemorial (Ankron vs. Government of the Phil., 40 Phil. 15; Llana vs. Director of Forestry, CA-G.R. No. 4887-R, Sept. 23, 1950). Applicants have established by preponderance of evidence that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession of the land in question for over 30 years introducing improvements thereon. As we have stated in previous decisions, the registration of public lands for private titles after satisfying the requirements of open, adverse and public possession will be more beneficial to the country as it will promote development of Idle lands. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Hence, this petition The petitioners contend that in affirming the decision of the lower court, the Intermediate Appellate Court committed the following errors: 1. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE IdENTITY OF THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. 2. IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS. RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST THIRTY (30) YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE FILING OF THEIR APPLICATION IN 1972 AS TO ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTRATION. 3. IN NOT DECLARING APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REGISTRATION.

4.

IN NOT FINDING THAT APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND

The petitioners have come to us for a review on questions of fact property within the province of the trial courts to resolve. (Santos vs.Aranzanso 116 SCRA 1). This case furnishes occasion for us to reiterate the general principle that only legal questions, not factual issues, Should be raised in the Supreme Court (Magpantay vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 236) and that findings of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court should not be disturbed absent any showing of grave error or abuse of discretion. Since the factual findings of the respondent court are fully substantiated by evidence on record ( Regalano vs. Northwest Finance Corporation, 117 SCRA 45), we decide not to disturb them. The first issue raised refers to identity. Petitioners allege that the identity of the land sought to be registered has not been established. We sustain the contrary finding. Survey Plan Psu-215779 of the property, showing its boundaries and total area, clearly Identifies and delineates the extent of the land. The petitioners cite the insufficiency of such a survey to identify the land. The petitioners overlook the fact that no survey would at all be possible where the Identity of the land is not first properly established. More importantly, without such Identification, no opposition, even its own, to the application for registration could be interposed. Encroachment on or adverse possession of property could not be justly claimed. The petitioners cite differences in the description of the land boundaries, as well as in the land area stated in the tax declarations submitted in evidence by applicants-respondents. They allege that these do not refer to one and the same property. A careful examination of the record shows a misinterpretation of the evidence as to the Identification of the land. Tax Declaration Nos. 91 and 2021 in 1948 describe a twelve-hectare property bounded as follows: "N-Mocboc Brook; E-Campacat Mt. ; S-Emilio Aguirre; W-Mocboc Brook and Briccio Morales. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and 2662 in 1964 and 1974 speak of a 22.6773-hectare land bounded" N-Mariano Funtilar, et al.; "E-Heirs of Donaciano Pumarada; S-Emilio Aguirre; W-Emilio Aguirre and Bagopaye Creek." However, the applicants-respondents have satisfactorily explained the discrepancy. Tax Declaration Nos. 91 and 2021 followed in tax payments from 1948 to 1958 and beyond were made prior to the survey of the property in 1965. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and 2662 were made subsequent thereto and, hence, account for the difference in area stated. Such differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations are, more often than not, based on approximation or estimation rather than on computation. More so, if the land as in this case was merely inherited from a predecessor and was still held in common. Differences in boundaries described in required municipal forms may also occur with changes in boundary owners, changes of names of certain places, a certain natural boundary being known by more than one name or by plain error. Neither was it uncommon then to designate the nearest, most visible natural landmarks such as mountains, creeks, rivers, etc. to describe the location or situation of the boundaries of properties in the absence of knowledge of technical methods of measuring or determining boundaries with accuracy, especially where as in this case, the same were made merely by humble farm people. Certain discrepancies, if logically explained later, do not make doubtful, the Identification of the property as made, understood and accepted by the parties to the case. It is respondents' contention that the land in question was originally owned by Candida Fernandez; forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; subsequently repurchased by Vitaliano Aguirre in a tax delinquency sale and finally adjudicated in favor of applicants in 1948. Petitioners, however, allege that the relationship of the land sold at auction with the land subject of registration has not been established, since the final deed of sale in favor of Aguirre and the survey plan Psu-215779 refer to two different parcels of land. The difference in boundary descriptions has already been explained. Anent the disparity in land area, it must be noted that the property mentioned in the final deed of sale issued by the provincial treasurer at the delinquency auction sale was the property originally owned by Candida Fernandez. The parcel of land sought to be registered and Identified by Survey Plan Psu-215779 is a part of that property. The surveyed land resulted from the partition of Candida's property among her heirs. Adjudicated in favor of herein respondents was 22.6773 hectares thereof, the rest having gone to Emilio Aguirre, a son of Candida whose property bounds the parcel of land in dispute on the south. Such fact is revealed by the testimony of Mariano Funtilar on direct examination, to wit: xxx xxx xxx Q. Your counsel has presented a certain Exhibit 1, which is a certification from the Municipal Treasurer of Mulanay. It clearly states that a certain parcel of land is declared in the name of the heirs of Candida Fernandez, the administrator of which is Petronila Aguirre which clearly shows that the tax declaration was only made in the name of the heirs Candida Fernandez, but in her name, is that right? A. Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q. Do we understand also that you are trying to register only the portion that you personally, your brother and sister are occupying? A. Yes, sir and we are applying for that. Q. In other words, it is clear that this land supposedly originally owned by Candida Fernandez is a bigger portion, is that correct, a bigger parcel? A. Yes, sir. Q. And only a portion of the land is allotted to your brothers and sisters? A. Yes, sir. (Tsn-March 13, 1975, Land Reg. Case No. 192-G, p. 7) xxx xxx xxx And on cross-examination ATTY. LAUREL: Q. Would you like to enlighten this Court that you and your brother and sister who are children of Antonia Resales received this property, this entire property were the only ones who received this entire property? A. That was the property pointed to uses our own, sir. Q. I am asking you whether this entire property was given- was inherited by the children of Antonia Rosales only? A. That is a big parcel but it is only a portion which was given to us which we are causing for registration, sir. xxx xxx xxx (Tsn-March 4, 1976, Land Reg. No. 192-G, p. 7) ATTY. LAUREL: Q. When you said portions were adjudicated to the heirs in order to avoid conflict in the repurchase do I get from you Mr. Funtilar, that the property repurchased that this property you are claiming in your application is only a portion of the property repurchased from the Government? A. Yes, sir. (Tsn-April 27, 1976, Land Reg. Case No. 1921-G, p. 18) The petitioners contend that the private respondents have failed to establish possession for at least thirty years to entitle them to confirmation of imperfect title and registration under the law. The petitioners also fault the respondents reliance on the 1944 tax delinquency sale, forgetting that possession must still be proved. We are satisfied from the evidence that long before her death in 1936, Candida Fernandez already possessed the disputed property. This possession must be tacked to the possession of her heirs, through administrator Vitaliano Aguirre, and later to the possession of the private respondents themselves, who are Candida's grandchildren. The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in 1940 of the land in favor of the government. It would be rather absurd under the circumstances of this case to rule that the government would order the forfeiture of property for non-payment of real estate taxes if the property is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida Fernandez redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land of the deceased in the possession of their family, thus continuing prior possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more than the required period. As a matter of fact, the applicants' witnesses testified to their personal knowledge of more than 50 years possession. More important is the petitioners' allegation that the property sought to be registered was unclassified public forest until September 15, 1953 when L C Project No. 16-0, L C Map No. 1634 declared it alienable and disposable. It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. The private respondents tried their best to present the necessary evidence. A certification issued by then District Forester Fernando Roy on September 27, 1972 reads: xxxxxxxxx ... said parcel of land falls within the Alienable and Disposable LC Project No. 16-D, LCMap No. 1634 certified" (not classified) "on September 15, 1953, by the Director of Forestry. In view thereof, this office interposes no objection in behalf of the Director of Forestry for the registration and/or confirmation of title on the property mentioned therein without prejudice to such action, the Director of Lands and other government entities may deem proper to take on the premises. to which, the then District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, Land District No. IV-2 in Lucena City, in a communication dated March 16, 1973 responded:

1. the parcel of land subject of this registration was originally claimed by Emilio Aguirre and A. Fernandez and the herein applicants have acquired the rights and interest therein thru predecessors-in-interest; and 2. that said parcel of land has not been disposed of, reserved, leased, applied for or granted as homestead or otherwise be alienated by the government. In view of the above findings, and basing from the report of the investigation submitted thereon by a representative of this office, and considering that this Agency has no evidence to support the opposition of the Government, it is further informed that this office interposes no opposition in the confirmation of the rights to and interest on the parcel of land particularly described under Plan Psu-215779 in favor of the herein applicants. The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances. A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui us. Director of Forestry (supra) ruling is warranted whenever a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration Act, and Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act, then their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their own implementation. The land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33 years ago. It is not forest land. It has been possessed and cultivated by the applicants and their predecessors for at least three generations. The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged. We see no strong reason to reverse the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the respondent appellate court is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Oposa vs factoran (check previously assigned cases) G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents. ROMERO, J.: The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders promulgated by the President in the lawful exercise of legislative powers. Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable lands of public 1 domain through "license, concession or lease" under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions allowed under the 1987 Constitution. The adoption of the concept of jura regalia that all natural resources are owned by the State embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for national economic 3 development, but also for its security and national defense, ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of "full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.
2

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or productsharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. xxx xxx xxx The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied) 4 Pursuant to the mandate of the above-quoted provision, legislative acts were successively issued by the President in the exercise 5 of her legislative power. To implement said legislative acts, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in turn promulgated Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, the validity and constitutionality of which are being challenged in this petition. On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her then legislative powers under Article II, Section 1 of the Provisional Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten the development of mineral resources. The pertinent provisions read as follows: Sec. 1. Existing mining permits, licenses, leases and other mining grants issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences, including existing operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall continue and remain in full force and effect, subject to the same terms and conditions as originally granted and/or approved. Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, including renewal applications for approval of operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall be accepted and processed and may be approved; concomitantly thereto, declarations of locations and all other kinds of mining applications shall be accepted and registered by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences. Sec. 3. The processing, evaluation and approval of all mining applications, declarations of locations, operating agreements and service contracts as provided for in Section 2 above, shall be governed by Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws and their implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however, that the privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions thereof shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. The pertinent provisions relevant to this petition are as follows: Sec. 1. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretary") is hereby authorized to negotiate and enter into, for and in behalf of the Government, joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources with any Filipino citizens, or corporation or association at least sixty percent (60%) of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens. Such joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and shall include the minimum terms and conditions prescribed in Section 2 hereof. In the execution of a joint venture, co-production or production agreements, the contracting parties, including the Government, may consolidate two or more contiguous or geologically related mining claims or leases and consider them as one contract area for purposes of determining the subject of the joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreement. xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The Secretary shall promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this Executive Order. Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, 6 series of 1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279." Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural 7 Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation." Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims. Section 3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 82 provides: Sec. 3. Submission of Letter of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs). The following shall submit their LOIs and MPSAs within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR A.O. 57 or until July 17, 1991. i. Declaration of Location (DOL) holders, mining lease applicants, exploration permitees, quarry applicants and other mining applicants whose mining/quarry applications have not been perfected prior to the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57. ii. All holders of DOL acquired after the effectivity of DENR A.O. No. 57. iii. Holders of mining leases or similar agreements which were granted after (the) effectivity of 1987 Constitution. Failure to submit letters of intent and MPSA applications/proposals within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective 8 effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits. On July 2, 1991, the Court, acting on petitioner's urgent ex-parte petition for issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction, issued a Temporary Restraining Order, upon posting of a P500,000.00 bond, enjoining the enforcement and implementation of 9 DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, as amended, Series of 1989 and 1990, respectively. On November 13, 1991, Continental Marble Corporation, thru its President, Felipe A. David, sought to intervene in this case alleging that because of the temporary order issued by the Court , the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 in San Fernando, Pampanga refused to renew its Mines Temporary Permit after it expired on July 31, 1991. Claiming that its rights and interests are prejudicially affected by the implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, it joined petitioner herein in seeking to annul Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 and prayed that the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 be ordered to issue a Mines Temporary Permit in its favor to enable it to operate during the pendency of the suit. Public respondents were acquired to comment on the Continental Marble Corporation's petition for intervention in the resolution of 12 November 28, 1991. Now to the main petition. If its argued that Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing 13 mining laws which are not inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279. Invoking Section 7 of said Executive Order 14 No. 279, petitioner maintains that respondent DENR Secretary cannot provide guidelines such as Administrative Order Nos. 57
10 11

and 82 which are inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279 because both Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 merely reiterated the acceptance and registration of declarations of location and all other kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, until Congress opts to modify or alter the same. In other words, petitioner would have us rule that DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary in the exercise of his rule-making power are tainted with invalidity inasmuch as both contravene or subvert the provisions of Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 or embrace matters not covered, nor intended to be covered, by the aforesaid laws. We disagree. We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated 15 as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barrias. The scope of the exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed 16 in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in 1914, thus: "Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid." Recently, the case of People v. Maceren gave a brief delienation of the scope of said power of administrative officials: Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provision. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). xxx xxx xxx . . . The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558). In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Considering that administrative rules draw life from the statute which they seek to implement, it is obvious that the spring cannot rise higher than its source. We now examine petitioner's argument that DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 contravene Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 as both operate to repeal or abrogate Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other mining laws allegedly acknowledged as the principal law under Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.
17

Specifically, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, on lease of mining claims under Chapter VIII, quarry permits on privately-owned lands of quarry license on public lands under Chapter XIII and other related provisions on lease, license and permits are not only inconsistent with the raison d'etre for which Executive Order No. 279 was passed, but contravene the express mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It force and effectivity is thus foreclosed. Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter explicitly ordains that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Consonant therewith, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may be undertaken by means of direct act of the State, or it may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or it may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. Given these considerations, there is no clear showing that respondent DENR Secretary has transcended the bounds demarcated by Executive Order No. 279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes said official to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Moreover, the subject sought to be governed and regulated by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of Executive Order No. 279 specifically issued to carry out the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner likewise maintains that Administrative Order No. 57, in relation to Administrative Order No. 82, impairs vested rights as to violate the non-impairment of contract doctrine guaranteed under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution because Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates and automatically converts mining leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from effectivity of said guideline, while Section 3 of Administrative Order No. 82, declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs within two (2) years from the effectivity of Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, and sand gravel permits. In Support of the above contention, it is argued by petitioner that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic conversion of mining lease agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements which must set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and enter into mining agreements does not include the power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements. To begin with, we dispel the impression created by petitioner's argument that the questioned administrative orders unduly preterminate existing mining leases in general. A distinction which spells a real difference must be drawn. Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to "license, concession or lease" granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. The intent to apply prospectively said 19 constitutional provision was stressed during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, thus: MR. DAVIDE: Under the proposal, I notice that except for the [inalienable] lands of the public domain, all other natural resources cannot be alienated and in respect to [alienable] lands of the public domain, private corporations with the required ownership by Filipino citizens can only lease the same. Necessarily, insofar as other natural resources are concerned, it would only be the State which can exploit, develop, explore and utilize the same. However, the State may enter into a joint venture, co-production or production-sharing. Is that not correct? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. MR. DAVIDE: Consequently, henceforth upon, the approval of this Constitution, no timber or forest concession, permits or authorization can be exclusively granted to any citizen of the Philippines nor to any corporation qualified to acquire lands of the public domain? MR. VILLEGAS: Would Commissioner Monsod like to comment on that? I think his answer is "yes." MR. DAVIDE: So, what will happen now license or concessions earlier granted by the Philippine government to private corporations or to Filipino citizens? Would they be deemed repealed? MR. VILLEGAS: This is not applied retroactively. They will be respected. MR. DAVIDE: In effect, they will be deemed repealed? MR. VILLEGAS: No. (Emphasis supplied) During the transition period or after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 until the first Congress under said Constitution was convened on July 27, 1987, two (2) successive laws, Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, were promulgated to
18

govern the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals. To carry out the purposes of said laws, the questioned Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, now being assailed, were issued by the DENR Secretary. Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 provides: ARTICLE 9 TRANSITORY PROVISION 9.1. All existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less shall be subject to these guidelines. All such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreement within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. However, any minimum firm which has established mining rights under Presidential Decree 463 or other laws may avail of the provisions of EO 279 by following the procedures set down in this document. It is clear from the aforestated provision that Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the 20 non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution do not apply to the aforesaid leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, Executive Order No. 279 issued on July 25, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative power has the force and effect of a statute or law passed by Congress. As such, it validly modified or altered the privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases and agreements under Executive Order No. 211 after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable 21 exercise of the police power of the State. In the 1950 case of Ongsiako v. Gamboa, where the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 34 changing the 50-50 sharecropping system in existing agricultural tenancy contracts to 55-45 in favor of tenants was challenged, the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the law, emphasized the superiority of the police power of the State over the sanctity of this contract: The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against: impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one and it is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. Such provisions are restricted to contracts which respect property, or some object or value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State, and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby be affected; for such matter can not be placed by contract beyond the power of the State shall regulates 22 and control them. In Ramas v. CAR and Ramos where the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 authorizing the tenants to charge from share to leasehold tenancy was challenged on the ground that it impairs the obligation of contracts, the Court ruled that obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such power is exercised to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive. The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution could not be any clearer. As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
23

The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people. The recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources was expressed as early as the 1984 Constitutional Convention. In connection therewith, the 1986 U.P. Constitution Project observed: "The 1984 Constitutional Convention recognized the importance of our natural resources not only for its security and national defense. Our natural resources which constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation, should be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their prosperity. This will ensure the country's survival as a viable and sovereign republic." Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" if they are so minded. Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82. We, therefore, rule that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld. We now, proceed to the petition-in-intervention. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, an intervention in a case is proper when the intervenor has a "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. "Continental Marble Corporation has not sufficiently shown that it falls under any of the categories mentioned above. The refusal of the DENR, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga to renew its Mines Temporary Permit does not justify such an intervention by Continental Marble Corporation for the purpose of obtaining a directive from this Court for the issuance of said permit. Whether or not Continental Marble matter best addressed to the appropriate government body but certainly, not through this Court. Intervention is hereby DENIED. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 2, 1991 is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990 SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Filoteo T. Banzon for petitioners. SARMIENTO, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods Corporation (hereafter simply SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach Development Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH) bring to our attention the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, et al.," disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the respondent judge dated October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case No. 4062 is set aside, and respondent judge is ordered to require private respondents to file their answer to the complaint in said Civil Case No. 4062 and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits and to render judgment thereon.' The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision and restated by the petitioners in their petition are accurate: a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly described and bounded as follows: Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m ) Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land above-described; c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant Coral Beach Development Corporation I d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines instituted before the Court of First 2 Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as Civil Case No. 4062. SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: 1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all administrative remedies before filing the case in court; 2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become indefeasible and imprescriptible; 3 3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the Solicitor General and not by the Director of Lands. The then 4 Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the complaint in the Order of October 7, 1977, adopting mainly the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land. The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October 11, 1977 and filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 25, 1977 . The Solicitor General then moved for an extension of thirty days within which to file the Record on Appeal and to pay the docket fee in order to perfect the appeal. This was to be followed by another motion for extension filed by the Solicitor General, resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner another extension of fifteen days from December 10, 1977. Finally before this period of extension lapsed, instead of an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals was filed. According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and in a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to Dismiss, the correctness of its decision must be decided in the assumed truth and accuracy of the allegations of the complaint. The complaint alleges that the lands in question are forest lands; hence, inalienable. b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands despite clear and positive evidence to the contrary. c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it was not initiated by the Director of Lands. d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of action for alleged failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative 6 remedies. The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari, set aside the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 4062, and ordered the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the answers of the private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action for reversion. Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review. A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted only when there are special and important reasons therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the premises for granting a review: (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned 7 such departure by a lower court as to call for supervision .
5

We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court of First Instance with grave abuse of discretion. The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the Republic. An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated 9 in the Republic's complaint' was never denied specifically by the defendants (petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH. If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land 10 until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the 12 disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by 13 the title or patent is part of the public forest. The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land is by remanding the case to the lower court for a fulldress trial on the issues involved. Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient administration of justice is ensured. However, the rules of 14 procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They must lead to the proper and just determination of litigation, without tying the hands of the law or making it indifferent to realities. Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or 15 adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The long line of decisions denying the petition for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially in instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the instances when certiorari was given due course. The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or 16 when the broader interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, or when the questioned order amounts to an 17 oppressive exercise of judicial authority. We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to give due course to the petition considering that the issue affected a matter of public concern which is the disposition of the lands of our matrimony No less than the Constitution protects its policy. We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court, in the absence of a clear showing that the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in a manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that the respondent Court has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has been committed by the 18 respondent court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
11

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988 BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents. G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988 ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents. CRUZ, J.: The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where 1 the discovery is made be private. In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied. These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 2 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions 3 of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which 4 was possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier 5 possession of the land by Alberto's father. Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year 6 7 to 1964, Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and 8 its payment of taxes on the land. For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, 9 and its payment of annual taxes thereon. The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that: SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was 10 not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of 11 the land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and 12 recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the subsurface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that: There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes. The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok. It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546). "The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266) It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be 13 deprived thereof without due process of law.

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that: SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared: Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their respective locations. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the 14 public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of 15 any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons. First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration 16 in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer 17 to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she 18 was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" but she did not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not 19 only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application. Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights? The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely 20 mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows: Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the Constitution. SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface. SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents. SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles. This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong. The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate 21 expropriation proceedings. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 48327 August 21, 1991 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioners vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PAULINA PARAN, ELISA PARAN MAITIM and SINA PARAN, respondents. Florencio Q. Pax & Moises P. Cating for private respondents. FELICIANO, J.:p This Petition for Review assails the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 15 September 1977 and 18 May 1978 in C.A.-G.R. No. 59538-R, which dismissed the appeal filed therein by the Republic and two (2) bureau directors. Private respondents are applicants for registration of a parcel of land situated in Beckel La Trinidad, Benguet, containing an area of 34,178 square meters and covered by Survey Plan Psu-105218. In their application dated 13 February 1970, private respondents claim to have acquired the land from their father Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical, exclusive and open possession thereof 1 since time immemorial. On 18 November 1970, the Office of the Solicitor General filed on behalf of the Director of Lands an Opposition contending that: (1) private respondents have no registrable title; (2) the parcel of land sought to be registered is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines; and (3) the application for registration was filed after expiration of the period provided for in R.A. No. 2061, hence the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss based solely on the ground that the application made by private respondents was filed beyond 31 December 1968, the extended period for filing of applications for registration provided for by R.A. No. 2061. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet later filed another 4 Opposition first time in representation of the Director of Forestry, stating that the parcel of land sought to be registered is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve covered by Proclamation No. 217 dated 16 February 1929. On 12 November 1970, the land registration court issued an Order declaring a general default against the whole world except the 6 Bureau of Lands, the Reforestration Administration, and the Bureau of Forestry. Another Order was then issued denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Provincial Fiscal. Thereupon, the case proceeded to trial. On 7 August 1974, the land registration court rendered a Decision with the following dispositive portion: In view thereof, finding the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest to have been in open, continuous and notorious possession of the aforesaid land as bonafide owner[s] thereof for more than 30 years, their title hereto (sic) is hereby confirmed. Let an order issue for the issuance of the decree after the finality of this decision in the names of Paulina Paran, widow; Elisa Paran Maitim, married to Beles Paran; Sina Paran, widow; all of legal age, Filipino citizens and residents of Beckel La Trinidad, Benguet, in equal undivided shares. It is so ordered. A copy of the Decision was received by the Provincial Fiscal on 13 August 1974 who filed neither a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. The Solicitor General, who was separately furnished a copy of the Decision, received it on 26 August 1974. On 25 September 1974, the last day then allowed for filing an appeal, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied. Copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the Solicitor General almost a year later, on 18 August 1975; on the very same day, he immediately filed a notice of his intention to appeal. The record on appeal subsequently filed by the Solicitor General was approved, "having been filed within the period prescribed by law," and the records of the case were ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals.
7 5 3 2

Earlier, however, the land registration court had directed the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree for the titling of the land in the name of private respondents. The Order dated 23 June 1975 was issued because no appeal had apparently been perfected at that time from the Decision promulgated on 7 August 1974. The Solicitor General asked that that Order be set aside on the ground that it was issued prematurely, that is, he had not yet received as of 23 June 1975 the order denying his motion for reconsideration of the decision. The Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration was denied by the land registration court. Considering that the Solicitor General had filed an appeal from the Decision dated 7 August 1974, private respondents urged the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal contending that the Decision of the land registration court had attained finality and was no 8 longer open to review. By a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 15 September 1977, the motion of private respondents was granted and the appeal interposed by petitioners was dismissed. The Resolution reads: ACTING on the motion to dismiss appeal filed by counsel for applicants-appellees on the ground that the appellant's brief clearly indicates that appellant is only appealing from the original order which was already final and executory. (sic) Upon examination of the records of this case, the court finds out that the contention of appellees is tenable. In view of the same, the Court RESOLVED to GRANT applicants-appellees' motion. Wherefore, the appeal interposed by appellant is now and considered abandoned. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of that Resolution; their motion was denied in an extended Resolution Appeals promulgated on 18 May 1978.
9

of the Court of

Petitioners in the instant Petition for Review urge that: 1. respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioners' appeal was perfected on time; 2. respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that [the] decision rendered without jurisdiction does not attain finality since [the] land involved is part of [the] Central Cordillera Forest Reserve; and that 10 3. respondent Court of Appeals erred in not declaring as void in these proceedings [the] trial court's decision. The first issue raised by petitioners is founded on the holding of the Court of Appeals, that: This Admission notwithstanding, and if only to clarify, we will rule on the issue of perfection of the appeal in this case. We maintain that the decision in the court below had already become final and executory when the appeal was interposed. The period of appeal should commence to run from the date the Provincial Fiscal recieved a copy of the decision, to wit: August 13, 1974. The thirty-day period of appeal had lapsed when the Solicitor General filed his notice of appeal. The receipt by the Provincial Fiscal of the decision is deemed that of the Solicitor General. The records reveal that it was the Provincial Fiscal who all along had represented the Government in the hearing of the application for registration. His official actuations and omissions in regard to the case must perforce bind the Office of the Solicitor General. To ignore the official actuations and omissions of the fiscal in the hearing of the application for registration would be a virtual admission that there was no opposition on the part of 11 the Government, a situation which would have been even more absurd. Petitioners for their part contend that the thirty-day (30) period (now fifteen [15] days) for filing an appeal should not commence to run from the time the Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the Decision of the land registration court on 13 August 1974, but rather only from 26 August 1974 when the Solicitor General received his own copy of the Decision. Recent decisions of this Court sustain the position taken by petitioners. The Office of the Solicitor General is the entity that is 12 empowered to represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings and as such, the Solicitor General is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions. Service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period or filing of appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality. The representative of the Solicitor General, e.g. the Provincial Fiscal, has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should 13 be made. From the chronology of the instant case, it is evident that the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General was filed within the appropriate period. Although the Provincial Fiscal had received earlier a copy of the Decision of the land registration court, the Solicitor General received his copy only on 26 August 1974. On 25 September 1974, the last day then allowed for filing an appeal, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The order denying this motion for reconsideration was received on 18 August 1975; on the same day, the Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal. The Court considers the appeal of the Solicitor General 14 to have been filed on time since the motion for reconsideration earlier filed had suspended the running of the period to appeal.

During the proceedings below, petitioners had asked the land registration court to dismiss the application for registration of private respondents on the ground that the same was filed beyond the time allowed under R.A. No. 2061. R.A. No. 2061 had fixed a period expiring on 31 December 1968 while private respondents' application was filed sometime in 1970. The Court does not agree that private respondents are barred by prescription from having their imperfect title confirmed. The original text of Section 47 of C.A. No. 141 provided that applications for confirmation had to be filed at the latest on 31 December 1938. Pursuant to C.A. No. 292, the period was extended to 31 December 1941; later, that period was extended once more to 31 December 1957 by R.A. No. 107. The period for filing was for the third time extended by R.A. No. 2061 to allow applicants until 31 December 1968 to file their petitions. The extensions of time did not, however, end with R.A. No. 2061. R.A. No. 6236 again extended the period of 31 December 1976. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6236 reads: See. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December thirty-one, nineteen hundred and seventy-six within which to take advantage of the benefit of this chapter: Provided, That this extension shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed 144 hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with section fortyfive of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this chapter, but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. (Emphasis supplied) The Court notes that the application of private respondents was filed on 13 February 1970, i.e., after expiration of the period provided in R.A. No. 2061. We consider, however, that the above underscored portions of R.A. No. 6236, which was approved 19 June 1971, validated the application filed in the interim by private respondents, and the exercise of jurisdiction by the land registration court in respect of the subject matter of the application. The fact that a succession of statutes had simply extended the 15 original time period, rather than established a series of discrete periods of time with specific beginning dates and ending dates, shows a clear legislative intent to avoid interregna which would have generated doubts and difficult questions of law. In fact, R.A. No. 6236 was amended anew by P.D. No. 1073 issued on 25 January 1977 to allow applications to be filed on or before 31 December 1987. Petitioners, however, maintain that the land applied for is forest land located within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and hence not subject to registration. This was in fact the principal issue litigated by the parties before the land registration court. Petitioners submitted a letter dated 4 June 1971 signed by Baguio City Forester Luis U. Baker, Bureau of Forestry, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, informing the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet that the land occupied by private 16 respondents lay within the boundaries of the vast Reserve. While private respondents do not dispute that the land was formerly a part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, they contend that it had already been released therefrom. Private respondents 17 submitted a certification signed by Leopoldo Palacay, Chief of Land Classification Party No. 57 of the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, showing the legal nature or status of the land as alienable or disposable. After appraisal of the evidence submitted by the parties, the land registration court held that the land involved had already been released from the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and, accordingly, rendered a decision confirming the title of private respondents. There is no question that a positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department of the Government is needed to declassify land which had been classified as forestal and to convert it into alienable or disposable lands for agricultural or other 18 19 purposes. In the case of Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, the Court considered the reports of the District Forester and the District Land Officer as adequate proof that the land applied for was no longer classified as forestal. In that case, both the District Forester and the District Land Officer made identical findings that the land applied for was alienable and disposable in character and did not interpose any opposition to the application for registration. The difficulty in the instant case is that while the certification of Leopoldo Palacay on which private respondents rely may, standing alone, be evidence that a reclassification had occurred, it is contradicted by an official report of Luis Baker. Moreover, the private respondents' application for registration was in fact opposed by the Director of Lands as well as the Director of Forestry. The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the land here involved had been officially released from the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We consider and so hold that once a parcel of land is shown to have been included within a Forest Reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the parcel of land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent withdrawal therefrom or de-classification is shown. A simple,

unsworn statement of a minor functionary of the Bureau of Forest Development is not, by itself, such evidence. Under the view we take of this case, however, the definite resolution of this question becomes unnecessary. The applicants in the instant case are natives of Benguet and members of the Ibaloi tribe. They are members of a cultural minority whose application for registration of land should be considered as falling under Section 48(c) of C.A. No. 141. At the time private respondents filed their application, the text of Section 48 read: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been, in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (emphasis supplied) Section 48(c), quoted above, did not form part of the original text of C.A. No. 141; it was added on 18 June 1964 by R.A. No. 3872. It is clear to the Court that the addition of subsection (c) was intended to create a distinction between applications for judicial 21 confirmation of imperfect titles by members of national cultural minorities and applications by other qualified persons in general. Members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to lands of the public domain, whether disposable or not; they may therefore apply for public lands even though such lands are legally forest lands or mineral lands of the public domain, so long as such lands are in fact suitable for agriculture. The rest of the community, however, "Christians" or members of mainstream society may apply only in respect of "agricultural lands of the public domain," that is, "disposable lands of the public domain" which would of course exclude lands embraced within forest reservations or mineral land reservations. That the distinction so established in 1964 by R.A. No. 3872 was expressly eliminated or abandoned thirteen (13) years later by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, only highlights the fact that during those thirteen (13) years, members of national cultural minorities had rights in respect of lands of the public domain, disposable or not. P.D. No. 1073 amended Sections 48(b) and (c) of C.A. No. 141 in the following manner: The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c) , Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. (Emphasis supplied) It is important to note that private respondents' application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect title was filed in 1970 and that the land registration court rendered its decision confirming their long-continued possession of the lands here involved in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48(c) was in legal effect. Private respondents' imperfect title was, in other words, perfected or vested by the completion of the required period of possession prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073. Private respondents' right in respect of the land they had possessed for thirty (30) years could not be divested by P.D. No. 1073. The Court stressed in Director of Lands vs. Funtilar (supra): The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. Every application for a concession of public lands has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances . A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (supra) ruling is warranted whenever a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration Act, and Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act, then their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their own implementation. (Emphasis supplied)
20

The land registration court found that the possession of private respondents, if tacked on to that of their predecessors-in-interest, sufficiently meets the requirement of thirty (30) years open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession. Private respondents acquired the property from their deceased father who, in turn, had inherited it from private respondents' grandfather. Even before the death of their father, private respondents were already occupying the land. They lived on it since their father had built a house on the land and had planted it with bananas, camote, avocadoes, oranges and mangoes. Dayotao Paran had declared the land for 22 taxation purposes prior to 1938 and had since paid the corresponding realty taxes. The Declarations of Real Property submitted by private respondents indicated that the land had become suitable to agriculture. 23 Aside from sweet potatoes and vegetables, private respondents harvested rice from the land. To enhance their agricultural production, private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest had built terraces and dikes. Forester Luis Baker noted this fact in his report. Clearly, the requirements of Section 48(c) were satisfied by private respondents. They are entitled to judicial confirmation of their imperfect title. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the land registration court dated 7 August 1974 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14213 August 23, 1919 J. H. ANKRON, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objector-appellant. Assistant Attorney-General Lacson for appellant. P. J. Moore for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its purpose was to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel of land situated, bounded and particularly described in the plan and technical description attached to the complaint and made a part thereof. The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the Director of Lands. The oppositor [objector] alleged that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States under the control and administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands. During the trial of the cause two witnesses only were presented by the petitioner. No proof whatever was offered by the oppositor. After hearing and considering the evidence, the Honorable Francisco Soriano, judge, reached the following conclusions of fact: 1. That the land sought to be registered consists of one parcel of land as marked and indicated on the plan and technical description presented; 2. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north, the exact description and extension of which does not appear, has been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years prior to the date of this decision; 3. That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and that they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion of the land which was not planted or cultivated was used as pasture land whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses; 4. That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred and conveyed all their right, title and interest in said land to the applicant, J. H. Ankron, some eleven years past, at which time all of the said former owners moved o n to adjoining lands where they now reside; 5. That the possession under claim of ownership of the applicant and his predecessors in interest was shown to have been open, notorious, actual, public and continuous for more than forty-four years past, and that their claim was exclusive of any other right adverse to all other claims; 6. That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling house, various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin (storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other buildings and improvements on said land.

Upon the foregoing facts the lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the manner and conditions mentioned in said decision. The conditions mentioned with reference to the opening of the road, as found in said decision, are that the applicant give his consent, which he has already done, to the opening of said road which should be fifteen (15) meters wide and should follow approximately the line of the road as it now exists subject to the subsequent survey to be made by the engineer of the province of Davao. From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court. The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently identify the land in question. In reply to that argument, the record shows that a detained and technical description of the land was made a part of the record. The evidence shows that the boundaries of the land in question were marked by monuments built of cement. The oppositor neither presented the question of the failure of proper identification of the land in the lower court nor presented any proof whatever to show that said cement monuments did not exist. The appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that the appellant failed to prove his possession and occupation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The important prerequisites for registration of land imposed by said section 54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; (b) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of said Act. In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action. No question is raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference to the right of the Moros to acquire the absolute ownership and dominion of the land which they have occupied openly, notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a long period of years. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. Rep., 132 [212 U. S., 449].) Accepting the undisputed proof, we are of the opinion that said paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 has been fully complied with and that the petitioner, so far as the second assignment of error is concerned, is entitled to have his land registered under the Torrens system. Under the third assignment of error the appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be registered in accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares. That question is not discussed in the present brief. The appellant, however., refers the court to his discussion of that question in the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep., 560). By reference to the argument in the brief in the case, it is found that the appellant relied upon the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1148 in relation with section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second Administrative Code). Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall include all unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age." Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), which decision has been follows in numerous other decision, the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was held to mean "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands" (forestry lands). Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that it appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for registration must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is public forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for registration must be denied. Many definitions have been given for "agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral" lands. These definitions are valuable so far as they establish general rules. In this relation we think the executive department of the Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in view especially of the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148, define what shall be considered forestry lands, to the end that the people of the Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products." (Sec. 8, Act No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and definitely define what lands are forestry, occupants in the future would be greatly assisted in their proof and the courts would be greatly aided in determining the question whether the particular land is forestry or other class of lands. In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the

extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra.) In view of the foregoing we are of the opinion, and so order and decree, that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with the condition that before the final certificate is issued, an accurate survey be made of the lands to be occupied by the road above mentioned and that a plan of the same be attached to the original plan upon which the petition herein is based. It is so ordered, with costs. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Moir, JJ., concur. October 31, 1967

G.R. No. L-23300 October 31, 1967 ANDRES MANARPAAC, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ROSALINO CABANATAN, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS NORTE, in his capacity as such, defendants-appellees. Herman P. Coloma for plaintiffs-appellants. Harold M. Hernando for defendant-appellee Rosalino Cabanatan. , J.: On appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing the complaint, without costs. On December 7, 1960, the plaintiffs, numbering 24 in all, surnamed Manarpaac, filed this action against Rosalino Cabanatan, the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, on a complaint which as amended on December 22, 1960, alleges that the plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial, in actual possession as owners of two parcels of land, the first with an area of 8,742 sq. m. and assessed at P160.00 under tax declaration No. 034206, in the name of Rogaciano Manarpaac, the second, with an area of 12211 sq. m. and assessed at P390.00 under tax declaration No. 030876, both parcels are situated at Barrio 15, Batac, Ilocos Norte, specifically described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that such possession has been public, uninterrupted and in the concept of owner; that they have their houses built on the land; that in the year 1956, the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan filed an application for free patent of a parcel of agricultural public land situated at Barrio Suyo, Batac, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 27,788 sq. m., and said defendant taking advantage of the ignorance and lack o f education of the plaintiffs, wilfully, fraudulently, maliciously, and surreptitiously without previous notice to the plaintiffs whatsoever, included the above described parcels o f land (par. 2 of the complaint) in his application for free patent; that on November 7, 1959, a free patent was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the Director of Lands, and on December 3, 1959, certificate of title No. V-105031 was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the register of deeds; that said certificate of title which included the land of the plaintiffs, is null and void, because the patent was obtained thru fraudulent misrepresentation; and that the proceedings leading to the investigation an d survey of the land were without notice and without compliance with the requirements of the law. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that the free patent and the certificate of title be declared null and void, and the same should be cancelled; 4. That in case th e title issued may not be annulled, that the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan be ordered to reconvey unto the plaintiffs their lands unlawfully and fraudulently included in said title; that the defendant be ordered to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P1 ,000.00; and 6. That the plaintiffs pray for such further relief and remedy as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.

The defendants filed separate answer. In his answer dated February 8, 1961, Rosalino Cabanatan denied the material allegations in the complaint, and, as special defense alleged: (a) that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of title in his name were regular and after compliance with the requirements of the law; (b) that the plaintiffs never protested with the Director of Lands against the defendants applicati on for free patent; they did not appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands awarding the land to said defendants; and the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies required by law, and, therefore, the decision of the Director of Lands has become final; (c) that the original complaint was for nullity of title, however, the amended complaint is for RECONVEYANCE which is legally impermissible, for it changed the cause of action, and hence, the amended complaint should have been dismissed, and the plaintiffs required to file a new complaint. In its answer dated January 6, 1961, the Director of Lands alleged that the issuance of the free patent was regular and after compliance with the requirements of the law; that 2. . . . he admits the allegation in paragraph 6 of the complaint to the effect that one year from the issuance of patent has not yet elapse; and that the plaintiffs never filed any protest with the Bureau of Lands against the application for free patent filed by Rosendo Cabanatan. The Register of Deeds in his answer dated January 11, 1961, alleged that the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan was in pursuance of a decree of patent presented to its office and that he merely acted in compliance of the law. On September 22, 1962, Rosalino Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss on the following ground: That even assuming that plainti ffs have a right over the land in suit, their action has already prescribed and that the court, therefore, has no jurisdiction, predicating the contention of the rulings that When any public lands are alienated, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operat ion of Section 22 of the Land Registration Act and shall become registered land . . . and a certificate of title shall be issued as in other cases of registered land (Diwaling Sumail, et al. v. CFI of Cotabato, L-8287, April 20, 1955), and the one year period under Section 38 of Act 496 should, in the case of public land grants (patent), be counted from the issuance of the patent by the Government under the Public Land Act (Nelayan v. Nelayan, L-14518. August 29, 1960). The plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss. On September 23, 1963, the court issued an order dismissing the complaint holding that the free patent having been issued on November 3, 1959, and the first complaint was filed on December 7, 1960, the action for review of the decree was, therefore, filed more than one year after the issuance of the patent. From this order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court. From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that the plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but that through fraud and irregularity, defendant Rosalino Cabanatan succeeded in securing for himself, the certificate of title in question. The foregoing recital of facts in the complaint are sufficient averment of ownership. Possession since time immemorial, carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or, that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. And so, we said in one case . . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial. FOR SUCH POSSESSION WOULD JUSTIFY THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND HAVE NEVER BEEN PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR THAT IT HAD BEEN A PRIVATE PROPERTY EVEN BEFORE THE SPANISH CONQUEST. (Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, citing Cario v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 394.) Whether this presumption should hold as a fact or not, is a question appropriately determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at least, are given the opportunity to adduce, their respective evidence. The ruling in Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 414 [re-affirmed in Mesin v. Pineda, L-14722, May 25, 1960] sustained on all fours the validity of plaintiffs theory, thus In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the

provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. If by legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the state, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof. If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it. In the case at bar, predicated upon the allegations in the complaint, together with the admission of defendant Cabanatan in his answer that the amended complaint is an action for reconveyance, which are deemed admitted on a motion to dismiss, there can hardly be any debate that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action for recovery of possession of the land for, settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name is, afte r one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. (Casilan v. Espartero, 95 Phil. 799). WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Costs in this appeal against the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 45859 September 28, 1938 GOLD CREEK MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and QUIRICO ABADILLA, Director of the Bureau of Mines, respondents. Claro M. Recto and DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for petitioner. Solicitor-General Tuason and Ramon Diokno for respondents. Abad Santos (Jose), J.: This petition seeks to compel the respondents, as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as Director of the Bureau of Mines, respectively, to approve petitioners application for patent for a certain mining claim and prepare the necessary papers in r elation thereto, and to forward and submit said papers for the signature of the President of the Philippines. The petition alleges that petitioner owns the Nob Fraction mineral claim, situated in the barrio of Gomok, municipality of Itogon, sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province, and loca ted on public lands by C. L. ODowd in accordance with the provisions of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act of Congress of February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, relative to the location of mining claims; that said claim was located on January 1, 1929, and the original declaration of location registered in the office of the mining recorder of Benguet, Mountain Province, on January 7, 1929; that from March 16 to 17, 1934, an amended location on the premises was made, for which an amended declaration of location was registered in the office of the mining recorder on April 3, 1934; that petitioner by itself and its predecessors in interest, has been in continuous and exclusive possession of said claim from the date of location thereof: that prior to August 9, 1933, petitioner filed in the office of the Director of Lands an application for an order of patent survey of said claim, which survey was duly authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and performed by a mineral land surveyor in the former divisions of mines, Bureau of Science, from August 9, 1933, to April 30, 1934, at the expense of petitioner; that the return of the surveyor, the plat and field notes of the claim and certificate that more than P1,600 worth of labor and improvements had been expended on said claim, were approved by the Director of the Bureau of Science; that prior to November 15, 1935, petitioner filed with the mining recorder an application for patent, together with a certificate showing that more than P1,600, worth of labor and/or improvements had been expended by the

petitioner upon said claim, and with the plat and field notes above mentioned; having previously posted a copy of such plat, together with notice of said application for patent in a conspicuous place upon said claim; and filed a copy of such plat and of such notice in the office of said mining recorder, as well as an affidavit of two persons that such notice had been duly posted; that prior to November 15, 1935, the notice of petitioners application for patent was forwarded by the mining recorder to the division of mines, so that the latter could order the publication of said notice was made once a week for a period of sixty days in the Philippines Herald, El Debate, and the Official Gazette, commencing February 13, 1936; that the sum of P113.59 was tendered to respondents, as payment for the purchase price of said claim, the area of which is 4.5434 hectares; and that petitioner has requested the respondents, as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as director of the Bureau of Mines, respectively, to approve its application for patent, and to prepare the necessary papers relative to the issuance thereof and to submit such papers for the signatures of the President of the Philippines, but the respondents have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse, to do so. Petitioner claims that it is entitled, as a matter of right, to the patent applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law for the issuance of such patent. Respondents, in their answer, admit some allegations of the petition and deny others, and, by way of special defense, allege that petitioner was not and is not entitled as a matter of right to a patent to the Nob Fraction cl aim because the Constitution provides that natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated; and that the respondents are , not only under no obligation to approve petitioners application for a patent to said claim and to prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto, but, also, in duty bound to proven the issuance of said patent and the preparation of the aforesaid papers, because they have sworn to support and defend the Constitution. This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an interpretation, a determination of the meaning and scope, of section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, with reference to mining claims. The cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to determining the status, under the Constitution and the Mining Act (Commonwealth Act No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining claims which were located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended. In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the public interest to meet squarely the fundamental question presented, disregarding for that purpose certain discrepancies found in the pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with the view expressed by the Solicitor-General in his memorandum where he says that the statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be accepted for the purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny some of the allegations in the petitions and allege new ones in our answers, but these discrepancies are not of such a nature or importance as should necessitate introduction of evidence before the cases are submitted for decision. From our view of the cases, these may be submitted on the facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the difference between the allegations in the pleadings to be adjusted or ironed out by the parties later, which, we are confident, can be accomplished without much difficulty. Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows: SECTION 1. All agriculture, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land. It seems likewise clear that the term natural resources, as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provisions itself. It first declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other natural resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that their disposition, exploitation, development, or ut ilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the State. And as only agri cultural,

timber, and mineral lands of the public domain were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral land s which at the time the constitutional provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do not come within the prohibition. This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in the present proceeding formed part of the public domain on November 15, 1935, when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective in accordance with section 6 of Article XV thereof. In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provisions must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts a re bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. (Barry vs. Truax, 13 N. D., 131; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.) It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not effect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government . (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.) The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator. (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law. ed., 320, 322.) When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral rights of adjoining locators; and this is the locators right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues. (18 R. C. L., 1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S., 348 , 351; 32 Law. ed., 168, 170), the court said: There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not comply with all the requirements of the law in making the location of the Pay Streak Lode Mining claim, or that the claim was ever abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the claim. They marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily traced. They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in compliance with the regulations of the district. They had thus done all that was necessary under the law for the acquisition of an exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the ground. The claim was thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of the United States to render their title perfect, and that they could obtain at any time upon proof of what they had done in locating the claim, and of subsequent expenditures to specified amount in developing it. Until the patent issued the government held the title in trust for the locators or their vendees. The ground itself was not afterwards open to sale. In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was said: The rule established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of state and lower Federal courts, that when the location of a mining claim is perfected under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense of that term; and may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title of the United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the state; and is real property, subject to th e lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a state or territorial court. (Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S., 279, 283; 26 L. ed., 737, 737; 1 Mor. Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed., 532-534; 14. Sup. Ct. Rep., 651; 18 Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs. Wood, 208 U. S., 226, [317] 232; 52 L. ed., 464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S., 389; 53 L. ed., 564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349.) The owner is not required to purchased the claim or secure patent from the United states; but so long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. (Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U. S., 306; 74 Law. ed., 445.) The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in the McDaniel case in determinative of the fundamental question involved in the instant case. But he maintains that this decision is based on a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court relied, and that it is not well founded and should be abandoned. We do not deem it necessary to belabor this point.

Whether well founded or not, the decision in that case was the law when section 1 Article XII of the Constitution became effective; and even if we were disposed to overrule that decision now, our action could not affect rights already fixed under it. Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in this case. In Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States held that mandamus will lie to compel the secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for a patent for a mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do so is based on his misinterpretation of a stat ute. In the course of its decision the court said: While the decision of this court exhibit a reluctance to direct a writ of mandamus against an executive officer, they recognize the duty to do so by settled principles of law in some cases. (Lane vs. Hoglund, 244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 L. ed., 1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and case cited.) In Roberts vs. United States (176 U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed., 443, 447; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred to and quoted in the Hoglund case, this court said: Every statute to some extent requires constructions by the public officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense, construe it, in order to form a judgment from its languages what duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one. If the law direct him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is committed to him, and which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute which requires, in some degree a construction of its language by the officer. Unless this be so, the value of this writ is very greatly impaired. Every executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon him by a statute might refuse to perform it, and hen his refusal is brought before the court he might successfully plead that the performance of the duty involved the construction of a statute by him, and therefore it as not ministerial, and the court could on that account be powerless to give relief. Such a limitation of the powers of the court, we think, would be most unfortunate, as it would relieve from judicial supervision all executive officers in the performance of their duties whenever they should plead that the duty required of them arose upon the construction of a statute, no matter how plain its language, nor how plainly they violated their duty in refusing to perform the act requ ired. In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the petitioner. Considering, however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for a patent on its merits as due to their misinterpretation of certain constitutional and statutory provisions, following the precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, a writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions LAUREL, J., concurring: This is a case, as I understand it, of a mining claim whose location was duly perfected under a law of the Congress of the United States prior to the inauguration of our Commonwealth. This law of the Congress is the Act of July 1, 1902, the first Congressional legislation that gave us a cherished bill of rights. I express the opinion that a perfected location of a mining is an existing right within the purview of sectio n 1, Article XII, of our Constitution. It is a substantial property right and permits the locator to take all the necessary steps leading to the issuance of a patent. It is not contingent or expectant because nor contingency or expectation is neither property nor property right. It is a legal right in the sense that it is recognized by law and acknowledged by the Constitution. And recognition implies protection. I must, therefore, reject the suggestion that by the interposition of the Constitution such a right had been wiped out or frittered and now to be referred to. The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was originally embodied in the report submitted by the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and Other Natural Resources to the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1934. It was later inserted in the first draft of the Constitution as section 13 of Article XIII thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it now. Slight have been the changes undergone by the proviso from the time it came out of committee until it was finally adopted. When first submitted and as inserted in the first draft of the Constitution it reads: subject to any right, grant, lease, or concession existing in respect thereto on t he date of the adoption of the Constitution. As finally adopted, the proviso reads: subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this constitution. This recognition is not mere graciou sness but springs from the just character of the government established. The framers of the Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of acquired property rights. Withal, they erected a government neither episodic nor stationary but well-nigh conservative in the protection of property rights. This notwithstanding nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of the provisions embodied in the instrument.

But while I regard the recognition and protection of the right here invoked inevitable, I feel constrained to withhold my assent to the invocation of the case of McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia ([1922], 42 Phil. 749), insofar as citation thereof may imply unqualified acceptance of or adherence to the broad rule that where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area covered is not only thereby segregated from the body of the public domain but becomes the private property of the locator. My opinion is that while the locator, under the circumstances, secures the beneficial ownership or the dominium utile, the government retain s the bare ownership or the dominium directum, until the locators claim ripens into full ownership upon full compliance with all the requirements of the law for the issuance of a patent. I, therefore, concur in the result. CONCEPCION, J., dissenting: With regret, I have to dissent from the opinion of my learned colleagues in this very important case now under advisement. We are concerned with the correct construction of a constitutional prohibition in a matter directly related to the conservation of a great portion of our national wealth: the mines. Because of the refusal of the respondents, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and the Director of the Bureau of Mines, to approve the application of the petitioner, Gold Creek Mining Company, for the issuance in its favor of the patent for or title to a mining claim, and to prepare the papers necessary for the issuance of said patent and submit them for the signature of the President of the Philippines, the petitioner seeks to obtain from this court a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to do what they refused to do. Instead of granting or dismissing the petition, the majority orders the respondents to act on the application, which, they rule, is not affected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. This is the first point on which I disagree with the majority, for the reason that, as alleged in the petition, the respondents refused to approved the petitioners application and, on the other hand, that the Solicitor-General pointed out in his memorandum that the statement of facts contained in the briefs of the petitioner may be accepted for the purpose of deciding the legal questions raised; and although there are some discrepancies between the allegations of the parties, they are not of such nature or moment as would require the introduction of evidence before the case is submitted for decision. In my opinion, this court should now dispose of the petition for mandamus on its merits, granting or dismissing the same, instead of ordering the respondents to act on the petitioners application, it being a fact that said respondents had already acted by denying said application. Now, considering the petition on its merits, should we order the respondents to approve the petitioners application for patent, or should w e, on the contrary, deny the remedy prayed for? In other words, should we hold that the petitioner is entitled to the patent applied for, or on the contrary, that it has acquired such right? Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution provides as follows: All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five yeas renewable for another twentyfive years, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The majority maintains that the foregoing constitutional provision prohibits the alienation of natu ral resources and that the term natural resources includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not the mineral lands which at the time the provisions became eff ective no longer formed part of the public domain. The majority further states that the claim in question, having been located prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, has ceased to be land of the public domain and, therefore, does not fall within the prohibition contained in the foregoing section which expressly provides that the natural resources shall not be alienated. It is true that the mining claim in question was located prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth on November 15, 1935. It may be conceded that a location, once made and perfected, operates to segregate the land from the public domain, but this in no wise means that the Government parts with the absolute ownership over the mining claim by the mere fact of its location. Location should only be understood as segregating the land located from the public domain in the sense that it is no longer open to location or susceptible of appropriation by another, while the locator has not lost his right to or abandoned the mining claim. To give a broader meaning and greater effect to the location of a mining claim is to contend against the express provisions of sections 36, 37 and 39 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by section 9 of another Act of Congress of February 6, 1905, that location is all that is necessary to acquire absolute ownership over a location of a claim to the issuance of the patent for or title to the land, is a far cry. Location, without more, confers only the right of possession. Thus section 36 of the Act of Congress of February 6, 1905 refers to the manner of recording, and amount of work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim. Section 39 of the same Act also speaks of the right of possession of the claim, and the right to the issuance of a patent only arises after the execution of certain works and acts prescribed by law, such as the labor or improvements made each year (sec. 36); the full description and identification of the land by means of plat and field notes (sec. 37); the notice and publication of the application for a patent by the locator, etc., etc. (sec. 37). The same majority states: The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by the law. (emphasis mine.) Well, then: the Act of Congress does not fix any period within which the conditions prescribed ought to be complied with. It does specify the time for recording a claim in the registry, but it does not determine the period within which to make the necessary annual labor or improvements thereon. The law requires universal publication and notice of the application for a patent for a determine number of days, but it fails to fix the date when said notice may be made and published. The law requires that, if there be any claim adverse to the application for a patent, the corresponding action should be instituted in the proper court to determine who is entitled to the patent; but no period is fixed within which the litigation should be decided. The law finally requires the payment of a certain sum for every hectare of land covered by the mining claim before the patent is issued; but it does not prescribed the period within which to pay said sum, which is the price for the alienation of the land by the Government in favor of the applicant for the title or patent.

I now ask: Within what time must the conditions prescribed by the law be complied with in order that the locator may become entitled to the patent? I gather from the majority opinion that, as long as the location of the mining claim was perfected before the inauguration of the new Government of the Philippines on November 15, 1935, the other conditions may be complied with even after said date in order that the locator may acquire a right to the patent. I dissent on this fundamental point from the majority opinion. I maintain that in prohibiting the alienation of natural resources, save any existing right, the Constitution does not refer to the right of location or to the inherent right of possession, or to any inchoate or contingent right which are only a means to bring about another right; as this right cannot be acquired until after compliance with all the conditions prescribed by law, it is evident that the prescribed conditions should be complied with before the inauguration of the Commonwealth. Was the petitioner entitled to the issuance of the patent for the mining claim in question before the inauguration of the Commonwealth on November 15, 1935? I hold that he was not, because on said date, according to the very allegations of the petition for mandamus, the publication in the newspapers of the application for a patent for a period of 60 days as prescribed by law had not been made, as said publication was only commenced on February 13, 1936. Neither was the payment of P25 per hectare made before the inaugurations of the new Government, that is, the Government had not been paid the price for the alienation of the mineral land when Article XII of the Constitution went into effect. Petitioners right, therefore, to the patent had not matured before November 15, 1935, wherefore, he falls squarely within the constitutional prohibition. A similar thing has been provided for by Act No. 926, passed in October 1903, and Act No. 2874, passed in November, 1919, in relation to public lands. Section 54, paragraph 6, of the first Act, and section 45, paragraph (b), of the second, provide that those who have been in possession of agricultural lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894, may acquire a perfect title of ownership; and it is necessarily inferred that those who commenced their possession of such lands after July 26, 1894 have no right to obtain title, notwithstanding the fact that their possession may have been for 10, 20 or 30 years. This is exactly what the Constitution has provided: to fix a time for determining those who have become entitled to the patent for a mining claim. Although the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1905 are very clear and there is no better aid to construction than the law itself, I nevertheless cite the following authorities which support my points of view in this opinion. The locator of a mining claim under the United states laws, prior to the actual payment of the purchase-money and the issuance to him of the receipt therefor by the Land Department, possesses a mere privilege to purchase the property, and a constables sale of the m ine before payment only passes that privilege. . . . (Hamilton vs. Southern Nev. G. & S. Min. Co., 33 Fed., 562.) . . . But he is not the owner of the land until he pays for it, and obtains the United States patent. It is a part of a public domain. In the meantime the defendant is occupying it under a mere license from the government, which may be revoked at any time by the repeal of the act giving it. . . . His licensce under the statute to occupy and to work it as mining ground is sufficient for that purpose until withdrawn by congress, without purchasing it. . . . (U. S. vs. Nelson, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 864.) (Emphasis mine.) A prospector on the public mineral domain may protect himself in the possession of his pedis possessionis while he is searching for mineral. His possession so held is good as a possessory title against all the world, except the government of the United States. . . . (Crossman vs. Pendery, 8 Fed., 693.) A possessory title, while it may not be divested by any one except the United States, may be avoided by the default of its owner, either by abandonment or by forfeiture for non-compliance with local regulations or with the statutory requirements as to annual labor. . . . (1 The Law of Mines and Mining in the United States, Barringer & Adams, 318, 319.) Prior to the issuance of a patent the locator cannot be said to own the fee simple title. The fee resides in the general government, whose tribunals, specially charged with the ultimate conveyance of the title, must pass upon the qualifications of the locator and his compliance with the law. Yet, as between the locator and everyone else save the paramount proprietor the estate acquired by a perfected mining location possesses all the attributes of a title in fee, and so long as the requirements of the law with reference to continued development are satisfied, the character of the tenure remains that of a fee. As between the locator and the government, the former is the owner of the beneficial estate, and the latter holds the fee in trust, to be conveyed to such beneficial owner upon his application in that behalf and in compliance with the terms prescribed by the paramount proprietor. (Lindley on Mines, 3d. ed., sec. 539, p. 1200.) (Emphasis mine.) I therefore vote for the denial of the petition.