23 II. Responsibility as Absolute Spontaneity: Kant and Transcendental Freedom .

Personhood and Responsibility. Kant situates responsibility within the sphere of rational agency within the hori!on of sub"ecti#ity of the sub"ectum. A certain conception of freedom $as causa sui self%determination and autonomy& ma'es possible such responsibility and Kant(s philosophical reflection on responsibility ta'es place within the hori!on of the freedom of the sub"ect specifying further what Aristotle had metaphorically designated as the )paternity* of the act. +ere agency the principle of the act is further determined in terms of freedom and spontaneity freedom being defined as )absolute spontaneity * that capacity by the sub"ect to begin absolutely a new series of causes. For it is indeed the sub"ect the sub"ectum the spontaneous I that is the causal foundation and absolute beginning $transcendental freedom& and which Kant designates in the ,riti-ue of Pure Reason as the locus and basis of responsibility $as imputatibility Imputabilit.t&. Responsibility is understood in terms of the sub"ectum that lies at the basis of the act. Kant determines responsibility as imputation based on the freedom of the sub"ect and claims further that responsibility as self%responsibility defines personhood as such. /ltimately Kant pri#ileges the notion of personhood within his interpretation of sub"ecti#ity personhood actually being defined by responsibility and self%responsibility. The Kantian determination of the essence of sub"ecti#ity is indeed threefold and as it were split into three fundamental senses corresponding to the three determinations of the I that he retains: the I in the sense of the determining I $the 0I thin'0 or transcendental apperception&1 the I in the sense of the determinable I $the empirical I the I as ob"ect&1 and the I in the sense of the I as moral person as

78 end in itself. 4n the whole the Kantian determination of sub"ecti#ity can be di#ided into two fundamental senses: on the one hand that of the broad formal concept of the ego in general in the sense of self%consciousness whether as transcendental consciousness the I%thin' or as the I% ob"ect that is personality ta'en in the sense of rationality1 on the other hand the strict and proper concept of personality that of the moral person defined by responsibility. 5ith respect to the first sense Kant follows the traditional definition of man as rational animal. +owe#er the union of animality and rationality does not suffice to fully define the essence of personality or personhood through which man is not only considered as a particular entity among others but as freedom and self%responsibility. Strictly spea'ing personality applies to the sub"ect only as it is recogni!ed as capable of responsibility of imputation that is responsible for itself. The essence of the person is self%responsibility. The practical sub"ect en"oys a certain preeminence o#er the theoretical sub"ect because unli'e the theoretical determination of the I deemed 0impossible0 by Kant in the Paralogisms the practical determination of the sub"ect alone is capable of establishing a positi#e account of personhood as end in itself and self%responsibility. For instance the person6s being an )end in itself* $Selbst!wec'haftig'eit& such as it is displayed in the Kantian theory of the moral person could be posited as one of the most fundamental determination of the human being as Kant situates the ultimate ends of man in morality. In fact the characteri!ation of the sub"ect as moral with its distinction between persons and things is determinant for the notion of responsibility more precisely of imputation: As person the human being is understood as a being capable of imputation as being responsible for its own self.

7; The Foundation of Responsibility in Transcendental Freedom. Responsibility indeed constitutes for Kant the differentiating feature between persons and things the defining characteristic of personhood. In contrast with things Kant asserts a person is a sub"ect that is capable of imputation. In his 9octrine of Right Kant e:plains that a person is )a sub"ect whose actions can be imputed to him * whereas a )thing is that to which nothing can be imputed.*; This capacity to be a sub"ect as ground of imputation is owed to the faculty of freedom ta'en as )transcendental freedom * which determines the possibility of responsibility and moral responsibility: In the ,riti-ue of Practical Reason Kant insists that freedom is the ground for all subse-uent responsibility writing )the -uestion of freedom< lies at the foundation of all moral laws and accountability to them * which means that )without transcendental freedom in its proper meaning which is alone a priori practical no moral law and no accountability to it are possible.*2 Responsibility rests upon the sub"ecti#ity of the free sub"ect. Kant states that an )action is called a deed insofar as it comes under obligatory laws and hence insofar as the sub"ect in doing it is considered in terms of the freedom of his choice. =y such an action the agent is regarded as the author >/rheber? of its effect >5ir'ung? and this together with the action itself can be imputed to him if one is pre#iously ac-uainted with the laws by #irtue of which an obligation rests on these.*7 As we will see transcendental freedom is the foundation of responsibility. 4ne finds in Kant a crucial de#elopment on transcendental freedom and on the imputation of the acting sub"ect in the ,riti-ue of Pure Reason in the third antinomy in the Transcendental 9ialectic $)Third ,onflict of the Transcendental Ideas*& also 'nown as the )cosmological* antinomy. The imputability of the sub"ect is indeed both a moral or "uridical notion and a cosmological or metaphysical one and both in#ol#e a fundamental philosophical

72 interpretation of sub"ecti#ity approached here as transcendental freedom. 4ne cannot stress enough the importance of the role of transcendental freedom in this account of responsibility as well as for the entire critical system as Kant wrote famously that )The concept of freedom in so far as its reality is pro#ed by an apodictic law of practical reason is the 'eystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and e#en of speculati#e reason.*@ The discussion of freedom as a cosmological concept in the third antinomy is determinati#e for Kant(s thin'ing on the imputation of the act and on responsibility. As +enry Allison notes the third antinomy )is not only the locus of the ma"or discussion of the problem of freedom in the ,riti-ue of Pure Reason it is also the basis for Kant(s subse-uent treatments of the topic in his writings on moral philosophy.*A It is therefore necessary to focus on this passage for an understanding of Kant(s philosophy of responsibility and freedom. Bore precisely it pro#ides an account of imputability grounded on the faculty of freedom. The basis for imputability is the spontaneity of the agent as sub"ect that is a power )which could start to act from itself without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of connection*C. Responsibility ta'en here as imputation of the sub"ect is discussed within the conte:t of an antinomy between freedom and natural determinism. Freedom in turn is discussed within a general discussion of causalityD. Kant presents this aporetic structure through an opposition between a thesis and an antithesis $the thesis pro#iding the basis for an imputability of the act and the antithesis not&: )$Thesis& ,ausality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be deri#ed. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to e:plain them* $,PR A @@@ = @D2 p.@E@& to which the Antithesis counters: )There is no freedom but e#erything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature* $A @@A = @D7 p.@EA&. The burden of proof is on the

77 possibility of admitting a free causality as natural causality is assumed by Kant as a gi#en and not in dispute. As +enry Allison rightly stresses on page ;@ in his Kant(s Theory of Freedom )=oth parties to the Third Antinomy assume the #alidity within e:perience of Fcausality in accordance with laws of nature( that is the mode of causality affirmed in the Second Analogy. In dispute is whether it is also necessary or e#en permissible to appeal to another conception of causality transcendental freedom defined as Fthe power >GermHgen? of beginning a state spontaneously >#on selbst?( $A A77I=AC;& in order to account ade-uately for any gi#en appearance.* The -uestion of freedom of the responsibility that it grounds is discussed in the third antinomy in the conte:t of a cosmological discussion. It is as a notion both cosmological and ethical as I alluded to abo#e that Kant approaches the -uestion of imputability. ),osmological * because the reflection ta'es place within the conte:t of a discussion on causality in nature1 and )ethical * because of the appearance in this causal networ' of a freedom of the human being another causality as Kant states which will constitute the sub"ect as sub"ect of imputation. Another causality than that of nature would determine the free sub"ect as a person as personhood as self%responsibility: a dignity is gi#en to us in the cosmos by #irtue of this free causality or )causality by freedom.* There are thus two causalities for Kant J and only two: natural causality and causality by freedom J because there are for him two fundamental categories of beings. 4n the one hand there are things which obey the uni#ersal determinism of nature1 and on the other hand there are persons which follow a different 'ind of causality a causality through freedom or free causality. Kant e:plains in the ,riti-ue of Pure Reason in )Resolution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the deri#ation of occurrences in the world from their causes*: )In regard of what happens one can thin' of causality in only two ways: either according to nature or from

7@ freedom* $,PR AA72I=AC8 p.A72&. )In only two ways* $we recall that for Aristotle things could happen in three ways: through necessity through fortune or chance and through our #oluntary action& and only through two causalities: mechanistic causality $in Kant(s sense of a mechanism of nature& and freedom. For Kant there are thus only two ways for things to happen: either by necessity $they could not ha#e happened any other way& following the uni#ersal laws of nature by which each thing is at it were )pushed* or determined by a preceding cause1 or else from freedom a 'ind of spontaneity or free surge that does not follow the uni#ersal laws of nature $at least as we will see not in causality although it does follow it in time following a distinction made by Kant to which I will return shortly& and is therefore not )pushed* by some preceding cause that would determine it. Kant presents it as a sort of originary capacity to begin absolutely )from itself * i.e. spontaneously. )=y freedom in the cosmological sense on the contrary >to the causality of nature? I understand the faculty of beginning a state from itself $#on selbst& the causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause determining it in time in accordance with the law of nature.* $,PR A A77I=AC; p.A77&. Ket us clarify from the outset: both causalities are operati#e in the world in a singular intertwining. Let they are nonetheless said to be radically distinct as causalities in a classic Kantian dualismE. 4ur focus will bear mostly on so%called causality by or through freedom as it is the one instrumental in Kant(s definition of responsibility. Kant first and pro#isionally characteri!es freedom negati#ely as a sort of )lawlessness* $,PR A@@DI=@DA p.@EA& rebel to uni#ersal determinism leaping out of natural causality. Indeed in one sense $the negati#e sense& freedom is independence from the laws of nature a )liberation from coercion * or )from the guidance of all rules.* Freedom in this conte:t is identified with lawlessness: Kant for instance spea's of the )lawless faculty of freedom* $,PR A@A;I=@D3 p.@E3& and he goes so far as to claim that

7A freedom is )contrary* to causal law. )Thus transcendental freedom is contrary to the causal law* $,PR A@@AI=@D7 p.@EA&. Freedom seems as antinomical to rules and laws as nature is structured according to them to such an e:tent that Kant adds pleasantly: )if freedom were determined according to laws it would not be freedom but nothing other than nature*M $,PR A@@DI=@DA p.@EA&. 5ith transcendental freedom we are as it were leaping out of causality that is to say of nature 3 if not out of the world. Such faculty of freedom is indeed literally )out of this world * because it cannot appear in the field of appearances as a spatio%temporal gi#en and is for that #ery reason termed )transcendental.* Kant e:plains that freedom ta'en in the cosmological sense that is as the faculty of beginning a state from itself )is a pure transcendental idea which first contains nothing borrowed from e:perience and second the ob"ect of which cannot be gi#en determinately in any e:perience<* $,PR A A77I=AC; p.A77&. Such faculty of freedom is noumenal since it cannot appear in a spatio%temporal causal networ'. In the ,riti-ue of Practical Reason $op.cit. pp.3D%3E& in the ,ritical elucidation of the analytic of pure practical reason * Kant returns to the -uestion of freedom in its relation to natural causality and ma'es the following clarification. As established with the phenomenaInoumena distinction and in order to sol#e the apparent contradiction between freedom and the mechanism of nature as intertwined in one action Kant stresses that the )concept of causality as natural necessity unli'e the concept of causality as freedom concerns only the e:istence of things as far as it is determinable in time and conse-uently as appearances in contrast to their causality as things%in%themsel#es.* +owe#er with respect to the free agent we enter another realm than the mechanical causality of nature a realm in which the same sub"ect being conscious of himself as a thing in himself considers his e:istence not as sub"ect to time%conditions but determinable by

7C laws which he gi#es himself through reason. In such an e:istence nothing precedes the determination of his will. Kant begins by de#eloping the aporias in#ol#ed in the antithesis which claims that there is no freedom and that e#erything in the world happens only in accordance with the laws of nature. If we assume that there is only the causality of nature then the conse-uence is that )e#erything that happens presupposes a pre#ious state upon which it follows without e:ception according to a rule* $,PR A@@@I=@D2 p.@E@&. Now the same necessity applies to that pre#ious state as well which has also arisen from a pre#ious state that caused it $)=ut now the pre#ious state itself must be something that has happened<*&. The notion of a uni#ersal causality of nature presupposes this temporal antecedence as )the causality of the cause through which something happens is always something that has happened which according to the law of nature $nach dem Oeset! der Natur& presupposes once again a pre#ious state and its causality and this in the same way a still earlier state and so on* $,PR A @@@I=@D2 p.@E@&.;8 The aporia of natural causality as sole causality begins to appear: there is no way to interrupt or escape the ineluctability of this infinite regress so that one could ne#er reach the beginning of the series the )first* beginning and cause;;. Kant e:plains: )If therefore e#erything happens according to mere laws of nature then at e#ery time there is only a subordinate but ne#er a first beginning<* $,PR @@@I=@D2 p. @E@&. Now without such beginning one could ne#er ha#e arri#ed at this present state which is of course an impossibility: hence a first aporia. =ut most importantly the impossibility of finding a first cause would signify that no completeness of causes can be reached which would contradict the principle of sufficient reason which precisely demands such a completeness $)=ut now the law of nature consists "ust in this that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori* >,PR @@CI=@D@ p. @E@? and therefore a first absolute

7D beginning pro#ided by a first cause. This is why Kant insists that by following the mere causality of nature one could ne#er attain a )completeness of the series on the side of the causes descending one from another* $,PR A@@CI=@D@ p.@E@&. This aporia signifies the impossibility of the antithesis $)There is no freedom but e#erything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature*& which precisely claimed that there was only one causality the causality of nature: such causality cannot pro#ide the first beginning that would ensure the completeness of causes and thus satisfy its own re-uirement. Kant then concludes that )the proposition that all causality is possible only in accordance with laws of nature >nach Oeset!en der Natur? when ta'en in its unlimited uni#ersality contradicts itself and therefore this causality cannot be assumed to be the only one* $,PR A@@CI=@D@ p. @E@ emphasis mine&. As a conse-uence another causality must be admitted one in which )something happens without its cause being further determined by another pre#ious cause* $,PR A@@CI=@D@ p. @E@&. That implicit reference to the motif of a first cause and thus of the causa sui is presented by Kant in terms of spontaneity i.e. that which begins from itself an )absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself* that Kant also names )transcendental freedom * transcendental insofar as it transcends the course of nature e#en though it alone pro#ides the possibility of a completeness of the series of appearances on the side of the causes.;2 An intelligible freedom must be assumed although )no insight into it is achie#ed* $,PR A@A8I= @DE p.@EC& since it is not a part of the phenomenal world;7. It can thus only be assumed as an outside of the world and yet this outside ma'es the world possible by securing the completeness of causes. The completeness of the world and thus its possibility rests upon this noumenal outer%worldly freedom. Such is the enigma presented by Kant: the completeness of the world lies

7E outside the world and yet this outside constitutes the world1 it is literally the outside of the world. Transcendental freedom Kant e:plains is the capacity of a cause to produce a state spontaneously or )from itself* $#on Selbst& $,RP AA77I=AC; p. A77&. A transcendentally free cause would be a )first cause * that is without a prior cause. The whole determination of responsibility as imputation will re#ol#e around the possibility of such a causa sui. Kant "ustifies this claim by appealing to a re-uirement of reason going bac' to the Ancient tradition of the first mo#er: )The confirmation of the need of reason to appeal to a first beginning from freedom in the series of natural causes is clearly and #isibly e#ident from the fact that $with the e:ception of the Ppicurean school& all the philosophers of Anti-uity saw themsel#es as obliged to assume a first mo#er for the e:planation of motions in the world i.e. a freely acting cause which began this series of states first and from itself* $,PR A@A8I=@DE p. @EE&. The first instance of a free% acting cause is thus the first mo#er which allows one to concei#e of an origin of the world. The origin of the world cannot be in the world. Let as we saw the world as a totality is only possible on such basis. In fact nature and freedom are for Kant thoroughly intertwined: absolute spontaneity is said to begin )from itself * )a series of appearances that runs according to natural laws* $,PR A@@CI=@D@ p. @E@& this already indicating that free causality although independent from natural causality is intertwined it: Qust as natural necessity rests on transcendental freedom freedom in turn produces effects in the world. 5e will return to this intertwining shortly. At this stage it suffices to posit that natural causality does not gi#e us a first cause1 the causality of freedom does thus satisfying the principle of sufficient reason. Kant recogni!es that so far he has only established the necessity of a first beginning of a series of appearances from freedom )only to the e:tent that this is re-uired to ma'e

73 comprehensible an origin of the world* $,PR A@@EI=@DC p. @EC& which clearly for Kant does not apply to us. +owe#er he insists because )the faculty of beginning a series in time entirely on its own is thereby pro#ed* $while he immediately recogni!es as we alluded to abo#e that this proof gi#es us no insight into it since such a faculty is transcendental and ne#er to be obser#ed within a field of appearances& then )we are permitted * he continues )also to allow that in the course of the world different series may begin on their own< and to ascribe to the substances in those series the faculty of acting from freedom* $,PR A@A8I=@DE p.@EC&. Kant thus allows for an analogy between the transcendent creator of the world and rational agents operating in the world by #irtue of this capacity to begin absolutely to be a spontaneous free cause cause of itself causa sui. Through this analogy with the prime mo#er in the conte:t of a discussion on the aporia of natural causality Kant pro#es the possibility of freedom which can thus be admitted as operating in the world. Further Kant warns us not to be )stopped here by a misunderstanding namely that since a successi#e series in the world can ha#e only a comparati#ely first beginning because a state of the world must always precede it perhaps no absolutely first beginning of the series is possible during the course of the world* $,PR A@A;I=@D3 p.@EE&. This is only a misunderstanding )for here we are tal'ing of an absolute beginning not as far as time is concerned but as far as causality is concerned* $,PR A@A;I=@D3 p.@EE&. There is the origin of the world and there is also an origin in the world. It will be possible to spea' of an absolute beginning in the world than's to this distinction introduced by Kant between beginning in time and beginning in causality. Indeed Kant posits the freedom of the will in terms of the spontaneity of the act itself resting on the notion of causa sui. Now this concept traditionally only applies to Ood and Kant does ma'e e:plicit reference to the tradition of the prime mo#er. +owe#er such a first cause

@8 only pertained to the origin of the world. The issue here is determining how can there be also an origin in the world and how can one reconcile such a free spontaneity with uni#ersal determinism or causality of natureR +ow does one begin absolutely when e#ery e#ent must presuppose a prior e#ent that causes itR +ow can there be an origin within the causal networ' of natureR Kant himself recogni!ed the difficulty in admitting a free cause that would operate within the world that is within a chain of causes for all that has been established so far was the necessity of a first beginning of a series of appearances from freedom as it pertained to the origin of the world while )one can ta'e all the subse-uent states to be a result of mere natural laws* $)Remar' on the Third Antinomy * ,PR A@@EI=@DC p.@EC&. This is the antinomy of pure reason this idea of a free cause or unconditioned causality constituting for Kant )the real stumbling bloc' for philosophy* $,PR A@@EI=@DC p. @EC&. Kant attempts to resol#e this problem by distinguishing a beginning in time from a beginning in causality the latter applying to free agency operating in the world. As $transcendentally& free agents we can ne#er begin in time but we can begin in causality hence pro#iding a basis for responsibility. 4nly in the case of di#ine creation beginning in time and beginning in causality are merged. For our own free actions the beginning is only in causality $as we are not origins of the world but origins in the world that is as beginning in causality&. In the causality of freedom in the beginning in causality no antecedent cause determines my actions which in no way can )be regarded as simple causal conse-uences of the antecedent state of the agent*. In the midst of the world and within the world and in the course of time itself certain e#ents somehow happen as absolute beginnings that is from )a faculty of absolutely beginning a state* $,PR A@@AI=@D7 p.@EA&. To the potential ob"ection that no absolute beginning can happen in the world Kant replies that there can be a comparati#ely first beginning that there can be an absolute beginning $in

@; causality& occurring in medias res. Kant is e:plicit on this point namely that there is an origin of the world but there are also origins in the world writing that )we are permitted also to allow that in the course of the world different series may begin on their own as far as their causality is concerned<* $,PR A @A8I=@DE p.@EC&. P#en though freedom can only ta'e place within the causal networ' of the world it remains nonetheless absolute and uncaused Kant insisting that an absolute first beginning of a series is possible during the course of the world. Thus on the one hand the capacity to begin a new series of causes from oneself is absolute $although it is an absolute beginning not in time but in causality& and on the other hand this capacity is still inscribed within the fabric of the world and its causal laws. 5e introduce something new in the world out of our own spontaneity;@ but what we introduce is something new in the world which then gets ta'en up in natural causality. 5hate#er I decide to do out of this spontaneous transcendental freedom still has to ta'e place in the world. The new that I introduce is absolute $otherwise it would not be )new*& but that absolute happens in the conditioned world $this is why Kant spo'e of a )comparati#ely first beginning*&. All I can do is begin a new series of causes themsel#es inscribed in nature. This is why Kant establishes that one must assume a first uncaused beginning but along with it )its natural conse-uences to infinity * conse-uences of the free act which follow purely natural laws $,PR A@A8I=@DE p.@EE&. In a sense the act is both free or uncaused and part of natural determinism according to Kant(s distinction between a beginning in time $natural determinism& and a beginning in causality $freedom&. To ta'e Kant(s e:ample: )If $for e:ample& I am now entirely free and get up from my chair without the necessarily determining influence of natural causes then in this occurrence along with its natural conse-uences to infinity there begins an absolutely new series e#en though as far as time is concerned this occurrence is only the continuation of a pre#ious

@2 series* $,PR A@A8I=@DE p.@EE&. 5ith respect to free decision and action natural causes e:ercise no determining influence whatsoe#er. Free action does indeed )follow upon them * but )does not follow from* them $die !war auf "ene folgt aber daraus nicht erfolgt&. Now what is significant in such an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself )absolute spontaneity of an action* or transcendental freedom %% which lies in the )intention* or )resolution* $Pntschliessung& and the act Kant specifies %% is that it will be determined as ground for imputability that is for the #ery possibility of responsibility as accountability of the sub"ect. This power or performati#ity of transcendental freedom $defined as we recall by Kant as the power GermHgen of beginning a state spontaneously or from oneself #on Selbst& as decision to act outside of natural causality pro#ides a ground. In the )Remar' on the Third Antinomy * Kant clarifies that the originary capacity of initiating a causal series gi#es itself as the )ground* of what he terms Imputabilit.t or imputability. It appears here that responsibility as imputability rests upon a ground a basis a sub"ectum and in fact re-uires it. Kant(s account of responsibility i.e. the imputation of the act as articulated in the third antinomy thus relies on an ontology of the sub"ectum for it is because there is a sub"ectum at the foundation of the act that the latter can be imputed or ascribed to an agent. A certain conception of the human agency is here proposed consisting in understanding it as sub"ect and sub"ectum.;A The infinite chain of causes stops in a first cause allowing for the ultimate ground of the act to appear $as the collo-uial e:pression says )the buc' stops here*&. The infinite chain of antecedent causes of )reasons * of )whats * gi#es way to a )who * to an author%sub"ect as first cause of the act as ground of imputation. The search for reasons can proceed infinitely but the search for the author of the act is finite and stops when the )who* of the act is identified as ground of the act. Responsibility thus means here the imputation of a free sub"ect. Kant writes:

@7 )The transcendental ideas of freedom is far from constituting the whole content of the psychological concept of that name which is for the most part empirical but constitutes only that of the absolute spontaneity of an action as the real ground of its imputability $Imputabilit.t&1 but this idea is ne#ertheless the real stumbling bloc' for philosophy which finds insuperable difficulties in admitting this 'ind of unconditioned causality* $,PR A@@EI=@DC p.@EC&. This absolute freedom this first absolute beginning understood as a beginning in causality is then the ground of responsibility that is of an agent as free cause of its actions. Responsibility now means: an act can be grounded absolutely and a foundation of the act can be displayed: the freedom of the sub"ect. The spontaneity of freedom constitutes the inter#ention of the agent in the world its introducing new e#ents in the world and causing changes within it changes that can be traced bac' to the agent as free cause. +ence )the absolute spontaneity of an action* constitutes )the real ground of its imputability.*

Responsibility as Autonomy This sense of freedom as ground of imputability opens the space of personhood and autonomy. As we saw apart from a negati#e understanding of freedom as foreign to law rebel to causality another more positi#e sense appeared in the notion of self%causation causa sui. As Kant stresses the notion of a freedom as being foreign to causality as )lawless * is only the negati#e account of it one that merely emphasi!es that freedom is independent from )foreign causes* $Foundations p.2EA&. Kant e:plains in the beginning of the third section of The Foundations of the Betaphysics of Borals that the )preceding definition of freedom >as independence from causes? is negati#e and therefore affords no insight into its essence. =ut a

@@ positi#e concept of freedom flows from it which is so much the richer and more fruitful $Foundations< p. 2EA&. /nderstood positi#ely freedom is not foreign to law but indeed another 'ind of causality. For as Kant e:plains )freedom is by no means lawless e#en though it is not a property of the will according to the laws of nature* $Foundations p.2EA&. 4n the contrary it must be thought of as a different 'ind of causality a causality acting according to immutable laws if it is the case that the concept of causality )entails that of laws according to which something $i.e. the effect& must be established through something else which we call cause* $Foundations p.2EA&. Freedom will be ta'en as a causality $)4therwise a free will would be an absurdity* >Foundations p. 2EA?& J and thus )by no means lawless* %% but a causality of a peculiar 'ind: while natural causality presents a heteronomy of efficient causes freedom presents an autonomy that is the power of the will to be a law for itself.;C In fact Kant clarified that as a 'ind of causality of li#ing beings so far as they are rational )freedom would be that property of this causality by which it can be effecti#e independent of foreign causes determining it* $Foundations p.2EA&. 5hat is at issue here is the notion of a heteronomy of causes $)foreign causes*& not causality as such. 5hereas natural necessity is defined by Kant as )a heteronomy of efficient causes* $Foundations p.2EA& the freedom of the will is identified with autonomy: )5hat else then can the freedom of the will be but autonomy $i.e. the property of the will to be a law to itself&R* $Foundations p. 2EC&. The positi#e sense of freedom will thus be determined as a causality of autonomy: Kant understands this sense as the act of gi#ing oneself the law followed a 'ind of causality defined by an )ought * and not by the necessity $must& of nature. Freedom as freedom from causality supposes freedom as self%causation and autonomy: As free from all laws of nature the person is )obedient only to those laws which he himself gi#es* $Foundations p. 2DE&.

@A If freedom means acting independently from e:ternal causes $)heteronomy of efficient causes*& my actions cannot be said to be regulated by some heteronomical principle. Rather I act freely when I follow my own principles as freedom is the )faculty of determining oneself from oneself* $,PR AA7@I=AC2 p.A77&. 9espite the common #iew that freedom is not sub"ect to the law and despite Kant(s own formulations in the third antinomy according to which freedom seems )contrary to causal law * in fact freedom is the act of gi#ing oneself the law followed. The will cannot be thought of e:cept as some 'ind of causality producing effects. 5hereas e#erything in nature wor's according to laws a rational being has the power to act according to its conception of the law that is according to principles: )this conception is the will* $Foundations p.2C7&. Rational agents posit an end more precisely posit themsel#es as an end and to that e:tent are called persons. ,onse-uently the agent is free and responsible as an autonomous being. Kant defines personality as autonomy: It rests upon the freedom of the will as autonomous and therefore a person is only sub"ect to the laws he posits himself. This determines the moral person in terms of autonomy autonomy being the cornerstone of such ethics of freedom. This ethics is re#ealed in the feeling of respect. Kant writes in Foundations of the Betaphysics of Borals that )The =eings whose e:istence does not depend on our will but on nature if they are not rational beings ha#e only relati#e worth as means and are therefore called )things*1 rational beings on the other hand are designated )persons* because their nature indicates that they are ends in themsel#es $i.e. things which may not be used merely as means&. Such a being is thus an ob"ect of respect<* $Foundations 2D7&. Respect thus re#eals the dignity of the person through which man gi#es himself to himself. Self%worth grounds a morality of autonomy and autonomy becomes the ground for the dignity of the person. )A thing has no worth other than that determined for it by

@C the law. The lawgi#ing which determines all worth must therefore ha#e a dignity.* That is an unconditional worth. For such a being )only the word Frespect( is suitable* $Foundations p. 2DE&. This dignity lies in the fact that man ne#er e:ists merely as a means but as an end $that is as an absolute priceless #alue& precisely to the e:tent that in the feeling of respect he gi#es himself to himself and belongs to himself as responsibility for himself. The moral person e:ists as its own end1 it is itself an end. Respect re#eals that the person e:ists for the sa'e of itself that it is an end for itself and that the self e:ists for the sa'e of itself.;D 5hat is categorically imperati#e is no longer a di#ine command for that would still be heteronomical1 rather autonomy is the basis for dignity and respect and moral worth. Self%worth is the fundamental content of morality. This is why Kant stresses that autonomy is the )basis of the dignity of both human nature and e#ery rational nature* $Foundations p. 2DE&. The famous fundamental principle of morality states: 0Act so that you use humanity in your own person as well as in the person of e#eryone else ne#er merely as a means but always at the same time as an end.* As a result Kant places the principle of morality in the autonomy of the sub"ect stressing that in pure morality man is not bound to e:ternal laws but is sub"ect only to his own. )The moral principle I will call the principle of autonomy of the will in contrast to all other principles which I accordingly count under heteronomy* $Foundations p. 2DC&. As he articulated in the ,riti-ue of Pure Reason the rational being has two points of #iew from which it can regard itself: first as belonging to the world of sense and thus sub"ect to laws of nature $heteronomy&1 second as belonging to the intelligible world under laws which are independent from nature and are based in reason alone. As belonging to the intelligible world man can ne#er concei#e the causality of his own will e:cept as free and as independent from the causes of the sensible world. Thus the concept of freedom is indistinguishable from that of autonomy.

@D A law proceeding from a self%legislating rational will J and not from a heteronomical principle %% obligates us only through respect. Since it is the rational will that is the author of this law it is in a deeper sense the rational will that is the ob"ect of respect. Rational nature can be seen not only to be an end in itself $with fundamental ob"ecti#e worth& but to ha#e dignity $absolute or incomparable worth&. Respect here is respect for the moral law. Kant describes this law as being first negati#e in its effect for it tears one away from one6s inclinations tendencies and )sensible feelings.* It )humiliates* our self%conceit )repulses* feelings and thus has a negati#e effect on them. +owe#er "ust as in Spino!a an emotion can only be o#ercome by another emotion the repulsed sensible feelings will gi#e way to a positi#e feeling that of respect. The feeling of respect arising against the bac'ground of the humiliation of the sensible is therefore not itself sensible1 it is a priori intellectual. Kant writes: )And as stri'ing down i.e. humiliating self%conceit >the law? is an ob"ect of the greatest respect and thus the ground of a positi#e feeling which is not of empirical origin.*;E Respect for the law should also re#eal the self which feels respect for itself in its =eing and in an essential way. In the feeling of respect the self is immediately re#ealed to itself not in an empirical mode but in a non%sensible a priori way. Reason freely gi#es itself o#er to the moral law1 it produces as it were the feeling of respect for the law: respect for the law is the acti#e ego6s respect for itself as the self which is responsible. To the e:tent that it is both a priori and self%produced the feeling of respect is a self%affection and respect as submission before the law a self%submission. =y submitting to the law I in fact submit to myself and thereby am re#ealed to myself as freedom self%determination and self%responsibility. In sub"ecting myself to the law I sub"ect myself to myself as pure reason that is in this sub"ection to myself I raise myself to myself as a free self%determining being. Respect re#eals the self as responsibility to

@E itself and for itself. Respect thus manifests an essential characteristic of the person: In responsibility for itself the person is appropriated to itself in its own proper self: respect engages the responsibility of a self that in each case I ha#e to be. In respect I raise myself )up* to myself I )own up* to myself I answer for myself by ta'ing the responsibility myself. This concept of self%responsibility will become the #ery meaning of enlightenment for Kant as he proclaimed in the essay )5hat is PnlightenmentR*

The Ideal of Self%Responsibility 4ne 'nows that famous passage from Foundations of the Betaphysics of Borals where Kant writes: )+ere we see philosophy brought to what it is in fact a precarious position which should be made fast e#en though it is supported by nothing in either hea#en or earth. +ere philosophy must show its purity as the absolute sustainer of its laws and not the herald of those which an implanted sense or who 'nows what tutelary nature whispers to it.* A passage as it were echoed by Niet!sche who wrote in Twilight of the Idols: )For what is freedomR +a#ing the will to be responsible to oneself.*;3 Responsibility becomes identified with an ideal of self% responsibility as autonomy. For Kant the principle of autonomy re-uires that reason )must regard itself as the author of its principles independent of alien influences* $Foundations p. 2ED&. Autonomous self%responsibility is thus opposed to heteronomous determinations. To that e:tent and in contrast with the )causality of all irrational beings* that are determined by the influence of foreign causes we are defined in terms of responsibility that is autonomous self% responsibility. In his ;DE@ essay )5hat is PnlightenmentR*28 $the full title reads )=eantwortung der Frage: 5as ist Auf'l.rungR& answering the -uestion posed by the Re#erend Qohann Friedrich SHllner $an official in the Prussian go#ernment& and published in the =erlinische

@3 Bonatsschrift $=erlin Bonthly& Kant famously defines enlightenment as a way out of immaturity and dependency %% that is out of a state of irresponsibility %% and as a call to $self&responsibility. As Bichel Foucault has noted the way Kant poses the -uestion of Auf'l.rung is entirely different from other accounts of a historical era in that it is first characteri!ed negati#ely: )it is neither a world era to which one belongs nor an e#ent whose signs are percei#ed nor the dawning of an accomplishment. Kant defines Auf'l.rung in an almost entirely negati#e way as an Ausgang an Fe:it ( a Fway out.(*2; That e:it is from irresponsibility and enlightenment is thus the process that releases us from such irresponsibility. Indeed in the opening lines Kant declares that )Pnlightenment is man6s release from his self% incurred tutelage $/nmTndig'eit& * /nmTndig'eit designating both immaturity and dependence and )not being of age.* 5hat tutelageR 5hat immaturityR 5hat irresponsibilityR Kant defines it as )man(s inability to ma'e use of his understanding without direction from another* $5P p.@C2 my emphasis&. Irresponsibility is thus the state of being determined in one(s "udgment by another that is heteronomy. Significantly Kant claims that this dependence on others this being ruled by others is self%imposed $as Kant spea's of a )self%incurred* tutelage& as if humans were ultimately responsible for their own irresponsibility and immaturity22. This indicates that responsibility represents for Kant the essential nature and #ocation of man and that such a responsibility will be concei#ed outside and against the inter#ention of the other. There lies the sub"ecti#ist enclosure of the concept of responsibility and the pri#ileging of self%responsibility being con-uered against the presence of otherness in selfhood. Responsibility would then be the autonomous practice of one(s reason without the direction of others that is the #ery o#ercoming of heteronomy.

A8 Further Kant stresses that in this situation of irresponsibility the issue is not a lac' of understanding but of courage namely the courage to use one(s "udgment on one(s own. As Foucault ma'es clear )Pnlightenment is defined by a modification of the pree:isting relation lin'ing will authority and the use of reason.*27 To that e:tent responsibility as the autonomous practice of one(s own reason is not a matter of 'nowledge but of the courage to use it autonomously. Responsibility as autonomous practice thus pro#es to be a matter of power as Niet!sche would recogni!e when he wrote that )Independence is for the #ery few1 it is a pri#ilege of the strong* $=OP p. @;&. Responsibility is the power to act autonomously and affirm one(s independence. )Self%incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lac' of reason but in lac' of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere AudeM >dare to 'now?. F+a#e courage to use your own reasonM(%% that is the motto of enlightenment* $5P p.@C2&. 4ne notes here how responsibility is associated with the thematics of power and self% legislation and how such power arises out of a rupture with any heteronomical principle that is a rupture with the reliance on the other. Responsibility represents the position of the power of the autonomous self the auto%position of a so#ereign sub"ecti#ity. For its part irresponsibility $immaturity& is thereby defined as a $self%incurred& fleeing in the face of this self%determination. =y calling human beings bac' to their responsibility i.e. the courage to thin' and act on their own Kant also articulates a call to autonomy responsibility now being defined strictly as autonomy. In turn the human being in its proper personality is approached in terms of freedom and self%responsibility. The whole argument in a sort of self%fulfilling or self%positing circle $recalling the self% position of power that we noted in Aristotle(s account of responsible decision& de#elops on the assumption of a primacy of responsibility as self%positing of the self with irresponsibility

A; described as a deri#ati#e mode of it. As we "ust saw the state of immaturity is for Kant a self% induced situation for as he notes humans beings remain in such an irresponsible state )after nature has long since discharged them from e:ternal direction $naturaliter maiorennes&* $5P @C2&. They do so we are told out of )la!iness and cowardice * out of a wea' will we might add. They remain )under lifelong tutelage * facilitating some guardians to step in and ta'e o#er their sub"ecti#ity which e:plains )why it is so easy for others to set themsel#es up as their guardians* $5P @C2&. Not being responsible is easy $)It is so easy not to be of age*& being responsible is hard $)the step to competence* is )arduous*&2@ 4ne is thus not simply immature and irresponsible one yields to the easy way one wants to be irresponsible one ma'es oneself irresponsible. The parado: of this situation is patent: one is responsible for not being responsible. The only account for the #ery possibility of this parado: is that there is no radical irreducible irresponsibility but only instead a responsibility that attempts $and by definition fails& to escape itself. Irresponsibility arises out of a certain yielding of responsibility which Kant designates by the terms )la!iness* and )cowardice*: )Ka!iness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a portion of man'ind< ne#ertheless remains under lifelong tutelage* $5P @C2&. The weight that one must carry $responsibility& and that is so tempting to a#oid and flee from is thus the weight of oneself $hence the tas' of autonomy and self%responsibility&. That weight must be borne by oneself without ha#ing another relie#ing us of it. I must not rely on the other I must rely solely on myself Kant ta'ing issue with the following heteronomical principles the reliance on these e:ternal authorities: the authority of 'nowledge of religion and of technical and scientific e:pertise. )If I ha#e a boo' which understands for me a pastor who has a conscience for me a physician who decides my diet and so forth I need not trouble myself. I need not thin' if I can only pay %% others will readily underta'e the ir'some wor' for

A2 me* $5P @C2&. 4ne can associate this passage with the #ery thrust of Kant critical pro"ect and it is clear that the pro"ect of a criti-ue of pure reason supposes a sei!ing by reason itself of its own powers and thus supposes the space of autonomy. These three e:amples according to Bichel Foucault mirror Kant(s three criti-ues: )Kant gi#es three e:amples: we are in a state of Fimmaturity( when a boo' ta'es the place of our understanding when a spiritual director ta'es the place of our conscience when a doctor decides for us what our diet is to be. $Ket us note in passing that the register of these three criti-ues is easy to recogni!e e#en though the te:t does not ma'e it e:plicit&*.2A The mo#e to self%responsibility is not only difficult it is also inherently sub#ersi#e to powers: It is not by accident that those rulers who see' power o#er others always see' before anything else to infantili!e those they rule. )That the step to competence is held to be #ery dangerous by the far greater portion of humanity< J -uite apart from its being arduous J is seen to be those guardians who ha#e so 'indly assumed superintendence o#er them* $5P @C2&. The ruled are made to feel infantile in need of protection in danger. Fear is used in order to discourage people to become responsible and the guardians )show them the danger which threatens if they try to go alone* $one can thin' here of how certain political administrations ha#e used and manipulated public trauma and fear in order to establish control&. People are made to feel incapable of being on their own. +owe#er as Kant stresses )this danger is not so great for by falling a few times they would finally learn to wal' alone* $5P @C2&. 4ne(s irresponsibility and immaturity is thus chosen although as Kant notes it then becomes second nature: )For any single indi#idual man to wor' himself out of the life under tutelage which has become almost his nature is #ery difficult.* In fact one could say that one chooses such nature: irresponsibility is the choice through freedom to become nature: this is an impossible wish but that is the content of irresponsibility for Kant. 4ne wants to stay in this

A7 immature state as one )has come to be fond of this state* $5P @C2&. It is a matter in resei!ing one(s responsibility of abandoning the false security of nature of rules and formulas $)mechanical tools of the rational employment or rather misemployment* to which Kant will oppose )the dignity of men * who are )now more than machines* 5P @CD& and of reengaging the ris' of a free e:istence. That reappropriating of one(s freedom can ta'e place Kant clarifies )slowly * as a matter of education and e:perience and he warns the reader against a re#olutionary spirit that would certainly o#erthrow autocratic despotism but could ne#er amount to )a true reform in ways of thin'ing. Rather new pre"udices will ser#e as old ones to harness the great unthin'ing mass* $5P @C7&. The most powerful element the most re#olutionary and emancipatory is in the end nothing but freedom itself. As Kant states: )For this enlightenment howe#er nothing is re-uired but freedom* $5P @C7&. 5hat freedomR The freedom to use one(s mind and to do so publicly the freedom )to ma'e public use of one(s reason at e#ery point* $5P @C7&. There are of course many e:amples of restrictions on such freedom and Kant gi#es a list $)=ut I hear on all sides F9o not argueM( The officer says F9o not argue but drillM( The ta:%collector: F9o not argue but payM( The cleric: 09o not argue but belie#eM(*&. A more pernicious way of negating freedom is to allow for spea'ing one(s mind to allow for so%called )freedom of conscience * as long as it is not followed by any effect as long as it can be ignored $)Argue as much as you will and about what you will but obeyM0&. After the e#ents of 3I;; whene#er there were e:pressions of disagreements with some of the policies of the =ush administration oftentimes one would hear the president say: )Those people ha#e a right to spea' this is democracy they can say what they want.* Let in fact what was said was: spea' all you will your opinions will be allowed but ignored allowed as ignoredM This is why what matters is that this using of one(s reason be truly

A@ performati#e practical. It must in other words be not only a pri#ate matter but a public e:pression in#ol#ing others the whole community. P#erywhere there is restriction on freedom. =ut what sort of restriction is an obstacle to enlightenment and what sort is not an obstacle but a promoter of itR I answer: The public use of one(s reason must always be free and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. Kant introduces at this "uncture the crucial distinction between the pri#ate and public uses of reason. )=y the public use of one6s reason I understand the use which a person ma'es of it as a scholar before the reading public. Pri#ate use I call that which one may ma'e of it in a particular ci#ic post or office which entrusted to him* $5P @C7&. Reason must be free in its public use $as a member of the whole community or the society of world%citi!ens& and can tolerate restrictions in its pri#ate use i.e. within a role in society in a professional setting. Kant pri#ileges the public use of reason spea'ing out )before the public for "udgment* $5P @C@&: one uses one(s reason without sub"ecting oneself to any authority. Such is the sense of autonomy. ,learly in some technical capacities one must not argue but obey. In the pri#ate use of reason one must obey because one is playing a specific role in society. Let as a member of the reasonable community as a citi!en as )a scholar * as Kant puts it one can indeed argue. )5hile it would be ruinous for an officer in ser#ice to -uibble about the suitability of a command gi#en to him by his superior he must obey1 but the right to ma'e remar's on errors in the military ser#ice and to lay them before the public for "udgment cannot e-uitably be refused him as a scholar* $5P @C@&. 4ne must pay hisIher ta:es but as a scholar one can publicly e:press one(s doubts on the "ustice of these ta:es. A teacher6s use of reason for the sa'e of his congregation )is merely pri#ate* for Kant $)because this congregation is only a domestic one*&. As a priest one is not free. As a

AA scholar this cleric )has complete freedom* and )en"oys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to spea' in his own person* $5P @C@&. Any attempt to preclude through submission to religious authority future enlightenment of the human race is condemned by Kant as impossible. That would be he adds a )crime against human nature * as freedom autonomy and thus responsibility are humanity(s essential #ocation and destiny. +umanity(s #ocation is to be responsible for itself a self%responsibility that lies in autonomy. This is why Kant adds that the touchstone of e#erything that can be concluded as a law for a people lies in the -uestion whether the people could ha#e imposed such a law on itself* $5P @CA&. The monarch cannot impose in a despotic way his law on the people for )his lawgi#ing authority rests on his uniting the general people will in his own*. Such #ocation is in progress for Kant which e:plains why he clarifies that we do not li#e in an enlightened age but rather in an age of enlightenment. )If we are as'ed F9o we now li#e in an enlightened ageR( the answer is FNo ( but we do li#e in an age of enlightenment* $5P @CA&. Ban(s self%responsibility is the tas' and regulati#e idea of our age. )As things now stand much is lac'ing which pre#ents men from being or easily becoming capable of using their own reason in religious matters correctly with assurance and free from outside direction* $5P @CA%@CC&. Let the way is opened for men to remo#e the obstacles to enlightenment as )release from self%imposed tutelage.* The spirit of freedom must e:pand so that self%responsibility as self%determination and self% legislation becomes the future of humanity. The Kantian philosophy of responsibility thus rests on a philosophy of freedom as transcendental faculty of the sub"ect on the notion of the autonomy of the person and on the self%responsibility of man. I am responsible for what I ha#e done myself as a rational free agent and I am responsible as autonomous being. Further the call to responsibility as self%

AC responsibility engages the human to ta'e o#er its own destiny it is a self%empowering act. Kant thus also re#eals the historicity of responsibility by ma'ing of self%responsibility a tas' of humanity. +owe#er precisely as self%grounding autonomy will pro#e itself ungrounded and the more it see's to posit itself on its own the deeper the abyss will open beneath it. Autonomy as self%grounding deconstructs itself and opens onto its own groundlessness. Such groundlessness will be e:posed J indeed e:plored %% in Niet!sche(s historical genealogy of accountability with radical conse-uences for the concept of responsibility.

Immanuel Kant. The Betaphysics of Borals $Part ;: The 9octrine of Right& in Practical Philosophy

$NL: ,ambridge /ni#ersity Press ;333& p.7DE.

2

Immanuel Kant. The ,riti-ue of Practical Reason 7rd edition trans. Kewis 5hite =ec' $NL: The

Kibrary of Kiberal Arts BacBillan ;337& pp.33 ;88 ;8;.

7

Immanuel Kant. The Betaphysics of Borals p.7DE. Immanuel Kant The ,riti-ue of Practical Reason p.7. +enry Allison. Kant(s Theory of Freedom $,ambridge Ba: ,ambridge /ni#ersity Press ;338& p.;;.

4n a discussion of the third antinomy in terms of a reflection on responsibility one may also consult Paul Ricoeur Ke Quste $Paris: Pditions Psprit ;33A& pp. @;%D8 and in particular pp. @D%A8.
C

Immanuel Kant. The ,riti-ue of Pure Reason trans. Paul Ouyer and Allen 5. 5ood $,ambridge

/K: ,ambridge /ni#ersity Press ;33E& A A77I= AC; p.A77. +ereafter cited as ,PR followed by A and = edition pages and page number.
D

4n the limits of situating the -uestion of freedom in the conte:t of causality see Qean%Kuc Nancy The

P:perience of Freedom $Stanford ,A: Stanford /ni#ersity Press& pp. 2A%2C where Nancy comments upon a passage from +eidegger(s 4n the Pssence of +uman Freedom in which +eidegger states that ),ausality in the sense of the traditional comprehension of the being of beings in ordinary as well as in traditional metaphysics is precisely the fundamental category of being as presence%at%hand* $#olume 7; of +eidegger(s Oesamtausgabe p. 788 cited by Nancy in The P:perience of Freedom p. 2C& and that therefore the -uestion of freedom must be approached in a more originary sense than in relation to causality. I will return to this criti-ue of causality whether in Niet!sche(s genealogy in Sartre(s radicali!ation of freedom as original freedom or in +eidegger(s criti-ue of causality as improper access to being.
E

For instance one reads in the first lines of the preface of the Foundations of the Betaphysics of

Borals: )Baterial philosophy howe#er which has to do with definite ob"ects and the laws to which they are sub"ect is di#ided into two parts. This is because these laws are either laws of nature or laws

of freedom. The science of the former is physics and that of the latter ethics1 the former is also called theory of nature and the latter theory of morals.* Immanuel Kant. Foundations of the Betaphysics of Borals trans. Kewis 5hite =ec' in Selections $Pnglewood ,liffs NQ: Prentice +all ;3EE& p. 2@@. +ereafter cited as Foundations followed by page number.
3

Including our own nature as Sartre would recogni!e when he wrote that we do not ha#e a human

nature because we are free.

;8

Also in the ),larification of the cosmological idea of a freedom in combination with the uni#ersal

natural necessity * one reads: )The law of nature that e#erything that happens has a cause that since the causality of this cause i.e. the action precedes in time and in respect of an effect that has arisen cannot ha#e been always but must ha#e happened and so must also ha#e had its cause among appearances through which it is determined and conse-uently that all occurrences are empirically determined in a natural order %% this law through which alone appearances can first constitute one nature and furnish ob"ects of one e:perience is a law of the understanding from which under no prete:t can any departure be allowed or any appearance be e:empted1 because otherwise one would put this appearance outside of all possible e:perience thereby distinguishing it from ob"ects of possible e:perience and ma'ing it into a mere thought%entity and a figment of the brain.* ,PR A A@2I= AD8 p. A7E.
;;

Further Kant writes that )among the causes in appearance there can surely be nothing that could

begin a series absolutely and from itself. P#ery action as appearance insofar as it produces an occurrence is itself an occurrence or e#ent which presupposes another state in which its cause is found1 and thus e#erything that happens is only a continuation of the series and no beginning that would ta'e place from itself is possible in it. Thus in the temporal succession all actions of natural causes are themsel#es in turn effects which li'ewise presuppose their causes in the time%series. An original action through which something happens that pre#iously was not is not to be e:pected from the causal connection of appearances.* ,PR A A@7I= AD; p. A7E.

;2

Still in the ),larification of the cosmological idea of a freedom in combination with the uni#ersal

natural necessity * Kant e:plains that such a free causality would be considered as )an original action of a cause in regard to appearances which to that e:tent is not appearance but in accordance with this faculty intelligible * although it must at the same time as a lin' in the chain of nature be regarded as )belonging to the world of senses.* ,PR A A@@I= AD2 p.A73.
;7

Indeed it cannot be part of the phenomenal world as it contradicts the fundamental law of causality

structuring the unity of the world as nature. In fact such freedom is )contrary to the laws of nature * )to all possible e:perience* $,PR AE87I=E7;&. +enry Allison clarifies that )transcendental freedom is opposed to the conditions of the unity of e:perience $as specified in the Flaw of causality(& and therefore can ne#er be met within any possible e:perience*. Kant(s Theory of Freedom op.cit. p. 28.
;@

As Qean%Kuc Nancy comments in his own thin'ing of free decision it is a -uestion of a decision for

)what is in no way gi#en in ad#ance but which constitutes the irruption of the new unpredictable because without face and thus the Fbeginning of a series of phenomena( by which the Kantian freedom is defined in its relation to the world.* The ,reation of The 5orld or Olobali!ation translation FranUois Raffoul and 9a#id Pettigrew $Albany NL: S/NL Press 288D& p. A3.
;A

+eidegger would stress Kant(s debt toward this ontology of the Sub"ectum an indebtedness that

constitutes for +eidegger the insufficiency of Kant6s determination of sub"ecti#ity the fact that it turns out to be incapable of de#eloping an authentic ontology of 9asein. +eidegger6s reproach can be summari!ed as follows: by characteri!ing the ego as a sub"ect that is as the ultimate sub"ectum of its predicates $and of its actions in the practical sense& Kant maintains the traditional ontology of the substantial and thereby continues to concei#e of the I inade-uately as the )supporting ground $as substance or sub"ect&.* SS p. 7;D. As +eidegger e:plains to define the ego as a sub"ect is to approach it in a mode that is not appropriate to the being that we are.
;C

+enry Allison clarifies the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy in these terms: )either the

will gi#es the law to itself in which case we ha#e autonomy or the law is somehow gi#en to the will

from without in which case we ha#e heteronomy.* Kant(s Theory of Freedom op.cit. p.33.
;D

5ith respect to the Kantian determination of the moral person as end%in itself +eidegger argues that

it is not sufficient to merely add finality as a predicate to a being whose mode of being is still grasped in the sense of presence%at%hand and the tas' is to concei#e of it ontologically as a way to be. At the same time one could state that +eidegger(s analysis is also indebted to Kant(s theory of the moral person for instance when +eidegger writes $no longer distinguishing between person and 9asein&: )The person is a thing res something that e:ists as its own end. To this being belongs purposi#eness. Its way of being is to be the end or purpose of its own self. This determination to be the end of its own self belongs indisputably to the ontological constitution of the human 9asein* 9ie Orundprobleme der Ph.nomenologie #olume 2@ of the Oesamtausgabe $Fran'furt am main: Klostermann ;3DA& p. ;33 my emphasis. Pnglish translation by Albert +ofstadter The =asic Problems of Phenomenology $=loomington In: Indiana /ni#ersity Press ;3E2&. +ereafter cited as OA 2@ followed by page number.
;E

,riti-ue of Practical Reason First Part First =oo' chapter. 7 p. DC. Friedrich Niet!sche. The Twilight of the Idols. Trans. Richard Polt $IndianapolisI,ambridge:

;3

+ac'ett ;33D& p.D@ tr. slightly modified. +ereafter cited as TI followed by page number.
28

5hat is PnlightenmentR in Selections, op. cit. +ereafter cited as 5P followed by page number. Bichel Foucault. )5hat is Pnlightenment R* in Rabinow $P.& ed. The Foucault Reader, New Lor'

2;

Pantheon =oo's ;3E@ pp. 72%A8.

22

4ne thin's here of Ka =oetie(s The Politics of 4bedience: The 9iscourse of Goluntary Ser#itude

$New Lor': Free Kife Pditions ;3DA& the relin-uishing of one(s freedom and responsibility for the sa'e of a ruler such that it is the one oppressed under the ruler that gi#es that ruler the power. The rele#ance here is that in gi#ing the power to another one is attempting to relin-uish one(s responsibility something that will pro#e ultimately impossible.
27

Bichel Foucault. 05hat is Pnlightenment R0 art.cit.

2@

5e will return in our Sartre and +eidegger chapters on this thematics of a weight of responsibility of

the difficulty of e:istence and the role of responsibility in such a tas'.

2A

Bichel Foucault art.cit. p.888. Further in the te:t Foucault de#elops this pro:imity between this te:t

on Pnlightenment and the three criti-ues. +e writes: )Ne#ertheless notwithstanding its circumstantial nature and without intending to gi#e it an e:aggerated place in Kant6s wor' I belie#e that it is necessary to stress the connection that e:ists between this brief article and the three ,riti-ues. Kant in fact describes Pnlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use without sub"ecting itself to any authority1 now it is precisely at this moment that the criti-ue is necessary since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be 'nown >connaVtre? what must be done and what may be hoped. Illegitimate uses of reason are what gi#e rise to dogmatism and heteronomy along with illusion1 on the other hand it is when the legitimate use of reason has been clearly defined in its principles that its autonomy can be assured. The criti-ue is in a sense the handboo' of reason that has grown up in Pnlightenment1 and con#ersely the Pnlightenment is the age of the criti-ue.*$art.cit 888&.