VEGETARIANISM AND THE ARGUMENT MARGINAL CASES IN PORPHYRY BY DANIELA.

DOMBROWSKI

FROM

It is well known that many of the philosophers from antiquity were vegetarian:Pythagoras, Empedocles, Theophrastus, Seneca, Ovid, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and others.1 And Plato, although apparently not a vegetarian, was nonetheless greatly impressed by vegetarian thought.2What is not so well known by classicists is that there has been a rebirth in philosophical vegetarianism in the last decade that has generated an enormous debate of at least one hundred articles and books.3 As may be suspected, this debate has also rekindled some interest in Greek vegetarian thought,4 one inadequacy of which will be treated in this article. The aforementioned ancient thinkers were vegetarians for at least four different reasons, three of which have been noticed by several recent commentators. (1) Many of the ancient vegetarians believed in transmigration,leading them to spare animals in the belief that animals were, or will be, human beings. The famous story in Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 36) of Pythagoras asking a man to discontinue beating a dog because he recognized the voice of a deceased friend in the yelp of the animal is indicative of this tendency. (2) Another reason for ancient abstention from meat was the belief that flesh-eating was injurious to the health of either body or soul. The former belief was tied to ancient medical thought, while the latter was often associated with a more general commitment to moderation or asceticism. (3) But there was also among the ancients a concern for animals themselves: since they suffer when they are killed (or are deprived
1 See for a full treatment of the vegetarianthought my The Philosophyof Vegetarianism of these thinkers. 2 See e.g., the ideal diet at Republic 369D-373E; the vegetarianism of the golden age in the Statesman 269-274; and Laws 781E-783B and Epinomis 974D-975B. 3See e.g., Stephen R.L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); the many articles of Tom Regan, soon to be published by University of California Press; and perhaps most important, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (N.Y. Review, 1975). 4 Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Man, Animals, and Morals: A Brief History," in On the Fifth Day, ed. by Richard Knowles Morris; M. Detienne, "La cuisine de Pythagore," Archives de Sociologie des Religions 29 (1970), 141-162; M. Detienne, "Entre betes et Dieux," Nouvelle Revue de PsychanalyseIV (Fall, 1972), 230-246; U. Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike (Amsterdam, 1977); J. Donald Hughes, "Ecology in Ancient Greece", Inquiry 18 (1975), 115-125; J. Donald Hughes, "The Environmental Ethics of the Pythagoreans", Environmental Ethics 3 (1980), 195-213; Gareth B. Matthews, "Animals and the Unity of Psychology", Philosophy 53 (Oct., 1978), 437-454; John Passmore, "The Treatment of Animals", Journal of The History of Ideas 36 (1975), 195-218; John Rodman, "The Other Side of Ecology in Ancient Greece: Comments on Hughes," Inquiry 19 (1976), 108-112; P. Vidal-Naquet, "Plato's Myth of the Statesman, the Ambiguities of the Golden Age and of History," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 98 (1978), 132-141. All of these studies add to the work done decades ago by Johannes Haussleiter, Der Vegetarismusin der antike (Berlin, 1935).

141 Copyright Jan. 1984 by JOURNALOF THE HISTORYOF IDEAS, INC.

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of a life which is theirs if killed painlessly),5and since we can live healthy lives on vegetal food, eating meat is cruel and ought to be avoided. There is a fourth reason, however, that at least one ancient philosopher used. Porphyry's use of this argument has neven been mentioned before, to my knowledge, which is curious since this argument is perhaps the most important and forceful one in the contemporary debate. This is the argument from marginal cases, which is described by Singer (p. 265) as follows: that is possessed The catch is that any such characteristic by all humanbeingswill not but not only humans,are all For human be possessed humans, example, onlyby beings. of are humans while and of solvingcomplexmatheonly capable feeling pain; capable not all humanscan do this. So it turnsout that in the only sense in maticalproblems, of fact, that all humansare equal,at least some whichwe can trulysay, as an assertion of other speciesare also "equal"-equal, that is, to some humans. members Theological statements of man's privileged status cannot be philosophically justified. But to say that we can legitimately eat animals because human beings are rational, or autonomous, or just, or language-users, etc., is not true of many human beings. These "marginal cases" include infants, the mentally enfeebled, and the like. If we "lower" our standard to that of sentiency (e.g., the ability to experience pain) so as to protect these people,6 we must also protect many animals, including those that we eat. Or, as Regan puts it,7 if an animal has characteristics a,b, c . .. n but lacks autonomy (or reason or language) and a human being has characteristics a,b,c . . n but lacks autonomy (or reason or language), then we have as much reason to believe that the animal has rights as the human. Now let us consider Porphyry's De abstinentia,8which is a book length letter to a Firmus Castricius, a former vegetarian and fellow student of Plotinus who had fallen away from vegetarianism. Porphyry intends his arguments to bring Firmus back within the fold. The relevant text can be found at III. 19: To compareplants,however,with animals,is doingviolenceto the orderof things.For and adaptedto feel pain,to be terrified sensitive(aisthanesthai), the latterare naturally on which accountalso they may kai blaptesthai); and hurt (kai algein kai phobeisthai But the formerare entirelydestituteof sensation,and in conbe injured(adikeisthali. or evil (kakon),or hurtful(blabe),or injurious of this,nothingforeign, (adikia), sequence
5 See Plutarch's "Of Eating the Flesh" in his Moralia for a clear expression of a basis for vegetarianism. as for animals compassion 6 And we do surely want to protect these people, although not all of the Greeks did, as is evidenced by the practice of infanticide. 7 Tom Regan, "Fox's Critique of Animal Liberation", Ethics 88 (Jan. 1978), 126133; also see Dale Jamieson and Tom Regan, "Animal Rights: A Reply to Frey", Analysis 38 (Jan. 1978), 32-36. Critics of the argument from marginal cases include R. G. Frey, "Animal Rights", Analysis 37 (June, 1977), 186-189;and Jan Narveson, "Animal Rights", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (Mar. 1977), 161-178. 8 See the recent edition of J. Bouffartigue and M. Patillon, Porphyrede l'abstinence (Paris, 1977), 3 vols., with French and Greek on facing pages, and helpful notes and introductions. Also, a new edition of the Thomas Taylor translation is available, Porphyry, On Abstinencefrom Animal Food (London: Centaur Press, 1965). The following quote is taken from this translation.

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can befall them. For sensationis the principleof all alliance(Kai gar oikeioseos pases
kai allotrioseos arche to aisthanesthai) . . . And is it not absurd (alogon), since we see

live from sense alone (aistheseimonon),but that many of our own species(anthropon)
do not possess intellect (noun) and reason (logon). . . . but that no justice is shown

fromus to the ox that ploughs,the dog that is fed with us, and the animalsthat nourish us with their milk, and adornour bodieswith their wool?Is not such an opinionmost irrational and absurd? Indeed. Zeno and the Stoics are the ones who held such an opinion, but the continued popularity of meat-eating indicates that Porphyry's followers still have their work cut out for them. Zeno and his followers assert that alliance or intimacy (oikeioseos) is the principle to be used in determiningwhich beings deservejustice, but for Porphyry this begs the question. What is needed is some criterion for alliance, some way of determining how we will group nature into the various households of edible and inedible beings. For all those beings who think that unnecessary suffering ought to be avoided (i.e., for at least all rational human beings) sensation (aisthanesthal) is a principle of alliance that must be considered. Porphyry's comparison of plants and animals on this criterion is instructive. If we suggest that sentiency is an insufficient condition for being treated with justice we eliminate many of our own species that live from sense alone, without reason (alogon). And if we "lower" our standards so as to include all human beings, we must therefore be willing to include animals capable of sensation.9 At this point the defender of the Stoics would either have to admit his inconsistency or give up an opposition to infanticide, "mercy" killings of the retarded, etc. Hardly a nice position to be in! In any event, Porphyry's status as the discoverer of the vegetarian argument from marginal cases ought to be acknowledged. Creigton University.

would include cows, pigs, chickens, fish, and others all the way "down" the evolutionary scale until we reach beings like mollusks. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 183-189.
9 These