B. NATURE OF MARRIAGE IN PHILIPPINE LAW Family Code Article 1.

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a) Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa), Rules of Court - That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; Art. 220 (NCC). In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. Muslim Code (PD 1083) Sec. 14 Nature. Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.

1. GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review. ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home. HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

2. SERMONIA, vs. CA 233 SCRA 155, G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994 FACTS: On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription. In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial. Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992. On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed. HELD: No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.

3. People v. De la Cruz FACTS: Joel Song (Joel) testified that he and two others, including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing a card game known as tong-its just three to four arms length away from Victorianos house.While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein victim Anna in front of their house. Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair, then slammed the door. Joel overheard the couple shouting while they were already inside the house.

Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with their young daughter. Victoriano was behind Anna, with his arms wrapped around her. He asked for Joels help. Joel noticed blood spurting out of Annas mouth. He took the couples daughter and gave her to Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However, Anna died. The Report revealed that the victim sustained a fatal stab wound, lacerating the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital organ which directly caused her death. ISSUE: WON Victoriano was guilty of parricide HELD: Yes Ratio:The key element in Parricide other than the fact of killing is the relationship of the offender to the victim. In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. ----The death of appellants wife was not caused by mere accident. There was an intent, which was proven by Victorianos overt acts. His guilt was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence 1. Victoriano physically maltreated his wife by repeatedly punching and kicking her. 2. Violently dragged the victim inside their house, by pulling her hair. 3. Dr. Viray's Report, Anna sustained injuries in different parts of her body due to physical abuse. 4. The location and extent of the wound indicated Victoriano's intent to kill the victim.

5. Only Victoriano and Anna were inside the house, Victoriano was the lone assailant. 6. The act of carrying the body of a wounded victim and bringing her to the hospital as Victoriano did does not manifest innocence. It could merely be an indication of repentance or contrition on his part.

C. AGREEMENTS PRIOR TO MARRIAGE Stipulations in marriage Family Code. Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a) Art. 221. (NCC). The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife; (3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage; (4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

4. Espinosa v. Atty. Omana

FACTS: Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage. Omaa then prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay (contract). Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. She denied that she prepared the contract and claimed that her staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. ISSUE:WON Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. HELD/RATIO: Yes, in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that *a+ lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. Omaa knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy. Court ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.Notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: ratifying a document entitled Legal Separation where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other; preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other; preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.

Breach of promise to marry NCC. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents: (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;

FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint for 1)the acknowledgment of her and 2)support for the child and 3)for breach of promise to marry Petitioner 1)acknowledged the child 2) oppressed willingness to support the child but 3)denied that promise to marry the respondent Petitioner is 10years younger than the respondent. They were engaged, respondent gave up teaching and became a life time insurance underwriter. They had sex and Hermosisima promised to marry her. The child was born on June 1954 Petitioner married one Romancita Perez on July 1954. Spanish Civil Code Art 43 and 44 permitted the recovery of damages for BPM RTC decided in favor of Respondent and ordered the Petitioner to damages CA affirmed the decision of RTC, held Petitioner liable for seduction

ISSUE: WON moral damages are recoverable under our laws on Breach of Contract to Marriage? HELD: SC affirmed the decision of the CA but eliminated the moral damages

Respondent surrendered herself because by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy

PD 1083 (MC) Article 22. Breach of contract. Any person who has entered into a contract to marry but subsequently refuses without reasonable ground to marry the other party who is willing to perform the same shall pay the latter the expenses incurred for the preparation of the marriage and such damages as may be granted by the court. Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code: Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is

5. Hermosisima vs. CA 109 Phil 629

regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken

policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In this case, plaintiff already arranged everything for the wedding, like the wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial bed, etc. The SC held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry A wedding has been formally set and all the preparations have been made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days before. This is contrary to good customs, since defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner.

6. Wassmer VS. Velez. FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmerwere set to be married on September 4, 1954. All necessary works have been done for the wedding like: the giving of invitation; the apparels were already purchased; matrimonial bed with accessories was already both; and bridal showers were given. But before the big day came, Beatriz received two letter dated September 3 and 4 respectively from Francisco. The first letter says that the wedding would have to be postponed because Franciscos mother opposes it. The second letter NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE. Because of that, Beatriz sued Francisco. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Beatriz because of Franciscos failure to file an answer. On appeals, the defendant asked for many extensions and was granted by the court because it wanted that this problem would be settled amicably. In his defense, the defendant stated that there is no law that penalizes the breach of promise to marry. 7. Abanag VS. Mabute Related Law: No specific law here that is directly involved in the case. I think the doctrine, regarding disbarment or disciplinary action against public officials, laid down in the case is what we need. FACTS: The complainant alleged that respondent courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on respondents promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that she suffered. Respondent vehemently denied the complainants allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless, false and fabricated, and were intended to harass him and destroy his reputation. He believes that the complainants letter -complaint, which was written in the vernacular, was prepared byTordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in Tagalog; the respondent would have used the "waray" or English language if she had written the letter-complaint. The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that sheherself wrote the lettercomplaint. She belied therespondents claim that she was being used byTordesillas who wanted to get even with him. The Investigating Judge

ISSUE: WON Francisco may be held liable for his breach of promise to marry Beatriz. HELD: No, he is not liable but the case is not just a mere breach of promise to marry. The SC maintained that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable, the defendants act is still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public

recommends the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent.It definedwhat immoral conduct is as as conduct that is willful, Flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. 4 To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. Agrossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and falseas to constitute a criminal act or an act sounprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible toa high degree ISSUE: WON Nicolas Mabutes action warrants a disciplinary action. HELD: No, he cannot be held liable for any disciplinary actions based on his actions outside his workplace. The SC stated that Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action. While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their familys future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry. D. REQUISITES FOR A VALID MARRIAGE 8. Mariategui v CA FACTS: LupoMariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife EusebiaMontellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7

children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. Lupos second wife was FlavianaMontellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967. ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license. HELD: Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.The fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no

divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Police investigation commenced. The police, assisted by hotel personnel found the body on the bed covered by a blanket. Only the head was showing.They found out that the victim's eyes and mouth were bound by electrical and packaging tapes and his hands and feet were tied with a white rope. The saleslady in Alexis Jewelry confirmed that man appearing on Harper's passport was the same man who went to the jewelry store and the same man who appeared on the CCTV footage showing as the one who followed Harper to his room. The RTC ruled out that the incident occurred due to the hotel's gross negligence in providing the most basic security system inside the hotel and ordered to compensate the heir's of the victim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Makati Shangri-la appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: (related to Marriage) 1. Whether or not the plaintiff-appellees were able to prove with competent evidence that they are indeed the widow and son of Harper and thus, entitled to compensation and payment of damages.

9. Makati Shangri-la v Harper FACTS: Christian Harper, 30 years old, came to Manila on a business trip as the Business Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway. He checked in at the Shangri-la Hotel (Room 1428) but murdered inside his hotel room by unidentified persons. The crime was discovered when the American Express Card Company called Harper's residence in Oslo. A Caucasian male tried to use the card in Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta, Ayala Center in Makati City to purchase a Cartier watch worth P320,000.00. The buyer actually inquired if he can get the watch using to cards, a Mastercard and an American Express card named after Harper.The saleslady, Anna Liza Lumba became suspiscious when the buyer had difficulty answering questions of the credit card representative. She asked for the buyer's passport upon the representative's suggestion to put the cards on hold. The buyer might have felt he was in trouble so he hurriedly left the store, leaving the cards and the passport behind. To confirm the verification call, Harper's family tried to call him at his hotel room. When no one's responding to the call, his family asked the Duty Manager, Raymond Alarcon, to check on Harper. Alarcon and a security personnel went to his room and was shocked to see Harper's lifeless body on the bed. Col Rodrigo De Guzman, the hotel's Security Manager made an initial investigation. He concluded that Harper and his visitor had drunk much and smoked a lot due to the presence of several empty wine bottles in the trash can and cigarette butts thrown to the toilet bowl.

HELD: The petition lacks merit. The plaintiff-appellees presented the ff documents: Birth certificate of the son stating that he is the son of Christian Fredrik Harper (the victim) and Ellen Johanne Harper

Marriage Certificate of Christian Fredrik Harper (the victim) and Ellen Johanne Harper Birth certificate of Christian Fredrik Harper Certificate from the Oslo Probate Court stating the Ellen Harper was married to the deceased and that she and their son were listed as the heirs of Christian Fredrik Harper. Makati Shangri-la contended that none of the plaintiffs-appellees or any of the witnesses who testified for the plaintiffs gave evidence that Ellen Johanne Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper are the widow and son of the deceased Christian Fredrik Harper and that the documents presented were merely copies and there were errors in labeling such documents when presented as evidence. The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. Plaintiffs-appellees had substantially complied with the requirements set forth under the rules. WE would also like to stress that plaintiffs-appellees herein are residing overseas and are litigating locally through their representative. While they are not excused from complying with our rules, WE must take into account the attendant reality that these overseas litigants communicate with their representative and counsel via long distance communication. Add to this is the fact that compliance with the requirements on attestation and authentication or certification is no easy process and completion thereof may vary depending on different factors such as the location of the requesting party from the consulate and the office of the record custodian, the volume of transactions in said offices and even the mode of sending these documents to the Philippines.There is every

reason for an equitable and relaxed application of the rules on the issuance of the required attestation from the custodian of the documents to plaintiffs-appellees situation. Besides, these questioned documents were duly signed by the officers having custody of the same. Petitioners challenge against respondents documentary evidence on marriage and heirship is not well-taken. Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 provide: Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. Kinds of Requisites & Effects of Non-Compliance FC 2-3; FC 4; FC 5; FC 35; FC 45 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

1. Legal Capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and female; and 2. Consent freely given in the presence of a solemnizing officer. Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: 1. Authority of the solemnizing officer; 2. A valid marriage license except in cases except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and 3. A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained byforce, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexuallytransmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a) Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties

NCC 53 Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2) Their consent, freely given; (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character (Sec. 1a, Art. 3613).

10. De MijaresvsVillaluz, 274 SCRA 1 Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary. FACTS: -In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. deMijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Jus tice of the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct. - Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. -Such unbearable utterances of respondent on the day of their wedding (they had a very serious fight) left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately ever since. - Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, complainant learned that a judge who was a friend had solemnized a wedding between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. -Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him. -Respondent contends theirs was a sham marriage in an effort to protect the complainant from the administrative case on immorality to be charged against her by her legal researcher and that during their marriage his

RPC 350-351 Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. The penalty of prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph. Art. 351. Premature marriages. Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arrestomayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos. The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she shall marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of three hundred and one day after the legal separation.

marriage with his first wife was subsisting since the declaration of its annulment was not yet final and executory pending publication of the decision. -The administrative case was referred to Associate Justice Purisima of CA for investigation who recommended suspension of the respondent for 2 years with a warning that similar future misconduct shall be dealt with more severely. ISSUE: WON Villaluz has made a mockery of the institution of marriage and should be disbarred for deceit and grossly immoral conduct. HELD: YES, Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility Ratio: - The mere admission of the respondent of contracting the marriage with the complainant while knowingly his first marriage subsists and then married another woman after said marriage with complainant is a gross misconduct. His claim that he married complainant to protect her from the administrative charge against her is unfounded since one cannot correct a wrong by doing another wrongful act. Finding the respondent morally unfit in the practice of the law profession, the court upheld the recommendation of Justice Purisima.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a)

11. Silveriovs Republic, October 22, 2007 When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2) [Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373(2007)] FACTS:

Essential Requisites: (a) Legal Capacity (i) Gender, FC 2 (1); FC 148 Art. 2 (1). Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female;

- On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. - Petitioner alleged in his petition that his name was registered as Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as male.

- He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. -After undergoing a procedure in Thailand (SEX CHANGE sibakla), petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. RTC rendered a decision in favour of Silverio (gay guy) OSG then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA asserting that there is no law change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA renderd decision in favour of Republic, hence this petition. ISSUE: WON the court should allow the sex reassignment requested by petitioner (change of gender from male to female and name from male to female). HELD: NO -A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a) Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; RA 6809 cf. FC 21 RA 6809 - AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 236.Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one. "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code." FC Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.

(ii) Age FC 5, 35(1); RA 6809 cf. FC 21