ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIO G. RAMOS, respondent.

This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos for violation of Act No. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch. 11, otherwise know as the Notarial Law, particularly Secs. 245 and 246 thereof. In September 1990 Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales, borrowed from Rosalinda the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 194464 covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H in her name. The lot measures 112 square meters and is located at the back of Manuels house on Fabie Street, Paco, Metro Manila. On 25 November 1990 Rosalinda sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro. When she asked her brother Manuel to return her title he refused. On 22 October 1990 Rosalinda executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title and presented the affidavit to the Register of Deeds of Manila. On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her title to the property was already transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale she purportedly executed in favor of Manuel on 5 September 1990. The document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos on 1 October 1990 and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 388, Page No. 718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda however denied having signed any deed of sale over her property in favor of Manuel. On 3 September 1991 Rosalinda filed with the NBI a complaint for falsification of public document against her brother Manuel. The NBI invited respondent Atty. Ramos for questioning. The complaint alleged among others that on 12 September 1991 Atty. Mario G. Ramos executed an affidavit before the NBI admitting that when Manuel presented the purported Deed of Absolute Sale to him for notarization, he (Atty. Ramos) found some defects in the document and that complainant Rosalinda was not around. The NBI Questioned Documents Division also compared Rosalindas signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale with samples of her genuine signature, and found that the signature in the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and her genuine signatures were not written by one and the same person. On 5 October 1992 the NBI transmitted its findings to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the recommendation that Manuel and Atty. Ramos be prosecuted for Falsification of Public Document under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and that Atty. Ramos be additionally charged with violation of the Notarial Law. The NBI also transmitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) photocopies of the NBI investigation report and its annexes, and a verified complaint[i][1] for disbarment signed by Rosalinda. The CBD received the records on 5 October 1992. On the same date, the CBD through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez directed respondent to submit an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Respondent admitted in his Answer[ii][2] that he had affixed his signature on the purported Deed of Absolute Sale but failed to enter the document in his Notarial Registry Book. He also admitted executing before the NBI on 12 September 1991 an affidavit regarding the matter. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint since according to him he only inadvertently signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that his signature was procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence, claiming that he simply relied on the assurances of Manuel that the document would not be used for purposes other than a loan between brother and sister, and that he affixed his signature thereon with utmost good faith and without intending to obtain personal gain or to cause damage or injury to another.

The CBD set the case for hearing on 3 March 2000, 28 April 2000, 16 June 2000 and 5 October 2000. Complainant never appeared. The records show that the notices sent to her address at 1497 Fabie Street, Paco, Manila, were returned unclaimed.[iii][3] On 26 January 2002 the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of the CBD through Commissioner Fernandez that the case against respondent be dismissed in view of complainants failure to prosecute and for lack of evidence on record to substantiate the complaint.[iv][4] The Investigating Commissioner found that the notices sent to complainant were returned unclaimed with the annotation moved out, and that she did not leave any forwarding address, and neither did she come to the CBD to inquire about the status of her case. From these actuations, he concluded that complainant had lost interest in the further prosecution of this case,[v][5] and so recommended its dismissal. We cannot wholly agree with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It is clear from the pleadings before us that respondent violated the Notarial Law in failing to register in his notarial book the deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact respondent readily admitted. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. It requires him to keep a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary,[vi][6] and specifies what information with regard to the notarized document should be entered therein.[vii][7] Failure to perform this duty results in the revocation of his commission as notary public.[viii][8] The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.[ix][9] Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.[x][10] A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.[xi][11] For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.[xii][12] Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.[xiii][13] Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.[xiv][14] The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act and deed.[xv][15] The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary information regarding the document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the document presented to him for acknowledgment and certification especially when it is a contract.[xvi][16] The notarial registry is a record of the notary publics official acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments recorded in it are considered public documents. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document. Considering the evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when in fact it was not. We take note of respondents admission in his Answer that he had affixed his signature in the purported Deed of Absolute Sale but he did not enter it in his notarial registry. This is clearly in violation of the Notarial Law for which he must be disciplined.

Respondent alleges that he merely signed the Deed of Absolute Sale inadvertently and that his signature was procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence as he relied on the assurances of Manuel A. Bernardo, a kababayan from Pampanga, that the document would not be used for any illegal purpose. We cannot honor, much less give credit to this allegation. That respondent notarized the document out of sympathy for his kababayan is not a legitimate excuse. It is appalling that respondent did away with the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a friend and client. In doing so, he displayed a decided lack of respect for the solemnity of an oath in a notarial document. He also exhibited his clear ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the Notarial Law, he also did so without thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-observance. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery.[xvii][17] Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.[xviii][18] Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions. From his admissions we find that Atty. Mario G. Ramos failed to exercise the due diligence required of him in the performance of the duties of notary public. We do not agree however that his negligence should merit disbarment, which is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Removal from the bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired.[xix][19] Under the circumstances, imposing sanctions decreed under the Notarial Law and suspension from the practice of law would suffice. WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, the commission of respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED and thereafter Atty. Ramos should be DISQUALIFIED from reappointment to the office of Notary Public. Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect. The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately circularize this Decision for the proper guidance of all concerned. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

LEILANI OCAMPO-INGCOCO and BALTAZAR D. OCAMPO, complainants, vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO G. YRREVERRE, JR., respondent. In a verified Complaint dated July 11, 2001,[1] Leilani Ocampo-Ingcoco and Baltazar D. Ocampo filed an administrative complaint before the Court charging respondent Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. for unethical and unprofessional conduct in violation of his duty as a lawyer,[2] praying that on the basis of the facts alleged therein, the said respondent be disbarred and/or administratively sanctioned. The complainants alleged that on April 17, 2000, the respondent notarized a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale[3] involving a parcel of land then registered under the name of their parents, Pacita and Hermilindo Ocampo under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31064.[4] The alleged vendee, Rosita S. Billones, falsified their fathers signature and caused the notarization of the deed before the respondent. The complainants alleged that on the date the Deed of Absolute Sale was purportedly notarized, their mother was in Isabela with her children. As such, it was impossible for her to appear before the respondent on the said date. Furthermore, their father, Hermilindo, had been dead for more than a year and could not have appeared before the respondent to attest to the truth of the matters contained in the deed. The respondents illegal act of notarizing the said deed without the parties thereto appearing before him was compounded by the fact that he even placed a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) Number, which was not issued to Pacita, but to a certain Edelia M. Balingan on March 6, 2000.[5] As a consequence of the respondents acts, Rosita Billones and her husband were able to transfer the subject property in their names despite the non-payment of the purchase price. TCT No. T-31064 was thus cancelled, and a new TCT was issued in the name of the Billones Spouses, TCT No. T75256.[6] The complainants later learned that the respondent apparently had a personal interest in the subject property, as it was later mortgaged to JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc., a company owned by the respondent, and for whom the latter also acted as legal counsel. Rosita Billones secured a loan from JCY Loan and Mortgage, Inc. and used the subject property as collateral.[7] On November 15, 2000, Pacita filed a civil case for nullification of the deed of sale and reconveyance of title to real property before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-00-230.[8] In an apparent attempt to protect his interests, the respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the Billones Spouses.[9] The complainants also filed a criminal case for estafa through falsification against the Billones Spouses. [10] The complainants further alleged that the respondent, although acting as counsel for the Billones Spouses in the said civil case, also acted as counsel for JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc., which had earlier filed a civil case against the same spouses.[11] The respondent also entered his appearance as counsel for JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc., which moved to intervene in Civil Case No. LP-000230.[12] According to the complainants, such act of the respondent was unprofessional and unethical, as he counseled for parties with conflicting interests. Furthermore, based on the respondents actuations and those of the Billones Spouses, it was most likely that they connived with one another in defrauding the Ocampo family.[13] On May 24, 2001, the respondent wrote a letter to the Ocampo family, denying the charges against him, thus: 1. Before the execution of the Deed of Sale, you together with Debbi Abendano and Mrs. Billones personally came to the office of our client at Makati City on or before April 2000, and requested to accommodate the loan application of Mrs. Billones using your house and lot as collateral so that the loan proceeds thereof, part of which, will be paid to you as additional of her down payment of PHP=1,000,000.

2. As a matter of fact, you personally submitted to our client through the undersigned lawyer the following documents: (a) Your receipt of the down payment of PHP=1,000,000 from Sps. Billones, (b) Contract to Sell between Sps. Billones and yourself; (c) Philamlife and (d) Price Smart IDs and (e) your Cedula, copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D and E; 3. Further, you were the one who personally delivered to the undersigned the original copy of TCT No. 31064 together with other related documents such as tax declarations, vicinity map. In addition, you even signed in the presence of the undersigned a Special Power of Attorney (copy of which is hereto appended as Annex F) empowering Mrs. Billones to u se your real property as collateral with our client; 4. Finally, you executed the subject Deed of Sale in front of ATTY. ALEJANDRO G. YRREVERRE, JR. together with the witnesses in favor of SPS. Billones for the sum of PHP=1,000,000. When asked by the notary public about the signing of your husband, you requested that he will sign it in your house because your husband is so sick and old and that he could not come to office for that purpose. Banking on your representation, the notary public agreed and later the said Deed of Sale was returned back to the latter.[14] In a Resolution dated April 3, 2002, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation/decision.[15] Commissioner Dennis B. Funa of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline thereafter submitted a Report and Recommendation dated July 4, 2002, with the following findings and recommendations: 1. On the Charge of Conflict of Interest. We adopt in toto the arguments of respondent in quoting Canon 6, Canon[s] of Professional Ethics, which provides for an exception to the rule on conflict of interest, to wit: except by express consent of all the parties concerned given after a full disclosure of facts. 2. On the charge of Notarizing Deed of Sale Without the Affiants. Respondent herein had all but admitted this particular charge and, in fact, is willing to face the appropriate sanction. Respondent furthermore pleads for leniency and consideration. Accordingly, Respondent is found NOT GUILTY with respect to the charge of Conflict of Interest. However, Respondent is found GUILTY of notarizing a document supposedly executed by Mr. Hermilindo P. Ocampo, who was actually deceased at the time of the notarization. Respondent is also found GUILTY and responsible for the use of a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) that did not belong to affiant Mrs. Pacita Ocampo, but instead belonged to another person. PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent is GUILTY of the offenses charged, discussed above, and should be given the penalty of ONE (1) MONTH SUSPENSION with a STERN WARNINGthat repetition of said acts will warrant a more severe penalty.[16] On the issue of representing clients with conflicting interests The respondent cannot be held liable for representing conflicting interests in acting as defense counsel for the Billiones Spouses in Civil Case No. LP-00-0230 while acting as counsel for defendant-intervenor JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc. in the same case. The evidence presented by the respondent shows that when the Billones Spouses secured his services as counsel, they were made fully aware of the pertinent facts and circumstances. Their consent and written conformity was obtained after full disclosure of the facts of the case.[17] They even submitted a verified written manifestation of conformity to show proof that the respondent was hired with their approval.[18] One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against a lawyers representation of clients with conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after the prospective counsel makes full disclosure of the facts to the parties.[19] On the issue of notarizing a deed without requiring the parties to be present to attest to the truth of the matters contained therein

The respondent maintains that Mrs. Pacita Ocampo was present when he notarized the deed of sale, but admitted that Mr. Hermilindo Ocampo did not appear before him. The respondent claims that he acted in good faith, and had no knowledge that Mr. Ocampo, the other party to the document, was already deceased. It was Mrs. Ocampo who led him to believe that her husband was merely ill In yielding to Mrs. Ocampos plea, I just acted out of passion, generosity and kindness to her to facilitate the processing of the loan as she also intimated to me during the meeting that she was also in dire need of money to be used for her husbands recovery. [20] The respondent further explained that he took precautionary measures to safeguard the public interest by making specific instructions to Rosita S. Billones and Deborah Hernandez Abendano to be present when Mr. Ocampo affixed his signature, and not to use the subject deed unless and until he got hold of Mr. Ocampos CTC. No damage was caused to any party, since what facilitated the transfer of the property was a subsequent Deed of Transfer entered into by and between the same parties. As such, the subject deed was without any legal effect and a mere scrap of paper.[21] The respondents arguments are without merit. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 [22] provides: (a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. It is thus clear from the foregoing that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. [23] Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantial public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document by law is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.[24] When the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that the vendorssignatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared before him to attest to the truth of what were stated therein, he undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[25] In acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before him, the respondent also made an untruthful statement, thus violating Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.[26] Moreover, he opens himself to prosecution for falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[27] we had the occasion to state: As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sancrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon

respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. [28] We take note of the respondents remorseful attitude and his willingness to forego his notarial work or accept severe censure, reprimand and admonition from the Court.[29] We agree that the penalty of disbarment is too excessive and is not commensurate to the faux pas committed by the respondent. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, for breach of the notarial law, the commission of respondent Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED. He is disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years. Respondent Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months effective immediately for violation of Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to the Court to enable us to determine when the revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as Notary Public as well as when his suspension from the practice of law shall have taken effect. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. VICENTE FOLLOSCO and HERMILINA FOLLOSCO, complainants, vs. ATTY. RAFAEL MATEO, respondent. The present administrative complaint against Atty. Rafael Mateo was originally filed by the spouses Vicente and Hermilina Follosco with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) some time in 1994. In August of the same year, the CHR referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action. A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4375, was also filed by the spouses Follosco against herein respondent, based on the same acts complained of in the present complaint. The complaint was then raffled to Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.. After the parties submitted their respective position papers and other pertinent pleadings, Commissioner Magpayo, Jr., rendered his Report and Recommendation dated July 24, 2003. Based on the following findings of facts, to wit: Respondent was a notary public during all the time (1992 and 1993) material to the complaint. Complainants are the owners of a certain property (house and lot) located in Tanay, Rizal which was mortgaged to Dr. Epitacio R. Tongohan for a loan of P50,000.00. Pursuant to this transaction, several related documents were caused to be executed namely: (1) Sinumpaang Kasunduan Salaysay Tungkol sa Lupang Sanlaan; (2) Dagdag na Paglilinaw Tungkol sa Lupang Sanlaan; (3)Sinumpaang Salaysay; (4) Sinumpaang Pangako Tungkol sa Lupang Sanglaang; and (5) Promissory Note (Sinumpaang Pangako) which were all notarized by herein respondent in his official capacity as notary public for the Province of Rizal. Claiming that the signatures appearing on the documents to be forged, complainants filed criminal complaints for falsification of public documents against Dr. Tongohan, respondent Mateo and the instrumental witnesses which complaints were docketed as I.S. Nos. 94-269 and 94-2064 of the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Rizal. I.S. No. 94-269 which involves the document entitled Dagdag na Paglilinaw Tungkol sa Lupang Sanglaan was dismissed by Pros. Marianito Santos while I.S. No. 94-2064 which was filed at a later time was dismissed as against respondent, but four (4) counts of falsification of public documents were filed in court

against Tongohan and Trinidad Iposadas and one (1) count of falsification against Veronica Regondola. The latter two were the witnesses to the documents. Herein complainants not entirely satisfied with the resolution of investigating prosecutor Jison D. Julian elevated I.S. No. 94-2064 to the Department of Justice on a petition for review. The Department of Justice, speaking thru Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo, reversed the resolution in I.S. No. 94-2064 and directed that the questioned documents be referred to the NBI or PNP Crime Laboratory for appropriate examination and thereafter to conduct a re-investigation of the case and resolve the case anew based on the evidence adduced by the parties. After due examination of the questioned document (Sinumpaang Pangako Tungkol sa Lupang Sanglaan), the NBI issued Questioned Documents Report No. 661-900 containing the conclusion: The questioned signatures on one hand and the standard sample signatures on the other hand were not written by one and the same person. By the use of this forged documents, new tax declarations bearing Nos. 00-TN-001-3661 and 00TN-001-3147 were issued in the name of Dr. Epitacio Tongohan effectively canceling Tax Declaration Nos. 00-001-1158 and 001-3217 in the name of complainant Vicente Follosco.[1] Commissioner Magpayo, Jr. found respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months with warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.[2] In its Resolution dated August 30, 2003, The IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Magpayo, Jr., with the modification that instead, respondents notarial commission be suspended for one year and that respondent be reprimanded with warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. The Court agrees with the finding of the IBP that respondent failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his duties as notary public. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides: Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. [3] In this case, respondent does not deny notarizing the questioned documents. According to him, these documents were already prepared and executed at the time it was submitted to him for notarization; and because he was familiar with the complainants, he unsuspectingly affixed his signatures thereon. Respondent also stated that he does not have the slightest intention of causing damage to complainants.[4] It cannot be said that respondent acted in good faith in notarizing the questioned documents without requiring the affiants to personally appear before him and ensuring that the signatures were indeed theirs. Respondents claim of good faith cannot relieve him from the consequences of his reckless failure to comply with the dictates of the law. Acknowledgment of a document is not an empty act or routine.[5] Thus, in Vda. de Rosales vs. Ramos,[6] the Court emphasized the significance of the act of notarization, to wit:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed. A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. [7] The Court is not unaware of the careless practice of some lawyers who notarize documents without requiring the physical presence of the affiants. For one reason or another, they forego this essential requirement without taking into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. The Court had resolved numerous cases involving unauthentic notarized deeds and documents. Sadly, public faith in the integrity of public documents is continually eroding, and the Court must, once more, exhort notaries public to be more circumspect in the discharge of their functions. It devolves upon herein respondent to act with due care and diligence in stamping fiat on the questioned documents. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.[8] As borne by the records, respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resu lted not only in damaging complainants rights over the property subject of the documents but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for such negligence, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion.[9] As the Court has held in Flores vs. Chua: Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. In Maligsa v. Cabanting, we emphatically pronounced: As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional

indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.[10] (Emphasis supplied) Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondents notarial commission should not only be suspended as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors but respondent must also be suspended from the practice of law as recommended by the investigating commissioner. WHEREFORE, Atty. Rafael Mateo is SUSPENDED from practice of law for three (3) months; his incumbent notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED; and he is prohibited from being commissioned as notary public, for one year, effective immediately, with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to the personal record of respondent; the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Court for dissemination to all lower courts; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper guidance and information. SO ORDERED. ATTY. MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO P. ZABALA, respondent. In his Letter-Complaint for Disbarment filed before the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz charged respondent, Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala, for violating his oath as a notary public. Complainant alleged that respondent notarized with unknown witnesses, a fake deed of sale allegedly executed by two dead people, in gross violation of his oath as a Commissioned Notary Public in Quezon City.[1] Complainant averred that he was retained by a certain Demetrio C. Marero last December 21, 1996, to finance and undertake the filing of a Petition for the Issuance of a Second Duplicate Original of the Owners copy of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4153, in the names of Sps. Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72. The court issued an Order approving the said petition on March 10, 1997.[2] On May 20, 1997, complainant purchased the said property from Marero and had the title transferred to him and his wife. OCT No. 4153 was then cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 330000.[3] The next day, complainant requested a certain Mrs. Adoracion Losloso and Mr. Nestor Aguirre to register the title in the formers name at the Assessors Office of Antipolo City. However, they were unable to do so because the property was already registered in the name of Antipolo Properties, Inc., under TCT No. N-107359.[4] On May 27, 1997, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over the land covered by OCT No. 4153, executed by Cirila Tapales and Pedro Sumulong in favor of the complainant and his wife.[5] On December 9, 1997, Mr. Marero filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title of the land, subject of the Deed of Sale which was notarized by respondent, with damages against the complainant and his wife. The Deed of Sale was the same document Marero used when he filed a complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document docketed as I.S. No. 98-16357 before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and in a disbarment case docketed as Adm. Case No. 4963 against complainant.[6] Purportedly, to clear his name, complainant filed this complaint for disbarment against respondent. According to complainant, respondent notarized an irregular document where one of the parties to the transaction was already dead, grossly violating his oath as a notary public.[7] The IBP then required the respondent to file his answer to the said allegations. Respondent, in his Answer alleged that as a notary, he did not have to go beyond the documents presented to him for notarization. In notarial law, he explains, the minimum requirements to notarize

a document are the presence of the parties and their presentation of their community tax certificate. As long as these requirements are met, the documents may be notarized. Furthermore, he adds, when he notarized the Deed of Sale, he had no way of knowing whether the persons who appeared before him were the real owners of the land or were merely poseurs. [8] Thereafter, the parties were ordered to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline on July 31, 2001 and August 21, 2001, and required to submit their position papers. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in its Report dated September 29, 2003, recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violating Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [9] The allegations with respect to the prayer for disbarment were recommended for dismissal for insufficiency of evidence. The Commissioner held that complainant failed to establish by convincing proof that respondent had to be disbarred because of his notarial negligence. The alleged failures of respondent did not indicate a clear intent to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, according to the Commissions Report. Noteworthy, however, respondent did not deny that he notarized the cited Deed of Sale under the circumstances alleged by complainant. It appears that there was negligence on respondents part which, in our view, is quite serious. Thus, we cannot conclude that he did not violate the Notarial Law,[10] and our rules regarding Notarial Practice.[11] Nor could we agree that, as recommended by the IBP, he should only be reprimanded. At least his commission as Notary Public should be revoked and for two years he should be disqualified from being commissioned as such. The IBP noted that on its face, the Deed of Sale was not executed by the purported vendee and that only Pedro Sumulong appeared and executed the deed even though the property was co-owned by Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales. In addition, a copy of the title was not attached to the said Deed of Sale when it was presented for notarization. The aforementioned circumstances should have alerted respondent. Given the ease with which community tax certificates are obtained these days, respondent should have been more vigilant in ascertaining the identity of the persons who appeared before him. We have empathically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.[12] Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides, . . . (a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. [Emphasis ours.] A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representatives names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same.[13]

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.[14] By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. In doing so, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world that (1) all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (2) they are all personally known to him; (3) they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (4) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.[15] As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat.[16] Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon him, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining the identities of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public. WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala GUILTY of gross negligence in his conduct as a notary public. His notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Resolution to the Court within five (5) days from such receipt. Further, he is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subject to disciplinary action as a member of the Bar. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let this Resolution be also made of record in the personal files of the respondent. SO ORDERED. HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. AURORA O. SANTOS, JOVITA SANTOS GONZALES, ARNULFO O. SANTOS, ARCHIMEDES O. SANTOS, ERMELINA SANTOS RAVIDA, and ANDRES O. SANTOS, JR., defendantsappellants. The Court of Appeals, 1 in accordance with Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, certified to Us the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. No. 56674-R entitled "Amparo del Rosario, plaintiffappellee, vs. Spouses Andres Santos and Aurora Santos, defendants-appellants," as only questions of law are involved. On January 14, 1974, Amparo del Rosario filed a complaint against the spouses Andres F. Santos and Aurora O. Santos, for specific performance and damages allegedly for failure of the latter to execute the Deed of Confirmation of Sale of an undivided 20,000 square meters of land, part of Lot 1, Psu-206650, located at Barrio Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, in malicious breach of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit A or 1) dated September 28, 1964. Amparo del Rosario died on Sept. 21, 1980 so that she is now substituted by the heirs named in her will still undergoing probate proceedings. Andres F. Santos also died, on Sept. 5, 1980, and he is substituted by the following heirs: Jovita Santos Gonzales, Arnulfo O. Santos, Archimedes O. Santos, Germelina Santos Ravida, and Andres O. Santos, Jr. The Deed of Sale (Exh. A or 1) is herein reproduced below: DEED OF SALE KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: I, ANDRES F. SANTOS, of legal age, married to Aurora 0. Santos, Filipino and resident cf San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, Philippines, for and in consideration of the sum of TWO THOUSAND (P 2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby

SELLS, CONVEYS, and TRANSFERS (sic) unto Amparo del Rosario, of legal age, married to Fidel del Rosario but with legal separation, Filipino and resident of San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, Philippines that certain 20,000 square meters to be segregated from Lot 1 of plan Psu-206650 along the southeastern portion of said lot, which property is more particularly described as follows: A parcel of land (Lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-206650, situated in the Barrio of Sampaloc, Municipality of Tanay, Province of Rizal. Bounded on the SW., along lines 1-2-3, by Lot 80 of Tanay Public Land Subdivision, Pls-39; on the NW., along lines 3-4-5, by Lot 2; and along lines 5-6-7-8-910-11, by Lot 6; on the NE., along lines 11-12-13, by Lot 3: and along lines 13-1415, by Lot 4, all of plan Psu-206650; and on the SE., along line 15-1, by Lot 5 of plan Psu- 206650 ... ; containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY (181,420) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: ... of which above-described property, I own one-half (1/2) interest thereof being my attorney's fee, and the said 20,000 square meters will be transferred unto the VENDEE as soon as the title thereof has been released by the proper authority or authorities concerned: That the parties hereto hereby agree that the VENDOR shall execute a Deed of Confirmation of Deed of Sale in favor of the herein VENDEE as soon as the title has been released and the subdivision plan of said Lot 1 has been approved by the Land Registration Commissioner. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 28th day of September, 1964, in the City of Manila, Philippines. s/ ANDRES F. SANTOS t/ ANDRES F. SANTOS With My Marital Consent: s/ Aurora O. Santos (Wife) t/ Aurora O. Santos (Wife) SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: s/ Felicitas C. Moro s/ Corona C. Venal REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) ) SS. BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in Rizal, Philippines, personally appeared Andres F. Santos, with Res. Cert. No. 4500027 issued at Paranaque, Rizal, on Jan. 9, 1964, B-0935184 issued at Paranaque, Rizal on April 15, 1964, and Aurora 0. Santos, with Res. Cert. No. A-4500028 issued at Paranaque, Rizal, on Jan. 9, 1964, giving her marital consent to this instrument, both of whom are known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instruments and they acknowledged to me that the same is their free act and voluntary deed. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed this instrument and affixed my notarial seal this lst day of October, 1964, in Pasig, Rizal, Philippines. Doc. No. 1792; Page No. 85; Book No. 19; Series of 1964. s/ FLORENCIO LANDRITO t/ FLORENCIO LANDRITO NOTARY PUBLIC Until December 31, 1965 2 Plaintiff claimed fulfillment of the conditions for the execution of the Deed of Confirmation of Sale, namely: the release of the title of the lot and the approval of the subdivision plan of said lot by the Land Registration Commission. She even enumerated the titles with their corresponding land areas derived by defendants from the aforesaid lot, to wit: (a) TCT 203580 30,205 sq. meters (b) TCT 203581 19, 790 sq. meters (c) TCT 167568 40,775 sq. meters In a motion to dismiss, defendants pleaded, inter alia, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo over the subject of the action and lack of cause of action allegedly because there was no allegation as to the date of the approval of the subdivision plan, no specific statement that the titles therein mentioned were curved out of Lot I and no clear showing when the demands were made on the defendants. They likewise set up the defense of prescription allegedly because the deed of sale

was dated September 28, 1964 and supposedly ratified October 1, 1964 but the complaint was filed only on January 14, 1974, a lapse of more than nine years when it should have been filed within five years from 1964 in accordance with Article 1149, New Civil Code. Defendant also claimed that the demand set forth in the complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished. It is alleged that the deed of sale was "only an accommodation graciously extended, out of close friendship between the defendants and the plaintiff and her casual business partner in the buy and sell of real estate, one Erlinda Cortez;" 3 that in order to allay the fears of plaintiff over the non-collection of the debt of Erlinda Cortez to plaintiff in various sums exceeding P 2,000.00, defendants, who were in turn indebted to Erlinda Cortez in the amount of P 2,000.00, voluntarily offered to transfer to plaintiff their inexistent but expectant right over the lot in question, the same to be considered as part payment of Erlinda Cortez' indebtedness; that as Erlinda Cortez later on paid her creditor what was then due, the deed of sale had in effect been extinguished. Defendants thereby characterized the said deed of sale as a mere tentative agreement which was never intended nor meant to be ratified by and acknowledged before a notary public. In fact, they claimed that they never appeared before Notary Public Florencio Landrito. Finally, defendants alleged that the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the statute of frauds and that the cause or object of the contract did not exist at the time of the transaction. After an opposition and a reply were filed by the respective parties, the Court a quo resolved to deny the motion to dismiss of defendants. Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim interposing more or less the same defenses but expounding on them further. In addition, they claimed that the titles allegedly derived by them from Lot 1 of Annex A or I were cancelled and/or different from said Lot I and that the deed of sale was simulated and fictitious, plaintiff having paid no amount to defendants; and that the deed was entrusted to plaintiff's care and custody on the condition that the latter; (a) would secure the written consent of Erlinda Cortez to Annex A or I as part payment of what she owed to plaintiff; (b) would render to defendants true accounting of collections made from Erlinda showing in particular the consideration of 2,000.00 of Annex A or I duly credited to Erlinda's account.4 Plaintiff filed a reply and answer to counterclaim and thereafter a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the defenses of defendants fail to tender an issue or the same do not present issues that are serious enough to deserve a trial on the merits, 5 submitting on a later date the affidavit of merits. Defendants filed their corresponding opposition to the motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Not content with the pleadings already submitted to the Court, plaintiff filed a reply while defendants filed a supplemental opposition. With all these pleadings filed by the parties in support of their respective positions, the Court a quo still held in abeyance plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings pending the pre-trial of the case. At the pre-trial, defendants offered by way of compromise to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00, the consideration stated in the deed of sale. But the latter rejected the bid and insisted on the delivery of the land to her. Thus, the pre-trial proceeded with the presentation by plaintiff of Exhibits A to Q which defendants practically admitted, adopted as their own and marked as Exhibits 1 to 17. In addition, the latter offered Exhibit 18, which was their reply to plaintiff's letter of demand dated December 21, 1973. From the various pleadings filed in this case by plaintiff, together with the annexes and affidavits as well as the exhibits offered in evidence at the pre-trial, the Court a quo found the following facts as having been duly established since defendant failed to meet them with countervailing evidence: In February, 1964, Teofilo Custodia owner of a parcel of unregistered land with an area of approximately 220,000 square meters in Barrio Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, hired Attorney Andres F.

Santos "to cause the survey of the above-mentioned property, to file registration proceedings in Lot 4 40,775 square meters court, to appear and represent him in all government office relative thereto, to advance all expenses for surveys, taxes to the government, court fees, registration fees ... up to the issuance of title in the Lot 5 50,000 square meters name" of Custodia. They agreed that after the registration of the title in Custodio's name, and "after deducting all expenses from the total area of the property," Custodio would assign and deliver to Road Lot 6 5,303 square meters Santos "one-half (1/2) share of the whole property as appearing in the certificate of title so issued." Exh. B or 2). TOTAL 206,853 square meters On March 22, 1964, Custodio's land was surveyed under plan Psu-226650 (Exh. D or 4). It was divided into six (6) lots, one of which was a road lot. The total area of the property as surveyed was On June 22, 1966, the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-5273 (Exh. E or 5) was approved by the Land Registration Commission and by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in an order dated 211,083 square meters. The respective areas of the lots were as follows: July 2, 1966 (Entry No. 61037 T-167561, Exh. Q). Upon its registration, Custodio's O.C.T. No. 5134 Lot 1 181,420 square meters (Exh. Q) was cancelled and TCT Nos. 167561, 167562, 167563, 167564 (Exh. G), 167565 (Exh. H and 167566 were issued for the six lots in the name of Custodio (Entry No. 61035, Exh. Q). Lot 2 7,238 square meters On June 23, 1966, Custodio conveyed to Santos Lots 4 and 5, Pcs-5273 with a total area of 90,775 square meters (Exh. B or 2) described in Custodio's TCT No. 167564 (Exh. G or 7) and TCT No. Lot 3 7,305 square meters 167565 (Exh. H or 8), plus a one-half interest in the Road Lot No. 6, as payment of Santos' attorney's fees and advances for the registration of Custodio's land. Lot 4 5,655 square meters Upon registration of the deed of conveyance on July 5, 1966, Custodio's TCT Nos. 167564 and 167565 (Exhs. G and H) were cancelled. TCT No. 167568 (Exh. I or 9) for Lot 4 and TCT No. Lot 5 5,235 square meters 167585 (Exh. J or 10) for Lot 5 were issued to Santos. On September 2, 1967, Santos' Lot 5, with an area of 50,000 square meters was subdivided into Road Lot 6 4,230 square meters two (2) lots, designated as Lots 5-A and 5-B in the plan Psd-78008 (Exh. F or 6), with the following areas: TOTAL 211,083 square meters Lot 5-A 30,205 square meters xxx xxx xxx On December 27, 1965, a decree of registration No. N-108022 was issued in Land Registration Lot 5-B 19,795square meters Case No. N-5023, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, LRC Record No. N-27513, in favor of Teofilo Custodia married to Miguela Perrando resident of Tanay, Rizal. On March 23, 1966, Original TOTAL 50,000 square meters Certificate of Title No. 5134 (Exh. Q or 17) was issued to Custodio for Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Psu206650, with a total area of 206,853 square meters. The areas of the five (5) lots were as follows: Upon registration of Psd-78008 on October 3, 1967, Santos' TCT No. 167585 (Exh. J) was cancelled and TCT No. 203578 for Lot 5- A and TCT No. 203579 for Lot 5-B were supposed to have Lot 1 181,420 square meters been issued to Santos (See Entry 6311 in Exh. J or 10). Actually, TCT No. 203580 was issued for Lot 5-A (Exh. K or 1 1), and TCT No. 203581 for Lot 5-B (Exh. L or 12), both in the name of Andres Lot 2 7,238 square meters F. Santos. Out of Custodio's original Lot 1, Psu-206650, with an area of 181,420 square meters, Santos was Lot 3 7,305 square meters given a total of 90,775 square meters, registered in his name as of October 3, 1967 under three (3) titles, namely: Lot 4 5,655 square meters Lot 5 5,235 square meters TCT No. 167585 for Lot 4 Pcs-5273 (Exh. J or 10) TCT No. 203580 for Lot 5-A Psd-78008 30,205 sq. m. 40,775 sq. m.

In April to May, 1966, a consolidation-subdivision survey (LRC) Pcs-5273 (Exh. E or 5) was made on the above lots converting them into six (6) new lots as follows: xxx xxx xxx Lot 1 Lot 2 Lot 3 20,000 square meters 40,775 square meters 50,000 square meters

February 2, 1981, to its previous legal efficacy, as if it has never been cancelled at all, and in effect cancelling TCT No. T-80694 which it issued in the name of the defendant/Cross-Claimant INSTRADE, INC.; TCT No. 203581 for b) Ordering defendants CANTRADE (DAVAO) and/or CESAR A. BUSQUE to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; Lot 5-B Psd-78008 19,795 sq. m. c) Ordering defendants CANTRADE (DAVAO) and/or CESAR A. BUSQUE to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and P5,000.00 as reimbursement of expenses in this (Exh. L or 12) litigation; and d) Ordering defendants CANTRADE (DAVAO) and/or CESAR A. BUSQUE to pay the costs. 90,775 sq.m. II. ON INSTRADE'S CROSS-CLAIM: plus one-half of the road lot, Lot 6, PCS-5273, with an area of 5,303 square meters, which is a) Its Cross-claim against CANTRADE (DAVAO) and/or CESAR A. BUSQUE is hereby allowed and registered jointly in the name of Santos and Custodio (Exh. B & E) 6 granted, and therefore, Defendants/Cross-Defendants CANTRADE (DAVAO) and/or CESAR A. The court a quo thereupon concluded that there are no serious factual issues involved so the motion BUSQUE are, jointly and severally, ordered to pay its debt/obligation to INSTRADE, INC., in the for summary judgment may be properly granted. Thereafter, it proceeded to dispose of the legal total amount of P72,340.56 plus interests thereon at 12% per annum computed from dates such issues raised by defendants and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of obligations became due and payable; and the decision states as follows: b) Further ordering Defendants/Cross-Defendants CANTRADE (DAVAO) and/or CESAR A. WHEREFORE, defendants Andres F. Santos and Aurora Santos are ordered to execute and BUSQUE, jointly and severally, to pay INSTRADE, INC., the sum equivalent to 25% of the total convey to plaintiff Amparo del Rosario, within ten (10) days from the finality of this decision, 20,000 demandable amount, as and in the concept of attorney's fees; and square meters of land to be taken from the southeastern portion of either Lot 4, Pcs-5273, which c) Finally, ordering said Defendants/Cross-Defendants CANTRADE (DAVAO) and/or CESAR A. has an area of 40,775 square meters, described in TCT No. 167568 (Exh. I or 9) of from their LOL BUSQUE, jointly and severally, to pay INSTRADE, INC., the sum of P2,500.00 as and for litigation 5-A. with an area of 30,205 square meters, described in TCI No. 203; O (Exh. K or 11). The expenses. expenses of segregating the 20,000 square meters portion shall be borne fqually by the parties. rhe III. ON THE CROSS-CLAIM AS WELL AS THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT/CROSSexpenses for the execution and registration of the sale shall be borne by the defendants (Art. 1487, CLAIMANT/THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF CESAR A. BUSQUE: Civil Code). Since the defendants compelled the plaintiff to litigate and they failed to heed plainliff's For being unmeritorious, said Cross-Claim against INSTRADE, INC., and Third-Party Complaint just demand, they are further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees against Third Party Defendants De Castro is/are disallowed and dismissed outright. and the costs of this action. IV. ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS: SO ORDERED. 7 Based on considerations of justice, fairness and equity, the counterclaims set up by INSTRADE, INC., CESAR BUSQUE, and the DE CASTRO spouses as Third Party Defendants is/are INSURANCE SERVICES and COMMERCIAL TRADERS, INC. (INSTRADE dismissed."[3] Inc.), petitioner, vs. The COURT OF APPEALS, and/or Honorable Justices MANUEL C. As found by the trial court, the facts are as follows: HERRERA, JUSTO P. TORRES, JR., PACITA CAIZARES-NYE, and PAZ SALVALEON, Paz Salvaleon and her sister Vivencia Salvaleon, both married, were the owners of a parcel of land MANUEL GARCIA, VIVENCIA SALVALEON, and DALMACIO ABAD, respondents. located at Ma-ao, Davao City, registered under the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-37249 of For review on appeal are: the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 30 1992, and its the Register of Deeds of Davao City. Resolution,[2] dated February 3, 1993, in CA - G.R. CV No. 15737. The appealed decision affirmed The Salvaleons borrowed two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos from spouses Amador and Mila de the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 11299 ordering the Castro under the following conditions: (1) They mortgage their parcel of land in favor of the spouses annulment of an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land with damages filed by private respondents de Castro. (2) They surrender the possession of the title to the latter. And (3) they sign an against petitioner. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision dated December 28, 1986, authorization to obtain a loan from a bank. reads: Amador sought the advice of Cesar Busque, the General Manager of Cantrade Davao, on how to "WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows: solicit a mortgage, using the Salvaleons' property as collateral. Busque recommended a "fast loan," I. ON THE COMPLAINT: where the Salvaleons would sign a prepared special power of attorney. The spouses de Castro a) Declaring, as it is hereby declared, that the Special Power of Attorney (Exh. 'A') is null and refused. Instead, a special power of attorney authorizing Mila to mortgage the property was signed void ab initio, and therefore, it follows that the Real Estate Mortgage contract (Exh. 'C') to be a by the Salvaleons. Amador surrendered the said document "already notarized" to complete nullity. As such the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings, as well as the public auction Busque. Afterwards, Busque negotiated a real estate mortgage with Insurance Services and sale and the Sheriff's Sale that ensued as conducted by defendant-City Sheriff of Davao and Deed Commercial Traders, Inc. (Instrade), using a forged special power of attorney purportedly signed by of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation executed by Noe C. Elizaga, President of Instrade, Inc. all the Salvaleons, authorizing Busque to use the property as security for Cantrade'sindebtedness to being inefficacious for lack of legal and factual basis are likewise declared of no legal force and Instrade. When Cantrade failed to fulfill its obligation, Instrade initiated foreclosure proceedings on effect, and therefore, the Register of Deeds of Davao City is hereby ordered to reinstate in the the property. names of the plaintiffs herein their Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-37249 which it cancelled on (Exh. K or 11)

Eventually, the Salvaleons learned of the scheduled extra-judicial foreclosure of their property by the City Sheriff. They filed a complaint[4] for annulment of the foreclosure sale and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, against Instrade, Cantrade, and Busque. Paz and Vivencia were assisted by their respective husbands, Manuel Garcia and Dalmacio Abad. The suit was temporarily restrained by the trial court's October 25, 1978 Order, which was lifted on October 30, 1978. The foreclosure sale pushed through and after the expiration of the period for redemption, TCT No. T-80694 was issued in the name of Instrade. The new title bore the annotation, Lis Pendens, under Entry No. 267545, carried over from the cancelled title. In their complaint, the Salvaleons claimed that the special power of attorney authorizing Busque to mortgage their property to Instrade was a forgery. Allegedly, the real estate mortgage between Cantrade and Instrade and its subsequent foreclosure were null and void. The Salvaleons prayed for the reconveyance of the property in their favor. On October 13, 1978, Busque admitted in his Answer that Cantrade was indebted to Instrade. Busque's version was that Instrade required a surety bond to cover Cantrade's purchases of automotive parts on credit. Cantrade failed to furnish a surety bond, hence, Instrade agreed to accept a direct real estate mortgage. The plan was for the spouses de Castro to sell the Salvaleons' foreclosed property for thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos. Inasmuch as the Salvaleons were anyway willing to sell their property for only an additional ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, apart from the extinguishment of a P2,000.00 debt, Busque thought he would as well pay the balance of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos directly to the spouses de Castro. Then in turn, the spouses de Castro and Busque would mortgage the property to Instrade and the final deed of absolute sale would be executed later on. Before the plan materialized, a special power of attorney signed by the Salvaleons authorizing Busque to mortgage the property and its TCT- 37249 were forwarded to Instrade. Cantrade even submitted as optional collateral to Instrade, two other properties owned by a certain Conchita Ambe. Instrade accepted the properties owned by Ambe, but refused to surrender the documents of the Salvaleons' parcel of land. On January 12, 1979, Busque, to exculpate himself, filed an amended answer, denying he owned Cantrade, and pointing to Antonio J. Palma, Jr., as its proprietor. On January 22, 1979, Instrade in its Answer alleged good faith, not knowing nor participating in the irregularity. It asserted that it merely relied on the express authority given by the Salvaleons to Cantrade. On February 5, 1979, Busque moved to join as indispensable party the alleged proprietor of Cantrade, Antonio J. Palma, Jr. The motion was denied for lack of merit on March 1, 1979.However, the motion of Busque for leave to file third party complaint against the spouses de Castro, was given due course. As third party defendants, the spouses de Castro denied they offered to sell the Salvaleons' property to Busque. They claimed Busque promised to help them secure a loan from JVA Financing Corporation and they entrusted the Salvaleons' title and Mila's authority as mortgagor to Busque. It was only later when Amador de Castro discovered that JVA Financing Corporation was nonexistent. When he confronted Busque, the latter admitted that the Salvaleons' title was used as mortgage for a loan from Instrade. Amador repeatedly asked for the proceeds of the loan and Busque assured him that as soon as a certain Mr. Frace arrived, the money would be released. This never happened. When the spouses de Castro threatened to sue, Busque made a ten thousand (P10,000.00) peso deposit and guaranteed the return of the Salvaleons' title. The spouses de Castro asserted they never transacted with Cantrade nor Instrade. On December 28, 1986, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the Salvaleons. It ruled that there was no valid transfer of the Salvaleons' property to Instrade. The court annulled the

foreclosure proceeding by the City Sheriff, ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 80694 in the name of Instrade, and ordered reinstatement of TCT No. 37249 registered in favor of the previous owners, the Salvaleons. Instrade appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 30, 1992, respondent court rendered its decision, affirming the judgment of the trial court. Instrade filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on February 3, 1993. Hence this petition for review, with petitioner Instrade contending that: I. A PUBLIC DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED TO FULL CREDIT BY A THIRD PARTY. II. A PERSON WHO IS AT FAULT OR GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL RELIEF. Essentially the basic issue is: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court, which nullified a forged notarized special power of attorney purportedly executed by the Salvaleons. Petitioner claims that the special power of attorney allegedly executed by the Salvaleons authorizing Cantrade and/or Busque as their agent is a public document duly executed by the parties, in accordance with notarial law. Vivencia Salvaleon's testimony that their signatures were forged was belied by the notarial attestation of Atty. Bumanglag. Since the attestation of the notary was not controverted, its regularity is presumed. Furthermore, petitioner stresses that Vivencia offered contradictory evidence. She denied she appeared before the office of Atty. Bumanglag. At the same time, she presented another power of attorney, authorizing Mila as the Salvaleons' representative. This power of attorney was curiously also notarized by Atty. Bumanglag. The Rules of Court provide for the manner by which a document may be presented as evidence. Section 30 of Rule 132 states: "Proof of notarial documents. - Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved." A public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public enjoys the presumption of regularity. This presumption is rebuttable, only by strong, complete and conclusive proof. The questioned special power of attorney is void ab initio for lack of consent on the part of the Salvaleons who are supposed to be the "principals" of Cantrade. The records also showed: First, there were three special powers of attorney notarized by Atty. Bumanglag bearing the same notarial registry, allegedly executed by (1) the Salvaleons, authorizing Mila to mortgage their property; (2) the Salvaleons, empowering Cantrade and/or Busque to mortgage the same property; and (3) Conchita Ambe, allowing Cantrade and/or Antonio Palma, Jr. to mortgage two other parcels of land owned by Ambe. Second, Busque testified that the Salvaleons were not with him, when he presented the second document for notarization, thus: "Q. You are swearing under oath that those documents were signed without the presence, the appearance of the parties other than the witnesses, are you swearing that under oath? A. Yes, sir."[5] We agree with the trial court when it said: "From all the foregoing assertions which were not only left undisputed, but in fact admitted, there exists very strong and sufficient grounds to believe that the controversial notarized documents were really procured under questionable circumstances, as fraudulent misrepresentations appear perceptibly obvious in obtaining the supposed signatures which were repudiated as forged, and the admittedly irregular manner by which said documents were notarized, would clearly establish the

conclusion that the Special Power of Attorney (Exh. 'A') purportedly executed by the plaintiffs suffers from a congenital flaw thus subjecting its validity to serious legal doubt. As such, it is that kind of instrument which plaintiffs has correctly asserted to be null and void ab initio for due lack of consent on the part of the plaintiffs who in the attendant circumstance above-narrated are supposed to be the 'principals' in that Special Power of Attorney (Exh. 'A')."[6] Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case.[7] The fact that the Court of Appeals adopted the findings of fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this Court. We find no reason to alter the conclusion of both courts. Petitioner contends that it was an innocent purchaser for value, and it should be protected as against the registered owners who were negligent. As early as Juaquin vs. Madrid,[8] we said that in order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith and for value, the instrument registered should not be forged. When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property. An innocent purchaser for value is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself not by a forged deed.[9] Patently, petitioner is not an innocent purchaser. Petitioner was given the option to choose a mortgage collateral from among the real estates registered in the names of third parties. It chose the one owned by the Salvaleons, which Cantrade later proposed to replace with Conchita Ambe's properties. Petitioner refused because the offered properties were subject to restrictions under the Public Land Laws. Despite the opportunity to scrutinize the documents, including the powers of attorney of Ambe and the Salvaleons, petitioner did not do so. Given these circumstances, petitioner cannot claim good faith. The Salvaleons proved that it was not their intention to mortgage the property to petitioner, and it was Cantrade and Busque who forged the special power of attorney. Petitioner made no effort to verify whether the Salvaleons really offered their property as collateral. Where the petitioner acted with undue haste in granting the mortgage loans and did not ascertain the ownership of the lands being mortgaged, as well as the authority of the supposed agent executing the mortgage, it cannot be considered an innocent mortgagee. We held in Pichay vs. Celestino, 20 SCRA 314 (1967) that: "One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts, which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation." By putting blinders in its eyes, and by refusing to see the defects in the transaction, petitioner added to the injury of the Salvaleons. As pointed out by the respondent court, Cantrade had bad business dealings with the petitioner. Cantrade attempted to settle its indebtedness with a check that bounced. Cantrade offered a security registered under the names of third persons. When a special power of attorney allegedly signed by the Salvaleons was presented to the petitioner's counsel, the latter approved the same, without investigation as to the true owners who were residing within the

same vicinity. As ruled by respondent court, an ordinarily prudent man would have inquired into the authenticity of the title, its location, and the owners. Petitioner's failure to investigate betrays its good faith. We, therefore, find that petitioner cannot be an innocent purchaser. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 15737 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. PERMANENT SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MARIANO VELARDE, respondent. In a complaint for sum of money filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 37), docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71639, petitioner Permanent Savings and Loan Bank sought to recover from respondent Mariano Velarde, the sum of P1,000,000.00 plus accrued interests and penalties, based on a loan obtained by respondent from petitioner bank, evidenced by the following: (1) promissory note dated September 28, 1983;1 (2) loan release sheet dated September 28, 1983;2 and (3) loan disclosure statement dated September 28, 1983.3 Petitioner bank, represented by its Deputy Liquidator after it was placed under liquidation, sent a letter of demand to respondent on July 27, 1988, demanding full payment of the loan.4 Despite receipt of said demand letter,5 respondent failed to settle his account. Another letter of demand was sent on February 22, 1994,6 and this time, respondents counsel replied, stating that the obligation is not actually existing but covered by contemporaneous or subsequent agreement between the parties 7 In his Answer, respondent disclaims any liability on the instrument, thus: 2. The allegations in par. 2, Complaint, on the existence of the alleged loan of P1-Million, and the purported documents evidencing the same, only the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note, Annex A seems to be that of herein defendant. However, as to any liability arising therefrom, the receipt of the said amount of P1-Million shows that the amount was received by another person, not the herein defendant. Hence, no liability attaches and as further stated in the special and affirmative defenses that, assuming the promissory note exists, it does not bind much less is there the intention by the parties to bind the herein defendant. In other words, the documents relative to the loan do not express the true intention of the parties.8 Respondents Answer also contained a denial under oath, which reads: I, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, of age, am the defendant in this case, that I caused the preparation of the complaint and that all the allegations thereat are true and correct; that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses; 9 During pre-trial, the issues were defined as follows: 1. Whether or not the defendant has an outstanding loan obligation granted by the plaintiff; 2. Whether or not the defendant is obligated to pay the loan including interests and attorneys fees; 3. Whether or not the defendant has really executed the Promissory Note considering the doubt as to the genuineness of the signature and as well as the non-receipt of the said amount; 4. Whether or not the obligation has prescribed on account of the lapse of time from date of execution and demand for enforcement; and 5. Whether or not the defendant is entitled to his counterclaim and other damages.10 On September 6, 1995, petitioner bank presented its sole witness, Antonio Marquez, the Assistant Department Manager of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) and the designated Deputy Liquidator for petitioner bank, who identified the Promissory Note11 dated September 28, 1983, the Loan Release Sheet12 dated September 28, 1983, and the Disclosure Statement of Loan Credit Transaction.13

After petitioner bank rested its case, respondent, instead of presenting evidence, filed with leave of court his demurrer to evidence, alleging the grounds that: (a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. (b) THE CAUSE OF ACTION, CONCLUDING ARGUENTI THAT IT EXISTS, IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND/OR LACHES.14 The trial court, in its Decision dated January 26, 1996, found merit in respondents demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint including respondents counterclaims, without pronouncement as to costs.15 On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision16 dated October 27, 1999.17 The appellate court found that petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove the existence of respondents alleged loan obligations, considering that respondent denied petitioners allegations in its complaint. It also found that petitioner banks cause of action is already barred by prescription.18 Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules Court, with the following assignment of errors: 4.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GENUINENESS, DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE SUBJECT LOAN DOCUMENTS. 4.2 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS CAUSE OF ACTION IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND OR LACHES.19 Before going into the merits of the petition, the Court finds it necessary to reiterate the well-settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.20 It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.21 There are, however, exceptions to the rule, e.g., when the factual inferences of the appellate court are manifestly mistaken; the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; or the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different legal conclusion.22 This case falls under said exceptions. The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the genuineness or due execution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. It was the trial courts opinion that: The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the loan, but absent the testimony of a competent witness to the transaction and the documentary evidence, coupled with the denial of liability by the defendant does not suffice to meet the requisite preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The documents, standing alone, unsupported by independent evidence of their existence, have no legal basis to stand on. They are not competent evidence. Such failure leaves this Court without ample basis to sustain the plaintiffs cause of action and other reliefs prayed for. The loan document being challenged. (sic) Plaintiff did not exert additional effort to strengthen its case by the required preponderance of evidence. On this score, the suit must be dismissed.23 The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial courts finding and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, viz.: The bank should have presented at least a single witness qualified to testify on the existence and execution of the documents it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations of Velarde. This falls short of the requirement that (B)efore any private writing may be received in evidence, its due

execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) By a subscribing witness. (Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court) It is not true, as the Bank claims, that there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting papers as Velarde has already admitted these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his responsive pleading. And consistent with his denial, he objected to the presentation of Marquez as a witness to identify the Exhibits of the Bank, and objected to their admission when these were offered as evidence. Though these were grudgingly admitted anyway, still admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. 24 A reading of respondents Answer, however, shows that respondent did not specifically deny that he signed the loan documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note seems to be his. Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties.25 Respondent reiterated these allegations in his denial under oath, stating that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses 26 Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,27 the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.: This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either. In fact, respondents allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.28 Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.29 Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent specifically denied petitioners allegations regarding the loan documents, as respondents Answer shows that he failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and its concomitant documents. Therefore, respondent is deemed to have admitted the loan documents and acknowledged his obligation with petitioner; and with respondents implied admission, it was not necessary for petitioner to present further evidence to establish the due execution and authenticity of the loan documents sued upon. While Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that private documents be proved of their due execution and authenticity before they can be received in evidence,i.e., presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in the present case, there is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan documents because of respondents implied admission thereof.30

Respondent claims that he did not receive the net proceeds in the amount of P988,333.00 as stated in the Loan Release Sheet dated September 23, 1983.31 The document, however, bears respondents signature as borrower.32 Res ipsa loquitur.33 The document speaks for itself. Respondent has already impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the loan documents. No further proof is necessary to show that he undertook the obligation with petitioner. A person cannot accept and reject the same instrument.34 The Court also finds that petitioners claim is not barred by prescription. Petitioners action for collection of a sum of money was based on a written contract and prescribes after ten years from the time its right of action arose.35 The prescriptive period is interrupted when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors.36 The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand.37 Thus, in the case of The Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez,38 the Court categorically stated that the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from meresuspension or tolling of the prescriptive period is that said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. In said case, the respondents Valenton and Juan, on February 16, 1966, obtained a credit accommodation from the Overseas Bank of Manila in the amount of P150,000.00. Written extrajudicial demands dated February 9, March 1 and 27, 1968, November 13 and December 8, 1975 and February 7 and August 27, 1976 were made upon the respondents but they refused to pay. When the bank filed a case for the recovery of said amount, the trial court dismissed the same on the ground of prescription as the banks cause of action accrued on February 16, 1966 (the date of the managers check for P150,000.00 issued by the plaintiff bank to the Republic Bank) and the complaint was filed only on October 22, 1976. Reversing the ruling of the trial court, the Court ruled: An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues (Art. 1144[1], Civil Code). The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor (Art. 1155, Ibid, applied in Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. City of Manila, 117 Phil. 985, 993; Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, L-20086, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 645, 648; Harden vs. Harden, L-22174, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 706, 711). A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period. Giorgi says: La interrupcion difiere de la suspension porque borra el tiempo transcurrido anteriormente y obliga a la prescripcion a comenzar de nuevo (9 Teoria de las Obligaciones, 2nd Ed., p. 222). La interrupcion . . . quita toda eficacia al tiempo pasado y abre camino a un computo totalmente nuevo, que parte del ultimo momento del acto interruptivo, precisamente, como si en aquel momento y no antes hubiese nacido el credito (8 Giorgi, ibid pp. 390-2). That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil. 483, 488, where it ruled that the interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial demand means that the full period of prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the suspension. When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption (Spring vs. Barr, 120 So. 256 cited in 54 C.J.S. 293, note 27). That rule was followed in Nator and Talon vs. CIR, 114 Phil. 661, Sagucio vs. Bulos, 115 Phil. 786 and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 974, 981. Interruption of the prescriptive period as meaning renewal of the original term seems to be the basis of the ruling in Ramos vs. Condez, L-22072, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1146, 1151. In that case

the cause of action accrued on June 25, 1952. There was a written acknowledgment by the vendors on November 10, 1956 of the validity of the deed of sale. In National Marketing Corporation vs. Marquez, L-25553, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 722, it appears that Gabino Marquez executed on June 24, 1950 a promissory note wherein he bound himself to pay to the Namarco P12,000 in installments within the one-year period starting on June 24, 1951 and ending on June 25, 1952. After making partial payments on July 7, 1951 and February 23, 1952, Marquez defaulted. His total obligation, including interest, as of October 31, 1964, amounted to P19,990.91. Written demands for the payment of the obligation were made upon Marquez and his surety on March 22, 1956, February 16, 1963, June 10, September 18 and October 13, 1964. Marquez did not make any further payment. The Namarco sued Marquez and his surety on December 16, 1964. They contended that the action had prescribed because the ten-year period for suing on the note expired on June 25, 1962. That contention was not sustained. It was held that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the written demands, copies of which were furnished the surety. Respondents obligation under the promissory note became due and demandable on October 13, 1983. On July 27, 1988, petitioners counsel made a written demand for petitioner to settle his obligation. From the time respondents obligation became due and demandable on October 13, 1983, up to the time the demand was made, only 4 years, 9 months and 14 days had elapsed. The prescriptive period then commenced anew when respondent received the demand letter on August 5, 1988.39 Thus, when petitioner sent another demand letter on February 22, 1994, 40 the action still had not yet prescribed as only 5 years, 6 months and 17 days had lapsed. While the records do not show when respondent received the second demand letter, nevertheless, it is still apparent that petitioner had the right to institute the complaint on September 14, 1994, as it was filed before the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period. Lastly, if a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.41The movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.42 Thus, respondent may no longer offer proof to establish that he has no liability under the loan documents sued upon by petitioner. The promissory note signed and admitted by respondent provides for the loan amount of P1,000,000.00, to mature on October 13, 1983, with interest at the rate of 25% per annum. The note also provides for a penalty charge of 24% per annum of the amount due and unpaid, and 25% attorneys fees. Hence, respondent should be held liable for these sums. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 37) dated January 26, 1996, and the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1999 are SET ASIDE. Respondent is ordered to pay One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus 25% interest and 24% penalty charge per annum beginning October 13, 1983 until fully paid, and 25% of the amount due as attorneys fees. Costs against respondent. SO ORDERED.

ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale involving interest over real property, notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals, which overturned the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the presumption of regularity attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We conclude instead that the document has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals. The facts are as follow: On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria).[1] The complaint sought to enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344.[2] The conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978. Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven (7) years. Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved and incorporated the compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered on 7 September 1981. Bustria died in October of 1986.[3] On 1 December 1989, petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in substitution of her deceased father Isidro Bustria,[4] attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December 1989, the Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment. In anOrder dated 10 October 1999, the RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.[5] In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was likewise opposed by the Aquinos, and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment,[6] seeking the revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so that it could be executed accordingly.[7] The Aquinos filed an answer, wherein they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale dated 17 October 1985.[8] Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia (De Francia), the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized the same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as their Exhibit No. 8, the deed of sale (Deed of Sale)[9] purportedly executed by Bustria. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tignos previous Motion for Consignation.[10] In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence.[11] A Motion for Reconsideration praying for the admission of said exhibit was denied in an Orderdated 27 April 1994.[12] Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cario as conflicting.[13] The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of

sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria;[14] that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale[15] or that Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.[16] The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion for Execution lodged by Tigno had to be denied since more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become final and executory; but the judgment could be revived by action such as the instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the revival of the judgment dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257.[17] The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.[18] In the meantime, the RTC allowed the execution pending appeal of its Decision.[19] On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division promulgated a Decision[20] reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that would taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null and ineffective.[21] It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that the document extinguished the right of Bustrias heirs to repurchase the property. After the Court of Appeals denied Tignos Motion for Reconsideration,[22] the present petition was filed before this Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He also argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of Sale as a false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any consideration at all. The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based. As such, they could normally lead to the dismissal of this Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts,[23] factual review may be warranted in instances when the findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are contrary to each other.[24] Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding the capacity of the notary public, Judge Cario, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately silent on that matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness. The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows: ACKNOWLEDGMENT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S. MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS ) SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument. FRANKLIN CARIO Ex-Officio Notary Public Judge, M.T.C. Alaminos, Pangasinan There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him.[25] Under Section 127 of the Land Registration

Act,[26] which has been replicated in Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[27] theDeed of Sale should have been acknowledged before a notary public.[28] But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of this petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to notarize the Deed of Sale. It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos.[29] Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis,[30] that municipal judges may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and other acts of conveyance which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges.[31] In response, respondents claim that the prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing documents took effect only in December of 1989, or four years after the Deed of Sale was notarized by Cario.[32] Respondents contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officiounder Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code.[33] However, as far back as 1980 inBorre v. Moya,[34] the Court explicitly declared that municipal court judges such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their official duties.[35] The Deed of Salewas not connected with any official duties of Judge Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our observations as to the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering that Judge Cario identified himself in the Deed of Sale as Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC: [A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business. In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents involving private transactions and sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public ExOfficio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex officio.[36] There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies.[37] The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Carios improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,[38] was even then not an isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers. There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who ceased being a judge in 1986, for his improper notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate considering Judge Carios advanced age, assuming he is still alive.[39] However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation of the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the exercise of their official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90. Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission.

Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense. The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.[40] Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.[41] On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough, from a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for convenience.[42] We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the timehonored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties.[43] Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid notarization of the Deed of Sale from the perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of Sale. Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of Appeals no longer holds true since the Deed of Sale is not a notarized document. Its proper probative value is governed by the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 132 states: Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.) The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public documents; hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat. Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132, which states: Section 20. Proof of private document.Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.

The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its enforceability militates against Tignos claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private document and in applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents, as distinguished from private documents. Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132 provides ample discretion on the trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private document in evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its veracity. The RTC was not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants due respect. The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very first time respondents alleged the existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed their answer to petitioners current action to revive judgment.[44] Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement the Compromise Agreement through two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos duly opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not raise then the claim that such right to repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only a few years after the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents themselves were signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale when they opposed in court petitioners successive attempts at consignation and execution of judgment. TheDeed of Sale, if in existence and valid, would have already precluded Tignos causes of action for either consignation or execution of judgment. The only believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be created when petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of judgmentan existential anomaly if we were to agree with the respondents that such document had been signed and notarized back in 1985. The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other observations of the RTC. It also pointed to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos tale of events. It noted that no receipts were ever presented by the respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts.[45] The Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the receipts, an assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature to ask for receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the same.[46] In itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be conclusive since consideration is always presumed. However, given the totality of the circumstances surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates against the claims of the Aquinos. We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals that Bustria did not bother to seek his lawyers assistance as regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject property had previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would not be rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of the scenario strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as credible. The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the doubts raised by the Court of Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from his home in Dasol, Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute the Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it should be acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that

persons of Bustrias age are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on traveling significant distances alone. Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record. Bustrias signature in the 1981 Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising, considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89) years old. However, Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale, which if genuine was affixed when he was already ninety-three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other evident differences between Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale and on other documents on the record. Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of circumstantial evidence. These have to be weighed against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the Deed of Sale was established by the respective testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge Cario. In its own appreciation of these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final measure of analysis, the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies. The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that Judge Cario himself prepared and typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where the document was signed,[47] while Judge Cario testified that he did not type the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the signing.[48] On this point, the Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record revealed no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia. Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of the Deed of Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly come out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no contradictions in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia on the question of whether or not Bustria signed the Deed of Sale. However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document. Thus, not only the due execution of the document must be proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by the Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia now become material not only to establish due execution, but also the authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the RTC become crucial. The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the progenitor of this all-important document is a material evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own personal and sensory knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted the document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary witness. Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be necessary to establish the validity of the transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the document itself that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about the due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the competence and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cario was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath and with particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his presence.

However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary public, Judge Cario, would be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge Cario had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would indeed be odd that he would not remember having written the document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the same. If his testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all the reason to make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale. These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC. As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute conclusive value to the testimonies of de Francia and Judge Cario. The totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale, since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to the non-existence of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut the typical presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial documents. However, for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than sufficient basis to conclude that it is a spurious document. Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tignos right to repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23 December 1996 and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents. SO ORDERED.