181 Myanmar Burma

160 Termsak Chalermpalanupap
ASEAN Regional Forum and held several bilateral talks with other foreign ministers in attendance. Her active participation was a sharp contrast to that of her predecessor, Condoleezza Rice, who skipped the ministerial dialogue with ASEAN and the forum twice in her four-year term (2005 in Vientiane and 2007 in Manila). On September 23, 2009, Clinton attended a meeting of the Group of Friends on Myanmar hosted by the UN secretary-general. 16 This participation implied an increased interest in Myanmar on the part of the United States. (Normally the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations would attend such a meeting.) After the meeting, Clinton announced the Obama administrations new policy approach to Myanmar at the United Nations headquarters in New York: The United States will begin a direct dialogue with Burmese authorities to lay out a path towards better relations on . . . democracy and human rights; cooperation on international security issues such as non-proliferation; areas of mutual benet, such as trafcking in persons, counter-narcotics; and recovery of WWII-era remains.17 The new U.S. policy approach to Myanmar seemed good enough to win support from Aung San Suu Kyi. Her spokesman told the media in Yangon, [Daw Suu Kyi] said she had always supported the idea of engagement. However, that engagement should be done with both the military government and the democratic forces.18 On September 25, 2009, Aung San Suu Kyi sent a letter to Senior General Than Shwe to suggest ways to convince Western governments to lift political and economic sanctions on Myanmar. She requested and obtained permission to meet with Western diplomats to discuss how to remove the sanctions.19 This represented a change in her attitude toward the sanctions, which she had previously welcomed as a way to put pressure on the Myanmar government and military leadership. Consequently, the European Union approved a new ve-year Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fund of 35 million euros to support programs to improve job and food security in Myanmars Rakhine, Chin, Shan, central Myanmar, and Kachin regions. Back in New York, Myanmars prime minister General Thein Sein addressed the UN General Assembly on September 28, 2009. He is the most senior Myanmar government leader to attend the UN General Assembly in fourteen years. Before him, General Maung Aye, vice chair of the State Peace and Development Council, attended the assembly in October 1995. The presence of the prime minister of Myanmar at the UN General Assembly could signify the readiness of his government to engage the world community, including the United States, more actively.
ASEANs Policy of Enhanced Interactions 161
In his address to the General Assembly, Prime Minister Thein Sein stated the following: Sanctions cannot legitimately be regarded as a tool to promote human rights and democracy. Sanctions are being employed as a political tool against Myanmar, and the government of Myanmar considers them unjust. Such acts must be stopped. The transition to democracy is proceeding. . . . The government is taking systematic steps to hold free and fair elections.20 The rst ASEAN-U.S. Summit, including all ten ASEAN leaders, was held with President Barack Obama on November 15, 2009, immediately after the end of the Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation summit in Singapore. In the recent past, President George W. Bush had met with only seven ASEAN leaders on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation summit meetings in Los Cabos (2003), Pusan (2005), and Hanoi (2007).
ASEANs Stand on Myanmar

On the issue of the long-standing internal conict in Myanmar, the ASEAN Secretariat and the organizations other nine member states have consistently defended the membership of Myanmar in ASEAN opposed any discrimination directed at Myanmar in ASEANs external relations and cooperation with any dialogue partner or other external party21 continued to support Myanmars quest to join Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation as soon as the moratorium on organization membership is lifted supported Myanmars joining the annual ASEAN-Europe meeting, along with Laos and Cambodia, starting from the fth meeting in Hanoi in October 2004 encouraged and supported dialogue and cooperation among all parties concerned with achieving peaceful resolution to the political problems and national reconciliation in Myanmar supported the prompt implementation of Myanmars seven-step roadmap to democracy, as expressed, in particular, at the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali encouraged Myanmar to keep fellow ASEAN member states fully informed of progress as well as setbacks in implementing various measures in the roadmap supported the ASEAN chair when interacting with Myanmar supported the good ofces of the UN secretary-general and his special envoy to Myanmar
supported and participated in the concerted efforts of the Group of Friends of Myanmar in the United Nations called for the immediate release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners, especially since the 2003 summit encouraged Myanmar to help defend the common interests of ASEAN22 had no direct formal contact with Aung San Suu Kyi or other Burmese exile groups nor recognized any Myanmar exile groups expressed readiness to support Myanmar in ensuring free and fair general elections in 2010 supported Myanmars active participation in ASEAN activities, including the Initiative for ASEAN Integration aimed at narrowing the development gaps between old and new member states as well as within needy member states taken an active leadership role in mobilizing ASEAN and international support for the operations to provide humanitarian assistance to survivors of Cyclone Nargis, under the Tripartite Core Group of ASEAN, the United Nations, and Myanmar supported capacity building for the Myanmar government, including attachment to and training at the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as recruitment of Myanmar nationals to work in the ASEAN Secretariat23 supported Myanmars invitations to host ASEAN meetings, including meetings held in Naypyidaw Taking together, these actions and advocacies indicate that ASEAN and its member states know what to do and how to work with Myanmar. Their collective stand is consistent with ASEANs paramount value of keeping every member state inside the ASEAN fold happily cooperating with all other member states in the process of community building. Myanmars membership in ASEAN serves the long-term interest of all parties concerned with Southeast Asia. Trying to ostracize or isolate the country runs against the common beliefs and unique values of ASEAN. The ASEAN member states believe that every Southeast Asian nation and its people have a legitimate role to play and that together they can play this role constructively in building the ASEAN community.
Notes
1. Timor-Leste, which gained independence in May 2002, is actively preparing for ASEAN membership and has expressed its wish to join the group by 2012. The country has been regularly invited to attend opening ceremonies at the ASEAN

foreign ministers meetings and ASEAN Summit meetings as a guest of the host country and lately as a guest of ASEAN (which denotes a higher status). Timor-Leste started participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum at its twelfth annual meeting in Vientiane, Laos, on July 29, 2005. On January 13, 2007, Timor-Leste acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In a January 2007 meeting in Cebu, the ASEAN foreign ministers assured the deputy prime minister of TimorLeste, Jose Luis Guterres, that ASEAN membership for Timor-Leste was a question not of whether but of when. Guterres attended the opening ceremonies at a later meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Phuket in July 2009. The Thai host noted with appreciation the high-level representation of Timor-Leste at the meeting, saying that it signied the continued strong interest of the country in learning about ASEAN and preparing for its eventual membership. Papua New Guinea has been a special observer in ASEAN since the late 1980s. In March 2010 Papua New Guinea expressed renewed interest in ASEAN membership and received an expression of support from Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, a moratorium on new members is in effect until 2015, with the understanding (at least on the ASEAN side) that it would continue to afliate with the Pacic Islands Forum. Papua New Guinea was the rst nonregional state to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (on July 5, 1989) and took part in founding the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. 2. First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen both signed for Cambodia. The 1995 treaty entered into force on March 27, 1997. So far, only China has expressed its readiness to sign the protocol to support the treaty. Four other nuclear weapon states (France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have raised some objections, on issues such as the zone of coverage, which includes continental shelves, and the 200-mile exclusive economic zones of the treatys signatory states. 3. See full text of the Bangkok Summit Declaration on the ASEAN Secretariats website (www.aseansec.org/5189.htm [July 2010]). 4. See Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on Cambodia, Kuala Lumpur, July 10, 1997 (www.aseansec.org/1826.htm). 5. Opening statement of H. E. Mr. Ohn Gyaw, the Union of Myanmar (www. asean.org). 6. Crisis Prevention, Newsweek International, July 21, 1997. 7. Surin Pitsuwan, opening statement, Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post-Ministerial Conference, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand, June 12, 1998 (www.asean.org). Surin Pitsuwan and Anwar Ibrahim were among the founding members of the Asian Dialogue Society. The founding members were a group of Southeast Asian intellectuals and politicians (including M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, now the governor of Bangkok, the Thai journalist Kavi Chongkittavorn, and the Singaporean think tank scholar M. Rajaretnam) aspiring to build a better Asia through international dialogue and cooperation. The society had funding

support from the Hans Seidel Stiftung, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Sasakawa Foundation, the Nippon Foundation, and UNESCO, among others. 8. These points are based on the recollection of the author, who accompanied the ASEAN secretary-general to a working dinner of ASEAN foreign ministers in Manila on July 23, 1998. 9. Surin, statement, June 12, 1998. 10. Mr. Abdullah Badawi, opening statement, Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post-Ministerial Conference, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand, June 12, 1998 (www.asean.org). 11. As it turned out, however, the Thai prime minister briefed his counterparts from Indonesia and Malaysia on the Deep South issue during their meeting on the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle in Vientiane before the start of the tenth ASEAN Summit. 12. ASEAN foreign ministers were briefed by Cambodia and Thailand on the border temple dispute during a working dinner in Singapores Botanic Garden on July 20, 2008. While Cambodia welcomed ASEANs involvement, Thailand objected on the ground that there were existing bilateral border mechanisms that could be used to address the dispute. Nevertheless, Singapore, as the chair of ASEAN, issued a statement saying that the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting also decided to offer its facilities to be placed at the disposal of Cambodia and Thailand in the event that they felt the need for further support to nd an early resolution to the issue. 13. See the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 (www.asean.org) (ASEAN summits). One of the main reasons for the acceleration was that ASEAN risked losing its economic competitiveness if its economic integration toward one ASEAN market and regional production base moved too slowly. The ASEAN economic ministers were the rst to agree on realizing the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. The ASEAN foreign ministers thought it would be incongruent (or even divisive) to move faster on the economic pillar than on the other two pillars. Therefore, they recommended the acceleration of the ASEAN Political and Security Community and the ASEAN Sociocultural Community by 2015 so that all the three pillars would advance in tandem. 14. ASEAN certainly did not invent noninterference. The principle is recognized in the UN Charter and in international law. However, the principle is enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Article 2(b) asserts the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion. Article 2(c) includes non-interference in the internal affairs of one another as part of the regional code of interstate conduct in Southeast Asia. 15. Scott Marciel, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacic affairs, was appointed U.S. ambassador to ASEAN on April 11, 2008 (holding both positions at the same time). He became the rst ambassador to ASEAN more than eight months before the ASEAN Charterwhich under article 46 encourages

ASEANs friends and partners to accredit their ambassadors to ASEANentered into force on December 15, 2008. By the end of 2009, twenty-eight other nonregional governments had appointed ambassadors to ASEAN. Most of these are concurrently ambassadors of their respective countries to Indonesia. 16. The Group of Friends includes Australia, China, the European Union, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam. 17. Based on a U.S. nonpaper on U.S. policy on Burma, which was shared with the ASEAN Secretariat. A U.S. delegation visited Myanmar for ofcial talks and factnding in November 2009. It was led by the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacic affairs, Kurt Campbell. 18. Quoted in Suu Kyi Backs U.S engagement with Burma, Mail and Guardian Online, Rangoon, September 25, 2009. 19. Aung San Suu Kyi Seeks to Meet Western Diplomats, Jakarta Post, September 29, 2009. 20. Based on the prepared text of Thein Seins address released by the UN Secretariat (www.un.org/ga/64). 21. From 2007 to 2009, Myanmar was the country coordinator for the ASEAN New Zealand Dialogue Partnership. New Zealand could not host any ASEAN New Zealand meeting, even though it was New Zealands turn to do so. Hence the ASEANNew Zealand Dialogue Partnership was virtually frozen during this period. Myanmar is now the coordinator of the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership and no such problem for Russia is foreseen. Myanmar hosted the ASEAN-Russia Joint Cooperation Committee meeting in Yangon on November 2425, 2009. 22. Myanmar was encouraged to skip the ASEAN chairmanship in 200506 and the chairmanship of the ASEAN economic ministers meeting in 200607. 23. In 2009 there were three Myanmar nationals working in the ASEAN Secretariat. In 2012 it will be Myanmars turn to nominate a deputy secretary-general to serve a three-year term in the ASEAN Secretariat.
pavin chachavalpongpun
10
The Last Bus to Naypyidaw
yanmar was admitted into the ASEAN family in 1997. In the face of strong objections from the West and certain civil society organizations in the region, ASEAN insisted on welcoming Myanmars regime, claiming that the admission served the organizations long-term interests. It wanted to engage the rulers of Myanmar constructively to moderate the regimes repressive policies. It wanted to counter Chinas increasingly tight embrace of the Myanmar junta and its growing inuence inside Myanmar, considered a potential threat to ASEAN.1 The organizations approach to Myanmar underwent multiple modications over the years, from constructive engagement to exible engagement and then to forward engagement.2 The ten member countries of ASEAN had their own views and interpretations of these multiple modications, reafrming their independence vis--vis Myanmar. None of the positions seemed satisfactory. Along the way, Myanmar exploited ASEANs mechanisms, taking advantage of the groups strict principle of noninterference as a political shield. Sadly, many ASEAN members themselves have also suffered from a legitimacy deciency. This condition allowed Myanmar to manage its domestic affairs without outside interference and moral policing from ASEAN members. Because ASEAN membership is irreversible, and because the Myanmar regimes behavior has become more unpredictable, ASEAN has embarked on an effort to reconstruct certain identities for Myanmar to justify its membership and to cloak ASEANs own discomfort.
Fiction versus Reality

The incongruity between ASEAN-constructed Myanmar and the reality inside the country resurfaces every so often. In 2009 at least three signicant incidents seriously challenged ASEANs standing on Myanmar.
166
The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 167
First, in May, the Myanmar junta decided to press charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy, over a bizarre episode wherein an American entered her residence uninvited, which the junta interpreted as a violation of the terms of her house arrest. While ASEAN practiced its usual diplomatic rhetoric, calling for the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the junta found her guilty and extended her house arrest for another eighteen months.3 The sentence effectively bars the National League for Democracy leader from participating in the upcoming election in 2010. Second, in late August there were armed clashes between the Tatmadaw and the Kokang militias, despite previous ceasere agreements. ASEANs concentration on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the juntas reconciliation with the National League for Democracy had eclipsed the fact that the underlying causes of ethnic conict in Myanmar had not been addressed.4 Third, in September Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced what would become a watershed in U.S. policy toward Myanmar. No longer depending solely on sanctions, the United States was adopting an engagement approach, forming a dual-track policy on Myanmar, and would soon begin a direct dialogue with the juntas representatives. Although the shift in U.S. policy on Myanmar was welcomed by ASEAN, it could potentially further undermine ASEANs position vis--vis Naypyidaw. During the past twelve years, myth has unmistakably taken a central stage in ASEANs policy toward Myanmar. ASEAN re-created Myanmars military regime, the State Peace and Development Council, as a political entity lled with hope and possibility for a thriving democracy. ASEANs constructive engagement was designed to make that come true. The group believed that its regional approach would be able to foster change in Myanmar. An envoy from ASEAN was appointed to convince the Myanmar regime to open itself up politically. The real Myanmar, however, has remained unchanged. It has been content to be the black sheep of the ASEAN family. The juntas refusal to release Aung San Suu Kyi and its continued disregard of the human rights of its own people not only debunked the constructive engagement approach but also gave the lie to ASEANs highly romanticized Myanmar policy. ASEAN legitimized Myanmars seven-step roadmap to democracy without having looked at it carefully to determine whether it was a real step forward for the country or whether it warranted ASEANs support. In an interview, former ASEAN secretary-general Rodolfo Severino noted that ASEAN had fallen into its own oblivion trap. Consequently it has become more difcult to criticize Myanmars so-called democratization process, especially the juntas
168 Pavin Chachavalpongpun
scheme to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi from the 2010 election and perpetuate the militarys position in politics.5 ASEAN has also embraced a view of China as possessing overwhelming power over Myanmar. In 1997 ASEAN was in a hurry to pull Myanmar out of the orbit of Chinese inuence. Throughout the following decade, the perception of Chinese inuence has been intensied by a more visible Chinese presence in Myanmar, through the inux of Chinese migrants into northern Myanmar, and a ood of Chinese investment that has threatened to dominate the Myanmar economy. This perception has kept ASEAN from seriously addressing difcult issues with Myanmar for fear that doing so would drive the regime further into Chinas arms. As an example, Thailand was reluctant to criticize the Myanmar regime because of its dependence on gas from Myanmar. The Thai government was concerned about its energy shortages and thus avoided upsetting the Myanmar junta, which might turn its back on Bangkok and look toward energy-hungry China instead. In reality, ASEAN has never understood the true nature of Sino-Myanmar relations and has often adopted the opinion of Western governments and the media. The complexity of Sino-Myanmar relations served to obstruct ASEANs own efforts to deal with the Myanmar issues more directly and honestly. However, the recent exchange of re between the Tatmadaw and the Kokang militias underscores the complexity of the relationship between China and Myanmar. Ian Storey has argued that the Kokang incident illustrates that the State Peace and Development Council is capable of undertaking actions that challenge Beijings interests and belies characterizations of Myanmar as Chinas client state. Fighting at the border could severely disrupt bilateral trade, much of which is conducted at the border, which would adversely affect Chinas landlocked southwestern provinces. It could trigger an outpouring of refugees into China whom the authorities would be forced to feed and house. According to the UN high commissioner for refugees, as many as 37,000 Kokang refugees ed in August 2009 to the Chinese border towns of Nansan and Genma. Moreover, construction of the Kyaukphyu-Kunming pipelines, which China considers a strategic necessity, could be suspended, as the proposed route passes close to potential battle zones.6 From this perspective, Myanmar has successfully demonstrated independence in its relations with China.7 The shift in U.S. policy toward Myanmar under the Obama administration has emerged as a wake-up call for ASEAN. All along, ASEAN seemed to believe that it had been the sole provider of legitimacy to the State Peace
and Development Council, while the global community was punishing the regime with harsh sanctions, which made its role indispensable. Seeing ASEAN as Myanmars only sanctuary, some ASEAN leaders were convinced that the organization would be able to inuence the regime and dictate its behavior, simply because nobody else could offer the same legitimacy. As a point of fact, Myanmar made it known that it would disallow any outside pressure. From petty to serious matters, Myanmar cares very little about ASEANs reputation and credibility. The junta relocated its capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw without informing other ASEAN members. It changed its mind at the last minute and objected to the participation of Ibrahim Gambari, special adviser to the United Nations secretary-general, in the 2007 East Asia Summit in Singapore, where he was expected to receive a brieng on the situation on Myanmar in the aftermath of the juntas crackdown on street protesters in September 2007. The Myanmar regime brushed aside ASEANs offer to lead the reconciliation process, judging it to be an act of intervention. It has effectively exploited the differing regional and international approaches to its own advantage, from irting with ASEANs constructive engagement in the 1990s to tilting toward the United Nations in recent years and now to reaching out to the United States. At this hour, according to some analysts, the junta apparently considers the United States, not ASEAN or the United Nations, as the real provider of legitimacy.8 This development raises a serious question about the future of ASEAN and how it can remain in the drivers seat as it manages regional issues such as democratization in Myanmar. Kurt Campbell, the U.S. State Departments assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacic affairs, may emphasize that the United States will continue to coordinate closely with ASEAN as a means of reinforcing the fundamental message of reform to the Myanmar regime.9 But ASEANs role is at stake. ASEAN is confronted with two options: either give up on Myanmar or quickly jump on the last bus, driven by the United States, to Naypyidaw.
ASEANs Critical Hurdles

Evidently, ASEAN has chosen to jump on the U.S. bandwagon and to downplay its own failure to persuade Myanmar to undertake serious political reforms. After the meeting of the Group of Friends on Myanmar at UN headquarters in New York on September 23, 2009, Singapores foreign minister George Yeo declared, Singapore welcomes the shift in position by the
U.S. and Europethe decision to engage Myanmar while keeping sanctions in place for the time being. We believe this would enable the United States and Europe to have more inuence in the political evolution of the country.10 The Singapore media swiftly congratulated the new U.S. policy, while interpreting the policy shift as ASEANs own success. ASEAN can take satisfaction in the Obama Administrations new track. The group has been no less aggrieved over the juntas abuse of the constitutional process and the long detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, but it stuck by its policy of engagement and it disputed the usefulness of sanctions.11 Once again, ASEANs support for the new U.S. policy is merely a reaction to the changing strategic interests of Washington in Naypyidaw. How can ASEAN be certain that the U.S. policy shift will not have a negative impact on its own position in Myanmar? Has ASEAN ever dened its own strategic interests in this member country? As the United States is modifying its policy toward Myanmar, signs that ASEAN might be marginalized are clearly detectable. According to Larry Jagan, the United States began its high-level talks directly with senior representatives of the Myanmar government in Beijing in July 2007, brokered by the Chinese government.12 But the follow-up meeting collapsed because of the juntas crackdown on antigovernment demonstrators two months later. Not until the concerns over Myanmars renewed ties with North Korea and the State Peace and Development Councils nuclear ambition reached new heights was the United States compelled to consult with certain ASEAN members, notably Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The consultations took place during the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 23, 2009, in Phuket, Thailand. ASEAN might have anticipated the review of U.S. policy toward Myanmar after President Obama assumed ofce in January 2009. At the forum meeting, however, sanctions seemed to be very much on the mind of Secretary Clinton, partly because the United States had become increasingly suspicious of the elusive relations between Myanmar and North Korea and partly because the ASEAN Regional Forum took place in the middle of the controversial trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. Even at that point, ASEAN did not anticipate that the United States would establish a direct dialogue with the Myanmar regime. As the likelihood of ASEAN marginalization increased, the group started to realize that its inuence over Myanmar had long since passed a critical threshold. Economic and political factors may be responsible for ASEANs growing constraints in dealing with the Myanmar issue. Some ASEAN members clearly do not want political issues to disturb business opportunities in Myanmar, and some continue to restrain themselves by adhering tightly to
the nonintervention principle as they interact with the Myanmar regime. But the most critical hurdle, arguably, stems from the lack of a concerted effort and a unied stance among ASEAN members on how to collectively tackle the political malaise in Myanmar. During the past decade, not only has the ASEAN approach greatly differed from that of the rest of the world, but each ASEAN member has also had its own way of dening the Myanmar problem. These differences persist in ASEAN.
Thailands Challenges
Thailands policy toward Myanmar took a sharp turn when the Democrat Party came to power at the beginning of 2009. The government of Abhisit Vejjajiva impatiently discarded the business-oriented Myanmar policy of former premier Thaksin Shinawatra. Abhisits government has been particularly vulnerable because it has no record of civilian supremacy over the military nor a commitment to democracy and reconciliation. Therefore, Abhisit has been forced to construct his own legitimacy by appearing to advocate democratic principles both in his domestic and foreign policies. His strategy served Thailand well, as the country was the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee in 2009. In May Abhisit released a statement on behalf of ASEAN expressing grave concerns over the way the junta handled the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEANs statement infuriated the Myanmar leadership. Myanmar foreign minister Nyan Win took a swipe at ASEAN for deviating from its noninterference policy: Some countries in our region and others have a strong interest in the case of John Yettaw and Aung San Suu Kyi. But their interest in the case has been found over-proportionate, overlooking the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, and should not have happened.13 Not long after that, the Tatmadaw launched attacks against the Karen National Union to disturb trade and create insecurity along the ThaiMyanmar border. In another attempt to secure legitimacy at home, in August 2009 the Abhisit government rallied support from fellow ASEAN members to request that Senior General Than Shwe grant a pardon for Aung San Suu Kyi. Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia supported the Thai initiative, although in the end Thailand failed to get full ASEAN support for its initiative. Some members, like Vietnam, saw it as a violation of the nonintervention principle. Moreover, this idea was completely overshadowed by the visit to Naypyidaw of U.S. senator Jim Webb in the same month. The Thai government has been relatively unenthusiastic about the shift in U.S. policy toward Myanmar. The Foreign Ministry released a statement on
September 30, 2009, that supported the new U.S. policy direction: Thailand and ASEAN have consistently used an engagement approach with Myanmar, for the benet of Myanmar and her people as a whole. In this regard, Thailand stands ready to work closely with ASEAN, the United States, the United Nations, and other stakeholders to engage with Myanmar in a constructive and concerted manner to ensure substantive political development in Myanmar.14 Indeed, the dilemma for Thailand is how to exploit the U.S. presence in Myanmar for its benet and at the same time remain independent from the U.S. approach to Naypyidaw. Abhisit once said, I insisted that ASEAN countries and western countries have the same goal or opinions but it does not mean that we can resort to the same procedure. We have different conditions particularly between countries in the region and countries far from [Myanmar]. We have different relationship policies.15
Indonesias Challenges
After years of political turmoil, Indonesia has nally emerged as a reborn democracy and is now considered the most stable democratic state in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the country has become more vocal about promoting the regions democratization. The successful political transition has made Indonesia less patient with ASEANs progress in this direction. While the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is seeking to reinvent its role in ASEAN in a more proactive way, some members of the House of Representatives, others across a number of political parties, and some leading think tanks, have all been pushing for a more radical change in the countrys perception of ASEAN. Rizal Sukma, executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has called for a post-ASEAN foreign policy because of the failure of ASEAN as an effective organization. He alleges that ASEAN continues to ignore critical issues, such as the role of the ASEAN human rights body. Instead, ASEAN defends Myanmar at various international forums, including the International Labour Organization and the UN Security Council: We should stand tall and proclaim that enough is enough. It is enough for Indonesia to imprison itself in the golden cage of ASEAN for more than 40 years. Indonesia needs to begin formulating a post-ASEAN foreign policy. ASEAN should no longer be treated as the only cornerstone of Indonesias foreign policy. For Indonesia, ASEAN should constitute only one of the available platforms through which we can attain and fulll our national interests. Some of our foreign policy initiatives, such as the Bali Democracy
Forum, the G20, and strategic partnerships with global and regional major powers, have already shown signs toward that direction.16 With this new attitude, Indonesia loudly hailed the U.S. decision to engage the reclusive Myanmar junta, urging the latter to respond positively to the appeasing gesture from Washington.17 If the shift in U.S. policy toward Myanmar could possibly marginalize ASEAN, Indonesias post-ASEAN foreign policy would serve the country well in the new regional order. Indonesia has already expressed its interest in playing a leading role in Myanmar. Previously preoccupied with its own democratization, Indonesia is now paying more attention to the situation in Myanmar to bolster its own democratic credentials. Jakarta is in the position to do so because it does not have substantial economic interests in Myanmar. It also wants to carve out a niche for itself that is commensurate with its status as ASEANs largest and most populous member.18
Singapores Challenges
Singapore takes every opportunity to stress its seemingly pro-U.S. foreign policy. This position extends to its support for the shift in U.S. policy toward Naypyidaw. The city-state has been at the forefront in responding to the United States new move in Myanmar. Foreign Minister Yeo was among the rst ASEAN personalities to applaud the landmark U.S. decision. Over the years, Singapore has successfully maintained its channel of communication with Myanmars top leaders, thereby signaling its championing of engagement. Singapore has been one of Myanmars top trading partners, with annual bilateral trade of more than $1 billion. At the same time, this relationship has been occasionally beset by various allegations, including that Singapore has supplied the Tatmadaw with arms used to suppress dissidents.19 More recently, it was reported that the junta has siphoned off from the national coffers some $4.85 billion in revenue generated by Total and Chevrons Yadana gas project and has deposited almost all of the money offshore with Singapores Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation and DBS Groupan allegation promptly dismissed by the banks concerned.20 Among its ASEAN partners, Myanmar seems to have been most comfortable in its interactions with Singapore. Former prime minister and senior minister Goh Chok Tong became the rst foreign leader to meet Senior General Than Shwe, in June 2009, following the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. His visit came at a time when relations between Myanmars military regime and ASEAN had soured over the trial. It was clear that the ongoing political crisis in Myanmar presented ASEAN with a critical challenge as the organization
was pushing ahead with plans to introduce a charter that encompassed a regional human rights body. Thus while in Naypyidaw, Goh expressed ASEANs concern over Myanmars political situation. However, Than Shwe was not enraged by Gohs repeated call for the emancipation of Aung San Suu Kyi. Instead, Goh was given the red-carpet treatment during his fourday trip to Myanmar. Myanmar analysts believe Gohs message carried more weight than those from other ASEAN nations.21 As a small state, Singapore values multilateral cooperation and has sought to identify itself with ASEAN so as to reduce the pressure from bigger powers within the organization. As a result, Singapore has seen itself as one of the key players in ASEAN. It supports ASEANs role in Myanmar and opposes sanctions. Singapore strongly backed ASEANs initiative in acting as a bridge linking Myanmar and the United Nations in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. Robert Chua, Singapore ambassador to Yangon and also dean of the diplomatic corps, played a signicant role in the Tripartite Core Group (consisting of ASEAN, the United Nations, and the Myanmar government) that led the Nargis relief effort. From this perspective, Singapore will be tempted to use its connections inside Naypyidaw to facilitate the new U.S. dialogue with the juntaa win-win foreign policy option for the city-state.
Vietnams Challenges
Vietnams view of the new U.S. Myanmar policy is important in part because Vietnam assumed ASEANs chairmanship at the beginning of 2010. Although Vietnam and Myanmar are fellow members in various regional organizations, such as the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy and the Greater Mekong Subregion, the bilateral relationship has not progressed far because there are no deep historical ties between them.22 In 2007 UN special adviser Gambari paid an ofcial visit to Hanoi to exchange views with the Vietnamese leaders on the Myanmar issue. Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem told Gambari that as a former victim of embargo and blockage policies, Vietnam would not support any embargo or blockage on Myanmar but would respect the Myanmar peoples right to self-determination.23 Vietnams opposition to Western sanctions justied its reluctance to unambiguously endorse demands for political transition in Myanmar. Jrgen Haacke has argued that this was more or less clearly linked to concerns about the incumbent regimes own political future as well as concerns about any ASEAN role in amplifying external pressure.24 In August 2009 Vietnam made a strong statement indicating that it refused to support calls by other
ASEAN members for Myanmar to free Aung San Suu Kyi. It is our view that the Aung San Suu Kyi trial is an internal affair of Myanmar, said Vietnamese government spokesman Le Dung.25 As the most impassioned advocate of traditional understandings associated with the ASEAN way and its application to Myanmar, Vietnams chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010 could bring a certain awkwardness. So far, the Vietnamese government has kept quiet about its view of the shift in the United States Myanmar policy. Although Vietnam successfully normalized its relations with the United States, that does not automatically mean it would cheer for U.S. direct intervention in Myanmar. Taking its current stance to the extreme, it is possible that, as the ASEAN chair, Vietnam will assume responsibility for protecting the groups core values and therefore seek to shrink the range of opinion. (Vietnam disagreed with the scheduled Gambari brieng at the East Asia Summit in 2007, arguing that it would represent interference in Myanmars domestic affairs.) Vietnam could also nd itself in conict with other more liberal members, such as Indonesia, in competing to redene the role of ASEAN.
The United States Tangible Move

To reafrm his governments seriousness about its new policy, U.S. assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell paid an ofcial visit to Myanmar on November 34, 2009, the rst high-ranking American diplomat to visit this country in fourteen years. Campbell seemed to be a good choice to represent U.S. interests in interacting with the regime. He came across as genuine in his immense interest in and concerns about the situation in Myanmar. He might not have known everything about the junta, yet Campbell was not shy in consulting experts while seeking opinions regarding the best way to deal with the Myanmar regime. Campbells approach was refreshing, and it proved practical during his rst visit to Myanmar.26 Campbell met with both the ruling generals and Aung San Suu Kyi.27 His visit symbolized a thaw in U.S.-Myanmar relations and an end to the United States ofcial policy of isolating Myanmar. But Campbell strongly stated that the objectives of U.S. policy remained unchanged. He called on the military government, represented by Prime Minister Thein Sein, to open a dialogue with the opposition and the ethnic minority groups that have been struggling for a measure of autonomy. He also urged the junta to allow Aung San Suu Kyi more freedom to meet with people concerned with the political process, particularly her own partys senior executives. Campbell declared, The goals
of the new U.S. policy are strong support for human rights, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners, and the promotion of democratic reform.28 While the conversation between Campbell and Aung San Suu Kyi was not made public, it was reported in the press that the U.S. diplomat would seek Suu Kyis opinions on the sanctions against her country, on how she perceived the reconciliation process and the upcoming general election, and on how Myanmar might move forward in the postelection period. It is too early to call the new U.S. policy shift a success. Yet Campbells visit has certainly elevated the level of optimism in this reclusive country. When President Obama attended the rst ASEAN-U.S. Summit in Singapore in November 2009, he reiterated his unbending demand for tangible political developments as part of the process of improving relations between Naypyidaw and Washington. Obama was the rst U.S. president to initiate a dialogue with a Myanmar leader since 1966. He raised the issue directly with Prime Minister Thein Sein and reiterated the U.S. demands already conveyed to the Myanmar junta by Campbell. Obama insisted on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, an issue that saw a sharp difference in viewpoint from some members of ASEAN. In the twenty-eight-point joint statement, the leaders of ASEAN welcomed the high-level dialogue and the policy of the United States to engage with the Government of Myanmar but did not specically request Aung San Suu Kyis release. The two sides underscored the importance of achieving national reconciliation and stated that the general elections to be held in Myanmar in 2010 must be conducted in a free, fair, inclusive and transparent manner in order to be credible to the international community.29 There was no explanation why ASEAN omitted the request for Aung San Suu Kyis release, when it had many times in the past called for her freedom. Observers speculated that ASEAN did not want the United States to use the summit as a platform to belittle both the group and Myanmar. Whatever the reasons might have been, differences between the United States and ASEAN in their approaches to Myanmar remain. These could become more contentious as the United States further deepens its new relations with Myanmar. Campbell returned to Naypyidaw on May 10, 2010, for his second visit in six months. The timing of his visit could not have been more crucial. The NLD had decided to boycott the upcoming election following the enactment of the Union Election Commission Law, which stated that anyone currently serving a jail term would be banned from joining a political party and participating in the election. This law effectively barred Aung San Suu Kyis involvement in the election.30 In a statement issued at the end of his visit,
Campbell said, We are profoundly troubled by the response of the Burmese leadership [to the change in U.S. policy].31 While in Myanmar, Campbell held discussions with Aung San Suu Kyi as well as a number of Myanmar government ofcials, including foreign minister Nyan Win, information minister Kyaw San, and science and technology minister U ThaungMyanmars former envoy in Washington, who is the point person for Myanmars engagement with the United States. Key issues raised by Campbell were the disappointing election laws, the absence of a credible dialogue among all stakeholders in Burma, the continued incarceration of political prisoners, increasing tensions between the central government and the ethnic minorities, and possible noncompliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which imposed sanctions on North Korea related to its nuclear weapons program.
The Bus Is Leaving

It is clear that ASEAN members have reacted to the shift in the United States Myanmar policy on an individual basis. No attempt has been made for a regional response, conrming the perception that ASEANs policy on Myanmar remains fragmented. There is also no guarantee that even if ASEAN as one unied entity ramps up its support for the new U.S. policy, the members can work in harmony. Min Zaw Oo has argued that the U.S. engagement with Myanmar will be quite different from the way ASEAN does business.32 Democratization and human rights will still be among U.S. policy goals in Myanmar. But the most crucial aspect of U.S. policy will probably be its approach to the 2010 election. Washington does not want to abandon its moral code altogether and thus will need a plausible reason to maintain its policy shift on Myanmar. By contrast, most ASEAN members will be satised with the completion of the election and disinclined to question the new regimes legitimacy. More critical is the possibility that the diverse views within ASEAN could be highly self-defeating. ASEANs position on Myanmar has appeared unchanged since Myanmar joined the group twelve years ago. What is worse, forty-two years after its creation ASEAN members have not yet seen it fundamentally important to dene the groups strategic interests and to demonstrate its solidarity and maturity. True, the principle of noninterference has in recent years been toned down. But the degree of commitment in new essential areas, such as human rights protection and democratization, has remained low.
ASEANs shortcomings do not lie only in the various perceptions of its members. Organizational weakness has greatly impeded its progress. As repeatedly noted here, ASEANs permanent position is to react to events. Its Myanmar policy has been mainly driven, and sometime provoked, by the opinion of Western governments and the international media. ASEANs lack of strategic thinking could potentially lead to misinterpretations of the true situation. For example, while ASEANs main focus has been to call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, none of the member states has ever delved deeper into the lingering conicts between the junta and the many ethnic minorities. It is now time for all ASEAN members to design an integrated strategic policy on how best to deal with Myanmar if they wish to truly encourage political change in this member state. The global community is watching how ASEAN will readjust its position now that the United States has made a signicant change in its policy toward Myanmar. Such a question only reinforces the view that ASEAN reacts to, rather than anticipates or initiates, events. It is therefore fair to conclude that since ASEAN has failed to take the lead in addressing Myanmars political deadlock, it has indeed marginalized itself. With or without the U.S. policy shift, ASEAN must dene its strategic interest in Myanmar. This process is long overdue. If it fails to do so, ASEAN might actually miss this last bus to Naypyidaw.
Notes
1. Robert I. Rotberg, Prospects for a Democratic Burma, in Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Brookings, 1998), p. 2. Also see David Arnott, China-Burma Relations, in Challenges to Democratisation in Burma: Perspective of Multilateral and Bilateral Responses (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001) (www.burmalibrary.org/docs3/ BURMA_beyond_2000.pdf [July 2010]), p. 7. 2. See Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Neither Constructive nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEANs Burmese Policy, in Between Isolation and Internationalisation: The State of Burma, ed. Johan Lagerkvist, pp. 20122, Working Paper 4 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2008). 3. Thailand, as the ASEAN Chair, expresses grave concern about recent developments relating to Daw Aung San Aung San Suu Kyi, given her fragile health. In this connection, the Government of the Union of Myanmar is reminded that the ASEAN Leaders had called for the immediate release of Daw Aung San Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEAN Chairmans Statement on Myanmar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, May 19, 2009 (www.aseansec.org/PR-ASEANChairmanStatementonMyanmar.pdf).

4. Tania Branigan, Thousands Flee Burma as Army Clashes with Kokang Militias, The Guardian, August 28, 2009 (www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/28/ burma-shan-refugees-ghting-china). 5. Rodolfo Severino, interview with author, October 5, 2009, Singapore. 6. Ian Storey, Emerging Fault Line in Sino-Burmese Relations: The Kokang Incident, China Brief 9, no. 18 (2009) (www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1& tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35468&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=3cc6a7017c>). 7. This material is covered in the authors interview with the Washington Times. See Michael Standaert and Simon Roughneen, Myanmar Refugees Return as Fighting Cools, Washington Times, September 3, 2009. 8. Chua Chin Hon, Thaw in US-Myanmar Ties, Straits Times, October 5, 2009. Chua quotes Singapore lecturer Bridget Welsh: When people talk about the issue of acceptance (of the legitimacy of the upcoming elections in Burma), they are really referring to this recognition from the United States, Asia News Net, May 10, 2009 (www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=8067&sec=1). 9. Kurt Campbell, U.S. Policy toward Burma, testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacic Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington,September30,2009(http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/Campbell Testimony090930p.pdf). 10. George Yeo, comments to the media after the meeting of the Group of Friends on Myanmar at the United Nations headquarters in New York, September 23,2009(www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/mfa/press_ release/P-20090924-2). 11. Myanmar: ASEAN Stands Vindicated, editorial, Straits Times, September 29, 2009 (http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,13603). 12. Larry Jagan, U.S. Policy Shift on Burma Gets Mixed Reactions, Inter Press Service, September 25, 2009 (http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48589). 13. Martin Petty, Myanmar Says Suu Kyi Trial Not Political, Reuters, May 28, 2009 (www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54R2DU20090528). 14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Press Release 470-2552, September 30, 2009. 15. Quoted in Usa Pichai, ASEAN Will Not Expel Burma: Thai PM, Mizzima, July 24, 2009 (www.mizzima.com/news/regional/2499-asean-will-not-expel-burmathai-pm.html). 16. Rizal Sukma, ASEAN Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy, Jakarta Post, June 30, 2009. 17. Ary Hermawan, Indonesia Lauds U.S. Policy Shift on Myanmar, Jakarta Post, September 28, 2009. 18. Simon Roughneed, Indonesia Steps into the Spotlight, Irrawaddy 17, no. 6 (2009) (http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16673). 19. Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein quote Professor Mya Maung, who claimed that Singapores economic linkage with Myanmar is one of the most vital factors for

the survival of Myanmars military regime. This link was also central to the expansion of the heroin trade. Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein, Burma-Singapore Axis: Globalising the Heroin Trade, Covert Action Quarterly, no. 64 (Spring 1998) (www. singapore-window.org/804caq9.htm). 20. Total, Chevron Enriching Burma Junta, Agence France-Presse, September 10, 2009 (news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/total-chevron-enrichingburma-junta-20090910-vd.html). 21. Aung Zaw, As Burma Draws Fire, ASEAN Gets Burned, Irrawaddy 17, no. 4 (2009) (www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=16215). 22. Jrgen Haacke, ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative? Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008): 35178, 360. 23. Vietnam Supports National Reconciliation in Myanmar, VietNamNet, November 25, 2007 (http://english.vietnamnet.vn/politics/2007/11/756612/). 24. Haacke, ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar, p. 361. 25. Quoted in Sahil Nagpal, Vietnam Disagrees with ASEAN over Aung San Suu Kyi, TopNews Indonesia, August 14, 2009 (www.topnews.in/vietnam-disagreesasean-over-suu-kyi-2201675). 26. Kurt Campbell, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacic affairs, interview, Washington, October 29, 2009. 27. Campbell did not meet with Senior General Than Shwe, nor apparently did he request such a meeting. 28. Kurt Campbell, Aung San Suu Kyi Meet in Burma: A First in 14 Years, Associated Press, November 4, 2009 (www.hufngtonpost.com/2009/11/04/kurtcampbell-aung-san-su_n_345059.html). 29. Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and Prosperity, Joint Statement, First ASEAN-U.S. Leaders Meeting, November 15, 2009 (www.aseansec.org/24020. htm [June 2010]). 30. Burma Law Formally Bars Aung San Suu Kyi from Election, BBC News, March 10, 2010 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacic/8559048.stm). 31.Purposes and Principles of U.S. Engagement in Burma, Statement by Kurt M. Campbell on May 10, 2010, Rangoon, Burma, U.S. Department of State (www. state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/05/141669.htm). 32. Min Zaw Oo, Inevitable US Policy Shift on Burma: Why and How, Mizzima, September 7, 2009 (www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/2729-inevitable-us-policy shift-on-burma-why-and-how-.html).
andrew selth
11
Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question
ince the late 1990s there has been a steady trickle of reports in the news media and on activist websites that Myanmar is developing a close relationship with North Korea.1 These reports invariably hint at secret military programs with dire consequences for regional stability. During the latter part of 2009, these reports increased in frequency, and warnings about links between these two pariah states grew stronger. They included accusations that Pyongyang was helping the Naypyidaw regime develop the worlds rst Buddhist atomic bomb. If accurate, these reports would be grounds for serious concern. Before drawing any rm conclusions, however, it is important to separate rumor from reality and what is actually known from what is assumed or is the product of speculation.
Seven Headlines
Apart from occasional stories about the military governments human rights violations, Myanmar does not often feature in the mainstream news media. North Korea is mentioned more often but until recently was rarely linked with its fellow outpost of tyranny, as former U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice described the two countries in 2005.2 In a remarkable conuence of events, however, between June and October 2009 seven developments tied Myanmar and North Korea together in the news media and thus in the public imagination. The rst development was the publication on June 9 of several photographs showing underground facilities being constructed in Myanmar. Over
181
182 Andrew Selth
the following weeks, more photographs were released purporting to reveal a network of secret bomb-proof tunnels.3 The Democratic Voice of Burma claimed that between 600 and 800 tunnels were being built, with the help of North Korea. The purpose of these facilities was not clear, but activist groups cited the photographs as evidence of nefarious dealings between Naypyidaw and Pyongyang. The second development was the departure from North Korea on June 17 of the cargo vessel Kang Nam I, apparently bound for Rangoon. It was claimed that, in violation of a UN Security Council resolution passed earlier that month, the ship was carrying Scud-type missiles, nuclear weapon components, or even nuclear weapons. The Kang Nam 1 was shadowed by a U.S. destroyer until June 29, when it turned around and headed back home. It was widely believed that North Korea wished to avoid an inspection of the vessel by states supporting the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative. The third development took place on July 21, when the U.S. secretary of state spoke at a press conference in Thailand, where she was attending a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. She said that the United States took seriously growing concerns about military cooperation between Pyongyang and Naypyidaw. She believed such cooperation would be destabilizing for the region and pose a direct threat to Myanmars neighbors.4 Hillary Clinton revealed that the United States concerns included the transfer of nuclear technology and other dangerous weapons from North Korea to Myanmar.5 Two days later, Japanese police announced that they had issued a second warrant for the arrest of Ri Gyong Go, president of a Tokyo-based trading company. Ri was suspected of illegally exporting to Myanmar, in 2008, an instrument for grinding magnets. According to press reports, this device could be used to develop missile control systems and centrifuge machines for uranium enrichment. Ri was initially arrested on June 29, 2009, on suspicion of attempting to export to Myanmar another machine, reportedly used for developing missiles.6 Also in July, Myanmar opposition groups obtained a report of the visit to North Korea in December 2008 by a delegation led by Myanmars joint chief of staff General Thura Shwe Mann. The leaked report described the inspection of several military bases and arms factories. It also referred to a draft memorandum of understanding outlining proposals for closer defense cooperation between the two countries. The memorandum covered North Korean assistance with military training programs and the construction of underground bunkers and arms shelters in Myanmar.
Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question 183
Throughout this period, there was a lively debate on Internet sites about various unidentied facilities in Myanmar, which had been found using commercial satellite imagery. These facilities were suspected of being related to a nuclear weapons program. One buildingknown as the Burma Box was said to be located at a place identied by Myanmar defectors.7 Some observers claimed to have found the signatures of a nuclear reactor and a uranium processing plant. These six stories prepared the ground for the publication on August 1, 2009, of a report by two Australian researchers stating that, according to two Myanmar defectors, Naypyidaw had embarked on a secret nuclear weapons program. Since then, news outlets around the world have cited claims that the regime decided in 2002 to build a nuclear reactor and develop a nuclear weapon. The reactor was said to be hidden underground at Naung Laing, near Pyin Oo Lwin. This project reportedly included all key components of the nuclear fuel cycle. According to the two Australian researchers, technology and expertise for the project was being provided by North Korea. They estimated that if everything proceeded according to plan, by 2014 Myanmar could produce a bomb a year, every year.8 These seven developments created a sensation. Yet it is worth putting these reports into a broader context and examining them more closely. For, considered from a more critical perspective, the picture is not as clear as it might rst appear.
The Historical Background

Since they both achieved independence in 1948, Myanmar and North Korea have enjoyed a checkered relationship.9 Myanmar established full diplomatic relations with both Koreas in 1975. The Ne Win government took pains to balance the demands of North Korea and South Korea for diplomatic support and trade. However, during the late 1970s Myanmars relationship with Pyongyang became a little stronger than that with Seoul, as Ne Win and the Burma Socialist Program Party forged direct links with Kim Il-sung and the Korean Workers Party. The relationship with North Korea collapsed in 1983, after Pyongyang sent three agents to Rangoon to assassinate South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan, who was making a state visit to Myanmar. Ne Win considered the attack against Chun not only a violation of Myanmars sovereignty but also a personal insult. He severed diplomatic relations between Rangoon
184 Andrew Selth
and Pyongyang and withdrew recognition of North Korea as an independent state. Kim Il-sung later made several attempts to restore ties but was repeatedly rebuffed. Ironically, it was Myanmars ostracism by the West after the abortive 1988 prodemocracy uprising that gave North Korea its chance to reestablish links. Shunned by its usual aid donors and arms suppliers, the new military regime in Rangoon turned to China and the former Eastern-bloc countries for assistance. It also developed relationships with states that were out of favor with the United States. Contacts were made with North Korea in the early 1990s, leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations in 2007. Even before then, however, there were a number of bilateral agreements and arms sales. Reliable information is scarce, but it seems that in 1990 Myanmar purchased some small arms ammunition from North Korea. This deal was reportedly followed in 1998 by the purchase of about a dozen eld guns. Around 2002 the regime may have opened discussions with Pyongyang about the purchase of a small submarine. The following year there were reports that Myanmars military leaders were interested in acquiring short-range ballistic missiles from Pyongyang. The latter deals do not appear to have gone ahead, however, probably because of pressures from Washington. The periodic visit of North Korean freighters to Myanmar since then, and the secrecy surrounding their cargoes, has led to speculation that other deliveries of conventional arms and military equipment have occurred. For example, there were reports in 2007 that North Korea had supplied Myanmar with some truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems. Claims have also been made regarding the sale to Myanmar of various kinds of missiles, including short-range ballistic missiles. However, none of these arms deals has yet been conrmed. The bilateral relationship seemed to reach a turning point in 2003. North Korean technicians were observed on Myanmar military bases, and it was reported that North Korean aircraft had unloaded heavy equipment in central Myanmar. It was also reported that the Daesong Economic Group, which had a record of conducting clandestine activities on Pyongyangs behalf, was dealing with the regime.10 Later it was claimed that the Namchongang Trading Companywhich probably assisted Syria with its secret nuclear reactor projecthad sold some sophisticated dual-use equipment to Myanmar.11 The implication of these reports was that North Korea was helping Myanmar with a secret nuclear program. Since then, there have been numerous reports in the news media and on activist websites accusing Myanmar and North Korea of conducting
suspicious activities. Most have lacked hard evidence. Even so, it has become evident that North Korea has developed strong military ties with the State Peace and Development Council. The links between the two states have caused unease in Washington and among Myanmars neighbors. The actual nature of the relationship, however, remains the subject of debate.
Rumors and Realities

Over the past twenty years, Myanmar has signicantly increased its military capabilities. The armed forces have been expanded and modernized. The regime has also strengthened Myanmars defense infrastructure and constructed a range of underground facilities. It was logical for Naypyidaw to ask Pyongyang to assist in these projects. Both are authoritarian regimes fearful of external intervention. Pyongyang needs Myanmar primary products, which Naypyidaw can use to barter for North Korean arms, expertise, and technology. North Korea has considerable experience in subterranean engineering. Many of the underground facilities depicted on the Internet are probably for military purposes. The generals have long feared an attack from the air and have taken measures to protect against such a threat. However, some of the tunnels pictured are quite modest and, despite efforts at concealment, would be vulnerable to attack by a modern air force equipped with the latest weapons. A few are likely to be related to civil engineering projects. More important, none of the photos supports claims of a secret nuclear reactor or a nuclear weapons program. Press coverage of the Kang Nam 1 incident seems to be another case of public commentary running ahead of the facts. The ship was indeed going to Rangoon, but it returned to North Korea at Naypyidaws request. Its cargo remains a mystery. Reports that it was carrying short-range ballistic missiles have never been conrmed. The claim that it was transporting nuclear weapon components, or nuclear weapons, is even less credible. Indeed, the most recent news reports suggest that the ship may have only been carrying small arms. Before claims that the Kang Nam I was carrying strategic weapons to Myanmar are dismissed entirely, however, it is worth remembering the export of dual-use technology from Japan in 2008 and the attempt to do so again in 2009. They are not the only occasions when Naypyidaw has tried to acquire high-precision machinery for which there have been few logical explanationsapart, that is, from the manufacture of weapons or weapon components. In 2006 and 2007 Myanmar imported some machine tools from Europe, which aroused the suspicions of proliferation analysts.
186 Andrew Selth
Yet such purchases do not necessarily mean that the State Peace and Development Council is engaged in a secret program to develop weapons of mass destruction. Myanmar has a large defense industrial complex. Faced with the threat of a comprehensive arms embargo after 1988 and suspicious even of its current suppliers, the regime has sought to become more self-sufcient. It is possible that Myanmar is trying to develop a capability to manufacture more sophisticated arms. The report on Shwe Manns visit to North Korea, for example, suggests that Myanmar wishes to produce its own ballistic missiles. Caution also needs to be exercised about the identication of various facilities around Myanmar as part of a secret nuclear weapons program. For example, the Burma Box was revealed to be nothing more than an industrial workshop.12 Indeed, suspicions that this building was some kind of nuclear facility had been dismissed by the International Atomic Energy Agency some six months earlier.13 Not all unidentied facilities in Myanmar can be discounted as easily, but the Burma Box asco demonstrates how speculation about secret weapons programs can take on a life of its own. Bear in mind too that Hillary Clinton did not say North Korea was passing Myanmar nuclear weapons technology. After mentioningconfusinglythe possible transfer of nuclear technology and other dangerous weapons, she said, Im not saying it is happening, but we want to be prepared to try and stand against it. Moreover, she referred only to dealings between Pyongyang and Naypyidaw that were perhaps taking place.14 The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacic later stated that he was not aware of any direct evidence to support claims of nuclear weapons technology transfers to Myanmar.15 Few of the claims made by the two Australian researchers in August 2009 were new. Rumors about a secret nuclear reactor and weapons program had been circulating in Thailand and on activist websites for years.16 While some of the defectors claims are plausible, their testimony needs to be treated with caution. Defectors are rarely reliable or disinterested sources. Some of their claims cited in the press are incorrect, while others have lacked the necessary context.17 There are other reasons to be cautious. Myanmar would have to overcome enormous nancial, technical, and practical obstacles to develop all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, build an underground reactor, and make a deliverable nuclear weapon. Even for more developed, technologically advanced, and better resourced countries, these would be daunting challenges. If North Korea is as deeply involved in a Myanmar nuclear weapons program as the defectors claim, then such obstacles may not be insurmountable. Even so,
suggestions that Myanmar could produce a nuclear weapon by 2014 and a handful of devices by 2020 must be considered extremely optimistic.18 Relations between Myanmar and North Korea have clearly come a long way since 1983. North Korea is selling Myanmar conventional arms, sharing its military expertise and experience, and helping upgrade Myanmars defense infrastructure. It is likely that North Korea is also aiding Naypyidaws arms industries, and it is possible that Pyongyang is passing nuclear technology to Naypyidaw. It still cannot be conrmed, however, that North Korea is helping Myanmar build a nuclear reactor and fuel-processing facilities, with the aim of producing a nuclear weapon.
Myanmars Nuclear Ambitions

Arguably, of all the Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar has the strongest strategic rationale to develop nuclear weapons. Since 1988 Myanmars military leaders have feared external intervention, possibly even an invasion to restore democratic rule. These fears have waxed and waned over the past twenty years, but they have never gone away. Indeed, they have been kept alive by the aggressive rhetoric leveled against the regime by the United States and some other members of the international community, the economic sanctions imposed against Myanmar, and the support given to the countrys opposition movement. An invasion of Myanmar has never been a serious prospect, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the impact such threat perceptions have had on the regimes security policies. Some Myanmar generals are clearly attracted to the idea of acquiring a nuclear weapon, in the belief that possession of weapons of mass destruction would give Myanmar the same status and bargaining power that they believe is now enjoyed by North Korea. The key question, however, is whether this is just wishful thinking or indicates a serious attempt by the regime to pursue a nuclear weapons program. In 2000, when Myanmars military government announced that it planned to purchase a small reactor from Russia, activist groups warned that the generals were not to be trusted. They accused the regime of planning to develop a nuclear weapon to threaten the international community and resist pressures to reform. They cited the regimes long record of duplicity, its fear of external intervention, and its customary disregard for international norms of behavior. They dismissed assurances that the proposed Russian reactor was for peaceful research and would be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
188 Andrew Selth
After 2003 others warned against Myanmars relationship with North Korea, even then suspected of spreading sensitive nuclear technologies. For example, the then chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard G. Lugar, called Myanmar a potential source of instability throughout South and Southeast Asia. Noting the increasing contacts between Myanmar and North Korea, he stated that the link-up of these two pariah states can only spell trouble.19 At the time, these suspicions were greeted with skepticism.20 Myanmar had a long record of opposition to nuclear weapons and was party to all the major nonproliferation agreements. Its nancial reserves and level of technological development were very low. It was struggling even to maintain its basic civil infrastructure. The countrys higher education system had collapsed. After an inspection tour in 2001, the International Atomic Energy Agency declared Myanmar to be completely unready for the construction of even a small Russian research reactor. Since then, however, the situation has changed. Thanks to natural gas sales, Myanmar now has large foreign exchange reserves that could be used to fund a nuclear program.21 The armed forces can boast an extensive network of military training, research, and development institutions. Russia is providing technical instruction for a large number of Myanmar servicemen and ofcials, including some in the nuclear eld. Items of sophisticated equipment have been imported, and it is possible that expertise and sensitive technologies are being provided by North Korea. In these circumstances, the question of whether Myanmar has embarked on a covert nuclear weapons program may now depend more on issues of intention and political will than on matters of resources, expertise, and practical management. Myanmar has not made any public response to the spate of news reports in 2009, but during U.S. senator Jim Webbs visit to Naypyidaw in August of that year a senior ofcial told him that Myanmar did not have a secret nuclear program. Similar assurances were given to the Japanese foreign minister in October. Predictably, the international response to these statements has been mixed.
The Ofcial Silence

All these developments have raised concerns, but without hard evidence few claims can be veried. Indeed, some reports have prompted more questions than they have answered. One of the most intriguing questions is why so few governments and international organizations have made ofcial statements
specically addressing this subject, despite all the publicity it has received. Most puzzling of all, given its usually strong stance on Myanmar, is the U.S. governments continued silence. The Bush administration had no love for Myanmars military regime, which it took every opportunity to criticize. At the same time, the administration made nuclear nonproliferation one of its highest priorities. The United States condemned countries, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and North Korea, that it believed were pursuing nuclear weapons programs or spreading nuclear technologies. At no time, however, did the Bush administration accuse Myanmars government of trying to build a secret reactor or develop nuclear weapons, with or without North Korean assistance. Throughout this period, Washington was watching developments in Myanmar closely. Since 2006 the United States has known about the Myanmar defectors on whose testimony the two Australian researchers based their August 2009 news stories. Indeed, the researchers suggested that a third Myanmar defector was picked up by U.S. intelligence agencies in 2008, presumably to be interviewed about Naypyidaws nuclear ambitions.22 Yet even when armed with the apparent revelations of all these defectors, the Bush administration remained silent about Myanmars nuclear status. As rumors of a secret nuclear program grew in frequency and scope, the administration came under pressure from activists and members of Congress to accuse Naypyidaw of developing nuclear weapons. Yet it refused to do so. This position prevailed even in 2006, when Washington conducted a campaign in the UN Security Council for Myanmar to be branded a threat to international peace and security. It is difcult to escape the conclusion that the Bush administration remained silent on this issue because it did not have the evidence on which to make a public case against Naypyidaw and Pyongyang. The Obama administration has investigated this matter closely, as part of its review of U.S. policy toward Myanmar. It has reiterated U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation and North Koreas activities, but it too has refused to conrm that Myanmar is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. In July incoming assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell told Congress that he would watch all external support for Myanmars nuclear activities, including from Russia and North Korea, but he made no reference to a secret weapons of mass destruction program. Following Hillary Clintons remarks in Thailand, the State Department conceded that the United States did not have a good sense of the military cooperation between Myanmar and North Korea.23 After the dramatic news stories that August, ofcial U.S. spokespersons repeatedly refused to answer
190 Andrew Selth
questions about Myanmars reported nuclear ambitions, other than to say it was an intelligence matter. This continuing reticence suggests that while the United States is concerned about Naypyidaws relationship with Pyongyang, it still does not have hard evidence of a secret nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the United States seems to have accepted Myanmars assurances that it will implement UN sanctions against North Korea, which prohibit arms and nuclear technology transfers. In September 2009 Washington announced plans for closer engagement and increased dialogue with Naypyidaw. U.S. ofcials have stated that their discussions will cover nuclear proliferation and Myanmars relations with North Korea. Yet such a signicant policy shift would seem unlikely if the United States believed Naypyidaw was already well advanced on a covert nuclear weapons program, with Pyongyangs help. A few other governments have commented on this issue, but none has conrmed the existence of a secret nuclear program. In 2006, for example, the British government said that it was not able to corroborate reports about the alleged transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea to Myanmar.24 In October 2009 London was still referring to unconrmed reports of nuclear cooperation between Pyongyang and Naypyidaw.25 In August 2009 senior Thai ofcials refuted news reports that Myanmar was building a secret nuclear reactor.
Policy Challenges
In tackling the nuclear issue at a policy level, governments and international organizations face a number of seemingly intractable problems. The greatest is the sheer difculty of determining whether or not Myanmar actually has a secret nuclear program and, if so, how far it might have progressed. This is clearly proving a real challenge, even to agencies with enormous resources and highly sophisticated technologies. Understandably, foreign ofcials looking at this issue are being very cautious. No one wants a repetition of the mistakes that preceded the 2003 Iraq war by giving too much credibility to untested intelligence sources or by underestimating a countrys capabilities. Particularly in the highly charged political environment that surrounds consideration of Myanmars complex problemsnot to mention proliferation issues more generallyno government is going to accept claims of a secret nuclear weapons program without investigating them thoroughly. If, for the sake of argument, evidence of such a program were found, then another problem arises. The military government has shown that it
is determined to decide its own security policies, according to its perceptions of Myanmars national interests. If it has embarked on a weapons of mass destruction program out of a fear of external intervention, then there is unlikely to be any progress toward halting the program until those fears are assuaged. Yet in the current political climate the United States among others would nd it difcult to offer the Naypyidaw regime the kind of security guarantees this would probably require. Should the international community try to force Naypyidaw to abandon a clandestine nuclear weapons program, it would face another set of problems. Over the past twenty years, many countries have tried to make the regime surrender power, release political prisoners, and adopt more humane policies through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and other punitive measures. Yet as Hillary Clinton acknowledged in February 2009, this approach has been demonstrably unsuccessful. Indeed, it has probably hardened the regimes resolve to resist external pressures. Countries enjoying closer ties to Myanmar, such as China and India, would doubtless share international concerns about a secret nuclear program. Their inuence with the military government is not as great as is often claimed, however, and it is likely that in dealing with Myanmar on this issue they would encounter many of the same problems as the regimes critics. In halting a serious nuclear weapons program North Koreas cooperation would be vital, but Pyongyang is unlikely to be responsive to international pressures. Naypyidaw does not appear to fear international criticism or the threat of increased sanctions. Myanmar occupies a critical geostrategic position and is rich in natural resources. The regime knows it is unlikely to be abandoned by Myanmars powerful and energy-hungry neighbors. If Myanmar were found to have a nuclear weapons program, then it could be expelled from ASEAN.26 Even if that were to occur, however, the generals seem prepared to see Myanmar return to its pre-1988 isolation and poverty if that is the price they must pay to remain masters of the countrys destiny. As the international community has repeatedly been reminded since Myanmars armed forces took back direct political power in 1988, there are few practical ways to inuence a government that is deeply committed to its self-appointed role in national affairs, does not care for the welfare of its own people, does not observe international norms, and is protected by powerful friends and allies. If that government has embarked on a secret nuclear weapons program, then the international community faces a real policy challenge.
192 Andrew Selth
Conclusion
On security-related issues, Myanmar and North Korea are information black holes. Given the isolated and secretive nature of both regimes, it is difcult to determine the precise nature of their relationship. Both countries are at the center of emotive and highly politicized debates about human rights, nuclear proliferation, and regional security. The picture is further clouded by rumors and speculation in the news media and on activist websites. There is the danger, too, of individuals and groups encouraging anti-Naypyidaw or anti-Pyongyang sentiments for partisan political reasons. Any suggestions of a secret nuclear weapons program, however, particularly one conducted by a country like Myanmar, must be cause for concern. Some of the information that has leaked out of the country in recent years seems credible, and other snippets of information have emerged that, taken together, raise suspicions. No one should underestimate the lengths to which Myanmars military leaders will go to stay in power and to protect the countryand themselvesfrom perceived threats. With this in mind, many observers are looking to the Obama administration to settle Myanmars nuclear status once and for all. The Burmese JADE Act enacted by the U.S. Congress in July 2008 stipulates that, within 180 days, the secretary of state must issue a statement describing the provision of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, capabilities, and technology, including nuclear, chemical, and dual use capabilities to Myanmar.27 That deadline has already passed without the appearance of any statement. The world is still waiting for an authoritative public statement from the U.S. government or some other credible source that will put all the rumors, blogs, and newspaper stories into their proper perspective. Until that appears, Myanmar watchers may have to be satised with the ndings of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which concluded in September 2009 that there was insufcient information to make a well-founded judgment about Myanmars nuclear ambitions and the North Korean connection.28
Notes
1. See Andrew Selth, Burma and North Korea: Conventional Allies or Nuclear Partners? Regional Outlook 22 (Brisbane, Australia: Grifth Asia Institute, Grifth University, 2009). 2. Rice Names Outposts of Tyranny, BBC News, January 19, 2005 (http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4186241.stm).

3. Myanmars Secret Tunnels Revealed, Al Jazeera, June 25, 2009 (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacic/2009/06/20096255353936689.html). 4. Quoted in Glenn Kessler, U.S. Concerns Growing about N. Korean Military Ties with Burma, Washington Post, July 22, 2009 (www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/21/AR2009072101021.html). 5. Secretary Clinton Interviewed in Thailand, Secretary Clinton Blog, July 23,2009(http://secretaryclinton.wordpress.com/2009/07/23/secretary-clintoninterviewed-in-thailand/). 6. Mari Yamaguchi, Japan Holds 3 Accused of Trading for N. Korea, Taiwan News,June30,2009(www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=990278& lang=eng_news). 7. See, for example, The Box in Burma: Preliminary Analysis, Verication, Implementation, and Compliance, August 13, 2009 (www.armscontrolverication. org/2009/08/box-in-Burma-preliminary-analysis.html). 8. Hamish McDonald, Revealed: Burmas Nuclear Bombshell, Sydney Morning Herald ,August1,2009(www.smh.com.au/world/revealed-Burmax2019snuclear-bombshell-20090731-e4fw.html). See also Daniel Flitton, Burma and the Bomb, The Age, August 1, 2009 (www.theage.com.au/world/Burma-and-thebomb-20090731-e4h6.html?page=-1). 9. Andrew Selth, Burmas North Korean Gambit: A Challenge to Regional Security? Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense 154 (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2004). 10. Bertil Lintner and S. W. Crispin, Dangerous Bedfellows, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 20, 2003, pp. 2224. 11. Kessler, U.S. Concerns Growing about N. Korean Military Ties with Burma. 12. James Fallows, About That Ominous Building in Burma, Atlantic Monthly, August 20, 2009 (http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/08/ about_that_ominous_building_in.php). 13. Mark Hibbs, IAEA Probes Myanmar Data, Discourages New Research Reactors, Nuclear Fuel, August 10, 2009, pp. 34. 14. Quoted in Secretary Clinton Interviewed in Thailand. 15. Admiral Timothy Keating Discusses U.S. Strategic Interests, Australian Broadcasting Commission, Lateline, September 1, 2009 (www.abc.net.au/lateline/ content/2008/s2673745.htm). 16. See, for example, Roland Watson, Plagiarism in the Burma Nuclear Scoop, Dictator Watch, August 3, 2009 (www.dictatorwatch.org/). 17. Andrew Selth, A Reply to Des Ball: Burmas Nuclear Programs: A Need for Caution, Security Challenges 5, no. 4 (2009): 12731. 18. Burmas Bomb Alive and Ticking, Bangkok Post, August 2, 2009 (www. bangkokpost.com/news/investigation/21362/Burma-s-nuclear-bomb-alive-and-ticking). 19. R. G. Lugar, Seeds of Trouble from Burma, Washington Post, September 28, 2003.
194 Andrew Selth

20. See, for example, Andrew Selth, Burma and Nuclear Proliferation: Policies and Perceptions, Regional Outlook 12 (Brisbane, Australia: Grifth Asia Institute, Grifth University, 2007). 21. Sean Turnell, Burmas Insatiable State, Asian Survey 48, no. 6 (2008): 95876. 22. McDonald, Revealed: Burmas Nuclear Bombshell. 23. Deputy spokesman Robert Wood, daily press brieng, U.S. Department of State, Washington, July 22, 2009 (www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/july/126321.htm). 24. United Kingdom Parliament, Burma, answer from Ms. Margaret Beckett to Mr. Hague, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, June 5, 2006 (www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060605/text/60605w0061.htm#0606071 2000009). 25. United Kingdom Parliament, North Korea: Nuclear Power, answer from Mr. Lewis to Mr. Pritchard, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, October 14, 2009 (www. theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2009-10-14c.291973.h). 26. Myanmar May Have to Leave ASEAN If It Has a Nuclear Plant, MCOT.Net, August 8, 2009 (http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=11215). 27. HR 3890: Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Juntas Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, 110th Cong. (www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-3890). 28. Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), p. 115.
kurt m. campbell
12
The New U.S. Policy of Pragmatic Engagement
r. Chairman, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify about U.S. policy toward Burma and a possible new direction for U.S.-Burma relations. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the overarching assessments that helped shape our review. The Administration launched a review of our Burma policy seven months ago, recognizing that political and humanitarian conditions in Burma were deplorable. Neither sanctions nor engagement, implemented alone, have succeeded in improving those conditions and moving Burma forward on a path to democratic reform. Moreover, it was clear to us that the problems Burma presents, not only to its people, but to its neighbors, the wider region and the world at large, demand that we review and reconsider our approach. In addition to taking a hard look at the current situation inside Burma, we also focused on emerging questions and concerns regarding Burmas relationship with North Korea, particularly in light of the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1874. This resolution prohibits member states from engaging in trade with North Korea in virtually all conventional weapons as well as in sensitive technologies, including those related to ballistic missiles and nuclear and other WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs. Our policy review also was informed by the fact that, for the rst time in recent memory, the Burmese leadership has shown an active interest in engaging with the United States. But, let me be clear: we have decided to engage with Burma because we believe it is in our interest to do so.
Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2009.
195
196 Kurt M. Campbell
We have consulted widely throughout the review process with Congress, other governments, and key stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations, business leaders, academics, and representatives of international organizations. We also have consulted with the National League for Democracy and other democratic activists inside Burma. The conclusions of our policy review, announced last month, reafrmed our fundamental interests in Burma: we support a unied, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma. While our goals in Burma remain the same as before, the policy review conrmed that we need additional tools to augment those that we have been using in pursuit of our objectives. A policy of pragmatic engagement with the Burmese authorities holds the best hope for advancing our goals. A central element of this approach is a direct, seniorlevel dialogue with representatives of the Burmese leadership. We hope a dialogue with the Burmese regime will lay out a path forward towards change in Burma and a better, more productive bilateral relationship. Through a direct dialogue, we will be able to test the intentions of the Burmese leadership and the sincerity of their expressed interest in a more positive relationship with the United States. The way forward will be clearly tied to concrete actions on the part of the Burmese leadership addressing our core concerns, particularly in the areas of democracy and human rights. We will also discuss our proliferation concerns and Burmas close military relationship with North Korea. Burma has said it is committed to comply fully with UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about the nature and extent of Burmas ties with North Korea. Full and transparent implementation of these resolutions is critical to global peace and security, and we will be looking to the Burmese authorities to deliver on their commitments. We expect engagement with Burma to be a long, slow, and step-by-step process. We will not judge the success of our efforts at pragmatic engagement by the results of a handful of meetings. Engagement for its own sake is obviously not a goal for U.S. policy, but we recognize that achieving meaningful change in Burma will take time. We will work to ensure that the Burmese leaders have an absolutely clear understanding of our goals for this dialogue and the core issues on our agenda. A fundamentally different U.S.-Burma relationship will require real progress on democracy and human rights. We will continue to press for the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners; an end to conicts with ethnic minority groups; accountability of those responsible
The New U.S. Policy of Pragmatic Engagement 197
for human rights violations; and the initiation of a genuine dialogue among the Burmese government, the democratic opposition, and the ethnic minorities on a shared vision for the way forward in Burma. This last issue is critical, since only the Burmese people themselves can determine the future of their country. Our intent is to use our dialogue with the Burmese authorities to facilitate that process. Only if the government of Burma makes progress toward these goals will it be possible to improve our bilateral relationship in a step-by-step process. In this regard, we are pleased to see that Labor Minister Aung Kyi, who is the governments liaison to Aung San Suu Kyi, has met with her twice in the past few weeks in an apparent response to a recent letter Aung San Suu Kyi sent to Senior General Than Shwe. We are also pleased she was permitted to meet with diplomatic representatives from the United States, Australia, and the European Union, per her request to the Senior General. While we welcome these steps, we also note the need for concrete results. Aung San Suu Kyi needs to be able to meet with members of her own party, and the dialogue with the government should continue and be expanded to include all relevant stakeholders. The Administrations own senior-level dialogue with the Burmese government began with a rst meeting in New York on September 29. I led the U.S. delegation, and my counterpart on the Burmese side was U Thaung, the Burmese Minister for Science and Technology and former Ambassador to the United States. The Burmese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Than Swe, also participated in the discussions. These were substantive talks that lasted approximately two hours. We laid out our views clearly and I stressed to U Thaung that this dialogue is an opportunity for Burma if the authorities are ready to move forward. This was an introductory meeting. It will take more than a single conversation to resolve our differences. We intend to go to Burma in the next few weeks for a fact-nding mission. During that trip, we will talk to the Burmese government, representatives of the ethnic nationalities, and the democratic opposition, including the National League for Democracy Uncles and Aung San Suu Kyi. We will keep you informed as this process moves ahead. In parallel to the dialogue on our core democracy, human rights and nonproliferation concerns, we hope to identify some initial positive steps the Burmese could take in other areas that would help build momentum in the talks and could potentially allow the United States to respond in an appropriate manner. There are a number of areas in which we might be able
to improve cooperation to our mutual benet, such as counter-narcotics, health, environmental protection, and the recovery of the remains of World War II-era missing Americans. Our dialogue with Burma will supplement rather than replace the sanctions regime that has been at the center of our Burma policy for many years. Lifting or easing sanctions at the outset of a dialogue without meaningful progress on our concerns would be a mistake. We will maintain our existing sanctions until we see concrete progress and continue to work with the international community to ensure that those sanctions are effectively coordinated. We believe any easing of sanctions now would send the wrong signal to those who have been striving for so many years for democracy in Burma, to our partners in the region and elsewhere, and to the Burmese leadership itself. Through our dialogue, we also will make clear to the Burmese leadership that relations with the United States can only be improved in a stepby-step process if the Burmese government takes meaningful actions that address our core concerns. Moreover, in the absence of such actions, we will reserve the option of tightening sanctions on the regime and its supporters as appropriate. Some argue that sanctions should be lifted immediately because they hurt the people of Burma without effectively pressuring the regime. U.S. sanctions, implemented after the crackdown that began in September 2007, have been targetedaimed not at the people of Burma but at the military leadership, its networks and state-owned companies, and the wealthy cronies that support the government often through illicit activities. It is also important to keep in mind the nature of the countrys economic system. Decades of economic mismanagement by Burmas military leadership have resulted in high ination, endemic corruption, and poor regulation, which have stied broad-based economic growth. Burma had an unfriendly business environment well before the imposition of sanctions by the United States, the European Union, Australia, Canada, and others. The country will continue to be an inhospitable place to invest unless the government introduces serious reforms, rule of law, and good governance. We believe that opening up Burma to the outside world can benet the forces of change working for a better future for the people of this troubled country. Our commitment to the Burmese people is unwavering. We will continue to address the urgent humanitarian needs of the population by expanding our assistance efforts in a manner designed to help those most in need without bolstering the regime. We know it can be done. In the wake of Cyclone
The New U.S. Policy of Pragmatic Engagement 199
Nargis, the U.S. Government provided nearly $75 million in aid to the victims of the cyclone through responsible and effective international NGO [nongovernmental organization] partners. We also have broadly licensed nancial support of not-for-prot humanitarian activities in Burma, and continue to take care to ensure that U.S. sanctions do not impede humanitarian activities by NGOs. Regarding the elections that the Burmese regime plans to hold in 2010, we need to assess the conditions under which the elections will be held and determine whether opposition and ethnic groups will be able to participate fully. We do not yet know the date of the elections; the authorities also have not published the election laws. Given the way in which the Burmese government conducted its referendum on a new Constitution in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, we are skeptical that the elections will be either free or fair. We will continue to stress to the Burmese authorities the baseline conditions that we consider necessary for any credible electoral process. They include the release of political prisoners, the ability of all stakeholders to stand for election, eliminating restrictions on media, and ensuring a free and open campaign. We will emphasize, and ask that others do the same, that the 2010 elections will only bring legitimacy and stability to the country to the extent that they are broad-based and include all key stakeholders. This is why it is crucial for the regime to begin an internal dialogue now with democratic opposition leaders and representatives of the ethnic minorities. It is only through dialogue that the conditions can be established for all of Burmas political forces to participate. We also intend to remain engaged with the democratic opposition to ensure that our engagement with the regime is not at crosspurposes with their own objectives. We recognize that we alone cannot promote change in Burma. Many countries in the region have welcomed the results of our policy review. Now that we have taken the step to try to engage Burma, we have made clear we need regional states support in pressing for political and economic reform. We will need to work with friends and partners to achieve our goals, including stepped up dialogue and interactions with countries such as China and India that have traditionally close relationships with Burmas military leaders. I was in China last week and underscored to senior Chinese government ofcials the need for Beijing to play a positive role in promoting reform in Burma. We will continue to coordinate closely as well with ASEAN, the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan, and other actors such as the United
Nations to reinforce our fundamental message on reform to the Burmese regime. We will work with our partners to encourage Burma to be more open and to promote new thinking and new ideas. Since the conclusion of the policy review, we have moved quickly to implement our strategy, but remain realistic in our expectations. We must be prepared to sustain our efforts beyond the planned 2010 elections. Some day a new generation of leaders in Burma will come to power. If the country is more open to the outside world we can hope to inuence that transition and encourage Burmas leaders to take a more positive, constructive, and inclusive path. The process of dialogue itself should give us greater insight into the thinking of Burmas political leadership and offer opportunities to inuence the way in which they look at the world. Pressing for greater openness and exposure to new ideas and new thinking, particularly among members of the up-and-coming generation of leaders is likely, in the long run, to be the most effective means of encouraging change in Burma. Thank you for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on this pressing and vitally important issue. I welcome any questions you may have.
About the Contributors
David Dapice David Dapice has been a professor of economics at Tufts University since 1973. He has also been the chief economist for the Vietnam Program at the Harvard Kennedy School since 1990 and has recently worked on economic policy in Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Xiaolin Guo Xiaolin Guo is senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. She is the author of State and Ethnicity in Chinas Southwest (Brill 2008). Gurmeet Kanwal Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal is currently director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in New Delhi and is a former director of security studies and senior fellow of the Observer Research Foundation. In the Indian Army, he commanded an infantry brigade and an artillery regiment. He has a Master of Science degree in defense studies and a Master of Philosophy degree in strategic studies and management. Kyaw Yin Hlaing Kyaw Yin Hlaing is an assistant professor in the Department of Asian and International Studies at City University of Hong Kong. His most recent publication is Setting the Rules for Survival: Why the Burmese Military Regime Survives in an Age of Democratization (Pacic Review, vol. 22, 2009). He has a bachelors degree from the University of Mandalay and masters and doctoral degrees from Cornell University.
201
202 About the Contributors
Li Chenyang Li Chenyang is a professor and director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, acting director of the China Society for Southeast Asian Studies (CSSAS), and vice director of the GMS Study Center at Yunnan University. He earned his bachelors degree in the Burmese language from PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) University of Foreign Languages, his masters degree from Peking University, and his doctorate in world history from Yunnan University. Maung Zarni Maung Zarni is a research fellow on Burma at the London School of Economics (LSE) and a visiting senior fellow, Institute of Security and International Affairs, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. He frequently comments on Burma affairs in the media, is a columnist for Irrawaddy, and contributed to the LSEs Civil Society Yearbook 2010 (forthcoming, Blackwell). He founded and directed the Internet-based Free Burma Coalition (19952004). Pavin Chachavalpongpun Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a fellow and lead researcher for political and strategic affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He received his doctorate from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and is the author of A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations (2005). Lex Rieffel Lex Rieffel is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, which he joined in 2002 after eighteen years with the U.S. Treasury Department and seven years with the Institute of International Finance. His most recent publication is Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia (Brookings, 2007). He has a bachelors degree in economics from Princeton University and a masters degree in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University. Andrew Selth Andrew Selth is a research fellow with the Grifth Asia Institute at Grifth University in Brisbane, Australia. He has studied Burma as a diplomat, intelligence analyst, and research scholar. He holds a doctorate in Asian studies from Grifth University and has also been awarded degrees in history and international relations from the Australian National University. His latest major work is Burmas Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk, 2002).
About the Contributors 203
Termsak Chalermpalanupap Termsak Chalermpalanupap is director of political and security cooperation at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia. He received his bachelors degree in international relations from Chulalongkorn University and his masters and doctoral degrees in political science from the University of New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1982 and 1986, respectively. Michael Vatikiotis Michael Vatikiotis is regional director for the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. He is a former editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review and has been a writer and journalist in Asia for twenty years. He is a graduate of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, earned his doctorate from Oxford University, and was awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Maryland.

181 Myanmar Burma

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

181 Myanmar Burma

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

160 Termsak Chalermpalanupap

ASEANs Policy of Enhanced Interactions 161

ASEANs Stand on Myanmar

162 Termsak Chalermpalanupap

ASEANs Policy of Enhanced Interactions 163

164 Termsak Chalermpalanupap

ASEANs Policy of Enhanced Interactions 165

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw

Fiction versus Reality

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 167

168 Pavin Chachavalpongpun

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 169

ASEANs Critical Hurdles

170 Pavin Chachavalpongpun

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 171

172 Pavin Chachavalpongpun

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 173

174 Pavin Chachavalpongpun

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 175

The United States Tangible Move

176 Pavin Chachavalpongpun

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 177

The Bus Is Leaving

178 Pavin Chachavalpongpun

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 179

180 Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question

182 Andrew Selth

Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question 183

The Historical Background

184 Andrew Selth

Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question 185

Rumors and Realities

186 Andrew Selth

Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question 187

Myanmars Nuclear Ambitions

188 Andrew Selth

The Ofcial Silence

Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question 189

190 Andrew Selth

Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question 191

192 Andrew Selth

Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question 193

194 Andrew Selth

The New U.S. Policy of Pragmatic Engagement

196 Kurt M. Campbell

The New U.S. Policy of Pragmatic Engagement 197

198 Kurt M. Campbell

The New U.S. Policy of Pragmatic Engagement 199

200 Kurt M. Campbell

About the Contributors

202 About the Contributors

About the Contributors 203

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen