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LittIe BIack Book of

Operations Tradecraft












ParabeIIum Concepts

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Contents

CIA Secret Weapons Systems Page 3
Logistics oI a Black Bag Job Page 9
NSA Employee Manual Page 12
A Study oI Assassination Page 29
Surveillance Recognition Page 42































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THE CIA'S SECRET WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Exploding wine bottles, guns constructed out oI pipes,
bullets made oI teeth, aspirin explosives: they sound like
props Irom a second-rate spy story. HorriIyingly enough,
they are real. The CIA has spent a great deal oI its time--
and your money--developing countless bizarre weapons Ior
assassination, sabotage, and mass destruction. II that's
news to you, it's because the CIA doesn't want these
products, some oI which are quite easy to put together, to
Iall into the "wrong hands." As Ior whether they are in the
right hands now--judge Ior yourselI.


The CIA has developed many exotic and sophisticated devices
intended Ior use in interrogation, sabotage, and assassination.
These weapons are necessary--iI you grant that what the CIA itselI
does is necessary. II the CIA wants to eliminate a key KGB agent
operating in Hungary, it Iaces certain problems. It would be
virtually impossible to slip a deadly weapon, such as a gun or
bomb, past Hungarian customs oIIicials. Thus, the CIA assassin
must assemble his weapon Irom commonly obtainable materials aIter
he crosses the border.
The CIA agent might decide to construct a urea nitrate
explosive, commonly known as a urine bomb. This weapon is quite
deadly, easily exploded, and consists primarily oI nitric acid and
urine. The urine bomb is one oI literally hundreds oI murderous
weapons in the CIA arsenal.
"The New York Times" oI September 26, 1975 revealed the
existence oI guns that shoot cobra-venom darts. Then there was the
shoe polish compound intended to make Fidel Castro's beard Iall
out, so that he would lose his "charisma." And CIA laboratories in
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey developed the Iamous riIle that shoots
around corners.
Some CIA weapons are designed to kill many people--deadly germs
can be released in subways; others are intended to kill a single,
speciIic individual--the Borgia ring contains deadly poison to be
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slipped into a victim's drink; and still others are standard
weapons supplied Ior such missions as overthrowing the Allende
government in Chile in 1973.
The inIormation about CIA weapons that you will read in this
article generally has not been made public beIore. It was not
intended to be. But your tax dollars pay Ior these devices; it is
your right to know about them.
There is a booklet, written in 1977 and distributed to a select
group oI U.S. mercenaries, titled "CIA Improvised Sabotage
Devices." This instructional guidebook, part oI "the Combat
BookshelI," was published by Desert Publications, P.O. Box 22005,
Phoenix, Arizona 85028. II you want to know how the CIA turns a
cigar box into an explosive that can destroy a 10,000-gallon
capacity storage tank, then "CIA Improvised Sabotage Devices" is
what you should read. You will need it iI you want to build the
"Water-Drip Electric Delay," a bomb that requires little more than
wood scrap, a tin can, and a battery. The "Pocket Watch Electric
Delay" requires little more than a watch, a screw, and a battery.
The "Mousetrap Electric Release" is another bomb, this one
requiring a mousetrap, a trip wire, a battery, and little else. It
is described as "an excellent device to use with bazooka rockets
against trucks, tanks, or locomotives." The "Chemical
Instantaneous Initiator" is made Irom a sugar-chlorate mix and is
eIIective in sabotaging trains. The "Martini Glass Shaped Charge"
is a bomb that also can be made out oI a beer can. You might want
to try to construct the "Vehicle Booby Trap." The "Potassium
Chlorate and Sugar Igniter" and the "Sawdust, Moth Flakes, and Oil
Incendiary" can be made with only what you see in their titles.
For these and more than IiIty other CIA devices, step-by-step
instructions on how to make them and illustrations oI what they
should look like when completed are given. Turn a wine bottle into
a bomb. Build a land-mine rocket. ManuIacture napalm in your
basement. Even the simple how-tos oI causing a dust explosion can
be Iound in "CIA Improvised Sabotage Devices."
Why is the CIA so deeply involved in sabotage techniques? The
CIA might think it is in this country's interest to delay
scientiIic work being done by another nation. Or, the CIA might
want to disrupt a nation's economy in the hope that the resulting
chaos will lead to civil unrest and the overthrow oI the existing
government (some oI this actually happened in Chile). The original
John RockeIeller used such tactics against his competitors. He
simply had their reIineries blown up.
Another pamphlet the CIA would not like you to see is titled
"How to Kill," written by John Minnery, edited by Robert Brown and
Peder Lund, and published by Paladin Press, Box 1307, Boulder,
Colorado 80306. The reason the CIA would preIer that you not see
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this eighty-eight-page pamphlet, which is unavailable at bookstores
and newsstands, is because it contains a number oI "ingenious"
methods oI doing what the title says. Also, Paladin Press, which
published a book called "OSS Sabotage and Demolition Manual," is
widely regarded by journalists as an organization with close ties
to mercenary groups and the CIA. Paladin Press doesn't want you to
know that, but how else could they have published the "OSS Sabotage
and Demolition Manual?" The OIIice oI Strategic Services was the
precursor oI today's CIA.
This writer's call to Colorado yielded the Iollowing
conversation:

"How could you publish the "OSS Sabotage and Demolition Manual,"
I asked Peter Lund, editor and publisher oI Paladin Press, "iI your
organization, at the least, was not dealing with Iormer OSS agents?
And what about "How to Kill?"
"I don't talk to journalists," Lund said.
"You're called the Paladin Press. You must publish books. Can
I order them?"
"No."
"Why not? You're a publisher, aren't you?"
"We're aIraid our publications might Iall into the wrong hands."
"What are the right hands?" I asked.
"I don't talk to journalists."
"Have you ever heard oI Desert Publications?" I asked.
"A Iine outIit," Lund said. "II they recommend you, I'll send
you our material."
"That's my problem," I said. "They don't seem to have a phone
number."
"Well, they're a good group."
"Listen," I said, "wasn't your group, and Desert Publications
besides, involved in CIA mercenary activity in AIrica?"
"I don't know anything about that."
"Were you in the Special Forces?"
"July 1967 to July 1968 in Vietnam."
"Were you CIA?"
"I was MACV |Military Armed Forces Command Vietnam|."
"You weren't aIIiliated with CIA?"
"I didn't say that."
"What do you say?"
"We did joint operations with CIA on the Phoenix Program."
"Wasn't that a murder operation?"
"No. It was snatching people."

The Phoenix Program was designed Ior a job that the CIA
euphemistically described as "eliminating the Viet Cong
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inIrastructure." In reality, it was a rampant reign oI terror run
out oI CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. Former CIA director
William Colby later termed the program "eIIective." The Phoenix
Program was a naked murder campaign, as proved by every realistic
report, ranging Irom the Bertrand Russell Tribunal to the Dellums
Committee to admissions by CIA agents themselves. The program
killed--and *none* oI these killings occurred in combat--18,000
people, mostly women and children.
But what about Peder Lund, editor and publisher oI Paladin
Press? The book he edited and published, "How to Kill," outlined a
surIeit oI murder methods, horriIic techniques oI causing people to
die. For example:
"Without getting too deeply into the realm oI the bizarre,"
wrote John Minnery, the author oI "How to Kill" as he proceeded to
just that, "a specially loaded bullet made Irom a human tooth
(bicuspid) could be Iired under the jaw or through the mouth into
the head. The tooth is a very hard bone, and its enamel shell
would allow it to penetrate into the brain. The intention here is
also to hide the cause oI death because the examiner in his search
Ior a projectile will disregard bone Iragments."
One last example Irom "How to Kill" should give you the Ilavor
oI the book:

Lesson Nine: Hot Wire

"Essentially, the weapon is an electriIied grid in the urinal
basin. This can take the Iorm oI a screen cover Ior the drain
. or a metal grill. II the urinal is completely porcelain, the
. screen must be added by the assassin. The drain cover is
. connected to the electrical system oI the washroom by means oI
. an insulated cord that is hidden behind the plumbing.
"What happens when the subject uses the urinal should be
obvious now. The subject's urine, which is a salty liquid and
. a perIect conductor oI electricity, makes contact with the
. charged grid, and the shock will kill him."

This reporter's investigation revealed that the "Hot Wire" was
child's play compared to certain other CIA weapons devices. For
instance, I was able to obtain Volumes One and Two oI the "CIA
Black Book" on improvised munitions, volumes that are stamped "Ior
oIIicial use only" on almost every page. It is obvious why the CIA
would like these books to remain secret. With elaborate
instructions, they describe how to make high explosives Irom
aspirin, how to construct a nail grenade, and how to turn a Coke
bottle into a bomb.
Described in detail in the "Black Book" is the previously
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mentioned urea nitrate explosive, or, as it is known to the pros,
"the piss bomb." Instructions Ior the preparation oI this weapon
assure the maker that animal urine will do as well as human; the
important thing is to have ten cups oI it, boil it down to one cup,
and mix it with the nitric acid.
Also described in the "Black Book" is how to construct a pipe
pistol, which, as the name indicates, is a gun constructed out oI a
pipe. Other weapons include a cooking syringe Iilled with poison
that can be stabbed into "the subject's" stomach; a cyanide gas
pistol; a throat cutter gauntlet kniIe (razor sharp and only an
inch or so in length); and a mixture oI Iertilizer and aluminum
powder that can be made into a powerIul bomb.
Why build murder weapons out oI such weird material? Is the CIA
insane?
No. In its own way, the whole thing is perIectly logical.
The pamphlet "How to Kill" explained it all: "As most oI these
devices are homemade, this precludes the possibility oI their being
traced. They are, in eIIect, `sanitized' and perIect Ior
assassinations, where weapons are prohibited, or where customs in
the hostile country are stringent, so these can be made Irom local
materials."
Being a contract killer Ior the CIA is not all roses. You
cannot kill in just any way. A number oI attempts have been made
on Fidel Castro's liIe--some with the CIA and the MaIia
cooperating--and some oI them may have Iailed because oI
restrictions imposed on the potential assassins. It would be
unacceptable Ior Castro's murder to be laid at the door oI the CIA.
This would make Castro a martyr in the eyes oI his countrymen.
Thus, a method that would suggest death by natural causes must be
Iound.
Abundant speculation and considerable evidence suggest that the
CIA or some other government agency arranged Ior the "natural"
deaths oI David Ferrie, Jack Ruby, George De Mohrenschildt, and
other potential witnesses into the assassination oI John Kennedy.
Some methods oI killing, like the injection oI an air bubble into
the bloodstream, will oIten go unnoticed by medical examiners.
Another hard-to-trace method oI killing is to mail a snake to
the victim. This is known as killing by long distance. A
disadvantage to this method is that the snake might bite an
innocent third party who just happens to open the package. The
advantage is that once the snake has struck, the evidence can
simply slither away.
Sometimes, as the CIA knows, killing has to be done at close
range. For this purpose, a valuable weapon is the ice pick with a
blood arrester attached. The blood arrester is a cloth wrapped
near the tip oI the ice pick. When the pick is shoved into the
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victim, the spurting blood is absorbed by the blood arrester.
People who see the victim Iall will probably think he has had a
heart attack. While the onlookers try to help the victim, the
assassin uses this valuable ten or IiIteen seconds to escape
unnoticed.
OIten it is advisable to use what is called in the trade a
"quiet weapon." Silenced weapons can include pistols, riIles, and
even machine guns.
Poison is a quiet killer. Here is a partial list oI the poisons
the CIA has become expert at administering: oil oI bitter almonds;
ant paste; cadmium, used in vapor Iorm, and death is delayed Iour
hours; radiator cleaner, also causing a delayed death;
Cantharides (Spanish Fly); ethyl mercury; and Ireon, heated by a
Ilame. These poisons and many others are listed in "How to Kill."
The author then cautions the reader:
"Unless otherwise stated, these poisons are either to be
injected into the subject, or taken orally by him by adding it to
his Iood. Use common sense in the application oI these potions
and, iI possible, double the O.D. necessary."
W.H. Bowart, in his book, "Operation Mind Control" described the
CIA's use oI drugs: "In 1953, the CIA made plans to purchase ten
kilograms oI LSD Ior use in `drug experiments with animals and
human beings.' Since there are more than 10,000 doses in a gram,
that meant the CIA wanted 100 million doses. The CIA obviously
intended to `corner the market' on LSD so that other countries
would not be ahead oI the U.S. in their potential Ior `LSD
warIare.'"
Dr. Albert HoIIman, an early researcher into the uses oI LSD,
was horriIied by what the CIA was doing: "I had perIected LSD Ior
medical use, not as a weapon. It can make you insane or even kill
you iI it is not properly used under medical supervision. In any
case, the research should be done by medical people and not by
soldiers or intelligence agencies."
Perhaps the most Irightening weapon oI all is the one that can
be used to alter weather and climate. It was used with
considerable success in Vietnam. It slowed troop movements with
heavy rains, and it destroyed the rice crop, as well. The danger
is that these climatological changes may become permanent,
aIIecting not only enemies oI the United States, but also the
entire planet.
Finally, considerable evidence exists that the United States,
through the CIA, employed germ warIare during the Korean War. A
number oI captured pilots testiIied that germ warIare was used, but
their testimony was dismissed as brainwashing. A Marine Corps
colonel named Frank H. Schwable signed a germ warIare conIession
and, according to W.H. Bowart, "named names, cited missions,
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described meetings and strategy conIerences."
Schwable later repudiated his conIession. But the charges oI
germ warIare were taken up in Iront oI the United Nations, and a
number oI countries believed them.
The United States, incidentally, was later charged with using
nerve gas in Vietnam.
What you have read on these pages is pretty revolting stuII.
Yet, iI the world ought to be saved Irom Communism, who can say it
is not necessary? One danger, oI course, is that these terrible
weapons have been introduced into our body politic and have
produced strange and terrible Iruits on our own native soil. When
assassination becomes government policy, when men are trained to
kill in every conceivable way, when morality is set aside Ior a
"higher good," can even the President oI the United States consider
himselI saIe?


The Logistics of a Black Bag 1ob
by Wes Swearingen, FBI Whistleblower

1. IdentiIy the subject.
2. Determine target's place oI employment and type oI employment.
3. IdentiIy the mode oI transportation.
4. IdentiIy other residents oI the household.
5. Determine whether target has any other visitors in the residence such as
relatives, maids, etc.
6. IdentiIy the landlord iI the residence is not a privately owned home or
condominium.
7. PerIorm a trial run.
8. Start the bag job ...
A. All members oI the surveillance team, regardless oI their position, must
be in radio contact with one another or in contact with a reasonable relay.
No bag job should start or continue iI any member oI the team is out oI
radio contact. A hostile Iorce, such as another member oI the organization
under investigation, local police, or a thieI, may have neutralized may
have neutralized one oI your teammates and may monitor your movements by
radio.
Everyone involved must be physically and mentally alert, aware oI their
surroundings, attentive and aggressive, and a team player.
The successIul execution oI a bag job depends upon everyone doing their
job correctly. There is no room Ior error, bad judgment, or heroes. A
successIully planned and executed bag job will never give you any surprises
that you cannot handle. (A locked door should never be taped open as was
done by the inIamously incompetent Watergate burglars during the break-in
in 1972 at Democratic Party headquarters in Washington, D.C.
A bag job is a tremendous strain on the nerves. Emotions can run high in
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these tense situations, and each member oI the team must be able to control
himselI mentally, physically, and emotionally, and have conIidence that the
others can do likewise.

B. The surveillance team will Iollow the subject and any members oI the
residence. Depending upon the persons to be Iollowed, no less than two
surveillance agents should be used per person, unless school children are
involved, in which case one agent per child will suIIice. In the case oI
very young children, it is sometimes advisable to have two agents so as to
avoid the appearance oI being a child molester.

C. Once all members oI the residence have been surveilled away Irom the
residence or accounted Ior in another location, and there are no apparent
obstacles, then the plan is ready Ior a trial run.

D. When the "ball players" are ready to begin the "game," those agents
designated to telephone the residence oI any neighbors in a position to
observe the Iront should place their calls at a precise moment as
instructed by the "outside man."

E. The "outside man" or "lookout" will call the "inside team" into position
and will alert the various surveillance agents that the "ball players" are
approaching the Iield. The inside team on the trial run will consist oI the
lock picker and one radio person.
Radio transmissions can be received by anyone with the proper equipment,
such as a 200-channel scanning radio, or other similar portable equipment
with a retail price oI around $300, so communications must be innocuous.

F. The "pickup man" will deliver the inside team to the Iront door or to
the most suitable location to avoid attention; this could be the Iront
door, back door, a nearby alley, or a parking garage. The inside team is
dropped oII and the "pickup man" departs the immediate area to stand by Ior
Iurther instructions through the outside person or lookout.

G. The "inside team" approaches and examines the entrance Ior obvious alarm
systems. II no alarms are noted, the inside team will make the
surreptitious entry into the residence or oIIice. The radio person oI the
inside team will immediately announce to the outside person that "the
players are on the Iield."

H.The trial run will consist oI an immediate search oI all rooms Ior
Iriends, relatives, housekeepers, or anyone associated with the subject to
be sure the "Iield" is clear. The inside team will announce to the outside
person some description oI the events taking place inside. For example, iI
a quick observation reveals no inIormation available Ior Iuture bag jobs,
the inside person may announce that the game is being called Ior lack oI
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interest in today's game or poor attendance.
II prospects look good, the photographer may be called in through some
phrase such as "Send in the press photographer; we may need photographs Ior
a starting line-up Ior Iuture games."
It is important to keep the surveillance agents advised oI events as
they happen so they Ieel they are part oI the action. II the surveillance
team does not Iind out what happened until the end oI the day or the next
day, morale will suIIer and Iuture bag jobs may be compromised because the
surveillance team will Ieel they are not qualiIied to be kept inIormed oI
current events.
II the situation is such that a quick "game" can be played, that is, the
bag job can be done with one quick photographic session, the inside person
will ask the outside person to check with the other players to see iI three
or Iour innings can be played.
II the surveillance team has everyone under control, the outside personannounce
something like, "Weather permitting, the relieI pitchers can
go a Iull nine innings." this alerts the inside team that a regular bag job
oI one or two hours can be handled by the surveillance team with no problem.

I. Photographs may be needed to rearrange articles aIter completion oI the
bag job depending upon the inside condition and the number oI records to be
examined. A Polaroid camera is ideal Ior this purpose. Once an examination
oI the inside layout is clearly in mind and notes have been taken on
placement oI various articles on the desk, in Iile cabinets, etc., the ball
game can be played. A progress report Irom the inside should be given to the outside
person
every Iew minutes. When the inside team is through, they will announce the
completion by saying something like, "The game is in the bottom oI the
ninth with two men out and the count is two and two; have the pickup man
ready to transport the players back home."
The outside person may then relay the message to all surveillance units
that they may, "Head Ior the barn."




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NSA
Employee Manual



SECURITY GUIDELINES
This handbook is designed to introduce you to some oI the basic security principles
and procedures with which all NSA employees must comply. It highlights some oI your
security responsibilities, and provides guidelines Ior answering questions you may be
asked concerning your association with this Agency. Although you will be busy during
the Iorthcoming weeks learning your job, meeting co-workers, and becoming accustomed
to a new work environment, you are urged to become Iamiliar with the security
inIormation contained in this handbook. Please note that a listing oI telephone numbers is
provided at the end oI this handbook should you have any questions or concerns.

INTRODUCTION
In joining NSA you have been given an opportunity to participate in the activities oI
one oI the most important intelligence organizations oI the United States Government. At
the same time, you have also assumed a trust which carries with it a most important
individual responsibilitythe saIeguarding oI sensitive inIormation vital to the security
oI our nation. While it is impossible to estimate in actual dollars and cents the value oI
the work being conducted by this Agency, the inIormation to which you will have access
at NSA is without question critically important to the deIense oI the United States. Since
this inIormation may be useIul only iI it is kept secret, it requires a very special measure
oI protection. The speciIic nature oI this protection is set Iorth in various Agency security
regulations and directives. The total NSA Security Program, however, extends beyond
these regulations. It is based upon the concept that security begins as a state oI mind. The
program is designed to develop an appreciation oI the need to protect inIormation vital to
the national deIense, and to Ioster the development oI a level oI awareness which will
make security more than routine compliance with regulations. At times, security practices
and procedures cause personal inconvenience. They take time and eIIort and on occasion
may make it necessary Ior you to voluntarily Iorego some oI your usual personal
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prerogatives. But your compensation Ior the inconvenience is the knowledge that the
work you are accomplishing at NSA, within a Iramework oI sound security practices,
contributes signiIicantly to the deIense and continued security oI the United States oI
America. I extend to you my very best wishes as you enter upon your chosen career or
assignment with NSA.
Philip T. Pease
Director oI Security

INITIAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES

ANONYMITY
Perhaps one oI the Iirst security practices with which new NSA personnel should
become acquainted is the practice oI anonymity. In an open society such as ours, this
practice is necessary because inIormation which is generally available to the public is
available also to hostile intelligence. ThereIore, the Agency mission is best accomplished
apart Irom public attention. Basically, anonymity means that NSA personnel are
encouraged not to draw attention to themselves nor to their association with this Agency.
NSA personnel are also cautioned neither to conIirm nor deny any speciIic questions
about NSA activities directed to them by individuals not aIIiliated with the Agency.
The ramiIications oI the practice oI anonymity are rather Iar reaching, and its success
depends on the cooperation oI all Agency personnel. Described below you will Iind some
examples oI situations that you may encounter concerning your employment and how
you should cope with them. Beyond the situations cited, your judgement and discretion
will become the deciding Iactors in how you respond to questions about your
employment.

ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EMPLOYMENT
Certainly, you may tell your Iamily and Iriends that you are employed at or assigned
to the National Security Agency. There is no valid reason to deny them this inIormation.
However, you may not disclose to them any inIormation concerning speciIic aspects oI
the Agency`s mission, activities, and organization. You should also ask them not to
publicize your association with NSA.
Should strangers or casual acquaintances question you about your place oI
employment, an appropriate reply would be that you work Ior the Department oI
DeIense. II questioned Iurther as to where you are employed within the Department oI
DeIense, you may reply, 'NSA. When you inIorm someone that you work Ior NSA (or
the Department oI DeIense) you may expect that the next question will be, 'What do you
do? It is a good idea to anticipate this question and to Iormulate an appropriate answer.
Do not act mysteriously about your employment, as that would only succeed in drawing
more attention to yourselI.
II you are employed as a secretary, engineer, computer scientist, or in a clerical,
administrative, technical, or other capacity identiIiable by a general title which in no way
indicates how your talents are being applied to the mission oI the Agency, it is suggested
that you state this general title. II you are employed as a linguist, you may say that you
are a linguist, iI necessary. However, you should not indicate the speciIic language(s)
14
with which you are involved.
The use oI service specialty titles which tend to suggest or reveal the nature oI the
Agency`s mission or speciIic aspects oI their work. These proIessional titles, such as
cryptanalyst, signals collection oIIicer, and intelligence research analyst, iI given
verbatim to an outsider, would likely generate Iurther questions which may touch upon
the classiIied aspects oI your work. ThereIore, in conversation with outsiders, it is
suggested that such job titles be generalized. For example, you might indicate that you
are a 'research analyst. You may not, however, discuss the speciIic nature oI your
analytic work.

ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR AGENCY TRAINING
During your career or assignment at NSA, there is a good chance that you will
receive some type oI job-related training. In many instances the nature oI the training is
not classiIied. However, in some situations the specialized training you receive will relate
directly to sensitive Agency Iunctions. In such cases, the nature oI this training may not
be discussed with persons outside oI this Agency.
II your training at the Agency includes language training, your explanation Ior the
source oI your linguistic knowledge should be that you obtained it while working Ior the
Department oI DeIense.
You Should not draw undue attention to your language abilities, and you may not
discuss how you apply your language skill at the Agency.
II you are considering part-time employment which requires the use oI language or
technical skills similar to those required Ior the perIormance oI your NSA assigned
duties, you must report (in advance) the anticipated part-time work through your StaII
Security OIIicer (SSO) to the OIIice oI Security`s Clearance Division (M55).

VERIFYING YOUR EMPLOYMENT
On occasion, personnel must provide inIormation concerning their employment to
credit institutions in connection with various types oI applications Ior credit. In such
situations you may state, iI you are a civilian employee, that you are employed by NSA
and indicate your pay grade or salary. Once again, generalize your job title. II any Iurther
inIormation is desired by persons or Iirms with whom you may be dealing, instruct them
to request such inIormation by correspondence addressed to: Director oI Civilian
Personnel, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755- 6000.
Military personnel should use their support group designator and address when indicating
their current assignment.
II you contemplate leaving NSA Ior employment elsewhere, you may be required to
submit a resume/job application, or to participate in extensive employment interviews. In
such circumstances, you should have your resume reviewed by the ClassiIication
Advisory OIIicer (CAO) assigned to your organization. Your CAO will ensure that any
classiIied operational details oI your duties have been excluded and will provide you with
an unclassiIied job description. Should you leave the Agency beIore preparing such a
resume, you may develop one and send it by registered mail to the NSA/CSS InIormation
Policy Division (Q43) Ior review. Remember, your obligation to protect sensitive Agency
inIormation extends beyond your employment at NSA.

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THE AGENCY AND PUBLIC NEWS MEDIA
From time to time you may Iind that the agency is the topic oI reports or articles
appearing in public news medianewspapers, magazines, books, radio and TV. The
NSA/CSS InIormation Policy Division (Q43) represents the Agency in matters involving
the press and other media. This oIIice serves at the Agency`s oIIicial media center and is
the Director`s liaison oIIice Ior public relations, both in the community and with other
government agencies. The InIormation Policy Division must approve the release oI all
inIormation Ior and about NSA, its mission, activities, and personnel. In order to protect
the aspects oI Agency operations, NSA personnel must reIrain Irom either conIirming or
denying any inIormation concerning the Agency or its activities which may appear in the
public media. II you are asked about the activities oI NSA, the best response is 'no
comment. You should the notiIy Q43 oI the attempted inquiry. For the most part, public
reIerences to NSA are based upon educated guesses. The Agency does not normally
make a practice oI issuing public statements about its activities.

GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

ESPIONAGE AND TERRORISM
During your security indoctrination and throughout your NSA career you will become
increasingly aware oI the espionage and terrorist threat to the United States. Your
vigilance is the best single deIense in protecting NSA inIormation, operations, Iacilities
and people. Any inIormation that comes to your attention that suggests to you the
existence oI, or potential Ior, espionage or terrorism against the U.S. or its allies must be
promptly reported by you to the OIIice oI Security.
There should be no doubt in your mind about the reality oI the threats. You are now
aIIiliated with the most sensitive agency in government and are expected to exercise
vigilance and common sense to protect NSA against these threats.

CLASSIFICATION
Originators oI correspondence, communications, equipment, or documents within the
Agency are responsible Ior ensuring that the proper classiIication, downgrading
inIormation and, when appropriate, proper caveat notations are assigned to such material.
(This includes any handwritten notes which contain classiIied inIormation). The three
levels oI classiIication are ConIidential, Secret and Top Secret. The NSA ClassiIication
Manual should be used as guidance in determining proper classiIication. II aIter review oI
this document you need assistance, contact the ClassiIication Advisory OIIicer (CAO)
assigned to your organization, or the InIormation Policy Division (Q43).

NEED-TO-KNOW
ClassiIied inIormation is disseminated only on a strict 'need-to-know basis. The
'need-to know policy means that classiIied inIormation will be disseminated only to
those individuals who, in addition to possessing a proper clearance, have a requirement to
know this inIormation in order to perIorm their oIIicial duties (need-to-know). No person
is entitled to classiIied inIormation solely by virtue oI oIIice, position, rank, or security
clearance.
16
All NSA personnel have the responsibility to assert the 'need-to-know policy as
part oI their responsibility to protect sensitive inIormation. Determination oI 'need-
toknow
is a supervisory responsibility. This means that iI there is any doubt in your mind
as to an individual`s 'need-to-know, you should always check with your supervisor
beIore releasing any classiIied material under your control.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Separate Irom classiIied inIormation is inIormation or material marked 'FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY (such as this handbook). This designation is used to identiIy
that oIIicial inIormation or material which, although unclassiIied, is exempt Irom the
requirement Ior public disclosure oI inIormation concerning government activities and
which, Ior a signiIicant reason, should not be given general circulation. Each holder oI
'FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY (FOUO) inIormation or material is authorized to disclose
such inIormation or material to persons in other departments or agencies oI the Executive
and Judicial branches when it is determined that the inIormation or material is required to
carry our a government Iunction. The recipient must be advised that the inIormation or
material is not to be disclosed to the general public. Material which bears the 'FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY caveat does not come under the regulations governing the
protection oI classiIied inIormation. The unauthorized disclosure oI inIormation marked
'FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY does not constitute an unauthorized disclosure oI
classiIied deIense inIormation. However, Department oI DeIense and NSA regulations
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure oI inIormation designated 'FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY. Appropriate administrative action will be taken to determine responsibility and
to apply corrective and/or disciplinary measures in cases oI unauthorized disclosure oI
inIormation which bears the 'FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY caveat. Reasonable care
must be exercised in limiting the dissemination oI 'FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
inIormation. While you may take this handbook home Ior Iurther study, remember that is
does contain 'FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY inIormation which should be protected.

PREPUBLICATION REVIEW
All NSA personnel (employees, military assignees, and contractors) must submit Ior
review any planned articles, books, speeches, resumes, or public statements that may
contain classiIied, classiIiable, NSA-derived, or unclassiIied protected inIormation, e.g.,
inIormation relating to the organization, mission, Iunctions, or activities oI NSA. Your
obligation to protect this sensitive inIormation is a liIetime one. Even when you resign,
retire, or otherwise end your aIIiliation with NSA, you must submit this type oI material
Ior prepublication review. For additional details, contact the InIormation Policy Division
(Q43) Ior an explanation oI prepublication review procedures.

PERSONNEL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES
Perhaps you an recall your initial impression upon entering an NSA Iacility. Like
most people, you probably noticed the elaborate physical security saIeguardsIences,
concrete barriers, Security Protective OIIicers, identiIication badges, etc. While these
measures provide a substantial degree oI protection Ior the inIormation housed within our
buildings, they represent only a portion oI the overall Agency security program. In Iact,
17
vast amounts oI inIormation leave our Iacilities daily in the minds oI NSA personnel, and
this is where our greatest vulnerability lies. Experience has indicated that because oI the
vital inIormation we work with at NSA, Agency personnel may become potential targets
Ior hostile intelligence eIIorts. Special saIeguards are thereIore necessary to protect our
personnel. Accordingly, the Agency has an extensive personnel security program which
establishes internal policies and guidelines governing employee conduct and activities.
These policies cover a variety oI topics, all oI which are designed to protect both you and
the sensitive inIormation you will gain through your work at NSA.

ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS
As a member oI the U.S. Intelligence Community and by virtue oI your access to
sensitive inIormation, you are a potential target Ior hostile intelligence activities carried
out by or on behalI oI citizens oI Ioreign countries. A policy concerning association with
Ioreign nationals has been established by the Agency to minimize the likelihood that its
personnel might become subject to undue inIluence or duress or targets oI hostile
activities through Ioreign relationships.
As an NSA aIIiliate, you are prohibited Irom initiating or maintaining associations
(regardless oI the nature and degree) with citizens or oIIicials oI communist-controlled,
or other countries which pose a signiIicant threat to the security oI the United States and
its interests. A comprehensive list oI these designated countries is available Irom your
StaII Security OIIicer or the Security Awareness Division. Any contact with citizens oI
these countries, no matter how brieI or seemingly innocuous, must be reported as soon as
possible to your StaII Security OIIicer (SSO). (Individuals designated as StaII Security
OIIicers are assigned to every organization; a listing oI StaII Security OIIicers can be
Iound at the back oI this handbook).
Additionally, close and continuing associations with any non-U.S. citizens which are
characterized by ties oI kinship, obligation, or aIIection are prohibited. A waiver to this
policy may be granted only under the most exceptional circumstances when there is a
truly compelling need Ior an individual`s services or skills and the security risk is
negligible.
In particular, a waiver must be granted in advance oI a marriage to or cohabitation
with a Ioreign national in order to retain one`s access to NSA inIormation. Accordingly,
any intent to cohabitate with or marry a non-U.S. citizen must be reported immediately to
your StaII Security OIIicer. II a waiver is granted, Iuture reassignments both at
headquarters and overseas may be aIIected.
The marriage or intended marriage oI an immediate Iamily member (parents,
siblings, children) to a Ioreign national must also be reported through your SSO to the
Clearance Division (M55).
Casual social associations with Ioreign nationals (other than those oI the designated
countries mentioned above) which arise Irom normal living and working arrangements in
the community usually do not have to be reported. During the course oI these casual
social associations, you are encouraged to extend the usual social amenities. Do not act
mysteriously or draw attention to yourselI (and possibly to NSA) by displaying an
unusually wary attitude.
Naturally, your aIIiliation with the Agency and the nature oI your work should not be
discussed. Again, you should be careIul not to allow these associations to become close
18
and continuing to the extent that they are characterized by ties oI kinship, obligation, or
aIIection.
II at any time you Ieel that a 'casual association is in any way suspicious, you
should report this to your StaII Security OIIicer immediately. Whenever any doubt exists
as to whether or not a situation should be reported or made a matter oI record, you should
decided in Iavor oI reporting it. In this way, the situation can be evaluated on its own
merits, and you can be advised as to your Iuture course oI action.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS
NSA personnel are discouraged Irom initiating correspondence with individuals who
are citizens oI Ioreign countries. Correspondence with citizens oI communist-controlled
or other designated countries is prohibited. Casual social correspondence, including the
'penpal variety, with other Ioreign acquaintances is acceptable and need not be reported.
II, however, this correspondence should escalate in its Irequency or nature, you should
report that through your StaII Security OIIicer to the Clearance Division (M55).

EMBASSY VISITS
Since a signiIicant percentage oI all espionage activity is known to be conducted
through Ioreign embassies, consulates, etc., Agency policy discourages visits to
embassies, consulates or other oIIicial establishments oI a Ioreign government. Each
case, however, must be judged on the circumstances involved. ThereIore, iI you plan to
visit a Ioreign embassy Ior any reason (even to obtain a visa), you must consult with, and
obtain the prior approval oI, your immediate supervisor and the Security Awareness
Division (M56).

AMATEUR RADIO ACTIVITIES
Amateur radio (ham radio) activities are known to be exploited by hostile intelligence
services to identiIy individuals with access to classiIied inIormation; thereIore, all
licensed operators are expected to be Iamiliar with NSA/CSS Regulation 100-1,
'Operation oI Amateur Radio Stations (23 October 1986). The speciIic limitations on
contacts with operators Irom communist and designated countries are oI particular
importance. II you are an amateur radio operator you should advise the Security
Awareness Division (M56) oI your amateur radio activities so that detailed guidance may
be Iurnished to you.

UNOFFICIAL FOREIGN TRAVEL
In order to Iurther protect sensitive inIormation Irom possible compromise resulting
Irom terrorism, coercion, interrogation or capture oI Agency personnel by hostile nations
and/or terrorist groups, the Agency has established certain policies and procedures
concerning unoIIicial Ioreign travel.
All Agency personnel (civilian employees, military assignees, and contractors) who
are planning unoIIicial Ioreign travel must have that travel approved by submitting a
proposed itinerary to the Security Awareness Division (M56) at least 30 working days
prior to their planned departure Irom the United States. Your itinerary should be
submitted on Form K2579 (UnoIIicial Foreign Travel Request). This Iorm provides space
19
Ior noting the countries to be visited, mode oI travel, and dates oI departure and return.
Your immediate supervisor must sign this Iorm to indicate whether or not your proposed
travel poses a risk to the sensitive inIormation, activities, or projects oI which you may
have knowledge due to your current assignment.
AIter your supervisor`s assessment is made, this Iorm should be Iorwarded to the
Security Awareness Director (M56). Your itinerary will then be reviewed in light oI the
existing situation in the country or countries to be visited, and a decision Ior approval or
disapproval will be based on this assessment. The purpose oI this policy is to limit the
risk oI travel to areas oI the world where a threat may exist to you and to your knowledge
oI classiIied Agency activities.
In this context, travel to communist-controlled and other hazardous activity areas is
prohibited. A listing oI these hazardous activity areas is prohibited. A listing oI these
hazardous activity areas can be Iound in Annex A oI NSA/CSS Regulation No. 30-31,
'Security Requirements Ior Foreign Travel (12 June 1987). From time to time, travel
may also be prohibited to certain areas where the threat Irom hostile intelligence services,
terrorism, criminal activity or insurgency poses an unacceptable risk to Agency
employees and to the sensitive inIormation they possess. Advance travel deposits made
without prior agency approval oI the proposed travel may result in Iinancial losses by the
employee should the travel be disapproved, so it is important to obtain approval prior to
committing yourselI Iinancially. Questions regarding which areas oI the world currently
pose a threat should be directed to the Security Awareness Division (M56).
UnoIIicial Ioreign travel to Canada, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and Mexico does not
require prior approval, however, this travel must still be reported using Form K2579.
Travel to these areas may be reported aIter the Iact.
While you do not have to report your Ioreign travel once you have ended your
aIIiliation with the Agency, you should be aware that the risk incurred in travelling to
certain areas, Irom a personal saIety and/or counterintelligence standpoint, remains high.
The requirement to protect the classiIied inIormation to which you have had access is a
liIetime obligation.

MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS
Within the United States there are numerous organizations with memberships ranging
Irom a Iew to tens oI thousands. While you may certainly participate in the activities oI
any reputable organization, membership in any international club or proIessional
organization/activity with Ioreign members should be reported through your StaII
Security OIIicer to the Clearance Division (M55). In most cases there are no security
concerns or threats to our employees or aIIiliates. However, the OIIice oI Security needs
the opportunity to research the organization and to assess any possible risk to you and the
inIormation to which you have access.
In addition to exercising prudence in your choice oI organizational aIIiliations, you
should endeavor to avoid participation in public activities oI a conspicuously
controversial nature because such activities could Iocus undesirable attention upon you
and the Agency. NSA employees may, however, participate in bona Iide public aIIairs
such as local politics, so long as such activities do not violate the provisions oI the
statutes and regulations which govern the political activities oI all Iederal employees.
Additional inIormation may be obtained Irom your Personnel Representative.
20

CHANGES IN MARITAL STATUS/COHABITATION/NAMES
All personnel, either employed by or assigned to NSA, must advise the OIIice oI
Security oI any changes in their marital status (either marriage or divorce), cohabitation
arrangements, or legal name changes. Such changes should be reported by completing
NSA Form G1982 (Report oI Marriage/Marital Status Change/Name Change), and
Iollowing the instructions printed on the Iorm.

USE AND ABUSE OF DRUGS
It is the policy oI the National Security Agency to prevent and eliminate the
improper use oI drugs by Agency employees and other personnel associated with the
Agency. The term 'drugs includes all controlled drugs or substances identiIied and
listed in the Controlled Substances Act oI 1970, as amended, which includes but is not
limited to: narcotics, depressants, stimulants, cocaine, hallucinogens ad cannabis
(marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil). The use oI illegal drugs or the abuse oI prescription
drugs by persons employed by, assigned or detailed to the Agency may adversely aIIect
the national security; may have a serious damaging eIIect on the saIety and the saIety oI
others; and may lead to criminal prosecution. Such use oI drugs either within or outside
Agency controlled Iacilities is prohibited.

PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICIES
The physical security program at NSA provides protection Ior classiIied material and
operations and ensures that only persons authorized access to the Agency`s spaces and
classiIied material are permitted such access. This program is concerned not only with the
Agency`s physical plant and Iacilities, but also with the internal and external procedures
Ior saIeguarding the Agency`s classiIied material and activities. ThereIore, physical
security saIeguards include Security Protective OIIicers, Iences, concrete barriers, access
control points, identiIication badges, saIes, and the compartmentalization oI physical
spaces. While any one oI these saIeguards represents only a delay Iactor against attempts
to gain unauthorized access to NSA spaces and material, the total combination oI all
these saIeguards represents a Iormidable barrier against physical penetration oI NSA.
Working together with personnel security policies, they provide 'security in depth.
The physical security program depends on interlocking procedures. The
responsibility Ior carrying out many oI these procedures rests with the individual. This
means you, and every person employed by, assign, or detailed to the Agency, must
assume the responsibility Ior protecting classiIied material. Included in your
responsibilities are: challenging visitors in operational areas; determining 'need-toknow;
limiting classiIied conversations to approved areas; Iollowing established locking
and checking procedures; properly using the secure and non-secure telephone systems;
correctly wrapping and packaging classiIied data Ior transmittal; and placing classiIied
waste in burn bags.

THE NSA BADGE
Even beIore you enter an NSA Iacility, you have a constant reminder oI security
the NSA badge. Every person who enters an NSA installation is required to wear an
21
authorized badge. To enter most NSA Iacilities your badge must be inserted into an
Access Control Terminal at a building entrance and you must enter your Personal
IdentiIication Number (PIN) on the terminal keyboard. In the absence oI an Access
Control Terminal, or when passing an internal security checkpoint, the badge should be
held up Ior viewing by a Security Protective OIIicer. The badge must be displayed at all
times while the individual remains within any NSA installation.
NSA Badges must be clipped to a beaded neck chain. II necessary Ior the saIety oI
those working in the area oI electrical equipment or machinery, rubber tubing may be
used to insulate the badge chain. For those Agency personnel working in proximity to
other machinery or equipment, the clip may be used to attach the badge to the wearer`s
clothing, but it must also remain attached to the chain.
AIter you leave an NSA installation, remove your badge Irom public view, thus
avoiding publicizing your NSA aIIiliation. Your badge should be kept in a saIe place
which is convenient enough to ensure that you will be reminded to bring it with you to
work. A good rule oI thumb is to aIIord your badge the same protection you give your
wallet or your credit cards. DO NOT write your Personal IdentiIication Number on your
badge. II you plan to be away Irom the Agency Ior a period oI more than 30 days, your
badge should be leIt at the main Visitor Control Center which services your Iacility.
Should you lose your badge, you must report the Iacts and circumstances
immediately to the Security Operations Center (SOC) (963-3371s/688-6911b) so that
your badge PIN can be deactivated in the Access Control Terminals. In the event that you
Iorget your badge when reporting Ior duty, you may obtain a 'non-retention Temporary
Badge at the main Visitor Control Center which serves your Iacility aIter a co-worker
personally identiIies your and your clearance has been veriIied.
Your badge is to be used as identiIication only within NSA Iacilities or other
government installations where the NSA badge is recognized. Your badge should never
be used outside oI the NSA or other government Iacilities Ior the purpose oI personal
identiIication. You should obtain a Department oI DeIense identiIication card Irom the
Civilian WelIare Fund (CWF) iI you need to identiIy yourselI as a government employee
when applying Ior 'government discounts oIIered at various commercial establishments.
Your badge color indicates your particular aIIiliation with NSA and your level oI
clearance. Listed below are explanations oI the badge colors you are most likely to see:
Green (`) Fully cleared NSA employees and
certain military assignees.
Orange (`) (or Gold) Fully cleared representative
oI other government agencies.
Black (`) Fully cleared contractors or consultants.
Blue Employees who are cleared to the SECRET
level while awaiting completion oI their processing
Ior Iull (TS/SI) clearance. These Limited Interim
Clearance (LIC) employees are restricted to certain
activities while inside a secure area.
Red Clearance level is not speciIied, so assume the
holder is uncleared.
` - Fully cleared status means that the person has been cleared to the Top Secret (TS)
level and indoctrinated Ior Special Intelligence (SI).
22
All badges with solid color backgrounds (permanent badges) are kept by individuals
until their NSA employment or assignment ends. Striped badges ('non-retention badges)
are generally issued to visitors and are returned to the Security Protective OIIicer upon
departure Irom an NSA Iacility.

AREA CONTROL
Within NSA installations there are generally two types oI areas, Administrative and
Secure. An Administrative Area is one in which storage oI classiIied inIormation is not
authorized, and in which discussions oI a classiIied nature are Iorbidden. This type oI
area would include the corridors, restrooms, caIeterias, visitor control areas, credit union,
barber shop, and drugstore. Since uncleared, non-NSA personnel are oIten present in
these areas, all Agency personnel must ensure that no classiIied inIormation is discussed
in an Administrative Area.
ClassiIied inIormation being transported within Agency Iacilities must be placed
within envelopes, Iolders, brieIcases, etc. to ensure that its contents or classiIication
markings are not disclosed to unauthorized persons, or that materials are not
inadvertently dropped enroute.
The normal operational work spaces within an NSA Iacility are designated Secure
Areas. These areas are approved Ior classiIied discussions and Ior the storage oI
classiIied material. Escorts must be provided iI it is necessary Ior uncleared personnel
(repairmen, etc.) to enter Secure Areas, an all personnel within the areas must be made
aware oI the presence oI uncleared individuals. All unknown, unescorted visitors to
Secure Areas should be immediately challenged by the personnel within the area,
regardless oI the visitors` clearance level (as indicated by their badge color).
The corridor doors oI these areas must be locked with a deadbolt and all classiIied
inIormation in the area must be properly secured aIter normal working hours or whenever
the area is unoccupied. When storing classiIied material, the most sensitive material must
be stored in the most secure containers. Deadbolt keys Ior doors to these areas must be
returned to the key desk at the end oI the workday.
For Iurther inIormation regarding Secure Areas, consult the Physical Security
Division (M51) or your staII Security OIIicer.

ITEMS TREATED AS CLASSIFIED
For purposes oI transportation, storage and destruction, there are certain types oI
items which must be treated as classiIied even though they may not contain classiIied
inIormation. Such items include carbon paper, vu-graphs, punched machine processing
cards, punched paper tape, magnetic tape, computer Iloppy disks, Iilm, and used
typewriter ribbons. This special treatment is necessary since a visual examination does
not readily reveal whether the items contain classiIied inIormation.

PROHIBITED ITEMS
Because oI the potential security or saIety hazards, certain items are prohibited under
normal circumstances Irom being brought into or removed Irom any NSA installation.
These items have been groped into two general classes. Class I prohibited items are those
which constitute a threat to the saIety and security oI NSA/CSS personnel and Iacilities.
Items in this category include:
23
a. Firearms and ammunition
b. Explosives, incendiary substances, radioactive materials,
highly volatile materials, or other hazardous materials
c. Contraband or other illegal substances
d. Personally owned photographic or electronic equipment
including microcomputers, reproduction or recording
devices, televisions or radios.
Prescribed electronic medical equipment is normally not prohibited, but requires
coordination with the Physical Security Division (M51) prior to being brought into any
NSA building.
Class II prohibited items are those owned by the government or contractors which
constitute a threat to physical, technical, or TEMPEST security. Approval by designated
organizational oIIicials is required beIore these items can be brought into or removed
Irom NSA Iacilities. Examples are:
a. Transmitting and receiving equipment
b. Recording equipment and media
c. Telephone equipment and attachments
d. Computing devices and terminals
e. Photographic equipment and Iilm
A more detailed listing oI examples oI Prohibited Items may be obtained Irom your
StaII Security OIIicer or the Physical Security Division (M51).
Additionally, you may realize that other seemingly innocuous items are also
restricted and should not be brought into any NSA Iacility. Some oI these items pose a
technical threat; others must be treated as restricted since a visual inspection does not
readily reveal whether they are classiIied. These items include:
a. Negatives Irom processed Iilm; slides; vu-graphs
b. Magnetic media such as Iloppy disks, cassette tapes, and
VCR videotapes
c. Remote control devices Ior telephone answering
machines
d. Pagers

EXIT INSPECTION
As you depart NSA Iacilities, you will note another physical security saIeguardthe
inspection oI the materials you are carrying. This inspection oI your materials, conducted
by Security Protective OIIicers, is designed to preclude the inadvertent removal oI
classiIied material. It is limited to any articles that you are carrying out oI the Iacility and
may include letters, brieIcases, newspapers, notebooks, magazines, gym bags, and other
such items. Although this practice may involve some inconvenience, it is conducted in
your best interest, as well as being a sound security practice. The inconvenience can be
considerably reduced iI you keep to a minimum the number oI personal articles that you
remove Irom the Agency.

REMOVAL OF MATERIAL FROM NSA SPACES
The Agency maintains strict controls regarding the removal oI material Irom its
installations, particularly in the case oI classiIied material.
24
Only under a very limited and oIIicial circumstances classiIied material be removed
Irom Agency spaces. When deemed necessary, speciIic authorization is required to
permit an individual to hand carry classiIied material out oI an NSA building to another
Secure Area. Depending on the material and circumstances involved, there are several
ways to accomplish this.
A Courier Badge authorizes the wearer, Ior oIIicial purposes, to transport classiIied
material, magnetic media, or Class II prohibited items between NSA Iacilities. These
badges, which are strictly controlled, are made available by the Physical Security
Division (M51) only to those oIIices which have speciIic requirements justiIying their
use.
An Annual Security Pass may be issued to individuals whose oIIicial duties require
that they transport printed classiIied materials, inIormation storage media, or Class II
prohibited items to secure locations within the local area. Materials carried by an
individual who displays this pass are subject to spot inspection by Security Protective
OIIicers or other personnel Irom the OIIice oI Security. It is not permissible to use an
Annual Security Pass Ior personal convenience to circumvent inspection oI your personal
property by perimeter Security Protective OIIicers.
II you do not have access to a Courier Badge and you have not been issued an
Annual Security Pass, you may obtain a One-Time Security Pass to remove classiIied
materials/magnetic media or admit or remove prohibited items Irom an NSA installation.
These passes may be obtained Irom designated personnel in your work element who have
been given authority to issue them. The issuing oIIicial must also contact the Security
Operations Center (SOC) to obtain approval Ior the admission or removal oI a Class I
prohibited item.
When there is an oIIicial need to remove government property which is not magnetic
media, or a prohibited or classiIied item, a One-Time Property Pass is used. This type oI
pass (which is not a Security Pass) may be obtained Irom your element custodial property
oIIicer. A Property Pass is also to be used when an individual is removing personal
property which might be reasonably be mistaken Ior unclassiIied Government property.
This pass is surrendered to the Security Protective OIIicer at the post where the material
is being removed. Use oI this pass does not preclude inspection oI the item at the
perimeter control point by the Security Protective OIIicer or Security proIessionals to
ensure that the pass is being used correctly.

EXTERNAL PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
On those occasions when an individual must personally transport classiIied material
between locations outside oI NSA Iacilities, the individual who is acting as the courier
must ensure that the material receives adequate protection. Protective measures must
include double wrapping and packaging oI classiIied inIormation, keeping the material
under constant control, ensuring the presence oI a second appropriately cleared person
when necessary, and delivering the material to authorized persons only. II you are
designated as a courier outside the local area, contact the Security Awareness Division
(M56) Ior your courier brieIing.
Even more basic than these procedures is the individual security responsibility to
conIine classiIied conversations to secure areas. Your home, car pool, and public places
are not authorized areas to conduct classiIied discussionseven iI everyone involved in
25
he discussion possesses a proper clearance and 'need-to-know. The possibility that a
conversation could be overheard by unauthorized persons dictates the need to guard
against classiIied discussions in non-secure areas.
ClassiIied inIormation acquired during the course oI your career or assignment to
NSA may not be mentioned directly, indirectly, or by suggestion in personal diaries,
records, or memoirs.

REPORTING LOSS OR DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
The extraordinary sensitivity oI the NSA mission requires the prompt reporting oI
any known, suspected, or possible unauthorized disclosure oI classiIied inIormation, or
the discovery that classiIied inIormation may be lost, or is not being aIIorded proper
protection. Any inIormation coming to your attention concerning the loss or unauthorized
disclosure oI classiIied inIormation should be reported immediately to your supervisor,
your StaII Security OIIicer, or the Security Operations Center (SOC).

USE OF SECURE AND NON-SECURE TELEPHONES
Two separate telephone systems have been installed in NSA Iacilities Ior use in the
conduct oI oIIicial Agency business: the secure telephone system (gray telephone) and
the outside, non secure telephone system (black telephone). All NSA personnel must
ensure that use oI either telephone system does not jeopardize the security oI classiIied
inIormation.
The secure telephone system is authorized Ior discussion oI classiIied inIormation.
Personnel receiving calls on the secure telephone may assume that the caller is authorized
to use the system. However, you must ensure that the caller has a 'need-to-know the
inIormation you will be discussing.
The outside telephone system is only authorized Ior unclassiIied oIIicial Agency
business calls. The discussion oI classiIied inIormation is not permitted on this system.
Do not attempt to use 'double-talk in order to discuss classiIied inIormation over the
non-secure telephone system. In order to guard against the inadvertent transmission oI
classiIied inIormation over a non-secure telephone, and individual using the black
telephone in an area where classiIied activities are being conducted must caution other
personnel in the area that the non-secure telephone is in use. Likewise, you should avoid
using the non-secure telephone in the vicinity oI a secure telephone which is also in use.

HELPFUL INFORMATION

SECURITY RESOURCES
In the IulIillment oI your security responsibilities, you should be aware that there are
many resources available to assist you. II you have any questions or concerns regarding
security at NSA or your individual security responsibilities, your supervisor should be
consulted. Additionally, StaII Security OIIicers are appointed to the designated Agency
elements to assist these organizations in carrying out their security responsibilities. There
is a StaII Security OIIicer assigned to each organization; their phone numbers are listed at
the back oI this handbook. StaII Security OIIicers also provide guidance to and monitor
26
the activities oI Security Coordinators and Advisors (individuals who, in addition to their
operational duties within their respective elements, assist element supervisors or
managers in discharging security responsibilities).
Within the OIIice oI Security, the Physical Security Division (M51) will oIIer you
assistance in matters such as access control, security passes, clearance veriIication,
combination locks, keys, identiIication badges, technical security, and the Security
Protective Force. The Security Awareness Division (M56) provides security guidance
and brieIings regarding unoIIicial Ioreign travel, couriers, special access, TDY/PCS, and
amateur radio activities. The Industrial and Field Security Division (M52) is available to
provide security guidance concerning NSA contractor and Iield site matters.
The Security Operations Center (SOC) is operated by two Security Duty OIIicers
(SDOs), 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The SDO, representing the OIIice oI Security,
provides a complete range oI security services to include direct communications with Iire
and rescue personnel Ior all Agency area Iacilities. The SDO is available to handle any
physical or personnel problems that may arise, and iI necessary, can direct your to the
appropriate security oIIice that can assist you. AIter normal business hours, weekends,
and holidays, the SOC is the Iocal point Ior all security matters Ior all Agency personnel
and Iacilities (to include Agency Iield sites and contractors). The SOC is located in Room
2A0120, OPS 2A building and the phone numbers are 688-6911(b), 963-3371(s).
However, keep in mind that you may contact any individual or any division within
the OIIice oI Security directly. Do not hesitate to report any inIormation which may
aIIect the security oI the Agency`s mission, inIormation, Iacilities or personnel.

SECURITY-RELATED SERVICES
In addition to OIIice oI Security resources, there are a number oI proIessional,
security related services available Ior assistance in answering your questions or providing
the services which you require.
The Installations and Logistics Organization (L) maintains the system Ior the
collection and destruction oI classiIied waste, and is also responsible Ior the movement
and scheduling oI material via NSA couriers and the DeIense Courier Service (DCS).
Additionally, L monitors the proper addressing, marking, and packaging oI classiIied
material being transmitted outside oI NSA; maintains records pertaining to receipt and
transmission oI controlled mail; and issues property passes Ior the removal oI
unclassiIied property.
The NSA OIIice oI Medical Services (M7) has a staII oI physicians, clinical
psychologists and an alcoholism counselor. All are well trained to help individuals help
themselves in dealing with their problems. Counseling services, with reIerrals to private
mental health proIessionals when appropriate, are all available to NSA personnel.
Appointments can be obtained by contacting M7 directly. When an individual reIers
himselI/herselI, the inIormation discussed in the counseling sessions is regarded as
privileged medical inIormation and is retained exclusively in M7 unless it pertains to the
national security.
Counseling interviews are conducted by the OIIice oI Civilian Personnel (M3) with
any civilian employee regarding both on and oII-the-job problems. M3 is also available to
assist all personnel with the personal problems seriously aIIecting themselves or
members oI their Iamilies. In cases oI serious physical or emotional illness, injury,
27
hospitalization, or other personal emergencies, M3 inIorms concerned Agency elements
and maintains liaison with Iamily members in order to provide possible assistance.
Similar counseling services are available to military assignees through Military Personnel
(M2).

GUIDE TO SECURITY
M51 PHYSICAL SECURITY 963-6651s/688-8293b (FMHQ)
968-8101s/859-6411b (FANX)
CONFIRM and badges Prohibited Items
(963-6611s/688-7411b)
Locks, keys, saIes and alarms SOC (963-3371s/688-6911b)
Security/vehicle passes NSA Iacility protection and compliance
Visitor Control
Inspections
Red/blue seal areas New Construction
Pass Clearances (963-4780s/688-6759b)

M52 INDUSTRIAL AND FIELD SECURITY
982-7918s/859-6255b
Security at contractor Iield site Iacilities
VeriIication oI classiIied mailing addresses Ior contractor Iacilities

M53 INVESTIGATIONS 982-7914S/859-6464B
Personnel Interview Program (PIP) Reinvestigations
Military Interview Program (MIP) Special investigations
M54 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 982-7832s/859-6424b
Security counterintelligence analysis Security compromises
M55 CLEARANCES 982-7900s/859-4747b
Privacy Act OIIicer (For review oI security Iiles) Continued SCI access
Contractor/applicant processing Military access

M56 SECURITY AWARENESS 963-3273S/688-6535B
Security indoctrinations/debrieIings Embassy visits
Associations with Ioreign nationals BrieIings (Ioreign travel,
Security Week ham radio, courier,
Security posters, brochures, etc. LIC, PCS, TDY,
special access, etc.)
Foreign travel approval
Military contractor orientation
Special Access OIIice (963-5466s/688-6353b)
M57 POLYGRAPH 982-7844s/859-6363b
Polygraph interviews
M509 MANAGEMENT AND POLICY STAFF 982-7885s/859-6350b
STAFF SECURITY OFFICERS (SSOs)
Element Room Secure/Non-Secure
28
A 2A0852B 963-4650/688-7044
B 3W099 963-4559/688-7141
D/Q/J/N/U 2B8066G 963-4496/688-6614
E/M D3B17 968-8050/859-6669
G 9A195 963-5033/688-7902
K 2B5136 963-1978/688-5052
L SAB4 977-7230/688-6194
P 2W091 963-5302/688-7303
R B6B710 968-4073/859-4736
S/V/Y/C/X C2A55 972-2144/688-7549
T 2B5040 963-4543/688-7364
W 1C181 963-5970/688-7061

GUIDE TO SECURITY-RELATED SERVICES
Agency Anonymity 968-8251/859-4381
Alcohol Rehabilitation Program 963-5420/688-7312
Cipher Lock Repair 963-1221/688-7119
Courier Schedules (local) 977-7197/688-7403
DeIense Courier Service 977-7117/688-7826
Disposal oI ClassiIied Waste
Paper only 972-2150/688-6593
Plastics, Metal, Film, etc 963-4103/688-7062
Locksmith 963-3585/688-7233
Mail Dissemination and Packaging 977-7117/688-7826
Medical Center (Fort Meade) 963-5429/688-7263
(FANX) 968-8960/859-6667
(Airport Square) 982-7800/859-6155
NSA/CSS InIormation Policy Division 963-5825/688-6527
Personnel Assistance
Civilian 982-7835/859-6577
Air Force 963-3239/688-7980
Army 963-3739/688-6393
Navy 963-3439/688-7325
Property Passes (unclassiIied material) 977-7263/688-7800
Psychological Services 963-5429/688-7311

FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS/DESIGNATORS
ARFCO
S
Armed Forces Courier Service (now known as DCS)
AWOL Absent Without Leave
CAO ClassiIication Advisory OIIicer
COB Close oI Business
CWF Civilian WelIare Fund
DCS DeIense Courier Service (Iormerly known as ARFCOS)
DoD Department oI DeIense
29
EOD Enter on Duty
FOUO For OIIicial Use Only
M2 OIIice oI Military Personnel
M3 OIIice oI Civilian Personnel
M5 OIIice oI Security
M7 OIIice oI Medical Services
NCS National Cryptologic School
PCS Permanent Change oI Station
PIN Personal IdentiIication Number
Q43 InIormation Policy Division
SDO Security Duty OIIicer
SOC Security Operations Center
SPO Security Protective OIIicer
SSO StaII Security OIIicer
TDY Temporary Duty
UFT UnoIIicial Foreign Travel

A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION

DEFINITION
Assassination is a term thought to be derived Irom "Hashish", a drug similar to
marijuana, said to have been used by Hasan-Dan-Sabah to induce motivation in his
Iollowers, who were assigned to carry out political and other murders, usually at the cost
oI their lives.
It is here used to describe the planned killing oI a person who is not under the legal
jurisdiction oI the killer, who is not physically in the hands oI the killer, who has been
selected by a resistance organization Ior death, and who has been sele cted by a resistance
organization Ior death, and whose death provides positive advantages to that
organization.

EMPLOYMENT
Assassination is an extreme measure not normally used in clandestine operations. It
should be assumed that it will never be ordered or authorized by any U.S. Headquarters,
though the latter may in rare instances agree to its execution by membe rs oI an
associated Ioreign service. This reticence is partly due to the necessity Ior committing
communications to paper. No assassination instructions should ever be written or
recorded. Consequently, the decision to employ this technique must nearly always be
reached in the Iield, at the area where the act will take place. Decision and instructions
30
should be conIined to an absolute minimum oI persons. Ideally, only one person will be
involved. No report may be made, but usually the act will be pr operly covered by normal
news services, whose output is available to all concerned.

JUSTIFICATION
Murder is not morally justiIiable. SelI-deIense may be argued iI the victim has
knowledge which may destroy the resistance organization iI divulged. Assassination oI
persons responsible Ior atrocities or reprisals may be regarded as just puni shment.
Killing a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the
cause oI Ireedom may be held necessary.
But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons who are
morally squeamish should not attempt it.

CLASSIFICATIONS
The techniques employed will vary according to whether the subject is unaware oI his
danger, aware but unguarded, or guarded. They will also be aIIected by whether or not
the assassin is to be killed with the subject hereaIter, assassinations in which the subject
is unaware will be termed "simple"; those where the subject is aware but unguarded will
be termed "chase"; those where the victim is guarded will be termed "guarded."
II the assassin is to die with the subject, the act will be called "lost." II the assassin is to
escape, the adjective will be "saIe." It should be noted that no compromises should exist
here. The assassin must not Iall alive into enemy hands.
A Iurther type division is caused by the need to conceal the Iact that the subject was
actually the victim oI assassination, rather than an accident or natural causes. II such
concealment is desirable the operation will be called "secret" ;; iI concealment is
immaterial, the act will be called "open"; while iI the assassination requires publicity to
be eIIective it will be termed "terroristic."

Following these deIinitions, the assassination oI Julius Caesar was saIe, simple, and
terroristic, while that oI Huey Long was lost, guarded and open. Obviously, successIul
secret assassinations are not recorded as assassination at all. |Illeg| o I Thailand and
Augustus Caesar may have been the victims oI saIe, guarded and secret assassination.
Chase assassinations usually involve clandestine agents or members oI criminal
organizations.
31
THE ASSASSIN
In saIe assassinations, the assassin needs the usual qualities oI a clandestine agent. He
should be determined, courageous, intelligent, resourceIul, and physically active. II
special equipment is to be used, such as Iirearms or drugs, it is clear that he must have
outstanding skill with such equipment.
Except in terroristic assassinations, it is desirable that the assassin be transient in the area.
He should have an absolute minimum oI contact with the rest oI the organization and his
instructions should be given orally by one person only. His saIe evacuation aIter the act is
absolutely essential, but here again contact should be as limited as possible. It is
preIerable that the person issuing instructions also conduct any withdrawal or covering
action which may be necessary.
In lost assassination, the assassin must be a Ianatic oI some sort. Politics, religion, and
revenge are about the only Ieasible motives. Since a Ianatic is unstable psychologically,
he must be handled with extreme care. He must not know the iden tities oI the other
members oI the organization, Ior although it is intended that he die in the act, something
may go wrong. While the Assassin oI Trotsky has never revealed any signiIicant
inIormation, it was unsound to depend on this when the act was p lanned.

PLANNING
When the decision to assassinate has been reached, the tactics oI the operation must be
planned, based upon an estimate oI the situation similar to that used in military
operations. The preliminary estimate will reveal gaps in inIormation and possibly indicate
a need Ior special equipment which must be procured or constructed. When all necessary
data has been collected, an eIIective tactical plan can be prepared. All planning must be
mental; no papers should ever contain evidence oI the oper ation.
In resistance situations, assassination may be used as a counter-reprisal. Since this
requires advertising to be eIIective, the resistance organization must be in a position to
warn high oIIicials publicly that their lives will be the price oI rep risal action against
innocent people. Such a threat is oI no value unless it can be carried out, so it may be
necessary to plan the assassination oI various responsible oIIicers oI the oppressive
regime and hold such plans in readiness to be used only i I provoked by excessive
brutality. Such plans must be modiIied Irequently to meet changes in the tactical
situation.
TECHNIQUES
The essential point oI assassination is the death oI the subject. A human being may be
killed in many ways but sureness is oIten overlooked by those who may be emotionally
unstrung by the seriousness oI this act they intend to commit. The spe ciIic technique
32
employed will depend upon a large number oI variables, but should be constant in one
point: Death must be absolutely certain. The attempt on Hitler's liIe Iailed because the
conspiracy did not give this matter proper attention.
Techniques may be considered as Iollows:

1. Manual.
It is possible to kill a man with the bare hands, but very Iew are skillIul enough to do it
well. Even a highly trained Judo expert will hesitate to risk killing by hand unless he has
absolutely no alternative. However, the simplest local tools a re oIten much the most
eIIicient means oI assassination. A hammer, axe, wrench, screw driver, Iire poker,
kitchen kniIe, lamp stand, or anything hard, heavy and handy will suIIice. A length oI
rope or wire or a belt will do iI the assassin is strong and agile. All such improvised
weapons have the important advantage oI availability and apparent innocence. The
obviously lethal machine gun Iailed to kill Trotsky where an item oI sporting goods
succeeded.
In all saIe cases where the assassin may be subject to search, either beIore or aIter the act,
specialized weapons should not be used. Even in the lost case, the assassin may
accidentally be searched beIore the act and should not carry an incrimin ating device iI
any sort oI lethal weapon can be improvised at or near the site. II the assassin normally
carries weapons because oI the nature oI his job, it may still be desirable to improvise and
implement at the scene to avoid disclosure oI his ident ity.

2. Accidents.
For secret assassination, either simple or chase, the contrived accident is the most
eIIective technique. When successIully executed, it causes little excitement and is only
casually investigated.
The most eIIicient accident, in simple assassination, is a Iall oI 75 Ieet or more onto a
hard surIace. Elevator shaIts, stair wells, unscreened windows and bridges will serve.
Bridge Ialls into water are not reliable. In simple cases a private meeting with the subject
may be arranged at a properly-cased location. The act may be executed by sudden,
vigorous |excised| oI the ankles, tipping the subject over the edge. II the assassin
immediately sets up an outcry, playing the "horriIied wit ness", no alibi or surreptitious
withdrawal is necessary. In chase cases it will usually be necessary to stun or drug the
subject beIore dropping him. Care is required to insure that no wound or condition not
attributable to the Iall is discernible aIter death.
33
Falls into the sea or swiItly Ilowing rivers may suIIice iI the subject cannot swim. It will
be more reliable iI the assassin can arrange to attempt rescue, as he can thus be sure oI
the subject's death and at the same time establish a workable al ibi.

II the subject's personal habits make it Ieasible, alcohol may be used |2 words excised| to
prepare him Ior a contrived accident oI any kind.
Falls beIore trains or subway cars are usually eIIective, but require exact timing and can
seldom be Iree Irom unexpected observation.
Automobile accidents are a less satisIactory means oI assassination. II the subject is
deliberately run down, very exact timing is necessary and investigation is likely to be
thorough. II the subject's car is tampered with, reliability is very lo w. The subject may be
stunned or drugged and then placed in the car, but this is only reliable when the car can
be run oII a high cliII or into deep water without observation.
Arson can cause accidental death iI the subject is drugged and leIt in a burning building.
Reliability is not satisIactory unless the building is isolated and highly combustible.
3. Drugs.
In all types oI assassination except terroristic, drugs can be very eIIective. II the assassin
is trained as a doctor or nurse and the subject is under medical care, this is an easy and
rare method. An overdose oI morphine administered as a sedat ive will cause death
without disturbance and is diIIicult to detect. The size oI the dose will depend upon
whether the subject has been using narcotics regularly. II not, two grains will suIIice.

II the subject drinks heavily, morphine or a similar narcotic can be injected at the passing
out stage, and the cause oI death will oIten be held to be acute alcoholism.
SpeciIic poisons, such as arsenic or strychine, are eIIective but their possession or
procurement is incriminating, and accurate dosage is problematical. Poison was used
unsuccessIully in the assassination oI Rasputin and Kolohan, though the latte r case is
more accurately described as a murder.

4. Edge Weapons
Any locally obtained edge device may be successIully employed. A certain minimum oI
anatomical knowledge is needed Ior reliability.
34
Puncture wounds oI the body cavity may not be reliable unless the heart is reached. The
heart is protected by the rib cage and is not always easy to locate.
Abdominal wounds were once nearly always mortal, but modern medical treatment has
made this no longer true.
Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical region. This
can be done with the point oI a kniIe or a light blow oI an axe or hatchet.
Another reliable method is the severing oI both jugular and carotid blood vessels on both
sides oI the windpipe.
II the subject has been rendered unconscious by other wounds or drugs, either oI the
above methods can be used to insure death.
5. Blunt Weapons
As with edge weapons, blunt weapons require some anatomical knowledge Ior eIIective
use. Their main advantage is their universal availability. A hammer may be picked up
almost anywhere in the world. Baseball and |illeg| bats are very widely dist ributed. Even
a rock or a heavy stick will do, and nothing resembling a weapon need be procured,
carried or subsequently disposed oI.
Blows should be directed to the temple, the area just below and behind the ear, and the
lower, rear portion oI the skull. OI course, iI the blow is very heavy, any portion oI the
upper skull will do. The lower Irontal portion oI the head, Irom th e eyes to the throat,
can withstand enormous blows without Iatal consequences.

6. Firearms
Firearms are oIten used in assassination, oIten very ineIIectively. The assassin usually
has insuIIicient technical knowledge oI the limitations oI weapons, and expects more
range, accuracy and killing power than can be provided with reliability. Since certainty oI
death is the major requirement, Iirearms should be used which can provide destructive
power at least 100 in excess oI that thought to be necessary, and ranges should be halI
that considered practical Ior the weapon.
Firearms have other drawbacks. Their possession is oIten incriminating. They may be
diIIicult to obtain. They require a degree oI experience Irom the user. They are |illeg|.
Their |illeg| is consistently over-rated.
However, there are many cases in which Iirearms are probably more eIIicient than any
other means. These cases usually involve distance between the assassin and the subject,
or comparative physical weakness oI the assassin, as with a woman.
35
(a) The precision riIle. In guarded assassination, a good hunting or target
riIle should always be considered as a possibility. Absolute reliability can
nearly always be achieved at a distance oI one hundred yards. In ideal
circumstances, t he range may be extended to 250 yards. The riIle should
be a well made bolt or Ialling block action type, handling a powerIul long-
range cartridge. The .300 F.A.B. Magnum is probably the best cartridge
readily available. Other excellent calibers are . 375 M.|illeg|. Magnum,
.270 Winchester, .30 - 106 p.s., 8 x 60 MM Magnum, 9.3 x

62 kk and others oI this type. These are preIerable to ordinary military calibers, since
ammunition available Ior them is usually oI the expanding bullet type, whereas most
ammunition Ior military riIles is Iull jacketed and hence not suIIiciently let hal. Military
ammunition should not be altered by Iiling or drilling bullets, as this will adversely aIIect
accuracy.
The riIle may be oI the "bull gun" variety, with extra heavy barrel and set triggers, but in
any case should be capable oI maximum precision. Ideally, the weapon should be able to
group in one inch at one hundred yards, but 21/2" groups are adequa te. The sight should
be telescopic, not only Ior accuracy, but because such a sight is much better in dim light
or near darkness. As long as the bare outline oI the target is discernable, a telescope sight
will work, even iI the riIle and shooter are in total darkness.
An expanding, hunting bullet oI such calibers as described above will produce
extravagant laceration and shock at short or mid-range. II a man is struck just once in the
body cavity, his death is almost entirely certain.
Public Iigures or guarded oIIicials may be killed with great reliability and some saIety iI
a Iiring point can be established prior to an oIIicial occasion. The propaganda value oI
this system may be very high.
(b) The machine gun.
Machine guns may be used in most cases where the precision riIle is applicable. Usually,
this will require

the subversion oI a unit oI an oIIicial guard at a ceremony, though a skillIul and
determined team might conceivably dispose oI a loyal gun crow without commotion and
take over the gun at the critical time.
The area Iire capacity oI the machine gun should not be used to search out a concealed
subject. This was tried with predictable lack oI success on Trotsky. The automatic Ieature
oI the machine gun should rather be used to increase reliability by placing a 5 second
36
burst on the subject. Even with Iull jacket ammunition, this will be absolute lethal is the
burst pattern is no larger than a man. This can be accomplished at about 150 yards. In
ideal circumstances, a properly padded and targeted ma chine gun can do it at 850 yards.
The major diIIiculty is placing the Iirst burst exactly on the target, as most machine
gunners are trained to spot their Iire on target by observation oI strike. This will not do in
assassination as the subject will not wait.
(c) The Submachine Gun.
This weapon, known as the "machine-pistol" by the Russians and Germans and
"machine-carbine" by the British, is occasionally useIul in assassination. Unlike the riIle
and machine gun, this is a short range weapon and since it Iires pistol ammu nition, much
less powerIul. To be reliable, it should deliver at least 5 rounds into the subject's chest,
though the .45 caliber U.S. weapons have a much larger margin oI killing eIIiciency than
the 9 mm European arms.
The assassination range oI the sub-machine gun is point

blank. While accurate single rounds can be delivered by sub-machine gunners at 50 yards
or more, this is not certain enough Ior assassination. Under ordinary circumstances, the
5MG should be used as a Iully automatic weapon. In the hands oI a capabl e gunner, a
high cyclic rate is a distinct advantage, as speed oI execution is most desirable,
particularly in the case oI multiple subjects.
The sub-machine gun is especially adapted to indoor work when more than one subject is
to be assassinated. An eIIective technique has been devised Ior the use oI a pair oI sub-
machine gunners, by which a room containing as many as a dozen subjects can be
"puriIico" in about twenty seconds with little or no risk to the gunners. It is illustrated
below.

While the U.S. sub-machine guns Iire the most lethal cartridges, the higher cyclic rate oI
some Ioreign weapons enable the gunner to cover a target quicker with acceptable pattern
density. The Bergmann Model 1934 is particularly good in this way. The Danish
Madman? SMG has a moderately good cyclic rate and is admirably compact and
concealable. The Russian SHG's have a good cyclic rate, but are handicapped by a small,
light protective which requires more kits Ior equivalent killing eIIect.
(d) The Shotgun.
A large bore shotgun is a most eIIective

37
killing instrument as long as the range is kept under ten yards. It should normally be used
only on single targets as it cannot sustain Iire successIully. The barrel may be "sawed" oII
Ior convenience, but this is not a signiIicant Iactor in its killi ng perIormance. Its
optimum range is just out oI reach oI the subject. 00 buckshot is considered the best shot
size Ior a twelve gage gun, but anything Irom single balls to bird shot will do iI the range
is right. The assassin should aim Ior the solar plexus as the shot pattern is small at close
range and can easily |illeg| the head.
(e) The Pistol.
While the handgun is quite ineIIicient as a weapon oI assassination, it is oIten used,
partly because it is readily available and can be concealed on the person, and partly
because its limitations are not widely appreciated. While many well kn own
assassinations have been carried out with pistols (Lincoln, Harding, Ghandi), such
attempts Iail as oIten as they succeed, (Truman, Roosevelt, Churchill).
II a pistol is used, it should be as powerIul as possible and Iired Irom just beyond reach.
The pistol and the shotgun are used in similar tactical situations, except that the shotgun
is much more lethal and the pistol is much more easily conceale d.
In the hands oI an expert, a powerIul pistol is quite deadly, but such experts are rare and
not usually available Ior assassination missions.
.45 Colt, .44 Special, .455 Kly, .45 A.S.|illeg| (U.S. Service) and .357 Magnum are all
eIIicient calibers. Less powerIul

rounds can suIIice but are less reliable. Sub-power cartridges such as the .32s and .25s
should be avoided.
In all cases, the subject should be hit solidly at least three times Ior complete reliability.
(I) Silent Firearms
The sound oI the explosion oI the proponent in a Iirearm can be eIIectively silenced by
appropriate attachments. However, the sound oI the projective passing through the air
cannot, since this sound is generated outside the weapon. In cases w here the velocity oI
the bullet greatly exceeds that oI sound, the noise so generated is much louder than that
oI the explosion. Since all powerIul riIles have muzzle velocities oI over 2000 Ieet per
second, they cannot be silenced.
Pistol bullets, on the other hand, usually travel slower than sound and the sound oI their
Ilight is negligible. ThereIore, pistols, submachine guns and any sort oI improvised
carbine or riIle which will take a low velocity cartridge can be silenc ed. The user should
38
not Iorget that the sound oI the operation oI a repeating action is considerable, and that
the sound oI bullet strike, particularly in bone is quite loud.
Silent Iirearms are only occasionally useIul to the assassin, though they have been widely
publicized in this connection. Because permissible velocity is low, eIIective precision
range is held to about 100 yards with riIle or carbine type weapons, while with pistols,
silent or otherwise,

are most eIIicient just beyond arms length. The silent Ieature attempts to provide a degree
oI saIety to the assassin, but mere possession oI a silent Iirearm is likely to create enough
hazard to counter the advantage oI its silence. The silent pisto l combines the
disadvantages oI any pistol with the added one oI its obviously clandestine purpose.
A telescopically sighted, closed-action carbine shooting a low velocity bullet oI great
weight, and built Ior accuracy, could be very useIul to an assassin in certain situations. At
the time oI writing, no such weapon is known to exist.
7. Explosives.
Bombs and demolition charges oI various sorts have been used Irequently in
assassination. Such devices, in terroristic and open assassination, can provide saIety and
overcome guard barriers, but it is curious that bombs have oIten been the imp lement oI
lost assassinations.
The major Iactor which aIIects reliability is the use oI explosives Ior assassination. the
charge must be very large and the detonation must be controlled exactly as to time by the
assassin who can observe the subject. A small or moderate explosi ve charge is highly
unreliable as a cause oI death, and time delay or booby-trap devices are extremely prone
to kill the wrong man. In addition to the moral aspects oI indiscriminate killing, the death
oI casual bystanders can oIten produce public reacti ons unIavorable to the cause Ior
which the assassination is carried out.
Bombs or grenades should never be thrown at a subject. While this

will always cause a commotion and may even result in the subject's death, it is sloppy,
unreliable, and bad propaganda. The charge must be too small and the assassin is never
sure oI: (1)reaching his attack position, (2) placing the charge close en ough to the target
and (3) Iiring the charge at the right time.
Placing the charge surreptitiously in advance permits a charge oI proper size to be
employed, but requires accurate prediction oI the subject's movements.
39
Ten pounds oI high explosive should normally be regarded as a minimum, and this is
explosive oI Iragmentation material. The latter can consist oI any hard, |illeg| material as
long as the Iragments are large enough. Metal or rock Iragments should be walnut-size
rather than pen-size. II solid plates are used, to be ruptured by the explosion, cast iron, 1"
thick, gives excellent Iragmentation. Military or commercial high explosives are practical
Ior use in assassination. Homemade or improvised e xplosives should be avoided. While
possibly powerIul, they tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive
missiles are excellent, provided the assassin has suIIicient technical knowledge to Iuse
them properly. 81 or 82 mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly
good. Anti-personnel shells Ior 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both
large enough to be completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.
The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six Ieet Irom it at the moment
oI detonation.
A large, shaped charge with the |illeg| Iilled with iron Iragments (such as 1" nuts and
bolts) will Iire a highly lethal shotgun-type

|illeg| to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact
replica oI the proposed device should be Iired in advance to determine exact range,
pattern-size, and penetration oI Iragments. Fragments should penetrate at lea st 1" oI
seasoned pine or equivalent Ior minimum reliability. Any Iiring device may be used
which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary commercial or military explorer
is eIIicient, as long as it is rigged Ior instantaneous action with no time Iuse in the
system. The wise |illeg| electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide
exact timing Irom as Iar away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avid the
disadvantages olitary or commercial high explosives are practical Ior use in assassination.
Homemade or improvised explosives should be avoided. While possibly powerIul, they
tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive missiles are excellent,
provided the assassin has suIIicient techn ical knowledge to Iuse them properly. 81 or 82
mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly good. Anti-personnel
shells Ior 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both large enough to be
completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.
The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six Ieet Irom it at the moment
oI detonation.
A large, shaped charge with the |illeg| Iilled with iron Iragments (such as 1" nuts and
bolts) will Iire a highly lethal shotgun-type

|illeg| to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact
replica oI the proposed device should be Iired in advance to determine exact range,
40
pattern-size, and penetration oI Iragments. Fragments should penetrate at lea st 1" oI
seasoned pine or equivalent Ior minimum reliability.
Any Iiring device may be used which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary
commercial or military explorer is eIIicient, as long as it is rigged Ior instantaneous
action with no time Iuse in the system.
The wise |illeg| electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide exact timing
Irom as Iar away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avid the
disadvantages oI stringing wire between the proposed positions oI the ass assin and the
subject, and also permit the assassin to Iire the charge Irom a variety oI possible
positions.
The radio switch can be |illeg| to Iire |illeg|, though its reliability is somewhat lower and
its procurement may not be easy.
EXAMPLES
(|illeg| may be presented brieI outlines, with critical evaluations oI the Iollowing
assassinations and attempts:
Marat Hedrich
Lincoln Hitler
Harding Roosevelt
Grand Duke Sergei Truman
Pirhivie Mussolini
Archduke Francis Ferdinand Benes
Rasputin Aung Sang
Madero |illeg|
Kirov Abdullah
Huey Long Ghandi
Alexander oI Yugoslvia
Trotsky



41



CONFERENCE ROOM TECHNIQUE

1.

(1) Enters room quickly but quietly
(2) Stands in doorway
2.

(2) Opens Iire on Iirst subject to react. Swings
across group toward center oI mass. Times
burst to empty magazine at end oI swing.
(1) Covers group to prevent individual
dangerous reactions, iI necessary, Iires
individual bursts oI 3 rounds.
3.

(2) Finishes burst. Commands"ShiIt." Drops
back thru |sic| door. Replaces empty magazine.
Covers corridor.
(1) On command "shiIt", opens Iire on opposite
side oI target, swings one burst across group.
4.

(1) Finishes burst. Commands "shiIt". Drops
back thru |sic| door. Replaces magazine.
Covers corridor.
(2) On command, "shiIt", re-enters room.
Covers group: kills survivors with two-round
42
bursts. Leaves propaganda.
5.

(2) Leaves room. Commands "GO". Covers
rear with nearly Iull magazine.
(1) On command "GO", leads withdrawl,
covering Iront with Iull magazine.
6.


Surveillance Recognition
by U.S. Dept. of State

Surveillance is required Ior successIul terrorist planning. Experience has taught us that
terrorist attacks are generally preceded by pre-operational surveillance in which terrorists
gather target intelligence. Surveillance is deIined as the process oI keeping Iacilities,
vehicles and persons under observation in order to obtain detailed inIormation. Any
indications oI surveillance should be reported immediately to the the security oIIice oI
your organization and/or the police. All training programs designed to protect individuals
Irom becoming victims oI terrorism recommend that people be alert to surveillance. This
is excellent advice, but, unIortunately, in most instances it is insuIIicient, because people
have had no training in detecting surveillance, and terrorist organizations are oIten
relatively sophisticated in their surveillance methods. Detecting surveillance conducted
by trained experts is not as easy as most Hollywood Iilms would lead us to believe.
Fortunately, however, the type oI surveillance conducted by terrorist organizations is not
normally as elaborate as that done by intelligence organizations nor does it involve as
many people or as much equipment. Nevertheless, Ior people to have a reasonable chance
at detecting most Iorms oI surveillance they would have to be somewhat Iamiliar with the
techniques used. The purpose oI surveillance is to determine (1) the suitability oI the
potential target based upon the physical and procedural security precautions that the
individual has taken and (2) the most suitable time, location, and method oI attack. This
43
surveillance may last Ior days or weeks depending upon the length oI time it takes the
surveillants to obtain the inIormation that they require. Naturally, the surveillance oI a
person who has set routines and who takes Iew precautions will take less time. The
people undertaking the surveillance will oIten not take part in the attack, nor will the
attack take place while surveillance is still in progress. BeIore undertaking surveillance
most experts gather inIormation about the subject Irom other sources. Public records oI
inIormation made available to the terrorist organization Irom a sympathetic individual
within an organization, local police, or other government oIIice may reveal useIul Iacts
about an individual such as the names oI Iamily members, an address, a description oI
vehicles and license numbers, photographs, etc. The surveillants will also make a
reconnaissance oI the neighborhood in which the target lives and works. This permits
them to select positions oI observation, the types oI vehicles to use, the clothing to be
worn, and the type oI ruse to use that will give them an ordinary or normal appearance
and plausible reasons to be in the area. There are basically three Iorms oI surveillance:
Ioot, vehicle, and stationary (generally categorized as either mobile or static). A brieI
description oI the most common techniques used Ior each oI these Iorms and methods Ior
detecting each one Iollows:
One or more individuals may undertake Ioot surveillance. One-person Ioot surveillance is
rather complicated and Iairly easy to detect. The surveillance must remain close to the
target, particularly in congested areas, to avoid losing him or her. In less congested areas
the surveillant can maintain a greater distance, but the lack oI other pedestrians makes the
surveillant that much more noticeable. The one complicating Iactor is the use oI a
disguise to make the surveillant look diIIerent (perhaps a uniIorm). One possible use oI a
disguise is a shopping bag or some other container Ior a change oI clothes, particularly iI
the shopping bag is Irom a store not Iound in the area or the container somehow seems
out oI place. Where a disguise is suspected, pay particular attention to shoes and slacks or
skirts. These items are less easily and, thereIore, less commonly changed. In elevators,
watch Ior people who seem to wait Ior you to push a button and then select a Iloor one
Ilight above or below yours. Two-person Ioot surveillance is more eIIective in that the
second surveillant provides greater Ilexibility. Normally, one surveillant remains close to
the target while the other stays at a greater distance. The second surveillant may Iollow
the Iirst on the same side oI the street or travel on the opposite side. Periodically the two
surveillants change position so that iI the target spots one oI them, that one will soon be
out oI sight, leading the target to think that he or she was mistaken. Obviously, spotting
this Iorm oI surveillance is more complicated, but individuals who are alert to the people
in their vicinity will eventually detect the same surveillant over a period oI time. Foot
surveillance with three or more people uses the most sophisticated techniques and is the
most diIIicult to spot. Generally, one surveillant remains behind the target close enough
to respond to any sudden moves. A second surveillant remains behind the Iirst on the
same side oI the street with the Iirst surveillant in sight. A third surveillant travels on the
opposite side oI the street parallel with or just behind the target. In areas where the target
has Iew paths to choose, one surveillant may walk in Iront oI the target, where he or she
is least likely to cause suspicion. The positions oI the surveillants are Irequently changed,
most commonly at intersections. The surveillant directly behind the target may move to
the opposite side oI the street, while another surveillant moves in close behind the target.
With the additional surveillants, any surveillant who Ieels that he or she has been
44
observed may drop out oI the Iormation. The use oI this sophisticated technique requires
that people be alert not only to those people behind them but also to those across the
street and perhaps in Iront oI them. II the same person is seen more than once over a
certain distance, surveillance may be suspected even iI that person is not continuously
seen. Common methods Ior detecting surveillance apply to all three Iorms oI Ioot
surveillance. The most eIIective are: 1. stopping abruptly and looking to the rear, 2.
suddenly reversing your course, 3. stopping abruptly aIter turning a corner, 4. watching
reIlections in shop windows or other reIlective surIaces, 5. entering a building and
leaving immediately by another exit,
6. walking slowly and then rapidly at intervals, 7. dropping a piece oI paper to see iI
anyone retrieves it, 8. boarding or exiting a bus or subway just beIore it starts, and 9.
making sudden turns or walking around the block. While taking these actions, watch Ior
people who are taken by surprise, react inappropriately, suddenly change direction, or
give a signal to someone else. Surveillants will not normally look directly at the target,
but they may do so iI they are surprised or unaware that you are observing them. Foot
surveillance is oIten used in conjunction with vehicle surveillance since it is likely that
the target will use a combination oI Ioot and vehicle transportation. Vehicles used Ior
surveillance are inconspicuous in appearance and oI a subdued color. Frequently, the
inside dome light is made inoperative so that it will not illuminate the interior oI the car
when the door is opened. Vehicles will have two or more people in them so that iI the
target parks his or her vehicle and walks away, the surveillance can be resumed on Ioot
while the driver remains with the vehicle. While moving, the driver gives Iull attention to
driving while the observer operates the radio, watches the target, and makes notes on the
target's activities. Sometimes it will be necessary Ior surveillants to break traIIic
regulations to avoid losing you. II you see a vehicle run a red light, make an illegal
U?turn, travel over the speed limit, or make dangerous or sudden lane changes in an
apparent eIIort to keep up with you, you should, oI course, be suspicious oI that vehicle.
The distance between a surveillance vehicle and the target will vary depending on the
speed at which the vehicles are traveling and the amount oI traIIic. Surveillants will try to
keep one or two vehicles between themselves and the target. As with Ioot surveillance,
vehicle surveillance may be undertaken using only one vehicle or using two or more
vehicles. One-vehicle surveillance suIIers Irom the same drawbacks as one-person Ioot
surveillance. The target has to be kept in view at all times and Iollowed by the same
vehicle. Surveillants can try to overcome this advantage somewhat by changing seating
arrangements within the vehicle; putting on and taking oII hats, coats, and sunglasses;
changing license plates; and turning oII onto side streets and then turning back to resume
the tail. This makes it necessary Ior a person suspecting surveillance to remember aspects
oI a Iollowing vehicle that cannot easily be changed such as the make, model, and color
oI the car and any body damage such as rust, dents, etc. The use oI two or more vehicles
permits surveillance to switch positions or to drop out oI the surveillance when necessary.
One vehicle Iollows the target vehicle and directs other vehicles by radio. The other
vehicle may Iollow behind the lead surveillance vehicle, precede the target vehicle, or
travel on parallel roads. At intersections, the vehicle Iollowing directly behind the target
vehicle will generally travel straight ahead while alerting all other vehicles oI the
direction in which the target vehicle has turned. Another vehicle in the Iormation will
45
then take a position behind the target and become the lead vehicle, taking over the
responsibility Ior giving instructions to other surveillants. The
Iormer lead vehicle then makes a U?turn or travels around the block to take up a new
position ready to resume the lead vehicle position again when necessary. People who
have well established routines permit surveillants to use methods that are much more
diIIicult to detect. II, Ior example, you leave the oIIice at the same time each day and
travel by the most direct route to your home or iI you live in a remote area with a Iew or
no alternate routes to your home, surveillants have no need to Iollow you all the way to
your residence. An alternative method oI surveillance in such situations is leading
surveillance and progressive surveillance. In leading surveillance the surveillant travels in
Iront oI the target while the observer watches Ior turns. When the target turns, this is
noted. The next day the surveillant makes a turn where the target did the previous day.
Over a period oI time the surveillants will discover the entire route to the residence while
still driving in a position that creates much less suspicion. There are two Iorms oI
progressive surveillance. In the Iirst Iorm, surveillants are placed at intersections along
the probable routes oI the target. When the target makes a turn, this is noted and the
position oI the surveillants is adjusted to check the next intersection. Eventually, this
method leads the surveillants to the residence. In the second Iorm or progressive
surveillance, a vehicle will Iollow the target Ior a short distance and then turn oII. On
successive days the surveillant picks up the target where he or she leIt oII the previous
day. Leading and progressive surveillance are extremely diIIicult to detect, but you
should not give anyone the opportunity to use these methods. The most eIIective methods
Ior detecting most Iorms oI vehicle surveillance are: 1. making a U-turn where it is saIe
to do so, 2. making a turn to the right or leIt (in general, right turns create greater
complications Ior surveillants because oI oncoming traIIic that may delay a turn), 3.
going through a traIIic light just as it is turning red, stopping just beyond a curve or hill,
and circling a block. In each case, watch Ior the reactions oI any vehicles that you may
suspect. Any vehicles that make unusual maneuvers should be careIully noted. Do not
Iorget to check Ior motorcycles or motorbikes, since in many parts oI the world they
seem to be Iavored by surveillants because they move easily through heavy traIIic.
Stationary surveillance is commonly used by terrorist organizations. As mentioned
earlier, most attacks take place near the residence or oIIice because that part oI the route
is least easily varied. Most people are more vulnerable in the morning when departing Ior
work, because morning departure times are more predictable than are evening arrivals.
Surveillants seek a position that permits them to observe the residence or oIIice clearly
without being observed or suspected. Surveillants want to identiIy observation points that
aIIord the best view oI the target. Foot and vehicular traIIic, buildings and terrain around
each government Iacility vary with each location. Pedestrian traIIic, rush hour traIIic
Ilow, temporary street closure, etc. will aIIect observation points. II the surveillants
decide that it is best not to be seen, they may obtain an apartment or rent oIIice space in
the area that provides Ior an adequate view, but such apartments or oIIice space may not
be available and the renting oI an apartment or oIIice space could provide clues Ior a
subsequent investigation. The use oI an apartment or oIIice space Ior surveillance, while
possibly the most diIIicult to detect, is generally not the easiest or saIest method. Many
surveillance teams use vans with windows in the side or back that permit observation
Irom the interior oI the van. OIten the van will have the name oI a store or utility
46
company to provide some pretext Ior its being in the area. The driver may park the van
and walk away, leaving the surveillance team inside. Some teams use automobiles Ior
stationary surveillance, parking the vehicle Iar enough Irom the residence or oIIice to be
less noticeable, using other vehicles Ior cover, Iacing the vehicle away Irom the target,
and using the rear view mirrors to watch. Where it is not possible to watch the residence
or oIIice unobserved, surveillants must come up with a plausible reason Ior being in the
area. The types oI ruses used are limited only by the surveillant's imagination. Some oI
the more commonly used covers are automotive repairs due to engine trouble or a Ilat
tire, door to door sales, utility repair crews, lovers in a park, walking a dog, construction
work, or sitting at a caIe. Women and children are oIten used to give a greater appearance
oI innocence. Some things to check Ior are parked vehicles with people in them, cars with
more mirrors or mirrors that are larger than normal, people seen in the area more
Irequently than seems normal, people who are dressed inappropriately, and workers who
seem to accomplish nothing. II you become suspicious oI a van, note any inIormation
printed on the side oI the van, including telephone numbers. Check the telephone book to
see iI such a business exists. Note the license numbers oI any suspicious vehicles and
provide them to your security oIIice so they can be checked. Make a habit oI checking
the neighborhood through a window beIore you go out each day. Detecting surveillance
requires a constant state oI alertness and must become an unconscious habit. We do not
want to encourage paranoia, but a good sense oI what is normal and what is unusual in
your surroundings could be more important than any other type oI security precaution
you take. Above all, do not hesitate to report any unusual events to the police. Many
people who have been kidnapped realized aIterwards that their suspicions had been well
Iounded. II those suspicions had been reported, their ordeal might have been avoided.
Since surveillance attempts to determine the suitability oI a potential target and the most
opportune time Ior an attack, it is crucial to avoid predictability. Although the
recommendation to vary routes and times oI arrivals and departures has become trite,
implementing it in one's daily schedule has proven to be eIIective in deterring suIIicient
terrorist planning. Varying times and routes apply to jogging, shopping and all activities
where a pattern can develop.