Civil Law Property Rights Guide

Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware
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jarius.treadway@yahoo.com brittaniaware@gmail.com
PROPERTY
Domain of Civil Law Property a. Property i. An exclusive right to control an economic good, corporeal or incorporeal 1. Corporealmaterial objects that could be felt or touched; things 2. Incorporealabstract conceptions, objects having no physical existence but having a pecuniary value; rights b. Objects of property rights i. Legislation, doctrine, or jurisprudence determines which things may become objects of property rights c. Property, ownership, patrimony and real rights i. La def. of property 1. Rights forming part of a person patrimony and narrowly to denote rights conferring on a person a direct and immediate authority for the use and enjoyment of a thing that is susceptible of appropriation. d. Civil law property i. Principle real rights a person may have 1. Common, Public, and Private Things a. Common air and high seas that are insusceptible of any ownership. (Neither public/private persons may own these things) i. Art 449 ii. Air 1. [art 490] Mixture of chemical compounds, Atmospheric air in its entirety 2. Airspace is a private thing up until a certain altitude. iii. High seas 1. Column of water beyond the territorial sea iv. Class Notes 1. Available for all people at any time in any way in which they want to use it. Although, things like air and water can be charged as it relates to their usage. b. Publicstate highways and roads; susceptible only of public ownership; insusceptible of private ownership i. Public things 1. Things the state or political subdivisions own in their capacity as public persons a. i.e. the mayors office; public entity owning a private thing 2. Susceptible of ownership, though not of private ownership. 3. For the benefit of all persons, citizens and non citizen a. Public can use it as it relates to the intent that the property was intended for. ii. Public domain and private domain capacity in which a public body owns a particular thing 1. Depends on characteristics of particular things and pertinent provisions of law
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c. Privateonly things susceptible of private ownership i. Not necessarily owned at all times; ie. Lost ii. Alienable, prescriptible, and subject to seizure iii. Things of private persons 1. 2 classes a. Partnerships/corporations b. Belonging to the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as private persons 2. Private persons may freely dispose of private things under modifications est. by law 3. Private things belonging to the state may only be disposed of in accordance w/ applicable laws and regulations iv. Things of the state and its political subdivisions 1. Alienable 2. Private things of political subdivisions are prescriptible but exempt from seizure 3. Private things of the state are both imprescriptible and exempt from seizure 4. Category of private things of the state and its political subdivisions a. Though serving a public purpose, are not subject to, or needed for, public use. i. i.e. $ in st. treasury revenues from leases of public proper 5. protection of private ownership a. Constitution restricts the ability of the state to interfere with the rights of property owners through the states private or public law i. Amendment 4 (V) 1. Private property shall not be taken for public use w/o just compensation ii. LA Constitution Article 1 (4) 1. Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property 2. Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state except for public purpose. The purpose shall be a judicial question 3. Personal effects, except for contraband, shall not be taken Landry v. Council of East Baton Rouge Parish -Council wanted to take the airport, close it and convert it to something else. The citizens of Baton Rouge disagreed with this because their tax dollars were going into the operation of the airport. The court initially decided that the council did not have the authority to discontinue the use of the property.
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- Once something is designated as public, it shall remain as such. The only way it can be converted is if you pass some sort of legislative act. The only way you can change public property, is to convert it into another piece of public property. Ex: converting a library into a museum. 2. Navigable Water Bodies and Related Lands a. Running Waters i. Public thing; owned by the state in its capacity as a public person ii. Used in accordance with applicable laws and regulations b. State Ownership of Water Bodies i. Coyle v. Smith 1. Equal footing doctrine a. Every new state that enters the union is granted the same dignity and powers held by the original states that adopted the constitution. ii. Pollard v. Hagan 1. Shores of navigable waters and the soils under them were not granted by the Constitution, but were reserved to the states 2. New states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over navigable waters as the original states c. Navigability i. a body of water is navigable if it is susceptible of being used, in its
ordinary condition, as a highway of commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
ii. State v. Two oclock Bayou and land company 1. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that a stream was navigable and subject to public use to maintain a cable across the Two OClock Bayou. 2. Issue: a. Whether the bayou is navigable, entitling the parish and the state to enjoin its obstruction by privately owned barriers i. The bayou is navigable Notes to Consider Question of navigability: Whether the evidence shows a body of water to be suitable by its depth, width, and location for commerce. Class Notes The state argued that the body of water was navigable. Once navigable in law, navigable in fact Public v. private d. The Territorial Sea and the Sea Shore i. Ownership of waters within boundaries (La. R.S. 49.3)
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1. LA owns the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and of the arms of the gulf w/in the boundaries of LA ii. Milne v. Girodeau 1. Arms of the sea and shores are public things and not susceptible to private ownership iii. Buras v. Salinovich 1. Land that is subject to tidal overflow does not characterize the land as seashore 2. the sea and shores and seashore = the gulf coast, lakes, bays and sounds along the coast e. Navigable Rivers i. Ownership of the bed and the banks of rivers Wemple v. Eastham Facts: The Governor leased to Eastham state owned land. Plaintiff owned land bordering on one side of the land leased and brought suit to cancel the lease and enjoin defendants from drilling wells on the land. Wemple argues that the two bayous have never been navigable streams. NOTES TO CONSIDER The land which the state holds in her sovereign capacitypublic property The only land that is covered by the water at is ordinary low state. Land lying between the edge of the water as its ordinary low stage and the line which the edge of the water reaches at its ordinary high stage [bank] i. Bank of the stream 1. Highest stage that it usually reaches at any season of the year 2. Belongs to the owner of the adjacent land, subject to the right of the public to use the bank, to land and unload boats, to dry nets. 3. La. C.C. art. 456 ii. Proof for navigability in this casewhen LA was purchased the water was navigability iii. The owner of private property is also the owner of the bank. Was the drilling subject to public use under the law? No, drilling was State v. Barras
Issue: Whether a certain portion of land located w/n a basin is part of the bank of the river and whether flood waters over privately owned lands may become subject to public use? FACTS: Barras were crawfishing in the basin when they were each forbidden to remain. They gained access to the property owned by Williams, Inc by boat for commercial fishing. Because of being convicted of entry on remaining in a place or on land after being forbidden Barras contend the land constitutes the bank of the river and therefore they had the legal right to fish from water covering areas in the basin
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Barras also believe the yearly spring rise of the river constitutes it as running waters under La. c.c. art. 450 and therefore public things subject to public use. Rule: If there is a levee in proximity to the water established according to the law, the levee shall form the bank
Flood waters are not public things subject to public use NOTES TO CONSIDER Servitude - private property, but it is subject to public useex: the sidewalk in front of a piece of private land. Owner of property is accountable for maintaining the property, even though it is subject to public use. Private land owner will always be held accountable for the condition of their property. ii. Alluvion and dereliction: Civil Code Arts. 499-501 Jones v. Hogue FACTS: Alluvion has formed by accretion in front of two owners tracts of land. Formation of this alluvion began in front of the Hogue tract and continued in front of the Barker tract also. All of the alluvion must be apportioned pursuant to the provisions of Article 501 Each owner should receive a fair proportion of the area of the alluvion and each should receive a fair proportion of the new frontage on the water RULE: The basis of the apportionment is the extent of the front line of the proprietors iii. Avulsion; opening of new channel; Civil Code Arts 502-505 Butler v. State
Rule : La. C.C. art. 503 If a river or stream, whether navigable or not, by opening itself a new branch cuts off and surrounds the field of any individual owner of the shore, and makes it an island, the owner shall keep the property of his field. La. c.c. art. 505: Islands and sand bars, which are formed in the beds of navigable rivers or streams, and which are not attached to the bank, belong to the state, if there be no adverse title or prescription.
State v. Bourdon
Rule: La. c.c. art. 500 There is no right to alluvion or dereliction on the shore of lakes. La. c.c art. 504: The bed of a lake is susceptible of private ownership La. c.c. art 506: No riparian rights to the bed of non navigable lakes Action to determine ownership of the bed of an oxbow lake created by Red River The river abandoned its former bed and created a new bed which meandered eastward State contends that the oxbow lake was the bed of Red River and was navigable in law Bed of an oxbow lake, navigable in 1812, remains a public thing after 1812. The bed of the river that formed a navigable oxbow lake before 1812 is a public thing When a navigable river or stream abandons its bed and opens a new one, the owners of the land on which the new bed is located shall take by way of indemnification the abandoned bed, each in proportion to the quantity of land that he lost. If the river returns to the old bed, each shall take his former land did
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Pizanie v. Gauthereaux Facts: An injunction to restrain defendant from trespassing upon the property of Pizanie for the purpose of gaining access to
a wharf, erected by him upon the bank of Bayou Segnette, and there selling and distributing gasoline and other oils to the boats engaged in supplying sea food to the canning factory, owned by Pizanie.
Rule: La. c.c. art. 456banks of navigable rivers or streams 1) The banks of navigable rivers or streams are private things that are subject to public use 2. The bank of a navigable river or stream is land lying between the ordinary low and the ordinary high stage of the water. Nevertheless, when there is a levee in proximity to the water, established according to law, the levee shall form the bank.
Lake Providence Port Commission v. Bunge Corporation Facts: Bunge Corporation desired to use a portion of the improved land owned by the port commission and submitted a bid for a site in order to construct a grain facility for loading and unloading of grain. As long as you dont use it for something other than it was designed for, you cant be prevented from enjoining v. Nature of the public use of river banks 1. Public use is regarded in LA as a charge in the interest of the public akin to a servitude. 2. Confers on administrative authorities and courts broad powers for the regulation and protection of the rights of the public 3. Servitude of public use a. Right to all the profit, utility, and advantages that the property may produce and the public authorities being the administrator. vi. Prerequisites of public use 1. Banks or shores of non navigable inland waters are private things that are not subject to public use. 2. It is important to determine whether a. The body of water is a river b. Whether it is navigable 3. Banks of a river that is no longer navigable are freed of the servitude of public use due to the fact that non navigable river is no longer an avenue of commerce and the servitude for the public use of its banks 4. Non navigable rivers may become navigable as a result of natural forces or as a result of artificial works, such as drainage, irrigation, or dredging. 5. Canalpublic waterway a. If the banks of a canal are within the right of way acquired by the public authorities, they are ordinarily subject to public use b. If the banks of the canal belong to private persons, public use should be excluded vii. Areas subject to public use: banks 1. River consists of three things
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a. The waterpublic b. The bedpublic c. The banksprivate things subject to public use viii. Rights of the General Public 1. Servitude of public use burdening the banks of navigable rivers is not for the use of the public at large for all purposes 2. Members of the public do not have right to hunt on the banks of navigable rivers nor the right to trap fur bearing animals w/o permission from the owner a. Does this mean they can trap fish or other animals that do not have fur? 3. Where there is a leveehunting or trapping may be excluded by the rules and regulations of the levee board, which has the authority to post levees against uses 4. Public has right to fish from the banks of a navigable river, but no right to fish in ponds or pit bars between the levee and the water 5. Public does not have right to cross privately owned lands in order to go to the banks of navigable rivers. 6. Although the public has a right of free passage over the banks of navigable rivers, this does not mean that a member of the public may construct a roadway on the banks or use a private road that may be located there. ix. Powers of Public Authorities 1. Political subdivisions may lease the riverfront for limited periods of time and for public purposes as the establishment of a ferry. 2. Municipality may not give to private person a right to erect permanent structures upon the batture which will obstruct or embarrass the free use of a public servitude, and to maintain the same 3. Discretion of public political subdivision to regulate commerce and traffic on the banks of navigable rivers is not to be disturbed by the courts, unless the discretion is abused. a. And when the administrative action violates the equity of all persons under the law w/ respect to use of banks of navigable rivers, both state and federal courts may intervene for the protection of individual rights. x. Prerogatives of Bank Ownership 1. The ownership of banks of navigable rivers are private things burdened w/ a servitude of public use down to the ownership of the ground, down to the ordinary low water mark, remains vested in the proprietors. 2. Private ownership of banks may be impaired by public use, but on principle the owner retains all prerogatives of ownership that are not incompatible w/ public use. 3. The owner cannot himself enjoy the bank in a way which would prevent its common enjoyment by all, nor is he entitled to be preferred over
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others in the use of banks as a landing place, but he may use the bank, provided he does not prevent the use of it by others. 4. One of the most important rights is to build on the bank structures for the accommodation of the public or for his private use and enjoyment Wood Marine Service, Inc. v. City of Harahan
Batture alluvial land between the rivers low water edge and the inside toe of the levee Rights of riparian owners are subject to the publics right to utilize the river and the batture for navigation and commerce Although the batture is private land, it is subject to numerous public uses incident to navigation such as the right to moor temporarily, to unload cargo, and to pass freely over the batture from the river
f. Sapp v. Frazier
Lakes
Bed of the lake has never been looked upon as private property Plaintiff believed that by acquiring the land fronting on the lake, he would take as riparian proprietor, to the center of the lake bed, or to the low-water channel; fighting over grass that grows in bed Temporary subsidence of the waters, occasioned by the seasons, does not constitute dereliction in the sense of an addition to the contiguous lands, susceptible of private ownership
Miami Corporation v. State

Action of boundary by a riparian owner seeking to be decreed the owner of an eroded area which forms part of the bed of a lake Property forms part of the bottom of a navigable lake Where forces of nature (subsidence and erosion) have operated on the banks of a navigable body of water, regardless of whether it be a body of fresh water or of the sea, or an arm of the sea, the submerged area becomes a portion of the bed and is insusceptible of private ownership Submerged portion becomes a part of the bed or bottom of the navigable body of water and therefore the property of the State In all cases where a change occurs in ownership of land or water bottoms as a result of a change in course, alluvion, dereliction, erosion, etc, the new owner of such lands shall take any oil gas and or mineral leases
g. La. R.S. 9:1151 i. Change in ownership of land or water bottoms as result of action of navigable stream, bay or lake; mineral leases State v. Placid Oil Company *Ownership of a tract of land located below the high-water mark of a lake *Sedimentary deposits caused a buildup, transforming the area into alluvion lying below the ordinary high-water mark *Alluvion formed on the shores of rivers and streams belongs to the adjacent landowners. As to lakes, the adjacent landowners have no rights *If the lake was a lake when Louisiana was admitted to the Union, the banks are state-owned and
accretion is inapplicable. If it was a stream, the banks belong to the riparian owners and the land belongs to the adjacent land owners.
*Multiple factor test for classifying a water body as a lake or a stream
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Size, especially its width as compared to the streams that enter it Depth
Banks Channel Current, especially compared to that of streams that enter it Historical designation in official documents
In this case, the lake has been designated as a lake, was subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, much wider than the river entering into it, currents are reduced substantially Wide, irregularly shaped body of water of great size, relatively shallow in depth, with a current substantially slower than the inflowing river classified as a lake
State v. Aucoin If a state-owned lake, whether navigable or not, goes dry, the land from which the water recedes does not become the property of the riparian owner but remains the property of the State. h. Canals Vermilion Corporation v. Vaughn
Right of the public to use man-made navigable canals on private property constructed and maintained with private funds Canal on private property constructed and maintained with private funds and used for private purposes is a private canal subject to private control If the public has no right of use on a natural waterway made navigable by private funds under federal law, then a fortiori it has no right of use on an artificial navigable waterway constructed with private funds
Patents Conveying Navigable Water Bottoms i. Principle of Inalienability 1. There is recognition private ownership over certain navigable water bottoms and parts of the sea and its shores 2. Swamp lands subject to overflow that is unfit for cultivation are susceptible of private ownership ad could be conveyed to private persons. 3. State issued patents purporting to convey to private persons and to public bodies, such as levee boards, large area that occasionally include navigable water bottoms or lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. ii. The Repose Statute: Act 62 of 1912 1. Purpose was to promote security of title declaring that all suits or proceedings of the st. of La, priv. corp, partnerships or persons to vacate and annual any patent issued by the st. of LA, signed by the governor and the registrar and of record in the st. of land office on any transfer of property shall be brought w/n 6 yrs from the passage of the act. 3. Movables and Immovables; Corporeals and Incorporeals a. Bank 936 So.2d 841 i. Private entity cannot own public property b. Immovables i. Anything that is an immovable must be in writing if the person is selling it
i.
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1. This document is necessary to establish that there was an agreement, it is effective between the parties, if there is a 3rd person who is interested in the land the document is to show the history to this 3rd party (P. Whites example) CA B ii. Tracts of Land and Their Component Parts 1. Tracts of Lands a. Portions of the surface of the earth individualized by boundaries, are immovable par excellence 2. Component parts of tracts of land a. Tracts of lands should not be considered empty space b/c they contain organic, inorganic substances such as soil, minerals, vegetation, and buildings or other constructions permanently attached to the ground i. Buildings and standing timbre are separate immovable when they belong to a person other than the owner of the ground ii. Constructions & crops are movables w hen they belong to a person other than the landowner b. Landry v. Leblanc
Action: Landry brought suit for damages sustained when Leblanc, who was leasing the land from Landry, removed topsoil from the land. The trial court held in favor of Leblanc and Landry appealed. Facts: Landry and Leblanc had a verbal lease where Leblanc was to lease Landry's farm for 8 1/years. After the third year, Leblanc made arrangements to have some soil removed from part of the property without Landrys permission. The removal of the soil allegedly improved drainage. Leblanc alleged that he had received permission to do this from Landry's brother, who was also Landry's agent. This was disputed. P0pg Issue: Whether Leblanc's removal of the soil was authorized. Held: No. The judgment of the lower court was reversed.
Rule: Lands may be defined as portions of the surface of the earth. The ownership of land carries, by accession, the ownership of all that is directly above and under it. The provisions of this code are applicable to rights to explore for or mine or remove from the land the soil itself. Indeed any dealing with realty, onerous or gratuitous, must be in writing unless the adverse party admits under oath that he made a contract affecting realty. Reason: The court noted that any agreement for immovable property must be in writing. In this case the parties had an oral lease, but not an ownership transfer of the topsoil. As there was no written contract to remove the soil, the court held in favor of Landry.
c. Buildings
P.H.A.C. Services v. Seaways International, Inc. 403 So.2d 1199 (La. 1981). Action: PHAC, who were two unpaid subcontractors, sued Seaway Int, who was the general contractor, seeking to be paid for supplying material and labor for the construction of a living quarters unit. The trial court held that the living quarters unit was not a building because it was not being used as a building, but was set on wooden blocks while under construction. The court of appeals reversed, noting that there was no code requirement that the building have its foundation on the soil. Seway Int. appealed. Facts: Pennzoil contracted with Seaways for construction of a three story offshore drilling platform living quarters unit. Seaways subcontracted out some of the work to the PHAC. Both plaintiffs performed their work and it is not disputed by any party that they have not been paid. Both subcontractors/ PHAC filed suit to collect the amounts owed. Issue: Whether the building quarters built by PHAC are considered immovable property. If so, what, if any, privileges are available to these plaintiffs? Affirmed. The building quarters are immovable, thus they have a privilege under the Private Works Act.
Held:
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Rule: The Private Works Act confers a privilege to certain persons who supply labor or materials for the erection, construction, repair or improvement of immovable property. Constructions other than buildings are now classified as movables unless they are component parts of a tract of land. To be a component of a tract of land, a construction must meet two requirements: it must be permanently attached to the ground, and it must belong to the owner of the ground. Buildings which belong to the owner of the ground are considered component parts of a tract of land, and when there is no unity of ownership, the building is considered a separate immovable. Reason: The court noted the trial courts incorrect statement that the structure was not a building because it was not being used as a building, as it was set on blocks under construction. The appellate court correctly identified that the law does not require the building have its foundation in the soil. Additionally, the court held that the Private Works Act was intended to protect claims of workmen who build these structures, which are not placed into use until completion. Even though it can be moved by a large crane, it does not believe that it should not be classified as an immovable. Finally, the court held that this structure is a building based upon the cost and its design to house workers. As such, the building is considered immovable property and the Private Works Act applies.
Class Notes The issue here was that in fact the building was actually movable. In this case immovability is not based on definition because it is not attached to the ground, so the court looks to: 1)size [3 story] 2) intended use [to put it on the rig indefinitely 3) permanency; where will it be located? Will it be there permanently? d. Other Constructions
Bayou Fleet Partnership v. Dravo Basic Materials Company, Inc. Action: Dravo filed a declaratory judgment (dec action) in state court seeking to be declared the owner of limestone removed from the batture property. Bayou Fleet then filed suit against Dravo and removed Dravo's action to federal court. The cases were then consolidated. The trial court held that Dravo was entitled to remove the majority of the limestone, except for the working bases that had become a component part of the property. The court held Dravo liable in damages for trespass. Both parties appealed. Facts: Dravo, by way of an oral lease with Neal Clulee, operated an aggregate yard on a river batture. This yard was used to store and sell limestone that was transported to the yard from the northern U.S. Dravo made three piles of limestone on foundations of hardened limestone called working bases. These were formed by putting a liner on the batture and placing loose limestone on it until the weight compressed the batture and the limestone became compacted. The bases could then be used to store tons of limestone. In August of 1992, the property was seized by the Sheriff and sold at auction to Bayou Fleet. Bayou Fleet intended to continue the lease with Dravo but they could not agree on terms. Dravo then planned to vacate the property. In early 1993, Dravo removed the limestone, including the bases. Three days later, Bayou Fleet learned of the removal and contested Dravo's authority to do so. Issue: 1). Whether Dravo had the right to remove the limestone working bases and the loose stockpiles of limestone from Bayou Fleet's property. 2). Whether the limestone was movable or immovable under Louisiana law. Held: Reversed.
Rule: 1). An immovable is defined as a tract of land with its component parts. Component parts of a tract of land include, among other things, other constructions that are permanently attached to the ground. 2). In determining whether an object is an other construction within the meaning of Article 463, Louisiana courts generally rely on three criteria: the size of the structure, the degree of is integration or attachment to the soil, and its permanency. If there is a failure of any of these criteria, an object will not be deemed to be an immovable. Other constructions are presumed to belong to the owner of the ground unless separate ownership is evidenced properly by a recorded document. Absent such a public recordation, an other construction is considered to be a component part of the land and is transferred with it. Reason: The court found that the limestone bases were massive, capable of supporting tons of limestone, trucks and other equipment. They were also firmly attached to the property as they formed the surface level of the property. To be removed, they had to be dug out of the ground by use of an excavator. Additionally, the bases were permanent as they had been on the property since 1989 (4 years). Only the limestone on the bases was moved during the operation of the site, and not the bases themselves. As such, the court held that the bases were other constructions, thus immovable. Once the bases were found to be immovable, the court had to determine whether Dravo owned them when the land was sold. As Dravo did not record its
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lease with Clulee, the bases would be considered to be owned by Bayou Fleet once they purchased the land. Based on the above, Dravo had no right to remove the bases and is liable for their replacement cost. Class Notes: He would have to return the base or the $$
i. Accessionconcept that in the absence of other law, the ownership of a tract of land carries with it the ownership of everything that is directly above or underneath it 3. Component Parts of Buildings and Other constructions (art 466) a. Millenial Fever: Recent Changes in the Law of Component Parts of Immovables i. Immovable by nature vs. immovable by destination 1. Naturefor the use or convenience of the building a. Ex. Standing timber 2. Destination attached permanently by the owner a. Barn, house, shed (buildings) b. 2nd group based on the owners intent c. Movables are converted into immovables by destination when placed by the owner of a tract of land upon it for its service and improvement 3. Attachment 4. Equibank v. U.S. shows the distinction between electrics that cannot be merely unplugged (lamps plugged into a socket) vs. chandeliers which are wired into the building and can only be removed by an experienced electrician to prevent harm. 5. Immovable test for items in home [societal expectation] a. Does the avg, ordinary prudent person buying a home expect the light futures to be there when he or she arrives to take possession? b. Does that person expect for the house to operate fully with/without the fixture Equibank v. United Statescomponent parts is an important discussion!!!
FACTS: The Johnsons defaulted on their mortgage with Equibank and failed to pay their income tax. The IRS (because they had a lien) removed some chandeliers from the home subject to an Equibank mortgage. Equibank appeals the denial of a petition for injunction against the IRS. ISSUE: whether the chandeliers were component parts of the Johnson residence or separate movables, because they were actually in the ceiling and had to be physically taken out by an electrician. Who should get them?
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RULE: Component parts are parts of a building or other construction if they fit into the category of things Art. 466 1) such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical, or other installations are component parts of a building or other construction as a matter of law.2) they are actually permanently attached or cannot be removed without damaging the property. ANALYSIS: Objective test: what would an ordinary prudent buyer or mortgage expect to be a component part of a home (hot water heater) (societal expectation) The court found that electrical installations are component parts because people expect the lights to be on when they buy a home. They are component parts despite the fact that they can be removed without damage to the chandeliers or the residence
American Bank & Trust Company v. Shel Boze

Facts: American Bank & Trust Company, (Ambank) is the holder of a number of promissory notes executed by A & M Builders, Inc. and secured by collateral mortgages affecting two residential lots in a subdivision. Financing was provided to A & M by Ambank for the construction of a single-family dwelling on each of the lots. In the course of the construction of these residences, A & M contracted with Shel-Boze and Jenkins Tile for the purchase of and installation of light fixtures and related electrical paraphernalia, and carpeting. All of these items were installed in the residences constructed by A & M. After the residences were substantially completed, A & M surrendered physical possession of the two residences in question to AmBank for lack of funds. After Ambank had advanced funds to the owner to pay for the materials purchased from the defendants, representatives of Shel-Boze and Jenkins Tile went to the two residences and removed all of the items which had been sold and or installed by them with the permission of A & M. Neither Shel-Boze not Jenkins Tile had received payment for the materials they supplied. The bank later paid other companies to replace what was taken out. Ambank filed suit against the corporate defendants, Shel-Boze and Jenkins Tile, and the individual defendants. Trial courts found for the defendants, and Ambank appeals. Issue: Whether the defendants are liable for the value of the various items removed by them from the two residences, together with the costs of reinstallation of said items. Holding: We come to the conclusion that the light fixtures, other electrical paraphernalia and carpeting had become component parts of the two residences in question prior to their removal by Shel-Boze and Jenkins Tile. Reasoning: The ordinary view of society being a relevant consideration, we conclude our consideration by asking the question: Does the average, ordinary, prudent person buying a home expect the light fixtures to be there when he or she arrives to take possession? Undoubtedly, a reasonable person buying a residence expects finished flooring to be there when he or she takes possession. The societal expectation is to have finished flooring, such as carpeting. We further find that the trial judge erred in his conclusion that the mortgages in favor of Ambank did not perfect, from the date of recordation of the mortgages, a security interest in the component parts of the two residences. GPL: According to article 469, an encumbrance of an immovable, such as a mortgage on a building, includes the encumbrance of its component parts. The mortgages provided for a security interest in the two lots, together with all the buildings and improvements therein. We conclude that the mortgages also encumbered the component parts of the two residences . R.S. 9:2721 provides that since the Mortgage included that type of carpet cannot be replaced even with a comparable carpet.
6. Objectimmovable by attachment 4. Classification: Component Part or Separate Immovable a. The issue with timber and maximum protection for interests in the timber and the fact that standing timber may exceed the value of land stripped timber/ i. Timber 1. is a component part of tract land WHEN it belongs to another person 2. AND a separate immovable when it belongs to another person. 3. Fallen timber is movable property whether it belongs to the owner of the ground or to another person
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4. Segregated timber (pg 95) 5. Classification: Component Parts or Movables by Anticipation a. Growing crops are component parts of lands when they belong to the owner of the ground and movables by anticipation when they belong to another person i. Fallen timber ii. Because it can be anticipated that the owner of the ground may decide to move the crops iii. Separate ownership of derives from contract relationships, lease of land, sale of standing crops. iv. Owner of the crops may always assert his rights against the owner of the land b. Transfer, Mortgage or Seizure Land i. Gathered cropsmovables rather than a part of the ground and ii. Question of the status of crops as component parts of the ground arise typically in cases involving transfer, mortgage, or seizure of lands 1. In cases involving transfer of lands, by purchase at a private or public sale LA holds that standing crops and ungathered fruits are part of the ground and follow it unless they belong to third persons as movables by anticipation. a. A part of the standard rule that no one can transfer a greater right than he has himself 2. In cases of sale or any disposition of immovable party 3. In cases of a seizure of lands by general or mortgage creditors of the landowner, standing crops and ungathered fruits of trees are included in the seizure as part of the immovable c. Transfer, Pledge, and Seizure of Growing Crops i. owner of growing crops may sell, pledge, or dispose of his interest d. Lesees Crops i. Predial lessee(?) owns growing crops as movables by anticipation ii. The lease must be recorded to be allowed to assert ownership of the crops against the creditor and/or landowner AND/OR purchaser of the land. e. Crops of other persons i. Good faith possessors, purchases of standing crops, persons having contractual or real rights may also own crops on the land of another
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ii. When there is separate ownership that derived from a juridical act made by the owner, the act must be recorded in order to affect the 3rd person 1. BUT if separate ownership arises from acts of possession, recordation is not required Porche v. Bodin
Notes to Consider *Recordation is important *As long as we can establish it is owned by someone else it is movable and cannot be seized even if it is in the land owners possession. f. Immovables by their object i. Ownership involves 3 aspects 1. Manage a. Trustee has authority to manage it 2. Title a. Beneficiary 3. use ii. Not all persons are capable or willing to manage their property so the law permits management to be detached from ownership by 1. Use of corporate device a. Transfer of property to a juridical person such as i. Corporation, partnership, or foundation iii. Separation of management from the enjoyment of property w/o interposition of an artificial person (?) is only allowed when person is incompetent to manage his own affairs on account of absence, minority, or unsound mind 1. Competent persons are forced to manage their own property or at least find someone to manage their property a. A manager owns the property with a duty to manage it for the benefit of another OR manager has power of administration w/o owning the property iv. Trustees have real rights that permit him to manage and dispose of the trust property. v. Beneficiary has a real right but is ownership w/o pwr of administration and disposition BUT subject to a trust
Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware St. Charles Land Trust v. St. Amant
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Facts: The St. Charles Land Co., owning mineral leases and servitudes on lands involved, amended its Articles of Incorporation adopted by its shareholders provided that in the event of liquidation the directors could transfer the corporate property to a trust for the benefit of the shareholders. Acting under this authority, the liquidator transferred the mineral leases and servitudes to the trustees of the St. Charles Land Trust for the benefit of the former shareholders. The transfer was made an authentic act, and the instrument designated the shareholders as beneficiaries for both principal and income in the same proportion as their former stock ownership. The sole purpose of the trust is to conserve the trust estate and distribute the income to the beneficiaries after the payment of expenses. The trustees are prohibited from engaging in the development of mineral property or other business activities. The instrument further provides that the interests of the beneficiaries are classified as movable property, notwithstanding that the trust estate consists in whole or in part of immovable property; provided that the trustees shall have the right, but shall not be bound, to require, as a condition precedent to recognition of the validity or effectiveness of any transfer of the interest of a beneficiary, compliance in respect thereof with the formalities attendant on like transfers of immovable property. Mrs. Watkins, a beneficiary, died in Ca. where she was domiciled. She left no forced heirs. In due course, a Ca. court granted an order as to the La. trust interest. Procedural: the district court instructed the trustees that the decedents beneficial interest was incorporeal, immovable pro perty exempt from Louisiana inheritance taxes and transferable upon the order of the Cali. Court. The court of appeal reversed and said it was incorporeal, movable property and exempt from paying inheritance taxes in La. Issue: Whether the beneficiarys incorporeal right is movable or immovable. Rule:
Holding: We hold that the principal beneficiarys interest in the trust is an incorporeal immovable for Louisiana inheritance tax purposes. Appeal court reversed, trial affirmed. Reasoning: Under La. law, the mineral leases and servitudes held by the trustees and immovable property. Since that trust is upon such property, that object to which the beneficial interest applies is immovable property. Article 474 declares movable shares or interests in banks or companies of commerce, or industry or other speculations, although such companies be possessed of immovables. We are of the opinion the beneficial interest in the trust does not fall within the exception of Article 474. Rights are contingent upon the lease and the lease is based on the minerals that were extracted from the property. Dissent: its the trust and not the mineral leases owned by the trust. GPL: C.C. 470: Incorporeal things, consisting only in a right, are not of themselves strictly susceptible of the quality of movables or immovables; nevertheless they are placed in one or the other of these classes, according to the object to which they apply and the rules hereinafter established. The inheritance of a nonresidents immovable property, tangible or intangible, situated in this state is taxable. The inheri tance of intangible movable property owner by a nonresident is immune from the tax. A trust is a relationship resulting from the transfer of title to property to a person to be administered by him as a fiduciary (one who owes another good faith) for the benefit of another.
Notes to Consider The land was located in LA, although the beneficiary lived in CA. There were 3 issues: 1. Is this a trust? Partnership? Or agency relationship? a. Yes, there was a trust relationship. It was not a partnership because it involves two people to come together and be a part of the decision making process. In agency relationship you have a person who manages the property but they do not have rights or authority over the property. 2. If the property was movable or immovable? 3. Whether it was subject to taxes? Yes
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g. Non-Immobilization i. La R.S. 9:1106storage tanks placed on land by one not owner of land as movable property ii. whether they have become so incorporated into or merged in the immovable property as to have become part and parcel of it, and thereby ceased to be movables; w/ the consequence that the vendors privilege upon them has ceased to exist 1. general Issue in in re receivership iii. The things that lose itself and becomes emerged in the building within which its placed iv. Art. 1092Third person asserting ownership of, or mortgage or privilege on seized property.
In Re Receivership of Augusta Sugar Co.

FACTS: The Augusta Sugar Co. became insolvent and in the hands of a receiver. Payne and Joubert intervened asking for their vendors privilege upon equipment erected onto Augustas plantation. The receiver ordered to sell machinery to satisfy their said claim. Procedural History: D are appealing a judgment against them. ISSUE: whether they have become so incorporated into or merged into the immovable property as to have become component part and parcel of it, and thereby cease to be movables with the consequences that the vendors privilege has seized to exist . RULE: These materials when put into the building constructed or repaired or into the repaired machinery lose their identity and become merely part of the building or machinery. The vendors privilege is lost but another privilege of furnished of materia ls which rest upon the structure as a whole and upon one acre of the ground upon which the structure stands. HOLDING: Court found sugar making equipment did not lose its identity. REASONING: Privilege stands if movable is still in the hands of the vendee, its identifiable and can take it out w/o causing substantial damage. It would not be costly to the premises if they remove the vacuum pan that is worth thousands of dollars. Any damage to sugarhouse is a legal consequence of not paying for the machinery. DISSENT: should not have upheld the privilege since it can only be removed by taking down the side of a factory in which it is contained.
Notes to Consider Issue of immovable by destination; Court reasoned that instead of giving a money judgment just go ahead and take your property back h. De-immobilzation; Separate Immovables i. Art. 472 materials arising from the demolition of a building are movables until they have been made use of in raising a new building ii. Immobilization by desitnation ceases when the objects are detached form the immovable or cease to be
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applied to the cultivation or service of the tract of land to which they were attached Folse v. Triche
Facts: A district judge held that machinery and appliances of a sugar house which was destroyed by a fire had not lost their character as immovables by the conflagration which destroyed the house in which they were located. He therefore rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who, as a creditor of her husband, claiming a legal mortgage, had enjoined the sale of said machinery, etc., separately from the mortgaged premises. Defendant, an ordinary judgment creditor, who had caused the said property to be seized, appealed to the court of appeal. The entire sugar house was not destroyed, just the machinery. Because the entire thing was not destroyed. It now becomes a movable instead of an immovable. The way to deimmobilze something is attachment or writing a declaration. Issue: Whether the machinery and appliances of the sugar house destroyed by the fire, all in a demolished and ruined condition, but containing much valuable metal, are movables or immovables. Holding: Plaintiff cannot have a legal mortgage on the remnants of machinery in question, therefore her injunction must be dissolved, and her suit dismissed. Reasoning: When machinery becomes unfit for service as the result of accident, there is no reason for the continuation of the legal fiction made in the interests of agriculture and industry. The immobilization and hypothecation of movables by destination cease when the movable objects are detached from the immovable, or cease to be applied to the cultivation or service of the tract of land to which they were attached as accessories. GPL: Movables are converted into immovables by destination when placed by the owner of a tract of land upon it for its serv ice and improvement. Movables which do not perform this function do not fall within the terms of the definition. It does not matter whether the building be demolished by the act of the owner or by natural causes. The French courts hold that, where a house has been burned, a mortgage thereon cannot be enforced against the materials which escaped the flames. If such machinery be not incorporated with the building, but placed therein for the service and improvement of the land, it becomes immovable by destination, not because the owner so wills or intends, but by reason of such service and improvement. Rehearing: The decision handed down is therefore reinstated, in so far as it sets aside the judgment below. If, as a result of the fire, the property seized has ceased to be a sugar mill and machinery such as need only to be repaired and properly sheltered for continuing in the service of the plantation, and has become merely a lot of material, more or less susceptible of being utilized in the reconstruction of the destroyed sugar house, it shall be held to have lost its character of immobility; otherwise not.
Class Notes DeimmobilizationThe thing does not always have to be attached. i.e. Machinery, equipment. Example You have land, crops, and a tractor. What is the immovable property. Depends on how the hypo is set up. The tractor MAY be considered immovable property.
BROWN v. HODGE-HUNT: [brown had title to land v. Hodge owns the title; original owner of land] FACTS: Brown brought suit for the value of timber cut and removed from a certain tract of land. The land and timber was owned by the lumber company and the land was sold to A. Woods. The deed did not say a time when the lumber company would have to remove its timber. The sale was two separate items. Woods died and a doctor bought the land at a sale, and then in turn sold the land to plaintiff. ISSUE: whether or not the timber should be classified as movable property and given to the lumber company or attached with the sale of land (immovable property) and given to the plaintiffs. RULE: Act 188 of 1904 declared that standing timber shall remain an immovable, and be subject to the laws relating to immovables even when separated in ownership from the land on which its stands. When you sell just the land and the
timber remains, the timber becomes a separate immovable.

ANALYSIS: The timber was not included in the assessment and value of the land. The timber was worth eight times the value of the land without the timber. The timber in question was reserved to the defendant in the original sale of the land to Woods, the
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title of the timber was never transferred to woods, the failure of the lumber company to assess the timber did not have the effect of forfeiture of the title of the timber. DECISION: judgment reversed, dismissed with costs. Willetts Wood Products Co. v. Concordia Land & Timber [FIXING A TERM] Facts: Concorida was at one time the owner of both the land and timber, and at some time granted a mortgage in favor of Continental & Commercial Bank and Frank H. Jones, trustees. The mortgage debt not having been paid, the land was foreclosed on, and was sold to Goddard. Goddard sold the land to Black River Lumber Company, and from the latter to the present plaintiff. In each and every one of the sales mentioned the timber on the land was expressly excepted, and hence remained the property of the defendant. Concordia argued the there was no contractual relation between Concordia and Willetts and its authors in title with reference to the removal of the timber, therefore Concordia believed the court was without authority to order the removal within any fixed time. Procedural Posture: Trial court ruled for the plaintiff, requiring the timber to be removed with 4 years, and provided that all timber not removed within the time fixed shall revert to the plaintiff. Issue: Whether a court erred by ordering the removal of timber within a fixed time, absent a contract between the current plaintiff and defendant. Holding: Standing timber was property subject to be acquired separately from the land on which it grows; but that when land is sold it must be cut and removed within the period agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court in default of agreement; otherwise said timber reverts to the owner of the land. Reasoning: There may be created under the statute two separate estates, and the title to the land rested in one person and that of the timber in another, but it was never intended and will not do to say that the respective titles are of equal rank and dignity, in the sense that the owner of the timber can require that the timber be permitted to remain on the land in perpetuity without any right in the owner of the land to cause the timber to be removed. The statutes must be practical and represent the fact that over a certain time the owner would want full use of the land removed of the timber. GPL: Whatever contractual relations existed between the defendant and its mortgagee with regard to the timber passed to the present plaintiff, owner of the land.
Notes to Consider Owner of the land cannot require the timber to be removed just as the owner of the timber cannot make requirements of the land if the contractual agreement was silent on the subject. However, when standing timber has been sold to another party, the timber must be removed w/in a certain time period or its ownership reverts back to the land owner. Since you have separate immovable you cant require one party to take care of the separate immovable. c. Movables STEINAU V. PYBURN [money as a corporal]money is not an immovable, but a movable
FACTS: Pyburns mother was recognized as owner of 1/3 of real property in Caddo Parish. Funds in the amount of $8,000 had been deposited in the registry of the court as lease bonus money. The mother claims the deposit is immovable because it is money derived from an oil and gas lease. HELD: The statutes under which the heirs sought to have the money classified as immovable, did indeed provide that oil and gas leases were immovable, but not that funds resulting from such leases were immovable. Therefore the funds were not subject to succession. The deposit is just cash, not the oil or gas lease itself therefore it is a corporeal movable. Article 472 Building Materials: Materials gathered for the erection of a new building or other construction, even though deriving from the demolition of an old one, are movables until their incorporation into the new building or after construction. Materials separated from a building or other construction for the purpose of repair, addition, or alteration to it, with the intention of putting them back, remain immovables.
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Beard v. Duralde
Action: Archinard, who was the administrator of the succession of Giquel, having obtained a judgment against Beard, issued an execution and seized a lot of lumber and bricks on Beard's plantation. Beard indicated that the materials were being put to use for which they were intended thus they were immovables by destination and could not be seized separately from the land. The judge indicated that these grounds were sufficient to warrant the plaintiff in staying the execution by injunction. The defendant appealed. Facts: Beard used a portion of some bricks to lay a foundation for a structure on her property . Due to a judgment against her, Beard's building materials that were not yet used were seized by the sheriff. Beard filed suit. Issue: Held: Whether building materials on a piece of land are considered immovable? Reversed.
Rule: Materials arising from the demolition of a building, those which are collected for the purpose of raising a new building are movables until they have been made use of in raising a new building. But if the materials have been separated from the house or other edifice only for the purpose of having it repaired or added to, and with the intention of replacing them, they preserve the nature of immovables and are considered as such.
Reason: The court held that the materials, although intended to be used for building a structure, had not yet been used. As such, they are considered to be movables and the lower court is reversed.
Class Noters New materials that are being used to build a new building movables Old material taken from an immovable structure (for whatever reason. i.e. repair)immovable because it was once attached and was only taken off for renovating or maybe repairing old structure d. Corporals and Incorporeals South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Barthelemy computer software is corporeal
Facts: Bell received software into New Orleans from out of state to help run the phone company. This software was both sent to the business on rolls, and sent over the modem. New Orleans had a sales and use tax on all corporeal movables entering the city, and Bell stated that the software was in incorporeal immovable. Bell paid their taxes under protest and brought this suit to get their money back from the city. Issue: Is the software tangible personal property, and is it taxable? Holding: Yes; Yes Reasoning: Physical recordings of computer software are part of the physical world. Corporeal property is taxable. Software encompasses all parts of the computer system other than the hardware. The software at issue is knowledge recorded in a physical form which has physical existence, takes up space, makes physical things happen and can be perceived by the senses. The purchaser desires a certain arrangement of matter that will make the computer perform a desired function constitutes a corporeal body. Once the software is reduced to physical form and has come to rest in the city, the use tax attaches. The incorporeal right to software is the copyright which is reserved to vendors. They are taxed on the physical copy of the software itself, not the copyright use of the software. They looked at the actual components of software and agreed with the court of appeal dissenting opinion that it is tangible, and therefore taxable by the city. GPL: Tangible personal property personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched, or is in any other manner perceptible to the senses. The term tangible personal property shall not include stocks, bonds, notes, and other obligations and securities. Tangible personal property is corporeal movable property. C.C. 461,471,473 The civilian concept of corporeal movables encompasses all things that make up the physical world; conversely incorporeals encompass the non physical world of legal rights.
Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware Succession of Miller
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Action: Meyer filed a motion to traverse (deny factual allegation) the inventory of Miller's property. The trial court held that the bonds and cash were properly included in the inventory and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Facts: In August of 1974, Meyer and Miller went to a grocery store and purchased some bearer bonds. Miller had previously informed Meyer's husband of her intent to purchase the bonds and give them to Mrs. Meyer. After the bonds were issued, Miller gave them to Meyer. In January of 1976, Miller closed out a savings account and placed the funds into an account in both Miller's and Meyer's names. Miller indicated to Meyer that she wanted Meyer to have those funds. In May of 1976, Miller had a stroke. According to Meyer, Miller then instructed Meyer to withdraw the funds from the joint account. Miller died shortly thereafter. Miller's will was declared invalid, and the administratrix declared the bonds and the account funds are part of the inventory of Miller's succession. Issue: Held: Whether the transfer of bonds was valid. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. Whether the transfer of cash was valid.
Rule: Donations of immovables and movables, whether corporeal or incorporeal, be made by an act passed before a notary public and two witness. EXCEPTION: The manual gift, that is, the giving of corporeal movable effects, accompanied by a real delivery, is not subject to any formality. Corporeal movables are things that normally move or can be moved from one place to another. Incorporeal movables are the rights, obligations, and actions that apply to a movable thing, such as bonds, annuities, and interests or shares in entitles possessing judicial personality. Reason: The court held that the funds removed from the savings account were a corporeal moveable and subject to manual gift provided there was actual delivery. Meyer indicated that there was delivery even though Miller did not actually have the money in her hand. Miller instructed Meyer to withdraw the cash, thus the court found this to be a valid inter vivos donation by manual gift. As far as the bonds are concerned, C.C.Art. 473 clearly includes bonds in the definition of incorporeal movables. As such, the donation must meet the form requirement of two witnesses and a notary. This was not completed, thus the bonds belong to the inventory. Dissent: Dixon dissented indicated that bearer bonds are movable, but questioned whether they were incorporeal. Corporeals are things that have a body, whether animate or inanimate and can be felt or touched. Incorporeals have no body. Rights and obligations that apply to bonds are incorporeal, but bearer bonds themselves he believes are corporeal. Essentially, he believed that negotiable instruments, including the bonds, are movables that can be felt and touched and transferred via mere delivery. He believed it to be unnecessary to have an act of donation for this sort of item.
Notes to Consider/Class Notes *Transfer of ownership can happen inter vivos (living) or mortis causa (dead) *Miller wanted decedents to have property but she had never actually physically recvd money. *In this case the transfer of ownership of money was inter vivos but the bearer bonds without a written act decedent would not be an owner *The best thing to do with a incorporeal is to have it in writing. 4. Possession of Things a. Definition, nature, and effects of possession i. Possession is a state of fact which consists in holding a thing in an exclusive manner and in carrying out on it the same material acts of use and of enjoyment as if its possessor were its owner. ii. Possession is taken in its narrow and original sense. iii. The material thing and the idea of ownership iv. Progressive Extension of the Idea of possession 1. Physical power, something material v. Elements that constitute possession
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1. 2 elements a. Physicalcorpus i. Facts that constitute the possession ii. Physical acts of detention, use, enjoyment, transformation, carried out upon the thing b. Intentanimus i. Possesors intent to act on his own behalf Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury 367 So. 2d 1246 (La.App.2d Cir. 1979)
Facts: conversion of Peloquins pet cat. They sued for mental anguish, inconvenience, and humiliation suffered due to the alleged actions of the Calccasieu police. Mrs. Linscomb borrowed an animal trap from the control center and placed it in her yard which eventually trapped the pet cat George. After trapping the cat Mr. and Mrs. Calcasieu returned the trap with the cat to the animal control center where it was destroyed. Issue: Holding Rule: 3421 occupancy is a mode of acquiring property by which a thing which belongs to nobody, becomes the property of the person who took possession of it, with the intention of acquiring a right of ownership upon it. 3421 Allows a person who acquires a movable that has been abandoned to immediately become its master. 3413 allows the captor who reduces to possession a wild animal to immediately become the owner of the captured creature. Reasoning: The possessor has the same rights as an owner of a movable to sue for damages for conversion thereof by the defendant, and those damages may include awards for mental anguish, humiliation, as well as special and or actual damages. If plaintiffs can prove possession and they suffered provable and compensable damages as a result of the converstion of the cat involved,, then they are entitled to recover for there damages.
vi. Possession Ownership w/o title 1. Becoming the owner of the object through the passage of time and using it in the manner that the owner would use it 2. How you become the owner of property that you did not own in the past 3. Ownership 3 components a. Use and enjoyment b. Title c. Management 4. Possession has the same components as ownership without title a. However over the passage of time you can acquire title 5. Succession rep vs. owner a. Succession rep works on behalf of the owner 6. What are the requirements of acquiring ownership a. Intent b. Corporeal possession (Art. 3425) c. 1 Year d. Uninterrupted i. Explain uninterrupted in terms of possession being open, continuous, unequivocal, and non violent e. Susceptible to private ownership 7. Physical control over a thing in the absence of intent to have it as ones own is called detention. a. A lessor has possession, whereas the lesee has detention
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8. Precarious possessor is not a possessor; he merely has physical control over a thing and thus has detention over it 9. Art 3421(1) possession is defined broadly as the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing, movable or immovable, that one holds or exercises by himself or through another who keeps it or exercises it in the possessors name. 10. Possession applies to corporeal things only 11. Exercise of a right, such as servitude, with the intent to have it as ones own is quasi possession 12. One who has possessed a thing over a year acquires the right to possess it. 13. Possessor is a provisional owner of the thing he possesses until the right of the true owner is established. (3423) 14. All possessors are presumed to be owners, because the presumption is generally comfortable to the legal state of affairs. b. Corporeal, Civil, and Constructive Possession i. Arts. 36 Ellis v. Prevost 19 La.251 (1841)
Facts: Issue Holding Rule
In order that the possessor may be entitled ot bring a possessory action, it is required: 1 that he should have had the real and actual possession of the property, at the instant when the disturbance occurred: a mere civil or legal possession is not sufficient. Reasoning
st
Notes to Consider 2 species of possession: 1). Natural possession possession in fact; when a man detains a thing corporeally, as by occupying a house, cultivating a field 2). Civil possession possession in right; when a person ceases to reside in the house or on the land which he occupied, but without intending to abandon the possession. In order to acquire prescription by possession of 10 years, founded on just a title, it is necessary the possessor have held the thing in fact and in right as owner
Manson Realty Co. v. Plaisance

Facts: Issue: 1). Whether Manson realty was disturbed in possession which it had more than a year prior to disturbance. 2). Whether Manson was possessor prior to a year? Holding: Yes Rule: Yes

Reasoning:
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ii. Acquisition, Exercise, Retention, And Loss of Possession 1. Acquisition, exercise, retention and loss of possession a. To acquire possession, one must intend to possess as owner and must take corporeal possession of the thing (Art. 3424) b. One is presumed to have the intent to possess as owner unless he began to posses precariously, that is, in the name of another. (3427) c. Possession may be i. corporeal, 1. exercise of physical acts of use, detention, or enjoyment over a thing (3425) ii. civil 1. retention of an acquired possession solely by virtue of an intent to possess as owner 2. one may have civil possession even though he ceased to possess corporeally (3431) iii. constructive 1. sub for corporeal or civil possession. 2. One who possesses a part of an immovable by virtue of a title is deemed to have constructive possession within the limits of his title. (3426) a. Person may have title for land, but only constructive possesses part of the land. 3. In the absence of title, one has corporeal or civil possession only of the area that he actually possesses d. Possession may be acquired through another person who takes it for the possessor and in the name of the possessor (3428) e. May be exercised by the possessor or by another who holds for and in the name of the possessor (3429) f. A juridical person necessarily acquires and holds possession through its reps. (3430) g. Natural person who labors under some incapacity may acquire possession through his tutor or curator h. Possession is lost when the possessor manifests an intention to abandon it or when is evicted by force or usurpation. (3433) i. Right to possess is lost upon the abandonment of possession, though not upon eviction i. Eviction right to possess is lost if the possessor does not recover possession w/in a year of eviction (3434) ii. If the evicted possessor institutes a possessory action w/in a year and later obtains a judgment in his favor, then he is considered to have recovered possession even if judgment is rendered after the lapse of one year (3465)
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2. Acquisition of Possession a. Acquisition by a Third Party i. Intent 1. The intention of becoming possessor is in principle necessary in the person who is to possess. 2. The will of a 3rd party cannot make a man a possessor w/o his knowing it. 3. Persons incapable of having an animus of their own (i.e. insane, children) then possession could take place in their favor through the animus of another a. Therefore they borrow the animus of their reps ii. Physical element 1. Governed by a contrary principle. 2. Never necessary the acts of enjoyment be carried out by the possessor in person b. Loss of Possession i. Simultaneous Loss of the Two Elements of Possession 1. Possession is lost when the two elements (corpus and animus) disappear at the same time. 2. in 2 series of different cases a. where there is alienation. The old possessor of the thing transmits it to the acquirer who immediately possess it in his place b. where there is an abandonment. The possessor throws the thing away, w/ intent to give it upbecomes res derelict c. Loss of the Corporeal Element i. Losing the corpus while preserving the animus 1. Where a 3rd party takes possession in fact of the thing 2. Where w/o any intent on the part of the person, the thing gets away physically from him a. Ex. animal held in captivity, it escapes d. Loss of the element of intent i. Loss of animus ii. i.e. the possessor in selling the thing agrees to preserve it for the account of the purchase, although he held it for his own acct. e. Preservation of Possession Through Another
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f.
i. He who gives a lease retains possession w/ all advantages Preservation of Immovable Possession Merely By Intent i. he who after having had the possession of an estate, ceases to perform the acts that make up the corporeal element of possession remains nonetheless the possessor of the estate through the mere fact he preservers the intent of possessing it.
Harper v. Willisno intent to own

Facts: Property in question was created decades prior to the case being brought. Some of the lots eventually began to be sold for taxes. Initially Mr. Crowed as a caretaker looked after the property but eventually gave up his job and the property was left unattended. With the permission of Crowe and as along as plaintiff, Harper looked after the property, kept the fire out, and the brush down he could run his cattle on the land w/o payment of rent. Harper stated he had no intent to possess the land and whatever he did for the land was due to his own interest. Eventually he became interested in some lots which were sold to defendant Willis Issue: Whether Harper ever had the intent to acquire possession as required by Art. 3436?
Holding: No, Rule: Art. 3436 To be able to acquire possession of property, two distinct things are requisite: 1) The intention of possessing as owner 2). The corporeal possession of the thing Reasoning: because he stated he did not have intent element required by Art. 3436 to possess the land.
Notes to Consider: No way to know the persons intent except by actions or words. Regardless of corporeal possession there must be intent to own. OR THERE MAY BE A FENCE TO EXHIBIT AREA INTENDED TO POSSESS Once you lose possessory action, you have 60 days to bring petitory action. If after 60 days you are stating to the court you abandoned your property. Your inaction can be a statement of lack of intent to own A person brings a petitory action to prove ownership when someone else is possession. Petitory action deals with title and ownership.
Souther v. Domingue (tenant on Prejeans land)Possessory Action

FACTS: Souther acquired a tract of land by notarial act of sale in 1953. The land was bounded on the n, w, and s by the defendants property. Souther bridged disputed property which he had not used , cleared and built a barn, grazed cattle and grew crops. However, for at least 30 years Prejean used the disputed property as a pasture for their cattle. ISSUE: Was Southers constructive possession sufficient to oust their corporal possession or at least uninterrupted civil possession commencing with actual possession? HOLDING: No RULE: Where a contiguous body of land is conveyed by a single deed, possession exercised on any part of that tract extends constructively to the limits of the land as called for in the deed itself. The maintenance of cattle or a pasture on an enclosed tract of land constitutes corporeal possession. REASONING: Prejans (def) proved actual corporeal possession of the disputed area followed by civil possession. Souther merely interfered with their possession.
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Boundaries of the area possessed by the Prejeans were sufficiently marked, both naturally, by the heavy wood lines and the swamp, and artificially by the stakes and tree blazes, to be considered enclosed.
Notes to Consider: Precarious possessor: Putting up a fence is not enough to establish corporeal possession. More physical presence must be maintained. Enclosed does not necessarily mean one as owner must established with certainty, where by natural or by artificial marks; that is , that they must be sufficient to give definite notice to the public and all the world of the character and extent of the possession, to identify fully the property possessed, and to fix with certainty the boundaries or limits thereof. Liner v. LA Land and Exploration Co. Disturbance vs. Eviction
FACTS: Liner claimed his family had possessed marshland for over 100 years although they had no title for a certain portion of the land. Liner testified for 56yrs he occupied the land, trapping, raising cattle, and raising his family. ISSUE: Was LA Land HOLDING: REASONING: There was no loss of possession against his consent because the pipeline canal and the pipeline which crossed Liners land was constructed with his knowledge and consent. RULE : possession is not lost just b/c a 3rd person has occupied the immovable. If the former possessor lets a period elapse w/o any act of enjoyment or any claim for return of possession, he is considered as having lost it, whether he did or did not know of the adverse occupancy CC One who has acquired corporeal possession continues in possession until he transfers it or abandons it, or until another expels him from it, or until he permits the estate to be usurped and held for a year w/o doing any act of possession or w/o interfering w/ the usuprers possession .
Disturbance pg. 154

Disturbance might interrupt possession. It might bring a
RICHARD V. COMEAUX->mowing grass

FACTS: ISSUE: Have Richards adequately proven possession sufficient to sustain the possessory action? HOLDING: Yes RULE: REASONING:
Notes to Consider Is mowing grass sufficient to establish corporeal possession? No See Wagley v. Cross (pg. 159) kicking off Type of ground/land dictates type of corporeal possession. In an enclosed area. The fence shows the area that the possessor intend to own. Evans v. DunnThe building of the fence cut off the other persons enjoyment RULE: How the right is acquiredOnce a person shows he has possessed the property as required by law quietly and w/o interruption for more than a yr, he has proven his right to
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possess. There is no need to show he acquired the property in the yr immediately preceding the suit, but only he obtained the right at one time and that he has not lost it prior to the disturbance. How the Right is Lostvoluntarily, by transferring or abandoning the property; involuntarily by being evicted or expelled for more than a year or by acquiescing a third partys usurpation of the property for more than a year. What types of activity? Not every disturbance is strong or long enough to interrupt anothers right to possess. Minor disturbances are insufficient even if unchallenged w/in a years time. The disturbance must bring home to the actual possessor the realization that his dominion is being seriously challenged. (3449) c. Transfer of Possession; Tacking i. Transfer and Continuation of Possession 1. When tacking of Possession takes place a. Possession cannot pass from one person to another, but the benefits of possession, especially actions for restitution of or maintenance in possession can. 2. The Conditions of Tacking of Possession. The effect of defects of Possession a. Tacking can operate only w/ regard to possession which follow each other without an interruption i. Separation by an interim possession by a third party lasting at least one year ii. Necessary that both the possession which the new posseor wants to accumulate and his own possession be free from any defect. 3. Class Notes a. Possession is openthe public knows there is an intent to possess b. Ancestors in title merely means previous owner c. As long as there was no interruption between the ancestors in titles possession and your possession then you can tack on the ancestor in title time. d. Vices of Possession i. Definition and Enumeration 1. Possession exists as soon as its two elements corups and animus are united 2. A vice is a certain state of affairs of which w/o destroying possession makes it judicially valueless. 3. if possession is tainted with vice, the possessor is not entitled to possessory protection, and the plea of acquisitive prescription is not available to him. 4. 4 vices a. Discontinuity (pg 164) i. Possession must be continuous ii. Constant handling or use of the thing is not required.
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5. 6. 7. 8.
iii. Continuity consists in the regular succession of acts of possession at sufficiently short intervals not to form lacunae 1. Class Notes a. Depends on the type of property and its particular use b. Violence i. One must be able to retain possession without resorting to violence ii. It is inadmissible when possessor suffers violence but does not commit the act himself. iii. Acts of violence even when committed by the possessor himself in order to maintain possession have no effect when committed at long intervals iv. Vice of violence is temporary. As soon as the violence ends, possession commences. v. If the true owner be a third person untouched by the acts of violence, possession will be free from violence c. Secrecy/clandestine>open i. Possession must be public ii. Possession is considered clandestine(open) when possessor attempts to hide his acts from those who are interested in knowing of them iii. Possession may be clandestine for some persons and not for others, if the possessor lest some know what he hides from others. iv. Temporary v. As soon as the concealment ceases, effective possession commences and prescription begins to run vi. If there is no exterior sign, such as an opening that reveals the encroachment, the possession will be clandestine d. Uncertainty/Equivocal i. Possession is uncertain when one of its attributes such as continuity or public character is doubtful. ii. Possession is equivocal when the acts of enjoyment can be explained in 2 ways law requires that possession be peaceable (free of violence), public (not concealed), and continuous (free of discontinuity) law has 2 supplementary qualities: possession must be uninterrupted and must be enjoyed under the title of the owner. Possession must be enjoyed under the title of the owner Precarious possession exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of or on behalf of the owner
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a. Precarious possessor is not a possessor at all; he merely has physical control over the thing; detention, rather than possession. b. Possess for another even though he may intend to possess for himself c. May be terminated d. Precarious possessor begins to possess for himself when he gives actual notice of the intent to the person on whose behalf he is possessing. e. There is possessory protection against anyone except the person for whom he possess f. Once a person enters into a relationship with another that places him in the category of precarious possessor, the code presumes that such conditions continues throughout the duration of his detention of the thing FAlGOUST V. INNESS Facts: Owner Faigoust allowed the fianc of her adoptive daughter to erect a building on her property. Class Notes The minute a defendant brings up ownership or asserts ownership as a defense then the possessory action is automatically waived and plaintiff automatically wins possessory action. Defendant must then bring petitory action to prove his ownership. Defendant may bring this action at the same time the possessory action was brought. 9. Possession at the Time of Disturbance3658 10. Possession for One Year Quietly and w/o Interruption Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. FACTS: *Liner brought a possessory action against LA Land and Exp due to conflicting claims to marshlands.
*The disputed land was in the western end, west of the range line which separated 15 and 16. *Liners title included the land in Range 16. *LA Land and Expl. Titles covered all the portion of the land Liner was attempting to claim in Range 15. *Liner used all the land for cattle and for trapping. *Years later LL&E resurveyed the land and set new concrete markers to claim their land. *Liner gave a gas company a pipeline right of way on the property. *LLE marked their land with a ditch which Liner later appropriated for his own use and installed bulkheads, which remained until they were removed by LLE AND then quickly replaced by Liner. *Liners attorneys insisted LA LE cease their activities, but LLE performed other activities such as: 1)cleaning the ditch, 2) pulling Liners stakes up, used an air horn to communicate, 3) placed no trespassing signs along the ditch, and 4) removed obstructions
ISSUE: Whether LLE's activities during the year leading up the lawsuit were sufficient to prevent Liner from peaceful possession of the property for the time required to maintain the possessory action? HOLDING: Reasoning: The court concluded that the words quietly and w/o interruption dont mean that a possessor who suffers a disturbance on several occasions in the year preceding the suit has lost his right to bring the possessory action.
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Unless his possession comes to an end in such a way that he cannot show he was in possession, he has the right to bring the action. Court held 3658 Cannot be read literally; it cannot mean there must be no adverse claim for a year before the disturbance. Quietly means peaceably
Notes to Consider Legislative intent seems to be that possessory protection is available to anyone who has previously acquired the right to possess and did not lose it in the year immediately preceding the disturbance. Mire v. CroweTriangle piece of property NUTSHELL OF POSSESSORY ACTION AND WHAT CAN BE DONE *In 1968, Mire bought land from Crowe. Prior to the sale, they walked the boundaries of the property.
* The area pointed out by Crowe included lot 6 and an area in lot 7. The sale documents refer to lot 6. * Once Mire acquired the land, he immediately took possession. He had it surveyed, placed stakes for a fence and later built the fence. *Hunting and fishing also took place on the land. *Members of Mire's family often used a portion of the land called the "hill" for these activities. *Several family members raised hogs and grazed cattle over his land and the disputed land. *Mire also built a barn. In 1981, Mire leased some land to Buttrey for housing and maintaining horses. Crowe had lived on the property since he was a child. After the sale, he owned land south of Mire, and adjacent to. Crowe and his friends used the disputed land to get to his camp on numerous occasions. When Buttrey began building a corral on the "hill", Crowe infomred him to cease construction. This then lead to the lawsuit. Issue: Whether Mire is entitled to be maintained in possession of the property. Held: Affirmed.
Rule: A person acquires the right to possess immovable property by possessing the property quietly and without interruption for more than a year. In all cases, the owner must possess as owner and for himself. Thus, to acquire the right to possess, one must combine the intention of possessing as owner with the corporeal detention of the thing. To win a possessory action, a plaintiff must show that he at one time acquired the right to possess and that he has not lost the right prior to the disturbance.
Reason: The court found that Mire, after purchasing the property, moved onto it, had it surveyed, and established boundaries. Each of these acts were acts of possession. Additionally, Mire granted a lease to a portion of the tract, as well as used a portion to raise hogs and graze cattle. The areas on which there were no activities were enclosed with natural and artificial boundaries erected by Mire. Based on this, the court found that when Mire took possession, in 1968, of lot 6 and the disputed portion of lot 7, Crowe abandoned use of the property until August of 1981. As the court has found Mire had the right to possess, the court then had to consider whether he lost the right
to possess. Although Crowe committed a number of trespasses on the property, these were without Mire's possession. The
court held that the activities conducted by Crowe were not sufficient to interrupt the quiet and peaceful possession of Mire. Mire possessed the property and conducted numerous activities consistent with the possession. He never gave in to Crowe's claims to the property even when Crowe claimed ownership of a portion of the land. As such, he did not lose his possessory rights thus he is entitled to the property. Issue: Whether Mire is entitled to be maintained in possession of the property?
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Notes to Consider (3658) (2) Who has the right to possess often decided by the determination of whether any acts of the defendant have sufficiently interrupted the plaintiffs possession so as to strip the plaintiff of his right to possess. Class Notes If plaintiff brings possessory action and loses then the defendant can possess the area in question. Then the defendant must posses the disputed land for a year in order to possess the land. The person being disturbed brings the possessory action. The defendants obligation is to attack one of the possessory elements. Title isnt necessary for possessory action, but can be used. Title shows ownership not possession. Interference------------Disturbance-------------Interruption Interference doesnt interfere with the enjoyment Disturbancewhen action is escalated beyond interference and my possession is being threatened. I know this person is threatening my possession InterruptionDisturbance occurs for more than a year Test 1. Intent to own. Intent is manifested thru (2) 2. Physical corporeal action 3. uninterrupted for a year 4. subject to private ownership 11. Disturbance in Fact and Disturbance in Law; Prescription a. Disturbance in Fact and Law i. In factphysical interference w/ the possession of an immovable or of a real right that prevents the possessor from enjoying his possession quietly, or which throws an obstacle in the way of that enjoyment. 1. Mere disturbance/may amount to eviction ii. In lawexecution, recordation, registry, or continuing existence of record of an instrument that Asserts/implies an adverse claim to the ownership or possession of an immovable or of a real right, except in an action or proceeding adversely to the possessor of such immovable or right iii. Class Notes 1. Another person has title recorded in title, other documents, conveyance office b. Institution of Action w/in a Year from the Disturbance i. in the case of a mere disturbance the possessor is still in possession of the immovable property but his right to
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demand maintenance in his possession and damages is lost by the prescription of one yr. ii. In the case of eviction, the possessory may not demand restoration in his possession after the lapse of 1 yr b/c his possession has been interrupted or b/c his right to demand restoration is lost by the liberative prescription of one year. iii. 1 yr prescription runs from the commencement of either disturbance/eviction and not the completion of. iv. Prescription for disturbance in law doesnt begin to run as long as the document asserting an adverse claim remains in the public records. Gill v. Henderson removal of fence
This is the second suit between these parties relative to the said tract. In the first suit, a possessory action, Mr. Henderson was plaintiff and Mr. Gill defendant. The case was tried on its merits and judgment was rendered dismissing Mr. Hendersons suit. In the said suit, Mr. Gill did not reconvene alleging his own possession of the property, and no finding was made relative thereto. No appeal was perfected from the judgment, and it is final. After another suit brought by Mr. Henderson
which was dismissed, Mr. Henderson constructed a one strand barbed wire fence around the property, and Mr. Gill
brought this suit to compel its removal. It is his position that Mr. Henderson, having lost the possessory action, must now bring a petitory action in which he would have the burden of proving his own possession, or the superiority of his title. Plaintiff claims that there is no law applicable to this situation, and that under the equity provision of article 21 of the civil code, the court should protect his right not to bear the burden of proof. Trial court ruled for d in the injunctive matter, p appeal s. Issue: Whether a plaintiff who loses a possessory action must file a petitory action in order to prove his own possession. Holding: No. Only a losing defendant or defendant in reconvention in a possessory action can be compelled by law to bring the petitory action. Since Gill did not reconvene and attempt to show his own possession of the disputed tract in the possessory action, the effect of the judgment in that suit was to find that Henderson was not in possession thereof. Gills possession of lack thereof was not adjudicated. Issue: Whether the plaintiff of a possessory action must be a legal possessor. Holding / Reasoning: Yes. Nowhere has the plaintiff claimed ownership, the possession or the enjoyment of this disputed tract. He has alleged certain acts of possession, but not that he enjoys the legal possession of the disputed tract. We think it clear from a perusal of the codal provisions relative to the petitory and possessory actions, that one who wishes to enjoy the evidentiary benefits which accrue to the successful plaintiff in a possessory action, whether in a declaratory judgment suit, a suit for injunctive relief, or any other case in which ownership may be an issue, must bear the burden of proving himself to be the legal possessor of the property. Plaintiff herein has not done so, and we hold that, under the specific provisions of 3663 of CCP, he is not entitled to the relief sought herein. GPL: CCP 3663 Injunctive relief is available to a plaintiff in a possessory action or to one who has been disturbed in the possession which he has enjoyed for more than one year of immovable property of which he claims the ownership, possession or the enjoyment.
c. Possessory Action Against the State Todd v. Statesues the state

FACTS: The land in question eventually was a shute. Todd and Haynes purchased the eastern half of the island from Stevens who reserved the timber rights. St. of LA halted Stevens timber operations on the island. Todd and Haynes with legislative permission brought a possessory action against St. of LA stating that their ancestors had taken possession of the property through various acts of corporeal possession for one year prior to the disturbance. St. claimed the land was public and could not be subject to a possessory action by an individual.
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Holding: Yes
Issue: Whether a possessory action may be brought against LA?
REASONING: Allowing a private litigant to maintain a possessory action against the state is statutorily, constitutionally and jurisprudentially supported; although the sixty-day mandate in CCP 3663(2) for bringing a petitory action, as applied to the state, is constitutionally impermissible. Affirmed in part
Notes to Consider Purpose of the POssesory Action protect possession; Good faith possessor only on who possess by virtue of an act translative of ownership and does not know of any defects in his ownership A simple squatter or bad faith possessor who would be eligible to acquire ownership of other than state owned property would not be entitled to retain the fruits produced on the lands owned by the state Right to possess means the person has acquired the right to bring a possessory action. Benefits of Possession (non owner) Protection of all rights attending possession. 1)present authority to detain and enjoy (until adverse ownership is proven) 5. OWNERSHIP the idea of a complete legal power of a person over a thing a. Content of Ownership 1. Right by virtue of which the things is absolutely and exclusively subject to the volition and the actions of a person ii. Ownership of Corporeal Things 1. Owner can a. at will use or enjoy his property, b. dispose of it physically, c. perform all the legal transactions of which it is susceptible d. and exclude all third parties from any participation in the exercise of his various powers over the property. 2. Exercise of ownership is subject to various restrictions imposed in public interest 3. Powers inherent in ownership right must not be exercised so as to interfere with the property interests of others. 4. Ownership may be modified by statutory or contractual servitudes 5. Benefits of ownership are the same whether its in regards to an immovable or movable iii. Extension of the Term Ownership to Incorporeal 1. Originally ownership referred only to corporals but the term was broadened to include the exclusive right to use and dispose of incorporeal iv. Use Transformation and Destruction of the Thing 1. Owner has the power to subject the thing belonging to him to any use compatible with its nature
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2. Authorized to recv all the profits, income, or other benefits which the thing can produce or procure a. This aspect is the basis for the right to fish or hunt on the owned land 3. Owner may change the nature of the thing, lessen its value or destroy it 4. The mere fact that the exercise of ownership deprives a 3rd person of some advantage or benefit does not give a cause of action for damages v. Acts of Administration and of Disposal 1. Owner can lease, alienate it gratuitously or for consideration; if the thing is immovable, burden it with servitudes or mortgages; he can abandon it w/o transfer to another person 2. Owner cannot renounce alienation by contract vi. Exclusive Character of Ownership. The Right to Enclose ones Land. Common Pastures 1. Owner has power to exclude all 3rd persons from any use, enjoyment or disposal of his property and to take all convenient measures. vii. The Perpetual Character of Ownership 1. Ownership of an immovable is not lost b/c the owner has abstained for 30 yrs from any acts of enjoyment 2. It can be lost as a result of non use only if another person becomes the owner through acquisitive prescription. b. Patrimonyassets, liabilities, extension of the person, personality i. Classical Theory 1. Patrimony is the projection of personality and the expression of the juridical capacity with which a person is invested 2. Propositions a. Only natural juridical persons may have a patrimony b. Every person has a patrimony, even if its merely liabilities i. Person may be deprived of his patrimony by a general confiscation as a penalty imposed by the state c. Every person has only one patrimony thats inseperable and indivisible ii. Objective Theory 1. Patrimony is an independent economic unit, a mass of assets and liabilities iii. Indivisibility of Patrimony; Patrimonial Masses 1. Under LA and French law patrimony is a coherent mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities attached to a person for the satisfaction of his economic needs. a. Patrimony is basically assets/liabilities 2. Law recognizes rights in individual items rather than in the economic unit as a whole 3. Patrimonial assets may only be transferred by individual delivery; protection is afforded to indiv. Patrimonial rights rather than the universality.
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iv. Transferability of Patrimony 1. Patrimony is attached to a person until termination of personality ordinarily 2. Patrimony is nontransferable by inter vivos act 3. It will be ineffective but may be a valid transfer of ones all existing individual assets 4. Patrimony or a fraction thereof may be transferred by a marriage contract 5. Upon death, the patrimony of a natural person is transmitted to his heir who continues the personality 6. The heir is personally bound to pay debts of the deceased as if they were his own v. Composition of Patrimony; Assets and Liabilities 1. Assets are real rights, credits and accrued causes of action even if they are exempt from seizure or exercise by creditors. 2. Persons ability to work, in contrast with his right to earned salary is not a patrimonial asset 3. Liabilities are personal and real obligations 4. Assets exceed the liabilities, the patrimony is solvent 5. Infringement of patrimonial as well as extrapatrimonial rights may everywhere give rise to a claim for damages 6. Patrimony is distinct from the elements that compose it. a. Assets and liabilities may increase or decrease but the patrimony remains the same in the sense that it retains its identity. vi. Common Pledge of Creditors 1. As far as creditors are concerned, the patrimony of their debtor consist only of assets that may be seized as the time of execution of judgment against him. 2. Creditors may exercise all patrimonial rights and actions of their debtor with the exception of those that are strictly personal a. Strictly personal means rights and actions which are so closely connected with the personality of the debtor that they cannot be exercised by third persons. i. Based on prevailing moral ideas and considerations of social utility 3. Pending actions for slander and malicious prosecution, for damages resulting from wrongful attachment have been classified by LA courts as patrimonial assets subject to seizure by creditors vii. Real Subrogation 1. Substitution of a thing for another in a universality of assets and liabilities 2. Takes place of right when a person has a single patrimony anything acquired in exchange or as a consideration for the alienation of an element of the patrimony enters in the mass.
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viii. Enterprise 1. Mass of rights, interests, and relations destined to a determined purpose and organized as an economic unit by an entrepreneur. a. Purpose of an enterprise need not be economic gain 2. Elements constitute a universality which is not the object of a single right 3. Differs from patrimonial mass b/c it is comprised of interstes and relations as well as potential sources of income 4. Enterprise may not become the object of a real right and it may not be transferred without individual delivery of its elements a. Integrity is protected from unauthorized or unlawful interference by the law of unfair competition c. CO OWNERSHIP i. Ownership in In division 1. Definition a. Thing belonging to several co owners is in in division when the right of each owner bears upon the whole (and not upon a given pat) of the thing held in common. b. The share of each is not a tangible share but a portion expressed by a fraction: a third, a fourth, a tenth. c. No limit to number of co owners d. Shares of each may be equal or unequal 2. how In division Ends a. terminated by partition which attributes to each owner a divided share in the thing instead of the undivided share he previously had. b. Partition is a juridical act whose inherent function consists in terminating in division by separating the thing into shares or lots. 3. Perpetual In division a. Instances where in division is destined to last forever and where application can never be made for partition.-->forced in division b. Common examples forced indivision always bear upon things which are destined to the common use of several pieces of property. Ex i. Narrow streets, passages, alleys, and courts common to several houses ii. Soil and certain parts of houses divided into stories by several owners iii. Walls, hedges and other party enclosures. 1. Considered separately and most frequently recurring example of the things held in indivision in perpetuity 4. Comparison of the Various Forms of Indivision a. None of the co owners can perform juridical acts alone
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5. Problems Created by Co-Ownership in LA a. LA generally only recognizes one form of joint ownership of landsimple, undivided co ownership b. Fundamental principles i. Co owners own the entire propertybut with this co owners ii. Co owner may freely use the property for the purposes for which it is destined, but he may not interfere with the right of the other co owners to the same enjoyment iii. Co owner may not w/o unanimous consent of the others, modify, or materially change the property or devote it to a use inappropriate to its destination 1. How do you define inappropriate? iv. Co owner is entitled to share in the fruits, products, or other revenues of the property in proportion to his undivided interest, whether or not he contributed to their production. v. Co owner is responsible for a proportionate part of the reasonable costs of maintaining or preserving the property vi. Co owner may require partition of the property at any time. Agreements not to partition the property are valid only under restricted circumstances and for limited periods c. Co owner may demand partition at any time. d. No one can be compelled to hold property with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon e. Co ownership is a voluntary relationship dependent for its existence upon the continued will of the owners f. Relationship among co owners is quasi contractual g. Co owner is not bound for the obligations of the other co ownersnot even for those debts incurred for the improvement of the co owned property 6. The Extent of a Co-Owners Undivided Interest a. Interests or shares of co owners in the property do not have to be equal b. Interest of co owner is determined from the nature of his acquisition, such as heirship, or form his agreement with the other owners. 7. Personal Enjoyment of the Property a. Each co owner has an equal and correlative right to personally occupy and use all the property w/o regard to the extent of his fractional interest if his activities are consistent with the destination of the prop. b. Co owners cant charge each other for the use of shared prop.
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c. Disputes over ordinary use cant be arbitrated. i. The remedy of co owners is to partition the prop. If they cant agree upon how the property is to be used. d. One co owner may enjoin another from interfering w/ his lawful use of the prop. Unless the interference is caused by lawful use of the prop by his co owners e. Courts will not referee or settle disputes as to when or under what circumstances the various owners may use the land for ordinary purposes i. If co owners cannot agree their remedy is to partition the property and terminate the relationship 8. Exceptional Uses of or Alterations to the Property a. Property may not be used in a manner incompatible with its destination, nor may it be materially modified or altered w/o the unanimous consent of the owners i. Consent need not be written ii. Failure of an owner to object promptly after learning of activities ordinarily constitutes a tacit consent to the activities b. There is a difference between a co owner who exclusively occupies the premises and a person who engages in the same activity because he claims ownership of the entire property, although he is actually a co owner 9. Responsibility for and Expenses of Maintaining and Preserving the property a. Co owner may take such action and incur such expenses as are reasonably required to preserve protect or maintain the property. 10. Liability for Other Expenses and the Right to Share in Profits or Products a. Fruits, products, or other revenues derived from the premises are deemed to belong to all the co owners in proportion to their undivided interest. b. Co owner has a right to claim his share of the profits from the land by the other co owners even though he may have refused to participate in or be responsible for their costs but consented to the activities i. Non participating co owners may only claim profits derived from the activity and those co owners receiving the revenues may deduct the reasonable costs of producing such revenues in accounting to him c. If one of the co owners leases property to a third party the other co owners may claim form him their share of the rent d. If co owner fixes property himself he cannot charge the co owners for his labor or services; only if he employs someone else
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e. A co owner cannot be charged with losses or expenses incurred by the other co owners in conducting any activities on the land in which he has not agreed to participate, and he has an absolute right to refrain from engaging in such activities. 11. The New law of co ownership a. Necessary expenses i. Co owners right to be reimbursed for 3 categories of expenses 1. Necessary expenses a. Those incurred for the preservation of a thing and for the discharge of private or public burdens, other than those incurred for ordinary maintenance and repairs b. Property taxes and assessments, indispensable repairs and maintenance costs and insurance costs c. Costs incurred by a co owner in litigation necessary to preserve the property 2. Expenses for ordinary maintenance and repairs 3. Necessary management expenses paid to a third person ii. Useful expenses are those which though not needed for the preservation of the thing, result in enhancement of its value. iii. Luxurious expenses are those made for the gratification of ones personal predilections. iv. Distinctions become important when determining good and bad faith possessors b. Expenses for ordinary maintenance and repairs i. Article 806 applies when ordinary repairs are made pursuant to an agreement of all the co owners under 801 or the court order under 803 c. Necessary management expenses paid to a third person i. Co owner may not demand reimbursement for his own services in managing the co owned property ii. Co owner may be entitled to recover reimbursement for his own management of the property under a management plan adopted by agreement of all the co owners, by judgment, or under the law of unjust enrichment d. Other expenses: unjust enrichment and negotiorum Gestio i. Reimbursement for due for expenses that do not qualify as necessary but do qualify as useful in the sense that
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they enhance the value of the thing is not due under Article 806. 1. Reimbursement may be available under a different article e. Indirect Rent
LeBlanc v. Scurtoowners in division FACTS LeBlanc is the owner of an undivided 1/3 interest in certain real property in Houma. Sam Scurto owns another 1/3, Antonia Scurto (widow of Charles Scurto) owns another 1/3. *The property is fully developed and occupied by several small stores and shops. *Among them a shoe shop which Scurto is the proprietor. *At the south end of the property there has been for 14 yrs a 12 ft alley and has been used by the Phillip Morris Furniture Company. *The furniture company is a lesee of a store situated south of the litigants property on property owned by LeBLanc. *one day Scurto parked his car in the alley and blocked it in order to unload some boxes in his shoe store. *LeBlanc claims that Scurto parked his car to prevent the LeBlancs from using the alley and that the blockage constituted irreparable injury to the LeBlancs rights as co owners to the property. ISSUE The court must determine the applicability of the injunctive process as between co owners where one of the co owners has acted to deliberately deny to the others the equal and co extensive possession of a designated portion of the common estate granted to each co owner by the law of Louisiana. RULE The right of a co owner to use the property held in common for the purposes for which it is destined. cannot legally prevent equal and co extensive possession of the common property to his co owner. *He
REASONING Alley in question was used as an avenue of passage and not as a parking lot. It cannot be said the blockage was deliberate. The deliberate blocking of the ally by the defendant in regards to his desire for revenge or to induce some action cannot be sanctioned. By parking as did the defendant co owner all day, plaintiffs co owners have been deprived of equal and coextensive possession and use of the common property.
NOTES TO CONSIDER CLASS NOTES Partnership vs. co ownership In a partnership any third party who contracts with the partners, contracts with all of the partners. IN a co ownership third parties who contract, contract with that one co owner.
Butler v. Hensley
FACTS At the trial court Hensley acquired a small undivided interest in the subject property but concluded tht such ownership did not constitute the interest required by law and ordered them evicted. Trial court also stated that the Hensleys were on the property as a result of a lease which had been confected without the unanimous consent of all owners. ISSUE Whether one co owner may maintain an eviction proceeding and legally eject another co owner from possession of the common property? Whether interest, solely by reason of its small fractional part of the whole, are not entitled to the same rights as the large fractional interests? Whether plaintiff-appelle can thus be evicted. RULE HOLDING: NO
Co owners have a right to use and occupy common property and cannot ordinarily be divested of possession by an action to evict.
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REASONING *Plaintiff-appellee was at all times pertinent exercising a degree of use and occupancy of the particular portion of the long, thin tract of land in question. She had fenced it and was making us of it along with the immediately adjoining portion which she owned outright and on which she lived.. *Defenant-appelle cut the wire fence that was put up around the portion in question and set about making a new use of it as the site for the parking of their house trailer. Thus defendant-appellee effectively evicted plaintiff-appelle from that portion w/o benefit of legal proceedings REHEARING At all times all parties in the literal legal sense were co owners thus neither party was entitled to possession of the property in question to the exclusion of the other.
NOTES TO CONSIDER: Court questioned the trial courts determination that such interest, solely by reason of its small fractional part of the whole is not entitled to the same rights as the large fractional interests. CLASS NOTES Each person who owns interest in the land is counted as one vote basically, even if they own different percentages of the land. Succession of Miller
FACTS: Decedant Miller died and one of her sons, Miller II was appointed executor pursuant to her last statutory will and testament. At the time of death each surviving child owned 1/16 undivided interest and 4 children of the deceased daughter owned 1/64 undivided interest in a residence and the movables contained within. *Miller proposed a plan in regards to his concern on personal liability which had 2 options. 1) the heirs could have access to the residence if they gave him reasonable notice or 2)they could have unrestricted access to the house if they all released him from personal liability. All heirs did not release him from liability so Miller implemented the restricted access plan. ISSUE: Whether one co-owner could be allowed under law to regulate and determine the use and management of the thing owned. RULE: Yes. 803 When the mode of use and management of the thing held in indivision is not determined by an agreement of all the co-owners and partition is not available, a court, upon petition by a co-owner may determine the use and management. Trial court affirmed.
REASONING: Class Notes: The problem with this situation is that Partition is likely if it is divisible. Partition by ilicitation wasnt possible b/c the home was already up for sale. Partition by kind wasnt likely because a home is more difficult to divide in parts.
f.
Partition i. Problems Created by Co Ownership in LA 1. Purpose of partition is to eliminate co ownership. Either through a. Consent of all parties b. Judicially against the will of some of them i. By dividing the property into lots and awarding each co owner full ownership of one or more of them or by licitationselling property at a
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jarius.treadway@yahoo.com brittaniaware@gmail.com public sale and dividing the proceeds among the owners in proportion to their interests
ii. Conventional Partition 1. May be affected in any matter that vests full ownership of the property in a single person 2. Accomplished through a. Form of exchange by which each co owner conveys his interest in part of the common property in exchange for the co owners interest in another part so that each acquires full ownership of the part conveyed to him. 3. Divided amongst the co owners; court doesnt get involved. iii. Judicial partition 1. Requires the person seeking it to bring an action against the other co owners 2. Accomplished in kind unless it is impracticable to do so in light of the rules regulating the matter. iv. Principle factors that prevent partition in kind are 1. There must be as many lots as the least common denominator of the fractional ownership of the various parties 2. Lots must be substantially equal value, although minor variations in value may be compensated by ordering payment to equalize the discrepancy 3. Aggregate value of the individual lots must substantially equal the value of the entire undivided property before the partition 4. If there are mineral rights created by less than all the parties, the surface and mineral values of each lot must be proportionate to the value of the interests of the mineral and surface owners in the whole g. Effect of Partition on Charges Over the Property i. Mortgages, servitude, other charges against property created by all of the owners for their predecessors are unaffected by partition, conventional or judicial ii. Conventional partitions vs. judicial partitions 1. Conventional partition is an agreement among co owners that terminates co ownership
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jarius.treadway@yahoo.com brittaniaware@gmail.com a. Referred to as voluntary partition or an extrajudicial partition b. Co owner can annual an extrajudicial partition for any of the 3 vices of consent: i. Error ii. Fraud iii. Duress
Thompson v. Celestian FACTS ISSUE RULE REASONING NOTES TO CONSIDER: An agreement to sell property in lieu of partition must be definite and certain, otherwise the court must be bound to follow the code of civil procedure and effect a partition by licitation Class Notes * What makes this different than any other partition? The parties did not go into this agreement equally . Ben Glazer Company, Inc. v. Tharp-Sontheimer-Tharp, Inc
Facts: On 6/17/83, Jayne Glazer passed away. Her husband Meyer Glazer (d), made arrangements to have her buried next to his mother and father in the family burial plot, and two days later she was. Shortly thereafter, Meyers 4 siblings sued Meyer seeking: (1) to have the title to the burial plots recognized in Ben Glazer, Inc.; (2) to have the remains of Meyers wife ex humed and moved and (3) monetary damages for the burial without permission. Subsequent amended pleadings sought damages from Tharp Sotheimer Tharp, the funeral home that arranged Ms. Glazers funeral. Tharp Sontheimer third partied the Congregation Gates of Prayer, Inc. custodian of the cemetery grounds. The trial court held that the burial plots were owned in indivision by the Glazer children (not the corporation) and ordered a partition by licitation, Tharp Sontheimer and the Congregation Gates of Prayer were dismissed. The court reserved ruling on the issue of damages until after the ownership issue becomes final. Meyer appeals. Issue: Whether the partition should be in kind rather than by licitation. Holding: Yes. It should be in kind, other than the one that is left open (licitation). Rev. Reasoning: Given the public policy against exhumation, the remaining five plots (including the one containing the remains of defendants wife) should be partitioned in kind. However there are four co -owners. We decree that title to the plot containing the remains of defendants wife be vested in defendant, Meyer Glazer. We decree that plaintiffs, Abe Glazer, Harry Glazer and Pearl Glazer Horowitz be vested with the title to one vacant plot each. The remaining plot, owned by all in indivision is not susceptible to being divided in kind, and therefore a partition by licitation of said plot is ordered. This matter is also remanded for a determination of damages, if any, that may be due plaintiffs because of the burial of Meyer Glazers wife.
NOTES TO CONSIDER Exhumation is against public policy, is not favored in the law and should only be done on a showing of good cause CLASS NOTES Partition in kind would be against public policy.
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Co owners and the conflict of property in division Partition in kind is the ideal, then go to illicitation, if still not valid the courts will decide h. Article 808Indispensable Use of co owned things i. Forced indivison is intended for things which are destined to the common use of several pieces of property ii. When co owned property is an indispensable accessory for two or more principle estates so that the principle estates are substantially less useful w/o common use of the accessory property, the co owned accessory property cannot be partitioned. d. Modes of Acquiring Ownership i. Various Classifications 1. According to the extent of the acquisition a. Distinction is drawn between the modes by universal and those by particular title. 2. According to the gratuitous or onerous nature of the mode of acquisition. 3. w/ regard to the moment when the acquisitions are accomplished. 4. Death 5. Inter vivos ii. Transmissions by Universal and by Particular Titles 1. Acquisition takes place by a universal title when it comprises the universality of the patrimony or an aliquot part of it a. Acquirer or his successors are held for the debts and obligations of their author b. He is bound for the entirety, regardless of if he has acquired the entire patrimony or part of it c. Acquirire not held personally for his debts, to any extent or any fraction 2. Takes place by a particular title when it applies to one or more given objects, considered individually, regardless of their number iii. Acquisition by Gratuitous and Onerous Titles 1. If acquirer gives or promises anything in exchange for what he receives the acquisition is made by an onerous title iv. Law of Property 1. Property rights may be acquired in a variety of ways a. By the occupancy of things that belong to no one b. By transfer from a previous owner or even by a non owner c. By operation of law d. By the effect of judgments e. By acts of public authorities 2. For systematic purposes there is a distinction between original and derivative acquisition of property rights
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3. 4. 5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
a. Originalinvolves the creation of a new property right; independent of any pre existing rights over the same thing i. i.e. occupancy, finding accession, acquisitive prescription, expropriation, est. of property rights by acts of public authorities b. Derivativeinvolves a transfer of a pre existing right from one person to another No one can transfer a greater right than one has Occupancytaking of possession of things that belong to no one Accession a. Ownership of a thing, either movable or immovable, carries with it the right to whatever the thing produces and to certain other things that are united with it, whether naturally or artificially b. Fruits of the earth, increase of animals belong to the owner by right of accession c. Ownership of land carries with it ownership of all that is directly above and under it, unless the contrary is established by provision of law or contract Acquisitive prescriptionpossession of a thing over a designated period of time w/ intent to own. a. Acquisition of property rights in immovable ordinarily require a longer period of possession than the acquisition of property rights in movables. b. Required period of time varies with nature of possession i. good faith vs. bad faith ; good faith possessor normally acquires possession in a shorter period of time Expropriation a. Expropriation is different from confiscation which is the taking of property by authorities arbitrarily or as a penalty for the violation of the law b. Constitutional provisions insist upon notice and the payment of an adequate fair or just compensation to the owner for the expropriation to be valid c. Expropriation is made in favor of the state, its political subdivisions, or private utilities Privileges conferred by public authorities a. Original acquisition of property rights when public authorities confer upon certain persons entirely new economic privileges or recognize privileges that existed in fact but not in law Derivative acquisition a. By transfer from a previous owner b. Transfer may be voluntary (i.e. last will and testament or agreement btwn the previous owner and the transferee) c. Involuntaryjudicial sale
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d. Operation of lawintestate succession 10. Sale a. Most prevalent mode b. transfer of a thing for a sum of money or the promise of a sum of money c. If the transfer is for something other than money it is constituted as an exchange 11. Donation a. Inter vivosintended to take effect while the donor and the donee are living b. Mortis causain contemplation of death i. Normally contained in last testaments and wills which must be executed everywhere 12. Judicial sale a. Take place when property of an insolvent debtor is seized and sold for satisfaction of his creditors b. When prop. Is sold by state or by its political subdivisions for the pmnt of tax claims c. When prop is judicially partitioned among co owners d. When inherited property or that of a minor is sold by an administrator or tutor e. Judicial sale only transfers the rights to the acquirer only the property rights the previous owner had 13. Intestate succession a. When a person dies w/o leaving a will b. Legal heirs of a deceased person are supposed to continue the personality of the deceased and to succeed to all of his rights and obligations that are considered to be heritable. c. Certain close relatives (descendants, ascendants, or surviving spouses) are entitled to a forced share of the estate, even against the will of the deceased v. LA Purchaser Doctrine 1. Transfer of movable is effective btwn the owner and the transferee according to their agreement 2. Transfer affects third parties when possession of the movable has been delivered to the transferee 3. Relative innocence/negligence is determined and ownership is awared to the party who was less negligent 4. Doctrine a. Lost and stolen things i. If a thing is lost or stolen the person having possession cant transfer its ownership to another ii. Stolen 1. True owner did not consent to the possession by another
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2. Doesnt mean the true owner voluntarily transferred ownership to another as a result of fraud 3. Exception a. If a lost or stolen thing has been sold by an authority of law then the person who bought it will prevail against the previous owner b. Vice of consent i. If an owner of a thing transfers ownership to someone in a transaction tainted with a vice of consent, and tht someone thereafter transfers ownership to a third party, the 3rd party gets ownership of the thing if he is in good faith and has paid fair value for the thing c. Registered movables i. Art. 525 states that the provisions do not apply to movables that are required by law to be registered by public records d. General rule Autochephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts Inc Notes to Consider A bad faith purchaser of stolen property never acquires title. A purchaser did not act in good faith, a court must either find that the purchaser actually knew that the seller Falcones v. Springview Country Club, Inc.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff family members sought review of the decision of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Tangipahoa (Louisiana), which found in favor of defendant country club in the family members' action claiming ownership of several acres of land that were in the country club's possession. OVERVIEW: The family members instituted proceedings against the country club claiming ownership of particular land within the country club's possession. In 1964, the predecessor owner sold property containing the subject parcel to the country club. The court affirmed the judgment rendered in favor of the country club. Although the trial court erred in determining that the country club acquired ownership of the disputed property through 10 years of peaceful possession within bounds and by just title, as the parcel in question was not sufficiently described within the 1964 sale, the country club had possession based upon acquisitive prescription of 30 years. The country club had maintained the parcel as a golf course from at least 1961. Although at all times proper to the 1964 sale, the country club's detention of the property amounted to precarious possession, the act of sale in 1964 was the juridical link, which enabled the country club to tack its possession to that of its ancestor title, as the country club demonstrated actual, public, continuous, uninterrupted, and corporeal possession of the property within visible bounds from at least 1961 until the filing of the suit in 1993. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the trial court's decision, which found in favor of the country club in the family members'; action claiming ownership of several acres of land in the country club's possession.
Notes to Consider There is no prohibition for tacking on time in which a person was precarious possessor Class Notes Just titlevalid in form, written, registered/filed Tackingprocess of adding time on for possession
Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware Accession 1. Fruits and Products Elder v. Ellerbe
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Elder is surviving daughter of one of joint owners of piece of land. *Ellerbe claims that even though Elder is the owner of the undivided half; court rules that she is entitled to half the mineral rights of the land *Ellerbe claims that because he was a possessor in good faith, he is owed the fruits that have been gathered and that even though he was evicted by the owner, entitled to a certain degree of reimbursement. *
FACTS: CW and John were co-owners of the property in question. Elder is the only surviving heir of CW. Ellerbe is the possessor, occupying the land. He granted a mineral lease to Standard Oil and was receiving the money from the lease. HELD: Ellerbe has to give of the payments to Elder because they arent fruits, they are products. Ellerbe is co-owner with Johns heirs, but since he is possessor, he is presumed to be the owner. Because he is in good faith, he has a right to reimbursement for expenses for products derived from the thing. Notes to Consider The fruits must be of things that are born and reborn of the soil. Class Notes This case is about mineral rights and the question is rather oil is to be considered mineral rights. Mineral rights are neither civil nor natural fruits because the person is depleting the land of its resources.
Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co. Suit to recover the value of forest timber cut and taken by defendant from tract of land which plaintiff is a co-owner of Defendant was a possessor in good faith; however, defendant was without valid title and is liable for the value of timber
2. Accession in Relation to Immovables a. The Space Above and Below b. Artificial Accession Marcellous v. David
Facts: This is a suit for the return of a building and for damages caused by its wrongful removal from plaintiffs land. Distric t judge found for defendant. The defendant, Ms. David, was living alone in a house in the country and desired to move to the town of Breaux Bridge. She proposed to members of her family that if one of them would buy a lot in Breaux Bridge and pay for the expense of moving the house to the lot and installing a cess pool and then let her live there rent free for the remainder of her life, she would execute a will leaving the house to the owner of the lot. Ms. Davids niece (wife of P) accepted, in which the plaintiff bought 2 lots in Breaux Bridge to which the house was moved. It was placed on brick pillars, a cess pool was installed, plumbing was attached,
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and the plaintiff painted the house. At around the same time, Ms. David executed a will leaving all of her property to plaintiffs wife. Ms. David lived in the house rent free for almost 2 years, improving the building at a cost of about $1200. In 1969, difficulties arose between Ms. David and her niece. Ms. Davids brother purchased a lot near his and moved Ms. Davids house. Plaintiff brought this suit, claiming he became the owner of the house when it was moved onto his lot, and that he can recover for its wrongful removal without his consent. Plaintiff also claims that buildings are immovable by nature and not susceptible of ownership separate from the land. Defendant claims she never lost her ownership of the house and had the right to move it. Issue: (1) If when the house was moved to plaintiffs lot in Breaux Bridge, installed on brick pillars and a cess pool constructed and connected to the plumbing, it became immovable by nature and its ownership passed to the owner of the lot. (2) Whether Ms. David has sustained her burden of proving that she owned the house which was located on plaintiffs lot. Holding: (1) It is immovable, but not passed to the owner of the lot. Under traditional civilian concepts, the ownership of land was not susceptible of horizontal division. However, Art. 506 of the CC of 1870 states that All the constructions, plantations and works made on or with the soil, are supposed to be done by the owner, and at his expense, and to belong to him, unless the contrary be proved. Buildings are presumed to belong to the owner of the soil, but a person claiming the ownership of a building on the land of another can overcome that presumption by proof to the contrary. (2) Since she owned the house before it was moved to plaintiffs lot, she remained the owner unless she conveyed it to plaintiff. Reasoning: Plaintiff claims ownership of the house was transferred by an oral donation inter vivos, but buildings are immovable by nature, whether they belong to the owner of the ground or not. Every donation inter vivos of immovable property must be by an act passed before a notary public and two witnesses. In the present case, there was no written instrument and hence there was no donation inter vivos of the house. (The will was written, but Ms. David was not dead.) Plaintiff also claims this is an onerous donation, due to the fact that the object given did not exceed by one-half that of the charges and services rendered by (p). The object was an immovable and must be in writing. There was no written transfer of the house.
Notes to Consider Class Notes
Graffagnino v. Lifestyles, Inc.

Facts: This litigation began when plaintiffs filed a petition to enjoin the defendants, Lifestyles Inc. and Mr. Holmes from removing or disassembling ODOME the land a dome-like building on a wooden platform supported by pilings and hooked up to electrical and water connections. The defendant, Murray, stated the former owner of the property, Leeand, Inc. had allowed Lifestyles to place this demonstration model of the type of building it sells in return for keeping the grass cut. The defendants further alleged that the building is designed to be portable and therefore movable and its ownership did not pass when ownership of the land passed to the plaintiffs. Defendants also alleged that Leeland had agreed in its arrangement with Lifestyles that it would retain ownership of the ODome and the right to remove it at the end of the lease and had informed the plaintiffs of this agreement before plaintiffs had brought the property. The defendants also reconvened against the plaintiffs for damages to the structure, which is now destroyed, in the amount of $15,000. The defendants third-partied the former owner, Leeand and its president, Folse rd Roy, alleging that if the third party defendants had failed to notify the original plaintiffs of the separate ownership, that the 3 party defendants are liable to the defendants for the amount of the reconventional demand. The petition for an injunction is moot since the building is now destroyed. The only issues now concern the defendants demands. The trial court ruled against Leeand, in the amount of $8,000, stating the he was well aware of the fact that it did not own the building when it sold the land. (The written act of sale by which Leeand conveyed the land to the plaintiffs describes the property conveyed as 6 lot s of ground, together with all the buildings and improvements thereon. Issue: (1)Whether the ownership of the portable O-Dome (an immovable when assembled) passed to the plaintiffs along with the land at the time of sale. (2) Whether Leeand should pay damages for the destruction of the ODome. Holding: (1) Yes. Leeands lease with Lifestyles was not recorded and plaintiffs were not privy to the lease, therefore, title to the immovable structure was legally transferred to plaintiffs at the time of the sale with Leeand. Affmd. (2) No. The record shows that Leeand notified one of the plaintiffs in writing prior to the sale that Lifestyles owned the ODome, and it is abundantly clear that all parties to this litigation were aware that the Dome structure was owned by Lifestyles. Most importantly, Lifestyles was put on notice that Leeand was selling its property to (P).
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Reasoning: The ODome is designed to be portable, but also to withstand high winds, therefore, when it is in use it is a dwe lling and designed to have a degree of permanence. It was situated on a platform integrated into the ground with pilings. t Lifestyles had knowledge that the sale was pending, certainly was aware that its lease with Leeand was not recorded, yet did nothing to protect its acknowledged ownership of the structure. We feel that Lifestyles failure to protect itself constituted negligence and was the proximate cause for its subsequent loss. GPOL: When a lease is unrecorded and land is sold, all immovable property transfers.
Notes to Consider Look to the constructions identity when movedif it has no identity when moved or rather only an identity when constructed upon the ground then it is immovable by nature Class Notes
Guzzetta v. Texas Pipe Line Co.

Facts: Plaintiffs are co-owners in indivision of a tract of land on Bayou Lafourche. In 1955 their ancestors in title granted the Texas Pipe Line Company, defendant, a pipeline right of way for the right to lay, construct, operate, maintain, inspect, rep air, replace, change the size of, and remove the pipe line for the transportation of oil, gas, petroleum or other substances. The stated consideration in the servitude agreement for the granting of these rights was $250. Texas Pipeline constructed an 8 inch pipeline running north to south across the plaintiffs property for a distance of 1,061 feet buried three feet below the ground in low, marshy terrain. Around June of 1982, the TX Pipeline discontinued using this portion of the pipeline. Ps asked the D to remove the pipeline or to pay the costs of removal estimated at $12,0000 and D refused. Ps filed suit against the pipeline company asking for damages amounting to the costs of removal of the pipeline, which has not been removed. Procedural History: The trial court and court of appeal determined that Ps had no cause of action. Court of appeal found that the servitude agreement was still in effect, because the agreement contained no applicable term or resolutory condition, and could only be extinguished by 10 years nonuse (article 753). Under the still valid agreement, the court noted that only the pipeline company was granted the right to remove the pipeline at its discretion and accordingly the Guzettas had no cause of action. Holding: Reversed Rule: Article 493 Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plantings made on the land of another with his consent belong to him who made them. They belong to the owner of the ground when they are made without his consent. When the owner of buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, or plantings no longer has the right to keep them on the land of another, he may remove them subject to its former condition. If he does not remove them within 90 days after written demand, the owner of the land acquires ownership of the improvements and owes nothing to their former owner. Comment (b) of article 493 points out that the second paragraph in this article fills a gap in the code, which previously had neglected to specify the rights and obligations between the owner of the improvements and the owner of the ground when their legal relationship terminated. This paragraph may apply when a lease expires, when a predial or personal servitude is established, or when a precarious possessor is given notice to vacate. It gives the owner of the improvements the right to remove them, but if he does not do so 90 days after written demand, the owner of the land acquires ownership of the improvements. It does not give the new owner of the improvements the right to compel removal by the old owner, nor to recover payment for the costs of removal. Reasoning: Under article 493, Ps rights are clear and they have no right to compel removal or costs of removal of the pipeline. The servitude would remain in effect until the actual abandonment of the pipeline or the expiration of 10 years of nonuse. While plaintiffs cannot obtain the relief they prefer under Louisiana law, they are entitled, under the allegations of their petition, to pursue a suit declaring that the servitude has ended. If successful, this suit will at last unencumber their property and restore them to full ownership of their land. Outcome: The judgment of the court of appeal sustaining the exception of no cause of action against plaintiffs is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court.
Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware Britt Builders Inc v. Brister
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Facts: Ms. Brister bought (financed) lot 201 in a subdivision on 3/1/84, in which title was recorded the next day. Total purchase price was $20,500. On 6/25/84, the plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement for lot 201 with the same company that sold the lot to Ms. Brister. A title search was conducted by Chambers(real estate lawyer) who did not discover that the lot was owned by Ms. Brister. Soon after Britt was told was clear, he removed the large oak tree poured a concrete slab for a residence, and began framing the walls, which cost $10,179. On 7/10/84, Britt first learned that Brister owned the lot. Brister was immediately contacted, all work was stopped , and negotiations begin to mitigate damages. Two weeks later Britt filed suit against Brister seeking $12,000 in damages for the enhanced value to her lot. She answered and filed a reconventional demand, seeking damages associated with the cost of her lot, damages for trespass, mental anguish, and attorneys fees. Experts testified at trial, stating the treed lot should bring $2-$2500 more than untreed lot. He estimated that the cost of removing the concrete slab was $8-$10,000 and the lot had a present value of $14-$15,000 with the slab on it (nobody would want this custom sized slab). A contractor gave Brister an estimate of $9,168 to remove the slab. Brit claimed he spent $4$500 to have the tree removed. He added that he bought the lot next to 201 hoping to negotiate a settlement and he was paid $8,816 by Chambers for the materials used in constructing the slab on Bristers lot. Brister claims she chose the lot b/c of its shape, and it had a large tree which she envisioned next to her bedroom. She had spent $1,630 keeping the lot clear for the last 7 years, so the neighbors wouldnt complain. Brister argues that the court erred when it determined that Britt was a go od faith possessor when he constructed the slab on her lot. She contende d that Brits actions were a legal trespass. Britt argues that he was a good faith when he bought the lot by constructing $12,00worth of improvements, and should be entitled to restitution for these improvements. Trial court awarded $3500 for damage to her property. Brister appeals.
Issue: Whether Art. 496 requires an owner to reimburse a good faith possessor for improvements made, even when they do not increase the value of the property.
Holding: No. CC 496 is only for an owner who is unjustly enriched. (Not partial const.) Damages: $1,000 for cleanup of const. materials, $2,500 for removal of the tree, and $9,168 as damages in trespass for removal of the concrete slab.
Reasoning: Britt did not dispute that he erected the concrete slab on Bristers property without her permission, nor does Britt claim to be owner of the property. Britt only occupied the lot as owner for two weeks, but the slab has remained on the lot seven years. Also, the continued presence of the slab deprived Brister of the use and enjoyment of her property and diminished its value to her or other potential owners.
GPL: A good faith possessor needs only to be reimbursed when improvements are made that increase the value of the property.
Accession in relation to immovable in the context of lease 3. Reimbursement for expenses and improvements If the improvement becomes a component part (swimming pool) Voiters v. Atkins Bros.
Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware Sanders v. Jackson Aetna v. LAA Machinery Co.
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International Paper Co. v. E. Feliciana Parish School Board PrescriptionGeneral Principles Notion and Kinds of Prescription *Acquisitive prescriptionmode of acquiring ownership as a result of lawful possession over a certain period of time. *Liberative prescription --is a mode of discharging a debt as a result of inaction by the creditor for a period of time stipulated by law; the time period which you have a right to act -begins to run as soon as the action accrues or the day on which the creditor could institute his demand -when the action depends on a suspensive condition, the prescription does not run until the condition happens -when a sum is payable in fractions at different terms, the prescription runs separately against each part of the debt, counting from the day when it comes due. This rule applies: 1) to the principle reimbursement of which is payable by annuities or by fractions, to facilitate payment by the debtor 2) to revenues (interest, rents, arrears, etc.) payable by installments 3) to pledges and salaries payable at the end of the year or at various times of the year Things susceptible of prescription All private things are susceptible of prescription unless prescription is excluded by legislation. [3485] Reservation of mineral rights Mineral rights property sold by the state shall be reserved, except when the owner or person having the right to redeem buys or redeems property sold or adjudicated to the state for taxes. Prescription Lands and mineral interests of the state, of a school board, or of a levee district shall not be lost by prescription. Prescription shall not run against the state in any civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this constitution or expressly by law.
City of New Iberia v. Romero FACTS: Romero occupied a strip of land in New Iberia pursuant to a lease dated from the year 1972. Romero filed peremptory exceptions [An answer which merely raises an issue of
law, the legal effect of which is the same as that of a demurrer.]
of 10 years liberative prescription, 30 years acquisitive prescription, and no right of action. Romero alleged the property in question wasnt being used for any public purpose and had been abandoned by nonuse for a period in excess of 10 years.
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ISSUE: Whether a thing acquired by a public body as a public thing but subsequently owned as a private thing is subject to acquisitive prescription. RULE: if the thing is never used or ceases to be used as a public thing it takes on the character of alienability and becomes subject to prescription. Reasoning: acquisitive prescription may run against a public body as to private things it owns, but not as to public things. Public property not used by the people in common, which is used for their benefit by the administrators of the city, is subject to prescription. The property ha not been used as a public street since at least 1940 and probably never was. The first evidence of any use was the lease to the defendant.
Prescription and Peremption Peremption [common law term] Statute of limitations=prescription Prescription bars the remedy sought to be enforced and terminates the right of access to the courts for enforcement of the existing right. A preemptive statute destroys the previously existing right with the result that upon expiration of the prescribed period, a cause of action or substantive right no longer exists to be enforced. Contractual Freedom A juridicial act purporting to exclude prescription, to specify a longer period than that established by law, or to make the requirements of prescription more onerous, is null. Commencement of Prescription Commences to run the day after the day of the entrance into possession. The day itself of the taking of possession does not count b/c it is incomplete. Ex. Entrance into enjoyment takes place april 7, the 1st day that counts is april 8th Exceptions: Eventual rightsrights suspended by a condition; rights that have not yet come into prescription and which can neither be transmitted nor defended Mode of computing the time -counted by days, not hours -last year must be finished for the acquisition of prescription -last day must be completed Imprescriptible Actions Partition, boundary, establishing the right of passage in case of an enclosure, acquiring rights to a party wall -these actions have an indefinite duration b/c their cause renews itself everyday Prescription begins to run from the last injury 3. Interruption of Prescription a) naturalapplies only to acquisitive prescription results from a physical act; namely a loss of possession
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b) civilapplies to all forms of prescription civil act; either a suit by the prescribe against the prescriber or an acknowledgement of the prescribees right by the prescriber Class Notes Ex. $1kAl youre supposed to make that payment by March 15th. On March 16th Al comes and ask for 1k. . .you can plea prescription. If debt is acknowledged then they can no longer plea prescription. Lets say you now acknowledge $100 for 10 months *Acknowledgement throws away your ability to plea prescription Civil Interruption; Filing of Suit *An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense in trial court. *half holiday is considered as a legal holiday. 4. Civil Interruption; Acknowledgement Carraby v. Navarre FACTS: The action was brought on a promissory note, given by Navarre in payment of a house and lot, purchased by Navarre from the Carrabys. The debt was secured by a mortgage of the property, which was the consideration of the note. An agent of Carraby demanded payment of Navarre frequently and she answered by requesting his patience. RULE: A promise to pay a debt can be considered in no other light but an acknowledgement of its existence. Any promise to pay (orally, verbally, email) can be acknowledgement of debt SUSPENSION OF PRESCRIPTION *Prescription does not run against a fugitive or former citizen w/o a rep in the state upon whom judicial process may be served. *Prescription begins to run from the day the fugitive returns to the state or from the day his power of attorney appoint a rep Corsey v. State Dept of Corrections
FACTS: Corsey was a prisoner at the state pen and sued the state for injuries sustained in 1972. He did not bring the action until 1974, but he was so mentally incapacitated that he did not gain understanding of his injuries and possible legal remedies until 1973. ISSUE: Whether the year within which the plaintiff must bring his tort action for personal injuries caused by the defendant is interrupted or suspended during the period in which, due to the defendants conduct, the plaintiff had incurred such mental incapacity as to be unable to assert a legal demand to recover for such injuries. HOLDING: Prescription did not begin to run against the plaintiff until 1973 RULE: Prescription runs against all persons, unless they are included in some exception established by law. Contra non valentem 1. where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiffs actions
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2. where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting 3. Where the debtor himself has done some act effectively to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action. 4. Where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant. Principle will not except the plaintiffs claim from the running of prescription if his ignorance is attributable to his own willfulness or neglect; REASONING: defendants own tort produced the plaintiffs mental and physical inability to file suit during the period of tort caused in competency. Dissent stated there should have been some juridical act to claim disability of defendant.
Notes to Consider A person whose ignorance of his cause of action or inability to assert it is the result of his own mental incapacity cannot claim the benefits of this rules unless he has been interdicted. *personal disabilities do not prevent prescription from running *inability to bring suit for some cause foreign to the person of the plaintiffsuspends its running Renunication of Prescription Class Notes Renunciation can happen in writing (express renunciation) or tacit renunciation where renunciation is implied from your actions Prescription cannot be renounced in advance. Prescription is public policy
Possibility of Renouncing an Acquired Prescription *Renunciations allowed after the completion of prescription *Renunciation is a unilateral act that doesnt require acceptance by the other party *tacit renunciationflow from facts which imply an intention of abandoning an acquired right Effect of Renunciation *Court cannot set out prescription; it must be set out by the party *When he in whose favor prescription has run renounces it, he refrains from making use of a means that the law offers him to become owner. Capacity Renunciation of an acquired prescription is the equivalent of an alienation b/c it deprives the person who make it of the ownership of a piece of property which he could have retained. Rights of Creditors of Person who Renounces
Succession of Slaughter
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FACTS: Gardner held 3 notes due 45 days after may 1 1885 w/ 8% interest from date; $75 for may 31, 1189, due 60 days after th date w/ 8% interest. No payments had been made on the notes. July 28 19900 letter was written to the opponent stated that he was aware he owed money and that he could pay but there was difficulty therefore he was pleading bankruptcy. 5 months later the de cujus gave the opponent a check for $1k. ISSUE: Whether under this condition of the facts, that part of the three notes not satisfied by the 1k payment was taken out of prescription. HOLDING: RULE: The renunciation of a prescription once acquired may be either express or tacit.
REASONING: The letter amounts to nothing more than to an expression of ability on the part of the write to pay some uncertain sum of money which his memo book told him he was owing the opponent. The payment of 1k reduced to an isolated fact amounts at most to an acknowledgement of the existence of debt. OR The letter and the payment taken together amount to nothing more than to an acknowledgement of the existence of the debt. They neither expressly nor tactily renounce the acquired prescription.
Harmon v. Harmon
FACTS: 4 loans in the amount of $2300 were made by Alma Harmon to her brother Alfred Harmon between feb 8 67 and feb 7 68. It was further stipulated that payments totaling $250 were made by Alfred between May and Oct of 72. Loans st were made by alma to her brother while he was a sr in med school and during the 1 yr of his internship. There were no paymnts or other activity prior to 72. A phone call was made by alma concerning the loans and Alfred agree to begin monthly pamnts of $50 in 72. Payments begin in May but after oct 72, Alfred stopped the monthly pmnts apparently in response to a fight with his sister. Suit was filed july 5 73 RULE: UNDER ART 3538 (former) The following actions are subject to a liberative prescription of three years:
(1) An action for the recovery of compensation for services rendered, including payment of salaries, wages, commissions, tuition fees, professional fees, fees and emoluments of public officials, freight, passage, money, lodging, and board; (2) An action for arrearages of rent and annuities; (3) An action on money lent; (4) An action on an open account; and (5) An action to recover underpayments or overpayments of royalties from the production of minerals, provided that nothing herein applies to any payments, rent, or royalties derived from state-owned properties. *A mere acknowledgment is not sufficient for the renunciation of prescription, even if accompanied by payment on account of the debt. There must be a new promise to pay the debt in order to nullify an accrued prescription. REASONING: a new promise to pay was made by Alfred during the telephone call
Actions for legal malpractice No action for damages against an attorney at law admitted to practice in LA may be rought after one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or negelict or within one year of discovery; at the latest 3 years Effects of Prescription Acquisition of Ownership When prescription is completed, the possessor becomes owner Survival of Personal Actions Acquisitive prescription does not have the effect of liberating the debtorsdoes not prevent the owner from exercising the different personal actions he may have in restitution of his property from those who detained it.
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Retroactivity of Prescription When prescription is completed, the possessor is deemed to be owner, not merely from the last day, but retroactively from the moment when prescription begin to run. Prescription replaces the title Consequences of Retroactivity 1). The fruits collected by the possessor, even if he in bad faith, remain with him indefinitely. The owner who has lost his main action has no right to retake the fruits; 2) 3rd parties who had acquired from the possessor real rights upon the immovable during the duration of the prescription, find them retroactively consolidated. It is just as if they had been granted by the true owner 3)if the possessor marries under the legal community system, the immovable which he was in process of prescribing at the time of marriage, will belong to the possessor personally. Necessity of Setting up Prescription Prescription must be set up by the possessor At what moment plea should be raised At any stage of proceedings. The fact that no plea of prescription was set up for the first time before the trial court does not deprive the possessor of the right of doing so on appeal. Right of Possessors Creditors Effect of Prescription Prescription furnishes to the debtor and against the creditor a peremptory exception which is a means of defense permitting him to obtain the dismissal of the suit w/o paying anything. Normal Effect of the Exception of Prescription Liberation of the Debtor: obligations are extinguished by prescription. Debtor is discharged and the creditor has no means of avoiding the loss which confronts him. Survival of a natural obligation: ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION -mode of acquiring ownership or other real right by possession for a period of time. -applies to both immovable and movables Movables 3 [good faith]/10 [bad faith] yrs immovable 10 [good faith]/30 [bad faith] years Immovable: 10 year prescription A. Just Title Wilkie v. Cox
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Wilkie and Colbert allege that they and their authors in title have possessed the property for more than 10 years under a deed translative of title, and that they have thus acquired the ownership of the subject property by prescription of 10 years. Wilkie demands he be recognized as owner of the north of the prop and Colbert demands he be recognized of the south of the property. The tract of land was homesteaded by Cox prior to 1902 and a patent was issued to him. Prop was adjudicated to the state of la at a tax sale in 1904 and was not redeemed from the state until 1965. At a tax sale in 1941 the prop was sold to howard raphiel ISSUE: Whether plaintiff and Colbert have acquired the ownership of the subject property by prescription of ten years HOLDING: Yes Whether the 1941 tax deed is a just title sufficient to serve as the basis for claiming ownership by the acquisitive prescription of ten years? HOLDING: Yes REASONING: 2). The tax deed appeared on its face to be valid and translative of title and the tax purchaser was in good faith and took actual and notorious possession of the property. PH: trial court found for wilkie and colbert
B. Good Faith Possessors in good faith are those who believe that he who transmitted the immovable to them was its legitimate owner. Good faith consists in making a mistake regarding the alienators ownership, when dealing with some one who is not the owner of the thing. The acquiriers good faith must be entire; if he had the slightest doubt regarding his authors ownership, he must be deemed to be in bad faith it is not necessary the possessor be ignorant of other defects that may exist. Proof of good faith Good faith is always presumed At what moment good faith is necessary Solely at the moment of acquisition. Even if bad faith arises during the course of prescription by the discovery of error, it doesnt prevent possessor from from prescription of 10/20 yrs Board of Commissioners v. S.D. Hunter Foundation
o Act of sale for two distinct pieces of land that are now being disputed o George tract was sold with full guarantee of title and full subrogation of rights o Title is not the only way to prove ownership o If aside from non-warranty nature the deed discloses a basis for doubting the vendors ownership of the property conveyed, then the purchaser is not in good faith o Dont have to talk about good faith in relation to the second tract of land because of the interruption of prescription of land o Acquisitive prescription is interrupted when possession is lost (Art. 3465) o To win at the possessory action, must show that it has been evicted and within one year it has recovered possession o 13:421 adopted the idea of issue preclusion rather than claim preclusion Says issues decided between the very same parties have the effect as res judicata between those two parties o George issue is settled upon good faith non warranty sale is not in and of itself bad faith. More than just a nonwarranty sale; non-warranty sale in the same deed as a warranty sale. Reasonableness part of the argument has now been lost o Powell issue is the same question. Levee district has a superior title, can SD prove they have owned the land regardless of the title through acquisitive prescription. Need ten years possession, need good faith and just title. Have just title Court originally said they did not have ten years possession because they were evicted for the laying of the pipe line. Questionable whether or not they were actually evicted o For purposes of accession, you cease to be in good faith when defects are made known
Malone v. Fowler
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Sallie Jones bought a tract of cotton growing land in Alexandria for $250 in 1916. D begins negotiations with two random women, neither of whose last name is Jones, he knows Jones is last recorded owner. D is obviously worried that the two are not the true owners, so he writes to their attorney and tells him to have the vendors send back a statement that they are the only owners. The letter itself is suspicious. Held, there is no good faith because in light of subjective and objective circumstances, it was not reasonable for D to think the title was valid and that he owned the thing. i. 1. 2. ii. 1. 2. 3. Objective: the price of the thing possible forgery Subjective: his actions seem to prove that he thought there might be a problem. he prepared the sale and lied about it knowledge of gap in the title
Note: Initial bad faith (doubt as to true owner) can be transformed into good faith if a reasonable inquiry turns evidence that would do away with the doubt. i.e. in Fowler if the two transferors had sworn to be the heirs of Jones, before a notary and other suspicious facts were omitted, the buyer might have been in good faith.
LIMITED PERSONAL SERVITUDES *General Principles 2 kinds of servitudes: personal and predial Personal servitudecharge on a thing for the benefit of a person; individual juridical --3 types of personal servitudes:: all 3 forms of personal servitudes overlap. 1. usufruct Conventional (juridical act-donation or by last will and testament) or operation of law(legal) 2. habitation Gives person the right to live on the property or in the house. Wont have rights of usufruct. Rights still governed by rules of usufruct. 3. rights of use A personal servitude that is enacted by a juridical act can be terminated by non use of 10 years OR after 30 years the servitude automatically Before discussing the relationship between the parties, determine the type of property subject to usufruct. Predial servitudecharge on an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to another owner Notion of Limited Personal Servitudes Limited personal servitudes are real right that confer on a person limited advantages of use or enjoyment over an immovable belonging to another person. Charges on prop in favor of a person rather than an estate. Charges on an immovable belonging to another person and are confined to certain advantages of use or enjoyment. personal indicates that the servitude is in favor of a person rather than an estate Incidents and Function of Limited Personal Servitudes
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Limited personal servitude thats established in favor of a natural person is a heritable right unless the contrary is provided by law or contract. Thus a right of passage stipulated in favor of a person may continue to be exercised by his universal or particular successors. If a limited personal servitude is established in favor of a juridical person, such as a corporation, or a partnership, it is not extinguished at the dissolution of that person; it continues to exist in favor of its successor or in favor of the person to whom the right may have been assigned. Rules of Interpreation-Predial or Personal Servitude? Rules of Interpretation Precise technical terms are not necessary to create a predial servitude.; nor is the use of the word servitude. *vice versa..use of the words may not est. serv+ Servitudes claimed under titles, are never sustained by implicationthe title creating them must be express, as to their nature and extent as well as to the estate which owes them, and the estate to which they are due. Intent to est. servitude must clearly appear from the face of the instrument purporting to est. the servitude @ a statement in an act of sale that the property is subject to a servitude already extinguished does not est. a new servitude. Types of Limited Personal Servitudes Rights of Use Sustainable Forests, L.L.C. v. Harrison McCormick v. Harrison Habitation Barrett v. Barrett
Leury v. Mayer:
Facts: Plaintiff is the only child of J.E. and Hannah Leury. J. E Leury acquired 20 shares of stock in the Bank of Baton Rouge. Then his wife died shortly after. After the death of his wife, he transferred the certificate to the defendant. The certificate was community property and on the death of Mrs. Leury her undivided half interest therein was inherited by P. D pleads prescription of 3 and 10 years and contends that the husband of deceased as usufructuary had the legal right to sell the stock. PH: D prevailed. Issue: Should P be recognized as owner of the undivided half interest issued to the defendant and or a partition by ilicitation said shares and dividends accrued therein? Rule: The usufructuary is entitled only to the fruits, as in the case of rents of real property, the interest of money, and annuities. Holding: Judgment appealed from be amended by restricting the partition sale to the stocks plus dividends which have not been heretofore declared and paid, and by ordering the D to account in the partition for all dividends received by him on the stockin dispute . P pay costs of appeal.
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Reasoning: J.E. leury was never confirmed and qualified as tutor of his minor son. The only dividends that can be sold are such as have not been declared and paid by the bank. The plaintiffs father was entitled to all the dividends declared up until th e date of his death. The only dividends which can be sold are such are such that have not been declared or paid by the bank. The defendant is not accountable for dividends collected prior to the date of the death of J.E. Leury.
Notes to Consider **P. White says this is all we need to know from this case. Pg. 737 Imperfect usufruct transfers the ownership to the usufructuary, so that he may consume, sell, or dispose of them as he thinks proper, subject to the obligation of returning the same quantity, quality, and value to the owner, or their estimated price, at the expiration of the usufruct. Succession of Goode *good case for personal usufruct
Facts: This case involves the validity of a testamentary disposition. The testator died in 1978, leaving no ascendants or descendants and being survived by a brother and the descendants of a predeceased sister. He left an olographic will, which provided for several specific dispositions, but no residuary legacy. The contested legacy provided as follows: Fifth: All oil & gas royalty interest payments owned by me shall be paid to Pauline Parker for as long as she might live (mineral interests payments). After her death the amount of any payments shall be equally divided between my nieces and nephews (mineral interests, then mineral interest payments after death of Parker) and Linda Paine. After the will was probated, the opponent s of the will filed a petition to annul the testament. The case was tried on stipulated facts, and the trial court held that the legacy was a prohibited substitution. The court of appeal affirmed. Proponents of will contend there was no express double disposition in full ownership and no express charge on the first beneficiary to preserve and transmit the property to a 2nd beneficiary. They urge that we construe the testators words as intending to separate his royalty interest in the property from the payments attributable to that interest, so that either (1) he intended to bequeath the payments to named beneficiaries by successive usufructs, while allowing the naked ownership of the royalty interest to pass by intestacy, or (2) he intended to bequeath a life usufruct to Pauline Parker and the naked ownership to the other named legatees. The opponents claim there were no words such as use, usufruct, naked ownership, enjoyment or use and benefit indicative of the testators intention to create the institutions of usufruct and nak ed ownership. Further citing the principle that a testator is presumed to have intended to dispose of all of his property, the opponents argue against construing the disposition as creating successive usufructs, while allowing the naked ownership to pass by intestacy. Trial court held that the legacy was a prohibited substitution. The court of appeal affirmed. Issue: Whether the contested legacy constituted a prohibited substitution. Prohibited substitution A disposition that is not in trust by which a thing is donated in full ownership to a
first donee, called the institute [owner of property], with a charge to preserve the thing and deliver it to a second donee, called the substitute, at the death of the institute, is null with regard to both the institute and the substitute La. Civ. Code art. 1520
Holding: No. In cases such as the present one, an appropriate solution is to give effect to the testamentary disposition by construing it as a valid usufruct naked ownership legacy, rather than as a prohibited substitution, when the testator does not expressly outline all of the details of a prohibited substitution. Reasoning: The testator clearly intended for Pauline Parker to receive the payments made on account of his royalty interest in the property until her death and for the other named lagatees to receive the payments thereafter in equal proportions. The law permitted him to accomplish this intention by giving the usufruct to one and the naked ownership to the others. While his uncounseled language did not expressly provide for the establishment of the legal institutions of usufruct and naked ownership, neither did the language expressly provide that both sets of legatees were to receive the royalty interest in full ownership or that the first legatee was to preserve it for the other legatees. This disposition can therefore be interpreted with equal reasonableness as the bequest of a life usufruct of the royalty interest to Pauline Parker and of the naked ownership to the other named legatees, and that interpretation accords completely with the testators apparent intent, while making the testament valid. Accordingly, we interpret the testamentary disposition as establishing the enforceable legal institutions. GPL: A prohibited substitution must contain (1) a double disposition in full ownership of the same thing to persons named to receive it, one after the other, (2) a charge to preserve and transmit the thing, imposed on the 1st beneficiary for the benefit of the 2nd, and (3) the establishment of a successive order that causes the thing the leave the inheritance of the burdened beneficiary and to enter into the patrimony of the substituted beneficiary.
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Notes to Consider Prohibited substitutiona previous owner cannot tell a future owner what to do with the property once they pass. Smith v. Nelson:
Facts: The mother of the Plaintiffs was a widow to Michael Smith and then got married to Defendant Nelson. She executed a will to leave her one-half interest in the first community to her children and the usufruct of her one-half interest in the second community to Nelson, and the children were left with her one-half interest in the second community. The mother died, and the heirs brought this suit to partition because they allege that the usufruct was lost by operation of law since the D remarried. They pray for a judgment ordering the sale of the real estate and against Nelson for rents and revenues collected by him. PH: The trial court dismissed Ps suit. P appeals. Issue: Does his remarriage terminate the usufruct? Should the property be sold in order to effect a partition? Rule: If the usufructuary of the property is burdened with a usufruct, the existence of the usufruct will not prevent the heirs from provoking between themselves a partition as concerns the naked property. But they cannot compel the usufructuary to participate in the partition and consent to the sale of the immovables, acknowledged indivisible, reserving his right to the proceeds. Holding: 1) No 2) No AFFIRMED Reasoning: Remarriage does not affect the usufruct. The Ps can only partition in kind among them, the naked owners, they cannot compel the usufructuary to partition and sell the property in question. Partition in kind is not even available in this suit.
PERSONAL SERVITUDESUSUFRUCT I. General Principles Personal Servitudes as Dismemberments of Ownership 3 sorts of personal servitudes 1. usufruct 2. rights of use 3. habitation Usufruct; Definition 1. Has the right to enjoy all natural and civil fruits , can make improvements and alterations to property, but must receive consent of naked owner or court approval (prudent administrator); 2. can de-immobilize movables on property; 3. usufruct will then become a usufruct of money. Usufruct obligations 1. Post security unless it is a legal ususfruct. Failure to give security will not delay the usufrutuary from enjoying the prop; must pay prop taxes. 2. Must conduct an inventory over the property, otherwise the usufruct will be delayed. 3. Answerable for losses due to his fraud, neglect or default (Adverse Possessor taking a portion of the property subject to the usufructart. 597 and 598. 4. Responsible for making ordinary, necessary repairs and expenses. Usufruct can make extraordinary repairs and seek reimbursement, but the reimbursement is without interest. (577-580) 5. May seek to abandon the prop. Or renounce his interest in the property subject to the usufruct, but he wil still be held accountable for all charges of the enjoyment of the property during the period of his possession. 7. May move all of his improvements that were placed on the property, but must restore the property to its former condition. He does not have the right to claim costs of materials etc. if he placed Iit on the property and it cant be removed and the issues of consent become relevant(496/497)
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La. Civ. Code art. 535 Usufruct is a real right of limited duration on the property of another. The features of the right vary with the nature of the things subject to it as consumables or nonconsumables. 2 kinds of usufructs 1. perfect Usufruct of nonconsumable things which the usufructuary can enjoy w/o changing their substance, though their substance may be diminished or deteriorated naturally by time or by the use to which they are applied; as a house, a piece of land, furniture and other movable effects 2. imperfect (quasi usufruct) Imperfect usufruct was the usufruct of consumable things which would be useless to the usufructuray if he did not consume or expand them, or change the substance of them, as money, grain, liquors. Today the articles combine both perfect and imperfect Classification of things as consumables or nonconsumables controls the features of the usufruct. (536) Usufruct of Nonconsumables; Definition [539] Grantor may relieve the usufructuary of the obligation to preserve the substance of a thing; for example the grantor may confer on the usufructuary authority to sell the thing. No reimbursement necessary, but usufruct must surrender the property to the naked owner at the end of the usufruct. (Prudent administrator) (perfect usufruct) Usufruct of Consumables; Definition [ Usufruct of nonconsumables may under certain circumstances be converted into a usufruct of consumables Usufruct of consumables differs from usufruct of nonconsumables in that it transfer to the usufructary the ownership of the things and renders the naked owner a general creditor of the usufructuary who as owner is entitled to any capital appreciation resulting from successful investment. Usufruct must reimburse the naked owner at the end of the term for the usufruct (imperfect usufruct) Things susceptible of Usufruct Usufruct may be established on all kinds of things, movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal Usufruct as an Incorporeal May either be an incorporeal movable or incorporeal immovable Conventional and Legal Usufruct Rights of the Usufructuary Gueno v. Medlenka
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Facts: This is a suit for a declaratory judgment. (P)s, Leonie Gueno, Albert Gueno Jr., and Donald Gueno , and their mineral lessee, Charles Wrightsman, seek a declaration that Leon Medlenka, who owns a usufruct on part of their land, has no right or interest in the oil, gas or other minerals thereunder and, therefore, was without authority to grant a mineral lease to the other defendant, Bryant A. Feglman. The judge, while upholding (p)s mineral lease, declared that their lessees rights were subordinate to the usufructory rights of Medlenka, in view of the obligations imposed on the landowners, and therefore decreed that the lessee could not enter on the surface of the land subject to the usufruct without first obtaining Medlendas consent. Plaintiffs complain of this ruling and we believe that there is merit in their contention that the subordination of the exercise by (p)s of their rights to the usufructuarys right of possession and enjoyment of the land may well be contrary to public policy. Issue: (1) Whether the creation of a usufruct on land carries with it a right in the usufructuary to search for and reduce to his possession the oil and gas which may lie under the surface. (2) Whether the naked owner has the right to search for the minerals during the existence of the usufruct and to reduce them to his possession. Holding: (1) No, unless the mine or quarry was worked before. (2) Yes. The naked owner retains, as an incident to his ownership, the right to open a new mine on land subject to the usufruct and to the products derived from the mining operations. CC561. Reasoning: The usufruct of land is specifically designed to be a perfect usufruct. Since minerals such as oil and gas are a part of the land itself, it follows that they cannot be used by a usufructuary of land if such use will alter their substance. However, oil and gas have no use unless their substance is altered and, therefore, it is apparent that the usufructuary of land cannot use any oil or gas which exists under the land, and by a parity of reasoning, he does not have the right to explore for these minerals and withdraw them from the land. The usufructuary of land, having only a perfect usufruct, has only the right to the natural fruits of the land and such civil fruits. CC 560 declares that the usufructuary has the right to draw all the profits which are usually produced by the thing subject to the usufruct; he may cut trees on the land or take from it earth, stones, sand and other material for his own use provided he acts as a prudent administrator, and does not abuse the right accorded. However, CC 561, which the trial judge found applicable to the case, restricts the right of the usufructuary to the enjoyment and proceeds of mines worked before the commencement of the usufruct; but he has no right to mines and quarries not opened. The usufructuary, not having any right to explore for minerals, is not a necessary party to a mineral lease and neither may he prevent the owners lessee from entering the property for exploration purposes nor may he object to such explorations as long as this right is exercised in such a way as to not unreasonable interfere with his use of the land. A servitude may even be granted, provided there will be no injury to the usufructuary. Hence, it would not be reasonable to conclude that the usufructuarys consent was required in order for the owner to conduct mineral operations, provided they dont
Class Notes If this was crop growing on the land or rental income he was getting the usufructuary would be able to use these fruits and the rent. However, if the natural owners opened this land then the usufructuary would be entitled to the minerals in the open land because the land was changed by the naked owner. Notes to Consider: The obligations of the owner of the usufructuary: [naked owner] 1. deliver the thing to the usufructuary 2. neither interrupt nor in any way impede the usufructuary in the enjoyment of the property or impair his rights 3. while he may make alterations on the premises, he must not do so in such a way to worsen the condition of the usufructuary 4. he may not create any new servitude on the property unless it be done in such a manner as to be of no injury to the usufructuary 5. he may sell or alienate the thing without the usufructuarys consent, but he is prohibited from doing it in such circumstances as may be injurious to the enjoyment of the usufructuary
*usufructuary is supreme. Naked owner cannot affect anything that would impede on the
usufructuary
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Rights which the owner retains 1. right of exploration for minerals 2. Entering the premises for certain purposes [i.e. to make alterations] 3. create a new servitude on the land Class Notes Ex. Will allows John to use his car [1999 Toyota] for 3 years. During this time period john put in a $1500 radio. There was no consent given for the radio and no communication between the two. *you would start this answer off with the relationship between the two partiesnaked owner and usufructuary. Then what was done to the vehicle How is this a usufruct? Definite time period and a donation inter vivos [living] *Would the radio be an improvement or a repair? *Did the radio increase the value of the car? *The radio would be an accessory? What happens when the accessory is attached to the movable? The owner of the car/movable is now the owner of the accessory. Louisiana Mineral Code Mineral rights are not included in usufruct of land except as specifically provided Conventional usufruct, including one created by a donation inter vivos or mortis causas may include enjoyment of mineral rights If a usufruct of land is that of parents during marriage the usufructuay is entitled to use and enjoyment of the landowners rights in minerals as to mines or quarries actually worked at the time the usufruct was created. If a usufruct of land is that of a surviving spouse, whether legal or conventional and there is no provision creating the usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the landowners rights in minerals, whether or not mines or quarries were actually worked at the time the usufruct was created. Kennedy v. Kennedy
FACTS: Kennedy, 91, sought a declaratory judgment authorizing a clear cut on the tract. Kennedy, 70 yr old naked owner, opposed the clear cut. ISSUE: a usufructuarys right to harvest timber from a previously unmanaged tract of land RULE: ordinarily the right of the usufructuary extends only to the fruits of the thing subject to the usufruct. Trees are normally considered to be capital assets rather than fruits. Usufructuary may cut trees only for his personal use or for the improvement or cultivation of the land. Continuous production of a tree farm or regularly exploited forests may be regarded as fruits, and thus belong to the usufructuary Facts: Helena Kennedy, a 91 year old usufructuary of a 143 acre tract of mature pine trees sought a declaratory judgment authorizing a clear cut on the tract. James Kennedy, the 70 year old naked owner opposed. Issue: Whether a usufructuary has the right to harvest timber from a previously unmanaged tract of land. Whether the tract is timberland. What constitutes proper management of that tract? Reversed, authorizing plaintiff to clear cut the land.
Held:
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Rule: When the usufruct includes timberlands, the usufructuary is bound to manage them as a prudent administrator. The proceeds of timber operations that are derived from proper management of timberlands belong to the usufructuary. Reason: The court considered numerous definitions of what constitutes timberland. This information was obtained via dictionaries as well as expert testimony (see page 670-671). They opined that the tract was timberland according to both sources. As far as what constitutes proper management, the court held that it should be determined by a trier of fact. In this case, the trial court accepted the opinion of plaintiff's expert regarding proper management. Although proper management will vary according to species, condition, location, age, etc. of the timber, plaintiff's expert offered the most prudent management opinion, thus the court found no error in the trial court's acceptance of his testimony. __________________________________________________________ Dissent: Johnson dissented. He indicated that a clear cut of the land will affect the substance of the property and deny the naked owner the protection that he is afforded under the law. However, he did conceded that prudent management did require that the land be selectively cut to preserve the substance of the land.
Notes to Consider one of the rights given to the usufructuary is the right to all fruits produced by or derived from the things that are subject to the usufruct. Rights to fruits commences on the effective date of the usufruct and ends when the usufruct terminates. Usufruct terminates when 1. Usufruct dies; or the legal entity is dissolved or after a period of 30 yrs. 2. Expiration of a term or condition (remarriage or a minor reaches the age of majority) 3. Total destruction of the thing subject to the usufruct does not terminate the usufruct because the usufruct attaches to any proceeds.4.Prescription of Non-use (10 years) 5. Usufruct and naked ownership (one person) can terminate the usufruct due to confusion (art. 622) i.e. if the servient estate (usufruct) buys the dominant estate from the naked owner then there is confusion and usufruct terminates. 6. Abuse, neglect, fraud, alienation w/o authority; failure to make ordinary repairs. 7. Renunciation by usufructuary; however, the usufructuarys creditors can annull the renunciation. [he may not want it but he owes us so we will enjoy his natural and civil rights] (626) If a fruit is produced by or derived from that thing during the existence of the usufruct, the usufructuary gets ownership of that fruit and need not account for it at termination of the usufruct to the naked owner. Where two statues deal with the same subject matter, they should be harmonized if possible. However, if there is a conflict, the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the statute more general in character. Class Notes What is a prudent administrator? Refer to page 760 for hypos Class Notes March 25th, 2011 A usufructuary cannot require the naked owner make any repairs. Naked owner is required to repair extraordinary repairs but the usufrucutary cant compel him to make these repairs. Usufructuary can either correct the problem him/her self and be reimbursed or wait. Extraordinary repairslook to the type of damage vs. ; when determining if its an extraordinary repair look at what has to be done to the repair. Do additional people have to come into fix the damage. Walker v. Holt
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FACTS: Walker was delivering gas to the Holts property and stepped in a hole injuring himself. The property had several naked owners and a usufructuary. The court was to determine who was responsible for repairing the hole, the naked owner or the usufructuary. [H] The usufructuary because the naked owners did not have knowledge of the hole in the ground.
Use and enjoyment; maintenance; prudent administrator; therefore they are supposed to know of any property damage. Naked owners wouldnt necessarily know of property damage usufructuary Class notes March 28, 2011 Usufruct must maintain property; must be prudent administrator [neglect, abuse, fault] Succession of Firman Firman has a life usufruct and she doesnt want to be responsible for the mortgage and interest. Notes to Consider: When you have a will it supersedes the code. Right of habitation vs. right of usufructuary Right of habitation does not include the right to civil and natural fruits. --right of habitation is simply the full enjoyment of the house. They may not lease the property. Unlike in a usufruct who can lease out the property. Legal Powers of the Usufructuary Sparks v. Dan Cohen co.
Facts: This is a suit to have a contract of lease adjudged terminated by the death of the lessor, who had only the life usufruct of the property. The plaintiffs are the owners of the property. They are the 6 sons and daughters and a grandson, the latter representing a deceased son, of R.J. Nelson, deceased. The (p)s acquired title to the leased property, which is a store bui lding in the city of Monroe, as a legacy from their uncle, James Nelson. He died in 1908, and in his will he bequeathed his estate to the 7 children of his deceased brother, R.J. Nelson, and bequeathed the usufruct of the estate to his widow, Mrs. Martha Nelson. She leased the store to the Dan Cohen Co., Inc., (d) in this suit, on 2/1/34, for the term of 5 years, at the rental of $200 per month, with the privilege of renewal for an additional term of 5 years at $300 per month, at the option of the lessee. Mrs. Nelson was then 92 years old. She died on 4/23/36. Four days after her death, the parties who are the (p)s in this suit, as owners of the property, served a written notice on the Dan Cohen Co., as lessee, that the lease was terminated by the death of Mrs. Nelson, who had only a life usufruct of the property. The Dan Cohen Co., after considerable correspondence and discussion, denied that the lease was terminated by the death of the lessor, and insisted that the lease should continue to the end of the term stipulated. Thereafter, the parties who are the (p)s in this suit, and who were collateral heirs of Ms. Mar tha Nelson, inheriting 1/8s of her estate, joined in a petition with the other collateral heirs of Ms. Nelson, inheriting 7/8s of her estate, to be recognized as her heirs at law, and to be sent into possession of her estate unconditionally and without the benefit of inventory. An ex parte judgment was rendered accordingly. Thereafter, the parties who are the (p)s in this suit, as owners of the leased premises, served a formal demand on the Dan Cohen Co. to vacate the leased premises; and, upon the companys refusal to vacate, the owners brought this suit. The (d) averred that the contract of lease, on the part of Ms. Nelson, was an unqualified or unconditional contract of lease for the term stipulated, because Ms. Nelson was not referred to in the lease as the usufructuary of the property, but rather the lessor. After hearing the case on its merits the judge decided in favor
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of the plaintiffs, declaring the lease terminated by the death of the lessor, and slowing the plaintiffs $300 per month rent thereafter, and ordering the (d) to deliver possession of the leased premises to the (p)s. Issue: Whether a lease made by a usufructuary terminates at the time of death of the usufructory. Holding: yes. A lease made by an usufructuary ceases of right at the expiration of the usufruct, whether the lessor informed the lessee, or failed to inform him, before or at the time of making the lease, that he, the lessor, was only the usufructuary and not the owner of the property. Reasoning: It is the right of the lessee to be indemnified by the heirs of the lessor, if the lessor is only the usufructuary and if he dies before the expiration of the term of the lease, that depends upon whether the lessor failed to make known to the lessee that he the lessor, was not the owner but only the usufructuary of the property. The evidence suggests that the (d)s knew Ms. Nelson was not the owner. An usufructuary cannot, by failing to disclose to a lessee that he, the lessor, is not the owner but only the usufructuary of the property, deprive the owner of his right under the law which states that such a lease ceases of right at the expiration of the usufruct. GPL: CC 567 The usufructuary may enjoy by himself or lease to another, or even sell or give away his right; but all the contracts or agreements which he makes in this respect, whatever duration he may have intended to give them, cease of right at the expiration of the usufruct. CC 607 The right of the usufruct expires at the death of the usufructuary. CC 2730 A lease made by usufructory ends when right of usufruct ceases.
Class Notes The civil code declares that a lease made by one having only the usufruct of the property ends when the right of usufruct ceases, and that lessee has no claim against the heris of the deceased usufructuary, for indemnification, if the usufructuary made known to the lessee that he the lessor, had only the usufructand not the ownership of the property.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY Inventory and Security Succession of Watson

Facts: This is an appeal form a judgment of the trial court ordering the executor to post security in the amount of $30,000 within 10 days from service of the order. The appellant, John Milton Watson, is the testamentary executor of the Succession of Frances Watson. The decedent left an olographic will in which she bequeathed the forced portion of her estate to her daughter, Sylvia Watson; her son, John Earl Watson; and her granddaughter, Laurie Watson. Sylvia and John Earl Watson are children of decedents marriage to John Minton Watson, her surviving spouse, testamentary executor and appellant herein. Laurie Watson is the only child of Sidney Watson, a predeceased son by appellant. The decedent left the disposable portion of her estate to appellant and gave him a usufruct for life over the forced portion. She also named appellant as executor of her estate and relieved him of the obligation of furnishing security. The decedents will was admitted to probate. Subsequently , Sylvia and Laurie Watson filed a petition seeking to compel appellant, as the executor of the estate, to furnish security. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment ordering appellant to post security in the amount of $30,000. Appellant has perfected this appeal. Issue: Whether appellant can be compelled to furnish security even though in her will the decedent dispensed with the requirement that he furnish security. Holding: Yes. Although decedent dispensed with the requirement that the executor of her estate furnish security, 3153 of CCP provides that a person named by the testator as executor is not required to furnish security except when required by the testament or as provided in 3154 3155. Reasoning: Art. 3154 provides authority for the forced heirs to compel the surviving spouse acting in the position of executor to furnish security even though the forced heirs )as issue of the marriage between surviving spouse and decedent) may not be able to compel the surviving spouse in the position of usufructuary to provide security. GPL: CCP 3154 Forced heirs and the surviving spouse in community of the testator may compel the executor to furnish security by an ex parte verified petition therefore. If the court finds that the petitioner is a forced heir, or the surviving spouse in community, it shall order the executor to furnish security, within 10 days of the service of the order, in an amount determined by the court as adequate to protect the interest of the petitioner.
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Class Notes: *If the succession is worth 75k. lets say 50k is worth the value of the usufruct. The naked owner can compel the usufruct to put up 50k Repairs, Preservation Efforts, and Charges Succession of Crain
FACTS : Crain died and was survived by his spouse and 2 daugthers. Crains will confirmed the legal usufruct in favor of appellee and also named her as Testamentary Executrix. Appelle resigned from her position as executrix and appellant was appointed as provisional administratrix. Appellee was later reinstated as Executrix. ISSUE : Whether the succession or the usufructuary should bear the costs of repair and maintenance of the family home? 2) Whether the testamentary executrix should be held personally liable for penalties and interest assessed against the succession because of late payment of the federal estate tax? HOLDING : Since appellee is a usufructuary appellee is entitled to the fruits of the property she must assume those liabilities resulting from the usufruct. Therefore, we find appellee responsible for the costs of the ordinary repair items. Mrs. Crain personally should not have been assessed with the penalties and interest. RULE : The naked owner is generally only responsible for extraoridinary repairs. However, the usufructuary does not have the right to compel the naked owner to make the extraordinary repairs. His only remedy is reimbursement by the naked owner at the end of the usufruct.
Notes to Consider Ordinary Repairs: [usufructuary responsibility] Paint interior and exterior of house, repair leak spots, remove all glass mould in kitchen, den and bedroom and reseal water leaks, replace one frame of glass (solar equal film); erect iron post around electrical substation; remove small tree; repairs to air conditioning system; Naked Owner Responsibility: [extraordinary repairs] Repairs to dock; repairs to boat slip; repairs to roof Person who actually owns the property subject to the usufruct and who has legal title to the property. Think of relationship as lesee lessor Can terminate the usufruct if usufructuary is committing waste, neglect or is alienating the thing without authority. Class Notes: Any expenses related to the preservation of the property or necessary expenses of the property and even extraordinary . Think about a lesee/lessor relationship. What would the lessee have to pay for vs what the lessor would be responsible for. Ex. Home owner Association dues Payments of debts Succession of Davis
FACTS : Davis died and was survived by his widow, Davis the administratrix and his 3 children from a prior marriage (the forced heirs). At the time of Davis death the community owed two mortgage debts. One due to Ford and a mortgage debt. ISSUE : Whether there is liability for mortgage payments? deceaseds separate funds with community funds? HOLDING: RULE: When the usufruct is est. mortis causa, the position of the usufructuray depends on whether the usufruct is universal under universal title, or under particular title. *Neither the universal usufructary nor the usufructuary under universal title is Whether there should have been the commingling of the
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liable for the debts of the succession. The property subject to their usufruct may be seized and sold for the pmnt of succession of debts. *When it is necessary to satisfy a creditor of the succession or the universal successor may sell so much of the property subject to a universal usufruct or usufruct under universal title. *The universal usufructuary must advance the funds needed for the discharge of all the debts of the succession.
Termination of Usufruct Causes of Termination Barry v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company
FACTS: In an automobile accident plaintiffs Barry, driver of one of the vehicles, and her mother sued individually and on behalf of the her minor son. The vehicle was purchased during the marriage between Mrs. A.e and her deceased husband. Mrs. Barry owner and undivided one half interest and has only a usufruct of the remaining one half which is owned by the 4 surviving children of the marriage. ISSUE: Whether all naked owners of property subject to the usufruct of a surviving spouse are indispensable parties to an action by the usufructuary for the total destruction of the property due to the wrongful act of a third person. HOLDING: The usufruct of the surviving spouse does not terminate. Instead it attaches to the claim for damages RULE: Art. 613 is inapplicable to usufructs under universal title, namely usufructs of an assembly or a universality of things. 613 applies to the usufruct of individual things REASONING:
CLASS NOTES B/c the destruction was due to third partys fault and not the usufructuaries fault then the usufruct remains. Then it attaches to the claim for damages. Universal title [recvs all community property upon decedents death] vs universal successor [recvs all property upon decedents death] vs. particular title [recvs all jewelry upon decedents death] Bond v. Green
Facts: James and Ann Bond filed a rule to evict George and Mildred Green and J.B. and Freddie Powell from the land in dispute. The (p) alleged that (d)s were occupying the property without a lease and that the purpose fo (d)s occupancy had ceased. I n the alternative, the plaintiffs pleaded that, in the event it was determined that the defendant had a right to occupy the premises, the court should define the boundary of such occupied land. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of (d)s recognizing that they had a usufruct over the disputed property. (Lots 13-16 of Hedges Landing Lake Lots). The court further ordered the (d)s the reimburse the (p)s for taxes previously paid in the amount of $24.89. The court ordered the (d)s to pay taxes for 1980 and future taxes. Plaintiffs appealed. Mr. and Ms. Green sold to Love a tract of land containing approximately 55 acres of land. The instrument by which the property was sold contained the following reservations: Vendors reserve unto themselves the usufruct of the house in which they now reside, the small house situated immediately on the west side of their residence and the yards surrounding the said residence. Mrs. Green, 76 years of age, testified that following the sale to Love in 1966, they co ntinued to live in the larger of the two structures. She stated that at the time of the sale to Love, both structures were in bad shape or dilapidated. The Greens attempted to make repairs, but the overall condition of the house could not be appreciably improved. The structural portions of the house had deteriorated (due to termites) to such an extent that the house could not be safely lived in. The small house was not lived in was in a dilapidated condition when the sale was made to Love. The condition of this structure deteriorated to the point that it was falling down. In 1976, Ms. Green had her son-in-law remove the structures. After the removal, 2 mobile homes were moved onto the property and placed around the location where the houses had been. The Greens occupied one, and the (d)s Powell, daughter and son-in-law of the Greens, occupied the other. Plaintiffs urge that, under the facts presented, the usufruct should be considered terminated on the ground that the property subject to the usufruct has been totally and permanently lost. Plaintiffs rely on CC 613. Issue: (1) Whether, under the facts, the Greens usufruct had terminated; and (2) If such usufruct is still in effect, whether the trial court erred in its designation of the extent of property subject to the usufruct. Rule: Article 613 terminates the usufruct if the total usufruct is lost through decay. Usufruct was on the house and the land. The land is still useable. CC art 2276: when the instrument is ambiguous parol evidence may be let in.
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CC 583 Neither the usufructuary nor the naked owner is bound to restore property that has been totally destroyed through accident or because of age. Holding: No. No. In the case at hand, the usufruct extended to not only the 2 houses, but the yards surrounding same. Reasoning: Plaintiffs urge that Greens committed waste or neglected to make ordinary repairs. (This position of the plaintiffs is likewise without merit, because these structures were old and decayed, and a usufructuary is not bound to restore property that has been destroyed because of age.) The plaintiffs contend that the (d)s failure to pay the property taxes on the land entitled the plaintiffs, as naked owners, to terminate the usufruct. ((P)s are wrong The usufructuary is bound to pay the annual charges imposed during his enjoyment on the property subject to the usufruct, such as property taxes.) Plaintiffs finally argue that trial judge was erroneous in allowing the testimony of Love as to the area covered by the Greens usufruct. ((P)s are wrong - Parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict or extend what is contained in a written instrument. However, where the instrument contains ambiguity, the court may resort to extrinsic evidence to clarify the ambiguity by showing the intention of the parites.)
Class Notes partial destruction vs. total destruction. With partial destruction the usufructuary still remains. Pg. 780sale of immovable property (must be filed and ) exceptionparol evidence may be used when there is ambiguity in the contract Ex. Duplex..one person owns one side and the other owns the other side. Duplex address is 123 main street with one side being 123 main st and the other 123 main st. Parol evidence would show that only half was to be sold and not the entire duplex. Kimball v. Standard Fire Ins.
Facts: On 6/28/83, (p), Bobbie Kimball, filed suit against (d), The Standard Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut (Standard), seeking to collect fire insurance proceeds after a house purchased during her marriage to the late Guy Kimball was totally destroyed by fire. After the house burned, Michael Davis, who had been appointed provisional administrator of the succession of Guy Kimball on June 24, 1980, gave notice to counsel for Standard that he intended to intervene in the suit on behalf of the succession. However, before a formal intervention was filed, Standard inadvertently sent a check directly ot Ms. Kimballs attorney and the check was cashed. Subsequently, on 11/30/83, and intervention was filed by Mr. Davis and tried without a jury. Trial court found for Ms. Kimball. On appeal, intervenor argues that the trial court erred in failing to find that a portion of the insurance proceeds belonged to the Succession of Guy Kimball. Issue: Whether any insurance money for a fire should be given to a deceased individuals administrator, when the only name on the policy if the deceased individuals wife. Holding: No. Reasoning: Ms. Kimball was the only named insured under the fire insurance policy and that she did not intend to cover any interest other than her own insurable interest. Accordingly, the trial court determined that the Succession of Guy Kimball was not entitled to a share of the insurance proceeds and dismissed the interveners suit at interveners costs. Rule: Article 617- when proceeds of insurance are due on account of loss, extinction, or destruction of property subject to the usufruct, the usufruct attaches to the proceeds. If the usufructuary or the naked owner has separately insured his interest only, the proceeds belong to the insured party.
Watson v. Federal Land Bank of Jacksonusufruct over funds

FACTS: Winston Estes executed a mortgage on his separate property in favor of the prudential insurance co. of America. His wife joined in the mortgage in order to wave any homestead exemption rights. Winston died and left his wife Margie by testament the usufruct over all of his proper, both community and separate, including the mortgage property 2 each of his 4 children. Money judgments were rendered against 3 of the 4 children. Margie and the 4 child not indebted to the land bank filed suit to recover the funds ISSUE: Whether a usufruct which was subject to a prior superior mortgage, applies to any of the excess proceeds after the superior mortgage has been satisfied by a judicial sale.
th
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RULE 620 enforcement of a mortgage placed on property prior to the creation of a usufruct terminates the usufruct only to the extent necessary to satisfy the mortgage obligation. Should there be any proceeds remaining after the sale, the usufruct attaches to those proceeds REASONING Although the appellant is a universal usufructuary is required to advance funds necessary to pay succession debts or suffer the seizure and sale of the property, she is not personally liable for these debts. Paragraph 1 of 620 only contemplates complete termination when the enforcement when of the superior mortgage exhausts the property and no proceeds remain. Enforcement of mortgage to terminate a usufruct should be allowed only to the extent necessary to satisfy the mortgage obligation; the remaining proceeds are still subject to the usufruct
CLASS NOTES *In certain circumstances the creditor can step in and state they want the proceeds deriving from the usufruct/property. *Can a usufructuary terminate their authority of usufruct? YES Consequences of Termination; Accounting *Succession of Hayes
FACTS: at her death, wife of jessee clark having several legal heirs left a will under which she gave to her husband the usufruct of her share in the community property. *husband filed a final acct and settlement of the community. *the heirs filed a case in opposition of his settlement in regards to 2 credits awarded to the husband which were related to cotton he sold for confederate money. *the court held he took and held the cotton in his rt of usufructuary under the will. *the husband had made an investment of the funds from the sale of the cotton BUT it wasnt made in the name of the succession and therefore not subject to his usufruct. *the court found the property brought into the community by the husband were horses and cows
Class Notes Proceeds from a sale reimbursed to naked owners. Obligation of prudent admin, maintain prop which is suitable of interest of naked owner, at the end of the usufruct Class Notes April 1, 2011 Usufruct of consumable thingsi.e. money; doesnt mean that you always will have to return the money. The usufruct may just be that you use the money in a certain way AND if you dont use it in the manner which it was given usufruct over, then you may have to repay or account for it. Termination of usufructex. selling it.
Succession of Heckert 2 children inherited stock from their deceased mother, but the shares were held by their father who collected dividends during his lifetime. When the father died the children brought an action against his wife for donations of their stock. The court held the children owned of the stock shares. No acquisitive prescription Pg 789 3rd para Class Notes Fiduciaryprudent administrator cannot transfer stocks regardless that they didnt use the stock. ;;breach of fiduciary obligationagency relationship between naked owner and usufruct. At all points usufruct is supposed to act on behalf of the naked owner.
Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware Legal Usufruct Class Notes
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Legal usufruct vs. testament usufruct Legal community property; no will Operation by law. can terminate upon remarriage or death of surviving spouse. Security. Testamentary usufruct community property and separate property, will ; surviving spouse pays taxes (inheritance taxes). Security Donation mortis causas ; usufruct for life unless otherwise specified *security is required on 1. Consumables 2. Legitime (forced portion) 3. No blood relationship. Testator may waive Purpose of security is to ensure the prudent administrator will fulfill their obligation to return the property in the same condition in which it was given to them. Not to damage the property. Comparable to when you rent an apartment and give a security deposit and if property is damaged the security deposit will be used to fix the damages. Ex. There is a house, a car, that the couple own. There is a personal injury settlement 200k. all property they own. If there is only one forced heir who is 10 years old, they will be a forced heir by the definition of the code. Their forced portion would be of the decedents estate. But if youre giving.
Darby v. Rozas FACTS: decedent granted a usufruct in his property to a surviving spouse. After the spouse remarried, the decedants daughters filed a suit to terminate the usufruct. *trial court ruled the usufruct didnt terminate upon the spouses marriage. *on appeal, the court reversed and held that there was nothing in the decedants testament that indicated he intended to create a testamentary usufruct. *court concluded the usufruct qualified as a legal usufruct. RULE 890usufruct terminated when the spouse remarried.
Norsworthy v. Succession of Norsworthy 704 so.2d 953

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant daughter of decedent sought review of a decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Morehouse (Louisiana), which awarded appellee widow of decedent the periodic allowance authorized by La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2437. The widow brought an action against the succession of her deceased husband for the La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2432 marital portion. Judgment was entered that awarded her the periodic allowance authorized by La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2437. In affirming the decision, the court held that there was no abuse of discretion in awarding the monthly allowance during the administration of the succession as provided by art. 2437. Under the statute, the widow was entitled to the usufruct of one-fourth or of a lesser fraction of the succession, depending on the number of children. She was not entitled to the value of such a fraction in usufruct or to a usufruct having a value equal to that of such a fraction of the succession. The court overruled Succession of Henry, 287 So. 2d 214, La. App. 3d Cir. 1973 to the extent that it was inconsistent with La. Civ. Code Ann. art 2434. Finally, the monthly allowance was not abusively high. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the decision that awarded decedent's widow the periodic allowance authorized by statute .
**[FINAL]PREDIAL SERVITUDES Arts. 646-654 When discussing it in exam.tell everything about predial servitude. What is it...what type (negative/affirmative) (natural/ ---deals with drainage)created by title? You dont have to repeat the same definition over and over again.
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Remember a predial servitude is a charge on an estate I. General Principles A. Predial Servitudes Real right burdening an immovable, requires the existence of two immovabls belonging to different owners, right is the benefit of an immovable rather than a person. 2 different estates with two different owners. Servienthas the servitude *may serve a multitude of purposes and may have a variable content Gratutious right offered by the owner of immovable property in favor of the public, a specific person (personal servitude) or to the adjacent landowner predial servitude) Acquired by title (non apparent) or through prescription; by declaration or destination of the woner (741). Predial servitudes wont always be visible by looking at the land. 2. Attaches to the land, not to the person; Therefore, if I live on a piece of property and I sell it, the new owner can enjoy the servitude.3. Doesnt form part of ones patrimony; it is simply a right granted to the owner of the dominant estate. 4. Three different forms of predial servitudes: Legal, Conventional and Natural Examples of predial servitudesright of support, drainage, view, erection of buildings or structures; passage (most common), usage of water for livestock. Creation of predial serv. 1. non apparent predial servitudes must be included in the deed or title to the immovable property and said title must be recorded; 2 . can only be established by the registered owners of the servient estateall co owners must agree to the servitude; 3. If the persons ownership is conditional, than servitude is conditional. 4. Permitted on public property b/c ownership isnt a n issue. 5. There can be multiple servitudes for the benefit of one estate, and there can be reciprocal servitudes. {art. 725). 6. Predial servitudes can be est. conditionally Who can acquire a predial servitude? 1. owner of dominant estate; mandatory or successors . the owners interdiction is irrelevant 2. dominant estate owner can renounce said servitude if it is onerous or was done w/o his authority. Termination of Predial Servitude 1.destruction of the dominant or servient estate. 2. confusionowner of the dominat estate acquires the ownership of the servient estate and vice versa. 3. Prescription of non use (10 years) prescription time is suspended if the servitude cannot be utilized. Prescription of non use does not apply to natural servitudes.
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B. Content of Predial Servitudes To abstain from doing something on his estate or to permit something to be done on it *may be the toleration of certain activities on the servient estate; prohibition of certain material acts; restriction of certain rights belonging to the owner of the servient estate by virtue of his ownership. *may not exclude the performance of juridical acts affecting the servient estate C. Prohibition of Affirmative Duties May not involve affirmative duties for the owner of the servient estate. Exception to certain incidental duties necessary for the exercise of a servitude Ex. Must be kept fit for the purposes of the servitude or that he shall maintain in good state of repair works necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude. Duties of servient estate. 1. must keep buildings in good repair. 2 cant interfere with the dominant estate owners usage of the servitude. 3. Can select where the servitude will be placed on his property and the times that it can be used. Cant revoke once it is granted. 4. Usually incurs all costs of maintain the servitude, but can seek indemnification in certain instances. 5.owner of the servient estate can establish multiple servitudes, but cant interfere with the servitude for the dominant estate. 6. Any doubt relative to the existence of a predial servitude is resolved in favor of the owner of the servient estate. 7. specific lang. to create a predial servitudes is not necessary so long as the wording indicates a charge placed on one estate for the benefit of another. Duties of dominant estate owner 1. can make necessary repairs for the preservation of the servitude 2. if there are multiple owners for the dominant estate the servitude is available to each of them 3. cant unduly burden the owner of the servient estate
Incidental servitudes qualify as real obligations; may be relieved of these duties upon abandonment of the burdened property to the owner of the dominant estate. D. Nature of Predial Servitudes *Real rights on the land of another *Owner of dominant estate doesnt own servitude, b/c only corporeal things may be owned; he doesnt own the part of the servient estate that is burdened with the servitude. Ownership v. predial servitudes
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*ownership of an immovable may not be lost by nonuse; predial servitudes are extinguished if not exercised during the requisite prescriptive period Owner of an immovable may use it as he sees fit, but the owner of the dominant estate must use his right in accordance with the purpose of the servitude Predial servitudesimmovable real rights, incorporeal immovable Actions for lesion incurred by the owner of the servient estate as a E. Servitudes on Public Property Private persons may acquire servitudes on private things of the state only by title and in accordance with the applicable formalities governing alienation of state property. Acquisition of servitudes on such property by prescription is excluded F. Essential Features of Predial Servitudes Necessity of 2 different estates Servient and dominant estate No servitude may be imposed on an estate in its own favor May not be imposed on a person in favor of an estate *Estates Must belong to different owners *If the two estates belong to the same person, the application which the owner makes of one to the advantage of the other is not called a servitude, but a destination of the owner. *it is necessary there be a benefit to the dominant estate. G. Non Essential Features of Predial Servitudes *if there is no longer a need for a servitude, or if the utility of the servitude is exhausted, the servitude may be declared terminated; but there is no reason to exclude the validity of the servitude in advance if future events are certain to cause the termination of the servitude. H. Indivisibility of Predial Servitudes Indivisiblean estate cannot have upon another estate part of a right of way, or of view, or of any servitude, nor can an estate be charged with a part of a servitude. I. Natural, Legal, and Voluntary or Conventional Servitudes *Natural servitudesarise from the natural situation of estates *legal servitudesimposed by law *voluntary/conventionalestablished by a juridical act, prescription, or destination of the owner Types of predial servitude: Natural/legal/conventional natural-pertains to drainage or usage of running waters upon ones estate. Legalrefers to those servitudes that are created by operation of law, which includes servitudes designed Lucas v. Strother **Notes to Consider
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Apparent servitudes vs. non apparent servitudes *Apparentacquired by peaceable and uninterrupted possession of the right for ten years in good faith [prescription], destination of owner, or just title; Destination of ownerin order to create this servitude it must be the owner and not a lessee, who creates the situation from which the servitude results On the test P.White may apply with ownership. Is the person really the ownership *Non apparent servitudesacquired by title; would have to be listed in the title/agreement so 3rd parties will know there is a servitude; cant be seen Title servitude must be unambiguous and must reflect the intent of the party; must put a charge on your estate for another estate. **[test] Blanchard v. Lionelnon apparent predial servitude Notes to Consider A predial servitude is a real right burdening an immovable. Its creation requires the existence of 2 distinct immovable belonging to a different owners. Such servitudes are due to an estate rater than the owner of the estate. A predial servitude is a charge on one estate (the servient) estate for the benefit of another estate (the dominant estate) c The title that establishes a servitude for the Reciprocal servtidues are provided for in 725. benefit of the dominant estate may also establish a servitude on the dominant estate for the benefit of the servieent estate. Doesnt have to be exact servitude being reciprocal. Predial servitudes are either apparent or non apparent. Non apparent servitudes are those that have no exterior sign of their existence such as a negative servitude that imposes on the owner of the servient estate the duty to abstain from doing something on his estate. A non apparent servitude may only be acquired by title b/c it cant be seen. RCC Properties v. Wesntar Properties Servitude was that no business could be built that acquired at least 15% of sales went to hamburgers. Notes to Consider This case exhibited a negative servitude Class Notes Williams v. Wiggins Notes to Consider Class Notes Predial servitude is assumed. Confusion can apply when one person is both usufruct and naked owner. In order for a predial servitude to exist you have to have both. Therefore the usufruct is terminated BUILDING RESTRICTIONSdeals with more of a community of land owners [graduated form of predial servitudes] Any restriction which will affect the immovable! Scope
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*due to inadequacy of building and zoning ordinances to meet demands for the preservation and enhancement of property values, landowners and developers of land have imposed restrictions limiting the future use of lands to certain specified purposes, prohibiting the erection of certain types of structures or specifying the type and value of buildings that may be erected. Nature of Building Restrictions Building restrictions are charges on immovable property imposed in pursuance of a general plan governing building standards, specified uses, and improvements. Such restrictions must be feasible and capable of being preserved. These restrictions are designed for subdivision planning (i.e. multi-lot areas) Ex. All houses in this subdivision shall have at least one pool and an adjacent pool house for pool equipment. Focus on feasibility when analyzing on exam Incorporeal immovable and real rights likened to predial servitudes. Building rights=property rights Landowners in a subdivision are not entitled to compensation for the taking of their rights to enforce building restrictions on an immovable expropriated for public utility. *Creation of Building Restrictions; General Plan Ordinarily imposed by developers of land who intend to subdivide their prop. Into indiv. Lots destined for residential, commercial, or industrial uses. Agreements among landowners imposing restrictions on their properties in the framework of subdivision planning=building restrictions Building restrictions are now ordinarily contained in recorded notarial acts or are annexed to recorded plats of subdivisions. Creation of building restrictions is subject to the requirement that there be a general plan that is feasible and capable of being preserved. Failure to make restrictions uniform or insert them in a substantial number of sales may vitiate a contemplated general development plan. Building restrictions must be created by title. Est. by a juridical act; declaration of intent made in the act of sale to the present owner or to an ancestor in title or in a separate document. *Building restrictions are done by juridical act and executed by the registered owner of the immovable property or by all owners of the affected immovable. Such restrictions can be amended or terminated according to the method instituted by the original building restrictions. *Reasonable and necessary for the maintenance of the general plan *Ex. By majority votes of all homeowners in the affected subdivision. In order to be effective against a 3rd party, instruments establishing restrictions must be filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable property is located.
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An acquirer of immovable prop. Burdened with recorded restrictions is bound by them. Restrictions need not appear in the act by which the present owner acquired the property nor in his chain of title. In the absence of recorded restrictions at the same time of the first sale by the subdivier, the prop. Is transferred free of restrictions. IF after the sale the subdivider imposes blanket restrictions by a recorded declaration of intent, the successors of the original acquirer arent bound by these restrictions. Prospective purchasers arent charged with notice of recorded building restrictions If existing restrictions werent disclosed to him at time of the conclusion of the contract to seel, the contract is voidable b/c the title of the vendor isnt clear. Protection and Enforcement of Building Restrictions *Active vs. passive side of building restrictions Activereal right of each landowner to enjoy his prop. w/o any violation of building restrictions Passiveduty of each landowner whose prop. Is burdened by building restrictions to do nothing in violation of the restrictions *An action for protection and enforcement of building restrictions may be brought against any violator by any person entitled to these property rights. *Enforcement of building restrictions Injunctive relief brought by the original developer or by landowners in subdivision Sued for damagescontractual fault Contractual remedies are not available to landowners in seeking to enforce restrictions against violators w/ whom the landowners are not in a contractual relationship *persons violating building restrictions may be enforced to cease activities in contravention thereof or to remove objectionable structures. Affirmative Duties Affirmative duties that are reasonable and necessary for the maintenance of the general plan Whether they are necessary/reasonable depends on the facts of each case. Effect of Zoning Ordinances They neither terminate nor supersede existing building restrictions Doesnt prevent the enforcement of existing restrictions May merely give rise to an inference that the general plan has been abandoned in the area Matters of Interpretation Doubt as to the existence is resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the immovableit is resolved in favor of the owner whose property is allegedly restricted. If document provides that the prop. Shall be used for residential purposes only, churches may not be erected. If commercial establishments are excluded, the erection of an ad billboard or use of prop. As a parking lot violates the restriction A single family dwelling restriction isnt violated by the use of a house as a community home for mentally retarded persons.
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In the absence of a specified method to amend building restrictions, the restrictions may be amended by a favorable vote for over of the landowners affected by the restrictions if the restrictions were in affect for more than 15 yrs and the amendment or the termination must be recorded it is 2/3 majority vote. Validity and Nature of Building Restrictions Cosby v. Holcomb Trucking, Inc 942 So. 2d 471
FACTS: King Jr. and King developed Wedgewood in Livingston Parish. Kings est restrictions for Wedgewood Acres and on 12/15/82 they filed the restrictions in the Livingston Parish public records. *2 yrs later, King and other fam. Members developed 4 rural tracts of land adjoining Wedgewood along Ben Road (front lots) in Livingston parish. Kings est. a building restriction agreement expressly stating that w/ the exception of the set back restrictions all other restrictive covenants shall be exactly as provided in the restrictive covenants. The restrictions were as follows: 1. all tracts are residential and only used for residential purposes. Cnt exceed 2 stories in height w/ usual buildings, barns, and private garage and/or carports designed to house no fewer than 2 cars 2. no house trailers, buses, and commercial vehicles or trucks shall be kept stored repaired or maintained on any lot, servitude or right of way in any which manner would detract from the appearance of the subdivision. No struc. Of any temp. char. Trailer, basement, tent, shack or other out building shall be allowed on any tract for a prolonged period of time. 3. no building shall be used to operate any commercial activity unless approved by the developer. *HOlcombs acquired Lot P in wedgewood but never built on the prop. King individually executed an authentic act wher he granted Holcomb permission to enter thru public acces and park on his premises his truck used in his profession., permitted him to maintain the truck for normal maintenance but cant enter n2 commerical main. In any form, allowed him to construct and maintain a perm. Struc. For the housing of the truck as long as it is built to other subdivision restrictions and doesnt detract in any manner from the appearance of the subdivision. In exchange Holcomb agreed not to haul loads in excess of 50k lbs into wedgewood. Eventually, Holcomb exchanged Lot P for one of the front lots. Holcomb stated no search of the parish public records was made prior to the exchange. HOlcombs later constructed a home and 4 yrs later a steel outbuilding on their lot for use in connection w/ their trucking comp. after the construction of the steel building, holcombs terminated their shop lease and strtd bringin trucks onto their fulger lrd lot for maint. And serv. ISSUE: Whether the applicable building restrictions form part of a general plan as required by 775? Whether the fact that certain of restrictions are not absolute and are subject to the discretion of a third party negates the finding of the general plan
HOLDING: RULE: 775. Where the power is granted to a committee to approve or disapprove the erection of a building based on a standard of whether it conforms to the harmony of external design and location in relation to the surrounding structures and topography, such a stand. Is not ambiguous and is enforceable, provided that the authority is exercised reasonably and in good faith. REASONING: Whatever commercial act. May or may not be allowed based on the discretion allowed by the developer, there is no doubt that commercial activity cant include keeping, storing, repairing, or maintaining commercial vehicles or trucks in such a manner as would detract from the appearance of the subdivision.
Richard v. Broussard
FACTS: Broussard was owner of a large tract of prop. Located between 4 streets which allegedly contained properties Broussard began to subdivide in 1954. There is an alley and parallel to 2 of the streets for approximately 3 quarters of th length of the block. No overall or general plan of subdivision restrictions was imposed on the entire subdivision. Restrictive covenants were inserted into the instruments conveying lots to individual purchasers of certain lots; but not in all cases. ISSUE: Whether the trial judge erred in his determination that there was a valid building restriction in effect on plaintiffs property which prohibited the use of that land for commercial purposes. *Whether the property has been developed according to general subdivision plan? *Whether plaintiffs property is a subdivision which has been developed in accordance with a general plan governing building standards, specified uses, and improvements?

HOLDING:3) NO RULE:
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REASONING: it is not possible to discern any general plan of development. It is simply a strip of property lying between two streets permitting the selling off of lots at random fronting on the two streets. The land was unrestricted. The property retained by Broussards seperateed a number of restricted lots fro
Types of Restrictions; Residential Use

Mulberry Association v. Richards FACTS: restricted covenant state the said lot and/or premises when acquired shall not be used, leased, or otherwise employed for advertising signs or billboards. Richards engaged in the practice of law and maintained his office and home at the premises named in the suit ISSUE: Whether the use of a residence for a law office violates a restrictive covenant which states that the use of said property shall be limited to residential purposes. HOLDING: RULE REASONING yes
Oak Ridge Builders, Inc v. Bryant FACTS: recorded instrument stated that no noxious, offensive unsanitary unsightly or unsually noisy activity or business may be carried on upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon that might be considered a nuisance to the neighborhood. ISSUE: do the recorded restrictive covenants forbid da business activity of the nature in which Mrs. Bryant is engaged? 2) if mrs. Bryant has been doing business in violation of the restrictive covenants, are the plaintiffs precluded from enjoining her b/c she has been doing so far more than 2 yers? 3) does a valid zoning ordinance, causing an area to be zoned commercial, prevent the subsequent establishment of restrictive covenants, limiting area to residential buildings. 1). the entire subdivision is limited to single family residential dwellings and prohibits the carrying on of any business activity as such. 2). A business activity of such on ay of the presmises covered by the covenants is restricted and prohibited. 3) the recorded, restrictive covenants forbid a business act. Of the nature in which mrs. Bryant is engaged on any of the premises covered by the covenants and the suite was filed before the 2 yr prescriptive period
HOLDING:
RULE: where building restrictions or covenants are violated, it is clear that the parties within a subdivision may have that activity enjoined and may enforce the restrictive covenants. However, if the violation continues for more than 2 yrs, prescription will bar any attempt to enforce the provisions or restrictive covenants. REASONING: the 1956 zoning ordinance est. a permissive use for the land w/in the zone. Vendor of the prop. In question had the rt to est. restrictions upon the use of the land which would enhance and increase the value of the land and make it more desirable. Nothing in the law prohibits the est. of covenants or agreements. The restrictions placed upon the use of property by the covenants establish in 1964 motivated and influenced those persons who acquired the property at the time to purchase this property, b/c of the guarantee that it would be used for residential purposes. TERMINATION OF BUILIDNG RESTRICTIONS Termination by Agreement of Owners Termination of Building Restrictions; Agreement of Owners Building restrictions may terminate: 1. according to the terms prescribed in the act 2. by agreement of owners of the lands affected by the restrictions 3. by liberative perescription for 2 yrs 4. abandonment of the subdivision plan or of particular restrictions *Termination rules must not be contrary to public order. *Termination may be based on the lapse of a period of time or the happening of an event. ..in favor of the landowners who the restrictions were imposed for.
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*in the absence of pertinent provisions in the act establishing restrictions owners of the area affected by the restrictions may terminated them Diefenthal v. Longue Vue Foundation FACTS: residents seek to enjoin Vues plan to convert an adjoining former Garden Ln property into a parking facility; to hold parties and other functions on its site. Vues prior owners, Edgar and Edith acquired a 250 by 500 lot at the end of Garden LN from Dr. Eckhardt. Mr. stern and 6 other owners of the prop. Fronting Garden Ln entered into an authentic act imposing certain retsrictions on their respective prop. Included among those restrictions imposed by the 1931 act not only was a commercial use restriction but also were restrictions on the types of buildings that could be erected, the number of dwellings on each lot, the sz of buildings, the sz. Of the lots, and the amount of setback. The restrictions were a general plan of development and were properly filed, thus giving knowledge to all prospective purchasers. The duration was without any limitation of time, if one is enforced then it is bdinging from 50 yrs from the date of the agreement. Mrs. Stern decided that despite the restriction to open her residence and surrounding gardens to the public and to convert her residence into a public museum. 1977neighbors agreed to relax the commercial use restriction but only to VUes property and only to certain uses. Stern wanted to donate the property to NO museuem of art but it failed due to city ordances. She created and funded Vue to operate the museum. Vue begin to host lardge loud parites and other functions frequently on prop ISSUE:n 1) Whether the restrictions are building restrictions, as Longue Vue extends or predial servitudes, as the Residents contend. 2) whether the provision in the 1931 Act addressing the duration of the Restrictions constitutes a contractual termination. HOLDING: vues act of termination is invalid. The restrictions may not be terminated w/o the consent of all the landowners until april 18 2027, 50 yrs from the date of the 1977 agreement. Second issue is now moot. RULE REASONING
Termination by Liberative Prescription Prescription of Building Restrictions All actions based on principles of property law for the enforcement of building restrictions become w/o object after accrual of the 2 yr prescription. Actions for the enforcement of restrictions that qualify as personal obligations arent affected by prescription of 781. (subject to 10 yr period) *2 yr prescription begins to run from the commencement of a noticeable violation rather than from the day the plaintiff acquires knowledge of the violation. Neither secretative or clandenstine an activity conducted on a modest scale may not be noticeable or may not be a violation at all; but the same type of activity if expanded may become a noticeable violation. Prescription may be interrupted by acknowledgement. When restrictions exclude the use of property for commercial purposes, the question may arise whether activities in violation of the restrictions free the property from all restrictions relating to commercial use or only from the particular type of commercial use that has been practiced. When an owner uses his prop. For commercial use contrary to restrictions during a period in excess of 2 yrs, the property is freed of all restrictions pertaining to commercial use; therefore the landowner is entitled to enlarge his business and even to conduct a business of a different nature.
Hidden Hills Community V. Rogers FACTS: HH is a community surrounding a lake. Developers adopted a set of restrictions and affirmative duties in order to maintain the community in the manner it deemed fit and recorded them. Restrictions provided the lots must be kept reasonably neat and clean. ISSUE: whether Rogers prop. Was reasonably neat and clean in accordance with the subdivision restrictions. HOLDING RULE: 781
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REASONING: bright and unusual paint choices as well as fluorescent painted lawn charis donte meet the standard of not reasonably neat and clean. There wasnt a noticeable violation until late 2000 when the residents of the community begin to report it to the HH board of directors as a violation of the covenant.
Salerno v. Delucca FACTS: Realtor Lucca was orderd to not erect a commercial building or conduct a business establishment on property owned by him in the farimount park subdivision was also ordered to remove a sign or bill board from the property w/in 30 days or to be guilty of contempt and sentenced to 48 hrs in parish prison . De Lucca acquired lots 1 and 2 and endeavored to construct a building to be used partly as a post office and partly as a restaurant. Respondents instituted proceedings against him and secured a judgment forever enjoining him from erecting a commercial building on the lots owend by him and from conducting operating or permitting the operation of a post office restaurant. ISSUE:2) Whether or not the respondents are by permitting the realtor and his predecessor in title to erect and maintain this billboard for a period of more than 2 years, now barred from questioning his right to continue its maintenance under the provisions. HOLDING: Yes they are barred. RULE: Where restrictions have been inserted in deeds in pursuance of a general plan devised by the ancestor in title to maintain crtaini building restrictions and uniform improvements, the are valid and enforceable. *actions must be brought w/in 2 years from the commission of said violation and in all cases where prescription has accrued shall be forever free from the restriction which has been violated. REASONING: It is obvious from a mere reading of the entire context of the restrictions to these titles that such lots as are not so reserved for business purposes are to be used exclusively for residential purposes. ..for the construction of dwellings to be used as homes. Termination by Abandonment of Plan or of Restriction Abandonment of Plan or of Restriction *Building restrictions terminate by abandonment of the whole plan or by a general abandonment of a particular restriction. *Abandonment extinguishes the real right. *Abandonment is predicated on a great number of violations of all or most restrictions. *upon abandonment of the plan all restrictions fall and the use of the property is free for all purposes *a limited number of violations in a remote part of the subdivision doesnt constitute abandonment of the restriction. *a change in the neighborhood from residential to commercial does not affect restrictions relating to the setback from property lines Violations for est. building restrictions must be brought w/in 2 yrs from the commencement tof a noticeable violation. This is a liberative prescription. Time period. If an action isnt brought w/in this time period then that specific immovable is exempt of the restriction. * EX. If a person erects a dragon mailbox in violation of a building restriction and it remains for 2 years w/o contesting then the mailbox may remain on that house. The restriction is not removed from all other property in the subdivision. Building restrictions terminate:
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1. uncontested violations of the restrictions 2. abandonment of the entire buiding restriction plan 3. unreasonable, incapable of being preserved or violates public order 4. majority vote of the affected landowners 5. ambiguity of the interpretation of the restrictions. Robinson v. Donnell
FACTS: Donnell owner of a certain tract of land registered a document which stated restrictions were binding upon all purchasers and their heirs successors. The first restriction stated that all lots in the subdivision are designated as residential lots. Restriction 9 stated that no structure of temporary nature, or trailer, shall be used on any lot at any time as a residence either temporarily or permanently. Donnell granted a list to Tl James Company. He later sold all property to Donnel Indutrial Maintenance which became Titan properties. Titan leased the lake to Cooper Maine Service for 12 months for purpose of demonstrating, testing, and storing motor boat equipment. The lease provided that it was to be used exclusively for the lesees business in the testing and demonstrating of boating equipment, that is only by Coopers employees and customers and not by the public at large. Cooper has continuously used for testing and demonstrating. He has maintained a large sign which advertises the lake as Coopers testing and demonstration site. He placed a mobile home on the property which was used as an office. ISSUE: Whether tract a was subject to the restrictions involved herein? HOLDING:Yes
RULE : pg. 707 An action for injunction or damages for violation of a building restriction must be brought w/in 2 yrs from commencement of a noticeable violation. When the violation has continued for 2 years w/o objection, the immovable on which the violation occurred is freed of the violated restriction. [781]. Building restrictions are terminated by abandonment of the restrictive plan as a whole, or by a general abandonment of a particular restriction. Abandonment of an entire plan of development frees the affected area of all restrictions. Abandonment of a particular restriction frees the area of abandoned restriction only. REASONING: there has occurred a subversion of and a significant change in the original plan of development of beau village resulting in a substantial change in the initially intended nature of the subdivision. Court found there was an abandonment of the intent to develop the area of tract a as residential. b/c of the lake there was no way to develop tract a as residential.
Gwatney v. Miller
FACTS: Lot 26 along with each of the lots owned by Gwatney originally formed part of an 82.15 acre tract of land owned by Hulin, Picard, and Meyers. All the plaintiffs with the exception of Gwatney purchased their lots directly from Messrs. 9 restrictive covenants, identical in form and content were incorporate into each act of sale for the lots purchased by Gwatney. No house was to be used or erected for trade or business of any form or for any purpose other than residential purpose. ISSUE: Do the Gwatneys have a right of action to enforce the restrictive covenants set forth in the deed whereby defendant acquired lot 26? 2)Whether Joseph Miller violated the restrictive covenants to which the land was subject (pg. 711) 3)Has the restrictive covenant precluding non residential use of lot 26 been abandoned? HOLDING: Yes RULE: The fact alone that restrictive covenants are inserted into individual acts of sale does not establish that they were not intended to pursue a general plan of development for the subdivision. Rather the uniformity or consistency of the restrictions must be examined in order to determine the original intentions of the subdivider. *Where the restriction is not a covenant running with the land it is personal to the creator of the restrition REASONING: court said that the building and use restrictions were uniformly incorporated into Gwatneys and Millers act of sale and devised for the purpose of maintaining a general plan of development for the are and therefore constitue a real right. This is evident in restriction nine which provides that these covenants and restrictions are to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties and all persons claiming under them
BOUNDARY ACTION [784-796] Boundary and Boundary Markers; Fixing the Boundary *Boundary is the line of separation between 2 contiguous land (touching, adjacent, not separated); normally marked on the ground by natural or artificial objects called boundary markers
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*sometimes markers are wrongly placed, may have been removed, or my have been destroyed *sometimes line of separation is certain but has never been marked on the ground. Ex. Pg. 450 *owners and persons having real rights on contiguous lands have claims for the fixing of the boundary. Fixing of boundary may just be the determination of the line of separation, if its uncertain or disputed. *boundary may be fixed either judicially [by boundary action] or extra judicially by a boundary agreement Boundary actions are usually brought by; 1. the recorded landowners; 2. A usufructuary can file this action, but it does not automatically bind the naked owner unless he is a party to the suit; Ex. if the naked owner gives usufructuary unlimited use to property but a 3rd party is disputing the boundary line, the naked owner needs to be the one to enforce the boundary action even though the usufructuary may bring the claim 3. a person who has corporeal possession of the landa possessor of an immovable. *Lessees or usufructuaries may compel the lessor/naked owner to fix the boundary of the land. *The right to bring a boundary or to compel the fixing of a boundary is imprescriptible. *May be fixed by the court (judicially) or between parties in dispute (extra judicially) which must be in writing and should be filed in the registry of the court. *Parties who decide to fix the boundary extra judicially each bear their respective costs. If the boundary is set judicially, then all costs will be determined by code of civ pro. *One who removes the boundaries (once theyve been set) will be held liable for damages and may be compelled to replace the markers. *Titles will be examined to determine the placement of boundaries or it shall be based on the limits of est. possession; *A boundary action can be a form of interrupting someones possession; *The rule of Better Title also pertains to Boundary Actions; *In a boundary action, a person can use acquisitive prescription to possess more than what his title dictates. BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS *Boundary is fixed extra judicially when adjoining landowners determine the line of separation between their lands by a written agreement, w/ or w/o reference to markers on the ground. *owners of contiguous lands may enter into a written agreement designating the boundary between their lands with reference to markers on the ground, utilizing for this purpose natural monuments, fences, trees, posts, or other boundary markers *owners may also enter into a boundary agreement that merely designates on paper the line of separation between their lands. Either of them may subsequently demand that the line be marked on the ground in accordance with the agreement. *boundary agreement may confirm an existing boundary or convey ownership to a neighbor up to the line fixed in the agreement. [having the effect of compromise]
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*when filed in registry in the appropriate conveyance records, the agreement is effective toward 3rd persons in the same way as any other contract affecting immovable property. *Annulment of boundary agreement; liberative prescription *If parties to a boundary agreement determine a line of separation between their lands w/ reference to markers on the ground made an error as to the location of the line, as to the location of the markers, or both the boundary agreement may be a relative nullity. *in such a case a party may institute an action for the annulment of the boundary agreement within 5 years from the time the ground for nullity either ceased *REMEMBER that the mere placement of markers is not a contract *if the parties to a boundary agreement determined correctly the line of separation w/o reference to markers on the ground and subsequently markers were incorrectly placed by one of the contiguous owners alone or by both of them but not in accordance w/ the prior agreement, the placement of the markers may be corrected. *Acquisitive prescription *when markers are placed by one of the contiguous owners or both without a written agreement, the boundary is not fixed. *the mere passive failure of a contiguous owner to object to the location of a fence or other marker, or the informal acquiescence by contiguous owners to a jointly erected fence, does not constitute a fixing of the boundary. *if markers were placed wrongly, they will be removed unless a contiguous owner and his ancestors in title have possessed up to them without interruption for 30 years. *existence of a recorded boundary agreement doesnt preclude the running of acquisitive prescription in favor of an adverse possessor. *line of separation may be altered in favor of a possessor in good faith and under just title more land than his ancestor owned under a boundary agreement the ancestor had made. *there isnt a 10 yr acquisitive prescription by possession under an erroneous or formally defective survey made amicably between adjoining owners in an effort to fix their boundary. *errors by surveyors in the ocation of the line of separation is the error of the parties that may rectified UNLESS the liberative prescription has run. Judicial Fixing of the Boundary Nature of the Boundary Action *boundary action is distinguishable from a petitory action, a possessory action or an action for declaratory judgment. *Boundary action may be brought by possessor *boundary action is brought for the fixing of the boundary between contiguous lands Effect of Titles, Prescription, and Possession *court considers evidence of testimony and exhibits of surveyor and other experts when determining the boundary between contiguous lands *possession is material when none of the parties establishes his ownership of the strip of land in dispute. *if both parties rely on titles only, boundary shall be fixed according to titles *if either or both parties rely on acquisitive prescription, the boundary shall be fixed according to limits established by prescription rather than titles. [10 years in good faith and with title OR
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30 years party and his ancestor w/o interruption w/in visible bounds more land than title called for *when parties rely both on titles and acquisitive prescription and a party proves acquisitive prescription the boundary shall be fixed according to lines established by prescription rather than titles. If neither party proves acquisitive prescription, boundary shall be fixed according to titles. Liberative Prescription; Rectification of Boundary *boundary action may not be dismissed on the basis of a peremptory exception of liberative prescription. *one is always permitted to bring a demand that the limits of his property be ascertained and fixed

Civil Law Property Rights Guide

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

318 235 7165 225 573 8407

Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Miami Corporation v. State

*Multiple factor test for classifying a water body as a lake or a stream

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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American Bank & Trust Company v. Shel Boze

Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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In Re Receivership of Augusta Sugar Co.

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timber remains, the timber becomes a separate immovable.

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware Succession of Miller

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Manson Realty Co. v. Plaisance

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Jarius Treadway Brittani Ware

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Harper v. Willisno intent to own

Souther v. Domingue (tenant on Prejeans land)Possessory Action

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Disturbance pg. 154

RICHARD V. COMEAUX->mowing grass