Hegel on Political Identity: Patriotism, Nationality, Cosmopolitanism

Lydia L. Moland, Hegel on Political Identity: Patriotism, Nationality, Cosmopolitanism, Northwestern University Press, 2 !!, 22"pp., #$%.%& 'h()*, I+,N %-. .! !2-/!..

0eviewed (y 1e22rey Ch3rch, University o2 Ho3ston

G.W.F. Hegel fascinates many political philosophers because he synthesizes political aims long thought to be in conflict with one another -- rights and duties, identity and difference, individuality and community. Yet on one issue, namely, the persisting tension between nationalism and cosmopolitanism -- a tension that has erupted into political upheaval and violence in urope in recent months -- the nation-state-centric Hegel seems unfortunately to come down s!uarely on one side. "n her insightful and timely boo#, $ydia %oland argues that Hegel rather ought to be understood as a defender of national identity tempered by cosmopolitan ethical principles and institutions. &hifting deftly between te'tual analysis and contemporary application, Hegel on Political Identity ma#es a strong case for Hegel(s relevance to contemporary attempts to reconcile patriotism and cosmopolitanism. "n ma#ing her case, %oland challenges the traditional way of reading Hegel(s distinction between )ob*ective spirit) -- the sphere of political right and )ethical life) -- and )absolute spirit) -- the sphere of universal human self-reflection in art, religion, and philosophy. &cholars tend to argue either that absolute spirit has nothing to do with the independently developing ob*ective spirit, or the universal perspective transcends that of the parochial political perspective. "nstead, %oland brings out the several ways in which these spheres are separable yet interdependent in Hegel(s te'ts. +he )particular) devotion to a national way of life fuels our attachment to abstract )universal) principles instantiated in the modern state and in cosmopolitan norms and institutions. "n turn, the modern state and international norms cultivate a reflective citizenry that can shape a national way of life so that it fits with these principles. +he difficulty %oland(s interpretation faces is that Hegel says very little about the relationship between ob*ective and absolute spirit, and so several of her conclusions re!uire inferring Hegelian views from Hegelian principles. "n interpreting Hegel, %oland eschews the practice of cleaving scrupulously to Hegel(s views. "nstead, she defends an )open) Hegelian system in which she deploys Hegelian principles sometimes against Hegel himself ,e.g., on his views about the necessity of war for the ethical health of states-. +his interpretive approach invites certain challenges -- "(ll suggest one below -but overall %oland ma#es a persuasive case. +o summarize the argument. %oland understands Hegel(s central concern to be finding the conditions for individuals to become autonomous agents. /n agent does not achieve

freedom through a process of abstraction from her desires, as for 0ant. 1ather, an individual becomes free )through her desires,) specifically by molding )her desires in such a way that she can reflectively endorse them) ,23-. For Hegel, %oland argues, an individual achieves this ability to mold and reflect on desires through relationships of mutual recognition with others, in which the individual shapes her desires to help pursue common purposes the individual shares with others. 4nly through ethical participation in institutions of the family, estates and corporations, and the state can individuals develop the reflectiveness to ma#e their otherwise arbitrary desires their own. 5y focusing on the conditions for autonomous agency in chapters 2 and 6, %oland follows recent nonmetaphysical interpreters of Hegel(s practical philosophy such as +erry 7in#ard and 1obert 7ippin. +his interpretation has become !uite influential in Hegel scholarship in the last twenty years as it provides a philosophically compelling theory of action and normativity that is social or )intersub*ective) in nature and avoids the dangers of abstract 0antian rigorism on the one hand and relativism on the other. With this interpretive approach, %oland turns in chapter 6 to Hegel(s theory of the state. &he challenges the received view of Hegel that the )state) is a monolith incorporating everything from cultural mores to legal institutions within it. "nstead, she claims, Hegel distinguishes patriotic support for the state from the affection a member feels for one(s nation. &he substantiates her claim with a careful te'tual study and an illuminating historical conte'tualization of the changing meaning of )patriotism) in the uropean nlightenment era. "n his lectures on The Philosophy of Right, %oland argues, Hegel shifts between two meanings of )patriotism) he gleaned from the age -- a traditional German )patriotism) e'pressed in local philanthropic associations, which Hegel appropriates in his discussion of corporations, and a 5ritish sense of patriotism for the rational institutions of government, which is compatible with a critical stance towards e'isting government if it fails to carry out its rationally ordained function. %oland hence argues that Hegel does not support what would become the destructive form of )patriotism) in nineteenth-century Germany, that of the chauvinist nationalism that puts one(s nation above all others ,89-:2-. +hough %oland provides a much needed historical conte't, she has difficulty e'plaining some of Hegel(s uses of )patriotism) in which he suggests that citizens also have patriotism for the customs, mores, and cultural meanings and goods that ma#e up a )nation) ,33, 2;2n6-. 5y contrast to this largely reflective )patriotism) for rational state institutions, %oland argues in chapter <, Hegel *u'taposes the affection for and membership in national ways of life and culture, what Hegel calls a )Volksgeist.) +o elaborate on the relationship between nation and state in Hegel, %oland e'amines Hegel(s notion of the )Volk als Staat) ,usually translated as )nation-state)- in the lectures on The Philosophy of History. /ccording to Hegel, %oland claims, nations that follow the proper path develop selfreflection in the form of newspapers and public dialogue, yet this reflection becomes complete only when a nation creates rational state institutions to shape the people(s desires ,9<, 9;-. /ccordingly, state and nation have an interdependent relationship -- the nation fuels members( desires to support the state, whereas state patriotism cultivates rational reflection on one(s desires.

"n chapters 8 and :, %oland e'tends this insightful )interdependence thesis) further and suggests that )absolute spirit) helps rationalize national identity for Hegel. +hese are e'citing chapters, because most Hegel scholars either ignore Hegel(s reflections on world history or thin# that absolute spirit is irrelevant to or transcends politics in the form of art, religion, and philosophy. %oland argues that the crucial point of Hegel(s philosophy of history is often obscured by Hegel(s implausibly strong teleological view of history and the unfortunate things Hegel says about places li#e /frica and the )4riental World) ,22:-. +he crucial point is that Hegel(s Philosophy of History establishes the freedom of all individual agents as the universal standard against which all nations ought to be *udged. +hus, world history provides a cosmopolitan perspective from which to evaluate one(s own national identity and hence to reflectively shape and endorse it. Furthermore, %oland argues that Hegel(s views of art, religion, and philosophy, rather than being beyond state and nation, can help perfect them. ven in modernity, art can bring selfreflection to a nation(s people, as %oland demonstrates through an analysis of Hegel(s lectures on aesthetics ,particularly interesting here is a short section on Hegel(s reading of Friedrich &chiller(s plays The Robbers and Wallenstein, 2<3-282-. 7hilosophy, for %oland(s Hegel, apprehends universal rational principles and also discerns how these principles can be applied in the particular nation and state. "n the final chapter, %oland applies Hegelian principles to the contemporary world, one !uite different than the world Hegel was used to. &he argues that if Hegel were alive in our day, he would not be the state-obsessed philosopher he is often ta#en to be, but rather would be a robust defender of cosmopolitanism. %oland argues that Hegel(s distinction between nation and state means that Hegel need not demand a homogenous national identity to support the state, but rather that a multicultural society in which each culture supports rational state institutions is compatible with Hegel(s view ,2::-. /lso, she contends, Hegel would argue that the globalization of the mar#et or )civil society) has created ethical responsibilities on the part of citizens to all human beings, especially those impoverished by the vicissitudes of the global mar#et. %oland contends that Hegel would be a proponent of some contemporary proposals to ameliorate world poverty, such as ethical consumer activity, micro-loans, and international trade unions ,232-6-. For %oland, Hegel would encourage a cosmopolitan ethical life, a global ethical community that would not undermine but could help improve our own national ethical life. %oland(s boo# contains many insightful readings of Hegel and creative e'tensions of his theories. "t ma#es a powerful case for Hegel(s synthesis of patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Yet ultimately " worry %oland may have given us a too-idealistic and too-0antian Hegel, thereby missing some of Hegel(s s#epticism about the cosmopolitan pro*ect. %oland(s Hegel appears 0antian almost from the beginning, when she argues that freedom means that we can )reflectively endorse) our desires ,23-. Hegel certainly defended reflection as integral to human freedom, but Hegel also thought that ethical action is fundamental to )earning) or ma#ing inherited ethical determinations our own. Hegel thought of action as a#in to labor, as a human activity that helps create a human world that invests meaning and value to human actions and events ,on this point " thin#

Hegel follows =ohn $oc#e(s insight that by investing my labor on something, " transform that thing in accordance with my own self and thereby ma#e that thing my own-. "n many passages of The Philosophy of Right, Hegel even spea#s of the institutions of public life as the results of human )wor#) ,see, for instance, %oland(s citations on her pages ::, :>, 9:-. 5y focusing on a reflective form of autonomy, %oland downplays this selfdetermining form. /s a result, she e'aggerates the critical distance state institutions can achieve toward national character, missing the ways in which Hegel characterizes state institutions and laws as e'pressions of national self-determination. "(m s#eptical, then, that reflection can play the tempering role %oland wants it to. " also worry that %oland puts more weight on the capacity of human reflection to motivate ethical action than Hegel does, especially when it comes to an )ethical cosmopolitanism.) For Hegel, modern individuals ta#e interest in ethical actions only when it serves their self-interest, which is why Hegel thin#s philanthropy is not a real solution to the problem of poverty and instead he loo#s for structural solutions that would draw on, rather than encourage the transcendence of, self-interest. +he problem with an )ethical cosmopolitanism) is that there is no structural solution available, and so any #ind of cosmopolitan ethical action would be of the reflective, philanthropic type, such as ethical consumer activity or microloans. )"nternational trade unions,) by contrast, Hegel might worry about since they are not circumscribed by a world government and so might devolve into the )miserable guild system) Hegel bemoaned in his day ,236-. Hegel would, " thin#, be more pessimistic about )ethical cosmopolitanism) than %oland thin#s. +his isn(t to say that Hegel wouldn(t recognize the #ind of cosmopolitan moral claims %oland points to -- he does -- but it is to say that "(m not convinced that Hegel would thin# reflection can play the shaping role in the identity and ethical behavior of average citizens in the way %oland wants it to do. 1ather than giving politics or philosophy this tas#, Hegel would be more li#ely to loo# to religion to serve the cosmopolitan ethical ideals %oland points toward. +hough ultimately %oland does not offer a convincing case that Hegel can be marshaled to reconcile nationalism and cosmopolitanism, nonetheless she has written an e'cellent, thoughtful, engaging boo#, a )must-read) for scholars of Hegel(s political philosophy. " applaud her efforts to ma#e Hegel relevant to the contemporary world, since his wisdom about modern life should be shared not only among Hegel e'perts, but with all modern citizens.