LABOR LAW: ABANDONMENT; ELEMENTS To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for

work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship !f the employee"s aim is to secure the benefits due them from their employer, abandonment would surely be an illo#ical and impractical recourse, especially for simple laborers DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEES; LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. $oss of trust and confidence to be a valid #round for an employee"s dismissal must be clearly established % breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowin#ly and purposely, without justifiable e&cuse, as distin#uished from an act done carelessly, thou#htlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently !t must rest on substantial #rounds and not on the employer"s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion, otherwise, the employee would remain at the mercy of the employer BACKWAGES AND MORAL DAMAGES; WHEN RECOVERABLE. 'ackwa#es in #eneral are #ranted on #rounds of e(uity for earnin#s which a worker or employee has lost due to ille#al dismissal )pon the other hand, moral dama#es are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or constituted an act oppressive to labor or was done in a manner contrary to morals, #ood customs or public policy while e&emplary dama#es may be awarded only if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner SECURITY OF TENURE; MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL *ana#erial personnel and other employees occupyin# positions of trust and confidence are entitled to security of tenure, fair standards of employment, and the protection of labor laws +owever, the rules on termination of employment, penalties for infractions, and resort to concerted action are not necessarily the same as those for ordinary employees STRIKES; ILLEGAL IF UNDERTAKEN DESPITE ASSUMPTION OR CERTIFICATION BY SECRETARY OF LABOR % strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the ,ecretary of $abor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus ille#al, pursuant to the second para#raph of %rt 2-. of the $abor /ode as amended (0amboan#a 1ood 2roducts, !nc v 3$4/, 5 4 62766, 8ctober 19, 1:6:; 1<6 ,/4% .62) The )nion officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for havin# knowin#ly participated in an ille#al act COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTRACT; NON-MEMBER OF UNION ENTITLED TO BENEFITS. !n a lon# line of cases, this /ourt has held that when a collective bar#ainin# contract is entered into by the union representin# the employees and the employer, even the non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the contract To accord its benefits only to members of the union without any valid reason would constitute undue discrimination a#ainst nonmembers !t is even conceded, that a laborer can claim benefits from a /'% entered into between the

company and the union of which he is a member at the time of the conclusion of the a#reement, after he has resi#ned from said union PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY; DEFINED This /ourt has consistently ruled that =disability should not be understood more on its medical si#nificance but on the loss of earnin# capacity 2ermanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wa#es in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of >his? mentality and attainment could do !t does not mean absolute helplessness = >5,!, @, /%, 26A ,/4% .97 (1::6); 5,!, @, /%, 2-7 ,/4% 199 (1::-); 'ejerano vs /%, 27A ,/4% A:6 (1::2)? This /ourt has also held that in disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resultin# in the impairment of one"s earnin# capacity RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF SECRETARY OF LABOR; FAILURE OF EMPLOYER TO SATISFACTORILY ESTABLISH VIOLATION 1here the employer fails to satisfactorily establish any violation of the $abor ,ecretary"s retunto-work-order, any contrary findin# by the $abor %rbiter and the 3ational $abor 4elations /ommission is committed with #rave abuse of discretion ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE The essential elements of the crime of ille#al recruitment in lar#e scale are: (1) the accused en#a#es in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under %rt 19(b) or in any prohibited activities under %rt 9. of the $abor /ode; (2) the accused has not complied with the #uidelines issued by the ,ecretary of $abor and Bmployment, particularly with respect to the securin# of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (9) the accused commits the unlawful acts a#ainst three or more persons, individually or as a #roup POWERS OF SECRETARY OF LABOR; EFFECTIVITY OF ARBITRAL AWARDS !n the absence of a specific provision of law prohibitin# retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the ,ecretary of $abor, he is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO CONDUCT THE AFFAIRS OF HIS BUSINESS; MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE. The employerCs ri#ht to conduct the affairs of his business, accordin# to its own discretion and jud#ment, is well-reco#niDed %n employer has a free rei#n and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to re#ulate all aspects of employment, includin# the prero#ative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, includin# dismissal, upon errin# employees This is a mana#ement prero#ative, where the free will of mana#ement to conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose takes form The only criterion to #uide the e&ercise of its mana#ement prero#ative is that the policies, rules and re#ulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and the correspondin# penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and to the de#ree of the infraction APPEAL TO NLRC; HOW TAKEN

%n appeal from the $abor %rbiter"s decision to the 3$4/ may be taken (1) by filin# a verified memorandum of appeal and (2) by payin# the appeal fees within ten calendar days from receipt of a decision, award or order of the $abor %rbiter,both of which re(uisites must be satisfied, otherwise the runnin# of the prescriptive period for perfectin# an appeal will not be tolled ABANDONMENT;MERE ABSENCE NOT CONSIDERED AS ABANDONMENT. Eor abandonment to arise, there must be concurrence of two thin#s: (1) lack of intention to work; and (2) the presence of overt acts si#nifyin# the employee"s intention not to work 1hile absence from work for a prolon#ed period may su##est abandonment in certain instances, mere absence of one or two days would not be enou#h to sustain such a claim ABANDONMENT AS VALID GROUND FOR DISMISSAL Eor an abandonment to constitute a valid #round for dismissal there must be a clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship on the part of the employee FINDINGS OF FACT OF LABOR DEPARTMENT ACCORDED RESPECT AND FINALITY Eactual findin#s of (uasi-judicial a#encies, like the labor department, which have ac(uired e&pertise in matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by the ,upreme /ourt not only respect but finality if supported by substantial evidence RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT; NON LICENSEE OR NON HOLDER OF AUTHORITY, DEFINED. % non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to en#a#e in recruitment and placement by the ,ecretary of $abor, or whose license or authority to en#a#e in recruitment and placement by the ,ecretary of $abor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the 28B%, or the ,ecretary DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE; DUE PROCESS; TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING The twin re(uirements of notice and hearin# constitute essential elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal: the re(uirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer"s intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand, the re(uirement of hearin# affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer"s char#es a#ainst him accordin#ly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected 3either of these two re(uirements can be dispensed with without runnin# afoul of the due process re(uirement of the 1:6< /onstitution WAGE; DEFINED. =1a#e= paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnin#s, however desi#nated, capable of bein# e&pressed in terms of money, whether fi&ed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculatin# the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable

value, as determined by the ,ecretary of $abor, of board, lod#in#, or other facilities customarily formatted by the employer to the employee CERTIFICATION ELECTION; ONLY MEMBERS OF UNION MAY VOTE; POWER OF MED-ARBITER TO DETERMINE MEMBERSHIP. )nder %rticle 2A- of the $abor /ode, to have a valid certification election at least a majority of all eli#ible voters in the unit must have cast their votes !t is apparent that incidental to the power of the med-arbiter to hear and decide representation cases is the power to determine who the eli#ible voters are !n so doin#, it is a&iomatic that the med-arbiter should determine the le#ality of the employees" membership in the union !n the case at bar, it obviously becomes necessary to consider first the propriety of the employees" membership withdrawal from the cooperative before a certification election can be had ADJUSTMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE; TWO METHODS. +istorically, le#islation involvin# the adjustment of the minimum wa#e made use of two methods The first method involves the fi&in# of determinate amount that would be added to the prevailin# statutory minimum wa#e The other involves =the salary-ceilin#-method= whereby the wa#e adjustment is applied to employees receivin# a certain denominated salary ceilin# The first method was adopted in the earlier wa#e orders, while the latter method was used in 4 % 3os --.7 and -<2< 2rior to this, the salary-ceilin#-method was also used in no less than eleven issuances mandatin# the #rant of cost-of-livin# allowances TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY UNDER CARP LAW The issue of the constitutionality of the takin# of private property under the /%42 $aw has already been settled by this /ourt holdin# that where the measures under challen#e merely prescribe the retention limits for landowners, there is an e&ercise of police power by the #overnment, but where to carry out such re#ulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in e&cess of the ma&imum area allowed, then there is definitely a takin# under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any branch or official of the #overnment MINIMUM WAGE; CONCEPT; ESSENCE. The concept of =minimum wa#e= is, however, a different thin#, and certainly, it means more than settin# a floor wa#e to up#rade e&istin# wa#es, as B/82 takes it to mean =*inimum wa#es= underlies the effort of the ,tate, as 4epublic %ct 3o -<2< e&presses it, =to promote productivity-improvement and #ain-sharin# measures to ensure a decent standard of livin# for the workers and their families; to #uarantee the ri#hts of labor to its just share in the fruits of production; to enhance employment #eneration in the countryside throu#h industry dispersal; and to allow business and industry reasonable returns on investment, e&pansion and #rowth,= and as the /onstitution e&presses it, to affirm =labor as a primary social economic force = %s the /ourt indicated, the statute would have no need for a board if the (uestion were simply =how much= The ,tate is concerned, in addition, that wa#es are not distributed unevenly, and more important, that social justice is subserved

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER DOES NOT VEST OWNERSHIP; ONLY EVIDENCES RECOGNITION OF GRANTEE AS QUALIFIED PARTY. !t must be stressed, however, that the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmerF#rantee ownership of the land described therein %t most, the certificate merely evidences the #overnment"s reco#nition of the #rantee as the party (ualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the ac(uisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under 2residential Gecree 3o 2< 3either is this reco#nition permanent nor irrevocable Thus, failure on the part of the farmerF#rantee to comply with his obli#ation to pay his lease rentals or amortiDation payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or a#ricultural lessor is a #round for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer >,ection 2, 2 G 3o 61-; 2a#talunan v Tamayo, 5 4 3o A.261, *arch :, 1::7? RELIEFS GRANTED; SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE IS A STATUTORY BENEFIT; !TH MONTH PAY. 2rivate respondents" memorandum of appeal e&plicitly prayed for =such other remedies and benefits as may be proper under the premises = ,uch #eneral prayer included the relief #ranted in the disputed order *oreover, the award of ,ervice !ncentive $eave pay is a statutory benefit which cannot be denied to private respondents (,ee %rticle :A, $abor /ode), the same is true with respect to the 19th month pay since 2 G 6A1 states that =all employers are re(uired to pay all their employees receivin# a basic salary of not more than 21,777 77 a month, re#ardless of the nature of their employment, a 19th month pay not later than Gecember 2. of every year and so all the complainants who were not paid their 19th month pay must be paid accordin#ly ARTICLES "#! AND "#$ OF THE LABOR CODE; NO LAW PASSED BY CONGRESS REPEALING THE SAME. !n the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by /on#ress e&pressly repealin# %rticles 2-9 and 2-. of the $abor /ode 3either may the 1:6< /onstitution be considered to have impliedly repealed the said %rticles considerin# that there is no showin# that said articles are inconsistent with the said /onstitution *oreover, no court has ever declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the 1:6< /onstitution 8n the contrary, the continued validity and operation of %rticles 2-9 and 2-. of the $abor /ode has been reco#niDed by no less than the /on#ress of the 2hilippines when the latter enacted into law 4 % -<1A, otherwise known as +errera $aw, ,ection 2< of which amended para#raphs (#) and (i) of %rticle 2-9 of the $abor /ode ASSUMPTION AND CERTIFICATION ORDERS OF SECRETARY OF LABOR; E%ECUTORY IN CHARACTER AND ARE TO BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH. )EB completely misses the underlyin# principle embodied in %rt 2-.(#) on the settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are e&ecutory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even durin# the pendency of any petition (uestionin# their validity This e&traordinary authority #iven to the ,ecretary of $abor is aimed at arrivin# at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardiDin# national interests AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY OF LABOR; CANNOT BE UNDERMINED BY STRIKING WORKERS. 4e#ardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the strikin# workers must cease andFor desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the

,ecretary of $abor, once an assumption andFor certification order is issued They cannot, for instance, i#nore return-to-work orders, citin# unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions RETURN TO WORK ORDER; NOT A MATTER OF OPTION OR VOLUNTARINESS BUT OF OBLIGATION. The return to work order does not so much confer a ri#ht as it imposes a duty; and while as a ri#ht it may be waived, it must be dischar#ed as a duty even a#ainst the worker"s will 4eturnin# to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obli#ation The worker must return to his job to#ether with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue servin# the public and promotin# its interest STRIKES; RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER; MAY BE ENFORCED WHETHER THE STRIKE IS LEGAL OR ILLEGAL. 8ne other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pendin# the determination of the le#ality or ille#ality of the strike !t is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is le#al and may be disre#arded if the strike is ille#al, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status (uo while the determination is bein# made 8therwise, the workers who contend that their strike is le#al can refuse to return to work to their work and cause a standstill on the company operations while retainin# the positions they refuse to dischar#e or allow the mana#ement to fill 1orse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the #round that they are still le#ally employed althou#h actually en#a#ed in the activities inimical to their employer"s interest STRIKES; EFFECT OF ASSUMPTION&CERTIFICATION ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR. 1e also wish to point out that an assumption andFor certification order of the ,ecretary of $abor automatically results in a return-to-work of all strikin# workers, whether or not a correspondin# order has been issued by the ,ecretary of $abor Thus, the strikin# workers erred when they continued with their strike alle#in# absence of a return-to-work order %rticle 2-.(#) is clear, once an assumptionFcertification order is issued, strikes are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall immediately return to work ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION BY SECRETARY OF LABOR; NATURE. The assumption of jurisdiction by the ,ecretary of $abor over labor disputes causin# or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure !t cannot be denied that the private respondent is en#a#ed in an undertakin# affected with public interest bein# one of the lar#est manufacturers of food products The compellin# consideration of the ,ecretary"s assumption of jurisdiction is the fact that a prolon#ed strike or lockout is inimical to the national economy and thus, the need to implement some measures to suppress any act which will hinder the company"s essential productions is indispensable for the promotion of the common #ood )nder this situation, the ,ecretary"s certification order for compulsory arbitration which was intended for the immediate formulation of an already delayed /'% was proper

NATURE AND FUNCTION OF NLRC WHEN SITTING IN A COMPULSORY ARBITRATION CERTIFIED BY THE SECRETARY OF LABOR. 1hen sittin# in a compulsory arbitration certified to by the ,ecretary of $abor, the 3$4/ is not sittin# as a judicial court but as an administrative body char#ed with the duty to implement the order of the ,ecretary !ts function only is to formulate the terms and conditions of the /'% and cannot #o beyond the scope of the order *oreover, the /ommission is further tasked to act within the earliest time possible and with the end in view that its action would not only serve the interests of the parties alone, but would also have favorable implications to the community and to the economy as a whole This is the clear intention of the le#islative body in enactin# %rt 2-9 para#raph (#) of the $abor /ode, as amended by ,ection 2< of 4 % -1<A UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; ACCUSATION THEREOF SHOULD INCLUDE ALL ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE. 1e have already held that when a labor union accuses an employer of acts of unfair labor practice alle#edly committed durin# a #iven period of time, the char#es should include all acts of unfair labor practice committed a#ainst any and all members of the union durin# that period The union should not, upon dismissal of the char#es first preferred, be allowed to split its cause of action and harass the employer with subse(uent char#es based upon acts committed durin# the same period of time (Gionela, et al v /!4, 3o $-1:99., %u#ust 91, 1:-9, 6 ,/4% 692 at 69<) DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE; LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. 3ow, there is no #ainsayin# that loss of confidence is a reco#niDed #round for the dischar#e of an employee from employment 'ut such a #round must be founded from facts established by substantial evidence %nd the burden of establishin# such facts as reasonably cause loss of confidence in an employee such facts as reasonably #enerate belief by the employer that the employee is connected with some misconduct and the nature of his participation therein is such as to render him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position is on the employer The fact that the employee has been absolved in a criminal prosecution involvin# said misconduct does not preclude the employer from attemptin# to prove the same before the labor arbiter or the latter from acceptin# that evidence as sufficient foundation for a findin# of lawful termination of employment 1ithal, the employer"s evidence, althou#h not re(uired to be of such de#ree as is re(uired in criminal cases, i e , proof beyond reasonable doubt, must be substantial, must clearly and convincin#ly establish the facts upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY; SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY; E%AMPLES. There should be no (uestion that where it comes to such valid but not ini(uitous causes of failure to comply with work standards, the #rant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company Eor e&ample, a subordinate who has irreconcilable policy or personal differences with his employer may be validly dismissed for demonstrated loss of confidence, which is an allowable #round % workin# mother who has also to take care of her child may also be removed because of her poor attendance, this bein# another authoriDed #round !t is not the employee"s fault if he does not have the necessary aptitude for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be re(uired to maintain him just the same at the e&pense of the efficiency of its operations +e too may be validly replaced )nder these and similar circumstances,

however, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY; E%PLAINED. The social justice policy mandates a compassionate attitude toward the workin# class in its relations with mana#ement 1hile in callin# for the-protection of labor, the /onstitution does not condone wron#doin# by the employee, it nevertheless ur#es a moderation of the sanctions that may be applied to him in the li#ht of the many disadvanta#es that wei#h heavily on him like an albatross han#in# from his neck *ana#ement must look upon the workin# class with sympathy, rememberin# that they are e(ual partners joined in a common venture whose success should redound to their mutual benefit APPEALS; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ASSUMES JURISDICTION OVER CASES OF NATIONAL INTEREST. 1ith re#ard to the remedy of appeal to which the petitioners are entitled under the applicable law then, this /ourt deems it impractical to allow the parties to still pursue their appeal to the 8ffice of the 2resident at this time considerin# that under the present law, the $abor /ode, as amended, the 2resident may only assume jurisdiction only in cases which the latter considers to be of national interest 1ith respect to those labor cases which do not involve national interest, such as the case at bar, the machinery or body in the 8ffice of the 2resident #overnin# such appeals apparently is no lon#er e&istin# under the present law +ence, for just and e(uitable considerations, this /ourt instead shall #rant the petitioners the opportunity to file a proper petition for certiorari within a reasonable time (uestionin# the decision on the merits of the ,ecretary of $abor AUTHORI'ED CAUSES OF DISMISSAL; REDUNDANCY. 4edundancy e&ists when the service capability of the work force is in e&cess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the enterprise % redundant position is one rendered superfluous by a number of factors, such as overhirin# of workers, decreased volume of business, droppin# of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company or phasin# out of a service previously undertaken by the business DUE PROCESS IN DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE; BURDEN UPON EMPLOYER TO PROVE DISMISSAL WAS WITH JUST CAUSE. !t bears stressin# that a workerCs employment is property in the constitutional sense +e cannot be deprived of his work without due process !n order for the dismissal to be valid, not only must it be based on just cause supported by clear and convincin# evidence, the employee must also be #iven an opportunity to be heard and defend himself !t is the employer who has the burden of provin# that the dismissal was with just or authoriDed cause The failure of the employer to dischar#e this burden means that the dismissal is not justified and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and backwa#es OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT; LOCAL AGENCIES MUST SUBMIT FORMAL APPOINTMENT OR AGENCY CONTRACT TO SUE AND BE SUED JOINTLY WITH FOREIGN PRINCIPAL. !t must be borne in mind that local private employment a#encies, before they can commence recruitin# workers for their forei#n principal, must submit with the 28B% a formal

appointment or a#ency contract e&ecuted by the forei#n based employer empowerin# the local a#ent to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or forei#n-based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment a#reement and contract of employment /onsiderin# that the local private employment a#ency may sue on behalf of its forei#n principal on the basis of its contractual undertakin#s submitted to the 28B%, there is no reason why the said a#ency cannot likewise si#n or e&ecute a certification of non-forum shoppin# for its own purposes andFor on behalf of its forei#n principal SEPARATION PAY DUE TO COMPASSION; E%AMPLES THEREOF. 'ut where the cause of the separation is more serious than mere inefficiency, the #enerosity of the law must be more discernin# There is no doubt it is compassionate to #ive separation pay to a salesman if he is dismissed for his inability to fill his (uota but surely he does not deserve such #enerosity if his offense is misappropriation of the receipts of his sales This is no lon#er mere incompetence but clear dishonesty % security #uard found sleepin# on the job is doubtless subject to dismissal but may be allowed separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not depraved 'ut if he was in fact not really sleepin# but sleepin# with a prostitute durin# his tour of duty and in the company premises, the situation is chan#ed completely This is not only inefficiency but immorality and the #rant of separation pay would be entirely unjustified TEST OF SUPERVISORY OR MANAGERIAL STATUS. =The test of HsupervisoryC or Hmana#erial statusC depends on whether a person possess authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in %rticle 212 (k) of the $abor /ode and ,ection 1 (m) of its !mplementin# 4ules and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but re(uires the use of independent jud#ment Thus, where such recommendatory powers as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other hi#her e&ecutives of the company, the same, althou#h present, are not e&ercise of independent jud#ment as re(uired by law ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; TWIN RELIEFS TO ILLEGALLY DISMISSED EMPLOYEE. %rticle 2<: of the $abor /ode, as amended, mandates that an ille#ally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin reliefs of (a) either reinstatement or separation pay, if reinstatement is no lon#er viable, and (b) backwa#es 'oth are distinct reliefs #iven to alleviate the economic dama#e suffered by an ille#ally dismissed employee and, thus, the award of one does not bar the other 'oth reliefs are ri#hts #ranted by substantive law which cannot be defeated by mere procedural lapses ,ubstantive ri#hts like the award of backwa#es resultin# from ille#al dismissal must not be prejudiced by a ri#id and technical application of the rules

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGREED REMEDIES MUST BE RESORTED TO BEFORE PARTIES MAY RESORT TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES FOR RELIEF. 1hen the /onstitution and by-laws of both unions dictated the remedy for intra-union dispute, such as petitioner"s complaint a#ainst private respondents for unauthoriDed or ille#al disbursement of unions funds, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to #ive the #rievance machinery or appeals" body of the union the opportunity to decide the matter by itself, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seekin# judicial intervention E%HAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES % party cannot, without violatin# the principle of e&haustion of administrative remedies, seek court intervention by filin# an action for replevin for the #rant of relief durin# the pendency of an administrative proceedin#s PERIOD FOR FILING AN ELECTION PROTEST AGAINST BARANGAY OFFICER % petition or protest contestin# the election of a baran#ay officer should be decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court within fifteen days from the filin# thereof !f the caseload of the jud#e presents the disposition of cases within the re#lementary periods, he should ask the ,upreme /ourt for a reasonable e&tension of time to dispose of cases involved POWERS OF COMMISSIONER OF LAND TRANSPORTATION The /ommissioner of $and Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to e&amine and inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are re#istered, or are unsi#htly, unsafe, improperly marked or e(uipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible e&cessive dama#e to hi#hways, brid#es and other infrastructures The $T8 is additionally char#ed with bein# the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles E%HAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; SIGNIFICANCE B&haustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, bein# a condition precedent prior to one"s recourse to the courts and more importantly, bein# an element of private respondent"s ri#ht of action, is too si#nificant to be waylaid by the lower court FAILURE TO E%HAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; FATAL TO PARTY'S CAUSE OF ACTION Eailure to e&haust administrative remedies is fatal to a party"s cause of action and a dismissal based on that #round is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action POWERS OF CONGRESS TO INTERVENE DESPITE E%ISTENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. !t cannot be denied that /on#ress may intervene anytime despite the e&istence of administrative a#encies entrusted with wa#e-fi&in# powers, by virtue of the former"s plenary power of le#islation, and when /on#ress does so, the result is not the withdrawal of the powers

dele#ated to the 1a#e 'oards but cooperative lawmakin# in an area where initiative and e&pertise are re(uired VALIDITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS WHEN ABANDONED BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. The (uestion of the validity of an %dministrative 8rder has become moot and academic where the administrative policy, the validity of which is sou#ht to be justified by private parties, has already been abandoned by the very administrative a#ency which adopted it EFFECT OF NON-E%HAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 3on-e&haustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional - it only renders the action premature, i e , the claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court RULE IN APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE. 1ithin the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to (uasijudicial proceedin#s, nevertheless, in adducin# evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere alle#ation is not evidence cannot be disre#arded Einally, in case of doubt in construction and interpretation of social le#islation statutes, the liberality of the law in favor of the workin# man and woman prevails in li#ht of the /onstitution"s social justice policy

COMMERCIAL LAW: RECEIVERSHIP; REASON FOR SUSPENDING CLAIMS AGAINST CORPORATION UNDER THE SAME. The reason for suspendin# actions for claims a#ainst the corporation should not be difficult to discover !t is not really to enable the mana#ement committee or the rehabilitation receiver to substitute the defendant in any pendin# action a#ainst it before any court, tribunal, board or body 8bviously, the real justification is to enable the mana#ement committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively e&ercise itsFhis powers free from any judicial or e&tra-judicial interference that mi#ht unduly hinder or prevent the HrescueC of the debtor company To allow such other action to continue would only add to the burden of the mana#ement committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defendin# claims a#ainst the corporation instead of bein# directed toward its restructurin# and rehabilitation I INSURANCE; COMPULSORY MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE;INSURER'S LIABILITY IMMEDIATE UPON OCCURRENCE OF INJURY. /ompulsory *otor @ehicle $iability !nsurance (third party liability, or T2$) is primarily intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by innocent third parties or passen#ers as a result of a ne#li#ent operation and use of motor vehicles The victims and or their dependents are assured of immediate financial assistance, re#ardless of the financial capacity of the motor vehicle owners The insurer"s liability accrues immediately upon the occurrence of the injury or event upon which the liability depends, and does not depend on the recovery of jud#ment by the injured party a#ainst the insured CORPORATION LAW; TEST IN DETERMINING BUSINESS OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. The true test, however, seems to be whether the forei#n corporation is continuin# the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was or#aniDed or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another The term implies a continuity of commercial dealin#s and arran#ements, and contemplates, to the e&tent, the performance of acts or works or the e&ercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in pro#ressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its or#aniDation FOREIGN CORPORATIONS; PURPOSE IN REQUIRING A LICENSE TO DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES. The purpose of the rule re(uirin# forei#n corporations to secure a license to do business in the 2hilippines is to enable us to e&ercise jurisdiction over them for the re#ulation of their activities in this country !f a forei#n corporation operates in the 2hilippines without submittin# to our laws, it is only just that it not be allowed to invoke them in our courts when it should need them later for its own protection 1hile forei#n investors are always welcome in this land to collaborate with us for our mutual benefit, they must be prepared as an indispensable condition to respect and be bound by 2hilippine law in proper cases, as in the one at bar CORPORATION; INVESTED BY LAW WITH A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PERSONALITY FROM PERSONS COMPRISING IT.

!t is basic that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composin# it as well as from that of any other le#al entity to which it may be related *ere ownership by a sin#le stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient #round for disre#ardin# the separate corporate personality TRUST RECEIPTS; DEFINED. % trust receipt is Ja security transaction intended to aid in financin# importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to ac(uire credit e&cept thru utiliDation, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased I CORPORATION CODE;SUFFICIENCY OF SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE 'ein# re#ular on its face, a ,ecretary"s certificate is sufficient for a third party to rely on-it does not have to investi#ate the truth of the facts contained in such certification, otherwise business transaction of corporations would become tortously slow and unnecessarily hampered FOREIGN CORPORATIONS; SINGLE ACT MAY INDICATE PURPOSE OF FOREIGN CORPORATION TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE. The rule stated in the precedin# section that the doin# of a sin#le act does not constitute business within the meanin# of statutes prescribin# the conditions to be complied with by forei#n corporations must be (ualified to this e&tent, that a sin#le act may brin# the corporation within the purview of the statute where it is an act of the ordinary business of the corporation !n such a case, the sin#le act or transaction is not merely incidental or casual, but is of such character as distinctly to indicate a purpose on the part of the forei#n corporation to do other business in the state, and to make the state a base of operations for the conduct of a part of the corporations" ordinary business BILL OF LADING; NATURE THEREOF. The petitioner-carrier, not bein# privy to any transaction between +,'/ and /*!, cannot be e&pected to look beyond what is contained on the face of the bill of ladin# in (uestion and #uess which of the many banks in *etro *anila or some other unrevealed corporation could possibly be the consi#nee To consider otherwise would not be sound business practice as petitioner would be forced to wait for the real owner of the #oods to show up, perhaps in vain !n *acondray and /ompany !nc v %ctin# /ommissioner of /ustoms, it was held that a bill of ladin# is ordinarily merely a convenient commercial instrument desi#ned to protect the importer or consi#nee %nd in 2hoeni& %ssurance /o , $td v )nited ,tates $ines, it was held that as a receipt, a bill of ladin# recites the place and date of shipment, describes the #oods as to (uantity, wei#ht, dimensions, identification marks, condition, (uality and value CORPORATION LAW; CERTIFICATES OF STOCKS; NATURE. /ertificates of stocks are considered as =(uasi-ne#otiable= instruments 1hen the owner or shareholder of these certificates si#ns the printed form of sale or assi#nment at the back of every stock certificate without filin# in the blanks provided for the name of the transferee as well as for the name of the attorney-in-fact, the said owner or shareholder, in effect, confers on another all the indicia of ownership of the said stock certificates

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. MATERIAL ALTERATION; DEFINED. %n alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument !t means an unauthoriDed chan#e in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obli#ation of a party or an unauthoriDed addition of words or numbers or other chan#e to an incomplete instrument relatin# to the obli#ation of a party !n other words, a material alteration is one which chan#es the items which are re(uired to be stated under ,ection 1 of the 3e#otiable !nstruments $aw CODE OF COMMERCE; ARTICLE ()* STILL GOOD LAW; NATURE OF MARITIME LAW. 3otwithstandin# the passa#e of the 3ew /ivil /ode, %rticle A6< of the /ode of /ommerce is still #ood law The reason lies in the peculiar nature of maritime law is which is =e&clusively real and hypothecary that operates to limit such liability to the value of the vessel, or to the insurance thereon, if any %s correctly stated by the appellate court, =this rule is found necessary to offset a#ainst the innumerable haDards and perils of a sea voya#e and to encoura#e shipbuildin# and marine commerce /ontrary to the petitioners" supposition, the limited liability doctrine applies not only to the #oods but also in all cases like death or injury to passen#ers wherein the shipowner or a#ent may properly be held liable for the ne#li#ent or illicit acts of the captain !t must be stressed at this point that %rticle A6< speaks only of situations where the fault or ne#li#ence is committed solely by the captain !n cases where the shipowner is likewise to be blamed, %rticle A6< does not apply ,uch a situation will be covered by the provisions of the 3ew /ivil /ode on /ommon /arriers CHECKS; CASHIER'S CHECK; EQUIVALENT TO ACCEPTANCE. !t is a well-known and accepted practice in the business sector that a cashier"s check is deemed as cash *oreover, since the said check had been certified by the drawee bank, by the certification, the funds represented by the check are transferred from the credit of the maker to that of the payee or holder, and for all intents and purposes, the latter becomes the depositor of the drawee bank, with ri#hts and duties of one in such situation 1here a check is certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the certification is e(uivalent to acceptance ,aid certification =implies that the check is drawn upon sufficient funds in the hands of the drawee, that they have been set apart for its satisfaction, and that they shall be so applied whenever the check is presented for payment !t is an understandin# that the check is #ood then, and shall continue #ood, and this a#reement is as bindin# on the bank as its notes in circulation, a certificate of deposit payable to the order of the depositor, or any other obli#ation it can assume NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW; ACCOMODATION PARTY; LIABILITY. %n accommodation party is one who has si#ned the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receivin# value therefor, and for the purpose of lendin# his name to some other person ,uch a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstandin# such holder, at the time of takin# the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party TRUST RECEIPTS LAW; DOES NOT SEEK PAYMENT BUT PUNISHES DISHONESTY AND ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE. The Trust 4eceipts $aw does not seek to enforce payment of the loan, rather it punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handlin# of money or #oods to the prejudice of

another re#ardless of whether the latter is the owner The practice of banks of makin# borrowers si#n trust receipts to facilitate collection of loans and place them under the threats of criminal prosecution should they be unable to pay it may be unjust and ine(uitable, if not reprehensible ,uch a#reements are contracts of adhesion which borrowers have no option but to si#n lest their loan be disapproved The resort to this scheme leaves poor and hapless borrowers at the mercy of banks, and is prone to misinterpretation ASSIGNMENT OF CREDIT; DEFINED. %n assi#nment of credit is an act of transferrin#, either onerously or #ratuitously, the ri#ht of an assi#nor to an assi#nee who would then be capable of proceedin# a#ainst the debtor for enforcement or satisfaction of the credit The transfer of ri#hts takes place upon perfection of the contract, and ownership of the ri#ht, includin# all appurtenant accessory ri#hts, is thereupon ac(uired by the assi#nee The assi#nment binds the debtor only upon ac(uirin# knowled#e of the assi#nment but he is entitled, even then, to raise a#ainst the assi#nee the same defenses he could set up a#ainst the assi#nor 1here the assi#nment is on account of pure liberality on the part of the assi#nor, the rules on donation would likewise be pertinent; where valuable consideration is involved, the assi#nment partakes of the nature of a contract of sale or purchase INSURANCE; INJURED PARTY NOT LIMITED IN FILING OF ACTIONS. !n the event that the injured fails or refuses to include the insurer as party defendant in his claim for indemnity a#ainst the insured, the latter is not prevented by law to avail of the procedural rules intended to avoid multiplicity of suits 3ot even a "no action" clause under the policy which re(uires that a final jud#ment be first obtained a#ainst the insured and that only thereafter can the person insured recover on the policy can prevail over the 4ules of /ourt provisions aimed at avoidin# multiplicity of suits LIMITED LIABILITY DOCTRINE; CORPORATE OFFICER MAY BIND HIMSELF PERSONALLY FOR CORPORATE DEBTS There is no law that prohibits a corporate officer from bindin# himself personally to answer for a corporate debt 1hile the limited liability doctrine is intended to protect the stockholder by immuniDin# him from personal liability for the corporate debts, he may nevertheless divest himself of this protection by voluntarily bindin# himself to the payment of the corporate debts The petitioner cannot therefore take refu#e in this doctrine that he has by his own acts effectively waived SHARES OF STOCK; HOW TITLE TRANSFERRED. %s provided under ,ection 9 of 'atas 2ambansa 'ilan# -6, otherwise known as the /orporation /ode of the 2hilippines, shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the transferree of the certificate properly indorsed Title may be vested in the transferree by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock +owever, no transfer shall be valid, e&cept as between the parties until the transfer is properly recorded in the books of the corporation CORPORATE LAW; NO GENERAL RULE AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES +DOING+ OR +ENGAGING+ OR +TRANSACTING+ BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES. There is no #eneral rule or #overnin# principle laid down as to what constitutes =doin#= or =en#a#in# in= or =transactin#= business in the 2hilippines Bach case must be jud#ed in the

li#ht of its peculiar circumstances Thus, a forei#n corporation with a settlin# a#ent in the 2hilippines which issued twelve marine policies coverin# different shipments to the 2hilippines and a forei#n corporation which had been collectin# premiums on outstandin# policies were re#arded as doin# business here The acts of these corporations should be distin#uished from a sin#le or isolated business transaction or occasional, incidental and casual transactions which do not come within the meanin# of the law 1here a sin#le act or transaction, however, is not merely incidental or casual but indicates the forei#n corporation"s intention to do other business in the 2hilippines, said sin#le act or transaction constitutes =doin#= or =en#a#in# in= or =transactin#= business in the 2hilippines TRANSPORTATION; RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS. 8win# to the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers are tasked to observe e&traordinary dili#ence in the vi#ilance over the #oods and for the safety of its passen#ers (%rticle 1<99, 3ew /ivil /ode) Eurther, they are bound to carry the passen#ers safely as far as human care and foresi#ht can provide, usin# the utmost dili#ence of very cautious persons, with a due re#ard for all the circumstances (%rticle 1<AA, 3ew /ivil /ode) 1henever death or injury to a passen#er occurs, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted ne#li#ently unless they prove that they observed e&traordinary dili#ence as prescribed by %rticles 1<99 and 1<AA (%rticle 1<A-, 3ew /ivil /ode) INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY; EFFECT OF INSTITUTION OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING The petitioners contend, too, that the respondent banks have come to court with unclean hands, their filin# of the petition for involuntary insolvency bein# an attempt to defeat validly ac(uired ri#hts of domestic corporations The /ourt wishes to simply point out that the effects of the institution of bankruptcy proceedin#s on all the creditors of the alle#ed bankrupt are clearly spelled out by the law, and will be observed by the !nsolvency /ourt re#ardless of whatever motives apart from the desire to share in the assets of the insolvent in satisfyin# its credit that the party institutin# the proceedin#s mi#ht have SEC JURISDICTION; DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT. 2etitioner conjures a supposed conflict of jurisdiction between the /entral 'ank and the ,B/ by insistin# that it is only the /entral 'ank that has jurisdiction over violations of 2G 11. The ar#ument is misplaced 'asic is the rule that it is the alle#ations in the complaint that vests jurisdiction % case in point is 2hilippine 1omanCs /hristian Temperance )nion, !nc vs %biertas +ouse of Eriendship, !nc wherein we held that when the thrust of a complaint is on the ultra vires act of a corporation, that is the complained act of a corporation is contrary to its declared corporate purposes, the ,B/ has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint before it REQUISITES OF FORFEITURE OF GOODS UNDER SECTION "(!,-./, IN RELATION TO - / -!-(/ OF THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE. The re(uisites for the forfeiture of #oods under ,ection 2A97(f), in relation to (1) (9-A), of the Tariff and /ustoms /ode are: (a) the wron#ful makin# by the owner, importer, e&porter or consi#nee of any declaration or affidavit, or the wron#ful makin# or delivery by the same person of any invoice, letter or paper - all touchin# on the importation or e&portation of

merchandise; (b) the falsity of such declaration, affidavit, invoice, letter or paper; and (c) an intention on the part of the importerFconsi#nee to evade the payment of the duties due TRANSFER OF SHARES OF STOCK; HOW MADE. Erom the pleadin#s submitted by the parties it is clear that althou#h B'B has indorsed in blank the shares outstandin# in his name he has not delivered the certificate of stocks to %5% because the latter has not fully complied with his obli#ations under the memorandum of a#reement There bein# no delivery of the indorsed shares of stock %5% cannot therefore effectively transfer to other person or his nominees the undelivered shares of stock Eor an effective transfer of shares of stock the mode and manner of transfer as prescribed by law must be followed FRANCHISES; JURISDICTION OF SEC OVER VIOLATIONS. !t must be recalled that the complaint of private respondent alle#ed that the articles of incorporation of petitioner contained this prohibition: Jwithout, however, en#a#in# in pawnbrokin# as defined in 2G 11.I and despite this restriction, petitioner alle#edly continued to actually operate and do business as a pawnshop The complaint thus treats of a violation of petitionerCs primary franchise ,ection A of 2G 11., the same law invoked by petitioner, mandates that a corporation desirin# to en#a#e in the pawnshop business must first re#ister with the ,B/ 1ithout (uestion, the complaint filed by private respondent a#ainst petitioner called upon the ,B/ to e&ercise its adjudicatory and supervisory powers 'y law, the ,B/ has absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations that are enfranchised to act as corporate entities % violation by a corporation of its franchise is properly within the jurisdiction of the ,B/ AIR TRANSPORTATION; LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES %ssumin# ar#uendo that airline passen#ers have no vested ri#ht to amenities in case a fli#ht is cancelled due to force majeure, what makes an airline liable for dama#es in the instant case is its blatant refusal to accord the so-called amenities e(ually to all its stranded passen#ers who were similarly situated COMMON CARRIERS; DEFINED. /ommon carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations en#a#ed in the business of carryin# or transportin# passen#ers or #oods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offerin# their services to the public, whether to the public in #eneral or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an e&clusive basis The true test of a common carrier is the carria#e of passen#ers or #oods, providin# space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee ACCOMODATION PARTY; E%TENT OF LIABILITY. %n accommodation party liable on the instrument to a holder for value, althou#h such holder at the time of takin# the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party, does not include nor apply to corporations which are accommodation parties This is because the issue or indorsement of ne#otiable paper by a corporation without consideration and for the accommodation of another is ultra vires +ence, one who has taken the instrument with knowled#e of the accommodation nature thereof cannot recover a#ainst a corporation where it is only an accommodation party !f the form of the instrument, or the nature of the transaction,

is such as to char#e the indorsee with knowled#e that the issue or indorsement of the instrument by the corporation is for the accommodation of another, he cannot recover a#ainst the corporation thereon INSURANCE; INJURED CAN SUE DIRECTLY THE INSURER. The injured for whom the contract of insurance is intended can sue directly the insurer The #eneral purpose of statutes enablin# an injured person to proceed directly a#ainst the insurer is to protect injured persons a#ainst the insolvency of the insured who causes such injury, and to #ive such injured person a certain beneficial interest in the proceeds of the policy, and statutes are to be liberally construed so that their intended purpose may be accomplished !t has even been held that such a provision creates a contractual relation which inures to the benefit of any and every person who may be ne#li#ently injured by the named insured as if such injured person were specifically named in the policy CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH CORPORATION FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT DONE IN BAD FAITH OR WITH MALICE. !n labor cases, particularly, the /ourt has held corporate directors and officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of corporate employees done with malice or in bad faith 'ad faith or ne#li#ence is a (uestion of fact and is evidentiary !t has been held that bad faith does not connote bad jud#ement or ne#li#ence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obli(uity and conscious doin# of wron#; it means breach of a known duty thru some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud CORPORATION LAW; CORPORATION THAT KNOWINGLY PERMITS OFFICER OR AGENT TO ACT WITHIN SCOPE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE SAME. !t is familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowin#ly permits one of its officers, or any other a#ent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds him out to the public as possessin# the power to do those acts; and thus, the corporation will, as a#ainst anyone who has in #ood faith dealt with it throu#h such a#ent, be estopped from denyin# the a#entCs authority NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS; CHECK; NOT LEGAL TENDER; MERE DELIVERY DOES NOT DISCHARGE OBLIGATION ,ince a ne#otiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment % check, whether a mana#er"s check or ordinary check, is not le#al tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obli#ee or creditor *ere delivery of checks does not dischar#e the obli#ation under a jud#ment The obli#ation is not e&tin#uished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realiDed

REMEDIAL LAW:. ACTIONS; DEFINED. %n action is a formal demand of one"s le#al ri#hts in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law The determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an =action or suit= is the filin# of the same with a =court of justice= Eiled elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a court of justice, the claim may not be cate#oriDed under either term CAUSE OF ACTION; TWO ELEMENTS. The cause of action must always consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiff"s primary ri#ht and the defendant"s correspondin# primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they relate person, character, property or contract; and (2) the delict or wron#ful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary ri#ht and duty have been violated The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alle#ed DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAUSE OF ACTION AND ACTION. % cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a ri#ht to judicial interference in his behalf %n action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a ri#ht, or the prosecution or redress of a wron# PLEADINGS; RIGHT OF ACTION DISTINGUISHED FROM CAUSE OF ACTION. The term ri#ht of action is the ri#ht to commence and maintain an action !n the law on pleadin#s, ri#ht of action is distin#uished from cause of action in that the former is a remedial ri#ht belon#in# to some persons, while the latter is a formal statement of the operative facts that #ive rise to such remedial ri#ht The former is a matter of ri#ht and depends on the substantive law, while the latter is a matter of statement and is #overned by the law of procedure COMPLAINT; MUST CHARGE BUT ONE OFFENSE; WAIVER OF ERRONEOUS COMPLAINT. The information herein is violative of ,ection 19 4ule 117 of the 4ules on /riminal 2rocedure which states that a complaint or information must char#e but one offense e&cept in certain cases The four accused are char#ed with two separate offenses of ille#al possession of firearms and robbery with homicide 1hen each one of two offenses committed is punishable by two different laws, they cannot be char#ed in one information as a comple& crime but must be re#arded as two separate and distinct offenses, each one to be the subject of separate informations 1hen duplicity of offenses e&ists in an information the accused must present his objection by filin# a motion to (uash the information on the #round of duplicity of offenses !f the accused fails to object and #oes to trial under the information which contains a description of more than one offense, the #eneral rule is he thereby waives the objection and may be found #uilty of and should be sentenced for, as many offenses as are char#ed in the information and proved durin# trial (2eople v *edina A: 2hil 19.; 2eople v *iana A7 2hil <<1) This rule however shall apply only if the accused is formally arrai#ned and re(uired to plead on all the offenses as are char#ed in the information 8therwise, the accused cannot be convicted of the offenses with respect to which he was not properly arrai#ned

CIVIL PROCEDURE; SERVICE OF PLEADING BY REGISTERED MAIL; COMPLETED UPON ACTUAL RECEIPT BY ADDRESSEE The #eneral rule is that service by re#istered mail is complete upon actual receipt thereof by the addressee The e&ception is where the addressee does not claim his mail within A days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, in which case the service takes effect upon the e&piration of such period !nasmuch as the e&ception refers to only constructive and not actual service, such e&ception must be applied only upon conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee The presumption that official duty has been re#ularly performed is not applicable where there is evidence to the contrary, as in the case at bar REPLEVIN;DEFENDANT MAY DEMAND RETURN OF PROPERTY BY FILING REDELIVERY BOND AND WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER TAKING OF PROPERTY. This /ourt has e&plained that a defendant in a replevin suit, may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filin# a redelivery bond e&ecuted to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff"s affidavit, within the periods specified in ,ections A and - of 4ule -7 of the 4ules of /ourt )nder ,ection A, petitioner may =at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff" re(uire the return of the property; in ,ection -, he may do so, =within five (A) days after the takin# of the property by the officer = 'oth these periods are mandatory in character Thus, a lower court which approves a counterbond filed beyond the statutory periods, acts in e&cess of jurisdiction RES JUDICATA; IDENTITY OF ISSUES; RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT. 1hen there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there e&ists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of jud#ment %lthou#h it does not have the same effect as res judicata in the form of bar by former jud#ment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of jud#ment bars the reliti#ation of particular facts or issues in another liti#ation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; REQUISITES. Eor a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedin#s until the final resolution of the civil, the followin# re(uisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the #uilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (9) jurisdiction to try said (uestion must be lod#ed in another tribunal QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS The (uantum of evidence now re(uired in preliminary investi#ation is such evidence sufficient to =en#ender a well founded belief= as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent"s probable #uilt thereof % preliminary investi#ation is not the occasion for the full and e&haustive display of the parties" evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may en#ender a well #rounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably #uilty thereof

APPEALS; DUTY OF APPELLANT TO PROSECUTE HIS APPEAL WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE. % rule lon# familiar to practitioners in this jurisdiction is that it is the duty of the appellant to prosecute his appeal with reasonable dili#ence +e cannot simply fold his arms and say that it is the duty of the /lerk of /ourt of Eirst !nstance under the provisions of ,ection 11, 4ule .1 of the 4ules of /ourt to transmit the record on appeal to the appellate court !t is appellants duty to make the /lerk act and, if necessary, procure a court order to compel him to act +e cannot idly sit by and wait till this is done +e cannot afterwards wash his hands and say that delay in the transmittal of the record on appeal was not his fault Eor indeed, this duty imposed upon him was precisely to spur on the slothful PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS; WHEN PRESUMPTION WILL NOT ARISE. 1hen there are several related acts supposed to be performed by a public officer or employee in re#ard to a particular matter, the presumption of re#ularity in the performance of official functions would not arise and be considered as comprehendin# all the re(uired acts, if the certification issued by the proper office refers only to some of such acts, particularly in instances wherein proof of whether or not all of them have been performed is available under the law or office re#ulations to the officer makin# the certification !n other words, the omission of some of the acts in the certification may justify the inference that from the proof available to the officer there is no showin# that they have also been performed CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; GENERALLY BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE; BEST LEFT TO DETERMINATION OF TRIAL COURT JUDGE. 1here the bone of contention is the credibility of a witness, settled is the rule that the trial courtCs assessment of a witnessC credibility is accorded #reat wei#ht by appellate courts absent any showin# that the trial court overlooked certain matters which, if taken into consideration, would have materially affected the outcome of the case %nd where the trial courtCs findin#s have been affirmed by the /ourt of %ppeals, these are #enerally bindin# and conclusive upon this /ourt The determination of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court jud#e because of his uni(ue opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand, a vanta#e point denied appellate tribunals JUDICIAL BONDS; NATURE. Kudicial bonds are contractual in nature They constitute a special class of contracts of #uaranty since they are #iven by virtue of judicial order Bven if the appeal bond is defective, a situation not true in the present case, as lon# as it is not void and #iven in #ood faith and not for the purpose of delay, the trial /ourt may order its amendment The appeal should not be dismissed without #ivin# the appellant an opportunity to perfect the bond or to file a new bond This /ourt even held that an appeal bond si#ned by one bondsman is not defective as to justify dismissal of the appeal CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASE; RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR. !t is a&iomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the #overnment prosecutor and must always be under his control This is true even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the e&amination of the witnesses and the

introduction of other evidence The witnesses, even if they are the complainin# witnesses cannot act for the prosecutor in the handlin# of the case They have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action Their only function is to testify !n a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the #overnment prosecutor, or one actin# under his authority, and by no one else CERTIORARI; WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FILED FIRST; E%CEPTIONS The rule is that certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors >Tan vs /%, 2<A ,/4% A-6; Luiambao vs 3$4/, 2A. ,/4% 211 ? There are e&ceptions to the rule, these are: (1) when the issue raised is purely one of law; (2) where public interest is involved; (9) in cases of emer#ency; or (.) where special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS; HAS THE FORCE OF RES JUDICATA BETWEEN THE PARTIES; CANNOT BE DISTURBED E%CEPT FOR VICES OF CONSENT. 3o one can dispute that the =essence of compromises, bein# mutual concessions by the parties, is to avoid or end liti#ation !t is therefore a well-settled rule that a compromise, once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed e&cept for vices of consent or for#ery= !n a strin# of decisions, this /ourt has repeatedly held that a jud#ment upon compromise which is a jud#ment embodyin# a compromise a#reement entered into by the parties in which they make reciprocal concessions in order to terminate a liti#ation already instituted is not appealable, is immediately e&ecutory and has the effect of res judicata GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; DEFINED. 5rave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical e&ercise of jud#ment as is e(uivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is e&ercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and #ross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law !t is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the e&ercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be #rave GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; WHEN PRESENT. There is =#rave abuse of discretion= where there is a capricious and whimsical e&ercise of jud#ment amountin# to lack of jurisdiction or where the power is e&ercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reasons of passion or personal hostility, and it is so patent and #ross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law EVIDENCE; MUST NOT ONLY PROCEED FROM A CREDIBLE SOURCE BUT MUST BE CREDIBLE IN ITSELF %s repeatedly e&pounded by this /ourt, evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself %nd by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe 3o better test has yet

been found to determine the value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowled#e and common e&perience of mankind %s bewailed by the court below, the theory espoused by appellant =is ta&in# too much the credulity of this /ourt, an insult to the humble intelli#ence and the common sense of this /ourt COUNTERBOND OF DEFENDANT; PURPOSE. To forestall the possession by the plaintiff of the property our procedural law provides that the defendant must post a counterbond and must furnish the plaintiff with the copy of the undertakin# %#ain, if only for the purpose of emphasis, this is re(uired to protect the plaintiff, should his action be adjud#ed meritorious 1e need not mention, that this procedure was purposely formulated to allow the defendant to continue possessin# the property 3ot to re(uire him to post any bond would likewise, be counter to the objectives and intent sou#ht by the framers of the law !n short, whoever holds the property must post the bond to stand as security to the non-holder pendin# the final determination of the case PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN DISCIPLINARY CASES OF STUDENTS. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions re(uires observance of procedural due process %nd it bears stressin# that due process in disciplinary cases involvin# students does not entail proceedin#s and hearin#s similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedin#s in courts of justice The proceedin#s in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-e&amination is not, contrary to petitioners" view, an essential part thereof There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writin# of the nature and cause of any accusation a#ainst them; (2) they shall have the ri#ht to answer the char#es a#ainst them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (9) they shall be informed of the evidence a#ainst them; (.) they shall have the ri#ht to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (A) the evidence must be duly considered by the investi#atin# committee or official desi#nated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case CIVIL PROCEDURE; NOTICES; CERTIFICATION BY POSTMASTER. % certification from the postmaster would be the best evidence to prove that the notice has been validly sent The mailman may also testify that the notice was actually delivered, as we held in %ldecoa vs +on %rellano and ,i(uenDa The postmaster should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made /onse(uently, it cannot be too much to e&pect that when the post office makes a certification re#ardin# delivery of re#istered mail, such certification should include the data not only as to whether or not the correspondin# notices were issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ACCUSED SHALL BE INFORMED OF NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION. !n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation a#ainst him The ri#ht of the accused to be informed of the char#es a#ainst him is e&plicit in ,ec 1(b) 4ule 11A of the 4ules of /riminal 2rocedure To ensure that the due process ri#hts of an accused are observed, every indictment must embody the essential elements of the crime char#ed with reasonable particularity as to the name of the accused, the

time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof 8ne such particular circumstance is conspiracy where two or more persons are char#ed in an information CERTIORARI; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION NEEDED. !n essence, a writ of certiorari may be issued only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy and ade(uate remedy in the ordinary course of law +ence, #enerally, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resortin# to the e&traordinary writ of certiorari since a motion for reconsideration is still considered an ade(uate remedy in the ordinary course of law The rationale for the filin# of a motion for reconsideration is to #ive an opportunity to the lower court to correct its imputed errors 5enerally, only when a motion for reconsideration has been filed and subse(uently denied can petitioner avail of the remedy of the writ of certiorari TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; WHEN NORMALLY ACCEPTED; DUTY OF TRIAL COURT TO ACCEPT TESTIMONY. 1here considerations of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased a#ainst the accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted This is more so when the witness is the victim or his near relative because these witnesses usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants *oreover, the trial court #ave credence to the prosecution"s identification of the appellants as the culprits ,ubject to e&ceptions which do not obtain in these cases, the trial court is in a better position to decide this (uestion, havin# seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifyin# durin# the trial INTERVENTION; MERELY COLLATERAL OR ANCILLARY TO PRINCIPAL ACTION. %n intervention has been re#arded as =merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action and not an independent proceedin#; an interlocutory proceedin# dependent on or subsidiary to, the case between the ori#inal parties = (Erancisco, 4ules of /ourt, @ol 1) The main action havin# ceased to e&ist, there is no pendin# proceedin# whereon the intervention may be based PLEADINGS; COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL IMPERATIVES. !t is a settled rule that a tribunal may at any time take judicial notice of the records of a case pendin# before it, and satisfy itself that copies of the pleadin#s filed by the parties are in the numbers re(uired by its rules The failure of a pleadin# to comply with such procedural imperative set by the court, leaves the latter the discretion either to reject that pleadin# or order completion of the number of copies thereof 1here, however, the party whose pleadin# has been shunted aside offers to show that it has fully complied with the re(uirements of the rules and that the records kept by the tribunal contain inaccurate entries, the latter body should pause and listen, and #ive that party a day in court VENUE OF SUITS;AGREEMENT OF PARTIES;WHEN PERMISSIVE. !n interpretin# situations, in(uiry must be made as to whether or not the a#reement is restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place a#reed upon or merely

permissive in that the parties may file their suits not only in the place a#reed upon but also in the places fi&ed by the rules RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF PROPERTY. The =proper action=, the object of which is for the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seiDed by the sheriff, is and should be an entirely separate and distinct action from that in which e&ecution has issued, if instituted by a stran#er to the latter suit RIGHT OF ACTION; WHEN IT ACCRUES AND BECOME OPERATIVE. The ri#ht of action sprin#s from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred 1hen there is an invasion of primary ri#hts, then and not until then does the adjective or remedial law become operative, and under it arise ri#hts of action There can be no ri#ht of action until there has been a wron# a violation of a le#al ri#ht and it is then #iven by the adjective law CONTEMPT;NOT SUBJECT TO SEPARATE ACTION The contention that a party"s complaint for contempt must be the subject of a separate action would nullify contempt proceedin#s as means of securin# obedience to the lawful processes of a court-this theory would reward in#enuity and cunnin# in revisin# orders which substantially are the same as the order previously prohibited by the court CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DUTY OF FISCAL IN COMMENCING CRIMINAL ACTIONS AGAINST PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR AN OFFENSE. !t must be admitted that ,ection 1, 4ule 117 makes it mandatory on the Eiscal to commence criminal actions a#ainst all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense, but this does not mean that he has no discretion at all +e still is called on to determine whether the evidence before him is enou#h to justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense !t is the prero#ative of the Eiscal, on the basis of the evidence #athered by him, in the e&ercise of such discretion, to char#e the accused to the e&clusion of others WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION; REQUISITES. !t is a lon# settled rule that for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to issue, the followin# re(uisites must be present: (1) that the complainant has a clear le#al ri#ht; (2) that his ri#ht has been violated and the invasion is material and substantial; and (9) there is an ur#ent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious dama#e B(ually settled is that, as a rule, injunction will not be #ranted to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been established by law CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE; REQUISITES TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED. /ircumstantial evidence may be resorted to in provin# the identity of the accused when direct evidence is not available, otherwise felons would #o scot-free and the community would be denied proper protection The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused throu#h circumstantial evidence when the followin# re(uisites concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (9) the

combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the #uilt of the accused INTERVENTION; DEFINED. !ntervention is defined as a =proceedin# in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joinin# plaintiff in claimin# what is sou#ht by the complaint, or unitin# with defendant in resistin# the claims of plaintiff, or demandin# somethin# adversely to both of them; the act or proceedin# by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pendin# between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an ori#inal party to pendin# le#al proceedin#s, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some ri#ht or interest alle#ed by him to be affected by such proceedin#s ABATEMENT OR DISMISSAL OF ACTION; LITIS PENDENTIA !n order to constitute a #round for the abatement or dismissal of an action, litis pendentia must e&hibit the concurrnece of the followin# re(uisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representin# the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of ri#hts asserted and relief prayed for, the relief bein# founded on the same facts; and (c) identity in the two cases should be such that the jud#ment that may be rendered in the pendin# case would, re#ardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other MOTIONS; MUST MEET NOTICE REQUIREMENTS;OTHERWISE CONSIDERED A WORTHLESS PIECE OF PAPER. ,ection . of 4ule 1A of the 4ules of /ourt re(uires that notice of motion be served by the movant on all parties concerned at least three (9) days before its hearin# ,ection A of the same 4ule provides that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearin# of the motion % motion which does not meet the re(uirements of ,ections . and A of 4ule 1A of the 4ules of /ourt is considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no ri#ht to receive and the court has no authority to act upon ,ervice of copy of a motion containin# notice of the time and place of hearin# of said motion is a mandatory re(uirement RES JUDICATA; UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY. The underlyin# philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties ou#ht not to be permitted to liti#ate the same issue more than once; that when a ri#ht or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such a trial has been #iven, the jud#ment of the court, so lon# as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate, (*arapao v *endoDa, 11: ,/4% :<, ,y /ao v /%, 192 ,/4% 972) !t is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to liti#ation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated !nterest republicae ut sit finis litium ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH; PARTIES %ll persons whether natural or juridical, who stand to lose in favor of the #overnment under a jud#ment in such actions for recovery of so-called ille#ally ac(uired wealth should be impleaded as defendants to afford them an opportunity to be heard and to defend themselves in the action

COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION;MOTION TO QUASH OR DISMISS !t is clear from ,ection 2 of 4ule 11<, 4ules of /ourt, that a motion to (uash may be based on factual and le#al #rounds, and since e&tinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained amon# the #rounds for a motion to (uash in ,ection 9 of the new 4ule 11<, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such #rounds CERTIORARI;WHEN PROPER /ertiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and #ross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is e&ercised in an aribitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility CLASSES OF EVIDENCE The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, thou#h insufficient to establish #uilt beyond reasonable doubt, is ade(uate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence Then too, there is the =substantial evidence= rule in administrative proceedin#s which merely re(uires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind mi#ht accept as ade(uate to support a conclusion

CIVIL LAW: ANNULMENT;ROOT CAUSE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY The root cause of the psycholo#ical incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alle#ed in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by e&perts, and (d) clearly e&plained in the decision B&pert evidence may be #iven by (ualified psychiatrists and clinical psycholo#ists MORTGAGE; SPECIAL POWERS OF ATTORNEY;EFFECT AGAINST THIRD PERSONS WITH NO KNOWLEDGE. %bsent a valid revocation duly furnished to the mort#a#ee, ,pecial 2owers of %ttorney continue to have force and effect as a#ainst third persons who had no knowled#e of such lack of authority AGENCY; SCOPE OF AUTHORITY. %s far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the a#ent"s authority if such is within the the terms of the power of attorney as written even if the a#ent has in fact e&ceeded the limits of his authority accordin# to the understandin# between the principal and the a#ent ADOPTION; STATUTES; PURPOSE The main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of children The law must also be applied with compassion, understandin# and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide home, love, care and education for less fortunate children CONSIGNATION; INAPPLICABLE TO LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY !n @da de Luirino v 2alarca, it was ruled that consi#nation referred to in %rticle 12A- of the /ivil /ode is inapplicable to a lease with option to buy because said provision refers to consi#nation as one of the means for the payment or dischar#e of a =debt,= whereas the lessee was not indebted to the lessor for the price of the leased premises The lessee merely e&ercised a ri#ht of option and had no obli#ation to pay said price until e&ecution of the deed of sale in his favor, which the lessor refused to do PROPERTY; ACCRETION; REQUISITES %ccretion as a mode of ac(uirin# property under %rticle .A< of the /ivil /ode, re(uires the concurrence of the followin# re(uisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be #radual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (9) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; TENDER OF PAYMENT OF A JUDGMENT NOT SAME AS TENDER OF PAYMENT OF CONTRACTUAL DEBT. *oreover, as previously shown, the ri#hts and obli#ations of the parties arose from a jud#ment, not from contract and therefore the /ivil /ode re(uirements as to consi#nation are not applicable Thus, in case of refusal of a tender of the amount due on a jud#ment, the court may direct the money to be paid in court and when this is done, order satisfaction of the jud#ment to be entered The tender of payment of a jud#ment is not the same as tender of payment of a contractual debt and consi#nation of the money due from a debtor to a creditor The re(uisites of consi#nation under %rt 12A- et se( do not apply to the former

WILLS AND SUCCESSION; POWERS OF COURT TO CONTROL PROPERTIES OF DECEASED. The court which ac(uired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person throu#h the filin# of the correspondin# proceedin#s, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, ri#hts and credits which the law re(uires the administrator to set out in his inventory !n compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, ri#hts and credits of the deceased should be included in or e&cluded from the inventory ,hould an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court"s attention to the fact that certain properties, ri#hts or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court"s duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belon# prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties E%TRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION ALLOWED WHEN NO CREDITORS AFFECTED 1ithout creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an a#reement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothin# can be inferred that a writin# or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid MEETING OF THE MINDS IN A CONTRACT OF SALE The meetin# of the minds in a contract speaks of the intent of the parties in enterin# into the contract respectin# the subject matter and the consideration thereof, and if the words of the contract appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AGENT AND BROKER %n a#ent receives a commission upon the successful conclusion of a sale % broker earns his pay merely by brin#in# the buyer and the seller to#ether, even if no sale is eventually made The fact that a person invested his own money to put service centers and showrooms does not necessarily prove that he is not an a#ent of a car manufacturer CONTRACTS; INTERPRETATION OF STIPULATIONS IN LEASE CONTRACT. The new rule, therefore, is that a stipulation in the lease contract which provides for the e&tension of the period of lease, the terms and conditions of which are subject to the mutual a#reement of the lessor and the lessee, should be interpreted to mean that the lease may be e&tended only upon mutual a#reement of the parties and not at the option alone of the lessee or even the lessor for that matter CONTRACTS; E%TRAORDINARY INFLATION !t is only when an e&traordinary inflation supervenes that the law affords the parties a relief in contractual obli#ations %rt 12A7 of the /ivil /ode provides that =in case an e&traordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obli#ation shall be the basis of the payment, unless there is an a#reement to the contrary = !n Eilipino 2ipe and Eoundry /orporation v 3%1%,%, the

/ourt e&plained e&traordinary inflation thus: =B&traordinary inflation e&ists when "there is a decrease or increase in the purchasin# power of the 2hilippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such decrease or increase could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obli#ation (Tolentino, /ommentaries and Kurisprudence on the /ivil /ode, @ol !@, p 26. ) ALTERATION PLANS;MAJORITY OF HOMEOWNERS CONSENT NEEDED. !n alteration plans, written approval of the 3ational +ousin# %uthority alone is not sufficient !t must be coupled with the written conformity or consent of the duly or#aniDed homeowners association or the majority of the lot buyers ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; MUST BE PROVED WITH REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY. %ctual or compensatory dama#es cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with reasonable de#ree of certainty % court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or #uesswork as to the fact and amount of dama#es, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PROBATE OF A WILL; DOES NOT LOOK INTO ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY. 3ormally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity The authentication of a will decides no other (uestions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those re(uisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the wills !t does not determine nor even by implication prejud#e the validity or efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus may be impu#ned as bein# vicious or null, notwithstandin# its authentication The (uestion relatin# to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAUSE AND MOTIVE. /ause is the essential reason for the contract, while motive is the particular reason of a contractin# party which does not affect the other party and which does not preclude the e&istence of a different consideration %rticle 19A1 of the /ivil /ode provides that =the particular motives of the parties in enterin# into a contract are different from the cause thereof = PAROL PARTITIONS; MAY BE SUSTAINED ON GROUND OF ESTOPPEL; MAY BE RECOGNI'ED BY COURT FOR CONCLUDING RIGHTS OF PARTIES. !n numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the #round of estoppel of the parties to assert the ri#hts of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were e&ercised %nd a court of e(uity will reco#niDe the a#reement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concludin# the ri#ht of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty % parol partition may also be sustained on the #round that the parties thereto have ac(uiesced in and ratified the partition by takin# possession in severalty, e&ercisin# acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise reco#niDin# the e&istence of the partition

PROPERTY; IMPROVEMENTS ON PROPERTY; PROOF NEEDED TO DETERMINE REIMBURSEMENT. The /ivil /ode says that improvements, =whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses throu#h advancements from the partnership or throu#h the industry of either the husband or the wife, belon# to the conju#al partnership,= and buildin#s =constructed, at the e&pense of the partnership, durin# the marria#e on land belon#in# to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same = 2roof, therefore, is needful of the time of the makin# or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used therefor, in order to determine the character of the improvements as belon#in# to the conju#al partnership or to one spouse separately DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE !! OF CIVIL CODE; ONLY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED. To hold a person liable for dama#es under %rticle 99 of the /ivil /ode, only a preponderance of evidence is re(uired %n ac(uittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filin# of an action for civil dama#es, for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable Thus, the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an ac(uittal or conviction, is really inconse(uential and will be of no moment in the civil action CONSIGNATION; INAPPLICABLE TO A LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY. !n @da de Luirino v 2alarca, it was ruled that consi#nation referred to in %rticle 12A- of the /ivil /ode is inapplicable to a lease with option to buy because said provision refers to consi#nation as one of the means for the payment or dischar#e of a =debt,= whereas the lessee was not indebted to the lessor for the price of the leased premises The lessee merely e&ercised a ri#ht of option and had no obli#ation to pay said price until e&ecution of the deed of sale in his favor, which the lessor refused to do POSSESSION; MUST BE ADVERSE TO CONSITUTE THE FOUNDATION OF A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT. 2ossession, under the /ivil /ode, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive ri#ht, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or to use the common law e(uivalent of the term, it must be adverse %cts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how lon# so continued, do not start the runnin# of the period of prescription ARTICLE ,), OF THE CIVIL CODE; TWO OPTIONS FOR MAKING A PARTITION OF ESTATE. %rticle 1767 of the 3ew /ivil /ode allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the le#itime of the compulsory heirs 1hile the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in %rt 1767, is a case e&pressly authoriDed by law %rt 1767 of the /ivil /ode clearly #ives a person two options in makin# a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by will 1hen a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be e&ecuted in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such

partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the le#itime of compulsory heirs DAMAGES; MERE FILING OF A COMPLAINT IS NOT PER SE EVIDENCE OF ILL WILL ON WHICH A CLAIM FOR DAMGES MAY BE BASED. !t has not been sufficiently established that the complaint they filed was intended merely to harass and place petitioner in disrepute as they apparently were pursuin# a cause of action they sincerely believed was meritorious The fact that they have failed does not necessarily mean that they were actin# in bad faith The mere filin# of a complaint a#ainst a person, while it may cause him some an&iety, is not per se evidence of ill will on which a claim for dama#es may be based % contrary role would discoura#e peaceful recourse to the courts of justice and induce resort to methods less than le#al, and perhaps even violent MORTGAGE; SUBORDINATE LIEN HOLDER; A PROPER PARTY TO A FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING. % subordinate lien holder is a proper, even a necessary, but not an indispensable, party to a foreclosure proceedin# %ppropriate relief could be #ranted by the court to the mort#a#ee in the foreclosure proceedin#, without affectin# the ri#hts of the subordinate lien holders The effect of the failure on the part of the mort#a#ee to make the subordinate lien holder a defendant is that the decree entered in the foreclosure proceedin# would not deprive the subordinate lien holder of his ri#ht of redemption % decree of foreclosure in a suit to which the holders of a second lien are not parties leaves the e(uity of redemption in favor of such lien holders unforeclosed and unaffected SALE OF LAND IS VALID REGARDLESS OF FORM; REQUISITE UNDER ARTICLE $() OF THE CIVIL CODE FOR CONVENIENCE ONLY. % sale of land is valid re#ardless of the form it may have been entered into The re(uisite form under %rticle 1.A6 of the /ivil /ode is merely for #reater efficacy or convenience and the failure to comply therewith does not affect the validity and bindin# effect of the act between the parties !f the law re(uires a document or other special form, as in the sale of real property, the contractin# parties may compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected Their ri#ht may be e&ercised simultaneously with action upon the contract VALID TENDER OF PAYMENT; ENOUGH TO E%ERCISE RIGHT OF REPURCHASE. ,ince the case at bar involves the e&ercise of the ri#ht to repurchase, a showin# that petitioner made a valid tender of payment is sufficient !t is enou#h that a sincere or #enuine tender of payment and not a mock or deceptive one was made The fact that he deposited the amount of repurchase money with the /lerk of /ourt was simply an additional security for the petitioner !t was not an essential act that had to be performed after tender of payment was refused by the private respondent althou#h it may serve to indicate the veracity of desire to comply with the obli#ation ARTICLE !! OF THE CIVIL CODE; REASON FOR BURDEN OF PROOF To subordinate the civil action contemplated in %rts 99 and 21<< of the /ivil /ode to the result of the criminal prosecution would render meanin#less the independent character of the civil action when, on the contrary, the law provides that such civil action =may proceed

independently of the criminal proceedin# and re#ardless of the result of the latter = %rt 99 of the /ivil /ode contemplates a civil action for recovery of dama#es that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case This is the reason why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient in such civil action POSSESSION;ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER;PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROOF. !n an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of possession The le#al ri#ht thereto is not essential to the possessor"s cause of action, for no one may take law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or deprive him of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto were (uestionable or actually disputed in another case !f the plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no ri#ht of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION; DISTINGUISHED. !t must be stressed Jthat possession and ownership are distinct le#al concepts 8wnership e&ists when a thin# pertainin# to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the ri#hts of others 8wnership confers certain ri#hts to the owner, one of which is the ri#ht to dispose of the thin# by way of sale 8n the other hand, possession is defined as the holdin# of a thin# or the enjoyment of a ri#ht $iterally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thin# with or without ri#ht CONTRACTS; INTERPRETATION; LITERAL MEANING SHALL CONTROL. !t is a basic and fundamental rule in the interpretation of contract that if the terms thereof are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contractin# parties, the literal meanin# shall control !n order to jud#e the intention of the parties, their contemporaneous and subse(uent acts shall be principally considered NOVATION; PAYMENT BY THIRD PERSON DOES NOT RELEASE ORIGINAL DEBTOR. !t is a very common thin# in the business affairs for a stran#er to a contract to assume its obli#ations; and while this may have the effect of addin# to the number of persons liable, it does not necessarily imply the e&tin#uishment of the liability of the first debtor The mere fact that the creditor receives a #uaranty or accepts payments from a third person who has a#reed to assume the obli#ation, when there is no a#reement that the first debtor shall be released from responsibility, does not constitute a novation, and the creditor can still enforce the obli#ation a#ainst the ori#inal debtor PROPERTY;LIS PENDENS; DEFINED. $is pendens is a $atin term which literally means a pendin# suit or a pendin# liti#ation while a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in liti#ation, servin# as a warnin# that one who ac(uires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that he #ambles on the result of the liti#ation over the said property !t is but a si#nal to the intendin# buyer or mort#a#ee to take care or beware and to investi#ate the prospect or non-prospect of the liti#ation succeedin# before he forks down his money

LAND TITLES; UNRECORDED TITLE OF A HOUSE OF A PRIOR DATE PREFERRED OVER RECORDED MORTGAGE OF SAME HOUSE !t should not be amiss to state by reference a case wherein the ,upreme /ourt held that between an unrecorded title of a house of a prior date and a recorded mort#a#e of the same house of later date, the former is preferred for the reason that, if the ori#inal owner had parted with his ownership of the thin# sold, then he no lon#er had the ownership and free disposal of that thin# so as to be able to mort#a#e it CONTRACTS; INTENTION OF PARTIES ASCERTAINED BY WORDS USED. The important task in contract interpretation is always the ascertainment of the intention of the contractin# parties and that task is of course to be dischar#ed by lookin# to the words they used to project that intention in their contract, all the words not just a particular word or two, and words in conte&t not words standin# alone MORAL DAMAGES; PURPOSE THEREOF. The purpose of moral dama#es is essentially indemnity or reparation, both punishment or correction *oral dama#es are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the e&pense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferin# he has under#one, by reason of the defendant"s culpable action !n other words, the award of moral dama#es is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status (uo ante and, it must be proportionate to the sufferin# inflicted FORECLOSURE SALE; RIGHTS OF BUYER THEREOF; BOND REQUIREMENT. !t is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed durin# the period of one year after the re#istration of the sale %s such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time followin# the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even durin# the redemption period e&cept that he has to post a bond in accordance with ,ection < of %ct 3o 9199 as amended 3o such bond is re(uired after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed 2ossession of the land then becomes an absolute ri#ht of the purchaser as confirmed owner )pon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court

WILLS; PROBATE DOES NOT LOOK INTO INTRINSIC VALIDITY. 3ormally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity The authentication of a will decides no other (uestions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those re(uisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the wills !t does not determine nor even by implication prejud#e the validity or efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus may be impu#ned as bein# vicious or null, notwithstandin# its authentication The (uestion relatin# to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated

CONTRACTS; STIPULATION POUR AUTRUI; DEFINITION AND REQUISITES. % stipulation pour autrui is one in favor of a third person who may demand its fulfillment, provided he communicated his acceptance to the obli#or before its revocation %n incidental benefit or interest, which another person #ains, is not sufficient The contractin# parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person The re(uisites for such contract are: (1) the stipulation in favor of a third person must be a part of the contract, and not the contract itself; (2) the favorable stipulation should not be conditioned or compensated by any kind of obli#ation; and (9) neither of the contractin# parties bears the le#al representation or authoriDation of the third party DONATIONS; REQUIREMENTS FOR DONATION OF AN IMMOVABLE; REGISTRATION OF DONATION. %rticle <.: of the /ivil /ode provides inter alia that =in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifyin# therein the property donated and the value of the char#es which the donee must satisfy = /orollarily, %rticle <7: of the same /ode e&plicitly states that =the titles of ownership, or other ri#hts over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the 4e#istry of property shall not prejudice third persons = Erom the fore#oin# provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is re(uired is for said donation to be contained in a public document 4e#istration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective +owever, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be re#istered in the 4e#istry of 2roperty (now 4e#istry of $and Titles and Geeds) %lthou#h the non-re#istration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of re#istration comes into play when the ri#hts of third persons are affected POSSESSION; PURCHASER AT AUCTION SALE NOT OBLIGED TO BRING SUIT FOR POSSESSION AFTER LASE OF ONE YEAR REDEMPTION PERIOD. There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriff"s sale of real property is obli#ed to brin# a separate and independent suit for possession after the one-year period for redemption has e&pired and after he has obtained the sheriff"s final certificate of sale There is neither le#al #round nor reason of public policy precludin# the court from orderin# the sheriff in this case to yield possession of the property purchased at public auction where it appears that the jud#ment debtor is the one in possession thereof and no ri#hts of third persons are involved

CONTRACTS; LEASE; PERIOD OF LEASE DEEMED TO BENEFIT BOTH PARTIES. !t is also important to bear in mind that in a reciprocal contract like a lease, the period of the lease must be deemed to have been a#reed upon for the benefit of both parties, absent lan#ua#e showin# that the term was deliberately set for the benefit of the lessee or lessor alone 1e are not aware of any presumption in law that the term of a lease is desi#nated for the benefit of the lessee alone CONTRACTS; PERFECTION; QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE. /ontracts that are consensual in nature, like a contract of sale, are perfected upon mere meetin# of the minds 8nce there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject

matter, consideration, and terms of payment, a contract is produced The offer must be certain To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not (ualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain, une(uivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the proposal % (ualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal, constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the ori#inal offer /onse(uently, when somethin# is desired which is not e&actly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to #enerate consent because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer

CRIMINAL LAW: CONSPIRACY; MAY BE INFERRED FROM ACTS OF THE ACCUSED Girect proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as this may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, durin# and after the commission of the crime which, indubitably, point to and are indicative of a joint purpose concert of action and community of interest PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE; PRINCIPALS 8ne who participates in the material e&ecution of the crime by standin# #uard or lendin# moral support to the actual perpetrator is criminally responsible to the same e&tent as the latter ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSPIRACY; DIRECT PROOF NOT ESSENTIAL Girect proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as this may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, durin# and after the commission of the crime whuch indubitably, point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest SELF-DEFENSE; DUTY OF ACCUSED TO ESTABLISH EVIDENCE !n self-defense the burden of proof rests upon the accused +is duty is to establish by sufficient, satisfactory and convincin# evidence the followin# re(uisites: (a) unlawful a##ression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defendin# himself AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP; AWARD OF E%EMPLARY DAMAGES IN CRIME OF RAPE The relationship of stepfather or stepmother and stepson or stepdau#hter is included by analo#y as similar to that of ascendant and descendant, and where appreciated as an a##ravatin# circumstance in rape, the award of e&emplary dama#es, in addition to moral dama#es, is proper TREACHERY; UNE%PECTED AND SUDDEN ATTACK %n une&pected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack constitutes alevosia, and the fact that the act was frontal does not preclude the presence of treachery PRESENCE OF TREACHERY. There is treachery where the victim, soaked in his own blood, defenseless, and callin# for help, weakened and dyin#, was still attacked, thus employed means to insure or afford impunity TREACHERY; REQUISITES. Eor treachery to be present, two conditions must concur, namely, (a) the employment of means of e&ecution that #ives the personnattacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of e&ecution was deliberately or consciously adopted DUE PROCESS; ACCUSED MUST BE INFORMED OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.

!n a criminal case, due process re(uires that, amon# others, the accusation be in due form, and that notice thereof and an opportunity to answer the char#e be #iven the accused; hence, the constitutional and re#lementary #uarantees as to accused"s ri#ht =to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation a#ainst him = %n accused should be #iven the necessary data as to why he is bein# proceeded a#ainst and not be left in the unenviable state of speculatin# why he is made the object of a prosecution, it bein# the fact that, in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake !t is always wise and proper that the accused be fully apprised of the char#e a#ainst him in order to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY !t has been repeatedly held by this /ourt that there e&ists the (ualifyin# circumstance of treachery when one takes the life of a person who is asleep %s for a victim who had just awakened when attacked, there was also treachery =because the victim, who may still be daDed and unprepared for the attack, would not be in a position to offer any risk or dan#er of retaliation to the attacker ESTAFA;WHEN PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION COMMENCES TO RUN The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the crime if it is known at the time of its commission Thus, if there is nothin# that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the entire series of transactions was by public instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection with said transaction was known to the offended party when it was committed and the period of prescription commenced to run from the date of its commission AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PREMEDITATION; HOW APPRECIATED. 2remeditation cannot be appreciated if the evidence does not show when the plan to kill was hatched, or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out There must be a basis for determinin# whether the accused had sufficient time between the inception of the plan and its fulfillment to dispassionately consider and accept its conse(uences AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; MUST BE PRESENT AT INCEPTION OF ATTACK. !t is a fundamental rule of lon# standin# that for treachery to be appreciated, that circumstance must be present at the inception of the attack, and if absent and the attack is continuous, treachery, even if present at a subse(uent sta#e, is not to be considered That the final fatal blows may have in truth been delivered under conditions e&hibitin# some features of treachery does not remedy the fact that the prosecution failed to prove the e&istence of treachery at the onset of the attack AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY The /ourt a (uo properly appreciated the a##ravatin# circumstance of treachery which (ualified the crime to murder !t was clearly established that the accused-appellant fired si& successive shots on the victim, suddenly, without warnin#, and from behind, #ivin# the victim no chance to flee or to prepare for his defense or to put up the least resistance to such sudden assault There is treachery when the means, manner or method of attack employed by the offender offered no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim mi#ht have taken

PROBATION; DEFINITION; OBJECTIVE. 2robation is not a ri#ht of an accused but a mere privile#e, an act of #race and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which may be #ranted to a seemin#ly deservin# defendant who thereby escapes the e&treme ri#ors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense for which he was convicted The primary objective in #rantin# probation is the reformation of the probationer /ourts must be meticulous enou#h to ensure that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the accused be served by the #rant of probation AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;NIGHTTIME;WHEN ABSORBED IN TREACHERY. 3i#httime or nocturnity was absorbed in treachery since it was evidently an inte#ral part of pecu!iar treacherous means and manner adopted to ensure the e&ecution of the crimes or that it facilitated the treacherous character of the attack MERE ALIBI AND DENIAL CANNOT OVERCOME POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED. !n the face of the clear and positive testimony of the prosecution witness re#ardin# the participation of the accused in the crime, the accused"s alibi dwindles into nothin#ness The positive identification of the accused by the witness as the perpetrator of the crime cannot be overcome by the mere denial of the accused ,uch positive identification of the accused that he killed the victim establishes the #uilt of the accused beyond moral certainty RAPE; ESSENTIAL THAT FORCE USED IS SUFFICIENT TO CONSUMATE PURPOSE; ABSENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURIES DOES NOT NEGATE ITS COMMISSION. !t need not be over-emphasiDed that force or violence re(uired in rape cases is relative 1hen applied, it need not be too overpowerin# or irresistible 1hat is essential is that the force used is sufficient to consummate the purpose for which the offender had in mind or to brin# about the desired result !n fact, even the absence of e&ternal si#ns of physical injuries does not ne#ate the commission of the crime of rape B.P. ""; BOUNCING CHECKS LAW; ELEMENTS The elements of the offense penaliDed under ' 2 'l# 22 are: (1) makin#, drawin#, and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) knowled#e of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (9) subse(uent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment The maker"s knowled#e is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds RAPE; TESTIMONY OF VICTIM CREDIBLE WHERE SHE HAD NO MOTIVE TO TESTIFY FALSELY AGAINST ACCUSED. The testimony of the complainant on how she was forcibly taken from her home and brou#ht to a deserted hut, about half a kilometer away, and then raped twice, is credible and we find nothin# unusual or improbable in it +er testimony appears to be strai#htforward and consistent and she had no motive to testify falsely a#ainst the appellant This /ourt has consistently held

that the testimony of a rape victim as to who abused her is credible where she had no motive to testify falsely a#ainst the accused 1e need not also belabor the rule that no Eilipino #irl would publicly admit that she had been ravished unless this is the truth for her natural instinct is to protect her honor and future PROBATION; DISCRETIONARY UPON THE COURT. 2robation is a just privile#e the #rant of which is discretionary upon the court 'efore #rantin# probation, the court must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform, to#ether with the demands of justice and public interest, alon# with other relevant circumstances ('ernardo v 'ala#ot, 21A ,/4% A2- ) The courts are not to limit the basis of their decision to the report or recommendation of the probation officer, which is at best only persuasive ESTAFA; ATTEMPTED ESTAFA. %lthou#h one of the essential elements of estafa is dama#e or prejudice to the offended party, in the absence of proof thereof the offender would at least be #uilty of attempted estafa %ppellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of e&ecution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could obtain the amount ,ince only the intent to cause dama#e and not the dama#e itself has been shown, respondent court correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa RAPE; EVIDENCE MUST BE CLEAR AND CONVINCING; IF REASONABLE DOUBT E%ISTS, VERDICT MUST BE ACQUITTAL. 4ape is an accusation easy to make, hard to prove but harder to defend by the accused, thou#h innocent The evidence for the prosecution must be clear and convincin# to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence 4ape is an offense to which, as is often the case, only two people can testify, thus re(uirin# the most conscientious effort on the part of the arbiter to wei#h and appraise the conflictin# testimonies !f a reasonable doubt e&ists, the verdict must be one of ac(uittal ESTAFA; DECEIT DEFINED 'asically, the two essential re(uisites of fraud or deceit and dama#e or injury must be established by sufficient and competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established Geceit is the false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleadin# alle#ations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his le#al injury The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in (uestion and havin# benefited from the subse(uent withdrawals, as well as havin# attempted to #ain by tryin# to withdraw an amount thereon, the inevitable conclusion would be that he was the one who falsified said checks !neluctably, the use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit ROBBERY; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT; ALL THOSE WHO PATICIPATED ARE LIABLE. 1hen the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery was conclusively shown by the concerted acts of the accused and homicide was committed as a conse(uence thereof, all those who participated are liable as principals in the robbery with homicide, althou#h they did not actually

take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they attempted to prevent the killin# The (uestion as to who actually robbed or who actually killed is of no moment since all of them would be held accountable for the crime of robbery with homicide SELF-DEFENSE; NATURE AND REQUSITES. The validity of self-defense is premised on the impossibility on the part of the ,tate to at all times prevent a##ression upon its people Eounded in the human instinct to protect, repel and save one"s person from impendin# dan#er or peril, the ri#ht of self-defense justifies measures taken by one who is attacked and placed in a situation where he either has to forfeit his life or has to take the life of his assailant 3evertheless, the application of this justifyin# circumstance, in this conte&t, re(uires a clear showin# 1) that the victim has committed unlawful a##ression amountin# to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claimin# self defense; 2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful a##ression; and 9) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claimin# self-defense or, at least, that any provocation e&ecuted by the person claimin# self-defense be not the pro&imate and immediate cause of the victim"s a##ression ROBBERY; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT; ALL THOSE WHO PATICIPATED ARE LIABLE. 1hen the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery was conclusively shown by the concerted acts of the accused and homicide was committed as a conse(uence thereof, all those who participated are liable as principals in the robbery with homicide, althou#h they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they attempted to prevent the killin# The (uestion as to who actually robbed or who actually killed is of no moment since all of them would be held accountable for the crime of robbery with homicide REQUISITES FOR CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE. 8n the matter of conviction of the accused based on circumstantial evidence, the followin# re(uisites need to be satisfied: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (9) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt 8r, as jurisprudentially formulated, a jud#ment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute Jan unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the defendant, to the e&clusion of all others, as the #uilty person, i e the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is #uilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis e&cept that of #uilty I AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; DWELLING; WHEN CONSIDERED AGGRAVATING. Gwellin# a##ravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwellin# of the offended party if the latter has not #iven provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house Gwellin# is considered a##ravatin# primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode +e who #oes to another"s house to hurt him or do him wron# is more #uilty than he who offends him elsewhere %lthou#h accused-appellant was outside of the house when he fired, the victim was inside his house Eor the circumstance of dwellin# to be

considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwellin# of the victim to commit the offense; it is enou#h that the victim was attacked inside his own house, althou#h the assailant mi#ht have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside ARTICLE $ OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; REQUISITES. )nder %rticle . of the 4evised 2enal /ode, criminal liability shall be incurred =by any person committin# a felony (delito) althou#h the wron#ful act done be different from that which he intended = 'ased on the doctrine that =el (ue es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado= (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), the essential re(uisites of %rticle . are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wron# done to the a##rieved party be the direct, natural and lo#ical conse(uence of the felony committed by the offender DEFENSE OF DENIAL; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. +is defense is one of mere denial, and we have time and a#ain held that denial can not prevail over positive identification %nd so also, that credibility of witnesses is left to the sound discretion of the jud#e and in acceptin# one testimony and rejectin# another, he can not be overturned by the appellate tribunal unless he has seriously abused his discretion ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS; ELEMENTS. 2etitionerCs acts of lyin# on top of the complainant, embracin# and kissin# her, mashin# her breasts, insertin# his hand inside her panty and touchin# her se&ual or#an, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showin# that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainantCs se&ual or#an 4ather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by usin# force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of a#e; and (9) that the offended party is another person of either se& MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; PRESUMPTION MAY BE BASIS OF CONVICTION; REBUTTAL OF PRESUMPTION. %rticle 21< of the 4evised 2enal /ode makes clear that =failure of a public officer to have duly forthcomin# any public funds or property with which he is char#eable, upon demand by any duly authoriDed officer,= merely #ives rise to a prima facie presumption =that he has put such missin# finds or property to personal use = % conviction may be founded on the presumption notwithstandin# that there is no direct evidence of misappropriation, if the public officer fails to satisfactorily e&plain the shorta#e in his accounts 'ut the presumption, bein# merely prima facie, may be rebutted and destroyed by competent proof that the accountable officer has not in truth put the funds or property in (uestion to personal use PRO%IMATE LEGAL CAUSE; DEFINED. 2ro&imate le#al cause is defined as =that actin# first and producin# the injury, either immediately or by settin# other events in motion, all constitutin# a natural and continuous chain of events, each havin# a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effectin# the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event

should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelli#ent person, have reasonable #round to e&pect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person mi#ht probably result therefrom ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; CONVICTION THEREOF; HOW MADE. !t is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is imperative that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of a crime !n the absence of such proof, that killin# of the victim would only be simple homicide or murder, dependin# on the absence or presence of (ualifyin# circumstances CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS; REINVESTIGATION; OPTIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN. !n criminal prosecutions, a reinvesti#ation, like an appeal, renders the entire case open for review !t matters not that the complainants did not seek a reinvesti#ation or reconsideration of the dismissal of the char#es a#ainst petitioners /onsistent with its independence as protector of the people and as prosecutor to ensure accountability of public officers, the 8mbudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of complainants 8n the other hand, it is clear from ,ection 1A of 4 % -<<7 that the 8mbudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvesti#ation to assure that the #uilty do not #o unpunished FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT; MAY BE A MEANS OF COMMITTING ESTAFA. The falsification of a public document may be a means of committin# estafa because before the falsified document is actually utiliDed to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, dama#e or intent to cause dama#e not bein# an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial documents The dama#e to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa DRUG-PUSHING; MAY BE COMMITTED ANYTIME AND ANY PLACE. Gru#-pushin# when done on a small level as in this case belon#s to that class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any place %fter the offer to buy is accepted and the e&chan#e is made, the ille#al transaction is completed in a few minutes The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always discoura#e them from pursuin# their ille#al trade as these factors may even serve to camoufla#e the same +ence, the /ourt has sustained the conviction of dru# pushers cau#ht sellin# ille#al dru#s in a billiard hall (2eople v 4ubio, 5 4 3o --6<A, Kune 1:, 1:6-, 1.2 ,/4% 92:; in front of a store; alon# a street at 1:.A p m (2eople v Toledo, 5 4 3o -<-7:, 3ovember 22, 1:6A), and in front of a house (2eople v 2olicarpio, 5 4 3o -:6.., Eebruary 29, 1:66) REAL NATURE OF CRIME NOT DETERMINED BY TECHNICAL NAME BUT BY THE FACTS RECITED IN THE COMPLAINT. ,ince rape and homicide co-e&ist in the commission of robbery, the offense committed by the appellants is the special comple& crime of robbery with homicide, a##ravated by rape, punishable under 2ara#raph 1 of %rticle 2:. of the 4evised 2enal /ode (42/) !t does not matter if the technical name assi#ned to the offense is rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for the real nature of the crime char#ed is determined not by the title of the complaint,

nor by the specification of the provision of the law alle#ed to have been violated, but by the facts recited in the complaint or information (,ee 2eople v 8liviera, -< 2hil .2< >1:9:?) %s the acts constitutin# robbery with homicide were clearly set forth in the complaint and proven durin# trial, then the appellants may be held liable for such crime, re#ardless of the erroneous desi#nation of the offense CONSPIRACY; DEFINITION; SUFFICIENCY OF INDICTMENT FOR CONSPIRACY. /onspiracy denotes an intentional participation in a criminal transaction, with a view to the furtherance of a common desi#n and purpose !t imputes criminal liability to an accused for the acts of another or others, re#ardless of the nature and e&tent of his own participation !n a conspiracy, the act of one becomes the act of all and the particular act of an accused becomes of secondary relevance Thus, it is essential that an accused must know from the information whether he is criminally accountable not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well %n indictment for conspiracy is sufficient if: (1) it follows the words of the statute creatin# the offense and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is char#ed with conspirin# to commit; or (2) followin# the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy; or (9) alle#es both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the lan#ua#e of the respective statutes definin# them EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; REQUISITES. The re(uisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this case Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the followin#: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicatin# that the accused had clun# to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient len#th of time between the determination and e&ecution to allow him to reflect upon the conse(uences of his act AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; CONSPIRACY; NOT NECESSSARY THAT ALL OF THE ACUSED COMMITTED EACH AND EVERY ACT OF THE OFFENSE Eor a conspiracy to be established, it is not necessary that all of the accused commit each and every act constitutive of the offense =There is conspiracy where several accused, by their acts, aimed at the same object, one performin# one part and another performin# another part so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, thou#h apparently independent, are in fact concerted and cooperative, indicatin# closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments= BAIL; LATITUDE OF COURT IN FI%ING AMOUNT. The court has wide latitude in fi&in# the amount of bail 1here it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installin# devices to ensure a#ainst the same 8ptions may include increasin# the bail bond to an appropriate level, or re(uirin# the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accountin# of his movements RAPE; NOT NECESSARY THAT FORCE AND INTIMIDATION EMPLOYED COULD NOT BE RESISTED. !t has been held in one case that for rape to e&ist, it is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishin# it be so #reat or of such character as could not be resisted !t is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the

purpose which the accused had in mind The intimidation must be jud#ed in the li#ht of the victimCs perception and jud#ment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule