Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
investment
Gonzague Vannoorenberghe
University of Mannheim
This draft: 03/11/2008
Abstract
This paper develops a Melitz (2003) type model where heterogeneously pro-
ductive rms can decide on a level of investment in process innovation in order
to increase their productivity. This intensive investment decision gives additional
insights about the empirical relationship between rm size, export status and in-
vestment. I show that trade liberalisation aects rms choices in dierent ways
depending on their export status and on the investment technology. In addition,
the model addresses three recent empirical puzzles about standard heteroge-
neous rm models: (i) the negative relationship between rm size and Tobins Q
(Nocke and Yeaple (2006)) (ii) the change in the skewness of the size distribution
of rms when trade costs decrease (Nocke and Yeaple (2006)) (iii) the increase in
the mass of consumed varieties following trade liberalisation (Baldwin and Forslid
(2006)).
Keywords: Process innovation, Firm heterogeneity, Trade liberalisation
J.E.L. classication: F12
q()
1
d
_
1
(1)
where the set represents all available varieties, q() stands for the consump-
tion of variety and for the elasticity of substitution between varieties,
assumed to be strictly greater than one. The maximisation problem of the
consumer yields the following demand function for a variety :
q() =
_
p()
P
_
Q (2)
where Q is an index of consumption Q U and P the ideal price index, i.e.
the price of bundle Q, dened as:
P =
__
p()
1
d
_ 1
1
(3)
The consumers income consists exclusively of the proceeds of his labour,
paid at a wage normalised to one. Labour supply L is inelastic, and is
an index of the size of the economy. The aggregate budget constraint is
therefore:
PQ = L (4)
2.2 Production
There is a continuum of rms, each producing a dierent variety with a
production technology using exclusively labour. Firms are heterogeneous
with respect to a productivity parameter z > 0, drawn from a continuous
distribution G(z) with support (0, Z] where Z . A rm drawing a large
z has an advantage in the sense that it can, other things equal, produce
with lower marginal costs. Upon learning its productivity parameter, the
rm decides how much to invest in process innovation (i) in order to reduce
its marginal costs. The production function of a rm having drawn z is as
follows:
5
y = zlt(i)
1
1
(5)
where l is the amount of labour used for production and the function
t(i)
1
1
is the investment technology, linking the amount invested in process
innovation i to its impact on marginal costs
5
. I assume that the function
t(i), dened on the positive reals, has the following properties:
Assumption 1 t
(i) > 0, t
(i) =
The last assumption is made to ensure that all producing rms invest a
positive amount in process innovation, which simplies the analysis
6
. This
does not seem implausible if one takes a broader view of this investment i
as any type of cost increasing the productivity of labour such as giving some
thoughts about the organisation of production.
This is in a sense the opposite assumption to that made in models where
rms choose between discrete technology choices. Bustos (2005) among oth-
ers assumes that the xed costs of investing in the high technology are so
high that only the most productive among exporting rms do invest. This
is necessary due to the assumption of two discrete technologies in order to
generate the result that trade liberalisation favours investment by exporting
rms, but is not required in the present setup with continuous decision.
2.2.1 Timing
The timing of the model is as follows. In a rst stage, there is an unbounded
mass of entrepreneurs, who decide whether they want to enter the market or
not. As in Melitz (2003), entering the market means paying a labour sunk
cost f
e
in order to obtain a draw of the parameter z. I add here a second
stage in which the rm decides how much to invest. In a third stage, the
rm sets its price and decides how much to produce.
This timing is realistic, since the investment decision is usually made
before the employment decision, and has been chosen for clarity of exposition.
However, a simultaneous investment and production decision would yield the
same results.
Firms live for a single period, which is another dierence to Melitz (2003),
who considers the eects of exogenous death and endogenous entry of rms.
5
t(i) is taken to the power
1
1
for simplicity.
6
Having rms producing without investing would require to deal with an additional
cuto level for the investment status.
6
The model can be straightforwardly extended to a dynamic framework but
this only complicates the matter without adding any insight
7
.
2.2.2 The optimisation problem of the rm
In the third stage, the rm sets its optimal price given its investment decision.
Since there is a continuum of rms, there are no strategic interactions, and
each rm optimises given the market conditions summarised by the price
index P. As is well-known in monopolistic competition models, the optimal
pricing decision is a xed markup over marginal costs:
p(z) =
1
t(i)
1
1
z
(6)
Using this optimal price in the demand equation (2) yields:
q(z) =
_
1
t(i)
1
1
zP
_
Q (7)
By backward induction, in stage 2, the optimal choice of i should max-
imise prots, which, using (4), are given by:
d
(z) = A(zP)
1
t(i)L i f (8)
where A
1
_
1
_
1
. Choosing a high level of investment allows a rm to
charge a lower price and therefore to sell more, but comes at a cost. f is the
xed cost component of production, which is common to all producing rms.
The rst order condition for this problem is given by:
A(zP)
1
Lt
(i
d
) 1 = 0 (9)
where i
d
is the investment level solving the rst order condition for rm
z. Assumption 1 ensures the existence of a solution for any z [0, ).
The rst order condition (9) denes the optimal level of investment for
a rm with productivity z, which I will denote i
d
(z). It appears that rms
invest more (i) the higher the price index, (ii) the higher their own produc-
tivity z. For a given rm, a higher price index or a high productivity means
that it is relatively ecient in comparison to its competitors. The rm there-
fore sells higher quantities, which drives the returns of investment up. For a
7
Helpman et al. (2004) also use a one-period model for simplicity.
7
given P, totally dierentiating the F.O.C. with respect to i
d
and z allows to
compare the optimal investment of rms having drawn dierent z:
di
d
t
(i)
t
(i)
i=i
d
+ ( 1)
dz
z
= 0 (10)
where
t
(i)
t
(i)
is the sensitivity of optimal investment to a change in the
conditions faced by the rm. This establishes the rst important result:
Proposition 1 The optimal investment of a rm is increasing in its size.
The proof is as follows: from (10), it is immediate that a rm with a high
z will optimally invest more. It follows that t(i
d
(z)) is increasing in z, and
that, from (7), the size of a rm - whether dened as domestic sales or labour
employed - is increasing in z.
Lemma 1 The function i
d
: [0, ) [0, ) is bijective
This follows directly from Assumption 1 and (10).
Using the F.O.C., I rewrite the variable prots (V P
d
) - given by the
rst term in (8) and dened as the sales minus the costs of labour used for
production - as:
V P
d
(z) =
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
i
d
(z)
(i
d
(z))
(11)
where (i)
it
(i)
t(i)
is the elasticity of t(i). V P
d
(z) is increasing in z from
the concavity of t(i) and (10). It is useful at this stage to note that, by
construction of the model, the sales of a rm (s
d
(z)) are equal to:
s
d
(z) = V P
d
(z) =
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
(12)
I impose some additional regularity conditions on (i) to make sure that
very productive rms make positive prots (i), and to simplify the interpre-
tation (ii).
Assumption 2 .
(i) (i) < 1 for small and for all i
(ii) (i) is monotonic over the whole range of i and bounded away from
zero.
8
2.3 The cuto productivity level
I dene z
))
t
(i
d
(z
))
i
d
(z
) f = 0 (13)
Lemma 2 .
1. Under Assumption 1, the optimal level of investment of the cuto rm
z
.
2. There exists a strictly positive and unique cuto level z
)
independently of z
i
d
(z
).
I now turn to general the equilibrium eect of the model. It is convenient
to express the ideal price index P as a function of the cuto rm z
. From
(13):
P
1
=
f +i
ALt(i
)
z
1
(14)
Since i
.
Two additional conditions are required to close the model. First, there
is free entry of entrepreneurs in the rst stage. An equilibrium therefore
requires that the sunk cost of entry be equal to the expected prots:
_
Z
z
d
(z)dG(z) = f
e
(15)
9
Second, the labour market must be in equilibrium:
L = M
___
Z
z
( 1)
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
+i
d
(z) +fdG(z)
_
+f
e
_
(16)
where M is the mass of entrepreneurs paying the sunk entry cost f
e
.
The square bracket summarises the labour used for production purposes, for
investment and for the payment of xed and sunk costs.
3 The open economy
3.1 The setup
I now turn to the open economy version of the model, and assume that the
world consists of two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign. As in Melitz
(2003), exporting rms face two kinds of additional costs: iceberg trade
costs and xed costs of exporting. I dene iceberg trade costs 0 < < 1
as the fraction of goods that arrive at destination per unit shipped. The
xed costs of exporting f
x
, paid in units of labour, can be thought of as the
cost of establishing a brand on a foreign market, knowing a business law,
a culture. A Home rm which exports to the foreign market chooses the
following optimal pricing rule:
p
F
(z) =
1
t(i)
1
1
z
=
p
H
(z)
(17)
where the subscripts F and H denote Foreign and Home. The rm charges
the same markup as on its home market, due to identical preferences, but the
variable costs are higher, so that the c.i.f. price charged in a foreign country
is higher. Given the optimal price, and using the symmetry assumption
between the two countries, the sales of a rm on the foreign market are given
by:
q
F
(z) = q
H
(z)
(18)
Due to the higher price charged for exports, a Home rm sells less in Foreign
than at Home. The higher the price elasticity of demand, the higher this
eect. If it decides to export, a rm z faces the following maximisation
problem:
max
i
x
(z) = p
H
(z)q
H
(z) +p
F
(z)q
F
(z)
t(i)
1
1
z
(q
H
(z) +q
F
(z)) i f f
x
(19)
10
Plugging the optimal prices and quantities in the above problem, the
prots of an exporting rm can be rewritten as:
x
(z) = (1 +
1
)A(zP)
1
t(i)L (i +f
x
+f) (20)
And the the rst order condition for optimal investment if a rm export
i
x
is given by:
(1 +
1
)A(zP)
1
t
(i
x
)L 1 = 0 (21)
which denes a function i
x
(z) as the optimal investment decision of a rm
with productivity z if it decides to export. The optimal investment level of a
rm having drawn z is higher if it exports than if it does not. This is due to
the fact that an exporting rm sells more than an identical rm which would
only produce for the domestic market. This is therefore more protable to
save on the variable costs by investing in xed costs. This result is conform
to that of Bustos (2005) or Navas and Sala (2007).
Plugging (21) into (20) and rearranging allows to derive the global vari-
able prots (V P
x
) and sales (s
x
) of exporting rms:
s
x
(z) = V P
x
(z) =
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
(22)
A rm will decide to export if it makes higher prots by exporting than
by producing only for its domestic market. In contrast to Melitz (2003) and
the subsequent literature, the decision to export is here not taken indepen-
dently of domestic considerations, because it inuences the optimal level of
investment, which in turn aects domestic prots. A rm having drawn z will
therefore export if the dierence between the prots it makes when exporting
and when not is positive:
A(zP)
1
L
_
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z)) t(i
d
(z))
i
x
(z) f
x
+i
d
(z) 0 (23)
where i
d
(z) and i
x
(z) respectively denote the optimal investment decision
of a rm z when it decides not to export, and when it decides to export.
Proposition 2 For f
x
suciently high, there exists a unique cuto rm
z
x
> z
x
invests discretely more
than the most productive non-exporting rm.
11
Proof. See Appendix
There are two main dierences with the literature. First, the condition
for coexistence of non-exporting and of exporting rms is stronger than in the
standard Melitz (2003) framework, in the sense that f
x
should be suciently
higher than f. This is due to the fact that when deciding to export, a rm
scales up its investment and therefore its revenues on the domestic market at
the same time. This makes it more protable to export than in the standard
Melitz framework, and requires higher xed costs of exporting in order to
ensure that some producing rms do not export. Second, there is a discrete
jump in optimal investment at the cuto export level. This can not be
replicated by static discrete technology models, but goes in the direction
of Costantini and Melitz (2007), who argue that following an unanticipated
trade liberalisation, rms will simultaneously invest and enter the export
market. I therefore obtain a similar insight on this account in the present
static model as in dynamic frameworks, which are less tractable.
3.2 Trade liberalisation
In the following, I examine the eect of a decrease in the variable costs of
exports on the level of investment of exporting and non-exporting rms. A
decrease in the transport costs has an eect on the price index P and therefore
on the domestic cuto level z
x
z
d
(z)dG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
(z)dG(z) = f
e
(24)
I rewrite this condition using (8) and (20):
f
e
=
_
z
x
z
AP
1
Lz
1
t(i
d
(z)) i
d
(z) fdG(z)
+
_
Z
z
x
(1 +
1
)AP
1
Lz
1
t(i
x
(z)) i
x
(z) f f
x
dG(z) (25)
An increase in has a direct positive impact on the prot level of export-
ing rms, and tends to raise expected prots. The cuto z
therefore has to
increase in order for the expected prots to remain constant
8
. This decreases
8
The same mechanism as in Melitz (2003) is at stake here. The drop in the price index
increases the real wages and drives the least productive rms out of the market.
12
the price index from (14), and increases welfare, as in Melitz (2003). Follow-
ing a marginal change in , the envelope theorem states that the subsequent
change in the level of investment of all rms has a second order eect on
expected prots, and can be neglected. The entry of new rms on the export
market also has negligible eects on the expected prots, since these rms
are indierent between exporting or not.
The percentage change in the domestic cuto level is higher the larger
the proportional size of the exporting sector. Indeed, if most rms export,
a change in the variable costs of exporting has a large positive impact on
the expected prots, and the corresponding adjustment of z
must be high.
This, and the eect of trade liberalisation on the optimal investment of each
rm is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 .
1. A marginal decrease in variable trade costs raises the domestic cuto
level z
x
following a
marginal change in . This rm is by denition indierent between exporting
or not. From (23):
A(z
x
P)
1
L
_
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z
x
)) t(i
d
(z
x
))
i
x
(z
x
) f
x
+i
d
(z
x
) = 0 (26)
Using the envelope theorem, changes in i
d
(z
x
) and i
x
(z
x
) only have second
order eects on the above equation, which is the dierence between the prot
levels of exporting and of non-exporting rms. A marginal rise in has a
direct positive eect on the left hand side of the above equation, because
lower trade costs make it more protable to export relative to not exporting.
It also has an indirect negative eect through the implied decrease in the
price index P, which has a larger absolute impact for an exporting than for
a non-exporting rm. As shown in Appendix, the direct eect dominates
and a marginal trade liberalisation has the same impact on the export cuto
level as in Melitz (2003).
Proposition 4 A small reduction in the variable costs of trade decreases the
export cuto level z
x
, and raises the proportion of exporting rms.
Proof. See Appendix
3.3 Innovation intensity at the rm level
I now turn to the eects of trade liberalisation on the innovation intensity at
the rm level, which is dened as the ratio of spending on innovation divided
by sales. From the previous analysis, a decrease in the iceberg costs raises
optimal investment of exporting rms while decreasing that of non exporting
rms. This is however insucient to draw any conclusion about the change
in the innovation intensity of dierent rms.
The innovation intensity () for domestic and exporting rms is given by:
k
(z)
i
k
(z)
s
k
(z)
=
1
(i
k
(z)) for k {d, x} (27)
where the equality follows from (12) and (22). Therelationship between inno-
vation intensity and size of a rm depends on the elasticity of the innovation
technology. If
(i) > (<)0, a marginal decrease in the costs of trade raises (de-
creases) the skill intensity of exporting rms while decreasing (raising)
that of non-exporting rms.
Proof. The proof follows trivially from Proposition 3.
Following trade liberalisation, exporting rms increase their global sales
and therefore raise their innovation level. If the technology t is such that
large rms have a higher innovation intensity (
(i) < 0.
3.4 Aggregate innovation intensity
Since both exporting and non-exporting rms change their innovation inten-
sity in dierent directions following a reduction in trade costs, it is a priori
unclear how the aggregate innovation intensity changes.
For the interpretation of the results in this and the following sections, it
is useful to dene the relative sensitivity of investment to external conditions
as E(i):
E(i)
t
(i)
2
t
(i)t(i)
(28)
Indeed, as seen in (10),
t
(i)
t
(i)
can be interpreted as the sensitivity of optimal
investment by a rm investing i. The ratio of this sensitivity to the vari-
able prots, which is a measure of the relative sensitivity of investment, is
10
Tables 9 and 10
15
(i)
2
t
(i)t(i)
. The higher the E, the higher will be the proportional adjustment
of investment by a rm to changes in external conditions. The relationship
between E(i) and the investment intensity of a rm is given by the following
lemma:
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
(i) and E
x
z
i
d
(z)dG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
i
x
(z)dG(z)
_
z
x
z
_
z
z
_
1
t(i
d
(z))
t(i
)
(i
+f)dG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
(1 +
1
)
_
z
z
_
1
t(i
x
(z))
t(i
)
(i
+f)dG(z)
(29)
A decrease in trade costs has two types of eects on the aggregate innova-
tion intensity, which I will denote as Eects B and C. Eect B summarises
the impact of rms changing their export or domestic status following a re-
duction in , i.e. rms entering the export market or stopping production.
These are represented by the change in the cuto level z
and z
x
. Eect C
denotes the impact of the change in the innovation intensity of all other rms
following a decrease in trade costs. This second eect is to my knowledge
new in the literature and captures the adjustment in skill intensity of all
producing rms. As it concerns all rms, and not only cuto rms, it may
be potentially more important. The following Proposition summarises the
impact of Eect C on the aggregate innovation intensity R in the economy.
Proposition 6 .
if
(i). If E
(i) < 0.
4 The Puzzles
Thanks to its rich structure, the model can be used to study a number of
recent empirical puzzles in the literature on trade and heterogeneous rms.
These are: (i) the negative relationship between rm size and Tobins Q
(Nocke and Yeaple (2006)) (ii) the change in the skewness of the size dis-
tribution of rms when trade costs decrease (Nocke and Yeaple (2006)) (iii)
the increase in the mass of consumed varieties following trade liberalisation
(Baldwin and Forslid (2006)).
4.1 Tobins Q and rm size
Nocke and Yeaple (2006) nd empirical evidence that the Tobins Q of a rm
is negatively related to its size, and argue that the introduction of capital
in the Melitz (2003) model would predict the opposite relationship. For this
statement, they consider an extended version of the Melitz (2003) model
where xed costs of production are paid in terms of capital, and where the
production function is Cobb-Douglas with capital and labour. Without xed
costs, all rms would use the same fraction of capital in production, and the
value of capital (the book value) would be a constant fraction of variable
prots (the market value in a static framework) for all rms. The xed costs
paid in terms of capital however account for a higher share of the market
value for small rms than for large rms, and therefore yields a Tobins Q
that is increasing with size. This, they argue, runs counter to empirical
evidence.
It is straightforward to introduce capital in the present setup under the
asssumption that it is held by foreigners, and available to all rms in the
17
economy at an exogenous price r. I assume that the xed costs and the costs
of innovation (f + i) are paid in terms of capital so as to be in line with
the interpretation of Nocke and Yeaple (2006), but abstract from the Cobb
Douglas production function
11
. The main dierence between the present
model and traditional heterogeneous rm models is that larger rms invest
more in productivity. This is precisely the mechanism that allows me to
reverse the relationship between size and Tobins Q as I will show next.
A rm with productivity z uses the following amounts of capital if it
respectively does not and does export:
K
d
(z) = i
d
(z) +f (30)
K
x
(z) = i
x
(z) +f +f
x
(31)
From (11) and (22), the Tobins Q, which is equal to variable prots over
capital
12
:
T
d
(z) =
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))(i
d
(z) +f)
(32)
T
x
(z) =
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))(i
x
(z) +f +f
x
)
(33)
Proposition 7 .
If
(i) > 0, the Tobins Q is increasing in size for small rms, and
decreasing in size for larger rms.
The smallest exporting rm has a lower Tobins Q than the largest non-
exporting rms.
Proof. See Appendix
11
Introducing a Cobb Douglas production function would not alter the qualitative re-
sults.
12
To be precise, the Tobins Q is equal to variable prots over capital payment:rK. Due
to the price of capital however, variable prots are equal to r times the expression in (11)
and (22), so that r does not matter.
18
The intuition for this result is as follows. If
x
(34)
s
dx
(z) = A(zP)
1
t(i
x
(z))L for z z
x
(35)
where s
dd
and s
dx
respectively stand for the domestic sales of a non-
exporting and of an exporting rm.
Using the equation for the price index (14), I rewrite these quantities as:
s
dk
(z) = (f +i
)
t(i
k
(z))
t(i
)
_
z
z
_
1
for k {d, x} (36)
The percentage change in domestic sales for non-exporting rms following
a marginal trade liberalisation is given by:
dln(s
dd
(z))
d
=
dz
d
1
z
[E(i
d
(z)) + 1] (37)
There are two eects that inuence the domestic sales of non-exporting
rms following trade liberalisation. First, there is a direct eect of the price
index on sales, as shown by 1 in the bracket. Trade liberalisation increases the
average productivity of competitors, thereby decreasing the price index and
the domestic sales of all non-exporting rms. Second, the reduction in sales
drives the incentives to invest down, as shown by the rst part of the bracket.
This further reduces domestic sales. If
dz
d
1
z
+
_
2
1 +
1
dz
d
1
z
_
E(i
x
(z))
_
(38)
20
As for domestic rms, the decrease in the price index P directly aects
exporting rms and makes it more dicult for them to sell on the domes-
tic market. This is captured by the rst term in bracket in (38). Again,
the direct and the indirect eects mentioned above play a role here. The
increase in the price index also aects exporting rms and makes it more
dicult for them to sell on the domestic market. However, exporting rms
also benet from a decrease in the transport costs on their export market,
which raises their global sales, and therefore their investment and produc-
tivity (from Proposition 3). Which of the two eects dominates is unclear,
so that the sign of the change in domestic sales remains undetermined for
exporting rms. However, the group of exporters should see its domestic
sales decrease proportionately less than that of non-exporting rms.
The elasticity of the technology function plays again a central role in
the determination of the skewness of the sales distribution. A constant E(i)
yields the same proportional change in domestic sales by all exporting rms,
although it is worth noting that this change is not equal to that of domestic
rms. If E
(i) < 0(> 0), the dierence between the log of domestic sales of two
given non-exporters decreases (increases), while that between two given
exporters increases (decreases).
As in Nocke and Yeaple (2006), the present paper can explain the fact that
dierent rms reduce their domestic sales by dierent proportions following
trade liberalisation. While they predict a decrease between the dierences in
the log size of two given rms, the present model suggests a non monotonic
change, which however does not contradict their empirical ecidence as they
do not allow for non-monotonicity.
21
4.3 Mass of consumed varieties
Traditional models of monopolistic competition built on Krugman (1979)
emphasise the increase in the number of available varieties as one of the
main gains from trade, a result which has been supported by a number of
empirical studies, such as Feenstra (2006) or Broda and Weinstein (2006).
In Melitz (2003) however, the number of consumed varieties decreases with
trade liberalisation under the usual assumption that productivity draws are
Pareto distributed and that f
x
> f. I here show how the present framework
can account for this puzzle.
The labour market equilibrium requires that in each country:
L = M
__
z
x
z
A( 1)t(i
d
(z))z
1
P
1
L +i
d
(z) +fdG(z)
_
+M
__
Z
z
x
A(1 +
1
)( 1)t(i
x
(z))z
1
P
1
L +i
x
(z) +f +f
x
dG(z)
_
+Mf
e
(39)
where M is the mass of entrepreneurs in a country who decide to pay
the sunk cost in order to obtain a draw of productivity. The rst part of
the right hand side is the labour used by domestic rms for production and
xed costs purposes. The second bracket is the labour used by exporting
rms, and Mf
e
is the labour used for the payment of the sunk costs by all
entrerpreneurs who enter the market. This equation determines M.
The mass of consumed varieties (N) is given by:
N = M(1 G(z
) + 1 G(z
x
)) (40)
which is the mass of entrerpreneurs entering the market in a country, times
the fraction from which a consumer in a given country can buy products (i.e.
home entrepreneurs who decide to produce and foreign entrepreneurs who
decide to export). Trade liberalisation has dierent eects on the right hand
side of (39), which I decompose into two groups: (i) the eect of the cuto
rms, and (ii) the eect of all other rms.
(i) The increase in the domestic cuto level z
x
have a direct eect on the fraction of rms that serve a given
market. They moreover have an eect on M, the mass of entrepreneurs pay-
ing the sunk cost. Indeed, domestic rms exiting the market release labour,
which tends to increase M from (39). On the other hand, new exporting rms
will raise their demand for labour, and tend to decrease M. These combined
eects of the cuto rms are qualitatively similar to those of Melitz (2003).
22
Their quantitative eect depends, among others, on the distribution function
G(z) of productivity draws. In Melitz (2003), under a Pareto distribution,
these cuto eects tend to decrease the number of consumed varieties.
(ii) I now turn to the eects of all non-cuto rms on M. From the
labour market condition (39), if their combined demand for labour increased
(decreased), this would push M down (up). In Melitz (2003), the aggregate
labour used by all rms that are not at the cuto level remains constant
when trade liberalisation occurs. This is an important property of this model,
which is such that the eect of the cuto rms determines the change in the
mass of consumed varieties. The intuition is as follows. First, the decrease
in the price index following liberalisation reduces the demand for labour for
domestic sales. The size of this eect is determined by the relative weight
of exporters in the aggregate variable prots. The higher this proportion
the higher the eect of a marginal trade liberalisation on the price eect
since many exporters raise their production on the domestic market, and the
higher the reduction in the demand for labour for domestic sales. Second,
exporting rms sell more on the export market, and increase their demand
for labour for this reason. This eect also depends on the exporters weight
in aggregate prots, and the model is so constructed that both eects exacly
cancel out.
In the present model, however, this will not be necessarily the case. As
proved in Appendix, the change in aggregate demand for labour by all non-
cuto rms depends on
(i). If
(i)
i f = 0 (41)
For this, note that
t(0)
t
(0)
= 0 by Assumption 1. The left hand side of the above equation
is therefore equal to f for i = 0.
Dierentiating the left hand side with respect to i:
_
t(i)
t
(i)
i f
_
i
=
t
(i)t(i)
t
(i)
2
> 0 (42)
I now show that as i goes to innity, the left hand side will be positive, which is to
say that at least some rms will make non-negative prots in the economy.
The left hand side of (41) can be rewritten as:
t(i)
t
(i)
_
1
(i +f)t
(i)
t(i)
_
(43)
As i goes to innity,
t(i)
t
(i)
by Assumption 1. Moreover, lim
i
(i+f)t
(i)
t(i)
=
lim
i
(i), which is bounded away from 1. The square bracket above is therefore
bounded, and the whole expression therefore goes to innity.
This completes the proof that there exists a unique i so that there is a cuto rm that
makes zero prots. This is moreover independent of z
Proof of part 2
The proof of part 2 follows from part 1 and from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
For clarity of exposition, I rewrite the condition for a rm z to export (23):
A(zP)
1
L(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z)) i
x
(z) f f
x
. .
x
(i
x
(z))
A(zP)
1
Lt(i
d
(z)) +i
d
(z) +f
. .
d
(i
d
(z))
0
(44)
which requires that the dierence in prots between the two strategies (domestic&export
and domestic) be positive.
27
(i) A straightforward application of the envelope theorem shows that the derivative of
the left-hand side with respect to z is positive, since the eects of z on optimal investment
are of second order importance. This means that the higher the z, the larger the relative
prot of the export strategy.
(ii) For z = z
,
d
= 0, and
x
(i
x
(z
not
to export. This obtains if f
x
is suciently high for any .
(iii) As z , if > 0, it is immediate from (44) that
x
(i
d
(z))
d
(i
d
(z)) .
Since by denition,
x
(i
x
(z)) >
x
(i
d
(z)), this implies that the dierence between the
prots of the export and non-export strategies goes to innity.
Combining (i), (ii) and (iii) shows Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 3
Part 1: the selection eect
Plugging (14) into (25) and totally dierentiating yields:
z
=
_
Z
z
1
z
1
t(i
x
(z))dG(z)
_
z
x
z
z
1
t(i
d
(z))dG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
(1 +
1
)z
1
t(i
x
(z))dG(z)
=
X
S
(45)
Where X and S respectively denote total exports of a country, and global sales of
rms from this country (which, by the symmetry assumption is equivalent to total sales in
a country). To derive the above expression, the envelope theorem has been used, as well
as the indierence conditions of the z
and z
x
rms. It is clearly positive and shows that
trade liberalisation yields a selection eect by increasing z
.
Part 2: Change in optimal investment of non-exporting rms
For non-exporting rms, the rst order condition for optimal investment rearranged
with (14) is:
(i
+f)
_
z
z
_
1
t
(i
d
)
t(i
)
= 1 (46)
It is immediate that a change in impacts the optimal decision of non-exporting rms
only through the general equilibrium eect of a drop in the price index and therefore
an increase in z
following trade liberalisation must incur a decrease in the optimal investment of a non-
exporting rm since t(i) is concave. This can be immediately seen by totally dierentiating
(46):
di
d
= ( 1)
t
(i
d
)
t
(i
d
)
dz
(47)
Plugging in (45) yields:
di
d
= ( 1)
t
(i
d
)
t
(i
d
)
X
S
d
(48)
28
Part 3: Change in optimal investment of exporting rms
For exporting rms, the rst order condition for optimal investment rearranged with
(14) is:
(1 +
1
)
_
z
z
_
1
(i
+f)
t
(i
x
)
t(i
)
= 1 (49)
Totally dierentiating the above equation and rearranging:
di
x
= ( 1)
_
1
1 +
1
d
+
dz
_
t
(i
x
)
t
(i
x
)
(50)
The square bracket shows the two eects of trade liberalisation: the rst term is the
direct eect that exporting rms can sell more on their export market, the second term
is the indirect general equilibrium eect of a smaller price index, which makes it more
dicult for these rms to sell.
Plugging in (45):
di
x
= ( 1)
d
_
X
S
1
1 +
1
_
t
(i
x
)
t
(i
x
)
(51)
As long as some rms do not export,
X
S
<
1
1+
1
. This shows that the direct eect
of a change in (the 1 in the bracket) dominates the general equilibrium eect for the
total sales of exporters (the ratio of total exports to total sales) and trade liberalisation
therefore raises the investment of exporting rms.
Proof of Proposition 4
To highlight the general equilibrium eects of a change in trade costs on the export cuto
level, I rewrite (26) using (14):
(f +i
)
t(i
)
_
z
x
z
_
1
_
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z
x
)) t(i
d
(z
x
))
i
x
(z
x
) f
x
+i
d
(z
x
) = 0 (52)
Totally dierentiating the above equation and using the envelope theorem yields:
dz
x
z
dz
+
d
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z
x
))
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z
x
)) t(i
d
(z
x
))
= 0 (53)
Using (45), this can be rewritten as:
dz
x
z
x
=
d
1
1 +
1
_
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z
x
))
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z
x
)) t(i
d
(z
x
))
X
S
_
(54)
The rst term in the square bracket above is larger than one, while
X
S
< 1. The right
hand side is therefore negative and trade liberalisation decreases the export cuto level
z
x
.
29
Proof of Lemma 3
(i) =
t
(i)
t(i)
+i
t
(i)t(i) t
(i)
2
t(i)
2
=
_
t
(i)
t(i)
_
2
_
t(i)
t
(i)
+i
t
(i)t(i)
t
(i)
2
i
_
(55)
(i) has therefore the sign of the square bracket on the right hand side. From Assumptions
1 and 2 (and using lHopitals rule to show that
t
(i)t(i)
t
(i)
2
is bounded as i 0), the square
bracket is equal to zero if i 0. Furthermore:
_
t(i)
t
(i)
+i
t
(i)t(i)
t
(i)
2
i
_
i
= i
(i)t(i)
t
(i)
2
i
iE
(i) (56)
(i) and E
x
z
i
d
(z)dG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
i
x
(z)dG(z)
_
z
x
z
_
z
z
_
1
t(i
d
(z))
t(i
)
(i
+f)dG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
(1 +
1
)
_
z
z
_
1
t(i
x
(z))
t(i
)
(i
+f)dG(z)
(57)
Totally dierentiating the above equation requires to split up the problem in order
to keep track of the economic intuition. In order to simplify notation, I denote the nu-
merator of the above equation as u and the denominator as v. The total dierentiation
of the numerator and of the denominator can be decomposed into two parts: (i) Eect
B represents the impact of the cuto rms (z
and z
x
), which switch status (domestic
or exporting) following trade liberalisation. They correspond to the dierentiation of the
boundaries of the integrals in (29) and their eect will be summarised by the term B
u
for the numerator and B
v
for the denominator. (ii) Eect C stands for the impact of the
rms not switching status, of which the eect will be denoted C
u
and C
v
respectively for
the numerator and denominator. Therefore:
du = B
u
+C
u
(58)
dv = B
v
+C
v
(59)
and:
d
_
u
v
_
=
1
v
_
_
_
_
B
u
B
v
u
v
. .
Eect B
+C
u
C
v
u
v
. .
Eect C
_
_
_
_
(60)
The rst part of the bracket can therefore be interpreted as the eect of the cuto
rms changing status (the extensive margin) while the second part is the change in the
intensive margin of investment intensity for all rms.
30
Eect C
I rst turn to eect 2, which is the eect this paper concentrates on. Total dierentiation
of (29) using (48) and (51) yields:
C
u
= ( 1)
d
_
_
z
x
z
(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z)
X
S
+
_
Z
z
x
t
(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
_
X
S
1
1 +
1
_
_
(61)
and:
C
v
= ( 1)
d
_
_
z
x
z
(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z)
X
S
+
_
Z
z
x
t
(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
_
X
S
1
1 +
1
_
_
+ v
_
( 1)
d
X
S
dz
( 1)
_
(62)
The rst line on the right hand side of C
v
captures the eect on aggregate sales of
the change in innovation by all producing rms. The second line reects the between rm
reallocation of sales due to a change in trade costs, which, for a constant innovation level,
raises global sales of exporting rms and reduces those of purely domestic rms. The net
eect of this reallocation is however zero as can be seen by setting
dz
( 1)
_
1
u
v
_
_
_
z
x
z
(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z)
X
S
+
_
Z
z
x
t
(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
_
X
S
1
1 +
1
_
_
(63)
1
u
v
is positive since all rms make non-negative prots. Indeed,
v
is the average
variable prot of a rm, which is larger than average innovation spending (u) in order to
ensure that xed costs can still be paid without making negative prots. The sign of (63)
is therefore given by the sign of the square bracket.
From (11) and a similar equation for exporting rms, the ratio of exports to sales can
be rewritten as:
X
S
=
1
1 +
1
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
(64)
Using this expression, the square bracket in (63) is equal to:
1
1 +
1
_
_
_
z
x
z
(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z)
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z)
_
Z
z
x
t
(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
_
_
(65)
where
=
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z)
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
> 0 (66)
31
Dene:
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z) d(z) (67)
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z) d(z) (68)
Using the denition of E(i) and changing the measure of the integral with (67) and
(68):
_
z
x
z
(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z)
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))
t
(i
d
(z))
dG(z)
=
_
z
x
z
E(i
d
(z))d(z)
_
z
x
z
d(z)
(69)
_
Z
z
x
t
(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))
t
(i
x
(z))
dG(z)
=
_
Z
z
x
E(i
x
(z))d(z)
_
Z
z
x
d(z)
(70)
Using this in (65) immediately shows that if E
x
z
E(i
d
(z))d(z)
_
z
x
z
d(z)
< E(i
d
(z
x
)) (71)
_
Z
z
x
E(i
x
(z))d(z)
_
Z
z
x
d(z)
> E(i
x
(z
x
)) (72)
Moreover, if E
x
)) > E(i
d
(z
x
)). Therefore, if
g(z
)z
+
dz
x
z
x
(i
d
(z
x
) i
x
(z
x
))g(z
x
)z
x
(73)
B
v
=
dz
g(z
)z
(i
+f)
dz
x
z
x
_
z
x
z
_
1
z
x
g(z
x
)
(i
+f)
t(i
)
_
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z
x
)) t(i
d
(z
x
))
(74)
where
dz
and
dz
x
z
x
are given by (45) and (54).
32
The whole Eect 1 is therefore given by:
B
u
B
v
u
v
=
dz
g(z
)z
_
i
_
1
u
v
_
f
u
v
_
(75)
+
dz
x
z
x
g(z
x
)z
x
_
(i
x
(z
x
) i
d
(z
x
))
_
u
v
1
_
+f
x
u
v
_
(76)
The sign of the above expression is undetermined and depends among others on the
density function. The rst line of the right hand side represents the eect of the domestic
cuto rms dropping out of the market. They tend to decrease aggregate investment as
well as aggregate sales and therefore have an ambiguous eect for the innovation intensity.
The second line is the eect of new rms entering the export market. They raise their
spending on innovation as well as their sales, and therefore also have an ambiguous eect
on the aggregate innovation intensity.
Proof of Proposition 7
I rst concentrate on purely domestic rms. The Tobins Q of a rm investing i is given
by (33):
T(i) =
1
(i) +f
t
(i)
t(i)
(77)
Therefore, T
(i)
_
(i) f
_
t
(i)
t(i)
_
2
_
1 +
1
E(i)
_
_
(78)
The second term in bracket is always negative so that if
(i) 0, T
(i) =
t
(i)
t(i)
i
_
t
(i)
t(i)
_
2
_
1 +
1
E(i)
_
(79)
T
(i) =
_
t
(i)
t(i)
(i +f)
_
t
(i)
t(i)
_
2
_
1 +
1
E(i)
_
_
(80)
so that lim
i
(i) = lim
i
T
(i
) =
t
(i
)
t(i
)
1
E(i
)
> 0 (81)
The Tobins Q is therefore increasing in i, and in size, for the smallest producing rms.
From the indierence condition of the cuto exporting rm (26):
t(i
x
(z
x
))
t
(i
x
(z))
i
x
(z
x
) f
x
f =
t(i
d
(z
x
))
t
(i
d
(z
x
))
f i
d
(z
x
) (82)
33
Using the denition of the Tobins Q in (32) and (33), this can be rewritten as:
T
x
(z
x
) 1
T
d
(z
x
)
=
i
d
(z
x
) +f
i
x
(z
x
) +f +f
x
(83)
Since the Tobins Q is larger than one for the cuto exporting rm, it immediately
follows that T
x
(z
x
) < T
d
(z
x
). This shows that the smallest exporting rm has a lower
Tobins Q than the largest non-exporting rms.
Mass of consumed varieties
Plugging the free entry equation (25) in the labour market condition (39) yields:
L = M
_
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))Az
1
P
1
LdG(z) +
_
Z
z
x
(1 +
1
)t(i
x
(z))Az
1
P
1
LdG(z)
_
(84)
Using the price index equation (14):
L = M
f +i
t(i
)
z
1
_
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))z
1
dG(z) + (1 +
1
)
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))z
1
dG(z)
_
(85)
I here examine the change in the aggregate labour demand by all non-cuto rms, i.e.
those rms that do not change status (between non-producing, domestic and exporting)
following trade liberalisation for a constant M. This corresponds to the derivative of the
above expression treating M as given and neglecting the changes in the boundaries of the
integrals in the square bracket. It is of the sign of:
1
z
dz
d
_
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))z
1
dG(z) + (1 +
1
)
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))z
1
dG(z)
_
+( 1)
2
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))z
1
dG(z) +
_
z
x
z
(i
d
(z))
di
d
(z)
d
z
1
dG(z)
+(1 +
1
)
_
Z
z
x
t
(i
x
(z))
di
x
(z)
d
z
1
dG(z) (86)
The rst part is the general equilibrium eect, which tends to decrease the labour
demand by all rms. The second part is the direct eect that increases the demand for
labour by all exporting rms to satisfy the increased demand on their export market. Note
that these rst two terms cancel using (45), exactly as in the standard framework. The
last two terms correspond to the change in labour demand for investment purposes.
Rearranging using (47) und (50), this expression is of the sign of:
2
2
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))z
1
E(i
x
(z))dG(z)
_
z
x
z
t(i
d
(z))z
1
E(i
d
(z))dG(z) + (1 +
1
)
_
Z
z
x
t(i
x
(z))z
1
E(i
x
(z))dG(z)
dz
d
1
z
(87)
34
Using (45), it is immediate that if E
(i) > 0, the numerator of the rst term above has relatively more weight than in the
case E
(i) = 0, so that the whole expression is positive: if large rms are more sensitive in
their investment decision, their positive eect on labour demand dominates. The opposite
conclusion holds for E
(i) < 0.
35