A2 BIO/CHEMICAL WEAPONS A2: BIOWEAPONSGENERAL Terrorists wont use bioweapons and theres no impact if they do ONEILL 2004 (Brendan,

Spiked Politics, Weapons o! "ini#$# %estr$ction,& A$'$st (), *ttp:++,,,-spiked.

online-co#+Printa/le+00000001A2)3-*t#4 Rapoport sa5s t*at terrorist

$se o! c*e#ical and /iolo'ical ,eapons is si#ilar to state $se . in t*at it is rare and, in ter#s o! ca$sin' #ass destr$ction, not 6er5 e!!ecti6e- 7e cites t*e ,ork o! 8o$rnalist and a$t*or 9o*n Parac*ini, ,*o sa5s t*at o6er t*e past 2: 5ears onl5 !o$r si'ni!icant atte#pts /5 terrorists to $se W"% *a6e /een recorded- ;*e #ost e!!ecti6e W"%.attack /5 a non.state 'ro$p, !ro# a #ilitar5 perspecti6e, ,as carried o$t /5 t*e ;a#il ;i'ers o! Sri Lanka in ())0- ;*e5 $sed c*lorine 'as a'ainst Sri Lankan soldiers '$ardin' a !ort, in8$rin' o6er 20 soldiers /$t killin' none- ;*e ;a#il ;i'ers< $se o! c*e#icals an'ered t*eir s$pport /ase, ,*en so#e o! t*e c*lorine dri!ted /ack into ;a#il territor5 . con!ir#in' Rapoport<s 6ie, t*at one pro/le# ,it* $sin' $npredicta/le and $n,ield5 c*e#ical and /iolo'ical ,eapons o6er con6entional ,eapons is t*at t*e cost can /e as 'reat <to t*e attacker as to t*e attacked<- ;*e ;i'ers *a6e not $sed W"% sinceNo impacthistory proves bioweapon use is un i!e y ONEILL 2004 (Brendan, Spiked Politics, Weapons o! "ini#$# %estr$ction,& A$'$st (), *ttp:++,,,-spiked.
online-co#+Printa/le+00000001A2)3-*t#4 =et, as Rapoport points o$t, ,*ile t*e A$#

S*inr5ko attack certainl5 *ad tra'ic conse>$ences, it also s*o,ed $p t*e li#itations o! W"% attacks in ter#s o! ca$sin' cas$alties or destr$ction- 7e sa5s t*at e6en t*o$'* A$# S*inr5ko *ad <e?traordinar5 co6er !or a lon' ti#e< . #eanin' t*at t*e 9apanese a$t*orities ,ere ner6o$s a/o$t #onitorin' t*e 'ro$p on t*e 'ro$nds t*at it ,as a reli'io$s o$t!it . and despite t*e !act t*at it *ad <20 #e#/ers ,it* 'rad$ate de'rees in science, si'ni!icant la/oratories and assets o! o6er a /illion dollars<, it still did not s$cceed in its ai# o! takin' *$ndreds or t*o$sands o! cas$alties, o! ca$sin' #ass destr$ction- @or Rapoport t*is s*o,s t*at s$c* ,eapons are !ar !ro# eas5 to $se, especiall5 ,*en t*e 'ro$ps $sin' t*e# #$st #o6e aro$nd >$ickl5, <as all terrorists #$st do<- Accordin' to Rapoport, t*e #ost strikin' t*in' a/o$t t*e A$# S*inr5ko attack is t*at no one died !ro# in*alin' t*e sarin 'as itsel! . in e6er5 !atal case, t*e indi6id$al *ad #ade contact ,it* t*e li>$id- 7e cites Parac*ini
a'ain, ,*o sa5s t*at t*e indi6id$als killed /5 A$# S*inr5ko are t*e onl5 people to *a6e lost t*eir li6es as a res$lt o! a W"% attack /5 a terrorist 'ro$p o6er t*e past 2: 5ears- (;*ere ,ere also !i6e deat*s as a res$lt o! ant*ra? attacks post.)+((, /$t Parac*ini doesn<t incl$de t*ose /eca$se t*e indi6id$al responsi/le and t*e #oti6ation !or t*ose attacks re#ain $nkno,n-4 <W*en

5o$ t*ink t*at !e,er t*an (: people *a6e /een killed /5 kno,n terrorist $se o! c*e#ical and /iolo'ical ,eapons, and contrast t*at to t*e t*o$sands ,*o ,ere killed on )+(( and in con6entional /o#/in's in "adrid or Bali or Istan/$l, it<s >$ite re#arka/le t*at ,e are so o/sessed ,it* W"%<, sa5s Rapoport-

A2: BIOWEAPONSGENERAL Terrorists cou d not use bio o"ica weapons #$E%&'(( 2000 (Ro/ert, "ot*er 9ones, Sept+Oct, *ttp:++,,,-#ot*er8ones-co#+ne,s+!eat$re+2000+0)+p*anto#-*t#l4 B$t e6en #ost terroris# *a,ks .. incl$din' e?perts in t*e A-S- intelli'ence co##$nit5 and de!ense contractors like t*e RAN% 1orporation .. ackno,led'e t*at asse#/lin' and $sin' ,eapons o! #ass destr$ction is a da$ntin' pro8ect- Last 5ear, a /l$e.ri//on BAd6isor5 Panel to Assess %o#estic Response 1apa/ilities !or ;erroris# In6ol6in' Weapons o! "ass
%estr$ctionB iss$ed its report to 1on'ress and t*e president- ;*e st$d5 #aintains t*at n$clear, /iolo'ical, or c*e#ical terroris# Bpresents a 'en$ine t*reat to t*e Anited States-B B$t, it 'oes on, carr5in'

o$t s$c* attacks re>$ires capa/ilities t*at 6irt$all5 no

terrorist 'ro$p possesses, incl$din' B*i'*l5 kno,led'ea/le personnel, si'ni!icant !inancial reso$rces, !airl5 sop*isticated prod$ction

!acilities and e>$ip#ent, >$alit5 control and testin', and special *andlin'-B E6en

i! terrorists co$ld ac>$ire strains o! /ot$lis#, ant*ra?, or pla'$e, t$rnin' s$c* #aterials into a let*al de6ice !or #ass cas$alties is a *i'*l5 co#ple? $ndertakin'- BIt<s si#pl5 not eas5 to do,B e?plains "ilton Leiten/er', a /iolo'ical ,ar!are e?pert at t*e 1enter !or
International and Sec$rit5 St$dies at t*e Ani6ersit5 o! "ar5land- Leiten/er' points to t*e tec*nical *$rdles in6ol6ed in t*e e6ent t*at sparked #$c* o! t*e alar# a/o$t terrorist $se o! c*e#ical and /iolo'ical ,eapons .. t*e ()): ner6e.'as attack on t*e ;ok5o s$/,a5 /5 t*e 9apanese doo#sda5 c$lt A$#

S*inrik5o- S$/se>$ent in6esti'ations re6ealed t*at t*e 'ro$p possessed si'ni!icant >$antities o! c*e#icals, as ,ell as a#ple !$ndin' to proc$re ,*ate6er e>$ip#ent ,as necessar5 to prod$ce /iolo'ical ,eapons- Pro!essional scientists in t*e c$lt spent !o$r 5ears atte#ptin' to prod$ce t,o a'ents .. ant*ra? and /ot$lin$# to?in .. considered relati6el5 eas5 to ,ork ,it*- =et t*e 'ro$p !ailed to prod$ce an5 /iolo'ical a'ent, and ,ere red$ced to pokin' /a's ,it* $#/rellas to disse#inate t*e sarin 'as t*e5 ,ere a/le to #ake- S$c* di!!ic$lties e?plain ,*5 t*e 'o6ern#ent *as not doc$#ented a sin'le t*reat !ro# terrorists ,ieldin' to?ic a'ents- B;*ere is no A-S- 'o6ern#ent e6idence t*at an5 'ro$p *as prod$ced or o/tained /iolo'ical ,eapons,B Leiten/er' sa5s-

NO I"PA1; ;O BIOWEAPONS )ioweapons impacts are overstatedtheir impact evidence is biased by economic and psycho o"ica motives ONEILL 2004 (Brendan, Spiked Politics, Weapons o! "ini#$# %estr$ction,& A$'$st (), *ttp:++,,,-spiked.
online-co#+Printa/le+00000001A2)3-*t#4

So ,*5 are ,e so o/sessed ,it* W"%C W*5 do ,e contin$e to !ret o6er ,eapons ,*ic*, /5 all acco$nts, do not ca$se as #$c* #ass destr$ction as con6entional ,eapons, ,*ic* *a6e onl5 rarel5 /een $sed /5 terrorists (and not 6er5 s$ccess!$ll5 at t*at4, and ,*ic* ,e<re not e6en certain t*at toda5<s terrorists, speci!icall5 al.Daeda, *a6e 'ot access toC Rapoport sa5s t*at<s a 'ood >$estion . /$t a di!!ic$lt one to ans,er7e t*inks t*e reasons are co#ple?E *e ar'$es t*at it isn<t onl5 'o6ern#ent and #edia ,*o *a6e ratc*eted $p !ear a/o$t W"%, /$t t*at <econo#ic interests< *a6e, too . t*ose in /$siness, 'o6ern#ent and researc* instit$tions ,*o stand to #ake !inancial 'ain !ro# p$/lic concern a/o$t W"% and !ro# p$/lic de#ands !or #ore protecti6e #eas$res a'ainst s$c* ,eapons- No do$/t t*ere is so#e tr$t* in t*at- B$t t*e disparit5 /et,een t*e !acts a/o$t W"% and o$r !ears o! W"% also re6eals so#et*in' #ore a/o$t toda5<s terror.o/session- It s*o,s $p t*e 'ap /et,een t*e realit5 o! terroris# . ,*ic* o6er t*e past t*ree 5ears *as lar'el5 consisted o! scrapp5 /o#/ attacks /5 s#all ni*ilistic 'ro$ps . and t*e !ear o! terroris# as so#et*in' t*at #i'*t /rin' do,n ci6ilisation as ,e kno, it, or, in t*e ,ords o! President B$s*, in!lict <*$ndreds o! t*o$sands o! cas$alties<- It s$''ests t*at o$r concern a/o$t terroris# is not entirel5 s*aped /5 t*e real t*reat posed /5 terroris#, /$t /5 a /roader sense o! !ear and insec$rit5 at *o#e- ;*at #i'*t e?plain ,*5 so #$c* o! t*e terror disc$ssion, partic$larl5 in relation to W"%, is anticipator5 and spec$lati6e, al,a5s con8$rin' $p ,orst.case scenarios . /eca$se it co#es !ro# ,it*in, !ro# o$r o,n ni'*t#ares and i#a'inations, rat*er t*an !ro# ,it*o$t- In t*is sense, c*e#ical and /iolo'ical ,eapons . t*e ni'*t#are notion o! silent, in6isi/le killer poisons /ein' released into o$r ,ater s5ste#s or on to cro,ded p$/lic transport . are t*e per!ect #etap*or !or t*e West<s o,n sense o! 6$lnera/ilit5- W*at ,e co$ld reall5 do ,it* is a *ea65 dose o! realit5Lessons from the (*$( outbrea! have a ready improved wor dwide pub ic hea ththis wi imit future outbrea!s of any disease EN(O+ 200, (9i#, Glo/alcontin$it5-co#, 9$ne 20 *ttp:++,,,-'lo/alcontin$it5-co#+article+article6ie,+)3+(+F0+4 In reac*in' t*ese land#arks in t*e contain#ent o! SARS, t*e #ost se6erel5 a!!ected co$ntries

and areas *a6e identi!ied and rapidl5 corrected lon'.standin' ,eaknesses in t*eir *ealt* s5ste#s in ,a5s t*at ,ill #ean per#anent i#pro6e#ents !or t*e #ana'e#ent o! all diseases- In addition, s5ste#s o! data collection and reportin', and ne, patterns o! openl5 and !rankl5 co##$nicatin' in!or#ation to t*e p$/lic ,ill *old t*e ,orld in 'ood stead ,*en t*e ne?t ne, disease e#er'es and t*e
ne?t in!l$enGa pande#ic /reaks o$t-

A2: S"ALLPOH No impact to sma po- terrorismvaccines. residua resistance. pub ic hea th infrastructure and de ivery prob ems a chec! $OT/(TEIN. *'E$ *N# (IE0EL 2004 (Linda, editor, 1at*erine, #ana'in' editor, and 9onas, assistant editor o! t*e
B$lletin o! Ato#ic Scientists, BAS, No6e#/er+%ece#/er, *ttp:++,,,-t*e/$lletin-or'+article-p*pCartIo!nJnd03rot*stein4 So ,e escaped an attack /5 Ira>- B$t ,o$ld

,e all /e doo#ed i! Al Daeda terrorists (per*aps /earin' so#e o! t*at r$#ored @renc* s#allpo?4 decided to in!ect t*e Anited StatesC It see#s $nlikel5- @irst, set aside t*e pro/le#s attackers ,o$ld !ace in tr5in' to deli6er t*e disease ot*er t*an t*ro$'* person.to.person contact- (1old Warriors spec$lated t*at t*e So6iets ,o$ld !ill intercontinental /allistic #issiles ,it* t*e 6ir$s and send t*e #issiles o6er t*e Nort* Pole-4 ;*e ke5 to pre6entin' a #a8or o$t/reak is a 'ood p$/lic *ealt* s5ste# t*at can detect a *and!$l o! cases /e!ore t*e disease spreads- "ean,*ile, *elpin' to slo, t*e spread are t,o s$rprisin' !indin's: A st$d5 /5 Ore'on 7ealt* and Science Ani6ersit5 researc*ers, reported in t*e Septe#/er 200F iss$e o! Nat$re "edicine, re6ealed t*at in contrast to con6entional ,isdo# t*at t*e e!!ects o! 6accination lasted onl5 a !e, 5ears, B)0 percent o! t*ose 6accinated 2: to K: 5ears a'o #aintain a s$/stantial le6el o! i##$nit5-B In ot*er ,ords, *al! t*e A-S- pop$lation (nearl5 e6er5one ,as 6accinated /e!ore ()K24 *as so#e de'ree o! i##$nit5, a considera/le /arrier to t*e rapid spread o! s#allpo?- Si#$ltaneo$sl5, i! cases ,ere detected, t*ere ,o$ld /e ti#e to 6accinate t*e $nprotected pop$lation- As !or t*e 6accine<s a6aila/ilit5, t*ere see#s to /e an ade>$ate s$ppl5- %octors at Lander/ilt Ani6ersit5 report in t*e Septe#/er M iss$e o! t*e 9o$rnal o! t*e A#erican "edical Association t*at t*e 6accine in t*e e#er'enc5 s$ppl5 can /e dil$ted to as #$c* as one.tent* and still pro6ide an o6erall 6accination s$ccess rate o! ))-3 percent-

A2: EBOLA Ebo a is overratedthe worst possib e outbrea!s !i on y a few peop e %O$1 2334 (Ian, Pat*olo'5 Researc*er, A$'$st (M *ttp:++,,,-#c/-$ct-ac-Ga+e/ola+e/opa'e-*t#4 No o!!ense, Erik, /$t people ,*o t*ink t*at E/ola is a 'en$ine t*reat to *$#anit5 are 'enerall5 6er5 poor on conte?t- It s*o$ld #ean so#et*in' to 5o$ t*at ,e 6irolo'ists are not panickin' a/o$t it- I! 5o$ ,ant a
ni'*t#are disease, *o, a/o$t a *i'*l5 conta'io$s disease, ,it* a lon' inc$/ation ti#e (d$rin' ,*ic* people are still in!ectio$s4, ,*ic* can a!!ect an5one an5,*ere, rapidl5 /eco#e resistant to anti/iotics, !or ,*ic* t*ere is no e!!ecti6e 6accine despite #$c* e!!ort, ,*ic* can /e spread /5

E/ola *as killed less t*an 300 people in t*e past decade- B5 contrast, t5p*oid !e6er kills o6er 200,000 people per 5earE #easles kills (,000,000 (one #illion4 people per 5ear- I! 5o$ t*ink E/ola *as t*e potential to kill an5,*ere near t*at #an5, 5o$ don<t $nderstand t*e 6ir$s- ;*e E/ola o$t/reak in Nik,it O,asO t*e ,orst.case scenarioE Oe6er5t*in'O ,ent ,ron'- F00 deat*s- Not tri6ial- B$t a tin5 !raction o! t*e real killers- Lo//5 and tr5 to 'et #easles 6accine in A!rica, i! 5o$ ,ant to do so#e 'ood- Son<t ,aste 5o$r ti#e ,orr5in' a/o$t
non.inti#ate contactC ;$/erc$losis is on t*e ,a5 /ackE t*e W7O e?pects F0 #illion people to die o! t/ in t*e t*is decade-

E/ola-

Ebo a wont become pandemicit becomes fata before it can spread and symptoms encoura"e others to avoid infection 5*N #E$ 0IE((EN. ET *L 2004 (9-W-B-, "icro/iolo'ical La/orator5 !or 7ealt* Protection
1enter !or In!ectio$s %iseases Epide#iolo'5, Poonoses in E$rope: A Risk to P$/lic 7ealt*,& Ri8ksinstit$$t 6oor Lolks'eGond*eid en "ilie$ Report4 In 'eneral, Goonoses

t*at *a6e a *i'* case.!atalit5 rate and+or t*at ca$se se6ere #or/idit5 and *a6e li#ited a/ilities !or less likel5 to e#er'e 'lo/all5 t*an Goonoses t*at e#er'e rat*er $nnoticed- @or e?a#ple, t*e pro/a/ilit5 t*at E/ola 6ir$s ,ill ca$se a pande#ic is relati6el5 s#all /eca$se o! its trans#ission ro$te and /eca$se it kills rapidl5, t*ere/5 creatin' terror a#on' relati6es o! t*e dead so t*at t*e5 a6oid *i'*.risk contacts K0- In contrast, 7IL diseases can spread $nnoticed !or
*$#an.to.*$#an trans#ission are decades, since it opens t*e door to aspeci!ic opport$nistic diseases /5 i##$nos$ppression a!ter a lon' latenc5 period in pop$lations alread5 s$!!erin' !ro# decreased i##$ne !$nction d$e to ot*er in!ectio$s diseases and #aln$trition (Appendi? III4-

A2: 17E"I1AL WEAPONS Theres no impact to chemica weaponsdi ution. weather. reverse contamination and historica e-amp es prove $OT/(TEIN. *'E$ *N# (IE0EL 2004 (Linda, editor, 1at*erine, #ana'in' editor, and 9onas, assistant editor o! t*e
B$lletin o! Ato#ic Scientists, BAS, No6e#/er+%ece#/er, *ttp:++,,,-t*e/$lletin-or'+article-p*pCartIo!nJnd03rot*stein4 In B;*e %e, o! %eat*,B 9oel Lilensk5 and Pand5 Sinis* reco$nted t*e stran'e stor5 o! le,isite, an arsenic./ased c*e#ical ,eapon de6eloped /5 t*e 1*e#ical War!are Ser6ice d$rin' World War I- B5 t*e end o! t*e ,ar, t*e Anited States ,as prod$cin' (0 tons a da5 o! t*e st$!!, 5et it ,as ne6er $sed in /attle, ,*ere it ,o$ld pro/a/l5 *a6e !lopped- Le,isite s*ares #an5 o! t*e pro/le#s t*at *a6e

pre6ented #ost c*e#ical ,eapons !ro# enterin' t*e ,orld<s ar#ies< /attle!ield arsenals: "ost c*e#icals are 6er5 *ard to disse#inate in s$!!icientl5 $ndil$ted !or#, and #i'*t not ,ork in ,eat*er t*at is too *ot, too cold, too ,ind5, or too ,et- ;*e dil$tion pro/le# ,o$ld also #ake it 6er5 di!!ic$lt to carr5 o$t an attack in6ol6in' t*e poisonin' o! a #a8or cit5<s ,ater s$ppl5- Nearl5 e6er5 article a/o$t terrorist $ses o! c*e#ical or
/iolo'ical ,eapons /e'ins /5 recallin' A$# S*inrik5o<s $se o! sarin 'as in ()): in t*e ;ok5o s$/,a5- E#plo5in' !i6e separate packa'es o! poison, c$lt #e#/ers #ana'ed to kill (2 co##$ters, alt*o$'* anot*er (,000 *ad to seek *ospital treat#ent- ;*e attack ,as s*ockin', 5et !ell s*ort o! t*e c$lt<s a#/itions- (S*oko Asa*ara, t*e leader o! t*e 'ro$p, aspired eit*er to /e 9apan<s pri#e #inister or to kill as #an5 o! *is co$ntr5#en as possi/le-4 Sadda# 7$ssein<s !orces $sed poison 'as at 7ala/8a in t*e open air- 7ala/8a, a N$rdis* cit5 in nort*ern Ira>, is per*aps t*e /est kno,n o! t*e se6eral doGen to,ns and 6illa'es Sadda# 7$ssein is t*o$'*t to *a6e 'assed in ()MK and ()MM- So#e :,000 o! its pop$lation o! K0,000 died as a res$lt o! /ein' /o#/arded ,it* ,*at #i'*t *a6e /een a co#/ination o! #$stard 'as, ner6e a'ent, and possi/l5 c5anide- ;*e attack ,as a #onstro$s cri#e, /$t t*e

Ira>i #ilitar5 s$cceeded /5 *a6in' co#plete control o6er t*e place, t*e ti#e, and t*e c*oice o! a da5 ,it* ideal ,eat*er..and /eca$se it !aced no dan'er o! e?periencin' an5 resistance- Sadda#<s #en ,ere a/le to spread t*e poisons s5ste#aticall5 (deli6er5 #i'*t *a6e /een /5 a co#/ination o! dispersal !ro# lo,.!l5in' planes and attack ,it* c*e#ical s*ells4- ;*e 7ala/8a #assacre ,as not a de#onstration o! t*e $ni>$e po,er o! c*e#ical ,eapons, /$t o! t*e !act t*at t*e pop$lation ,as de!enseless- Ira>, and pro/a/l5 Iran, also $sed poison 'as d$rin' t*e Iran.Ira> ,ar (()M0.()MM4- E6en as t*o$sands o! 5o$n' people ,ere
sla$'*tered in a ,ar t*at ended in stale#ate, t*e ,ar<s less.controlled, /attle!ield $se o! c*e#ical ,eapons is c$sto#aril5 assessed as *a6in' lent neit*er side an ad6anta'e- ;oda5,

!e, o! t*e ,orld<s #ilitaries ,o$ld e6en consider $sin' c*e#ical ,eapons..t*e5 can conta#inate t*e /attle'ro$nd and co#e /ack on t*e attackers i! t*e ,ind takes an $ne?pected t$rn- ;*e #a8or #ilitaries..
incl$din' t*ose o! t*e Anited States, Britain, R$ssia, and Ger#an5..*a6e d$#ped old #$nitions (not al,a5s care!$ll54 or *a6e spent, or need to spend, /illions o! dollars to ne$traliGe deca5in' #$nitions t*at co$ld t*reaten ci6ilians ,*o li6e near stora'e sites- So#e tin5 a#o$nt o! ,orr5 s*o$ld pro/a/l5 /e de6oted to leakin' c*e#ical #$nitions-

No impact to chemica terrorism +'ELLE$ 2004 (9o*n, Wood5 7a5es 1*air o! National Sec$rit5 St$dies at t*e "ers*on 1enter at O*io State Ani6ersit5, Re'$lation,
@all4

POOR RESAL;S @or t*eir part, /iolo'ical

and c*e#ical ,eapons *a6e not pro6en to /e 'reat killers- Alt*o$'* t*e /asic science a/o$t t*e# *as /een ,ell kno,n !or a cent$r5 at least, /ot* kinds o! ,eapons are notorio$sl5 di!!ic$lt to create, control, and !oc$s (and e6en #ore so !or n$clear ,eapons4- ;o t*is point in *istor5, /iolo'ical ,eapons *a6e killed al#ost no one- And t*e notion t*at lar'e n$#/ers o! people ,o$ld peris* i! a s#all n$#/er o! c*e#ical ,eapons ,ere to /e set o!! is *i'*l5 >$estiona/le- Alt*o$'* t*e5 can /e *$'el5 let*al ,*en released in 'as c*a#/ers, t*eir e!!ecti6eness as ,eapons *as /een $ni#pressi6e- In World War I, !or e?a#ple, c*e#ical ,eapons ca$sed less t*an one percent o! t*e total co#/at deat*sE on a6era'e, it took a ton o! 'as to prod$ce one !atalit5- In t*e concl$sion to t*e o!!icial Britis* *istor5 o! t*e ,ar, c*e#ical ,eapons are rele'ated to a !ootnote t*at asserts t*at 'as #ade ,ar $nco#!orta/le---to no p$rpose-& A ())F anal5sis /5 t*e O!!ice o! ;ec*nolo'5 Assess#ent !inds t*at a terrorist ,o$ld *a6e to deli6er a !$ll ton o! Sarin ner6e 'as per!ectl5 and $nder a/sol$tel5 ideal conditions o6er a *ea6il5 pop$lated area to ca$se /et,een F,000 and M,000 deat*s so#et*in' t*at ,o$ld re>$ire t*e near.si#$ltaneo$s detonation o! doGens, e6en *$ndreds, o! ,eaponsAnder sli'*tl5 less ideal circ$#stances i! t*ere ,ere a #oderate ,ind or i! t*e s$n ,ere o$t, !or e?a#ple t*e deat* rate ,o$ld /e onl5 one.tent* as 'reat- ;*e ()): c*e#ical attack la$nc*ed in ;ok5o /5 t*e ,ell.!$nded
A$# S*inrik5o (atte#pted onl5 a!ter se6eral e!!orts to $se /iolo'ical ,eaponr5 *ad !ailed co#pletel54 #ana'ed to kill onl5 (2 people-