HAS SOCIAL 1USTICE LEGITIMACY IN KANTS THEORY OF RIGHT?

THE EMPIRICAL CONDITIONS OF THE RIGHTFUL STATE AS A CIVIL

UNION
1
This paper aims to shed light on a question equally entangled and disputed in the field
of Kants theory of the rightful state. It intends to discuss if Kants rational theory of the
state endorses or dismisses the fact that certain exceptional social situations, such as the
extreme poverty of some parts of the population, could request institutional state
support in order to guarantee the attainment of a minimum threshold of civil
independence. I pursue the following three goals: 1 claiming the capacity of Kants
doctrine of right to propose solutions for the entangled relation !etween economy and
politics in our present time" # showing that the pragmatic standpoint which Kant
em!races as he tac$les the social concerns of the state deny the idea that he claims for
an abstract conception of politics and % suggesting the thesis that a non&paternalistic
theory of the rightful state has not to renounce necessarily to the tenets of a welfare
state. The essay is divided into the following three sections: section I displays the
rational !asis of the rightful state in Kants political philosophy, which shields the legal
order from !oth social or economic interferences. 'ection II discusses the conflict
!etween the requirements of preservation of the state and the widespread exhortation to
struggle for happiness o!tained !y purely economic means. 'ection III investigates
what we should understand properly as a paternalistic proceeding of the state, especially
regarding the issue of pu!lic care of pauper people. (ithin this framewor$ I shall tac$le
the question of distributive justice, dealing with the following question, namely if
Kants political thought and, specifically, his grounding of the state, !elong to the realm
of li!eralism or rather to the tradition of repu!licanism )as it is formulated in *hilip
*ettits wor$s), without ruling out the advisa!ility to !lend the two nuances +,te
refieres a los dos -realms./0 in the expression -republican liberalism..
Kant warns a!out the dangers entailed !y people which have lost their political
shape to !ecome a mo!, on very similar terms to those used !y 1annah 2rendt to
denounce the dangers of the de&politici3ation process in times of totalitarian domination.
This 4unruly crowd will consider itself indeed exempt from the common laws and so
they shall feel themselves excluded 4from the quality of citi3en 52p1, 22 67: %11.
This argument entails the following outcome, namely that the state does not derive from
1
the requirement to provide security for every citi3en with respect to its neigh!ours or
foreign nations, or from the need to ensure the inviola!ility of the owners. 8y contrast
with this, civil union, as it happens in 2ristotle, !ounds on a form of gathering which
other associations do not share, however useful, convenient or even essential they might
result from a social point of view. Therefore, the state does not emerge steadily, on
Kants view, from the !ottom upwards, i.e., as a $ind of rationali3ation of customs and
practices esta!lished earlier in factual life, !ut reason itself is intended for regulating the
way men articulate their common life on 9arth:
2 constitution providing for the greatest human freedom according to laws that permit the
freedom of each to exist together with that of others 5not one providing for the greatest
happiness, since that would follow from itself is at least a necessary idea, which one must make
the ground not merely????? es una traduccin] of the primary plan of a states constitution,
!ut of all the laws too
#
.
2s Kant declares in Metaphysics of Morals, the idea of state has a normative
value for every form of union into a commonwealth 5::, 22 ;I: %1%. The instance of
rational totality that the law inserts in human interactions dignifies the social sphere, !y
forcing it to develop in accordance with <uridical laws
%
. The tas$ of law is therefore to
remem!er that freedom, the only innate right recogni3ed !y Kant, requires fulfilling
some conditions that neither an economic nor a social relationship ought to put in
danger.
Normativity and Reason: the Legitimacy of the Rightful State in Kant.
(e will move from a thesis that could hardly !e refused, namely the fact that the
constitution of a civil union wor$s for Kant as an end in itself
=
and consequently as a
moral duty)exeundum est e statu naturali 5Erluterungen zu Achenwalls Iuris, >efl.
7?%?, 22 1?: @A6), which determines the development of all human talents:
B+C0nion of many to some 5common end 5which all have is to !e found in all social contracts.
8ut an union of the same which is an end in itself 5that each ought to have +D0 is only found in
a society in so far as it constitutes a civil conditionE
@
.
Kant finds in the inclination to exchange )to have contact with the outside)
the engine of the first steps of culture. 'uch inclination is capa!le of unleashing an
enormous violence, !ut at the same time he regards it as the source of a Bdisposition to a
civil constitution and the pu!lic <usticeE 5:2:, 22 6F: 11?, according to which to
2
carry out the revenge for crimes committed ceases to !e a matter of private individuals
)as in the state of nature) to !ecome a pu!lic issue, under the control of the courts
claimed !y the state. In such situation, although the state relies on the !asis of social
inequality, civil equality does not undergo any loss, despite every fear a!out the
possi!ility that the order of finances could $eep some people away from a status
compara!le to those of their fellow citi3ens. Therefore, unlike Rousseau , who claims
the following:
It is precisely because the force of circumstances tends continually to destroy equality that
the force of legislation should always tend to its maintenance
6
.
Kant would argue for regarding such a governments intervention as
unnecessary, since the legal-political order does not admit to be coached by the
social about how to regulate human affairs. no se entiende la frase: parece que
~Kant argue. ~ prosigue lo que dice Rousseau, en cuyo caso la cita debera estar dentro del texto
principal; de otro modo no se entiende (o habra que quitar el punto al final de la cita y no tabular
al comienzo de la siguiente frase). No obstante, parece que dice que Kant argumentara a favor de
considerar . Si esto es lo que quieres decir, la versin que te proponemos es la siguiente:
Therefore, unlike Rousseau, who claims that ~It is ., Kant would argue in favor of regarding
such .] This autonomy of the political right vis vis es el verbo?, falta algo] any
pressure from social relationships, gives our author permission to claim nonchalantly
that inequality is the Bsource of so many evils !ut also of everything goodE 5:2:, 22
6F: 11?. 1ence, the rightful state shall ensure that, regardless the social relations
arising from the unequal economic status of individuals, the relationship of free !eings
shall !e determined !y practical reason. 2s the doctrine of right in use +ausbende
!echtslehre0 5GewH, 22 6F: %76, politics aims to shelter human !eings from social
excesses, where!y it also assesses the social competence as an anthropological effect of
the development of s$ills and talents of men. 2s men would prefer consciously to gra3e
li$e sheep and !e led comforta!ly !y a wise shepherd )in a dream that conceals
despotic cowardice and immaturity), it is inevita!le that Iature requires them to strive
!y themselves their own social identity:
Iature should thus !e than$ed for fostering social incompati!ility, enviously competitive vanity,
and insatia!le desires for possession or even power. (ithout these desires, all mans excellent
natural capacities would never !e roused to develop. :an wishes concord, !ut nature, $nowing
!etter what is good for his species, wishes discord. :an wishes to live comforta!ly and
3
pleasantly, !ut nature intends that he should a!andon idleness and inactive self&sufficiency and
plunge instead into la!our and hardships, so that he may !y his own adroitness find means of
li!erating himself from them in turn. The natural impulses which ma$e this possi!le, the sources
of the very unsocia!ility and continual resistance which cause so many evils, at the same time
encourage man towards new exertions of his powers and thus toward further development of his
natural capacities
7
.
*ut differently, the autonomy of the legal&political space is satisfied !y the
recognition of a general will, the highest point which any legislative operation ought to
draw on. :oreover, this will ensure the property of every citi3en and allow them to quit
a situation where they ac$nowledged the mere fact of possession, !ut not the right to !e
declared the rightful owners of anything specific. Thus, the perspective opened !y the
lawgiver acts as a $ey operator for civil dynamism:
Iow, a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone with regard to possession that
is external and therefore contingent, since that could infringe upon freedom in accordance with
universal laws. 'o it is only a will putting everyone under o!ligation, hence only a collective
general 5common and powerful will, that can provide everyone this assurance. )8ut the
condition of !eing under a general external 5i.e. pu!lic lawgiving accompanied with power is
the civil condition. 'o only in a civil condition can something external !e mine or yours.
Jorollary. If it must !e possi!le, in terms of rights, to have an external o!<ect of ones own, the
su!<ect must also !e permitted to constrain everyone else with whom he comes into conflict
a!out whether an external o!<ect is his or anothers to enter along with him into a civil
constitution
F
.
This construction of the civil union ma$es the lawgiver the 4supreme owner of
the state territory, and the ultimately responsi!le for the economy, finance and the
police in its territorial realm. :oreover, he is legitimated to appraise the pu!lic
equipped with a sufficient level of properties in order to improve the conditions for the
population that is in extreme poverty. This is a version of the distributive justice that
does not apply it as an end in itself !ut as a parergon for warranting the survival of all
civil community:
Kn this supreme proprietorship also rests the right to administer the states economy, finances,
and police. *olice provide for pu!lic security, convenience, and decency, for, the governments
!usiness of guiding the people !y laws is made easier when the feeling for decency "sensus
decori#, as negative taste, is not deadened !y what offend the moral sense, such as !egging,
uproar on the streets, stenches, and pu!lic prostitution "venus volgivaga#.
?

4
The next passage )also extracted from the Metaphysics of Morals) recalls
some of 1egelLs texts )especially from the $hilosophy of !ight) which draw attention
to the ris$s which would entail to the state the fact that significant quarters of society get
rid of every effort to o!tain political representation. In such a context, taxing those
layers of the citi3enship which en<oy civil independence would !e not an outcome
directly following from the coordinates of the political right, !ut a logical !ranch
derived indirectly from the duties which the lawgiver must protect:
To the supreme commander there !elongs indirectly, that is, insofar as he has ta$en over the duty
of the people, the right to impose taxes on the people for its own preservation, such as taxes to
support organi3ations providing for the poor, founding homes, and church organi3ations, usually
called charita!le or pious institutions.
The general will of the people has united itself into a society which is to maintain itself
perpetually, and for this end it has su!mitted itself into the internal authority of the state in order
to maintain themselves. Hor reasons of state the government is therefore authori3ed to constrain
the wealthy to provide the means of sustenance to those who are una!le to provide for even their
most necessary natural needs
16
.
It has !een discussed thoroughly if anything in the last argument might <ustify
the vindication of Kant as a champion of the distri!utive <ustice, advocated, for
example, in >awls %heory of &ustice
''
:
Hirst: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive !asic li!erty compati!le with a
similar li!erty for others. )'econd: social and economic inequality are to !e arranged so that
they are !oth 5a reasona!ly expected to !e to everyones advantage, and 5! attached to
positions and offices open to all. +D0
Kant supposes that +D0 moral legislation is to !e agreed under conditions that
characteri3e men as free and equal rational !eings
1#
.
'cholars who dealt with these passages from Kant, somewhat unusual, as is the
case of 2llen M. >osen, have classified the states indirect duty to support the poorest
people as a duty of beneficence, which would !roaden the scope covered !y the duty of
!enevolence set out in the (roundwor) of the Metaphysics of Morals
'*
, assigning it this
time to the state as a moral person, <ust li$e an individual su!<ect supplied with its own
duties. 8ut we must not forget that, when sei3ing with right, Bit does not signify the
relation of ones choice to the mere wish 5hence also to the mere need of others, as in
actions of !eneficenceE 5::, 22 6A: #%6. 1ence, the legal corpus that ma$es a
5
lawless mob to !ecome people
1=
does not rely on the faculty of choice ++ill)r0 of one
man or a few, !ut stems from the general will +allgemeiner +ille0, which confers
meaning and o!<ectivity to any act, property or capacity of a su!<ect that may !e called
legal.
Therefore, it would !e needless to wonder that, in Kants thought, only current
contri!utions fit in with the measures to !e enforced !y the rightful state. In fact, Bthis
arrangement does not ma$e poverty a means of acquisition for the la3y 5as is to !e
feared of religious institutions, and so does not !ecome an un<ust !urdening of the
people !y governmentE 5::, 22 6A: %#A. It should !e noted that the text a!ove, from
the Metaphysics of Morals, does not ta$e into consideration the material survival of
individual citi3ens, !ut the one of civil unity as one !ody. Iaturally, it is difficult to
separate completely the survival of the civic body and that of the citizens, !ut from the
point of view of the Kantian argument it is crucial that one or the other has the priority.
'ince the state must protect the survival of citi3ens, in extreme circumstances it could
!e necessary to impose inflexi!le limits to the dynamics of economic development.
Thus, the state will proceed to preserve the !odies and lives of citi3ens, in terms very
similar to the demands of caring for the su!<ectLs own !ody in the field of morals.
Indeed, the doctrine of virtue also displays the physical integrity of the human !ody as
an indirect duty regarding manLs moral !ehaviour 5::, 22 6A: %FF. (hen citi3ens
life is at issue in the pu!lic sphere, one can !e sure that politics have delved into a
period of fatal crisis. This is all )!ut nothing less) that Kant has to say a!out the
attention that the state ought to pay to the overall economic status of its population, a
tas$ that has nothing to do with the hypothesis that the state had allegedly to shape
despotically the happiness of citi3ens.
Salus civitatis and Happiness
The enigmatic passage in which Kant shapes the right of state to tax in order to
maintain the poorest people does not aim to !lur the tas$s to !e performed !y the jus
publicum with those of an institution charged with supplying every citi3en with the rate
of happiness that he deserves
1@
. :oreover, a state that would grant such a treatment to
their citi3ens would !ehave with them in an un!eara!le paternalistic manner
1A
. Kant
does not spare the appeals to the poor in order to convince them that they should solve
!y themselves, for example, the issue of the education of their offspring, since attaining
6
economic autonomy is equated with claiming ones own civil ripeness:
In the right of the state the principle of the constitution is not the happiness of citi3ens 5for they
can ta$e care of it !y themselves, !ut the right of them. The welfare of the whole is only the
means to secure the right and place them under the conditions !y which they could ma$e
themselves happy in every possi!le way. 1ence, the poor also have to deal with the maintenance
of schools and they have to educate their children themselves, !esides having the freedom to
determine for themselves their religion, and only change it !y consent
17
.
Net these recommendations, which !etray a certain idea of the development of a
society, are not the pro!lem addressed !y Metaphysics of Morals a!out the legitimacy
of state to require that some of the properties of most independent citi3ens is redeployed
to relieve the poverty of others. In fact, the health of the state is not identical to that of
individuals, and dealing with the private happiness of his su!<ects could !e part of the
merits of a prince, !ut hardly of his duties. 2s the welfare attained !y the rule of right
and individual well&!eing do not overlap, it is unsurprising that the first one ta$es
measures leading to increase the welfare of citi3ens. Ionetheless, the state should not
proceed in this way to please men sentimentally, !ut with the intention of furnishing the
state the cohesion of a commonwealth. This particular issue is emphasi3ed in this text
from %heory and $ractice:
If the supreme power ma$es laws directed primarily toward happiness 5the prosperity of citi3ens,
increasing population, and so on, this does not happen !ecause it is the purpose of esta!lishing a
civil constitution. Instead, it is merely a means for securing the state of right, especially against
the peoples external enemies. +D0 The purpose is not, as it were, to ma$e the people happy
against their will, !ut only to ma$e them exist as a commonwealth 5+D0 for unless the peoples
are prosperous, the nation will not possess strength enough to resist external enemies or to
maintain itself as a commonwealth.
1F

2ctually, previous texts have managed to shed light on the legitimacy of the
supreme lawgiver to survey effectively the economic situation of citi3ens, in order to
correct inefficiencies in relation to the civil community as a whole. 1owever, is KantLs
siding with repu!licanism clear enough to em!race the coordinates of corrective or
distri!utive <ustice, as formulated !y authors such as >awls/ (e cannot share the
easiness with which ;. Oerhardt, for example, states that the actions !efitting to a
(elfare 'tate result naturally from the tenets of KantLs doctrine of right
1?
. In contrast to
this interpretation, (. Kersting and 8. Pudwig
#6
, amongst other Kant scholars, have
offered assessments of KantLs pronouncements on matters concerning the (elfare 'tate
7
which shun overstatements and hermeneutic excesses incompati!le with the Kantian
doctrine of right. Therefore I consider of main interest to deal with texts li$e the
following:
The Kantian state is, to !e sure, limited to the functions of the reali3ation of right and the
protection of freedom, !ut when one considers the dangers that threaten right, freedom, and the
dignity of humans from a mar$etplace unsupervised !y a social state and from radical
li!ertarianisms politics of minimal state restriction, then one sees that the philosophy of right
must require a compensatory extension of the principle of the state or right through measures
toward a social and welfare state in the interest of the human right of freedom itself. Kants
philosophy of right is thoroughly compati!le with the concept of a social state in the service of
freedom. 8ut this extension of Kants philosophy of right !y no means revo$es its pervasive
antipaternalism
#1
.
KerstingLs convincing argument focuses without reluctance the shortcomings of
Kants doctrine of right from the angle of social <ustice, insofar as he ascri!es a
prudential target to the pu!lic duty to support poor people. It should !e noted that if
Kant considers social inequality as a principle of development of the provisions and
talents refolded as seeds in human nature, that is due to the fact, considered a!ove, that
the social is not regarded as a threat for the autonomy of political space, since only the
last one supplies a meaning and yields a purpose to the term e,uality. 8ut everything
changes if it is at sta$e to ensure the survival of the community 5see 22 6F: #?F, as
Kersting continues to argue thoughtfully:
The interests of the individual self&preservation only call the attention of the philosophy of law
when their negligence could desta!ili3e the community and <eopardi3e the conservation of right.
%herefore- the assistance of the welfare state is not grounded on a right to the livelihood of
individuals- but on the right of subsistence of the right itself- which- in turn- is exclusively the
institutional expression of law principles of freedom. The indirect duty of the state to preserve
the existence of dispossessed citi3ens is the price to !e paid !y the right itself, in case he wishes
to !e applied in a concrete space and time, and in case it wishes to gain power of organi3ation
and to exist under different empirically verifia!le conditions. 8ut that means that the welfare
state is not a legal concept, !ut only a prudent instrument, that is, attentive to the reality of the
exercise of right.
##
Thus, social inequality shall !e tolerated provided that it does not endanger the
equality of citi3ens !efore the law, hence, provided that the socio&economic relations do
not attempt to impose their will to the tenets of civil union. Thence, the supreme owner
would not undermine the sacred legitimacy to redistri!ute property, since he would
8
<udge such an action imperative for the survival of the dispossessed
#%
. In fact, it would
mean a clear meddling in the economic life of the population, and consequently, the
drop of right into !io&politics, whose dangers the Oerman philosopher was not even
remotely a!le to sight. 1owever, Kants theoretical construction protects firmly politics
from those social interferences:
This uniform equality of human !eings as su!<ects of a state is, however, perfectly consistent
with the utmost inequality of the mass in the degree of its possessions, whether these ta$e the
form of physical or mental superiority over others, or of fortuitous external property and of
particular rights 5of which there may !e many with respect to others. Thus the welfare of the
one depends very much on the will of the other 5the poor depending on the rich, the one must
o!ey the other 5as the child its parents or the wife her hus!and, the one serves 5the la!ourer
while the other pays, etc. Ievertheless, they are all equal as su!<ects !efore the law, which, as
the pronouncement of the general will, can only !e single in form, and which concerns the form
of right and not the material or o!<ect in relation to which I possess rights.
#=
The reluctance displayed !y scholars as Pudwig and Kersting regarding the
place that pu!lic care of the poorest should have within Kants theory of the rightful
state is made explicit !y Kant himself, as the following extract will show clearly. I am
not tal$ing a!out the intention of a private su!<ect to !enefit another, !ut a!out a much
more impersonal measure of !alance, almost a mechanical one, whose view is to
maintain and to protect the whole !ody of state. The systematic character of pu!lic
attention devoted to poverty leads Kant to distrust the !enefits of charity, since it is an
operation little interested in the common good and, to that extent, una!le to fight with
the inequality of certain individuals improperly tolerated !y the state:
Cp to where we should spend our goods to charity/ Kf course, not so much to end up needing
charity ourselves. +D0 The a!ility to do the good that depends on wealth is largely the result that
many men are favoured !y the in<ustice of the government, which introduces an inequality of
wealth that ma$es necessary the charity of others. In such circumstances, the assistance that the
rich could provide for the needy people, worths the name of charity, which he +the rich0 !oasts so
readily as a merit_____?
25
The Kantian Definition of a Paternalistic State
The texts quoted a!ove should have showed !y now that Kants theory of the
rightful state shuns every paternalism. 8y contrast, his theory provides a crucial lin)
!etween every human !eings right to see his existence on 9arth secured and the
foundation of a state that could not remain indifferent to the fact that certain individuals
9
are devoid of all access to the struggle for civil independence. The point is not that the
state should turn passive citi3ens into active ones, who should !e 4co&legislators of the
state 5::, 22 6A: %1=. If political institutions did this, they would !e led to encroach
on the functions of free human agency. Kn the contrary, the state rather ought to !e
responsi!le for preventing that entire layers of society would lac$ any possi!ility to
struggle for gaining their own place in the structure of social classes. Those who are not
their own master are limited to !e su!<ects of the state, namely part of the community
and co&!eneficiaries of protection, !ut not really mem!ers of it. Iaturally, the
aforementioned words presuppose that the acquisition of active citi3enship is a desira!le
goal for all finite rational !eings. 1ow might this agree with Kantian repu!licanism/
Jertainly, it should !e recogni3ed that Kant dismisses privileges as a criterion of full
citi3enship
#A
, as the fact that Bno one can !equeath to his descendants the prerogative of
the ran$ which he has within a commonwealthE proves 5T*, 22 6F: #?%. The
allocation of priority to self&employment, instead of leisure or inheritance, confirms that
Kant is thin$ing a!out a society led !y the !ourgeoisie and still not !y the aristocracy
#7
.
In this social context, underlings or odd&<o!!ers cannot live without the support of other
people, active mem!ers of the commonwealth 522 6A: %1@. It does not seem that,
according to Kant, this expulsion of civil order would !e a fait accompli. If it were so,
passages li$e the following would forestall a clear o!<ection on !ehalf of that statement:
I cannot really reconcile myself to +expressions such as0 4The !ondmen of a landed proprietor are
not yet ready for freedom +D0 Hor according to such a presupposition, freedom shall never
arrive, since we cannot ripen to this freedom if we are not first of all placed therein 5we must !e
free in order to !e a!le to ma$e purposive use of our powers in freedom.
#F
Texts as this recall that the experience of freedom should not !e connected with
a concrete social status. :oreover, !elonging to a determinate class or !ecoming part of
a mo! should neither hinder nor impend the development of human free action. In this
context, some authors have <ustly claimed that women would not !e availa!le to
undergo a similar civil promotion
#?
, since the restrictions to what their sex supposedly
condemn them would prevent them also from experiencing any political progress. I
consider the distinction suggested !y >ichard 9. Hlathman !etween a 4high&li!eral and
a 4low&li!eral citi3enship quite useful
%6
, according to which we claim that Kants
account of this su!<ect !elongs rather to the first la!el than to the second one, since his
philosophy of right em!races that human dignity involves that men are provided of a
10
civil identity. In any case, the achievement of a civil status expresses the specificity of
human community.
2ccording to the tenets conveyed !y the text a!ove, the supreme owner of the
national country, namely the supreme commander of the state acts according to the
general will when he intervenes directly in order to redistri!ute the private wealthy of
the citi3ens, recalling hence to all the individual owners that their properties result from
the rational civil covenant
%1
, instead of some previous empirical appropriation. In order
to throw some further light on this question, 9. Q. (einri! suggests considering the
(elfare 'tate not as a right inside the Kantian system of rights, !ut as the benefit
derived from a <uridical duty:
+*0roperty and the pu!lic duty to support the poor are connected through a single sequenced
argument that extends the reach of the universal principle of right while preserving consistency with the
ideas of rightful honour, innate equality and non&dependence that this principle implies. Hor Kant,
taxation is not theft, and neither is property. Kn the contrary, the two are <ointly necessary for a civil
condition. Kn KantLs view as I have reconstructed it, the pu!lic duty to support the poor is latent within
private property as a rightful institution
%#
.
In accordance with this approach, the contri!ution of state to the progressive
elimination of poverty would !e a consequence of the legal institution of private
property as a condition of civil independence. I find (einri!s formulation super!,
according to which the pu!lic duty which legitimately provides wea$est people with
social protection is a mere development implied in KantLs doctrine of private right, that
is, in his grounding of the property. The !oundary that inequality produced !y the
economic and commercial development of nations displays is the evidence that B+e0very
human !eing has an innate right to !e in some place on the earth, for his existence is no
deed "factum# hence no wrong "iniustum#E 5.ur Metaphysi) der /itten "0achlass#, 22
#%: #7?. Ktherwise, the following quotation ma$es clear that any li!ertarian deviation
of economy could remove the impregna!le right which set up that all men have to see
their material survival ensured enough against external threatens, as lac$ of
nourishment, of dwelling and of !asic human conditions of development:
+T0hrough the innate possession of the earth, I exclude everyone from that use of the same which
is necessary for the preservation of my existence 5thus not through my mere will.
%%

Hollowing the quotation a!ove, economic activity for Kant should never !ecome
a space which threatens the material survival of men. Indeed, if something li$e that was
11
ever to !e thought, it should put the economy in direct competition with the yields of the
pu!lic sphere and it is well $nown which <udgement would deserve a similar dispute for
our philosopher. 9conomical mechanisms rather allow the properties and other assets of
the citi3ens to increase unequally, depending on the capa!ilities of each one. It might
help to argue more accurately in favour of this thesis to recall that Kants definition of
man has not socio&economic sources, rather though it is the result of political agency,
i.e., of guarantees provided !y the rightful state protection. Jlaiming that man is not
only an animal, as Kants 2nthropology states, requires political forms free from the
pressure of the empirical social milieu. Therefore, young people must !e educated in the
idea that equality among men is a rational principle which underlies the social
inequality that they notice in their milieu, so that they do not consider it as an
unchangea!le destination or as a fathomless fate. Kn the contrary, they should !e taught
that social inequality stems from the radical tendency of men to extract profit from each
other 5*Rd., 22 6?: =?F, a situation that the right cannot definitely withdraw, !ut
instead correct. 'o far, I have tried to show that moral and legal grounds support the
commitment of the sate to aid the mo! and ragged people, as Kants following quotation
continues to uphold:
The very poor must !e fed, and if they are children, must !e cared. (hy/ 8ecause they are men,
not !easts. This does not stem from the right of the poor as citi3ens, !ut from their needs as men.
+...0 (ho has to feed them/ The question is not whether the state or the citi3en. Hor if it is the
state that feeds them, so does it also the citi3en, !ut whether it hangs on the free will of the
citi3en or on coercion, that is, on a gift or on a contri!ution.
%=
2ssessing the legitimacy of social <ustice in KantLs doctrine of right does not
involve su!mitting this theory under a prior pragmatic condition that would ruin its
theoretical purity. Kn the contrary, Kants comments a!out the public commitment to
social troubles are quite further from a pragmatic 4hy!rid solution in which the state
would ta$e care of certain disadvantaged classes. There!y, I would suggest pondering it
as the corollary of a theory !ased on reason. There is no contradiction !etween the
commented texts in section II from the Metaphysics of Morals and the following
passage:
The rights of man must !e held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to
ma$e. There can !e no half measures here" it is no use devising hy!rid solutions such as a
pragmatically conditioned right halfway !etween right and utility. Hor all politics must !end the
$nee !efore right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of
12
lasting !rilliance.
%@
The statement 1iat iustitia- pereat mundus held in $erpetual $eace
*2
might also
!e understood in the following sense, namely no worldly device, whether economic,
social or cultural, may give lessons to the state in order to provide <ustice. 8y contrast,
the utilitarian arguments of the !usiness world !elong to the sphere of physical laws )
which also contains all technical propositions), !ut never to the practical one.
:oreover, the paternalistic despotism, which every repu!lican government must shun,
not only focuses on the fact that the individual happiness might prevail over the
common good of citi3enship. In fact, in contrast with the outloo$ of the common good
sheltered !y the state, the interests of economic corporations and affairs, even those who
could !ecome of 4national interest, search only to materiali3e particular purposes. In a
line repeatedly explored !y 1. 2rendt, I would say that the consequences of the civil
union in accordance with KantLs doctrine of right anticipate that a 4social paternalism
would !e much worse than a 4state paternalism would !e. 2l!eit the state is called to
enlighten the civil society, Kant ac$nowledges that in the dar$ ages the path is the
opposite, so that in the !est case private initiatives and intellectual efforts deprived of
any academic endorsement are !urdened with the tas$ of drawing the outline of the state
to come, more precisely, the state that ought to !e. K!viously, Kant could not foresee
the reactions that the state should have in circumstances that he did not $now, li$e those
of advanced capitalism, !ut one can guess with some legitimacy that he would have
discerned in the arguments of the powerful industrial and financial trusts the interests of
4monumental individuals, that not !ecause of its si3e cease to !e private. In effect, they
argue as frightening su!<ects, since they are no longer limited !y !irth and death, !riefly
put, they are a!le to understand its organic development in terms of an infinite
accumulation.
Hinally, I turn to show that the following !lames on politicians attempts to
suppress the freedom of every man, when they lay down with no legitimacy which one
should !e the unique path to happiness, might !e understood as addressed not only to
political rulers, !ut also and especially to the socio&economic structures that impinge the
pu!lic space, imposing their own interests )their own vision of happiness) to the
whole civil !ody:
Io one can compel me to !e happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others,
for each may see$ his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon
13
the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can !e reconciled with the freedom of
everyone else within a wor$a!le general law )i.e. he must accord to others the same right as he
en<oys himself. 2 government might !e esta!lished on the principle of !enevolence towards the
people, li$e that of a father towards his children. Cnder such a paternal government "imperium
paternale#, the su!<ects, as immature children who cannot distinguish what is truly useful or
harmful to themselves, would !e o!liged to !ehave purely passively and to rely upon the
<udgement of the head of state as to how they ought to !e happy, and upon his $indness in
willing their happiness at all. 'uch a government is the greatest conceiva!le despotism, i.e. a
constitution which suspends the entire freedom of its su!<ects, who thenceforth have no rights
whatsoever.
%7
2s I pointed out !efore, the sharp distinction !etween happiness and freedom
included in Kants doctrine of right does not assign to the state the tas$ of turning
directly passive citi3ens into active ones. The dignity of the rational su!<ect prevents
treating someone as a simple su!ordinate. 1owever, this does not preclude that the state
must ta$e measures unavoida!ly when society tears//// dangerously, endangering the
survival of the civil !ody itself. Net, as a result of this, consider that trade and company
aggregates, which eventually enter into crisis, deserve the same support and ma$e those
individual su!<ects that run a similar fate !e victim of a terri!le political illusion. That
illusion would dignify illegitimately elements of social life !y granting them the
character of a person empirically originated, threatening where!y the human specificity
to aim to end autonomously 5::, 22 ;I: %?#. Indeed, in such a case, in a short time
the right and policy would !e limited )in an astonishing manner) to manage the
governance of economic 4concrete orders )in the sense la!elled !y Jarl 'chmitt),
however postmodern, decentrali3ed and flexi!le they might !e. 2nd as a result of it the
state would !ecome a mere referee who really holds service to the genuine sovereignty,
namely the one that factual wild powers have previously sei3ed.
References
8einer, >. 5#611. 4*aradoxes in Kants 2ccount of Jiti3enship. In: Jh. *ayneSP.
Thorpe 5eds., 3ant and the concept of community 5I2K' 'tudies in *hilosophy,
>ochester 5IN: Cniv. of >ochester *ress, pp. #6?&##@.
Motti, Q.9. 5#66@. 4K!servaciones so!re Kant y el Pi!eralismo. Araucaria, nT 1%, =&1#.
Hlathman, >.9. 51??@ 4Jiti3enship and 2uthority: 2 chastened view of Jiti3enship, in:
>. 8einer 5ed., %heorizing 4itizenship. 5Iew Nor$: 'tate Cniversity of Iew Nor$
*ress, pp. 16@&1@1.
14
Oerhardt, ;. 51?FA 4>e3ension von (. Kersting, +ohlgeordnete 1reiheit, 8erlin,
1?F=U. Allgemeine .eitschrift fr $hilosophie 11S#, 7?&F=.
Kant, Immanuel 51?6#V 3ants gesammelten /chriften. 9d. KWniglich Meutschen
2$ademie der (issenschaften. 8erlin: de Oruyter.
)51?76 3ant5s $olitical +ritings. 9d., introd. and notes !y 1. >eiss, translated !y
1.8. Iis!et, Jam!ridge: Jam!ridge C.*.
)51??Aa +ritings on !eligion and !ational %heology. 9d. 2. (ood and O. di
Oiovanni. Jam!ridge: Jam!ridge Cniversity *ress.
)51??A! (roundwor) of Metaphysics of Morals. In: K2IT, I., $ractical $hilosophy,
ed. and transl. !y :. Q. Oregor. Jam!ridge: Jam!ridge C.*.
)51??F 4riti,ue of $ure !eason. Trans. *. Ouyer and 2. (ood. Jam!ridge:
Jam!ridge Cniversity *ress.
)5#667 Anthropology- 6istory- and Education. 9d. O. GWller and >. Pouden.
Jam!ridge: Jam!ridge Cniversity *ress.
Kaufman, 2. 51??? +elfare in the 3antian /tate. Kxford, Jlarendon *ress.
Kersting, (. 51??#a 4*olitics, Hreedom, and Krder. In: *. Ouyer 5ed., %he 4ambridge
4ompanion to 3ant 5Jam!ridge Jam!ridge C.*., pp. %=#&%AA.
)51??#! 4Kants Joncept of the 'tate. In: 1.Pl. (illiams 5ed., Essays on 3ant5s
$olitical $hilosophy 5Jhicago: Cniv. of Jhicago *ress, pp. 1=%&1A@.
)5#66% 4Kant e pro!lema da <ustiXa social. 7eritas, vol. =F, nT 1, 1#1&1%A.
Pe!ar, :. 51??? 4Kant on (elfare. 4anadian &ournal of $hilosophy, vol. #?S#, ##@&
#@6.
Pudwig, 8. 51??% 4Kants ;era!schiedung der ;ertragstheorie )Konsequen3en fYr
eine Theorie so3ialer Oerechtig$eit. &ahrbuch fr !echt und Ethi)8Annual !eview of
9aw and Ethics, ##1&#@=.
:eld 'hell, '. 51?F6 %he !ights of !eason: A /tudy of 3ant5s $hilosophy and $olitics.
Toronto: Cniv. of Toronto *ress.
)5#611 4Kants conception of the Iation&'tate and the Idea of 9urope. In: Jh.
*ayneSP. Thorpe 5eds., 3ant and the concept of community 5I2K' 'tudies in
*hilosophy, : >ochester 5IN, Cniv. of >ochester *ress, pp. ##A&#==.
:ulholland, P. 51??6 3ant5s /ystem of !ights. Tennessee: Jolum!ia C.*.
Iour, '. 5#66% 42 filosofia social de Kant. $hilosophica, %?&@A.
Io3ic$, >. 51?7= Anarchy- /tate and ;topia. Iew Nor$: 8asic 8oo$s.
*atrone, T. 5#611 BKants !echtslehre and ideas of reasonE, in: '. 8aiasuS'.
15
*ihlstrWmS1. (illiams 5ed.. $olitics and Metaphysics in 3ant 5Jardiff: Cniv. of (ales
*ress, pp. 11@&1%%.
>awls, Q. 51?71. %heory of &ustice. Kxford: Kxford C.*.
>osen, 2.M. 51??% 3ant5s %heory of &ustice. Ithaca: Jornell C.*.
>ousseau, Q.&Q. 51??7 %he /ocial 4ontract and <ther 9ater $olitical +ritings. 9d. and
trans. !y ;. Oourevitch. Jam!ridge: Jam!ridge Cniversity *ress.
Thorpe, P. 5#616 4Is Kants realm of ends a unum per se/ 2quinas, 'uZre3, Pei!ni3 and
Kant on composition. =ritish &ournal for the 6istory of $hilosophy 1F 5%, =A1&=F@.
(einri!, 9.Q. 5#66%. 4*overty and *roperty in Kants 'ystem of >ights 0otre >ame
9aw !eview, vol. 7FS%, 7?F&F#F.
)51??# 4Paw as Idea of >eason. In: 1.Pl. (illiams 5ed., Essays on 3ant5s $olitical
$hilosophy 5Jhicago: Cniversity of Jhicago *ress, pp. 1@&=?.
16
1
I would li$e to than$ 2ndreas :ichala$is, :elina :ou3alas and 'tasinos 'taviraneas from the Mepartment of *hilosophy
of the Cniversity of *atras for their helpful suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this text, discussed with
students and professors of the :aster of the aforementioned Mepartment in 2pril #61#, during a stay supported !y a T'
9rasmus mo!ility scholarship grant accorded !y the Cniversity Jomplutense of :adrid. The present version has !een
written with the support of the >esearch *ro<ect HHI#66?&1#=6#, accorded !y the :IJIII of the Oovernment of 'pain.
2
3r7, 2 %1AS8 %7%. The references to Kants (ritings !elong to the 4ambridge Edition of the +or)s of Immanuel 3ant,
where availa!le. In some cases I have supplied my own translation. I use the following a!!reviations for frequently cited
wor$s of Kant: 3r7: 4riti,ue of $ure !eason 5in Kant 1??F" Ap6: Anthropology from a $ragmatic $oint of 7iew. 5In Kant
#667" MM: Metaphysics of Morals 5in Kant " $$: $erpetual $eace 5In Kant " !eligion: !eligion within the =oundaries of
mere !eason 5In Kant 1??A and %$: %his May =e %rue In %heory- =ut It >oes 0ot Apply in $ractice 5in Kant 1?76.
3
This question has !een formulated nicely !y T. *atrone 5#611: 1%6&1%1: B(e saw that the transcendental ideas of reason
!ring concepts of understanding into a systematic unity, and that here!y provide us with the 4sufficient mar$ of empirical
truth 53r7, 2 A@1S8 A7?. 'imilarly, we can now say, concepts of pu!lic right ma$e the rightful use of concepts of private
right possi!le. They ma$e the coherent application of all the claims involving possession possi!le, and thus provide us with
the mar$ of political truthE.
4
:ulholland 51??6: %6%: BThe state is unli$e the product of -social contracts., which are only means through which
individuals can pursue their private interests. The state, however, has a universal significance, and is an end in itselfE. 'ee
(einri! 51??#: =%: BThe idea of reason is thus not the !lueprint for a distant utopia. >ather, it maps the intelligi!ility of
any truly <uridical associationE.
5
T*, 6F: #F?.
6
>ousseau 51??7.
7
IO, I; *roposition, 6F: #1.
8
::, !echtslehre, [ F, 6A: #@A.
9
::, !echtslehre, 49ffects derived from the nature of the civil union, [ 8, 6A: %#@.
10
::, !echtslehre, 49ffects derived from the nature of the civil union, [ J, 6A: %#A.
11
'ee :ulholland, op: cit., p. %?7: B>awls first principle closely reflects Kants principles of the rightful attri!utes of
freedom and equality. 1owever, +D0 Kant does not provide any clear principle of distri!utive <ustice, compara!le to >awls
second principleE.
12
>awls, 1?71: A6 and #@#.
13
Hor example, passages li$e the following 522 6=: =#%: B+i0f no one can rationally will the maxim of never helping others
as a law of nature +D0 then neither can an entire people rationally will as a law of political society that the state should
allow them to perish rather than supply their !asic needs. The same reason that ma$es it impossi!le rationally to will the
maxim of never helping others as a law of nature also ma$es it impossi!le rationally to consent to a law of political society
that would permit the state to ignore the !asic need of its citi3ensE. 'ee >osen 51??%: 17%&#6F.
14
>egarding the conditions of this transformation, which Kant does not hesitate to compare with the development of an
organism, see '. :eld 'hell 5#611: #%#&#%%: B'tates are the vehicle through which a people !ecomes a nation. 2ll states
are nation&states +D0
Jiti3ens, according to Kants adaptation of ancient and a more recent political concept, are familiarly related in a dou!le
sense: first, as still&savage children, as it were, of a common soil" second, as <ointly enno!led sons of the repu!lic. (ithout
this shared dou!le -natality., for which !eing human is not enough, men, in their capacity as pure moral !eings, would
hover over the world li$e angels 5to !orrow a concept from *ierre :anent. 2 <uridical man is an em!odied man 5a -child of
the earth. who ta$es up space and thus comes potentially into conflict with other human !eings. 9veryone excludes others
from some portion of the glo!e, !eginning with the place where he or she is !orn. *eople arise, in !oth fact and right, from
the de!t of support that parents owe their children. Kants account of citi3enship ac$nowledges this de!t 5to which myths as
-autochtony. fictionally attest, while su!ordinating to an ideal of civic re&creationE.
15
>fl. 7=%6, 1?: %7#: B The health of the state is entirely different from that of a people. The first refers to the whole with
respect to its su!ordination under laws and to the administration of <ustice, the second one refers to the private happiness of
each one. To ta$e care of the latter !elongs to the merits of a princeE.
16
0aturrecht 1eyerabend, #7S#: 1%A6: BThe opinion of caring citi3ens and their happiness as parents do goes completely in
contradiction with the principle of law, civil li!ertyE.
17
!eflexion 7?%F, 1?: @A6.
18
T*, #?F&#??, note.
19
;. Oerhardt 51?F=: F=: B+Kant displays0 opportunities to support from the point of view of the political right social state
measuresE.
20
8. Pudwig, 1??%: #%=&#%@ and #@%: Bunder the Kantian approach to promoting material equality and individual welfare is
neither an aim nor a mediate consequence of the civil constitution. +D0
+T0he minimal conditions of a state of civil constitution are limited in the !est steady legal relations and serve to
maintain the state as a place of the fulfilment of right and in no event to promote the welfare of individual citi3ens. +D0
I hope to have shown that those who see$ a theory of social <ustice, which provide the criteria for the redistri!ution
of the results of social cooperation, have to leave for the time !eing without the company of KantE.
21
Kersting, 1??#a: %@A&%@7.
22
Kersting, #66%: 1#7 +my translation0" cfr. Idem, 1??#!, 1=% and 1A=, n. 7.
23
:ulholland has identified shrewdly this point 5see 1??%, p. %1F: B8y ta$ing over the control of land, the state thwarts the
individuals title to achieve land necessary for existence, and so must provide the means for existence in the case of the
needy. +D0
Knly acquira!le property can !e regarded as owned !y the commonwealth as such. Innate property 5including
ones natural a!ilities is not common property. 2ccordingly, while individual may !e treated unfairly !y nature, the state
may not rightfully interfere with this distri!ution, since its province of control lies only in the area of external o!<ects and
their distri!utionE. Jfr. >osen, #6A&#67.
24
T*, 6F: #?1.
25
::, %ugendlehre, [ %1, 6A: =@=.
26
'ee %heorie and $ractice, 6F: #?#: B9very mem!er of a commonwealth must !e allowed to attain any level of ran$
within it 5that can !elong to a su!<ect to which his talent, his industry and his luc$ can ta$e him" and his fellow su!<ects
may not stand in his way !y means of a hereditary prerogative 5privileges +reserved0 for a certain ran$, so as to $eep him
and his descendents forever !eneath the ran$E. >. 8einer guesses 5#611: #1# that T* 522 6F: #?A&#?7 adopts the point of
view of the lawgiver, not that of the citi3ens, whereas :: 522 6A: %1= focuses on the real civic status of each individual,
which the voting right expresses !etter than any other capacity.
27
;d. '. :eld 'hell 51?F6: p. 1@F.
28
!eligion, 6A: 1FF.
29
'ee especially the wor$ of '. :endus, B2n 1onest !ut Iarrow&:inded 8ourgeois/E, in: 1.Pl. (illiams 5ed., Essays on
3ant5s $olitical $hilosophy, Jhicago C.*., 1??#, pp. 1AA&1?6.
30
'ee Hlathman 51??@ and the good comments of Pucas Thorpe 5#616: =F%, n. @7.
31
:ulholland has seen this point with accuracy 51??6: %17 and %?@: BIn the light of this o!ligation to provide welfare, it
should also !e recalled that all individual rights to property are consequences of acts of the a priori general will which
permits private possession. The state, however, represents this general will and ma$es it effective. 2s a result, the state must
!e regarded as the original pu!lic owner of all its territory and everyones right to land must !e conditional on the
<udgement of the political authority so long as the constitution of this state accords with the rightful attri!utes. The state
may, therefore, tax and to some degree redistri!ute wealth. +D0
8ecause the general will control all land, the state, in ma$ing specific decisions that it means to accord with the general will,
has the o!ligation to ensure that its administration does not violate the right of freedom. 8ut it can do this only !y the
provision of pu!lic welfare. The important point to see here is that needy mem!ers of the community have the right to
welfare. +D0
+T0he state is not merely exercising !enevolence in taxing its wealthier mem!ers to provide for the needs of the
poor. Those wealthy mem!ers can achieve their wealth only through the cooperation provided !y the original "a priori# act
of the production of the general will. They may not claim that their right to property precedes and is independent of the
general will, for one can have even a provisional right only if one agrees to su!mit to a civil conditionE.
32
(einri! #66%: F#F.
33
.ur Metaphysi) der /itten "0achlass#, #%: #FA.
34
Iotes on 2chenwall, Iuris naturalis pars posterior, [ 1%6 -Me iure circa fecilitatem pu!licam., 1?: @7F.
35
$$, 6F: %F6.
36
$$, 6F: %7?: BThis proposition ?fiat iustitia- pereat mundus@ simply means that whatever the physical consequences may
!e, the political maxims adopted must not !e influenced !y the prospect of any !enefit or happiness which might accrue to
the state if it followed them, i.e. !y the end which each state ta$es as the o!<ect of its will 5as the highest empirical principle
of political wisdom" they should !e influenced only !y the pure concept of rightful duty" i.e. !y an o!ligation whose
principle is given a priori !y pure reason. The world will certainly not come to an end if there are fewer !ad men. :oral evil
has !y nature the inherent quality of !eing self&destructive and self&contradictory in its aims 5especially in relations !etween
persons of a li$e mind, so that it ma$es way for the moral principle of goodness, even if such progress is slowE.
37
T*, 22 6F: #?6s.