From: barrylw11@hotmail.com To: cheryl.gallant.a1@parl.gc.

ca Subject: JPSU Thoughts Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2012 18:57:42 -0500 Cheryl The following is intended to give you some basic info on the JPSU, and some of my personal thoughts on how best to go forward: The Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU) is a coast-to-coast Unit consisting of a Higher Headquarters (HHQ) located in Ottawa, where the Commanding Officer is situated. The HHQ controls eight Regions throughout Canada, with one of them being Eastern Ontario Region. Eastern Ontario Region has its Regional Headquarters (RHQ) in Petawawa and has four smaller sub-units known as Integrated Personnel Support Centres (IPSC's) spread throughout the Region. They are located in Petawawa, Ottawa, Kingston and Trenton with a small detachment in North Bay. Eastern Ontario Region is by far the largest (most populous) Region in Canada with close to 500 ill/injured being posted to us and another 1000 not being posted in, but receiving service in one form or another. Our Region is responsible to get the word out regarding our services to the tens of thousand of people located within our Region, and must be prepared to back up our words with action. To manage entire Region this we have a RHQ staff of only four military personnel. The JPSU replaces an ill advised program called the Service Personnel Holding List (SPHL), which was a cobbled together disaster of an idea. The SPHL was so bad, that unit commanders were not comfortable sending their ill/injured to this organization for fear of their welfare. So too, the ill and injured realized that a posting to the SPHL was the end of the line for their careers, or worse, it was to be forgotten. This made it a goal then never to get posted to the SPHL or it was curtains for you, and never to send one of your people to the SPHL. The answer was that the units stood-up their own Regimental system in unit lines, however this caused a number of issues. Firstly, the units, in wanting to care for their members, put injured people in jobs they could handle rather than their actual profession. In some cases these people were suffering from an Occupational Stress Injury (OSI), such as PTSD and although it was done with the best of intentions, it had debilitating ramifications to the person. By hiding the person and find work suitable for them, they also enabled the disorder by not addressing it. This, if allowed to continue for great lengths of time could far worsen the disorder. As well, for physical injuries, they could post a person internally in their Regiment to an Injured Platoon. There the person could recover from their injuries, but more times that not, when they returned to an active platoon, they re-injured themselves quickly because they were not totally healed when much was demanded of them and then they went back to the Injured Platoon. Also, in some cases, this Injured Platoon was referred to as the place for the sick, lame and lazy, and because of this, people hid their injuries rather than seek aid and in doing so injured themselves even more. This Injured Platoon also placed demands on the unit that were not in keeping with the function of the unit, for example infantry. The Infantry Regiment is a fighting unit that should be focusing their energy on those skills and being ready to deploy in short order - fit and effective. What happened with the retention of many injured personnel was that the focus was not as defined

as it could have been. You see, injured/ill people require an inordinate amount of administrative overhead, support and tracking - appointments, paperwork, one-on-one coaching is just a part of it. The term often used to describe this situation is that 10% of your people took up 90% of your time, while the other 90% went about their duties with regular supervision. When the numbers of injured personnel in the unit became too great, the only option available was to post them to the SPHL where they languished and "fell through the cracks". Now when they are posted to the JPSU where they have access to immediate and professional care, services and dedicated military leadership - they are not maligned, but instead are given every opportunity to get back in the game, fit and ready to deploy. The Region also makes available someone called a Regional Adaptive Fitness Specialist (RAFS) who can design physio programs to assist seriously injured people (amputees for example) build up their strength to gain confidence and independence. As well they can help less injured people to speed up their recovery so they can return to duty faster and fully prepared - because of our success, injured people are actually requesting to come to the JPSU for assistance! This shows that the JPSU is gaining credibility, and with that come the confidence of our deployed troops that there is a unit waiting for them should they be injured - this in-turn is telegraphed to their families, who also receive support from the JPSU. The SPHL suffered from disorganization, non-standardization, lower-priority (many times a secondary duty), inefficiency, poor control, leadership and poor staffing usually only one person was assigned to run it per Base and that person, being Reg Force, would be posted away leaving it for the nest person to deal with. The JPSU was designed to rectify the situation but despite a great start and vision, is failing because of inflexibility, outdated or dysfunctional policy, poor staff manning, questionable structure and other issues - indeed it has coasted to a stop and is now reverting back to an SPHL type organization. When the JPSU first stood-up, things were manageable as the posted-in personnel and supported personnel was fairly reasonable. Also, in the move to stand-up the organization, much effort was expended elsewhere and there was not much time to take account of how we were doing as a Region - but our numbers have over doubled and we did take time to take account - our Region is now has the numbers that the entire JPSU had only two years ago, and this normally would be a great and celebrated milestone - but it is not... Near the end of Phase III of the stand-up of the JPSU, it became very apparent to all those on the frontlines (IPSC and RHQ) that there were significant shortfalls with the unit. This is not to say they were difficult to overcome, but they were significant nonetheless and pains were taken to address them. Most of these are outlined in the document Thoughts on Staffing/Expansion, I shared with you; that document forecasted the present situation with unfortunate accuracy. The disconnect, as I see it, is between the HHQ in Ottawa and the RHQ; the RHQ is on the frontlines and knows what it requires to fulfill the responsibilities and vision of the JPSU. I personally have staffed our requirements to HHQ with no favourable response. As time passed the problems worsened and with the increase of posted-in and supported personnel, have reached a past-critical state. At our last conference in Ottawa, this was relayed to HHQ, as were our recommendations to solve these issues, but to no avail. Then the conversation turned to Mission Failure, and we were told specifically that Mission Failure was not an option. Then the discussion turned to what would have to happen to declare Mission Failure and it was broached that in the case of the civilian staff in the JPSU it would be defined as 0 personnel left in the

JPSU. This is to say, there would have to be no civilian staff remaining whatsoever in the entire unit before Mission Failure could be announced - this is just plain dumb. So, to stem off the chance of Mission Failure by being completely overwhelmed by posted-in and supported people, it was suggested by HHQ that we reduce the amount of Out Reach (advertising) we were performing. This essentially translates into if we dont tell them were here, they wont come to us for help and this will keep our numbers at a steady-state this translates to me into worse than Mission Failure - it is avoidance of reality and the shirking of our duty to the ill and injured. So what do we need to succeed brilliantly and have Mission Success, ideally, we need the following in order of precedence: IPSC At the Section Commander Level, a maximum ratio of no more than 1:18 (Section Commander to Supported (Ill and Injured) Troops). At the Platoon Warrant Officer Level, a ratio of no more than 1:4 (Platoon Warrant Officer to Section Commanders (and their Supported Troops). The addition of an IPSC Sergeant Major (Master Warrant Officer rank level), one per IPSC. At the Platoon Commander (Captain) Level, a ratio of no more than 1:4 (Platoon Commanders to Platoon WOs). The addition of an Officer In Charge (OIC) of the IPSC, Major rank level, one per IPSC (currently there is no single person in charge of an IPSC which is problematic). RHQ The increase of the Regional Master Warrant Officer to Regional Chief Warrant Officer. The increase of the Regional Officer Commanding from Major to Lieutenant Colonel. The addition of a Second-in-Command (Major). The Increase of Regional Clerk Warrant Officer, to Clerk Master Warrant Officer. The addition of appropriate clerical staff (Master Corporal/Corporal) based on the size of the unit, a minimum two (one Master Corporal, one Corporal), and an additional Corporal or Master Corporal per 150 pers posted in to the Region. The addition of a Regional Services Representative. There has also been much talk of the annuitant situation as well; to this I would like to point out that I have heard nothing but high praise for the staff at the IPSC level, made up almost entirely of annuitants. This, I believe, is largely because they have all volunteered to be here and have put there experience, leadership ability, maturity and dedication into this project. This is a critical characteristic to maintain in the JPSU Staff, and ironically the annuitant policy can work to ensure that we get the best there is. If the staff of the JPSU is offered exceptions, then it will attract a large number of applicants, from which the best can be chosen - this is an exceptional thing to use to get the best people. These annuitants, have tackled the stigma of the SPHL, worked to remove the stigma of OSI's, added to the efficiency of the Regular Force Units from which we all come, so of course it must be changed - it's working too good for its own good! The use of annuitants also brings in the element of stability these injured troops require a stable environment and stable leadership and not to have their Section Commanders and Warrant Officers posted in and out at the needs of the Reg Force. The effects of this on the injured from the medical staff changing over are difficult enough - the specter of both changing

would be chaotic and traumatizing to them at best. But annuitants are not the only means, I have suggested that the JPSU become its own trade which would allow this stability, as would it be if belonged to temporary component of the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service (COATS), which would allow for the employment of the seriously injured themselves (this one is a stretch). So too, the Retention Policy - if the JPSU was given a notwithstanding option to retain injured troops for employment within the JPSU, we could fill our shortfalls with select injured personnel for three years at a time, which would help us immensely. It would be a shame to lose what we have gained so far, and not to build on our success. The JPSU is truly Canadian in every respect and takes care of those who gave an oath to serve Canada, and when asked, gave of their bodies and minds to fulfill that oath - they do not deserve another SPHL called the JPSU. Regards... Barry