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Iranian Studies
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Culture traits, fantasy, and reality in the life of Sayyid Jamal Aldin Alafghani
Nikki R. Keddie
a a

Professor of History, University of California, Los Angeles Published online: 02 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Nikki R. Keddie (1976): Culture traits, fantasy, and reality in the life of Sayyid Jamal Aldin Alafghani, Iranian Studies, 9:2-3, 89-120 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00210867608701510

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CULTURE TRAITS, FANTASY, AND REALITY IN THE LIFE OF SAYYID JAML AL-DN AL-AFGHN
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Nikki R. Keddie

I Among the factors influencing the psychology of historical individuals are the "great" cultural tradition in which he or she participates, the local expressions of this tradition, the sex roles defined by society, the traditions of one's economic class, the local child-rearing practices, and the personal history of the individual. For the Near East, the study of the influence of such factors on individuals is in its infancy, and any remarks made here will be tentative. After listing some cultural factors operative in Islamic and Iranian society, we shall look at one leaderSayyid Jarcal al-Dln al-Afghanlwho both reflects the interaction of some of these factors and shows some highly individual features. Islam as a comprehensive religio-political-legal theory inculcates considerable conformity of behavior-more of behavior than of belief, unlike some religions. The central importance of religious law and of conformity to it have frequently been noted. If behavior had to conform, belief was freer than in the pre-modern West; Islam had

Nikki R. Keddie is Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles. 89 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

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very few heresy trials, and no witch-burning. The open expression of heretical views was, however, very rare. The combination of external conformity with freedom when alone or with a group of close associates continues among modern Near Eastern leaders, most of whom are careful to fulfill their Islamic religious duties, while their private beliefs may not be orthodox. Similar phenomena are of course known in the non-Muslim world. The contrast between external religiosity and conformism and internal non-conformity is found in Jamal al-DIn. In the Muslim world, a combination of law and custom led to separation of the sexes, which was accompanied by seclusion and a lower position for women, even though their property rights exceeded those of Western women until recent times. This seclusion was often justified by a reversal of the Victorian theory: women were considered so lustful and sensual that it was dangerous to expose them to men, since they could not restrain themselves (although sometimes they were simply considered naive and weak). There grew up two separate and unequal sub-societiesthat of men and that of women; in the towns and, to a large degree, in the villages, women had fewer social outlets than men. Polygamy, concubinage, arranged marriage, child brides, and male divorce prerogatives were all aspects of male dominance. In Iran there was also mut'a, or marriage for a fixed temporary term, which was often simply legalized prostitution, although this had some advantages over illegal prostitution. Very little consideration has been given to the effects of this sexually split and male-dominant culture on psychology and politics. It is an area where many Muslims have been resistant to fundamental change. Jamal al-DIn seems to have been ambivalent, but preimarily negative, about women. Once that we know of, during his 1871-1879 stay in Egypt, he spoke out in favor of better education for women, noting that they were the first educators of men and hence should not be ignorant. Disciples report his later denunciation of women and marriage, however, and his rejection of the model of Aysha, Muhammad's favorite wife, who even went into battlea model proposed by friends favoring greater emancipation for women. He thought evil conseIRANIAN STUDIES 90

quences would result from giving women a more equal position. A prominent aspect of Islamic culture is reverence for the word, including the spoken word. This may go back to the sacredness of the Koran, believed to be the literal word of God. Reading and memorization of the Koran dominated elementary education. Even at higher levels, education involved memorization of the words of the masters (and often still does). The sermons and speeches of religious leaders, including the talks of Sufi masters, had great influence. In esoteric and philosophic traditions,' the spoken word of master to disciples revealed things, thai: could not be written. A high regard for poetry and its memorization is another aspect of this respect for words. It sometimes appeared that rhetoric was valued over reality, or mistaken for it. This phenomenon remains important in the mass politics of the moden Muslim world; the great effect of speeches by leaders like Ataturk, Mosaddeq, and Nasser is well known. Jamil al-Din was extraordinarily effective in his use of the spoken and written word. He gathered around him many disciples who often copied down his comments and teaching sessions. He was one of the first in a line of successful mass political orators in the Near East, and in the late 1870s had tremendous oratorical influence over the lower classes in Cairo. He helped to politicize what had been an essentially religious function. Another aspect of Islamic culture, as of many other traditional cultures, was belief in a hierarchical society in which upper-class functions were valued above lowerclass ones. This was mitigated by social mobility, primarily through education, which was always religious education. For some, along with a belief in hierarchy went a class view of religious orthodoxy, which was considered to be a means of keeping the masses orderly and obedient through fear of punishment in the next world. Such views have also been prominent in the West at various times. In the Near East they have probably become more prominent in modern times, as more and more educated people lose their faith completely or in part, and many of them become more fearful than ever of lower-class revolt. I have heard such 91 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

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views widely expressed not only by Iranian intellectuals but by a sufficient number of non-Iranians to feel that they are also very common outside Iran. Jamal al-Din, as several of his talks and treatises show, was a firm believer in social hierarchy. His "Answer to Renan" indicates that he thought the masses were incurably religious, unlike the educated classes. Elsewhere he insists that the masses should not lose their religious identification because it contributes to political solidarity. Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 10:31 30 April 2013 Among the large number of Muslims influenced by Sufi ideas there was often a special idea of reality. The reality of the hidden, divine, inner world was far greater than the reality of the everyday world of appearances. This conviction merges with a philosophical idealism characteristic of Muslim culture. The primacy of ideas over mundane reality, and the achievement of mastery over that reality through knowledge of the proper ideas, are widespread concepts of Muslim culture. Jamal al-Din shared this belief in the power of ideas, and spent much of his life trying to influence rulers through the force of his own ideas. There were also certain traditions characteristic of Iran, the country of Jamal al-Din's birth, which influenced the formation of his character. Among these were a variety of traditions favoring dissimulation. Dissimulation of one's true beliefs, including denial of them and pretense to orthodoxy, is a strong tradition among nonSunni or heterodox groups within Islam, from the time of the early Kharijites, and it is known even among Sunnis. However, it is particularly strong among the Shi'a and more heterodox groups. Among the Shi'a it began as a precautionary practice to save people's lives and positions, but it developed into a positive creed as well. People eventually came to believe that it was wrong and defiling to reveal the truth about one's religion to an outsider; for religious reasons certain secrets must be kept within the creed. This injunction not to tell the whole truth about one's religion to outsiders, and the legitimization of telling non-truths passed over into non-religious spheres. In addition to religious causes, some have attributed this phenomenon to frequent conquest, with the IRANIAN STUDIES 92

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necessity to save one's self from oppression and worse by any means. There was also a lack of identification between the governed and those who governed them, and a self-protective practice grew up of lying to tax collectors and rulers about taxes owed and other matters. What began as a defense against oppression again spread into other areas. Jamal al-Dln carried this practice of dissimulation to an extreme, made up a fictional Afghan birth and youth, and distorted or invented various other episodes in his own life. For him even more than for other Iranians, the effect he expected from his words was more important than their literal truthfulness. Iran was also characterized by traditions that distinguished between the elite of initiated and the mass of uninitiated to whom different words should be used. Present in Shicism and strong in Eufism, this idea was particularly elaborated in the Muslim philosophical tradition. Greek-influenced philosophy had been quite effectively suppressed in the Muslim lands west of Iran, but in Iran and India it still had a vigorous life in the nineteenth century. Avicenna was followed by other Iranian philosophers, including a school of philosophers in Safavid times who attempted to reconcile Sufi, Shi'i, and philosophical ideas, and their work was carried on by philosophers into the nineteenth century. Some philosophical texts were even taught in religious schools, but the leading philosophers of the Muslim world had been categorical about the need to keep their teachings from the masses. These teachings generally included a deistic type of God, who did not interfere directly in the workings of the world and was not anthropomorphic, as he was in the Koran. The philosophers also rejected the Koranic resurrection of the flesh, and sometimes individual immortality, particularly a physical heaven and hell. They thought it was beneficial for the masses to believe in these things, however, and held that more rational ideas would only confuse those whose minds were incapable of understanding sophisticated philosophical notions. They feared that disbelief in the letter of religious law and in rewards and punishments after death 93 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

would make the masses unruly and disobedientan outcome which the philosophers wanted no more than the rulers. The philosophers' position was partly a response to persecution, but the majority of them probably believed it. It provided another prop for dissimulation. The intellectual elite was fit to know the complex and difficult truth; the rest of mankind could only be confused by it, and for them a literal understanding of the Koran was enjoined. This intellectual elitism of the philosophers was translated to new uses by Jamal al-DIn; while teaching his close disciples the rationalism of the philosophers integrated with new anti-imperialist and reformist politics, he appealed to those outside his circle mainly in Islamic and pan-Islamic terms.2 An unusual amount of religious innovation occurred in Iran in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The late eighteenth century saw the rise of Shaykhism, a new school of twelver Shi'ism which some Shi'is considered heretical. Originating in Arab territories outside Iran, the school and its founder, Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, found rapid and continuing popularity within Iran. This school, which combined philosophical and Sufi ideas with Shi'ism, is noted for its idea that there must always be an intermediary in the world between men and the hidden twelfth imam. Such an intermediary, or gate, Bab, declared himself in the 1840s in the person of Sayyid C A1I Muhammad, a merchant's son who had received a Shaykhi training; he was quickly recognized by many Shaykhls, but repudiated by others. He became the founder of a new religion, Babism, with a written revelation that he said superseded the Koran. In 1848 a series of Babi revolts began. The new religion had many middle-class, progressive, and, in one location, even socialistic features, and its development may in part be a reaction to the strains produced in Iran by the early Western impact.5 Recent documents show that among Jamil al-Dln's earliest adult possessions which he carried with him for most of his life were a series of Shaykhi tracts, and some of his ideas resembled Shaykhi ones. He was also very well informed about Babism, and it seems likely that its example of political activism through a religious IRANIAN STUDIES 94

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mass movement influenced his own efforts in that direction.

II The true elements of the life of Jamal al-Dln alAfghani have been unraveled only in recent years, thanks in part to the cataloguing in 1963 of his personal papers which he had left with his Iranian host upon his expulsion from Iran in 1891. Until the 1960s virtually all of the" numerous biographies of Afghani, which were written in many languages, stemmed directly or indirectly from accounts by disciples like the Egyptian reformer Muhammad c Abduh, and were based primarily on Afghani's own words and what he wished others to believe about him. Prior to the cataloguing of Afghani's papers in Iran, considerable evidence existed, especially in Persian, which cast doubt on this "standard biography," but most writers either did not know of this evidence or ignored it. The mythical self-view of Afghani is now so deeply enshrined in the Muslim world, where Afghani is one of a small pantheon of modern heroes, that it seems doubtful that a more accurate and less exalted view will find wide acceptance there.5 Every culture seems to need mythical heroes, partly because the childhood fantasy of the good, omnipotent, and allknowing father which, in the past was projected by adults onto gods and saints, in modern times is more frequently projected onto political figures. To question the veracity or outstanding importance of such a figure is to undermine one element in the world-view of a people. A similarly revisionist view of an American historic hero would likewise be widely rejected. In addition, Muslims are aware of the questioning by Western Orientalists of some of the foundations of Islam which sometimes includes unfairly negative views toward Islam and its peoples, and hence they are sensitive to anything that could be construed as an attack. Psychohistory, which often attributes neurotic motivations to great men, maybe particularly resented. The biography written during Afghani's lifetime by Muhammad cAbduh reflects the story about himself that 95 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

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Afghani wished to publicize, and has formed the primary direct or indirect source for later biographies. The essence of this biography deserves presentation and analysis for what it reveals about the image that Afghani wanted to project. This view will be contrasted with a brief account of the facts revealed by recent research. Abduh begins by speaking of what others have unjustly invented about Afghani; later it becomes clear that he is especially concerned about those who attributed unorthodoxy O T irreligion to Afghani. cAbdiih says that Jamal al-Dln was a member of a great Afghan familya story which Afghani promulgated, sometimes in more elaborate form. In fact, however, recent research proves that Jamal al-Din was born in Iran into a modest family. He was taken by his father as an early adolescent to the Shi'i shrine cities in Iraq, after which he made no recorded effort to see his family again, except for a few days' visit in his late twenties. He is never recorded as talking about his true family except to his nephew in Tehran during visits there between 1887 and 1891, and from this we can deduce a lack of familial attachment--an unusual feature in Iranian culture, where family ties and loyalties are often all-important. When speaking of his father, Jamal al-DIn makes him more illustrious than he was; possibly he wished to deny the humble status and achievements of his real father. Afghani's claim of Afghan birth was probably largely motivated by a desire to present himself as an Afghan Sunni to the Muslim world, and not as an Iranian, since a Persian-speaking Iranian would necessarily belong to the minority, or Shi'i, branch of Islam. Other factors seem to be involved, however. At the end of a Shaykhi treatise that he copied in his own writing Afghani wrote, "I wrote this in the Abode of Peace, Baghdad, and I am a stranger in the lands and banished from the homelands, Jamal al-Din al-Husayni al-Istanbul!." Here he was already speaking of being expelled from his homeland, for reasons we do not know, and using the place name "Istanbuli" that he was to use a few years later on his only trip to Afghanistan, where he claimed to be a Turk from Istanbul.
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The stay in Baghdad was followed by a trip to Iran in 1865-1866, and it was then that he briefly visited his family. His nephew recalls that Jamal al-DIn's father and other relatives pleaded with him repeatedly to stop his constant traveling and settle down with his family. Jamal al-Dln refused and is quoted as saying: "I am like a royal falcon for whom the wide arena of the world, for all its breadth, is too narrow for flight. I am amazed that you wish to confine me in this small and narrow cage." On his way from Iran to Afghanistan he wrote a short poem saying, "Iranian demons and beasts of prey have burnt my body and soul," and therefore he was quitting Iran.6 It seems likely that Jamal al-Dln had early experiences in Iran that were, at least subjectively, strongly negative. He avoided not only his family (he did not even correspond with them until sending them his newspaper al-CUrwa al-Wuthqa in 1884, which elicited letters from his nephews), but also his country of birth, to which he did not return until 1886. According to the biography by Afghani's nephew, Lutf Allah, based partly on Afghani's reminiscences and partly on those of members of his family, as a child, Afghani spoke of traveling widely in numerous countries. A family letter states that at a young age, he had promised to make one of his female relatives governor of the Iranian province of Khurasan. So it seems that ambitions to travel and to be an important political figure go back to Afghani's childhood. The denial of his Iranian background was both an aid to his political ambitions and, possibly a rejection of painful experiences within Iran. Abduh's biography continues to discuss Afghani's (mythical) education in Kabul, where his father was supposedly brought by the Afghan Amir, Dust Muhammad. cAbduh mentions Afghani's brilliance, and then describes his adolescent trip to India, where he stayed a year and some months, and then to Mecca. In fact, Afghani was educated first in Iran and then in the Shi'i shrine cities in Ottoman Iraq. From there he went to India, then probably to Mecca and the Shi'i shrines, and then via Iran to Afghanistan. All mention of Shi'i areas is left out of cAbduh's account, which must have originated with Afghani. People 97 SPRING-SUMMER 1976
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who remember Afghani's stay at the Shi'i shrine cities, the center of Shi'i higher education, indicate that Afghani had to. leave for India because of unorthodoxy, and even that some considered him to be the Mahdi (Messiah), a belief which was to recur later. As for his stay in India, neither cAbduh nor Afghani speaks of its influence, but it can be assumed that it affected Afghani strongly. From his first appearance in Afghanistan a few years after his Indian trip, Afghani appears as fiercely antiBritish; he might even be called a "premature" anti-imperialist, who reserved his hatred particularly for British imperialism. Such ideas could scarcely have arisen in Iran and Iraq, although the British occupation of Southern Iran in 1856 might have made some contribution. In India the idea that the British were undermining Indian Muslim society and civilization and disrupting the economic life of Indian Muslims was, however, widespread and realistic. Afghani expressed his hatred for British rule over Muslim lands in very strong terms, and we may conjecture that this was due both to perspicacity about British imperialism and to projection onto the British of the negative feelings he had towards authority figures. His neglect and denial of his father, his feelings of persecution in Iran, and his later breaks with authority figures are all part of the pattern. His concentration on British imperialism, which he had personally experienced, and his relative benevolence regarding French and Russian imperialism suggest the importance of personal as well as objective elements in his attitude. Abduh's biolgraphy relates that Afghani returned to Afghanistan and became a member of the government in the time of the Amir Dust Muhammad Khan. He claims that when the Amir marched to conquer Herat (in 1863), Jamal al-Dln accompanied him and stayed throughout the siege until the death of the Amir. In fact, Afghani first reached Afghanistan in 1866 and never knew the great Amir Dust Muhammad. It seems probable that Afghani was glorifying himself, and it is interesting that he assigns himself a military role which in reality he never played. He often encouraged others to war against the British, but did not IRANIAN STUDIES 98
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offer to participate in such a war. Abduh goes on to describe the Afghan civil wars that followed Dust Muhammad's death, and notes that when Dust Muhammad's son Aczam Khan became Amir, he made Jamal al-DIn his prime minister and followed his advice in all matters. When civil war broke out again, however, cAbduh says that the British helped Aczam's opponent Shir c Ali. Abdiih claims that Shir cAli treated Afghani well from fear that enthusiasm for Afghani's family, which belonged to the house of the Prophet, might excite a popular revolt. But the Amir spread lies about Afghani, and Afghani decided to leave Afghanistan. He requested authorization for the pilgrimage, and it was given to him with the proviso that he not pass through Iran, where A ^ a m Khan was. The above account mixes truth and falsehood. Jamal al-DIn entered Afghanistan in 1866 just as Aczam Khan was becoming Amir, and he met Aczam in Qandahar before he entered Kabul. In Afghanistan he was known to be a foreigner and claimed to be a Turk from Istanbul. According to reports reaching the British correspondent at Kabul, Afghani had secret papers with him; this presumably helped to gain the confidence of Aczam Khan. Jamal al-Din did become the Amir Aczam's most trusted adviser, although he was not given the title of Prime Minister as cAbduh claims. This is the first of several relationships which demonstrates the charismatic and magnetic power of Jamal alDin's personality and intellect. Jamal al-Dln's advice was to break ties with the British and to rely on Russian aid; the British suspected he was a Russian agent and in fact Afghani told someone that he was one near the end of his stay. This does not prove that he had become a Russian agent, however, since at least once later in his life when he was in Iran, Afghani falsely claimed to be a Russian emissary when he was not. The invention of protection by a foreign power was only one part of his pretensions to more grandiose roles for himself. Abduh's statement that the British helped Shir CA1I gain power is untrue. Also untrue is the notion that Shir c Ali treated Afghani well from fear of popular revolt; 99 SPRING-SUMMER 1976
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Afghani had no such widespread support. Nor did Afghani himself decide to leave Afghanistan; two of his letters in which he complained about lack of position and used equivocal expressions decided Shir C A1I to expel him. The statements that Afghani requested authorization for the pilgrimage and was forbidden to go through Iran are also untrue on the basis of existing documentation. The actual role of Afghani in Afghanistan is hidden in cAbduh's account taken as a whole. While there, as noted above, he called himself a Turk from Istanbul; he claimed, and possibly had, some form of foreign backing, and he spent his whole time promoting anti-British plans. While heavily occupied with political plans he also wrote religious and even Sufi fragments, though an Afghan who gave a report on him to the British said, "Apparently, he follows no particular religion. His style of living resembles more that of a European than of a Mussulman."? His true beliefs were then, as later, a matter of confusion for others, for he wrote a poem about himself in Kabul when he was under sentence of exile which said: The English people believe me a Russian (Rus) The Muslims think me a Zoroatrian (Majus) The Sunnis think me a Shii..(rafidi) And the Shi'is think me an enemy of Ali (nasibi) Some of the Friends of the Four Companions have believed me a Wah.ha.bi Some of the virtuous Imamites have imagined me a Babi The theists have imagined me a materialist The learned have considered me an unknowing ignoramus And the believers have thought me an unbelieving sinner . . . . 9 One can guess that Afghani was already presenting himself in a variety of guises to the public and that this led to the variety of charges regarding his beliefs and roles that he catalogs above. Among these are charges of unbelief or heresy, which must have been based on sentiments he expressed. IRANIAN STUDIES 100

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Also notable in this period is Afghani's talent for role-playing; although an unknown foreigner, he was able quickly to win over the Amir and become his most trusted and intimate advisor. Similar roles in relation to different individuals appear later in his life. When Amir Aczam was expelled, however, Afghani did not try to accompany him, but rather tried to ingratiate himself with Shir c Ali, telling him that he had never served Aczam willingly. He succeeded only briefly in this, however; Shir All's proBritish views opposed him to anyone with such an antiBritish reputation. Nonetheless, it is striking how readily Afghani could enter a country and quickly be on close terms with its leading figures, adapting his role and interests to the local situation. Abduh next describes Afghani's brief trips to India and Cairo, stressing his influence in both places. There is no independent documentation on these trips. He then describes Afghani's trip to Istanbul, where he says Afghani was well treated by the prime minister, cAli Pasha, and various other dignitaries; again there is as yet no evidence to prove or disprove this. cAbduh then discusses Afghani's appointment to the Council on Public Instruction where, he says, some of his ideas for disseminating scien- tific knowledge hurt the material interests of the Shaykh al-Islam Hasan Fehmi. The latter took revenge when Afghani gave a lecture on the crafts which had been approved and highly praised by various officials. The majority of Ottoman ministers came to the lecture. Hasan Fehmi wanted a pretext to discredit Afghani. cAbduh then quotes the contents of Afghani's speech, insists on its orthodoxy, and maintains that Hasan Fehmi invented lies about him when he charged that Afghani had called prophecy a craft. cAbduh says the newspapers discussed the subject at length, some supporting Afghani and some Hasan Fehmi. The prime minister ordered Afghani to leave Istanbul for a few months until people became calm; he could then return. This account is essentially a cover-up for an incident in which Afghani was attacked for heresyan event embarrassing to him in later years when he was trying to present himself as a pious Muslim. It also reflects 101 SPRING-SUMMER 1976
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Afghani's self-aggrandizement. There is no evidence of his having had contact with ministers; even the minister of public instruction, on whose council he served, refers to him as "an Afghan of unknown ideas and circumstances." It is unlikely that Hasan Fehmi wanted to discredit Afghani; many persons on the Council of Public Instruction were more advanced than Afghani in their ideas, and they were not attacked as cAbdtih claims Afghani was. As Niyazi Berkes has shown, the real target of the ulama was not Afghani, but the new secular university under whose auspices he gave his public lecture. It is improbable that the lecture had been approved in advance by high dignitaries and even more improbable that numerous ministers attended. A reconstruction from contemporary sources indicates that Afghani did call prophecy a craft and took an essentially philosophic and pragmatic view of religion, even though he also made statements on the superiority of prophecy to philosophy. The only two newspaper accounts of the incident in Afghani's papers are extremely brief, and mention him incidentally in an account of the dismissal of the head of the university. The documents also indicate that Afghani was simply expelled from the Ottoman Empire without any suggestion of a return in the near future.10 The stay in Istanbul shows Afghani's adaptation to a new role of reformer-educator. In the Ottoman Empire there was little use for his anti-British politics, and so he revealed another side of his multi-faceted personality. Abduh goes on to discuss Afghani's long stay in Egypt (1871-1879), noting his teaching and training students to write. Some people envied him, cAbduh says, and to calumniate him seized on the fact that he taught from philosophy books. They imputed to him the views in these books and spread this idea among the people. They were aided by men who came to Afghani's sessions, heard without understanding, and distorted what he taught. This again is an apologetic account designed to dismiss the widespread reputation for unorthodoxy or unbelief that Afghani had gained in Egypt. In this country Afghani IRANIAN STUDIES 102
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adapted a new role as a teacher and then as a figure in mass politics, which cAbduh does not mention. He helped and encouraged his students and disciples to edit newspapers with a political content, and, as the Egyptian crisis intensified in the late 1870s, he became a popular mass orator, as well as the head of an important freemasonic society which he used for political purposes. He was in contact with the heir-apparent to the khedivate, Tawfiq, and he and cAbduh plotted to assassinate the Khedive Ismacil and put Tawfiq on the throne. However, Isma.cIl was deposed by French and British pressure in 1879 and Tawfiq was heavily dependent on the will of the French and the British. According to cAbduh, those who calumniated the Sayyid had no influence among intelligent men, and all favored Afghani until the accession of Tawfiq. The Sayyid had supported him, but certain detractors, including the English consul-general, intrigued against him with Tawfiq. Calumniators made false accusations against Afghani and changed Tawfiq1s opinion of him; consequently Tawfiq ordered his expulsion. While it is true that Afghani had enemies who influenced Tawfiq, it is also true that Afghani was, at this time, delivering fiery speeches against the foreigners, and continuing his secret political masonic work, so that Tawfiq had reason to want to be rid of him. The mention of the British' consul is paralleled by other charges made by Afghani to the effect that the British persecuted him repeatedly. British documents evince no special concern about: Afghani, and there is no evidence that the British played any important role in his expulsion; indeed, in personal letters Afghani attributes this role rather to one of his Egyptian enemies. cAbduh's emphasis on jealousy and enemies reappears in Afghani's words. He often refers to jealous and lying enemies who calumniated and mistreated him, and were responsible for his political failures. Abdiih then tells how Afghani went to Hyderabad, India, where he wrote the "Refutation of the Materialists." At the time of the(cUrabi) revolt in Egypt he was called 103 SPRING-SUMMER 1976
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to Calcutta, where the government of India guarded him until the British victory in Egypt. He was then allowed to go where he wished and went briefly to London, then to Paris. It was during this time that Afghani tried to take on an Islamic and pan-Islamic coloring. The "Refutation" should be seen as essentially a political tract, directed against the pro-British Muslim Indian reformist, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his followers. In a later article Afghani attacked Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his followers directly as tools of the British who were undermining their own nation. Afghani's defense of Islam is largely for the purpose of using it as an instrument; Islam is a tool to produce political solidarity and other social virtues. If mass confidence in it is undermined, Indian Muslims will adopt the beliefs of their conquerors and become completely subservient to them. Al-cUrwa al-Wuthqa gave an interpretation of Islam stressing values that Afghani and Abduh considered modern Muslims might need, such as solidarity, military strength, and self-confidence. At the same time, it contained articles against British rule in Muslim lands and became the chief organ of the idea of pan-Islam, the union of all Muslims around the Sultan-Caliphat that time Sultan cAbd al-Hamid II. Until then Afghani had concentrated on the problems of each individual Muslim country in which he found himself, but he now adopted the pan-Islamic ideal that had first been put forth in the Ottoman Empire, and became its chief publicist. He gave leadership to the increasingly defensive and anti-European mood of the Muslim world, spurred partly by European victories in the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia, and Egypt. Like increasing numbers of Muslims, he felt that Islamic unity was necessary to ward off further encroachments. At the same time there is clear evidence that, despite his defense of Islam and pan-Islam, internally Afghani did not become more orthodox. In his "Answer to Renan," written in Paris in 1883 in French and directed at a French audience, Afghani makes a variety of negative statements about the Muslim religion, stating in conclusion: IRANIAN STUDIES 104

It is permissible, however, to ask oneself why Arab civilization, after having thrown such a lively light on the world, suddenly became extinguished, why this torch has not been relit since, and why the Arab world still remains buried in profound darkness. Here the responsibility of the Muslim religion appears complete. It is clear that wherever it became established this religion tried to stifle science and it was marvelously served in its designs by despotism . . . . . . . As long as humanity exists, the struggle will not cease between dogma and free investigation, between religion and philosophy; a desperate struggle in which, I fear, the triumph will not be for free thought, because the masses dislike reason and its teachings are only understood by some intelligences of the elite, and because, also, science, however beautiful it is, does not completely satisfy humanity, which thirsts for the ideal and which likes to exist in dark and distant regions which the philosophers and scholars can neither perceive nor explore. H Afghani here states both his preference for philosophy over religion and also his conviction that philosophy is only for the elite, and that the masses can be appealed to only in religious terms. This partly explains why he made more religious appeals when trying to reach a large audience. Abduh touches lightly on the events between the end of al-cUrwa al-Wuthqa late in 1884 and Afghani's return to Iran in 1886. In fact, this was a period in which Afghani did some new role-playing, and managed to convince the British poet and Arabophile Wilfrid Blunt, the Parisian socialist editor Henri Rochefort, and others that he was the European agent of the Sudanese Mahdi, with whom he in fact had not the slightest contact. Afghani also estabc

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lished contact with Sultan cAbd al-Hamid through two Egyptian disciples who entered the Sultan's circle in Istanbul. Afghani apparently hoped that the Sultan would use him in his pan-Islamic program; as previously, he was searching for a ruler to whom he could be a trusted adviser. The usual version that it was Sultan cAbd al-Hamid who first opened relations between them is false; rather Afghani made the preliminary overtures. Blunt also brought Afghani to London and introduced him to Randolph Churchill and Sir Henry Drummond Wolff. Wolff was about to go to Istanbul to try to negotiate British withdrawal from Egypt on terms favorable to Great Britain, and Blunt wanted Afghani to accompany him. Afghani was afraid to go without guarantees that the Sultan would not give, and Wolff eventually decided that taking Afghani would be a mistake. Having spent his whole life as an opponent of the British, Afghani now almost entered into British employ (although for a goal near his heart--the evacuation of Egypt) and this incident has been taken by some in the Near East as evidence that Afghani was a British spy for his whole life. This period was also that of his one known sexual liaison, with a young German woman in Paris. French police reports tell how Afghani was forced to vacate his premises by his landlord because he brought this woman to live with him, and his landlord considered her a German spy. The landlord, a certain Paolini, said that the woman, Catherine, made Jamil al-Din succumb to her desire to enter into intimate relations with him. Later correspondence from Catherine to Jamal al-Din reveals strong affection on her side, but since he did not even open her last two letters, it is doubtful that it was fully reciprocated. In general, Jamal al-Din's affects were wholly tied up with his political missions. His personal bonds were nearly all to meneither to his devoted disciples, who wrote to him and addressed him in worshipful terms, or to powerful figures who were likely to help him achieve his goals. With both groups he would often break off his relations. With the powerful, this break was often a result of Jamal al-Din's attempting to play two roles at once that of adviser to rulers and that of arouser of the masses IRANIAN STUDIES 106

or educated groups to political action. Since rulers like Tawfiq, and later the Shah of Iran, were afraid of local political activity, they broke with Jamal al-DIn, as did Sultan cAbd al-Hamld. Jamal al-DIn is reported as being hostile or uncomfortable in discussions concerning women, and particularly hostile to the idea of marriage. In the 1884-1885 period, Jamal al-DIn's multiple role:-playing caused him trouble, since he was simultaneously presenting himself as a partisan of the Sultan-Caliph and as the agent of the Sudanese Mahdi, whose Mahdist claims the Sultan opposed. In addition he was working with the British, and Blunt records that Jamal al-DIn agreed to support his scheme for an Arab caliph. As a result, the Sultan, whom Afghani wanted to influence, became very suspicious of Afghani both as a partisan of the Mahdi and of the scheme he believed to have widespread British backing, for establishing an Arab caliphate. In some cases, then, Afghani's multiple role-playing was selfdefeating and aroused suspicions.
c Abdiih, writing in 1886, concludes with some generalizations about Afghani, who, he says, was the most zealous man he had ever seen for preserving the principles of the Sunni Hanifite rite. There are many stories that contradict this statement, including one of Afghani's deliberately Skipping the time of prayer after being reminded of it several times by a member of his Istanbul circle; on the other hand, Afghani clearly wished to present himself as an orthodox Muslim. At the same time that cAbduh was writing, however, Afghani was presenting himself as an orthodox Shi'i in Iran.

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Abduh goes on to a summary encomium of Afghani but notes his violent temperament, with anger often ruining what prudence had built. H After 1886 there is no single standard biography like cAbduh's, but Afghani's version of these years has been incorporated into the accounts of Rashid Rida, Jurji Zaydan, Muhammad al-Makhzumi, and others. Afghani stated that he was invited to Iran by Nasir al-DIn Shah, who want107 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

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ed him to be either prime minister or minister of war, and to codify Iran's laws. In fact, he passed through Iran on the way to Russiathe minister of press did convince the Shah to invite him to Tehran after he reached southern Iran but he had only one interview with the Shah and there was no offer of any high post or duty. According to a brother of the Shah's, Jamal al-DIn frightened the Shah by offering himself as a "sharp sword" to be used against the Shah's foreign enemiesAfghani later used the same suggestive phrase to the Ottoman Sultan. After a few months, the Shah suggested to Afghani's host that he take him out of Iran, and this he did. Of his subsequent stay in Russia in 1887-1889, Afghani spoke little except to relate conversations he had had with the Tsar, and to say that the Shah and his ministers tried to see him in St. Petersburg when they came there in 1889, but that he refused. The available evidence shows that Afghani never met the Tsar, and he definitely did not see the Shah or his prime minister, despite his efforts to do so. He did manage to meet with them in Munich, however, and said that they gave him a mission to return to Russia to improve Russo-Iranian relations, then at a low point because of Iranian concessions to the British. The prime minister firmly denied any such mission. On his return to Iran, Jamal al-DIn claimed that the prime minister had invited himwhich the prime minister himself denied and that he was under the protection of the Russians. They in turn denied this. While in Russia, Afghani was trying to convince the Russians to go to war with the British, which he thought would bring about an anti-British uprising in India. He had already suggested the idea of war as a solution to Muslim problems years before in a petition encouraging a RussoBritish war, and in his support for the Mahdi. Wars, assassinations, and violent plots were part of his approach to solving the problems of the Muslim worldan approach that revealed the hasty temperament noted by cAbduh, rather than a desire to work gradually to spread his ideas.

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A story told by a Muslim who knew Afghani in Russia suggests the lengths to which Afghani would go to attract the attention of the powerful. Afghani had asked him to reserve a box at the opera near the Tsar's box, and after the performance Afghani began to say his prayers in a loud voice. Everyone, including the Tsar and his family, noticed him, and a general was sent to stop him, but to no avail. The very next story related by the same author recounts how Afghani missed the time of prayer at one gathering, despite the pleas of one of those present; thus the point of the first story is not his punctiliousness about sayi.ng his prayers. Back in Iran Afghani was bitter that the prime minister, who he said had given him a mission in Russia, would not see him. Probably Afghani did not always distinguish reality from his own exaggerations and his indignation was genuine. After some months Afghani discovered that the Shah intended to expel him, and so took refuge in a shrine near Tehran, where he continued to talk to his disciples. After some threatening leaflets denouncing the government's sale of Iran to foreigners were distributed in the capital, the Shah blamed them on Jamal al-Din, and sent soldiers who violated his sanctuary and escorted him into the Iraqi border. Jamal al-Din was far more bitter against the Shah than against any of his other persecutors except the British, and he began to plan revenge. In letters written during his trip, he compares himself to the early Shi'i martyrs and his persecutors to the victors over the Imam Husayn, adding, "Now one must await the wonders of the Divine Power." Similarly, in a letter to Riyad Pasha in 1883, Afghani attributed the troubles that had recently befallen Egypt to retribution for his own mistreatment.^ He did not attempt revenge on his Egyptian enemies, however, whereas he did work against both the Shah, and his prime minister, Amin al-Sultan. It is possible that the role of the Shah as a father-figure in his own homeland made him an object of special resentment. His exalted view of himself as a martyred instrument of destiny whose injuries would be revenged also deserves notice.

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To Iranian associates Jamal al-DIn admitted his Iranian origin, probably because it would make him more effective in Iran. He disliked being publicly reminded of his origins in Asadabad, however. In Iran, as in Egypt, he was a pioneer in setting up a secret political society, and in suggesting methods of anti-imperialist political activity, such as secretly distributed leaflets and placards. Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 10:31 30 April 2013 Soon after Afghani reached Iraq, the Iranian movement against a British-owned Iranian tobacco monopoly began. Afghani wrote a famous letter to the head of the Shi'i ulama denouncing the Iranian government for its sale of Iran's resources to foreigners. Many biographies credit this letter with influencing the Shi'i leader's later declaration of a boycott on tobacco, and present Afghani as the chief figure in the successful tobacco movement, but in fact the activity of the Iranian ulama was more important in both developments. In this letter, as in his Iranian period, Afghani expressed himself as a pious Shi'i. From Iraq Afghani went to England, where he gave talks and wrote articles against the Shah and his government. While there, he was invited to go to Sultan cAbd al-Hamld's court at Istanbul and, after some hesitation, accepted. The letters of invitation blamed Afghani for writing items hostile to the caliphate in the British press, and other evidence shows that the Sultan still suspected Afghani of anti-caliphal activities. For a while he was well treated by the Sultan, but then various incidents lost him the Sultan's favor. One of these was his meeting with the new Egyptian khedive, cAbbas Hilmi, which c Abd al-Hamid associated, possibly correctly, with plans to establish an Arab caliphate under Egyptian protection. At no time during his stay in Istanbul was Afghani permitted to publish anything, and his political activity was limited to encouraging a group of Shi'i disciples to write to the Shi'i ulama in order to obtain their support for the Sultan-Caliph. Aside from this, Afghani had a varying circle of followers to whom he spoke mainly with highly exaggerated versions of his past life and influence.

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Disciples in this period record stories of his aversion to women and his hostility to the liberation of women, which contrasted with his reformism in other areas. When the Sultan wanted to give him a wife, he turned down the suggestion violently and threatened to cut off his own "organ of procreation" if the Sultan persisted. Those who heard him vrere amazed at his words. Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 10:31 30 April 2013 Jamal al-Din's Iranian servant, Mirza Ri.za, came to see him in Istanbul after being released from jail, where he had been incarcerated for political acts, and Jamal alDin encouraged him to return to Iran and kill the Shah. Mirzfi Riza successfully carried out the assassination. Jamal al-Din denied all connection with the deed and Iranian efforts to extradite him were resisted by the Sultan. The following year, 1897, Jamal al-Din died in Istanbul of cancer of the jaw. Afghani's role in awakening Muslims to anti-imperialist, reformist, and pan-Islamic political activity through writings, teachings, speeches, and political organizations was a major pioneering one. Only the briefest account of his ideas can be given in this type of paper, but it is apparent that they were often new and have continued to be influential to the present day. He was a bold and forceful leader who made his mark on a widening circle of Muslims.

Ill The history of wandering, role-playing, fabrication, and a martyred and exalted self-view sketched above constitutes a special type of personality. Some of the Islamic and Iranian background of Jamal al-Din's personality was suggested at the beginning of this article, but even as an Iranian Jamal al-Din's personality is special. Some degree of imposture may be a national trait: Malkum Khan, Jamal al-Din's reformist associate, was known for it, and invented stories for Blunt regarding his founding a new religion of vast proportions and his influence on the Shah. Jamal al-Din, however, went beyond the usual bounds. Some light on his personality can be shed by the work of psychi111 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

atrists or those who have used psychiatric insights. Although the application of these ideas to Afghani is highly tentative, the ideas themselves are often suggestive. Erik Erikson writes of a study of reformers and ideological innovators: "Basic to their zeal (we found) is an infantile 'account to settle.'"14 in another work he speaks of those who are hostile to and deny their national identity, giving the example of a girl who invented a Scottish childhood because of a British woman who had loved her more than her parents had. Erikson claims: "The force behind the near-delusional power of the invented 'truth' was in turn a death wish against her parents, which is latent in all severe identity crises."15 Otto Rank's The Myth of the Birth of the Hero contains examples of numerous myths, including several Persian ones, in which a king or hero is brought up by someone other than his parents, often returning home to conquer lands, and sometimes even to kill the king. Regarding these myths, Rank says: "The old saying that 'A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country and in his father's house,1 has no other meaning but that he whose parents, brothers and sisters, or playmates, are known to us, is not so readily conceded to be a prophet. There seems to ., be a certain necessity for the prophet to deny his parents." Rank says that feelings of neglect result in the fantasy of being a stepchild or adopted. He notes that among children hostile to their parents, ambitious daydreams of getting rid of them and substituting those of higher social rank are common. The myth of the hero is a paranoid structure, as is dividing the parents into two sets of good and evil parents. The hero does not want a family. Hero myths, says Rank, are often similar to the delusions of persecution and grandeur of paranoids. Rank also sees every revolutionary as originally a rebel against his father. There is a transfer of hatred from the father to the king. 17 Erikson and Rank thus suggest that hatred and a death wish toward the father are behind such traits as IRANIAN STUDIES 112

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denial of one's own parents and country. Jamal al-Din's almost total neglect of his family and his failure even to talk about them suggest the relevancy of this interpretation. His indirect "killing of the king" of Iran, preceded by hatred and a desire for vengeance may also have been partly due to hostile feelings toward his father one basis of his revolutionary activity. In the absence of more childhood data, such an interpretation is, of course, speculative. More light on these points is shed by Harold Lasswell's Psychopathology and Politics. One section of this work is a discussion of political agitators, based on a close personal analysis of several of them. Lasswell notes that the essential mark of an agitator is the high value he places on the emotional response of the public. The agitator exaggerates the change that will come from an alteration in policy. "The agitator easily infers that he who disagrees with him is in communion with the devil, and that opponents show bad faith or timidity." He frequently neglects his family. Agitators were found to be indifferent to property and lacking in sexual possessiveness. They frequently manifest a hostility to their father, and sometimes to the whole family, which is transmuted into a desire for human brotherhoodreplacing the brotherhood not found at home. Agitators are highly verbal, as could be expected, and often good at writing. Some tend to develop close relationships easily, but then break them off in an atmosphere of mistrust. This is tied to fear of sexual ties to a person of the same sex. Some suffer from fears of impotency and nearly all were found to have a strong latent homosexual component. They were often paranoid. Their sexual lives showed varying degrees of maladjustment. Orator types, adds Lasswell, are often successful impostors. Some agitators have a desire for martyrdom, which Lasswell views as a "feminine" characteristic. 18 Many of these characteristics fit Afghani, despite the cultural difference between him and the persons Lasswell was studying. His highly verbal character is manifested in both his speeches and his numerous teaching and 113 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

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and discussion circles, in which he did most of the talking. His exaggeration of the change that would come from following his formulas and his hostility to any opponents certainly conform to the personality model, as does his tendency to develop close ties and then abruptly break off relations. It is also clear that Afghani had at least a moderate case of paranoia. Many of his letters and conversations are full of complaints about persons whom he thought were unjustly persecuting him, and he had the delusions of grandeur common to paranoiacsbelieving, for example, that God or fate would take revenge on his enemies for their mistreatment of him. He often saw himself as a martyr. Freud believed that paranoid delusions of persecution were a mechanism to ward off homosexual wishes.-^ In a symposium on the Schreber case, which formed the basis of Freud's theory of paranoia, some psychiatrists denied the universality of latent homosexuality in paranoia, while others affirmed it. One psychiatrist thought that Schreber1s homosexual tendencies were mainly a defense mechanism against a wish to kill and a dread of being killed by the father figure. He wrote that the assumed aggressor was almost always an authority figure.20 In an interesting paper, R. P. Knight states that an intense homosexual conflict is never absent in the male paranoiac. The paranoid also has an abnormal need to be loved, and in his battle against his supposed persecutors he tries to appeal to the loyalty and affection of all his friends and acquaintances, and even to prominent strangers. When they do not respond as he has expected, they are placed in the category of persecutors; there is a hostile element in his "love" for them. The drive to love, and be loved by, the object of the homosexual wish is supported by an intense need to neutralize a tremendous unconscious hate. This unconscious hatred is considered to be traceable to hatred for the father.^1 Thus there are numerous psychiatric descriptions of traits found in Afghani in which hatred of the father IRANIAN STUDIES 114

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acts as a triggering mechanism. We probably will never know enough about Afghani's early family life to verify this hypothesis, but his later behavior suggests that it may well be true. As for ascribing to him a latent homosexuality, this idea upset many who first read it, but Afghani's whole life style and attitude point in this direction. There is nothing to suggest that it was more than latent, but he had extremely close ties to men, while he avoided women for most of his life and expressed negative attitudes toward them. In addition to sub-clinical paranoia, Afghani showed signs of a related psychological traitimpostorship. In two articles on impostorship, Phyllis Greenacre, discussing both famous historical impostors and impostors whom she has treated, finds them to be dominated by the "family romance" (the Oedipal struggle), to have an intense disturbance of the sense of identity, and a malformation of the superego. For a typical impostor an audience is essential. As children they tend to be doted on by their mothers and have an aggravated fear of and hostility toward their fathers. They seem to seek confirmation of their assumed identity in order to overcome a sense of incompleteness. "Insofar as the imposture is accomplished, it is the killing of the father through the complete displacement of him."22 The public is seen as taking the place of the doting mother. All four of the cases Greenacre analyzed had some impairment of sexual potency and marked passive homosexual trends. Greenacre also notes that imposture is often related to paranoid conditions (especially with founders of religious cults). The impostor symbolically overthrows the king-father and takes his place. Large-scale imposture is, she says, most successful in times of disturbed or near-revolutionary social conditions, when people are looking for a saviour. The impostor cannot love, and has a craving for applause, recognition, and power.23 Helene Deutsch also writes of the impostor as one with a doting mother and a tyrannical or absent father.2^ Afghani may also have been a pathological liar, though many of his lies had political motives. A patho115 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

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logical liar is one who does not completely distinguish truth from his lies about himselfso much so that the lies cannot be detected by a lie detector. The lies are usually screen stories for actual occurrencescertainly the case with Afghani. Fantasy presented as reality may help entrench repression of unpleasant memories, and may be a form of revenge for having been deceived about sex or other matters. A strong need to increase self-esteem and to take revenge on adults for earlier disappointments are believed by one author to be common to pathological liars.25 In an earlier summary statement on pathological lying, Otto Fenichel, quoting another author, says that the formula of the liar may be phrased: "If it is possible to make people believe that unreal things are real, it is also possible that real things, the very memory of which is menacing, are unreal." He says Helene Deutsch "has proved that the content of pseudologia [pathological lies] consists of screen stories of something that actually happened. They are comparable to national myths _fi which also contain historical facts, falsified by wishes. The themes of early mistreatment and denial of his past, especially of his childhood, are certainly very obvious in Afghani. Denial of one's true origins along with grandiose statements about the present and recent past are characteristics of Afghani frequently found in both impostors and pathological liars. No more than with the case of paranoia can we say with certainty what was the familial basis of Afghani's character, but what is known about his childhood and later behavior conforms to the general patterns discussed in the psychoanalytic literature. Afghani, of course, was not a psychopath, but an effectively functioning leader. The danger of this type of analysis is that it may seem reductionist, in that reduces the chief characteristics of leading individuals to traits, and often negative traits, that go back to their early childhood. Also, the concentration on neurotic traits among reformers and re-

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volutionaries may appear to denigrate their humanitarian goals. What distinguishes a prominent leader like Afghani from the innumerable other persons who break with their families is a strength of character and intelligence that enables them to turn a difficult situation to advantage. Afghani was able to turn away from the passive acceptance of authorities characteristic in the Muslim world of his time and to recognize the oppressiveness of rule by the British, by the Khedive and the Shah. He was also intelligent enough to encourage the use of new methods of political agitation in the East. He recognized the appeal of religion for most Muslims, and pioneered in wedding religion to reformist and anti-imperialist politics. PanIslam joined religion to a political, proto-nationalist aim. Such religiously tinged nationalism has been successful in arousing the masses in countries ruled or threatened by imperialismIndia (Tilak, Ghandhi, etc.); Pakistan (Jinnah); Ireland, and nineteenth century Eastern Europe. Jamil al-Dln thus utilized many effective tools to awaken and enlighten a varying group of followers. Afghani tried to influence almost everyone with whom he had contactrulers, disciples, masses, Europeans. Near the end of his life, however, he saw his error in having tried to influence rulers. From prison he wrote to a Persian friend: Would that I had sown all the seed of my ideas in the receptive ground of the people's thoughts! Well would it have been had I not wasted this fruitful and beneficent seed of mine in the salt and sterile soil of that effete Sovereignty! For what I sowed in that soil never grew, and what I planted in that brackish earth perished away. During all this time none of my well-intentioned counsels sank into the ears of the rulers of the East, whose selfishness and ignorance prevented them from accepting my words.27 In addition to his pioneering role in reformism, anti-imperialism and political activism, Afghani looked forward to a type of politics that would rely more heavily 117 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

on activity by the masses. He was able to use creatively Islamic traditions in new ways, and adapted them to political necessities of reform, self-strengthening, and independence. His intelligence, psychology, writings, and political activity endowed him with an ever-growing reputation and influence in the Muslim world. Although parts of this influence may be seen as negative, his role in the political awakening of the Middle East cannot be denied. Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 10:31 30 April 2013

NOTES 1. The Times, August 30, 1879, and September 8, 1879, quoted in Nikki R. Keddie, Sayyid Jama.1 ad-Din "al Afghani": A Political Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 116-118. (Henceforth cited as Afghani.) Points about Afghani's life not footnoted below are discussed and documented in this biography. On traditions of esoterism and dissimulation in Islam, see Nikki R. Keddie, "Symbol and Sincerity in Islam," Studia Islamica, XIX (1973), 27-63. See Nikki R. Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism," Comparative Studies in Society and History, IV, No. 3 (April 1962), 265-295, and the sources discussed therein. Iraj Afshar and Asghar Mahdavi, Majmu'ah'i asnad va madarik-i chap nashudah dar barah'i Sayyid Jamal alD m mashhur bi Afghani (Documents inedits concernant Seyyed Jamal al-Din Afghani) (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1963). (Henceforth cited as Documents.) These were used effectively in the first very good biography of Afghini, Homa Pakdaman, Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani (Paris, 1969). I was not entirely surprised to find that the reviews of my first book on Afghani, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Views of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), were divided 118

2.

3.

4.

5.

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neatly into two categories: the non-Muslim reviews were all favorable and the Muslim reviews all unfavorable. This occurred despite the fact that the book is not hostile to Afghani. 6. 7. Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 10:31 30 April 2013 Keddie, Afghani, pp. 33-35, and Documents. Afghani, p. 16, citing Khatirat-i Hajji Sayyah (Tehran: Ibn-i Sina, 1967/68), pp. 290-291. Mirza Riza almost surely referred to Afghani as the Mahdi during his cross-examination after assassinating the Shah. See E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), p. 82 and n.; and Afghani, p. 406 n.

8. Afghani, p. 45, citing the Government of India's " "Cabul Diary." 9. 10. Afghani, p. 54, citing Documents. Afghani, pp. 58-80; and Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 181-188. Afghani, p. 193; from Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Refutation des materialistes, trans, by A.-M. Goichon (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1942), pp. 184-185. Muhammad cAbduh, "Biographie," in Afghani, Refutation, pp! 31-57; these last points are on pp. 48-52. Afghani, pp. 333, 437, from Documents. Erik Erikson, Insight and Responsibility (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), p. 202. Erik Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), p. 174. Otto Rank, The Myth of the Bi^rth of the Hero and Other Writings, ed. by Philip Freund (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), p. 66. 119 SPRING-SUMMER 1976

11.

12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

17. Rank, The Myth, p. 95. . 18. Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (new ed.; New York: Viking Press, 1960), ch. VI. 19. Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, III, trans, by Alix and James Strachey (New York: International PsychoAnalytical Press, 1959), p. 444.
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20. "Symposium on 'Reinterpretations of the Schreber Case: Freud's Theory of Paranoia,1" International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XLIV (January 1963), pp. 191-223. 21. R. P. Knight, "The Relationship of Latent Homosexuality to the Mechanism of Paranoid Delusions," Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, IV (1940), 149-159. Phyllis Greenacre, Emotional Growth (New York: International University Press, 1971), I, p. 104. Greenacre, Emotional Growth, II, pp. 533-554.

22. 23.

24. Helene Deutsch, "The Impostor: Contribution to Ego Psychology of a Type of Psychopath," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XXXIV, No. 5, pp. 483-505. 25. Thomas V. Hoyer, "Pseudologia Fantastica," typescript, Brentwood Veterans Administration Hospital, Los Angeles, 1957. 26. Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1945). Many thanks to my colleague Peter Loewenberg and to Dr. Marshall Cherkas for the psychoanalytic references. E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution 1905-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), 28-29.

27.

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