Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
CONFRONTING
MEMORIES OF
WORLD WAR II
E u ro pe a n a n d As ia n L e g ac i e s
Edited by
Daniel Ch irot,
Gi-Wo ok Sh in,
and
Daniel Sneider
ISBN 978-0-295-99346-1
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CONFRONTING
MEMORIES OF
WORLD WAR II
Edited by
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U n i v e r si t y of Wa sh i ngt on Pr e s s
Seattle and London
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Publication of this book was made possible in part by subventions from the
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, the
Job and Gertrud Tamaki Professorship in International Studies at the University
of Washington, and the Herbert J. Ellison Professorship of Russian and
Eurasian Studies at the University of Washington.
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Contents
Acknowledgments
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Introduction
Daniel Chirot, Gi-Wook Shin, and Daniel Sneider
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Acknowledgments
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Introduction
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In 2013, hardly a day went by without some mention in many leading news
media throughout the world of the dispute between China and Japan over
a set of tiny islands variously called Senkaku by Japan, which owns them,
and Diaoyu by China, which claims them. Typical is the story in the New
York Times on February 28, 2013, that mentions not only the increasing
tension between the two countries but also the fact that Japans prime minister, Shinzo Abe, had supposedly compared the situation to the Falkland
Islands dispute between Argentina, which called these Atlantic islands
Malvinas, and their owner, the United Kingdom, in 1982.1
The year 1982 was when Argentinas vicious military dictators whipped
up ultranationalist passions to cover up their incompetence and cruelty by
making an issue over some trivial islands seven hundred kilometers from
southern Argentina settled by British fishermen 150 years earlier. Argentina invaded, there was a short war, and hundreds of soldiers on both sides
died. Argentina suffered a humiliating defeat, but, as a result, its military
dictatorship collapsed.
There are some similarities in both cases but also alarming differences, because a war between China and Japan over a few uninhabited
rocks in the Pacific could turn into a major disaster. In both cases, however, reawakened old histories brought up by regimes seeking to bolster
their legitimacy, wounded pride about the past, and memories of colonial
annexations by a formerly great power, now in reduced circumstances,
played key roles. In East Asia in 2013, however, there is a more recent historical memory that has been brought into playthat is, World War II.
This East Asian confrontation, which has been heating up for several years, is all the more meaningful because it is hardly the only one to
involve memories of past outrages, wounded honor, and national pride in
this region. As several of the essays in our book point out, there is also an
almost equally bitter dispute between South Korea and Japan over some
islands in the sea between them and the meaning of Japanese imperialism
in the first half of the twentieth century when it colonized Korea. These are
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the Dokdo (in Korean) or Takeshima (in Japanese) islands. Though strategically far less dangerous than the Chinese-Japanese conflict, the dispute
between South Korea and Japan also brings up historical memories and
nationalist outrage in both countries.
How could it be that history and memory play such an important role?
Even if there are contemporary economic and strategic reasons for such
territorial issues, all of them, including various Japanese claims to some
northern islands now controlled by Russia and Chinese claims to a vast
part of the South China Sea, could be negotiated peacefully but are far
more serious because they have been linked to contested historical interpretations of late nineteenth- to mid-twentieth-century wars.
This situation is all the more surprising because in most (though not all)
parts of Europe, as we shall see, memories of the great and hugely destructive wars of the twentieth century, and especially World War II when Germany occupied most of Europe, slaughtering millions and causing almost
unfathomable ruin, are no longer highly contested. Nor are there any territorial issues between Germany and its neighbors, though there well could
have been. Why is it that in Europe there is a widespread perception that
justice, however that may be defined, has been more or less done, and
reconciliation between previously bitter enemies has been possible, while
in East Asia, historical memories are reaching a critical point not really
seen before? Why is it that in Asia angry memories have been reawakened
so strongly, whereas in Europe the opposite would seem to be the case?
Such questions are relevant for many parts of the world, and the general
issue of how history is interpreted, how it is used and manipulated, and
how nationalist versions can play a very emotional role is a huge one.
In this book we will look at these kinds of controversies as they pertain
to what was the bloodiest war in history, at least in terms of absolute numbers of deaths, World War II. We will explain why there is such a perceived
contrast between European and Asian memories, but also why close attention to detail shows that the contrast is not quite as great as superficial
generalizations would suggest.
The Pacific part of the war is sometimes said to have begun as early as
1931, when Japan conquered Manchuria, and if not then, in 1937 when it
invaded the rest of China, but Japans imperial expansion and seizure of
territories began well before then, in the Sino-Japanese War of 189495 and
the subjugation of Korea in 1905. These come up in the revived historical
memories and bitterness that now afflict the region. In Europe, World War
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II began in 1939, but if there were anything like the anger China and Korea
direct at Japan, there is no doubt that some Western European nationalists, particularly the French, would be associating this terrible war with
German aggression in 1914 and even Prussias invasion of France in 1870.
Yet, even as China makes claims against Japan based on Japans past
aggression, and both South Korea and China demand further Japanese
apologies, it seems completely impossible that there could be any territorial
dispute between France and Germany today. While memories of World
War II continue to produce countless histories, films, personal accounts,
and works of fiction even as the last survivors are quickly dying of old
age, nasty conflicts over what actually happened, who was responsible, and
what should now be done occur only rarely and do not get connected to
major issues of international relations. Germany is not making any claims
to regain the substantial territories it lost as result of its twentieth-century
wars, and none of its neighbors have claims against it. In fact, in Europe it
is only in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union that there are boundary
issues tied to historical memories, and these have little to do with Germanys role in history. Why, then, do such matters come up in East Asia,
with Japan as a focus for anger and recrimination?
There are some pat explanations. Germanyat least West Germany
(but not Communist East Germany, which existed from 1949 to 1990)
apologized for Nazi crimes. Japan never really made such an admission,
or so it is widely believed. Upon closer examination, this turns out to be
a vast simplification and leaves out the fact that the Germans could never
have killed so many, and especially could not have carried out the genocide
of Jews, if it had not been helped by collaborators all over the territories it
occupied or with which it was allied during World War II. It also neglects
the fact that Japanese leaders have apologized, as both Gi-Wook Shins and
Daniel Sneiders essays in this book show. But somehow, it is felt, with good
reason, as these two essays and Thomas Bergers demonstrate, that Japans
apologies have not been considered to be heartfelt.
Another obvious complication in the nice, simple story about a deeply
remorseful Germany and an arrogant, unrepentant Japan is that Germanys change of heart was hardly immediate, and as both Daniel Chirots
and Julian Jacksons chapters explain, it was not matched for a long time
by any repentance on the part of those who collaborated with the Germans, including very notably the French state, which took a half century
to come to grips with how its officials worked with the Germans and barely
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Minister Abe, are even now talking about taking back the limited apologies made in the past such as the Kono Statement of 1993.4
We should be perfectly clear. The possibility that a German chancellor, or Austrian president, or the leader of any state that was allied or collaborated with Germany during World War II would take a position like
Abes over the meaning of World War II is completely unthinkable. On the
other hand, in all fairness, it has to be said that Russias president, Vladimir Putin, and his political allies, including the highly nationalist Russian
Orthodox Church, have made former tyrant Joseph Stalin once more a
nationalist hero.5
But despite Japans culpability, or that of many of its conservatives who
have whitewashed Japans imperial and aggressive record, is this really the
cause of the growing conflict over some East Asian islands? Some would
say that it is, but the chapters of this book raise doubts by showing that,
first of all, these kinds of historical controversies have not been constant
and in this particular case have only heated up relatively recently. Second,
the pessimistic but convincing chapter by Gilbert Rozman puts the entire
matter in a very different light. His contention is that Chinese official historians since about 1990 have been systematically rewriting Asian and
even world history to legitimize growing Chinese big power claims. As he
shows, in topics ranging from the ancient kingdom of Koguryo, claimed
by the Koreans as one of their ancestral realms but now said by Chinese
historians to have been Chinese, to claims that Chinas domination over
East Asia was always peaceful and benign unlike European and Japanese
imperialism, to interpretations of World War II, and to contemporary
international issues, China is portrayed in such a way as to suggest that
the world will be a better place when China becomes the leading, kindly
power. This assertion is hardly better than Japans claims that its empire
was only meant to free Asia from European rule or Hitlers claim that Germany was defending European civilization against an Asian (by which
he meant Russian-Jewish) menace. Rozman suggests that we ought to be
more alarmed by Chinas assertions than by Japanese excuses for what they
did during World War II. If many Japanese are guilty of not confronting
the enormity of their aggression and crimes in the past, it is most unlikely
that Japan will ever again invade its neighbors or that it will be in a position to do so. But China?
In conclusion, then, this volume does not mean to suggest that history
is inevitable fate and that past aggression, if not followed by profuse apolo-
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gies, necessarily leads to new conflicts. After all, what nation has a completely clean past? What it does suggest, however, is that honest appraisal
of the past rather than nationalist distortion can help reconciliation. There
will always be some controversies about what happened in the past, but
there are also realities that cannot be negated. Germany did start World
War II and commit monstrous crimes. Japan was an aggressive and cruel
imperial power. So recognition of these facts, and teaching reality to students, is a necessary first step toward creating a more peaceful environment. This hardly means that in the United States there should not be an
examination of the moral and ethical difficulties of deciding to incinerate enemy civilians as part of a war effort or that France should go back
to ignoring its official complicity in rounding up Jews to deliver to the
Germans while occupied by Germany. All honest examination of the past
leads to better understanding.
At the same time, we should be aware of the fact that systematic distortion of history that privileges nationalist narratives and belittles others, be
they domestic minorities or external nations, is dangerous. Exactly such
mythologized narratives predominated in Europe from the nineteenth
century well into the twentieth. They were official dogma in Japan during
its period of imperial expansion. They have existed everywhere, and their
presence has often prefigured aggressive wars.
Just because Japan was guilty of atrocities during World War II hardly
justifies ultranationalist historical distortion by China today, and the
spread of such ideas is not a reassuring sign. Nor can such stories simply
be passed off as harmless exaggerations in any nation.
With this volume, we hope we have contributed to some important
clarifications about crucial historical issues and in at least a small way
helped to show that unbiased, balanced scholarship can be a force for better understanding, greater tolerance, and some measure of reconciliation.
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