The Korean War by Bruce Cummings provides insight into a war that, although most asians have not

forgotten, most Americans seem to have tossed aside. It seems that, between the perceived glory the victory over the Axis powers of World War II and the seemingly unending struggle in the jungles of Vietnam, the Korean War is less prominent in the psyche of the American peoples. Indeed, Cummings notes that some contemporary writers have claimed the Korean War as a relative success for the United States as "American leaders 'resistedpressures to expand its objective to include theconquest of the regime," a far cry from the events that actually happened. Why then is the Korean War so uninteresting in the American eye, in that many do not even know the course of the war? Cummings opens with a brief introduction on the nature of the war, and how the war has been seen in primarily US society: a war unknown and forgotten. More importantly though, he touches on the fact that the US did not really understand the political tensions of the region, ignoring the troubles of colonial Korea under Japanese rule, being colored by racism against Asians and a whole, and turning a blind eye to the war-time brutalities South Koreans carried out against their own forces and those of the North. In this then, he tries to convey a view of the war that is less propagandized towards the South, towards the capitalist-backed powers, and a view that is much more murky in terms of morality. A surprising note to consider during the action of the war is that South Korea had a fairly large army with decent amounts of materiel immediately prior to the full-on invasion. This is supported by the fact that, along the 38th parallel, skirmishes and small assaults back and forth were commonplace at the time. Yet, when a skirmish evolved into a full-on invasion by the North Korean army, South Korean units mostly devolved into chaos and the retreat south was less a orderly retreat and more a mass of people, fleeing from the storm of North Korea. When one then considers the history of the two states, this feels very awkward, as they are similar peoples, with similar military buildups and support. Yet, there are two key points to pick out. South Korean leaders and generals were nearly all Japanese supporters during the colonization, or at least, not dissidents. Comparing this to the amount of resent that Japanese supporters received after the end of the occupation, morale under such leaders was low. This is in stark contrast to North Korean leaders such as Kim Il Sung, a notorious hero of the resistance against occupying Japanese forces. Cummings comments on how South Korean elite tried to defame Kim, noting that even if the person in North Korea is claiming to be this hero, what was the South Korean elite doing while others were resisting? In addition, South Korea was bound by an ideology of anti-Communism, whereas the North by liberation. Although both provide their respective forces with a strong fervor, the North is by far more comfortable with pushing out what they perceive as an influence tainting their lands and people, with analogy to the Japanese in the 1930s. In contrast, anti-

Communism only goes so far, and with some of the decisions that South Korean generals made, such as detonating the bridge on the Han River while refugees were still trying to cross, it is clear why South Korean morale seemed low at many points. However, if we compare the course of the war in Cummings's first chapter with the plot of Taegukgi, we see a very stark contrast. Although the battles on the Nakdong River in the film were desperate attempts to hold the river, Cummings notes that the situation was even more precarious than that, with the northern pivot at Pohang providing a path straight towards Pusan. However, the film portrays the march northwards very similarly to Cummings, noting that although resistance was encountered, it was not completely organized. Both in history and the film, was the intervention of Chinese forces relatively unexpected, mainly due to overconfidence. However, in the film, it seems that North Koreans relied on the Chinese forces, whereas Cummings notes that North Korean forces melted away on purpose to link up with the Chinese as a tactical and strategic decision in order to destroy the UN security force. In general then, Cummings provides a view into the Korean War that most Americans have never seen and never realized due to an unfamiliarity with the historical background (and thus the hatred of the Japanese) and a propagandizing of the war against the "evil" Communist forces and the "defensive" South Korean forces. In that, understanding the war really requires an unbiased view on both the people and their motivations for this war, lest the war become lost in the senseless tit-for-tat politics of the Cold War.

Cummings notes that due to the light penalties inflicted on Japan, it is logical that they would not acknowledge the crimes of war. However, how exactly do they justify this then? Is it a sort of national amnesia that they recall the initial blows dealt to China and the Pacific powers and not the associated dishonorable activities, or is it more a repressed memory? Additionally, later, when the chief of staff of the Japanese Airforce writes an essay on the Japanese wars, how does he claim that the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor was a Kremlin plot when the debates over the merits and pitfalls of the attack are well documented?

Why did MacArthur not trust the OSS, and later, the CIA? Yes, it does threaten your own intelligence gathering, but only if you actively interfere with it. Wouldn't it make more logical sense to focus on the tactical and strategic planning necessary to guide the troops than to play spymaster, both against your allies and enemies? Or is his ego too big to approve this?

Was the connection between Moscow and Beijing so not obviously close? The working assumption was that Beijing was under Moscow's heel, but did they forget that, unlike many of the Eastern European Soviet Republics, Chinese Communists mostly fought their own struggle until after the conclusion of World War II. Thus, unlike the puppet states of Eastern Europe, these governments were less tied to Moscow. So then, why was the US so sure that China would not act relatively autonomously with respect to intervention in the Korean War? For that matter, Kim Il Sung would be known in China, or at least heard of in the upper echelons due to his actions against Japan. Were the going-ons of Manchuria completely unknown to decision-makers at the time?