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Summary
On Tuesday, August 25, 2009, a distinguished group of senior leaders and experts from across
the federal government and the private sector gathered at the SAIC conference facility in
McLean, Virginia, to participate in a Thought Leadership Symposium entitled “Cooperative
Threat Reduction: New Visions ... New Approaches.” The event featured prepared remarks by
current and former senior leaders from the United States Department of Defense (DoD),
Department of State (DOS), Department of Energy (DOE), National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
and the private sector. Participants discussed the concept of Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) 2.0, a new direction for the Nunn‐Lugar CTR program. In particular, focus was on the new
vision and expanded approach of CTR 2.0, but the success of the current program was also
emphasized.
This event was the tenth SAIC‐sponsored symposium designed to stimulate discussion on and
to bring into sharper focus significant national security challenges. The key underlying issue of
this event was the future of the CTR program, as envisioned by the NAS study “Global Security
Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction.” The original Nunn‐Lugar CTR
program has been successful in deactivating over 7,500 weapons, among other things, and the
program has strengthened and expanded with its successes. However, CTR 2.0 proposes a new
model to address an evolving threat environment, one that would include a wider range of
partners and seek to expand the program to a global scale.
This summary highlights the key points and takeaways from the symposium sessions (see
attached agenda), based on the presentations of the principal speakers, the related panel
discussions, and the question‐and‐answer period following each session. In keeping with
the symposium rule that comments are not for attribution, the names of speakers and
participants are not used. Every effort has been made to reflect accurately the
symposium’s discussions.
What is CTR 2.0?
The session began with an explanation of CTR 2.0 and how it differs from the predecessor
Nunn‐Lugar program. The new program is a whole‐of‐government effort that emphasizes being
fast, flexible, and agile. CTR 2.0 will not focus solely on the former Soviet Union (FSU) nor on
destroying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiles. It will now be a global program
that will build international partnerships to counter WMD proliferation.
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The early days of CTR—early to mid‐1990s—were characterized as the program’s “maverick”
era. It was asserted that the new program needs to recover some of that era’s boldness. As
the program has matured, and under the overlay of DoD 5000, some said that the U.S.
Government (USG) lost sight of the program’s purpose. They said that in more recent years the
program has been too absorbed in its own process metrics, forgetting about the most
important metric—preventing the one catastrophic failure, the one attack that could have been
prevented by implementing programs faster or having more imagination. This is the metric by
which the USG should measure its success. It was argued that the U.S. government should be
more concerned about the risk of not doing anything rather than about spending too much
money or spending on the wrong program; participants were reminded that the 9/11
Commission Report noted that lack of imagination is a problem for the USG. It is possible that
the CTR community has become too obsessed with preventing missteps and needs to return to
its obsession with preventing WMD attacks.
Former Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar are great statesman who had the
amazing vision in 1991 for a program to help the FSU secure its WMD. They never said it would
be easy to achieve this mission. CTR requires hard work, and sometimes taking risks. Although
the program’s mission will continue to be difficult going forward, it was argued at the
symposium that CTR should be a major part of U.S. national and international security because
the CTR program makes us and the world safer.
CTR is active in several areas for DoD, including nonproliferation, identification and mitigation
of threats, layered WMD defense, and management of WMD threats from fragile, failed or
ungoverned states. The Obama Administration is actively invested in this issue. Through his
mentor, Senator Lugar, President Obama took an interest in CTR early on. He visited weapons
sites and saw the threat in person. He supports the mission, which is demonstrated by the
team he has assembled at the White House and State Department, includingby the designation
of a WMD czar and the appointment of a threat reduction ambassador. The team throughout
the rest of the government includes some of the most qualified and experienced leaders in CTR.
President Obama has stated two overarching priorities moving forward. First, as long as
nuclear weapons exist, the United States, as a larger national security priority, will maintain a
safe, secure and reliable deterrent, and pre‐detonation activities will be reinvigorated. The
second priority involves what are considered “left of boom” activities: arms control,
nonproliferation and threat reduction. This includes the four‐year effort to secure all vulnerable
nuclear materials around the world, which requires a whole‐of‐government approach.
Furthermore, DoD will not be limited by the policies of the last administration but will be
involved in securing fissile material, not just weapons, in addition to addressing biological
threat reduction. The two specific areas of focus will be removing and securing materials at the
source and interdiction of materials on the move. Addressing the biological threat and
interdiction will be the greatest challenges.
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Participants discussed that, in general, securing fissile material is a lot simpler to understand
than the biological threat, and the United States needs to use a broad definition in order to
properly counter the biological threat. It was estimated that the USG is about 20 years behind
in the biological arena versus the nuclear materials security arena. The point of failure for
terrorists in biological efforts is that, thus far, they have not been able to acquire the correct or
effective pathogen strains. Therefore, it was discussed that the USG needs to focus on securing
biological materials and providing the right technologies to other countries so they may secure
the materials. One means to address the issue is through infectuous disease surveillance,
which is at the nexus of security and public health. The United States is currently developing a
laboratory network to provide early warning of a disease outbreak, which may include a
biological attack. It was argued that these networks should be linked with technology,
specifically a global surveillance system. Natural outbreaks were also noted as a national
security concern and, therefore, the biological surveillance system must be alert to these. If
Mexico had such a system in place, the current H1N1 flu pandemic might have been
diminished.
Throughout the symposium, it was emphasized that people are the most important part of
threat reduction. Developing relationships is important. The United States cannot limit itself to
interactions with scientists who worked on Cold War classified programs; it needs to increase
its focus to include any scientists who could be used for nefarious purposes, whether or not
they worked on a secret program. Programs such as scientist engagement efforts provide a
reason for USG presence and involvement in different areas of the world and ensure continued
work with international partners and a base from which to expand work. These existing
programs allow U.S. personnel access to facilities, the ability to get the ground truth and to
enhance peer‐to‐peer relationships.
In discussing the specifics of the biological threat, the challenges associated with preparing
vaccines were noted, as was the future of biological detectors. Regarding detectors, it was
argued that much progress has been made but that the Military Services’ efforts in this area are
focused on the battlefield and a large‐scale aerosol release, which is only one potential threat
scenario. More work is needed in clinical diagnostics to improve identification of what
individuals may have been exposed to, preferably before they show symptoms.
In terms of vaccinations, the United States may want to look at the transformational medical
technologies initiative and antivirals that can treat multiple viruses. Vaccines will take decades
to develop and approve, and the United States must pay attention to protecting not only forces
in the field but also the civilian population.
In discussing the expansion of CTR to the rest of the world, a question was posed on the need
to develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPs) to address the challenge. The responders noted
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that, in the nuclear security area, the USG knows almost every site in the world that has fissile
material, but that now it must accelerate execution and persuade partners to work with the
United States. Thus, nuclear security should no longer be considered an intelligence problem.
The USG understands the locations and types of materials and has enough information to
prioritize efforts. Biological security is very different. Much of the bio‐related information is
not classified and the United States can ask countries about their labs and institutes and what
they stock there, so covert collection is not always required. On the other hand, the
intelligence community has not focused on this issue beyond state programs.
The assembly discussed in more detail the CTR study conducted by the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS). NAS operates under an 1863 Congressional mandate to be an advisor to the
USG on science, engineering and medicine, and in 1980 NAS established the Committee on
International Security and Arms Control.
Choosing the appropriate name for the NAS study report was no small task. The term “global
security engagement” highlights the broad nature of the new program and removes the word
“threat,” important because some international partners expressed concern that the United
States saw them as a threat to security if they were approached about the program. While CTR
is a “brand,” it also implies that the partner is a threat. The new program seeks to incorporate
the new thrusts in diplomacy, engagement and partnership. It was argued that diplomacy is
where everything begins and that what occurs at DOS is CTR 2.0. An example of the
misunderstandings that occur concerning CTR played out during the U.S. dialogue with India
regarding that country’s nuclear energy program. Much of the Indian conservative response
was negative because the draft document called the activities between United States and India
“CTR.” The conservatives saw the dialogue as an attempt by the USG to remove India’s nuclear
weapons as opposed to just helping them secure their energy program.
It is possible that the CTR program has been a victim of its own success. The original program
was bold and visionary, but the USG has lost a lot of its tolerance for risk and it was argued that
a constituency in Congress must be developed to understand the need for boldness. The fact
that current challenges are different and therefore require new tools must be explained. Bold
White House leadership is also essential. In order to steer all of these programs in the right
direction, the USG needs someone to coordinate the efforts as well as to develop a strategic
vision and prioritization. To accompany the strategic vision, it was argued, a strategic budget
should be created because these programs cannot be funded on an annual basis; they need
sustained resources behind them.
Where CTR 2.0 diverges from the original program is the uncertain world in which the program
must function. Today the United States faces assymetrical warfare, terrorism, and a
technological revolution. CTR projects will no longer be the large infrastructure projects of the
past. They will be smaller, regional and will require both hard and soft resources. Furthermore,
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partners in the coalition will be different. There is significant opportunity for a broader range of
partners both within the USG and internationally. Both traditional and non‐traditional partners
should be included, such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department
of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, academia, industry, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).
A key concept of the NAS study is encouraging a habit of strategic partnership and cooperation.
It was argued that the United States should enhance its quality of listening. Instead of pulling
out the toolbox immediately and trying to employ these tools with partners before learning the
situation, the USG should learn what is most important to each partner and meet those needs.
Our partner nations may not share our priorities; therefore we should identify what will enable
the partnership and, ultimately, allow us to reach our objectives. It is important to determine
how we can make our interests relevant to our partners so programs will be sustained in the
future. It was also posited that the United States might not always be the right “face” to put in
the door. This highlights the importance of building the U.S. capacity in partner countries that
would allow our objectives to be addressed without having to directly insert ourselves. It was
argued that the United States should use “wedge strategies” to gain access to countries that
may not otherwise want U.S. intervention. For example, to eliminate the chemical agent in
Iraq, an approach might be to train an Iraqi chemical weapons disposal unit. Then perhaps that
unit could engage in Syria or other countries in the Middle East where direct U.S. involvement
would be unwelcome.
In general, CTR 2.0 should include reinforcing old treaties and employing new security
mechanisms, as well as increasing program agility. It was also emphasized that the core
precept should be partnership, meaning a sharing of responsibility for the project, its
management, oversight, organization, and ensuring all sides provide technical and personnel
contributions. Additionally, there are efforts in Congress through the Nunn‐Lugar Improvement
Act for increased flexibility to address the changing environment. The 2010 National Defense
Authoritization Act hopefully will also provide co‐mingling authority to allow DoD to accept
funds from other countries in order to make the partnerships as equal as possible. This was
tested with DOE and has allowed that department to bring in money from other nations.
The study did leave some unfinished business in terms of program impacts and metrics.
Specifically, questions remain about how to reflect the real security value of CTR. The program
needs to move away from the traditional Nunn‐Lugar scorecard and employ other tools that
evaluate the impact of programs, not just the outputs. This impact does not always include
concrete data, and developing new metrics will remain challenging.
The concept was presented that CTR is not about a single point in time but rather the
development of tools to deal with a rapidly changing environment. CTR has shown
considerable agility as it has transformed to be about more than just nuclear weapons and
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more than just government‐to‐government initiatives, as its focus has shifted beyond the
former Soviet Union.
However, CTR has suffered from stereotyping as a time‐bound task order to get rid of military
weapons and address the nuclear brain drain. Now CTR is looking for tools to deal with the
rapid change in the complexity of issues. When one considers the “complexity theory” that
applies to our security environment, there are a number of things to consider: action at a
distance, unintended consequences, tipping points, non‐linear behavior, etc. Governments are
having difficulty coming to grips with these issues and their increasingly global nature. In
general, technology is advancing and spreading so quickly that capabilities are expanding
beyond what experts predicted. It is essential for intelligence to keep up with the technological
advances or their added value will decrease.
Simulators are now the third leg of research, with theory and experimentation. Today,
computers have empowered large numbers of people to do things individually that used to
require a large infrastructure. Consequently, we should be more worried about smaller attacks
that can be accomplished by fewer people, sometimes passing under the radar of policies
already in place. For example, when the Chemical Weapons Convention was negotiated, the
threat was large stockpiles of chemical munitions that were produced in large facilities. Now
we have continuous micro‐reaction technology that can produce very pure chemicals
inexpensively, and this technology is spreading around the world.
There is a tendency to say that the United States is no longer concerned about state actors,
only non‐state actors, and that there are interactions going on around the world of which the
United States is not aware. The United States needs to find ways to get into these areas. For
CTR in the future, an American may not be the right person to act, but we need to have
influence and we need to understand how to leverage our influence.
In the past, CTR did some bold things, but we did not sustain the programs nor broaden them in
other areas. It was argued that if the United States modifies CTR and reenergizes the program,
it will be able to address these new challenges. It was noted that, although it is easy to say the
effort should be diverse and sustained, it must also be focused. There should be a strategic
review that steps back and reexamines CTR priorities.
Measuring success is becoming more difficult with the global nature of CTR. Measurements
such as the extent of resources spent, the number of weapons destroyed, the amount of dollars
saved, etc., may all be valid, but the real question is how to measure enhanced security. As CTR
moves forward, we need to create a win‐win situation for all partners. This is the value of a
successful program.
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CTR – Taking Stock
Several thought leaders discussed the accomplishments of CTR in the context of the changing
world.
Discussing CTR from a biological threat standpoint, it was noted that measuring the risk for
biological threats is very difficult and intent plays an important part. Previously, the biological
focus of CTR was on increasing transparency, refocusing research, avoiding and reducing brain
drain, enhancing personal relationships with scientists, and dismantling biological weapons
programs. Now, the world is rapidly changing, with biological technology changing at an even
more rapid rate than other technologies. Currently, a single person has the ability to do more
damage than ever before in history. CTR is evolving as well, moving from patronage to
partnership and working across agencies.
It was asserted that there will never again be another FSU‐sized biological program; it would be
too hard to hide. The threat from a nation state still needs to be considered, but it is not as
large as in the past. Also, we can no longer think in terms of a biological nonproliferation
program; the proliferation of capability already is too widespread. We are in a biotechnology
revolution. So, when we consider reducing the biological threat, we must think in terms of
people and their intent. The spectrum of biological interests runs from chronic disease to
weaponized agents. So, the process of working with our partners on hard life‐science problems
will reduce the most likely causes of death (chronic diseases) and the risk of targeted attacks
such as an anthrax scare. Concern was expressed that that the United States might fall behind
in the biological revolution, and the need to engage with individuals with the correct expertise
was emphasized.
From a nuclear weapons perspective, the DOE’s three models of threat reduction cooperation,
as well as lessons learned, were discussed. There are many issues that impact how the United
States should engage and the three models are not limiting; they are flexible to meet the
environment. The three models are:
1) Russia, a unique situation that focuses on finishing the job, sustaining the work, and
transitioning from assistance to a partnership relationship;
2) Countries, such as China and Pakistan, where the United States can assist in traditional threat
reduction, disposing of weapons‐grade materials;
3) Countries with new nuclear power programs or potential programs and poor infrastructure.
The goal is to never reach the point where the United States would need to implement one of
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the other models; threat reduction emphasizes safeguards, nuclear security, and helping to
build the countries’ own capacities to meet international requirements.
There are a number of lessons learned from employing these models. Foremost, it was argued
that engagement is important but is not the ultimate desired result. The United States must
obtain concrete results, but the ability to quantify results is difficult and hard to explain to
stakeholders. The success in Russia and the need for programs that are underway to be
completed was also emphasized. Going forward, issues and the environment will evolve and
will require a new approach. In general, the United States needs to be creative in working with
others and supporting the national nuclear infrastructure and nonproliferation norms.
Discussion then turned to lessons learned and where CTR is headed from the DOS perspective.
CTR has been very successful for DOS; the program provides diplomatic advantages that go
beyond its specific mission and contributes to the broader relationship by providing tangible
assistance and partnership. At DOS, CTR 2.0 is under way. DOS is taking a proactive approach
to prevent WMD proliferation worldwide, and to engage countries and strengthen linkages with
individuals who have access or skills related to WMD. As part of the broader move to CTR 2.0,
the USG needs to make assessments, both risk and threat assessments, to prioritize funding so
that we can explain to our partners where the resources go and why the USG believes a specific
program is important.
Symposium attendees were again reminded that many countries will not work with the United
States on anything called “threat reduction.” In many instances, partner scientists may be
putting themselves at risk by working with us. There may also be places where the USG is not
the appropriate entity to do this work. An approach to getting involved in these countries is to
have people on the ground who can engage the right people there. For example, DOS has
established small field offices in Pakistan that provide “train the trainer” programs to bio‐lab
personnel. In these situations we must be careful to ensure the safety and security of U.S. and
partner personnel.
The preventative power of CTR was noted. There are tools that CTR can put in place and
relationships that can be built to address the threats of tomorrow. The United States can
coordinate with other governments and international organizations, and collaborate on
multilateral initiatives. Furthermore, CTR needs to address the full range of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. This includes the biological threat, dual use
expertise, other threats aside from weapons, etc. Terrorists are interested in toxic industrial
chemicals as well as radiological materials, not just traditional nuclear weapons.
There are a number of additional challenges facing CTR 2.0. As noted earlier, there is a need for
good metrics for evaluation and to ensure sustainability. These metrics must prove to partners
and senior leaders that the programs are worthwhile. Another challenge is to scope the cost of
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CTR, to explain its expenditures, and to link all initiatives together. Flexibility is key; a formal
memorandum of understanding is not always possible, and the USG must find other means for
developing partnerships as the most difficult countries to involve are often the most important
to work with.
The importance of continuing current initiatives and not losing what was already gained was
emphasized throughout the symposium. Relationships must be maintained and sustained. It
was noted that legacy programs are intended to accomplish this but that they require resources
to sustain. An advantage of the early infrastructure heavy programs is that they did not require
a lot of government oversight during execution. The USG could hire an integrating contractor
to provide the on‐site day‐to‐day management. As the USG moves forward, the number of
countries engaged will increase and the approaches will need to be altered. Look at the
challenge of securing all fissile material in the next four years. Because of the energy situation
around the world, countries will not be able to get all their energy from fuel, wind, or solar
power. More will begin examining nuclear energy. This is just one example of why new
countries may decide to develop nuclear energy capability.
On the biological side, 194 countries have signed up to participate in international health
regulations. This will help the USG engage countries in productive dialogue about building the
capacity to detect, diagnose, and report illness. Some countries are capable and have the
capacity, but there are a number that do not have even the basic infrastructure. They will need
technology, financial support, and sustainment assistance in order to develop the capacity to
address the challenge to detect, diagnose, and report.
In addition, the United States needs to build a culture of responsibility in bioethics. Bio‐safety
associations are set up in many countries and there are also scientist‐to‐scientist exchanges.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has a number of efforts that
support this goal, one of which has brought together veterinarians through an informal
association. Building relationships also allows for sustained contacts, fosters ethics and
increases safety and security. Additionally, some of the best work is scientist to scientist rather
than government to government.
Regarding global chemical stockpiles, there was agreement that they need to be secured
beyond the FSU, and Iraq provides a good example of success. It was noted that it is critically
important when engaging scientists for CTR purposes to focus specifically on chemists. In this
field, material security is not really possible, but laboratory management is more feasible.
There was a concern voiced that perhaps the urgency that surrounded the initial CTR program,
which assisted in its success, is not present for CTR 2.0. However, some argued that there is
more urgency today than during the last ten years, primarily related to the USG leadership.
Additionally, international health regulations and associated timelines are generating an
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urgency because countries must have a plan by this year. All countries are supposed to be able
to report an outbreak within 24 hours by 2012. In many cases countries need technology more
than money; they have some capacity but do not have the ability to report. This provides an
opportunity to partner with these countries in the area of technology. It was also noted that,
although urgency is critical to success, the United States must also explain why other nations
will benefit from taking security measures. We should listen to the concerns of others states
and examine where they overlap with CTR, providng a means for discussion.
Threat Reduction Efforts
The proliferation threat, particularly from non‐state actors, has evolved considerably since the
turn of the century and is now more global in nature. Two of the foremost challenges facing
the United States are preventing terrorist acquisition of WMD and halting the spread of WMD
to dangerous regimes. Over the past decade, a dynamic set of terrorism and proliferation
threats has emerged. International terrorist networks, such as Al‐Qaeda, continue to pose a
serious threat to national and international security. The President has made it a high priority
to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, equipment, expertise, and delivery systems.
Accordingly, we must ensure that our threat reduction programs are suitably responsive and
equipped to address current threats.
Our diplomacy must also be focused in a way that supports these programs, especially in
countries where other competing factors can impede straightforward WMD threat‐reduction
activities—and this applies to almost all the key countries with whom we are now dealing.
The State Department brings a unique strength to these efforts—including two programs being
funded or implemented by other agencies—in being able to focus the dialogue to highlight the
mutual concerns and benefits of these programs, and to raise the WMD proliferation issues to
the top of our bilateral and multilateral agendas. Much of this dialogue is being driven by the
NAS CTR 2.0 study.
In line with the study’s recommendation, the DOS has managed several threat reduction
programs in recent years. These include the Global Threat Reduction (GTR) program, Export
Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program, and the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NDF).
The GTR program had its origins in the FSU, where the USG, as part of an international coalition,
engaged and redirected former WMD scientists in the FSU to peaceful activity via the
establishment and support of two science centers: the International Science and Technology
Center (ISTC) in Moscow, and the Science and Technology Center in Kiev, Ukraine (STCU).
Lessons learned from the ISTC and the STCU are being applied worldwide. As the proliferation
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threat has spread beyond the FSU, these programs have adapted and are now designed to
combat emerging global proliferation issues in a threat‐driven manner.
These programs improve our national security by promoting safety and security best practices,
nonproliferation and scientific collaboration worldwide, and are most successful when they
resonate with the scientists and engineers in those regions we wish to engage. GTR also works
with a wide range of partners in addition to host countries, including many U.S. departments
and agencies, NGOs, academia, international organizations and scientific societies, to achieve
its mission.
The DOS is duplicating the model of “science diplomacy” to engage scientists and engineers in
other technical disciplines, such as nuclear physics and chemistry, using our related nuclear‐
and chemical‐oriented initiatives within GTR. Additionally, through GTR, the DOS has identified
a plausible strategy for working cooperatively with other nations to address the nuclear,
biological, and chemical threats that they, and the United States, face.
The second key threat reduction program managed by the Department of State is the EXBS
program, which provides assistance to help countries develop and strengthen their strategic
trade control systems and border security capabilities. The program is unique in that it
provides assistance that spans the full range of elements of export control and border security,
including legal and regulatory frameworks, licensing, enforcement, interagency coordination
and government‐to‐industry outreach. EXBS initially focused on the FSU and Eastern Europe in
the 1990s; like other threat reduction programs it has evolved to meet the global proliferation
threats. It is active in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and will continue to intensify its
engagements in South Asia, North Africa, Mexico, and Latin America.
The NDF is also an important threat reduction tool because of its broad statutory
“notwithstanding” authority and “no‐year” money. It is a uniquely flexible program that, given
its rapid response capability, allows the USG to take advantage of high‐priority, time‐critical and
politically perishable opportunities to stop proliferation anywhere in the world, regardless of
the statutory restrictions faced by other programs.
The DOS also plays a role in multilateral threat reduction, leading the USG efforts to promote
the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
The Global Partnership is a vital tool as it provides the primary multilateral financial
commitment to implement and coordinate chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat
reduction activities globally. Since 2002, Global Partnership activities were focused in the FSU;
however, at the 2008 G8 summit, the leaders declared that the work would be expanded
geographically to combat 21st century proliferation threats. The Global Partnership is also
considering outreach to new members to provide technical and financial resources to facilitate
the geographic expansion of the partnership.
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Discussion then returned to CTR per se, as the leadership of the program was reviewed and the
importance of flexibility emphasized. Across the USG, the current CTR leaders represent a wide
range of knowledge and success under the existing CTR programs. Although CTR recently was
criticized for being too process‐laden and inflexible, it was noted that in the early days it was
not regulated enough. Now the USG is taking a case‐by‐case approach and evaluating the risk
profile. One thing remains lacking: the “Cooperation” within CTR. The United States needs
foreign governments to want to be involved.
Right now, the opportunities for a whole new phase in CTR are more favorable than they have
been since the program’s inception. It was argued that this is the time to seize the opportunity,
yet there are significant challenges as well. It is necessary to have a whole‐of‐government
approach that reaches beyond traditional CTR programs and security agencies. The expanded
CTR will involve not just the country team approach but the regional team approach. There
should be better communication between the field and Washington and a better understanding
of how efforts interact and intersect. All of this will be expensive, yet DoD CTR funding remains
the same since inception. There should be a single overall appropriation to allow rapid
response for unforeseen requirements and a provision for easy transfer of funds between
agencies.
There is a clear role for other USG partners to become involved in CTR, specifically for HHS and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Foreign assistance programs have a role
as well. USAID is authorized to respond to disasters in almost every country in the world, and
this could be linked to CTR. Since 9/11, USAID has worked to integrate stabilization programs
with DoD. Additionally, USAID and DOS established offices for DOS, DoD, and USAID
coordination for post‐conflict stabilization.
In order to get new partners involved, a campaign should seek to lay out the logistical case for
expanding CTR. Most agencies will be worried about using their own funds, so the funding
issue will be an important one to work out. CTR should seek to include NGOs that are working
in the difficult regions to engage. Many NGOs may not want to be directly involved because of
a perception in the field that U.S. defense policy is anathema to the interests of the locals and
because of fears that involvement may put NGO people in the field at risk. The USG needs to
be ready to address these issues.
The key challenge for engaging with new partners is that the civil sector partners have different
stakeholders and interest groups as well as different goals. This needs to be addressed.
Furthermore, there will be institutional challenges, such as the fact that there is no direct
funding currently for new partners and that there is likely to be bureaucratic reluctance to fund.
There will also be new stakeholder bias and a reluctance to allow the civil sector to implement
defense programs. It was noted that foreign assistance institutions are also in disarray and will
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need to be restructured and reorganized. The USG will need to tailor partnership efforts to
meet the new restructured bureaucracy.
Cooperation, engagement, and diplomacy are the cornerstones of CTR, but these will not
ensure success as there are still those who have ill will toward the United States. We should
consider restructuring old programs rather than developing new programs that may not be
necessary. Currently, CTR is seen to be DoD‐ and DOE‐centric. This needs to be changed in
order to expand to other agencies such as USAID. A program should be developed to look at
efforts to create new global architectures. CTR may be the foundation for dealing with specific
regions.
Concern was expressed regarding the notion that CTR is one of the President’s priorities. As
times goes by, many more priorities will be identified and implementers may not know which
are the most important. It is also possible that a sense of urgency is lacking. Because CTR
makes a pre‐incident investment, it may be difficult to prove that its programs are necessary as
other factors may be credited as producing a positive outcome.
Concluding Thoughts
During the course of the symposium, the speakers and attendees addressed the spectrum of
threat reduction issues facing the United States today. The advancement of CTR into CTR 2.0 is
a major effort that will require a whole‐of‐government approach. One recurring point made
throughout the event was the importance of people to the future of the program, specifically
the relationships that have been and will be formed as a result of the CTR program and are the
key to its success.
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August 25, 2009
SAIC Conference Center, McLean, Virginia
Agenda
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10:45 AM – 12:15 PM ............................................................................................ Panel Discussion
Dr. David Franz, Midwest Research Institute and Co-Chairman of the NAS CTR
Study, will chair an Expert Panel which will address the subject of “Cooperative
Threat Reduction – Taking Stock and Looking to the Future.”
Expert Panelists Include: Mr. Mark Whitney, Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation
and International Security, NNSA; Ms. Elizabeth Cameron, Deputy Director, Office of Cooperative
Threat Reduction, State Department and Mr. Jim Reid, Director, Office of
CTR Policy, OSD.
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