THE GREAT IDEl\S

363
INTRODUCTION
of the reality of change or motion, cannot be
treated as a physical theory. On the contrary,
it is, according to Aristotle, a complete negation
of the subject matter of physics. No:tnatter
what other .. points physicists may dispute
among themselves, they must all at least agree
in .. taking a stand againstParmertides.Aristotle
does not even seem to think that a book on
physics: is the ptoper place toargueagainst Par-
menides. That argument belongs to another
part of philosophy. The reality ofchange
seems to him sufficiently evident to assure the
physicist th.athehasa subject matter to inves-
tigate.
THE QUESTION whether the early physicists
were scientists or philosophers -calls attention to
different methods of investigating naturaVphe-
nomena. Agreement on the subject matter of
physics may :prevail, therefore, only in very
general terms. <When, in.a manner to accord
with the method employed, the object ofphys-
ical inquiry ismorespeciflcally defined, there
seem to be two physics,not philosoph-
ical and a scientificphysics, a philosophy ofna-
ture and a natural science, or, to use Kant's
phrasing, a rational' or pure physics and an
empirical or experimental physics.
Though Ne\\rton may .. caU his work a philos-
ophy of nature, he also:refers to it as an experi-
mental philosophy, in ,order to distinguish it
from the work of earlier natural philosophers
who did not perform experiments. The
ence between !the physics of Newton and that
of Aristotle seems, howevel1,toinvolve<more
than a divergence in method. The problems
which Newton and A.ristotle try to solve indi-
cate a difference in subject matter as well.
Nevertheless, this difference falls \vithin what,
in the most general terms, must be conceived
as the domain of physics. For all their differ-
Chapter 6T PHYSICS
@NCERNING the subject matter of
physics, one thing seems to he tradition-
'taken for granted. The objecfofits study
sensibleworld ofchangingthings ormat--
motion.. When' Plato,: for exam.ple, con-
sastronbrtly as dealing not with the actual
Dservablemotions of the heavenly bodies,
ith the 'possible formsbf the' motions of
s, he gives it the character
rather'than;a physical: science. Heasso-
s it with geometry, as fora similar reason
ssociates ITlusic-divorced from concern
audible arithmetic. In
e's view, if a science does notirtvestigate
Ie realities, if itdoes rtotundertake toac-
,fof the of. actual bodies, or,
most generally, if it has no concern with
lenomena of change; then it does hot ,have
df physical or natural 'science.
e early Greek physicists, the pre-"Socratics,
hom.. Plato .Aristotle refer; inaugurate
tudy of change with speculations about
ate origins, ,the underlying principles or
s of naturalphenorriena. Sometimes they
lIed philosophers and sometimesscientists
at least, precursors of empirical science.
here seems to be no difference of opinion
ttheir title as physicists. l-'heirundisputed
to this titlederives, not from the method
employ, butfrolllthe object they study-
ge.In that primary meaning of the word
re" which comesfrom the Latin l1atura-
lIivalent of phitsis in Greek-they can
Hed 'or "physicists" .indif-
ly. The realm of nature is the realm of
e.
s for this reason that Aristotle,' consider-:-
e theories of his predecessors in the open-
apters of his Physics, .sets Parmenides
rom all the rest. Partnenides' affirmation
unity of being, which .leads to his denial
NIETZSCHE. Beyond Good and Evil, Cll I
--. The Will to Power, BK II (2-3)
H. SIDGWICK. Philosophy, Its Scope and Relatt
BOSANQUET. Science and Philosophy, I
T. yEBLEN. The Place ofeSciencein Modern Ci
tlon, PP 56- 179
BERGSON. An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp
9
2
DEWEY et al. "The Need for a Recovery of Phil
ophy," in Creative Intelligence
SANTA:ANA. Soliloquies in England and Later S
oquzes, CH 48
B. RUSSELL. The Problems of Philosophv, CH 14-
--. Mysticism and Logic, CH 6 -
BEARD. The Economic Basis of Politics
CROCE. Politics and Morals
DEWEY. Reconstruction in Philosophy, CH I
--'. The Quest for Certainty, CH I I
J.. S. HALDANE. Ine Sciences and Philosophy; I.E
X-XI
M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK III, CH 5
TENNANT. Philosophy ofthe Sciences
VVHITEHEAD. Science the ModernWorld,cH
- .. -. Process and Realtty, PART I
--. Adventures of Ideas, CH 9-10
CARNAP. Philosophy and Logical Syntax
MARITAIN. The Degrees of I<nowledge, eH I
--. De la philosophie chretienne
-.-. Science and lVisdom, pp 137-220
--. Scholasticis1n and Politics, CH 2
GILSON. Christianisme et philosophie
--. The Unity of Philosophical Experience
--'.History of Philosophy and Philosophical
catton
JASPERS. The Perennial Scope of Philosophy
362
W. JAMES. Praglnatism, LEeT I-II
--. A Pluralistic Universe, LEcr I
--. Some Problems of Philosophy, CH I
II.
TERTULLIAN. On Idolatry
--. Apology
CICERO. De Oratore(On Oratory), III, CH XV-XVI
DIOGENES. Lives of Eminent Philosophers
PHILOSTRATUS. Lives ofthe Sophists
BOETHIUS. De Fide Catholiea (On the Catholic Faith)
AL-GHAZZALI. The Destruction of Philosophy
ABAILARD. Ethics (Scito Teipsum)
JUDAH HA-LEVI. Kitab al Khazari
JOHN OF SALISBURY. j\;fetalogicon
AVERROES. The Destruction ofthe "Destruction"
R. BACON. Opus Majus, PART II
DUNS SCOTUS. Oxford Commentary, BK I, DIST 3, Q 4
THOMAS A KEMPIS. The Imitation of Christ,BK I,
CH 1-5; BKIII, CH 43-45
ERASMUS. The Praise of Folly
GLANVILL.The Vanity of Dognlatizing
VOLTAIRE. "Philosopher," "Sophist," "Philos-
ophy," in A Philosophical Dictionary
COLERIDGE. Biographia Literaria, CH 9
HEINE. Religion and Philosophy in Germany
COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, INTRO, CH I
W. HAMILTON. Discussions on Philosophy and Liter-
ature, Education and University Reform
--. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL I (1-7)
WHEWELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,
VOL I, BK I, CH 2
LOTZE. Outlines ofEncyclopedia of Philosophy, SECT
I-n
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL I
THE GREi\T IDEAS
365
CHAPTER 67: PHYSICS
which have the utmost simplicity in rnathe"
matical statement.
On the second and third points, Newton's
declarations seem to be mostexplicit. "Nature,"
he says, "is pleased with simplicity and affects
not the pomp of superflous causes."
ingly, Nevvton directs his efforts tov/ard the
simplest statement of the laws of motion,and
these he seeks to give the.universality requisite
for covering every type of natural phenon1enon.
f\t the opening of the third. book of the M athe-
1natical Principles of Natural Philosophy, he ex-
plains that in the preceding books, he l:as
"laid down the principles of philosophy, pnn-
ciples not philosophical but mathematical;
such, namely, as \ve may build our reasonings
upon in philosophical inquiries. Theseprinci-
pIes are the laws and conditions of certain lno-
tions, and powers or forces." From these same
principles, he will now undertake to "demon-
strate the frame of the System of the World."
In the Preface to the first edition of this
work, Newton describes the third book as one
in which he derives "from the celestial phe-
nomena the forces of gravity with which bodies
tend to the sun and the several planets. Then
from these forces, by other \vhich
are also matheillatical," he goes on,"I deduce
the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon,
the sea." But he does not consider his work to
have attained the goal of physics-the compre-
hension of all natural phenon1ena by a fe\v
simple mathematical formulae.
His confession of failure Inay also be read as
a prognostication of what an experimental
physics based on mathematical principles
might some day be able to achieve. "I wish we
could derive the rest of the phenomena of na-
ture by the same kind of reasoning," he writes,
"for I am induced by many reasons to suspect
that they may all depend upon certain forces
by \vhich the particles of bodies, by some causes
hitherto unknown, are either lllutually im-
pelled to\vards one another, and cohere in
regular figures, or are repelled and recede from
one another." Einstein's unified field equations,
covering both gravitational phenomena on the
astronomical scale and the electrical attractions
and repulsions of sub-atomic particles, seem to
realize, or at least closely to approxilnate, the
ideall'Jewton has in Inind.
BOOKS of experimental physics
have three characteristics in COillmon.
most naturally, they insist upon ex-
1"1rY'\An1r"lt-1IAn as either the indispensable source
ul timate test of scientific formulations.
they tend to rely upon rnathematics as
as upon experiment, both for the formu-
of nature's laws and for the demonstra-
the consequences or corollaries of the
la\vs. Third, though experiments and
P-"'U'l'f-1.n.nC' Inultiply as science develops, they
bring all the phenomena of nature un-
smallest number of generalizations,
problems by t
they represent son1ethlnghke a dlVI7
labor. In the latter view, each would
""'<.'-..'-'4' ,..,. to its method, with different
and tend to supplement rather
than
the other. Psychology .. is another
matter \vhich seems to receive a dual
on1:-phllosoJ)nlCal and. experimental-
the great .books. It raises
to those just mentioned. They
in the chapter on MAN.
chapters on PHILOSOPHY and on
"' .... , the discussion of their differ"
and relation to one another is com-
by the double use of both terms. The
" for example, is used for both
tih1Io:SOf)nlCal and. the experimental sciences
the greater part of the tradition.
until quite recendy, the name of
is taken by those \vho experilllent
those who do not.
is llmlJOS;SlCHe, therefore, to speak without
a .scientific and .a philosophical
unless the verbal ambiguities are re"
some convention, such as the under-
that when the context indicates that
"science" and "philosophy" are be-
as opposites rather than as synonyms,
shall signify the experimental
the non-experimental lllode
Beyond this, it is necessary to
if the chapters on PHILOSOPHY and
formed a background for some. of the
to be discussed here. Otherwise the
Sldleratlon of natural philosophy and natural
\vould tend to become a general dis-
of philosophy and science.
branches or affiliates are also
chapter. Still other chapters deal
mental terms representing rAr'rp. .....
lems in. the larger domain of
sophical or scientific, --e.g., CAUSE,
ELEMENT, INFINITY, MATTER,
QUANTITY, SPACE, and
NATURE and WORLD, terms which
the most comprehensive way the
ied by the physicist.
Our discussion here can
stricted to. the problems raised
books concerning the conception
subject matter and method, its
sciences or other parts of
lead to such questions as \vhether
preme among the sciences
the nature of things and, at the
whether physics .. is at all possible
whether there can be scientific A.44'V' YY.L""UlPE
bodies in motion or of the whole
change and becoming.
The problem of the
philosophical and scientific physics
pear to be only a special case of the
between philosophy and science
it is more than that. It is the case
the main distinction itself, .. since
philosopher and scientist claim to, be
ing the same subject matter or at
dealing with the same general
nomena.
Mathematics and nletaphysics pear
distinction between philosophy and
a different way. If, for example, we
perimentation or errlpirical
characteristic of science in
philosophy, then mathematics would
resemble philosophy rather than
no understanding of the nature of
matical knowledge is mathematics ever
into two kinds which are capable of
scribed as empirical and rational.
ity of metaphysical kno\vledge may
lenged, but no one has ever proposed
mental nletaphysics to challenge the
physics of the philosophers.
But physics seems to permit both an
mental and a philosophical treatment.
they are to be regarded as in conflict
another depends on ,vhether they are
364
ences, both are physicists, though both are not
philosophers or scientists in the saIne sense.
There are other sources of variation in the
definition of physics. The problem of the rela-
tion of physics to other disciplines-whether
these are other branches of philosophy or other
fields of empirical research--raises issues about
the object and scope of physics. Aristotle,
Bacon, Descartes, and Kant, for example, do
not seem to have a common understanding of
the relation of physics to mathematics and
metaphysics. In consequence they conceive
physics itself differently.
On the level ofempirical research, physics is
sometimes regarded as just one of the natural
sciences and. sometimes as the whole group of
natural sciences. In the latter case it includes
such fields as astronomy,. mechanics, .. optics,
acoustics, thermodynamics, magnetism, and
electricity; and sometimes chemistry, biology,
and even psychology are included under the
head of physical or natural sciences,contrasted
in the broadest terms to the social sciences.. The
conception of physics obviously changes when
its scope is determined by a boundary line
which separates it from chemistry, or from
biology and psychology, or. from .the study of
society.
The separation of these other sciences from
physics does not necessarily imply a disconti..
nuity in nature or the natural sciences. The
biologist and the psychologist, for. example,
consider the physical bases of life and the phys-
ical conditions or correlates of mental phe-
nomena. Hybrid sciences like biophysics and
psychophysics have developed. Even the study
of society draws upon physics to the extent
that the laws of fiatter in motion and consider-
ations of space and time must be appealed to
for an understanding of the physical founda-
tions of economic and political life.
OTHER CHAPTERS DEAL with specific physical
sciences, e.g., ASTRONOMY and MECHANICS.
The latter tries to cover the various branches
of mechanics and related fields of study, such
as dynamics, optics, the theory of heat,mag7
netism, and electricity; particularly so far as
these are represented in the "vork of Galileo,
Newton, I-Iuygens, Gilbert, Fourier, and Fara-
day. The basic concepts of mechanics and its
.. GREAT IDEi\S
367
increases with the units of time elapsed rather
than with the intervals oEspace traversed. But
when Simplicio asks for an experiment to show
that the mathematical conclusion has physical
reality, in the sense of describing observable
phenomena, 'Salviati replies that . this request
"is a very reasonable one, for this is the custom
-c-and properly, so-in those sciences where
mathematical dem0llstrations are applied to
natural phenomena" and "where the principles
once established by well-chosen experiments
become ,the foundations of the entire super-
structure." Here experiment does not confirm
conclusions. It establishes principles, not by
inductive generalization but by comparing
actual measurements with mathematical
pectations.
CHAPTER 61; J?HYSICS
to experimentation to find byob;..
ation and measurementthe an-swerswhich
inary experience fails to yield does not ex-
st the uses of experiment. The greatexperi-
,tal physicists indicateatleast:three distinct
to which experiments can be put inaHdi-
to a merely exploratory use for "the dis-
}' of ne\v effects."
.' ,natural philosophy as in, mathematics,
.,s Newton, "the method ofanalysis ,ought
o precede the method of composition" Qr
esis. In physics, the method of analysis
sists in making experiments and. observa- WITHOUT EXPERIMENT but not without induc-
,and in drawing conclusions from them tions from experience,without measurements
eluction." In contrast, the synthetic meth- but. not without recourse to observation, Aris-
gins with the principles assumed, there- totle's Physics-and with it such physical
"explaining the phenomena!. ,. and prov- treatises as his works On t.he Heavens and, <On
he .explanations. " Generation and. Conruption-c- represents. a, phi-
re experiments performa probative rather - losophy of nature. In Aristotle'smeaningoftbe
an inductive function. As. Huygerisob"! term 'science,' these treatises expound sciences,
proof in physics does.nothave the certi... but they also constitute one part of philosophy,
fmathematical demonstration, but it can tobeclistinguished frommathematicsand from
an extremely high degree ofpjjobability what Aristotle .. regards. as. the first or highest
ery often scarcely less than complete part of philosophy, i.e., the science of meta-
"-as.a result of the experimental can- physics.
tion ofa conclusion deduced. from. the Aristotle's tripartite division of the theoretic
principles. This occurs "when.things sciences or speculative philosophyinto physics,
have been demonstrated by the prin- and metaphysics raises a question
that have been assumed, correspond per- concerning his numerous biological works,and
to the phenomena which experilnent perhaps also his treatise On the Soul. Are these
ought under observation, especially when to be classified as physical sciencesor parts of
are a great number of them." A. single natural philosophy? The fact that Aristotle
1experiment, so perfect in construction distinguishes between the forms and properties
11 relevant factors have been controlled, of living and non-living matter does not seem
s unnecessary the multiplication of experi- to affect the answer. By his criteria of physical
tsto establish the conclusion. inquiry-namely, that it investigates what nei-
third use of experiment is illustrated by ther exists nor can. be conceived apart from
o when he measures the velocity of a ball matter and motion, and that it .is concerned
down an inclined plane, in order to de- with every type of change-all these works be-
hether a certain mathematical definition long to the domain of physics. Accordingly
ormly accelerated motion describes the even such apparently psychological studies as
ation "which one meets in nature in the those dealing with sensation, memory, dreams,
f falling bodies." The persons in the justify the title under which they have been
e seem to be satisfied vlith some mathe- traditionally grouped-Parva Naturalia, i.e.,
al reasoning which shows that the veloci ty short physical treatises.
us or whether, although extremely rapid,
till occupies time." The. choice between
e,.alternatives .could not be determined by
nary experience. An experimenthad to be
tructed in order to measure the velocity of
curate determination of the lirst principi
action of the fl10St extraordinary and uniM
po\ver in na "
Methods of experimentation necessa:ril
fer in different fields of
Newton's optical experiments with mirro
prisms were adapted to the phenomena of
as Galileo's experiment wi th the inclined
Pascal's experiment on the equilibriu
fluids, or Faraday's experiments with indu
coils \vere adapted to the phenomena
ics, hydrostatics, and electricity. The mate
employed, the apparatus or instruments
vised, the factors controlled or isolated-
irrelevant circumstances, .and the unit
measurernent in which the results are reeo
naturally vary with the phenomena under
servation. Yet one thing is common to'
variety of experiments described in the
books of physical science.. They all involv
construction of an artificial physical. sy
which permi ts more accurate and refine<il
servation than does nature uncontrolled 0
tampered with.
The student of nature must observe; i
case, no matter \vhether he is a philosop
a scientist.. To say that philosophical phys
non-experimental does not mean for Aris
that knowledge of nature is possible wit
observation or induction from experience.
the experimentalists insist upon the distin
between the kind of 0 bservations which
normally make in the course of everydayr
rience and the kind which involve thes
experience enjoyed only by those who 00
and, in addition, measure the results of
cially contrived experiments.
1'his point of distinction seems to be
ingly illustrated by a passage in Galileo's
New Sciences. One of the persons in the
logue, Simplicio, declares "everyday ex
ence to show the propagation of lightt
instantaneous." He explains that' \vhen
a piece of artillery fired at a great distanc
flash reaches our eyes wi thout lapse of tim
the sound reaches the ear only after a
able interval." Sagredo replies that this fa
hit of experience permits him toin
that "sound, in reaching our ear, travel
slo,vly than light." It does not inform
says, "whether the coming of light is in
366
between Ne\vton and Einstein,
Fourier also bears testimony to the idealof
physics as a science at once simple in itsprin-
ciples and universal in the scope oftheir appli-
cation.The successors of Newton and GaliIeo,
he writes, "have extended their theories and
given them anadmirableperfectioll'; they have
taught tlS that the mostdive:rsephenomena are
subject to a small number 9f universal laws
\vhich are reproduced in alltheoactsofnature.
I t is recognized that the same principles. reg-
ulate all the movements of the stars, their form,
the inequalities of their courses, the equilibrium
and the oscillations of the seas, the harmonic
vibrations of air and sonorous bodies, the trans-
mission of light, capillary actions, the undula-
tions of fluids, in fine the most cOfl1plexeffects
of all natural forces. Thus has the thought of
Newton been confirmed," he concludes, re-
ferring to Newton's praise of geometry, whose
glory it is that the few mathematical principles
it provided for use in physics 'should have been
"able to produce so many things."
ON THE .EXPERIMENTAL SIDE, the.greatworks
of physicaLscience seem to contain diverse no"
tions of the purposes served by experimenta-
tion, accompanied bya fairly. uniform recogni-
tion of the dependence ofnatural science upon
experirnent. In the field of magnetism, for
example, Gilbert sets aside as unscientific all
those authors who "have written about amber
and jet as attracting chaff but with never a
proof from experiments These wri ters deal
only in words.... Such philosophy bears no
fruit." The fruitfulness of experiments on the
vacuum, the equilibrium of fluids, and the
weight of air leads Pascal to conclude that the
secrets of nature refll.ain hidden until "the
experiments which supply us with kno\vledge
about it" can be performed and multiplied.
"vVe ought never to search for truth but by
the natural road of experiment and observa-
tion," writes Lavoisier; and Faraday describes
himself as "an experimentalist" who feels
"bound to let experiment guide me into any
train of thought \vhich it may justify." The
science of electricity, he finds, "is in that state
in which every part of it requires experimental
investigation, not merely for the discovery of
new effects," but ultimately for "the more ac-
THE GR.EAT IDEAS
369 CHAPTER 67:PIIYSICS
what Bacon calls "magic") through the pro-
duction of effects by the application ora kno\vl-
edge of causes.
For I(ant, the whole body of theoretical
knowledge which is rational and a priori, not
empirical and a posteriori, is the metaphysic of
nature, of which one. part is rationa! physics,
and the other rational psychology. "T'he meta-
physic ... of corporealn.ature," he\vrites, "is
called physic, or, because it must contain the
principles of an a priori knowledge of nature
only, rational physic." Here physics and meta-
physics do not have distinct objects as they do
for Aristotle; nor does Kant's conception of
physics as purely a priori kno,vledge. of nature
seem to agree with Aristotle's conception of
physics as inductive and empirical, if not exper-
imental.
These issues concerning the relation of
physics to mathematics and metaphysics have
significance for the experimental as well as the
philosophical study of nature. If, for example,
following the position taken by Hume, meta-
physical inquiry is dismissed as incapable of
yielding knowledge, and mathematical knowl-
edge is restricted to the realm of ideal entities,
then natural science, which for Hume consists
in experimental reasoning about matters of
fact, becomes the only knowledge of reality.
Even though Hume looks upon the conclusions
of experimental reasoning as at best probable,
it remains the case that questions about nature
\vhich cannot be answered.. by physics cannot
be answered scientifically.
The effect is the same as that achieved by
Hobbes, who makes physics the primary science
of reality on the ground that nothing exists
except bodies in motion. The assertion of the
primacy of physics, in short, may be due either
to the denial that immaterial objects can be
known by us, or to the denial that such objects
have any real existence. Of quite opposite
tenor is the view that only immaterial and
eternal things can be scientifically
that the sensible world of things which come to
be, pass away, and are forever
change, belongs to the realm of probabIlity
and opinion, not knowledge.
F'orPlato, mathematics and dialectic can be,
respectively, science and wisdom because they
study the intelligible reality of being in its im
ically prior to experimental natural science.
the extent that the experimentalist employs
.cal as opposed to mathematical principles,
JS1 . h'l h
roay have to derive these a p. 1 osop y
llature. GaliIeo, for exampIe, InvestIgates the
ertiesof natural and violent motions in the
.P
d
and Fourth Dayo his Two New
(i.e., the motions of freely falling
'es and of projectiles). The problem of
the reality of this distinction and
defining the natural .and the
s. of motion seems to be a matter of phllo-
e. . 1
hical analysis rather than of experlmenta
estigation.
ON AND KANT appear to agree with Aris-
about the separation of physics from
thematics. Rational (or pure, as opposed to
physics is, according to Kant, "en-
ly separate from mathematics." It is not to
confused with "what is commonly called
iiea generalis, which is mathematics rather
n a philosophy of Criticizing ,th,e
Ural philosophy of the anCIents It IS
rupted by logic in the school of Anstotle and
mathematics in the school of Plato, Bacon
that mathematics should "terminate natu-
philosophy rather than generate or create it.
hope for better results," he adds, "from
te and unmixed natural philosophy."
Bacon elsewhere observes that "the investi-
on of nature is best conducted when mathe-
ics are applied to physics." I-Ie does not
"the great use of mathematics in physics,"
rather insists that mathematics be regarded
"an. appendage or auxiliary" of natural phi-
ophy, not its master. He is writing
rnathematicians "who would have their
ce preside over physics."
lIf to \vhatever extent Aristotle, Bacon,
Kant are in agreement concerning the re-
i()n of physics and mathematics, their the-
siof the scope and subject matter of physics
to be at variance. For Bacon, physics is
one of the theoretic parts of natural phi-
hy; the other is metaphysics. Both are
ces of nature or the physical world, though
investigates material and efficient, the
t/fonnal and final causes. Both studies,
over, can be conducted experin1entally and
yield practical fruits (in mechanics and
physical bodies, but only as
thought at least, froin matter and
There are sciences which represent
mathematics and physics, such as
harmonics, but the eXistence of
sciences-the equivalent of what is
"mathematical physics"-seems to
imply rather than deny the ....
physical science from pure mC::ltnerr:LatlLCS.
Where Newton (who can be
exemplary author of a physics which
mathematical and experimental) goes
ematics for the principles of natural pnlllOSonl
Aristotle seems to think that
own proper. principles. If any
standing of these principles is
to be found in mathematics,
physics, or \vhat Aristotle calls
philosophy."
For example, ill.atter, form and
are proposed by Aristotle as the basic
principles. In such terms he is able
insight that all change involv'es a <:'11t'('f- ....... 4- ...........
that which changes) and contraries (or that;
which and that to which the change occd
But the analysis of matter and form in term
potentiality and actuality as modes of bei
and the consideration of form and privat1or1.
terms of being and non-being, belong tome
physics rather than physics.
Furthermore, Aristotle as a physicistCf
with bodies in motion and \vith the differe
between the generation of bodies ,and their'
teration, increase and decrease, or chan
place. But he leaves to metaphysics__to
books which come after the books on physi
the discussion of physical bodies as substa
composite of matter and form, and the dist
tion of substance and accident which bea.r
the difference between substantial and
dental change (i.e., generation and corruR
as opposed to the change in quality, quaIl
or place).
Though for Aristotle physics is as
from metaphysics as it is from mathematic
subject matter, physics depends upon
physics, as it does not upon
the establishment as \vell as the .... t." ".rlrt r-tA
its principles. It is in this sense that
is logically prior to physics. But
be a sense in \vhich
368
For all these more specialized considerations
of natural phenomena the Physics seems to serve
as a general introduction, as well as being in its
own right an exposition. of the most funda-
mental science in the sphere of natural philos-
ophy. It tries to define change and to state the
principles underlying every type of change.
I t tries to classify the types of change,separat-
ing coming to be and passing away simply (or
generation and corruption), from coming to be
ina special respect (or change in quality, quan"
ti ty, and place) which Aristotle usually calls
"motion" in distinction from "becoming" or
"generation." It undertakes to analyze the
conditions or causes of change ormation, to
distinguish what happens by chance from\vhat
happens of necessity, to disctiminate bet,veen
natural and unnatural or violent motions, to
treat the relation of mover and moved, .todeal
with the continuity and divisibility ofnl0tions,
to consider place and time as conditions or
aspects of motion, and to ask about the infinity
of body and of change, and about the eternity
of motion or the whole order of becoming, the
natural world of things in motion.
Aristotle's physics thus seems to stand in
sharp contrast to the physics of theexperi-
mentalists," not merely in method, but in the
questions it tries to answer and in the principles
to which it appeals. The effort to define change
in general and to state the principles and
causes operative in every type of change might
appear to correspond to the searchfor formulae
of maximum generality to cover all natural
phenomena. But where Newton and Fourier
hope thereby to reduce nature's variety to the
simplest terms-a few laws of motion cornpre-
hending the whole framework of nature-
Aristotle tends on the contrary to insist upon
an irreducible variety of types of motion, kinds
of rnatter, and causes of change.
Furthermore, the principles to which Aris-
totle appeals are not mathematical. He criticizes
the discussion of becoming which takes place in
Plato's Timaeus, on the ground that it tries to
substitute Inathematical for physical terms in
the analysis of change. "Physical bodies contain
surfaces and volumes, lines and points," he
writes, "and these are the subject matter of
rnathematics"; but the rnathematician is .not
concerned with these things as the attributes of
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
3 The role of Inathematics in the natural sciences: observation and Ineasurement in
relation. to mathematical formulations
5 The utility of physics: the invention of machines; the techniques of engineering; the
mastery of nature

266a; CH 4 266d-267c; CH 5-6,
BK XI, ClI 25336b-d
19 AQUINAs:Sunfma Theologi(a, PART I, Q I, A I,
REP'23b-4a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART t, 71c-d; 72a-d;
PART IV, 271d
30 BACON: AdvancementofLearning,33b-34b;
40a-c; 42c-43d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XIV, 31c-d I Discourse,
PART VI, 61b-62c / Meditations, I,.76c /
Objections and Replies, 21Sa-b; 285b-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, ClI XXI,
SECT 1-2 394d; SECT S 395c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT
432c-436b
42 KANT: Reason, 5a-13d esp Sd-6c
19a / Fund. Prine Metaphysic of .Morals,
253a-d; 271a-c / Judgement, 578a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a-886a; 889a-':890a
la. The relation ofthe philosophy of nature to
metaphysics and dialectic
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-242b / Republic, BK VI,
38Sc-388a; BK VII, 391b-398c
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BKI, CH 2 [I84b25-18Sa
I9l2S9c-260a; CH 9 [I9
2a
33-
b2
] 268c-d; BK II,
CH 2 [I94b8-IS] 271a; CII 7-[I98a22-3I] 275b-c;
BK III, CH S [204a34-b3] 282b-c; BK VIII, CH I
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 67:PI-IYSICS
To find the'passages cited, use the numbers in he,avytype, whic.h are the volume and
numbers of the passages referred to. For e.xample, In 4 HOMER: Ibad, B.K [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume In the set; the number 12d IndlCates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the tex.t is printed one column, the letters a and b refer to the
u . er and lower halvesofthe page.For example, In 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b,the
in the upper half of page u6 and ends in the lower half of pilge U9. When the text IS
rfntedin two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower of
handsideofthe page, the letters c and d to t?e upper and lower halves ofth.e hand sldeof
thepage. For example,i11 7 PLATO: 163b-164c, the begIns I? the.lowerhalf
of the left-hand side of page-163 and ends In the upper half of the nght-hand SIde of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the divisions of (suclias B.K, CH,
SECT) are sometin1esincluded in the reference; hne numbers, In brackets, areglven In cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to.book, chapter., and verse. When the King
d Douay versions differ in title of books or In the numbenng of chapters or verses, the KIng
version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:4S---(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls. attention o.r
'relevant parts of a whole reference; "passIm SIgnIfies the tOpIC IS dIscussed IntermIt-
tently rather than continuously in the works or passage CIted.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
hysics as the general theory' of becoming
and the order of nature 'or change:
philosophical physics, the philosophy of
nature, pure or physics
PLATO: Republic, BK vn,391b-398c / Timaeus,
447a-477a,c
ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK T, CH I 259a-b; 'elI 2
[184b2S-18SaI9] 259c-260a; ClI 9 [I 92a33-C..b2]
268c-d; BK II, CH 2 270a-271a; CH 7-9 275b-
278a,c; BK III, CH I [200
b
I2-24] 278a; ClIS
[204a34-b3] 282b-c; BK IV,. CH I [208a27--33]
287a; BK VIII, CH 3[253a32-b6] 337c / He:vens,
BK I, CH I [268
a
I-7] 359a; CH 5 [271 1-18]
362c-d; BK III, CH I [298bI3-30] 390a,-b; CH 7
[306aI-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9
[9Q
2a2
9-
b
9] 510c-d; BK II, CH. 3 [995aI5:-20]
513d; BK VI, cn I 547b,d-548c; BK VII, II
I037aIO-I8] 560d; BK XI, CH 3 [106Ia29- 12]
89c-d; CH 4 589d-590a; CH 7 592b-593a /
oul, BK I, ClI I [43
82
S-P19] 632b-d /. Sense
nd the Sensible, CH I [436aI6-b2] 673b /
Youth, Life, and Breathing, CH 27 [480b21-3I]
726d
ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, ; CH I
161a-165d esp [639b32-640aIO] 162a-b
PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5a-6a
AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 2 265b-
ity with the certitude ofmathematics. It
mathematics and dialectic, as Hume's
does: not, ,for something' more than thei
tude-for their knowledge of
rather than of appearances.
Furthermore, Hurne, unlike Plato,do
think the pr0bability of physics detracts
its utility, the sort of utility which Bacon
nifies more eloquently than Hume-the i
tion of machines and the technical appHc
of physics whereby man extends his'domi
over nature. In the traditional discussion of
dignity and value of physics, PlatoRndBa,
seem to represent attitudes as far apart as
the theories of Aristotle and Newton in
discussion of the subjectmatter and met
of physics.
THE GREAT IDEAS
370
2. Experimental physics and the empirical natural sciences: the relation ofexperimental
and philosophical physics
2a. The derivation of and principles from the philosophy
oEnature: the metaphysics of the scientist
2b. The treatment of causes in philosophical and empirical physics: description and
explanation, theory ana prediction
mutable forms. But the physicists "vnotry' to
give an account ofbecoming in all its changing
sensible appearances can do no better' than
Hadduce probabilities as likely as any others."
On such matters, Timaeussays, "we ought to
accept a tale which is probable andinquire no
"After discoursing at length of physi-
cal matters, Timaeus apologizes for the merely
conjectural character of his account ofnatural
phenomena, saying tfuat "a man may. some-
times set aside meditations about eternal things,
and for recreation turn to consider. the truths
of becoming "vhich are probable only; he will
thus gain a pleasure not to be repented of, and
secure for himselfa wise and moderate pastime)"
This view goes further than Hume's> In. de-
preciating physics by contrasting its probabil-
I. Physics as the general theory of becoming and the order of nature or change: philo-
sophical physics, the philosophy of nature, pure or rational physics
ra. The relation of the philosophy of nature to metaphysics and dialectic
lb. The relation of the philosophy of nature to mathematics: mathematical method
and mathematical principles in natural philosophy
4 The experilnental method in the study ofnature
4
a
. The distinction between simple observation and experimentation:
creating ideal or isolated physical systems
4
b
. Experimental discovery: inductive generalization from experiment; the role of
thearyor hypothesis in experimentation
4
C
Experimental testing and the crucial experiment
4
d
. Experimental measurement: the application of mathematical formulae
373
BK I, APH 48 110d-ll1a; APH 99 BK II,
APH 2 137b-c / New Atlantis, 210d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, IX, 15b-d I Discourse,
PART VI, 61b-62c; 66a-b I Meditations, IV,
90a-b I Objections and Replies, AXIOM I
131d; 215a-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX 369b-372d
34 NE\VToN:Principles, 1a-2a; DEF VIII 7b... 8a;
BK III, RULE I-II 270a; GENERAL SCHOL,
372a / Optics, BK III, 542a; 543a-b
34 HUYGENS: Light, CH I, S53b-554a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III,
SECT 28-29 322a-323a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 32
418d-419a; SECT 50-53 422c-423a passim;
SECT passim; SECT 101-109
432c-434b passim
35 I-IUME: Human Understanding, SECT. I, DIV 9
454c-455a; SECT IV,DIV 26 460b-c; SECT VII,
DIV 57, 475d-476b [fn 2]; DIV 60, 477a; SECT
VIII, DIV 67
42 KANT: Pure Reason, / Practical Rea-
son, 311d-314d / Judgement,
c; 581a-582c
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART I,
9d-l0b
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c-240d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IX, 344a-b;
BK XI, 470a-c; BK XIII, 563a-b; EPILOGUE I,
650b-c; EPILOGUE II, 694d-696d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 89b-90a; 742a.. b;
745b; 882a-884b passim, esp 882b-883a, 884b;
885a-886a
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 484a
3. The role of mathematics in the natural
sciences: observation and measurement
in relation to mathematical formulations
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 9
[76a3-25] cn 13 [78b31-79aI6]108b-c
/ Physics, BK II, CH 2 [I94
a
J--II] 270b-c; BK
VII, CH 5 I Metaphysics, BK XIII, CH 3
[r078aS-I7]
9 ARISTOTLE: Gait of Animals, CH 9
11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes
519b / Floating Bodies / Method

14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus,
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK V, 964b-965a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, par 3-6 27c-
28c / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 29,651b-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 32,
A I, REP 2 PART l-n, Q 35, A 8,
ANS 780c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 9,
A 2, REP 3 424b-425a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 73b; PART
IV,
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
131b-132a; 133b; FOURTH DAY, 245b-d;
252a-b
CHAPTER 67: PHYSICS
GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
THIRD DAY, 197a-b; 200a-c
3 PASCAL: Vacuuln,
-t NE\VTON: Principles, BK III, RULE I-III 270a-
271a; GENERAL SCHOL, / Optics,
.BK I, 40gb; BK III, 540a;541b;;,542a
Light, CH I,
5 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 102

042 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals,
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry,' PART I,
36b;
5 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a
5 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity,582b-584a;
595a; 670a; 673d; 824a-b;
JAMES: Psychology, viib-viiia; 69b-70a;
119b esp 95a; 882a-886a; 889a-890a
FREUD: Narcissism, 400c-401d I Instincts,

The treatment of causes in philosophical
and empirical physics: description and
explanation, theory and prediction
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-246c I Republic, BK
VI-VII, / Timaeus,
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics
passim, esp BK I, CH 13 BK II, CH
1-2 CH 9 128a-b, CH II
129d, CH 16-18 134b136a / Physics, >BK II,
CH 3 [I94bI6- 23] ClI 7-9
BK IV, CH 4 [2II
a
6-II] 290a I Metaphysics, BK
I, CH I [98Ia24-982aI] 499c-500b; CH 2 [982a
28-3] SOOc; BK III, CH 2 [996aI8-b26J
515b; BK VI, CH I [I025bI-I8] 547b,d; BK VII,
CH 17 [I04IaIO_bII] BK VIII, CH 4
[I044a3J-b20] BK XI, CH 7 [I063b36-
I064
a
9] 592b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1
[639bIO-642b4] esp [642aI-30]
165a-c / Gait of Animals, CHI I Gen-
eration ofAnimals, BK I, CH I [715aI-I8] 255a-
b; BK IV, CH 1 [765a3S-bS]i 306c; BK V, CH I
[778b7-IO] 320d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 4 169a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [509-533]
BK VI [73-711]
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres,
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 32"
A I, REP 2 Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-
298a; Q 86, A 4, ANS
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, PART IV,
267a-b
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK I, 6a-7a; BK II,
27b-c
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
FOURTH DAY,
28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 319c / On
Animal Generation, 425a
SO BACON: Advancement of Learning,
45a-46a; 46c,47c / Novum Organu1n,
Ib t
51 and Peace, EPILOGUE II
53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a-883a ,69
2. Experimental physics and the erop' .
4. Irlcal
ural SCIences: the relation of ex
mental and philQSophical physics 11
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VII, 391b ..398c
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK II, CH 13 [29 a
BK III,CH 7 [306a3--18] 397b_c
3
/
5
eratton and Corruption, BK I CH 2 [ 6
a
411c-d '.3
1
5
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts oifAnimals BK I
, , CH 1 16
l65d esp [639b32--640aIO] 162a-b
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREP la b' BK 2
28 G ' -, II, 7
ALILEO: Two New Sciences TH
202d-203a; 2l4d ., IRD D
30 BACON: Adt/ancementojLearning, 3
3la; 33b-34b; 42a-43d; I No
vu
Organum, PREF l05a-l06d' BK
, . I, APR I
108a; APH.5
1
lllc; APH 54 lllc-d; APR 63-6
113d114b, APH 66 APH 80 120a-b
APH 95 126b-c; APH 107 l28c; APH 109 128d
129c; BK II, APH I-10
l37a, APH 9 140b-c APR
31 DESCARTES: PART VI,
34 NEWTON: Pnnclples, BK III, 269
RULE III-IV b; GENERAL SCRO
371 I Opttcs, BK III, 542a-543b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CR II
SECT 24--
2
9 esp SECT 26 321b-
CH VI, SECT I 3 CH XII, SECT 9-1
360d-362d passim, esp SECT 10 361
35 BERKELEY: l/uman Knowledge, SECT 59 424
35 HUME: lfuman Understanding, SECT IV, DIV'
23-
2
7 459a-460d esp DIV 26 460b-c; SECT XI
DIV 1.3 I-132
39 SMITH: Jealth of Nations, BK V,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 299a
42 KANT: Pure Reas?n, 5a-13d esp 17
19a I Fund. Prtn. of Moral
253a-d I Intra. Metaphystc of Morals, 387a-
I Judgement, 578a-b
45 LAVOISIER: ofChemistry, PREF,
49 DARWIN: Ongtn of Species, 239c
50 MARX: Capital, 6c
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 883b
54 FRE?D: Narcissism, 400d-401a I General Intro-
ductt?n, 545c-d I Inhibitions, Symptoms, ana
Anxtety, 722a- b I New Introductory Lectures
873d-875a esp
2a. The derivation of definitions distinctions
and principles from the 0'
nature: the metaphysics of the scientist
8 ARISTOTLE: [leavens, BK III, CH 7 [306a3-18
397b-c I Sense and the Sensible, CH I .[436
I6-,bI7] / Youth, Lift, and Breathing
CH 27 [480b21-30] 726d
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1_

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK V, 104b-l05d; BKVI

THE GREAT IDEAS
372
(1. Physics as the general theory of becoming and
the order of natu're or change: philosophical
the of nature, pure or
rat!onal phystcs. la. The relation of the
Pktlosop'hy oj nature to metaphysics and
dlalecttc. )
[250:11-25I
a
8] I Heavens,BK III, CH I
[298bI3-30] 390a-b I Metaphysics, BK I, CH 8
[9
8
9 21-99
oa8
] 507d-508a; BK II, CH 3 [995a
15-
20
] 513d; BK VI, CH I 547b,d-548c;BK
VII, CH 560d; BK XI, CH 3
[I06ra29- 12] 589c-d; CH 4 589d-590a; CH 7
592b-593a; BK XII, CH I [I069a3o-b2] 598b-c
I Soul, BK I, CH I [403a25-_bI9] 632b-d
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5a-6a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 85,
A I, REP 2
23 HOBBES; Leviathan, PART I, 72a-d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning,
I Novum Organum, BK II, APH I
137a; APH 9
42 KANT: Reason, 17d-19a I Fund. Prine
Metaphyslc of Morals, 253a-d I Practical
Reason, 351b-352c I Judgelnent 561c-562a c.
578a-b " ,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II 693d-
694d '
53 JAMES: Psychology, 862a-866a; 884b-886a esp
886a
lb. The relation of the philosophy of nature to
mathematics: mathematical method and
mathematical principles in natural phi.
losophy
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VII, I.Timaeus
449b-450b; .. ,
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 2
CH 9 [200
a
I5-29] I Heavens BK 1Ir'
[
a' ,
CH I 299 1-3
ooaI
9] 390b-391c I Metanh11sics
BK I, 9 [99
2a2
9--
b
9] BK ;
513c-d, BK VI, CH I BK XI, CH 3
[I06Ia29]-CH 4 [I06Ib33] 589c-590a; CH 7
BK XII, CH 8 [I073bI'-I7] 603d-
604a; BK XIII, CH 3 609a-610a I Soul BK I
CH I [403bIO-I9] 632d "
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts ofAnimals, BK I, CH I [639b
6-12] 161c-d
11 N ICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 813d-
814a '
19 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I, QI, A I,
REP 2 3b-4a; Q 7, A 3, ANS 32c-33c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, PART IV
' . ,
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
133b; THIRD DAY, FOURTH DAY,
252a-b
31 Rules, IV, 7a-c; XIV, 31c-d /
ObJecttons and Replies, 170a
34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; BK III, 269a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-19a' 211c-
218d '
THE GREAT IDE.AS
375
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
I60d-161a; SECOND DAY, 191b-193b
30 BACON: Advancen1ent of Learning, 34b I
Novum Organum, BK I, APH 81 120b-e; APH
124 133e-d; APH 129134d-135d; BK II, APH
39, 170b-e;APH 44-51 175d-194c/New At-
lantis, 210d-2I4d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART VI 60d-67a,e
esp 61b-e
33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 392b-393a
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 412a-423b
35 LOCKE: Human Understandng,BK IV, CH
XII, SECT 11-12 361e-362e
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART III, 99b-112a
39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations,BK I, 5d-6a
40 GIBBON: l)eclineandFall, 661c-:663c
41 GIBBON: DeclineglldFall, 291d-:292c; S09d:-
510a,e
45 LAVOISIER: Eleraents of Chemistry" PART ,l,
26e-27a; 41a-44d; 45e-d
45 FOURIER: Theory,lfJ! Reat,.170a'-172a; 184a;
213b
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 390b; 433a-
440a,e
50 MARX:' Capital, 170a-c; l80d-188e ; 23ge-d
50 Communist Manifesto, 421d
54 FREUD: Civilization' and Its, Discontents, 777a;
778b-779a
GHApTER67: PI-IYSICS
S-REFERENCES
: The general discussion of the distinction between philosophy and science, relevant to the
difference' between a philosophical,' and an experimental, physic:s, see KNOWLEDGE, 6cC4) ;
PHILOSOPHY I c; SCIENCE I C.
Whe relation of physics as a philosophy of nature to mathematics and to metaphysics,
see MATHEMATICS Ia; MATTER4b; METAPHYSICS 3b; NATURE 4b; PHILOSOPHY 2b;
SCIENCE Ia(2).
The relation of mathematics to experimental physics, and, for the nature of mathematical
physics, see ASTRONOMY 2C; MATHEMATICS Sb; MECHANICS 3; SCIENCE 5C.
0thercliscussions relevant to the treatment of causes in philosophical anq scientific physics,
see ASTRONOMY 3a-3b;CAUSE sb; SCIENCE 4c; and for other of problems or
concepts fundamental to physics, see CHANCE Ia-I b; CHL\NGE 2-ib, sa-sh, 6a-6b, 7a-7d;
ELEMENT 3-3d, S; INFINITY 3d-3e'4a-"4b; MATtER I-Ib,2a-"2b;MECHANICS
6e; NATURE 3a-3c(3); QUANTITY sa-se; SPACE I-2C, 3b; TIME 1.
The logic of the experimental method in the study of nature, seeINDucTIONS; I... OGIC 4b;
MECHANICS 2a; REASONING 6c; and for the theory of experimentation and the use of
hypotheses and measurements, see ASTRONOMY 2a-2b; EXPERIENCE HYPOTHESIS
4-4d ; MATHEr-A1\TICS sa; MECHANICS 2b, 3a ; QUANTITY 6;6c;SCIENCE sa-sb, sd-se.
Other considerations of the utility of physics or natural science generally, see KNOWLEDGE
8a; SCIENCE I b{ I).
The various branches of,physics, such as astronomy, statics, dynamics, optics, acoustics,
hydrodynamics, magnetisrn, and ' electricity, see ASTRONOMY 8a;':'9f ;MECHANICS 'Ib, sa-
5(2), 6a-6e, 7a, 7b-7c, 7d, 7e.
Discussions relevant to the distinction bet\veen physics and biology or psychology" see
ANIMAL 4a; CHANGE 6c-6d,9a-9D, loa-lob; LIFE AND DEATH 2; MECHANICS 4b-4C; MIND
2e; and for the treatment of one; aspect of psychophysics, see SENSE 3C(2).
Experimental measurement: the application
of mathematical formulae
8 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK IV, 8Se-8ge; BK V,
92a-93b
8 GALILEO: TVJo, , Net{) Sciel1ces,.FIRSTDA"Y-,
136d-137e esp 137b-c; 148d-14ge; 164a-166c
esp 165c-166e; THIRD DAY, 207d-208c
HARVEY: Motion ofthe Heart, 286c-288c
1\JEWTON:Principles, LAWS OF MOTION, SCHOL,
20a-22a; BK II, GENERAL sCHOL211b-219a;
PROp'40, SCHOL239a-246b
5 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PARTT,
14;a-e; 17a-20b; 22d-24a; 30a-32d; 33b-36a;
PART III, 87d-90a; 91a-95a;96b-l03b
FOURIER: Theory ofHeat,,175p;184b-185b
FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 277d-279a;
316b-31Be; 444a-451a; 465d..
467a,c; 768d-773d; 778b,d-793e
JAMES: Psychology, 56a-'66aesp 61P:-64a;
126a; 26Sa-268b;34Ja-344b; 348a-359;i
he utility of physics: the invention of. ma-
chines; the techniques" of' engineering;
the mastery of nature
PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252a-,25Sa
GILBERT: Loadst9ne,. BK III, ,75a-b; IV,
8Se-8ge; UK v, lOOc,>101d
34 NEWTON: Pri'nciples, BK III, RULE III-IV
271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a t
BK I, 379a; 386b-404b; 424a-440a; 4S0a-
BK II, 4S7a-478b; BK II-III, 496a-516a;
543a-b
34 HUYGENS: Li'ght, PREF, SSlb-SS2a
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK III, C
SECT 46-47 281d-282b; BK IV, CH XII S
9-13 360d-362d passim '
42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysi'c of Morals, 387a-
45 LAVOISIER: Elements ofChemi'stry, PREF
l
2
PART I, 10d-12d; 17a-20d esp 17a;, 22<1-
29d-33b
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a; 175b; 1
45 FARADAY: Researches i'n Electricity, 26Sa
esp 272e-273a; 277a-300a; 319b,d-
347a-351e; 362d-366e; 371d-377d; ,'440b
607a,e; 6S9a; 774d-77Sa;8S1a-e
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 136b-139apass
53 JAMES: Psychology, 126a-127a; 265a-2
341a-344b; 348a-357b passim; 385a-b ' ,
4c. Experimental testing and verification: t
crucial experiment
10 GALEN: Natural Faculti'es, BK I, CH 13 17
177a; BK III, CH 2199d-200a; CH 4 201b-20
CH 8 205a-207b
21 DANTE: Di'vine Comedy, PARADISE, II [4
6
-1
l08b-d
28 GALILEO: Two New Sci'ences, FIRST DA
148e-14ge; 166d-I68a; THIRD DAY, 200a-
202d-203a; 203d-205b; 207d-208e
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268d-273e e
268d, 273e; 286b-304a,e esp 286b-e, 295
296a / Circulation of the Blood, 3I1e-312
324e-d
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II,
164a-168d
31 DESCARTES: Di'scourse, PART VI,
66a-b
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-370a / Great Exp
ment 382a-389b / Weight of Air, 404a-40
425a-429a
34 NEWTON: Princi'ples, LAWS OF MOTION, seliC
19b-'22a; BK II, GENERAL sCHOL211b-219
PROP 40, SCHOL 239a-246b / Optics, BK
392a-396b; 408a-410b; 412a-416b; 45
455a; BK III, 543a-b
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK
XII, SECT 13 362e-d
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2a
PART I, 17a-b; 32a-33a
45 FOURIER: Theory 0.J1Heat, 181h; 184a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 300b-
334b-335e; 377d-383a; 385b-e; 388e..3
440b,d; 467a-b; 830b-832e
49 DARWIN: Ori'gin of Species, 12b-e; 149d-1
53 JAMES: Psychology, 865a; 882a-884b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 291d-2
Narcissism, 401a / New Introductory Lec
815a-b; 818e-819b
374
(3. The role of mathematics in the natural sci-
ences: observation and measurement inre-
lation to mathematicalformulations.)
30 BACON: ,Advancement' of Learning, 46b-e t
Novum Organum, BK I, APH 109, 129b; BK II,
APH 8 140b;APH 39, 170b-;-e
31 DESCARTES : Rules, IV, 7a'-e; XIV,. 31e-d /
Discourse, PART I,43b-e; PART III, SOd /
Objections and Repli'es, 169c-170a
34 NEWTON: Principles, la'-2a; DEF VIII 7b-8a;
BK I,PROp69, SCHOL, 131a; BK III, 269a
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF,551b-552a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIv 27
460e-d
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART III, 94b'-103a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 299b-c
42 KANT: Judgement, 551a-552a;
45 LAVOISiER: Elements', of Chemistry, PART I,
14a-e; 33b-36a;41a-44d;PART III, 96b-l03b
45 FOURIER: Theory ofHeat, 169a-b;172a-173b;
175b; 177a; 182b-184a; 249a-h
45 FARADAY: Researches i'n Electricity, 831b-e
50 MARX: Capital, 170a-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 469a-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 126a-b; 348a-359a esp
351a-354a; 675b; 876a-b; 882a-884b
4. The experimental method in the study, of
nature
4a. The distinction between simple observa-
tion and experimentation: the art of cre-
ating ideal or isolated physical systems
28 GALILEO: Two New Sci'ences, FIRST DAY,
I48d-14ge; 166d-167b
28 HARVEY: Circulation ofthe Blood, 320b
50 MARX: Capital, 6e
53 JAMES: Psychology, 126a-127b
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 815a-c
4b. Experimental discovery: inductive generali-
zation from experiment; the role of
theory or hypothesis in experimentation
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 la-3b
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, 1a-b; BK I, 6a-
7a; BK II, 27e-28a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
131a-138b; 157b-171b passim; THIRD DAY,
203d-205b; 207d-208a
28 HARVEY: Motion ofthe Heart, 273e-d; 280e-d;
285e-d / On Animal Generation, 331b-333d;
336b-d; 383d; 451b-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learni'ng, 16a; 30d-
31a; 34b; 42a-e; 56e-5ge / Novum Organum,
PREF-BK I 105a-I36a,c esp BK I, APH 64 114b,
APH 70 116b-1I7a, APH 82 120d-121b, APH
99-100 127b-e; .BK II, APH 11-14 140d-148d;
APH 36 164a-168d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART VI, 61d-62e
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 359a-365h t Equilibrium
of Liquids 390a-403a passim
AQUINAS. On the Trinity of Botthius, QQ 5-6
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART IV, CH 27
NEWTON. Letters on Various Subjects in Natural
Philosophy
KANT. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, par
14-39
-'-. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL II, SECT II, CH 2
II.
SUAREZ. Disputationes J.V!etaphysicae, I (4), xv (I I)
BOYLE.NeuI Experiments Physico-Mechanical
--. The Sceptical Chymist
--. The Origin of Forms and Qualities, According
to the Corpuscular Philosophy
--. Experin1ents, Notes, etc..About the Mechanical
Origine or Production ofDivers Particular Qualities
VOLTAIRE. Letters on the English, XIV-XVII
BLACK. Experin1ents upon Magnesia Alba, Quick-
lime, and Some Other Alcalil1e Substances
J. PRIESTLEY. Experiments and Observations on Dif-
ferent Kinds of
CAVENDISH. Experilnents of Factitious Air
--. Electrical Researches
--. Experiments on Air
SCHELLING. Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur
1;. YOUNG. Lectures on Natural Philosophy and the
Mechanical Arts
DAVY. Elements of Chemical Philosophy
DALTON. A New System of Chemical Philosophy
COMTE. The Positive Philosoplly, BK III-IV
'VHEWELL. The Philosophy ofthe Inductil/e Sciences,
VOL I, BK V-VI
TYNDALL. On the Study of Physics
HELMHOLTZ. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, I
HERSCHEL. A Prelin1inary Discourse on the Study of
lVatttral Philosophy
--. Fan1iliar Lectures on Scientific Subjects, VI-VIII,
XIII
MENDELEYEV. The Principles of Chemistry
W. THOMSON and TAIT. Treatise on Natural
phy
--. Elements of Natural Philosophy
LOTZE. Grundziige der Naturphilosophie
MAXWELL. Matter and Motion
CLIFFORD. The Comn10n Sense ofthe Exact Sciences,
CH 2,5
OSTWALD. IVatural Philosophy
or "delight," "pain" or "uneasiness," and he
observes that "whether we call it satisfaction,
delight, pleasure, happiness, etc., on the one
side, or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment,
anguish, misery, etc., on the other,. they are
still but different degrees of the same thing."
Other writers use "joy" and "sorro\v" or
"grief" as synonyms for "pleasure" and "pain."
The \vords "pleasure" and "pain" are closely
associated in meaning with "pleasant" and "un-
pleasant," though Freud sometimes uses "un...
pleasure" (unlust) to signify an opposite of
pleasure which is not the same as ordinary pain
(schmerz). The pleasant is often called "agree...
able," "enjoyable," or "satisfying." In the
language of Shakespeare, the words "like" and
"dislike" have currency as the equivalents of
"please" and "displease." A person who is dis-
pleased by something says of it that "it likes
me not."
THE PROBLEM OF what pleasure and pain are
seems logically to precede the ethical consider-
ation of their relation to good and evil, happi-
ness and nlisery, virtue and duty. But in the
tradition of the great books, the psychological
questions about pleasure and pain are usually
raised in Inoral or political treatises, and SOil1e-
times in connection with discussions of rhetoric.
What pleasure is, how it is caused, and the ef-
fects it produces are seldom considered apart
from whether pleasures should be sought or
avoided, whether some pleasures should be pre-
ferred to others, and \vhether pleasure is the
sole criterion of the good. Sometimes, as \vith
Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, the ethical
point-that pleasure and pain are in one sense
morally indifferent-is made without any psy-
chological account of the nature and origin of
these experiences. frequently, as in Pla-
to's Philebus and i\ristotle's Ethics, or in the
377
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 68: PLEASURE AND PAIN
EASURE and pain, writes Locke, "like
ther simple ideas, cannot be described, nor
names defined; the way of knowing them
. only by experience." That pleasure and
are elementary experiences, attributed to
als as well as enjoyed or suffered by men,
tested by poets and physiologists alike, by
omists and theologians, by historians. and
lists. Yet in the tradition of western
ght, few of the great \vriters are content to
e the nature or n1eaning of pleasure and
to the intuitions of experience alone.
nflicting definitions are proposed. Psy-
ogists disagree about the conditions under
h the feelings of pleasure and pain occur,
causes and consequences, their relation to
tion, to desire and emotion, to thought,
'on, and action. Moralists dispute whether
ure is the only good and pain the only
whether pleasure is only one good among
rs robe assessed according to its worth in
scale of goods, whether pleasure and pain
orally indifferent, whether some pleas-
are good, others bad, or all are intrinsi-
evil.
otonly in the theory of good and evil, huet
in the theories of beauty and truth, pleas-
nd pain are fundamental terms. They are
ted by all the difficulties which belong
ese great themes; and also with the diffi-
es attendant on the ideas of virtue, sin, and
'shment, of duty and happiness, into the
ideration of \vhich pleasure and pain tradi-
llyenter.
e traditional use of the words "pleasure"
'pain" is complicated by more than the
yof definitions \vhich have been given.
words are frequently substituted for
sometimes as synonyms and sometimes
press only one part or aspect of their
ing. Locke, for example, uses "pleasure"
TfIE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
1.
below.are n.ot in Great Books ofthe JVestern .w.orld, relevant to the
idea and tOpICS \VIth \vhIch thIS chapter deals. These \vorks are dIvIded Into t\VO groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. 'Vorks by authorsnot represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
POINCARE. The Value of Science, PART n
DUHEM. La theorie physique, son objet-sa stru
Identity and Reality
CASSIRER. Substance and Function, PART I,
SUP VII
BROAD. Perception, Physics, and Reality
N. R. CAMPBELL. Physics; the Elements
PAULI. Relativitiitstheorie
LORENTZ. Lectures on Theoretical Physics
-.-. Problems ofNlodern Physics
WHITEHEAD. The Concept of Nature, ClI 9
--. The Principle of Relativity with Applications
Physical Science
--. Science and Modern World, ClI 7---8
BRIDGMAN. The LogIC of Modern Physics
\VEYL. Space-Time-Matter
--. Philosophy ofMathematics and Natural Sci
BOHR. At01nic Theory and the Description ofNa
HEISENBERG. The Physical Principles ofthe Quan
Theory
SANTAYANA. The Realm of Matter, ClI 1
M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK II, CH 2
LENZEN. The Nature of Physical Theory
EINSTEIN. Relativity: The Special and the Gene
Theory
--. Sidelights on Relativity
--. lne Meaning of Relativity
--. On the Method of Theoretical Physics
CARNAP. The Unity of Science
-.-. Philosophy and Logical Syntax, III (5-:-9)
MARITAIN. An Introduction to Philosophy, PART II
--. The Degrees of Knowledge, CH 3
--. Science and Wisdom, pp 34-69
GILSON. The Unity ofPhilosophical Experience, c
EINSTEIN and INFELD. The Evolution of Physics
WATSON. On Understanding Physics
D'l\BRO. Decline of Mechanisln in Modern Physi
EDDINGTON. The Mathematical Theory of Relati
--. The Philosophy of Physical Science
RIEZLER. Physics and Reality
P. FRANK. Between Physics and Philosophy
B. RUSSELL. Our Knowledge ofthe External It':
III-IV
--. The Analysis o.f Matter, CH 1-26,37
--. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, p
I, CH 3; PART II, CH 4
PLANCK. A Survey of Physics
--. The Philosophy of Physics, CH I
--. Scientific Autobiography
SCHLICK. Philosophy of Nature
376