472

INTRODUCTiON
Chapter 7Y PRUDENCE
473
PRUDENCE IS NOT ALWAYS described as skill of
mind in deliberating about alternative courses
of action, nor is it always regarded as entirely
praiseworthy or admirable-inseparable from
virtue and the good life.
It is, for exalnple, sometimes identified with
foresight or even conjecturing about the future.
So conceived, prudence does not! seem to re'"
quire rational power so much as memory and
imagination, in order to project past experience
into the future. In this sense, Aristotle admits
it may be said that "even some of the lower
animals have practical wisdom, viz., those
which are found to have a po\ver of foresight
wi th regard to their own life."
Identifying prudence with foresight, Hobbes
conceives perfect prudence as belonging only
cerned not with action but with the nature of
things-Aristotle alone raises a further ques'"
tion about the distinction between practical
wisdom and art.
In making something, the artist also deals
wi th particulars. In this sense, art is also prac'"
tical. But, according to Aristotle, the word
"productive" should be used in distinction
from "practical" to signify the difference be'"
tween making and doing-two kinds of human
activity ,vhich, though alike as compared with
scientific knowing, represent knowledge differ-
ently applied. The knowledge which the artist
possesses can, furthermore, be formulated in a
set of rules. An individual can acquire the skill
of an art by practicing according to its rules.
What a man knows when he is prudent seems to
be much less capable of being communicated
by precept or rule. What he knows is ho,v to
deliberate or calculate well about things to be
done.
This, in Aristotle's view, marks prudence off
from all other virtues. That prudence is a qual-
ity of mind seems to follow from the fact that
it involves deliberation, a kind of thinking
about variable and contingent particulars of
the same sort which belong to the realm of
opinion. That prudence is also a moral quality,
an aspect of character, seems to fo11o\" no less
froill Aristotle's statement that prudence is not
deliberation about the means to any sort of end,
but only about those '\vhich conduce to the
good life in general."
CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE
sophia-both of which are sometimes trans'"
ain English by "wisdom." But Aristotle,
Hobbes, insists llpon the distinction be-
n the wisdom which is the ultimate fruit
he speculative sciences or philosophy and
wisdom \vhich belongs to the sphere of
ral and political action. Wishing to preserve
stotle's sense that phronesis and sophia have
ething in common which deserves. the
gistic connotation of '\visdom," his trans-
rs usually render these words in English by
phrases "practical wisdom" or "political
om" (for phronesis), and "speculative wis-
" or "philosophical \visdom" (for sophia).
English rendering of Aquinas, on the other
, usually translates his prudentia by "pru-
e," and his sapientia by "wisdom."
hether it is permissible to use "prudence"
."practical \visdom" as synonyms may be
a question of verbal equivalence; for
.te is a fundamental issue in theory concern-
the unity of wisdom, on which Plato differs
both Aristotle and Aquinas. The question
t the relation of knowledge and virtue
be differently ans\vered according to the
of wisdom which denies its division into
ulative and practical, and according to the
which conceives the possibility that a man
be wise in one way without being \vise in
other. In the language of Aquinas, a man
have acquired wisdom through science
understanding without having the moral
acter of a prudent man.
hat practical wisdom is not scientific
ledge is evident," Aristotle declares. This
nfirmed, he adds, "by the fact that while
g men become geometricians and mathe'"
cians and wise in lllatters like these, it is
ght that a young man ofpractical wisdom
ot be found. The reason is that such wisdom
ncerned not only with universals but with
iculars, which become familiar from expe'"
e, but a young man has no experience, for
length of time that gives experience."
abbes and Aristotle seem to agree that
rience is important for the development of
ence or practical wisdom precisely be'"
e"it is practical and practice is concerned
particulars." But though both also agree
this explains the distinction between pru'"
scientific is con'"
Even there, however, the conceptionof
dence is used more frequently than ie/i
pounded. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, flo
and Kant seem to be the exceptions,(.a
these only Aristotle and Aquinas offer/a
tended analysis-Aristotle in his> book
tellectual virtue in the Ethics, Aquinasi
tain questions of his Treatise on JIabits/i
Summ.a Theologica, but more extensively
Treatise on Prudence (see the questions
the Sunlma Theologica cited in the/iIi
i\dditional Readings).
THAT PRUDENCE IS NOT kno\vledgein the
nary sense of the term-that it is a prod
experience and a possession of reason whic
like science or art, cannot be expressed in
ositions-seems to be clearly implie6
Hobbes. "'Vhen the thoughts of a man,
has a design in hand, running over a multi
of things, observes how they conduce ld.
design, or \vhat design they nlay conduce
his 0 bservations are such as are not ea
usual; this wit of his is called Prudence, an
pends on much experience and memoryc:)
like things, and their consequences heretoL
Whereas science can achieve some
the judgments of prudence are, accordip
Hobbes, all uncertain, "because to obserV
experience and remember all circumst
that may alter the success, is impossible.."
the opposition between experience andsgt
which seems to lead Hobbes to distinguislj
dence from wisdom. "As much experieil.
prudence, so is much science sapience.
though we usually have one name of wis
for them both, yet the Latins did always
tinguish between prudentia and sapientia,
cribing the former to experience, the
science."
Greeks also had t\VO \vords-plm
O
F the qualities or virtues attributed to the
intellect, prudence seems to be least con-
cerned \vi th knowledge and most concerned
with action. When \ve call a man a scientist or
an artist, or praise the clarity of his understand-
ing, we imply only that he has a certain kind of
knowledge. We admire his mind, but we do not
necessarily adn1irehim as a man. \Ve may not
even kno\v \vhat kind of man he is or what kind
of life leads. It is significant that our Ian...
guage does not contain a noun like "scientist"
or "artist" to describe the man who possesses
prudence. We must use the adjective and
speak of a prudent man, which seems to suggest
that prudence belongs to the whole man, rather
than just to his mind.
Prudence seems to be almost as much a moral
as an intellectual quality. We would hardly
call a man prudent \vithout kno,ving his n1an-
ner of life. Whether he behaved temperately
would probably be much more relevant to our
judgment of his prudence than whether he had
a cultivated mind. The extent of his education
or the depth of his learning might not affect
our judgment at all, but we probably would
consider whether he was old enough to have
learned anything from experience and ,,,hether
he had a.ctually profited fronl experience to be'"
come Wise.
These observations not only express the ordi-
nary sense of the word "prudence," but also
give a summary indication of the idea for ,,,hich
that word stands in the great books. Like other
fundamental traits of mind or character, pru-
dence is considered by the poets and historians
in terms of precept and exaillple. For the defini-
tion of the term or for an analysis of its relation
to other fundamental ideas, such as virtue and
happiness, desire and duty, one must go to the
great \"orks of moral and political theory or of
theology.
THE. GREAT IDEAS
terms of Kant's division of the impera-
of conduct into the pragmatic and the
1, according as they refer to welfare and
iness or duty and law, prudence is merely
atic. It does not belong to morality. The
atic. imperative .of prudence is more like
technical in1perative of art, which is also
itional and concerned with determining
ns to an end-in this case" the thing to be
ced by skill. "If it were only equally easy
CHAPTER.73: PRUDENCE 475
h, they seem to give prudent deliberation to give a definite conception of happiness, the
vidious connotation of cold.. and selfish imperatives of prudence would correspond
ation. exactly with those of skill."
uggestion of this appears in Mill's con- As Kant sees it, "the sole business of reason
etween duties to ourselves and duties to in the moral philosophy of prudence is t() bring
wherein he remarks that "the term duty about a union of all the ends, which are aimed
:self, when it means anything more than at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end-
nee, means self-respect and self-develop- that of happiness, and to show the agreement
." It would seem to be implied that pru- which should exist among the means of attain-
means something less-something more ing that end. In this sphere, accordingly,reason
-than a proper and justifiable self-inter- cannot present to us any more than pragmatical
e violation of which involves "a breach laws of free action, for our guidance towards
y to others, for whose sake the individual the aims set up by the senses, and -is incom-
nd to have care for himself." petent to give us the laws which are pure and
nt, more explicitly than Mill, ,associates determined completely a priori." Hence the
nee with expediency and self-seeking, and precepts of prudence "are used by reason only
tes it froin action in accordance with as counsels, and by way of counterpoise against
under the categorical imperative of the seductions to an opposite course."
law. Prudence has meaning only in rela- The issue between Kant and Aristotle (or
o a hypothetical imperative "which ex- Aquinas) with respect to prudence thus appears
s the practical necessity of an action as a to be part of the larger issue between them on
s to the advancement of happiness." the fundamental principles of morality, dis-
ted that a man seeks his individual happi- cussed in the chapters on DUTYand HAPPINESS.
then "skill in the choice of means to his In Kant's view, Aristotle and Aquinas, no less
greatest well-being may be called pm- than Mill, are pragmatists rather than moral-
." Consequently, "the imperative which ists. They are all utilitarians in the sense that
to the choice of means to one's happiness, they regard happiness as the first principle of
he precept of prudence, is still always human conduct and concern themselves with
thetical ; the action is not commanded ab- the ordering .of means to this end.. Since the
y, but only as.a means to another consideration of means necessarily involves the
e," or, as Kant says elsewhere, "the weighing of alternatives as more or less expe-,
of self-love (prudence) only advises; the dient, prudence becomes indispensable to the
f morality commands." Furthermore, he pursuit, of happiness. The choice of the .best
that "what duty is, is plain of itself to means is second in importance only to the eIec-
one; but what it is to bring true durable tionof the right end.
rage, such as will extend to the whole ,of Kant admits that those who liye, forhappi-
existence, is always veiled in impenetrable ness requirea great deal of prudence, in order
rity, and much prudence is required to to adapt practical rules to variable circum..
the practical rule founded on it to the stances and to make the proper exceptions in
of life, even tolerably, by making excep- applying them. None is required by those who
live according to the moral law. "The moral
law commands the' most punctual obedience
from everyone; it must, .. therefore, not be so
difficult to judge what it .requires to be done,
that the commonest unpracticed understand-
ing, even without worldly prudence, should
fail to apply it rightly." That "the principle
of private happiness" is "the direct opposite of
the principle of morality" Kant seems to think
is evident from the questionable worth of pru-
dence; "for a man must have a differentcrite-
not stop at treachery or treason wh.
moment seems ripe for'action which, ifq
taken, may succeed. ,
Aristotle and Asauinas would use suc
to argue against what, in their view, ist
conception of the prudent man as thea
of,the impetuous. The prudentman"i
opinion, does not stand at the other extr
undue cautIon. In their theory of the
as means between extremes of excess a
feet, prudence, like courage or tempe
represents a mean consisting in neith.
much nor too little. As cowardice an
hardiness are the opposite vices of too
and too Ii ttle fear-and as both are oppo
the mean ofcourage which involvesam
tion of fear-so excessive caution and i
uosity are the vices opposed to pruden
well as to each other.
Nor are prudence and imprudences'
matters of Men may di
their temperamental dispositions; hut,
ing to Aristotle and Aquinas, these are
be confused with virtues and vices. 0
may be by nature more fearful or fearle
another, but regardless of these differe
<;motional endowment, either may b
courageous, by forming the habit of cant
fear for the right reasons. So, too, on
may be naturally more impulsive ortn
cumspect than another, but either can
prudence through learning to take Sil
counsel and to deliberate enough before
while also forming the habit ofresolving th
into action by reaching decisions and
manding their execution. Failing to
these conditions of prudence, either ill
velop the vices of imprudence, becomin
Hamlet or Nicias, irresolute; or, like Alci
impatient of counselor ill advised, lacki
in deliberation and soundness in judgme
THE CONCEPTION OF prudence as itself t
treme of caution, whether temperame
habitual, is not the only challenge
Aristotelian theory of prudence as a v
Other moralists, especially those who t
different view of virtue generally, do not
to look upon prudence as wholly adm'
Even when they do not condemn prude
an indisposition to act promptly.ordeci
474
to God. When the event answers expectations,
the pre:diction is attributed to prudence, yet
human foresight beingfallible, "it is but pre-
sumption. For the foresight of things to come,
which is Providence, belongs only to him by
whose will they are to come." Aquinas, gives a
quite different reason for saying that" 'pru-
dence or providence may suitably be attributed
to God." It is that the ordering of things to-
ward. their ultimate end is "the chief part of
prudence, to which two other parts are directed
-namely, remembrance of the past, and
derstanding ofthe present; inasmuch from the
remembrance of what .ispast and the under-
standing of what is present, we gather how to
provide for the future."
Prudence is sometimes described, not as a
virtue of the mind, or even as the power of
foresight, but as .a temperamental .trait, an
emotional disposition. It is associated with
timidity or caution in those who are fearful of
risks or unwilling to take chances. It is in' this
sense that Bacon seems to oppose hopefulness
to prudence, "which is diffident upon principle
and in all hUluan matters augurs the worst."
The cautiousness of the over-deliberate man
may involve thought as well as fear. Hamlet
thinks too much and on too many sides ofevery
action. His action being "sicklied o'er by the
pale cast of thought," he is irresolute. He la-
ments his misuse of reason. "Whether it be
bestial oblivion,or some craven scruple of
thinking too precisely on the event-a thOUight,
which quartered, hath but one part wisdom
and ever three parts. coward-I do not know
why yet I live to say 'this thing's to do,' since
I have cause" and will, and strength, and means
to do it."
When prudence is conceived as excessive
caution, its opposite is usually described' as
rashness, precipitateness, or impetuosity. Thu-
cydides portrays these opposites in the persons
of Nicias and Alci biades. Their speeches to the
Athenian assembly on the question of the Si-
cilian expedition do not merely present an op-
position of reasons for and against the under-
taking, but also represent an opposition of
types of human character. Both come to grief:
Nicias, the overcautious leader of the expedi-
tion, who earns a not inevitable defeat by his
ever-delaying tactics, and Alcibiades, who does
THE GREi\l' IDEAS
'MATTER7S, especially the interconnection
virtues and the theory of the cardinal
,are discussed in the chapter on VIRTUE.
blem of the relative worth of the moral
he intellectual virtues is also considered
and in the chapter on \vhere the
ioutions to happiness of prudence and
m-o
r
of practical and speculative'wis-
are specifically compared.
e there remains to be considered the
tic conception of the relation between
edge and virtue, for there seems to be an
etween his theory of this matter and the
ing view of the relation between pru-
and the moral virtues.
ne Meno, Socrates argues that whatever
desires or chooses he either knows or
to be good. The man who chooses some-
vil for himself does not do so knowingly,
ly through the mistake of deeming that
is in fact evil to be advantageous or good.
t for such mistakes, "no man," says
es, '\vi11s or chooses anything evil."
from error or ignorance, evil is never
tarily chosen. Hence, if virtue consists
iHing or desiring things ,vhich are good,
having the po,ver to gain them," it
seeln to follo\v that knowledge of the
s closely related to its practice.
sequently, Socrates suggests that "if
CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE 477
moral virtue can exist apart from prac- there be any sort ofgood which is distinct frorn
isdom, so with it, all must be present. knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if
inas mentions another intellectual virtue kno\vledge embraces all good, then we shall be
ispensable to the moral virtues, namely, right in thinking that virtue is knowledge."
rtue of understanding which consists in To test these' hypotheses, he proceeds to con-
ng the first principles in practical as well sider the various things which-whether or not
culative matters. The first principles of they are the same as virtue-are like virtue in
ractical reason (i.e., the precepts of the being advantageous to men. None of these
al la\v) underlie prudence as well as the things, such as courage or temperance, seems
.virtues. Just as sound reasoning in specu- to profit men unless accompanied by what, in
matters "proceeds from naturally known English translations, is sometimes called "wis-
pies ... so also does prudence which is dom" and sometimes "prudence."
reason about things to be done." Never- Socrates points out that"everything the
, though prudence and the moral virtues soul attempts, when under the guidance of
upon it, Aquinas does not include ,visdom"-or prudence-"ends in happiness;
tanding-as he does not include art, but in the opposite when under the guidance of
and wisdom-in his enumeration of folly"-or imprudence. "If then," he says,
cardinal virtues, cardinal in the sense "virtue is a quality of the soul, and if it be of
ng the virtues indispensable to a good necessity always advantageous, then virtue
life. must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the
things of the soul are either advantageous or
hurtful in themselves, hut they are all made
advantageous or hurtful" by the' addition to
them' of prudence or imprudence"--\visdom
or folly. From this, says Socrates, we can con-
clude that "prudence is virtue, either the ,vhole
of virtue or some part of it at least"-or, as
this is sometimes translated, "virtue is either
wholly or partly wisdom."
In the light of his own viewthat all the moral
virtues depend on practical ,visdom, Aristotle
criticizes the Sacratic position. "Socrates in one
respect was on the right track while in another
he went astray. In thinking that all the virtues
were forms of practical wisdom he was \\7rong,
but in saying that they implied practical wis-
dom he was right. . . Socrates thought the
virtues were rules or rational principles ...
while we think they involve a rationalprin-
ciple." Similarly, in considering the question
\vhether there can be moral without intellec-
tual virtue, Aquinas writes: "Although virtue
be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not
anIy is it according to right' reason, insofar as it
inclines a man to do that \vhich is in accord
,vith right reason as the Platonists maintained;
butit also needs to be joined with right reason,
as Aristotle declares."
Aquinas furthermore interprets the opinion
that "every virtue is a kind of prudence,"
which he attributes to Socrates, as meaning
nessman who, \vithout regard to justic
culates well ho\v to maxiinize his pron
Machiavelli's prince ,vho exercises cunni
get or keep his po\v;r, exhibits, not prud
butits counterfei ts. In some cases, the cl
ness or shre\vdness may simulate pru
without involving the knavery of Ct
. S a
cunnIng. orne men have what Aquina
ceives as artistic (or technical) rather
moral prudence. Those who are "good
sellars in matters of warfare or seamanshi
said to be prudent officers or pilots, bu
simply Only those are simply
dent who glve good counsel about al
concerns of life."
Aristotle and Aquinas make the relatio
tween prude.nce and moral virtue recip
The moral vlrtues depend, for their for
and endurance, as much upon pruden
prudence depends upon them. "Virtue m
us aim at the right end," Aristotle writes, '
practical wisdom makes us take the
means." The rightness of the means req
not merely that they be adapted to an end
that the end itself be right. The right end
not be achieved unless the means to it be r
Iy chosen. Hence no skill of mind in del
ing about and choosing means is tru
intellectual virtue of prudence unless the
who habitually calculates well is also habit
inclined by the moral virtues to choose
for the right end, whether that be happin
the common good of society. '
Conversely, the moral vi.t:tues depend
prudence because, in Aristotle's view, th
formed by the making of right choices
defini tion of moral virtue names prudence
indispensable cause. Since the mean bet
extremes, in which the virtues consist,
most cases subjective or relative to the
vidual, it cannot be determined by obje
measurements. Reason must determine it
prudent consideration of the relevant cir
stances.
The interdependence of prudence an
moral virtues seems to be the basis, for
Aristotle and Aquinas, of the insight tha
impossi ble to ha\>l'e' one moral virtue wi
having all. On this basis, Aristotle says,
"refute the dialectical argument ... th
virtues exist in sepaTat"ion ..,fmm oneaaotl
476
rion when he is compelled to say to himself: I
am a worthless fellow, though I have filled my
purse; and when he approves himself, and
says: I am a prudent man, for I have enriched
my treasure."
Kant does not limit his criticism of prudence
as pragmatic-or practical rather than moral-
to the fact that it serves what he calls "private
happiness." It may serve the public welfare.
"A history is composed pragmatically," he
writes, "when it teaches prudence, i.e., instructs
the world how it can provide for its interests
better." But he also distinguishes between
worldly and private prudence. "The former is
a man's ability to influence others so as to use
them for his own purposes. The latter is the
sagacity to combine all these purposes for his
own lasting benefit." Nevertheless, the pru-
dence which aims at individual happiness is
primary, for "when a man is prudent in the
former sense, but not in the latter, we might
better say of him that he is clever and cunning,
but, on the whole, imprudent."
THOSE WHO TAKE THE view that happiness is
the first principle of morality would still agree
with Kant that the man ,vho is skillful in exer-
cising an influence over other men so as to use
them for his own purposes, is clever or cunning
rather than prudent. Hobbes, for example, says
that if you permit to prudence "the use of un-
just or dishonest means ... you have that
Crooked Wisdom, which is called Craft."
Aristotle goes even further in his insistence
that "it is impossible to be practically. wise
\vithout being good," or, as the same point is
made in the language of Aquinas, "one cannot
have prudence unless one has the moral virtues;
since prudence is right reason about things to
be done, to which end man is rightly disposed
by moral virtue."
,'To be able to do the things that tend to-
wards the mark we have set before ourselves"
is, according to Aristotle, to be clever. "If the
mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but
if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere
smartness." Hence the man of prudence has a
certain cleverness, but the clever J:l11Q;n \vho is
merely smart cannot be called practically wise.
.By this criterion the clever thief \vho plans and
executes a the shrc\vd":busi-
THE.GREAT
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
479
PAGE
special mode of reignative prudence; or merely
a higher degree of the same prudence by which
they govern their private lives and their do-
mestic establishments; or, as Hobbes suggests,
have other abilities whereby they can apply the
same prudence. to a different kind of business.
CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE
e nature of prudence: as practical wisdom, as a virtue or quality of the deliberati.ve
mind 4
80
rudence in relation to the common good of the community
6a. Political prudence: the prudence of the prince or statesman, of the subject or
citizen
6b. Jurisprudence: .prudence in the determination of laws and the adjudication of
cases
e place of prudence among the virtues of the mind 4
81
2a. Practical or political wisdom distinguished from speculative. or philosophical
wisdolTI
2b. Prudence distinguished from art: action or doing contrasted with production or
making
2C. The relation of prudence to intuitive reason or to the understanding of the
natural law: the moral perception of particulars
he interdependence of prudence and the moral virtues: the parts played by deliber'"
ation, will, and emotion in human conduct
3
a
. Moral virtue as the end for which p.rudence makes a right choice of
means: right deSIre as the standard of practIcal truth 4
82
3b.Prudence as a factor in the formation and maintenance of moral virtue: the de-
termination of the relative or subjective mean
3
c
. Shrewdness or cleverness as the counterfeit of prudence: the abuses of casuistry
3d. Prudence, continence, and temperance
"e. The vices of imprudence: precipitance and undue caution 4
8
3
he sphere of prudence
4
a
. The confinement of prudence to the things wi thin our power: the reiation of
prudence to free wiU, choice, and deliberation
4
b
. The restriction of prudence to the consideration of means rather than ends 4
8
4
he nature of a prudent judgment
sa. The conditions of prudent choice: counsel, deliberation, judgment
Sb. The acts of the practical reason in matters open to choice: decision and command,
leading to execution or use 4
8
5
sc. The maxims of prudence
pable of being citizens-though not all,
ps, are equally eligible for the highest
offices-must not political prudence be
ived as attainable by all men?
e question remains open whether those
eserve the highest magistracies have '. a
ticulars to their universal is knownb}{
eralname of 'political wisdom' ...
wisdom also is identified especially
form. of it which' is concerned with
vidllal man, and this is known by th
name 'practical wisdom.' Of the othetrr
one is called domestic, another legisl
third .political; and of this last, Oile
called deliberative and the other judi
Does this mean that skill of mind .
mining the .. best means to an end is
according to differences in the end-
the happiness of an individual or the c
good of a society? Doesit mean, furthe
that the prudence involved inmaaa
hOl,lsehold is' different from the pruden
cerned wi th political affairs; and that,
state, the prudence of the ruler-: (pri
statesman) is different from the prude
the ruled (subject or citizen), because;th
moves on the level of general laws, the ot
the level of particular acts in complianc
law? Within the sphere of jurisprudence,
prudence of laws, is the. prudence of th
latoror different from thept:
of the judge who applies the law?
Treatise ... on Prudence, Aquin
these questions affirmatively.
tinguishes between private, domestic
political prudence, and within the 11
sphere places special emphasis uponw
calls "reignativeprudence," the sort ()
dence Dante calls "a kingly prudence,"
sets the prince apart. from ordinary
Hobbes, on the other hand, asserts tha
govern well a family and a kingdotn,. a
different degrees of prudence, but dO
sorts of business; no more than to draw
ture in little, or as great, or greater tha
are different degrees of art."
This issue is intimately connected wit
problem of the forms of government. 1
a few men are fitted by nature to acqu'
special mode of prudence which is reig-,
or legislative, would not government b
few or by the one seem to be naturally
If, however, in a republic, those who are cl
rule and are ruled in turn, should no
citizen have the prudence requisite fo
tasks, whether it be the same or di
Finally, if the democratic theory is that a
478
that when "a man is in possession.
edge, he cannot sin, and ..' ,who
sins does so through "This,he
"is based on a false supposi tion, .because. the
appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blind-
ly, but with a certain power of opposition."
Nevertheless, "thereis some truth in thesaying
ofSocrates that so long as a man is in possession
of knovvledge he does not sin; provided. that
this knowledge involves the use. of reason in
the individual act of choice."
Whether those who criticize the position of
Socrates. accurately perceive his intention and
state the issue fairly are problems of interpre-
tation as difficult as the question of where in
this matter the truth. lies. If Socrates is saying
that a man will do good if heknoyvs the good,
what sort of kno\vledge is
of the good in general or knowledge of yvhat.is
good in a. particular ,case? Do both, types: of
knovvledge of the good lead as readily or surely
to good or virtuous action?
Whetheror not, in addition to kpowledge, a
goodwill or right desire is essential, it may be
held that .prudence .is required to apply moral
at the goodin
particular cases. "There exists no moral
tern," writes Mill, "under which there do not
arise unequivocal cas(fs. of conflicting obligarc
tion. These are the real difficul ties, the knotty
points, both in the theory ofethics and in the
conscientious guidance of personal condu.ct.
They" are overcome practically, wi thgreat or
less success, according to the intellect and vir-'
tue of the individual." Mill seems to imply
that both prudence and virtue are essential to
good action on the level of particulars, anci
that without them the kind of knowledge
which is expressed in moral principles does not
necessarily lead a man to act well.
ONE OTHER PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION must
be Inentioned. It occ,urs with respect to Aris-
totle's statement concerning diverse modes of
prudence.
"Political wisdom and practical wisdom are
the same state of mind," he writes, "but their
essence is not the same. Of the wisdom con-
cerned with the city, the practical wisdom
which plays a controlling part is legislative vvis-
dom,\vhile that which is related to this as par-
I'HE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
481
2c. The relation of prudence to intuitive reason
or to the understanding of the natural
law: the moral perception of particulars
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics,BK I, cn 4 [109Sa30_bI2]
340c-d; CH 7 [I098a35-b8] 343d-344a; BK II,
CH 9 [II09b20-23] 355c; BK III, CH 3 [III2b34-
III.3
a2
] 358d-359a; BK VI, ClI 5-6 389a-d;
CH 8 [II42aI2-3I] 391b-c; CH II [II43a25-b5]
392d-393a; BK VII, CH 3 [II47a25-b6] 397c-d
20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I-II, Q56,
A3, ANS 31a-32b; Q57, A4, ANS and REP 2
39a; A 5, REP 3 39a40a; A 6, ANS and REP 3
40a-41a; Q 58, A 4, ANS 44a-d;A 5, ANS and
REP I 44d-45c
3. The interdependence of prudence and the
moral virtues: the parts played by de-
liberation, will, and emotion in human
conduct
4 HOMER: Odyssey 183a-322d esp BK IV [265-
295] 201d-202a, BK V [282-493] 210d-213a,c,
BK XII 250a-254d, BK XIII [185-440] 257a-
259d, BK XVI 272a.,.;216d
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound 40a-51d esp
[259-398] 42d-44a, [93-193] 50a-51d
5 SOPHOCLES: Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50-
134] 182d-183c
5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus [373-387] 228b-c /
Phoenician Maidens [697-747] 384a-d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK VIII, 269c-270a
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I,
370a-c; BK II, 389d-390b; BK IV, 474a-c
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 48a-50d; 58a-64d / Meno,
174d-176a; 183d-184d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [II03b27-
II04a9] 349b-c; CH 6 351c-352d passim; BK VI,
CH 12--13 393b-394d; BK VII, cn 9 [II5Ia29]--
CH 10 [II52a24] 402b-403b; BK X, CH 8 [II78a
16";"19] 432d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 5 257b-c
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VIII [18-25] 259b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 113,
A I, REP 2 576a-d
20 AQUINAS: SUJnnta Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57,
A 4, ANS 38a-39a; A 5, ANS 39a-40a; Q 58,
AA 4-5 44a-45c; Q 61 54d-59d
23 HOBBEs: Leviathan, PART I, 64a-c; 65b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 20d-22a; 159a-162c
26 SHAKESPEARE: julius Caesar, ACT II, SC I
[60-69] 575a
27 SHAKESPEARE: Han-det, ACT IV, SC IV [32-66]
59a,-:c
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 256c-d;
291d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 86c-95b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III 48b-51b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 46-54 189d-192c; SECT 69 196d-197a
37 FIELDING: Tom jones, 45b-c; 395a-396a
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic ofMoraIs,
c; 261c-d; 266a-267d / Practical Reason, 305d-
CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE
ractical or political wisdom distinguished
from speculative or philosophical wis-
dom
PLATQ: Statesman, 581c-582a / Philebus,
633a-635b
ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 8 [I098b24-26]
344b; BK VI, CH 1 [II3
8bI
7]-CH 3 [II39
bI8
]
387a-388b; CH 7-8 390a-391c; CH II [I I43bI4]-
eli 12 [II44
a
36] 393b-394a; CH 13 [II45
a6
-
12] 394d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH II [137Ib26-28]
615b
AQUINAS: Szunma Theologica, PART I, Q I,
A6, ANS 6b-7a
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q66,
A5, REP 1-2 79b-SOc
DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XIII [88-
104] 126b-c
HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60c-61a; 84c-d;
PART IV, 267a-b
MONTAIGNE: Essays, 327b-d; 520b-c
BACON: Ativancement of Learning, 4c-6c; 16d-
17a; 42a-c; 55b-d; 65d-66a; 86b-c
ESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 44a-b; PART
II,48b-c
EWTON: Optics, BK III, 543b-544a
OCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT
-694b-95a
UME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 1-5
51a-453b
OUSSEAU: Political Economy, 373c-374a
ANT: Pure Reason, 60b-c; 190c-191a /
undo Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261d;
66c-d; 271a-c / Practical Reason, 291a-296d;
19c-321b; 32'9a-330c / Metaphysic of
orals, 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / judgement,
61a-415d esp 463a-464c, 474b-475d
ILL: Representative Government, 346c-347a
EGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 4b-7a
udence distinguished from art: action or
doing contrasted with production or
nlaking
LATO: Charmides, 5c-6d / Philebus, 633a-
35b
RISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 2 [II39a32-b5]
88a; ClI 4 [II40aI]-CH 6 [II4IaI] 388d-389d;
H 12 [II43bI7-II44a61393b-c
QUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q34,
I, REP 3 768c-769d
QUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-'II, Q
6, A3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, A 4 38a-39a; A 5,
EP Id 39a-40a; Q 58, A 2, REP I 42a-43a;
5, REP 2 44d-45c; Q 65, A I, REP 4 70b-
a
CON: Advancement of Learning, 42a-c
NT: Fund. Prin. Metaph.,Vsic of Morals,
6c-d / Intro. Metaphysic Nforals, 388a-d
fudgenzent, 515b-c; 523d-524a
3
e place of prudence among the virtues of
the mind
/ Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 10, 662a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II,
A3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, AA 4-5 38a-40a;
A 2, REP I 42a-43a; A 3, REP I 43b-44a;
A I 70b-72a; PART II-n, Q 181, A 2
618c
22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-54a;
67d-68a; 84c-d
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel,
201b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 520b-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 42a-c
95b
37 FIELDING: Tom jones, 395a-396a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349b
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic 0..(
261c-d; 266b-c esp 266b,d [fn I]; 267
Practical Reason, 305d; 339b-d; 361
Prif. A1etaphysical Elements of Ethics,
377d
46 Philosophy of Right, PART III,
66b
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 315b-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x,424a-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a-lSa passim
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and pa
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265---28.3] 12d tne
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the 'pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For exanlple, in 53 JAMES: PJychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. vVhen the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left.;,
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page
16
4_
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a ,vork (such as PART, BK, CIt
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer:
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in ti tle of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
480
1. The nature of prudence: as practical wisdom,
as a virtue 01 quality of the deliberative
nlind
ApOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 1:4; 19:22 ; 34:9-10
-CD) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1:4; 19:-19; 34:9-
10
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian J;Var, BK I,
384a
7 PLATO: Charmides, 7b-c / Protagoras, 43a-b /
Jvfeno, 183d-184c; 188b-189d
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK IV, CH 2 [I2Ib24-
122
3
'2] 169d-170a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [II03a4-IO]
348c-d; BK VI, CH 5 389a-c; eH 7 390a-d esp
[I I4
Ib8
- 2 3] 390c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 9
[1366b20-2.3] 609a-b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH I 10Sa-106c;
BK II, CH 5 142c-144a; CH 23 170a-172d; BK
III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 10 185d-187a; BK IV,
CH 5 228a-230b
12 AURELIUS: A-feditations, BK II, SECT II 258a-b;
BKV, SECT 9270b-c; SECT 34 273c; BK VI,
SECT 12 274c; BK VIII, SECT 16-17 286d;
SECT 48 289c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, eH 4, 512a
4. The sphere of prudence
4a. The confinelnent of prudence to the things
within our power: the relation of pru..
dence to free will, choice, and deliber-
ation
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 2-3357b-359a;
BK VI, CH 2 [II39a32-bII] 388a-b; CH 5 [1140a
3I-bS] 389a-b; CI-I 7 [114Ib8-14] 390c
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH I 105a-l06c;
CH 18 124a-125a; CH 29 134d-138a; BK It,CH
IL: Aeneid, BK VII [572-'-600] 252a- b; BK
76-444] 338b-340a
TARcn: Fabius-Pericles, 154d / Pelopidas,
a-233a; 244c-245a / Marcellus-Pelopidas,
vices of imprudence:' precipitance and
ndue caution
TESTAMENT: Genesis, 25 :29-34 / Proverbs,
6-27; 14:16,29; 18:13; 19:2 ; 20:21; 25:8;
:II / Ecclesiastes, 5:2-3;7:9-(D) Ecclesi-
tes, 5:1- 2 ; 7:10
RYPHA: 'Ecclesiasticus, 2:2; 4 :29; 6 :7-8; 8: I9;
18; 19:4,8-9; 20:8; 21:25-26 ; 28:11; 30:24-
) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 2 :2; 4:34; 6 :7-8; 8:22;
5; 19:4,8-9; 20:8; 21:28-29; 28:13; 30:26
TESTAMENT: Matthew, 13 :19-23 IA1ark,
-20 / Luke, 8:5-15 / Acts, 19:36
MER: Iliad, BK I [1-492] 3a-8a;' BK IX [1-
] 57a-58d / Odyssey, BK IX
a-d; BK XII [260-419] 252d-254c
SCHYLUS: Persians 15a-26d esp [739-786]
-c / Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c esp
1-719] 34a-35a / Prometheus Bound 40a-
esp [930-1093] 50a-51d
PHOCLES: Oedipus the Ki'J7.g 99a-113a,c /
tigone 131a-142desp ,136c-137d
rjax 143a-155a,c esp [654-6831148d-149a,
8-783] 149c-d / Electra 156a-169a,c esp
1-403] 157b-159b, [938-157] 163c-164d /
iloctetes 182a-195a,c
RIPIDES: Rhesus 203a-211d esp[I-I48]
a-204c / Suppliants [465-510] 262b-d /
chantes 340a-352a,c esp [215-433] 341d-
b I Phoenician Maidens [443-593] 381d-
a
ODOTUS: History, BK III, 94c-d; 97b-c;
II, 216d-218b; 22Sc-d
CYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I,
a-c; BK II, 393a-c; 402a-404d.esp 402c-d,
b-c; BK IV, 449b-c; 462d-463a; BK V,
a-c; BK VII, 545b-c
TO: Protagoras,62b-64a
STOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [II04aIO-26]
c-d; BK VI, CH 5 [II4obI3-I9l389b-c; CH 9
2bI7-34] 391d-392b; BK VII, CH 6 399d-
; cn 9 [II5Ia28-bI6] 402b-c / Rhetoric,
I, CH 12 [I389a2]-CH 14 [1390bII] 636b-
4a CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE 483
II46a8] 395c-396a; CH 4 [II48a4-22] 398b-c; 262c / Nicias 423a-438d / Alexander, 547b-
ell 6 399d-400c; CH 8-10 401c-403c esp CH 10 548a / Caius. and Tiberius Gracchus-Agis and
[u52a7-24] 403a-b; CH II [II52bIS-18] 403d; Cleomenes, 690c-691a,c
elf 12 [II53a2I- 23]404c; [II53
a2
7-35] 404c-d 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 61h / Histories, BK
VGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 4, 512a I, 205d-206a; BK III, 252c
QUINAS: Sumlna Theologica, PART I-II, Q 58, 20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I-II, Q
2., ANS 42a-43a; A 3, REP 2 43b-44a; Q 65, 108, A 3, REP 5334a-336b
I70b-72a 21 DANTE: Divine Con1edy, HELL, XXVI[49-142]
ONTAIGNE: Essays, 312c-314b 38c-39c
ILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XI [334-369] 306b- 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK III, STANZA
07a; (527-551] 310b-3Ila / Samson Agonistes 42-4760a-b; STANZA 129 71a-b I Nun's
8-59] 340b Priest's Tale 450a-460b esp [15,273-452]
ONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XXVIII, 457b-460b /Manciple's Tale [17,206-311]
9b 491h-493b
23 MACHIAVELLI : Prince, CH XXV, 36b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 77d; 79c-d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 22d-23b; 53c-55d;
174a-d
26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and juliet, ACT III, SC
III 304d-306d / 1st Henry IV, ACT I, SC III
437d-440d; ACT II, SC III 443b-444b; ACT III,
SC I [147-19] 45Ic-452a; ACT IV, SC III [1-29]
459b-c '
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet 29a-72a,c esp ACT IV,
SC IV [33-66] 59a-c / Troilus and CresHda,
ACT III, SC III [184-241] 124b-125a / Othello
20Sa-243a,c esp ACT V, SC II [338-356] 242d-
243a / King Lear 244a-283a,c ;. Coriolanus
351a,;,392a,c esp 'ACT III, sc II-III 373c-377a /
Timon of Athens 393a-420d esp ACT II, SC II
400c-403b / Henry VIII, ACT I, SC I [122-149]
551b-c; sc II [68-88] 553c-d
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I,8c-IOa;
116a-117b; PART II, 252c-257a; 291d
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 92

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 172 203b
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 203a-207b
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 149b-c
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick esp 148b-150a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, l5d-18b; BK
III, 139a-c; BK V, 211a-213a; BK VIII, 321d-
322d; 328c-333a; 334d-335a; 336b-337d; BK
IX, 344b-346a; 366d-367b; BK X, 426b; BK
XIII, 569d-570b; BK XIV, 596c-d; 603a-604b;
EPILOGUE I, 655c-656b
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karan1azov, BK X,
273a-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 799b-807a passim, esp
80Ga-B01a, 806b-807a
3c. Shrewdness or cleverness as the cou
of prudence: the abuses of casuist
5 ARISTOPHANES: Frogs [534-541] 570b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 95d-9
VIII, 279d-280b
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, B
575b-d; 584b-585a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, cH 12 [1144
13 [II44bI6] 393d-394b; BK VII, CH I
8-15] 403a
14 PLUTARCH: Aratus, 829b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART 1-:1
A 4, REP 2 44a-d; Q 93, A 6; REP 2 219
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVII [
40a-41b
23 MACHIAVELLI : Prince, CH XVIII, 25a-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 68a
27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT I, SC III [3
212b-213a
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 27a-127a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 75b-76a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 142c
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 532d-533a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 204
228b-230c; BK X, 424a-c; BK XI, 476c
3d. Prudence, continence, and tempera
7 PLATO: Charmides, 7a-c /. Protagoras,
/ Meno, 183d-184c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [II
348c-d;BK III, cH 12 [I I I9
a
35-
bI
9]
BK VI, CH 5 [II4obll-I9] 389b-c; eR
17-34] 391d-392b; BK VII, CH I [1145
395c; CH 2-3 395c-398a esp CH 2 [I
THEGREAT IDEAS
BK V,CH 9 [I 137
a
S-26] .385b-c; BK V
389a-c; CH 9 [114
2bI
7-34] 391d-392
12-13 393b-394d; BK X, CH 8 [117881
432d
12 EPICTETUS: Dist;;.0urses, BK HI, CH 12
188b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VI, SECTI6
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK IX, CH
288b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,
A I, REP 2 576a-d,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I"';U
A 2, REP 230c-31a; Q 57, A 5 39a:..40a
A 2 42a-43a; A 4 44a-d; Q 65, A I 70b..
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 25
291d
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning,79b-c;
95b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III 48b-Slb
33 PASCAL: Pensees. 359 235a; 378-381 238
37 FIELDING: Tom jones, 45b-c
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 305d-307dcA
Metaphysical .Elements of Ethics, 36
376c-377d / Intro. Metaphysic of
387d-388a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART
49b-54a
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 61c-62a / Meno, 183d-184c
I Phaedo, 226a-b / Republic, BKX, 439b-d /
Laws, BK I, 643c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 2[1103
b2
7-
1104a9] 349b-c; CH 6 351c-352d passim, esp
[II06b36-II07a2] 352c; eH 9 354d-355a,c;
(3. The interdependence of prudence and the
moral virtues: the parts played by delib-
eration, will, and emotion inhuman
conduct.)
307d; 318c-d; 339b-d; 34lc-342a / Intro.
Metaphysic of Morals, 387b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 114
42a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-
166b
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 3l0c-313a esp
311b-d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 2l1a-213a;
BK VI, 235a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a-15a passim, esp 14b-
15a; 794a-808a passim
3a. Moral virtue as determining the end for
which prudence makes a right choice of
means: right desire as the standard of
practical truth
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK III, CH I [II6
b
22-26]
163b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [II03b27-
II04a9] 349b-c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; CH 5
[II40b4-I9] 389b-c; CH 9 [II42bI7-34] 391d-
392b; CH 12 [1144a6-37] 393d-394a; CH 13
[II44b30-I145a6] 394c-d / Politics, BK VII, CH
13 [I33Ib24-38] 536b-c
14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 121a-122b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q .113,
A I, REP 2 576a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56,
A2, REP 3 30c-31a; A3, ANS 31a-32b; A4, REP
4 32b-33c; Q 57, A 4, ANS 38a-39a; A 5,ANS
and REP 3 39a-40a; Q 58, A 3, REP 2 43b-44a;
A 4, ANS and REP I 44a-d;A 5 44d-45c; Q 65,
A I, ANS and REP 70b-72a; A 2, ANS and
REP 3 72a-d; A 3, ANS and REP I 72d-73d;
PART II-II, Q 181, A 2 617d-618c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 52c-53c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 235a-b / Fund. Prine
Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-b; 259c-260c;
266b-267d; 268b;271d-279d esp 271d-272b,
274d-275b / Practical Reason, 305d-307d;
'318c-d; 3S7c-360d / Pref. Metaphysical Ele-
ments of Ethics, 376c-377d / Intro. Metaphysic
of Morals, 387d-388a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, .456d-457b passim
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 122
44a; par 140 49b-54a
3b. Prudence as a factor in the formation and
maintenance of moral virtue: .the de
termination of the relative or subjective
mean
482
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE 485
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK I, STANZA
101--118 14a-16b; STANZA 136-139 18b-19a;
BK III, STANZA 233-236 85a-b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, esp 52c-53c;
136b-139b; 174a-d
26 SHAKESPEARE: flenry V, ACT I, SC II [183-220]
535d-536b
27 SHAKESPEARE: Han1let, ACT I, SC III [59-80]
35a
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 331d-333b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 81d-95b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III 48b-5Ib
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 45, SCHOL
438b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SEeTV, DIV
36, 465d [fn I]
43 l\1ILL: Representative Government, 345b; 410c-d
6. Prudence in relation to the common good
of the community
6a. Political prudence: the prudence of the
prince or statesman, of the subject or
citizen
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 41 :3.3-41 / I Kings,
3 :16-28- (D) III Kings, 3 :16-28 / Proverbs,
11:14; 20:18,28; 23: 1'-3; 24:6; 25:6-7; 29:12 ;
31:4-5 / Ecclesiastes, 8:2-4
ApOCRYPHA: Tobit, 12:7-(D) aT, Tobias, 12:7
/ Ecclesiasticus, 10:1-3-(D) aT, Ecclesiasti-
cus, 10:1-3
4 I-IOMER: Iliad, BK I [1-492] 3a-8a; BK IX [1-
172] 57a-58d
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [333-523] 5a-
7c / Persians 15a-26d esp [739-786] 23a-c
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [1-512] 99a-
103d / Antigone [1'-99] 131a-132a; [633-767]
136c-137d / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50-
134] 182d-183c
5 EURIPIDES: Rhesus 203a-211d esp [1-148]
203a-204c / Suppliants [103-597] 259a-263c
/ Bacchantes [266-271] 342a-b / Phoenician
Maidens [443-593] 381d-383a; [697-747]
384a-d / Orestes [682-716] 400d-401a /
Iphigenia at Aulis 425a-439d esp [1-542]
425a-429d
5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians [480-571] 460d-
461c; [971-999] 466c-d / Knights 470a-487a,c
esp [1316--1408] 486a-487a,c / Frogs [686-737]
572a-d; [1417-1514] 581a-582a,c / Lysistrata
[541-602] 590a-591a
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 6a-b; 41c-d; BK
III, 97b-c; BK VII, 216d-218a; 225a-226b;
242a-b; 245d-246b
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 365c-
367a; 370a-c; 383d-384a; BK II, 389d-391b;
393a-c; 397b-c; BK III, 427a-c; 436d-438b;
BK IV, 451a-c; 462d-463a; 474a-c; BK V,
483c-485b; 507a-c; BK VI, 511c-516a; BK VII,
545b-c; BK VIII, 564a-c; 569c-570a; 574d-
575d
e acts of the practical reason in matters
open to choice: decision and command,
leading to execution or use
RISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 10 [433aI3-31]
6sd-666a
RISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [1103b27-
I
0
4
a
9] 349b-c; BK III, CH 2-3 357b-359a;
I{ VI, CH 2 387d-388b; CH 7 [114
Ib8
'-23]
90c-d; CH 10 [1143a4-10] 392b-c; CH 12-13
93b-394d; BK VII, CH 2 395c-396c esp [I145
b
-II46a8] 395c-396a; CH 10 [115
2a8
- 2 4]
03a-b
QUINAS: SUm11'la Theologica, PART I, Q 22,
I, ANS and REP 1-2 127d-128d; PART I-II,
17 686b,d-693d
QUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,-II, Q 57,
6, ANS and REP 2 40a-41a; Q 61, A 3, ANS
6b-S7a
HAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT IV,. SC IV [33-66]
a-c
OUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK III, 409d
ANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic ofMorals, 260a-
; 26Sc-267d esp 266c-267d / Practical Reason,
OSd-307d; 314d-321b
EGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 38
Id; PART III, par 214 71a-c
OLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 235a; BK X,
llc-412d; 421c-426a; 440c-442c; 459d-461d;
K XI, 488c-489c; BK XII, 536b; BK XIII,
4e-585c; 586d-587d; EPILOGUE I, 654a-
5c; EPILOGUE II, 685a
MES: Psychology, 794a-798b esp 797b-798a
e maxims of prudence
ill.ESTAMENT: Proverbs passim / Ecclesiastes
SSlffi
RYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 1-43 passim-CD) aT,
clesiasticus, 1-43 passim
TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:19-.34 /
:13-32 / Acts, 19:36 / I Corinthians, 7:29-
/ Ephesians, 5:15-16 / Philippians, 4:6 /
'eter, 5:7
SCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [631-
9] 34a-35a / Pronzetheus Bound [259-398]
d-44a; [887-906] 49c-d; [930-1093] 50a-
d
PHOCLES: Antigone [1-99] 131a-132a /
etra [121-403] 157b-159b; [938-1057] 163c-
d
ERODOTUS: History, BK VII, 225b-226a; BK
II, 269c-270a
UCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 370a-c;
v,507a-c
UTARCH: Pericles, 131b-c
6a
HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 227
74b-d
TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 211a-213a;
BI{ VI, 235a
IA.MES: Psychology, 13a-15a; 794a-798b esp
796a-b, 797b-798a
FREUD: General Introduction, 624d-625b
5 EURIPIDES: Rhesus [1-148] 203a-20
pliants [465-510] 262b-d / Phoenicia
ens [443-593] 381d-383a; [697-747]
Iphigenia at Aulis [378-414] 428b-c
5 ARISTOPHANS:S: Birds [366-382] 546d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 31c-d; 4
VII, 217a; 218c; 219a-c; 258d; BK VII
270a
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I
384a; BK II, 397b-c; BK III, 427a-c
7 PLATO: Meno, 183d-184c; 188b-189a
lie, BK III, 337b-338a; BK X, 439b-44
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [I
I095a12] 340a-b; CH 4 [I095a30_bI2]
BK III, CH 2-3 357b-359a; BK v, CH 9
26] 385b-c; BK VI, CH 5 389a-c; CH7
23] 390c-d; CH 8 [1142aI.3-22] 391h;
391c-393b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 6 18
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT
14 PLUTARCH: Timoleon, 197c-198a
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK II, 234b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PART
A I 127d-128d; Q 83, A I, ANS 43
A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 438d-439c; PA
Q 13, A I 672d-673c; A 3, ANS 674
Q 14 677b-681a; Q 44, A 2 808b-d; A
809c-810a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I
A 4, REP 3 38a-39a;A 5, ANS and RE
40a; A 640a-41a
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK I,
90-93 12b-13a / Tale of Melibeus 4
esp par 7-13 402b-405a, par 17-3
414a, par 59-78 427a-432a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53a;
60c-d; 64a-c; 65a-c; 66c-68a; 77d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 393b-394a; 450
520b-522d
26 SHAKESPEARE: Comedy ofErrors, ACT
[85-106] 157b '
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida,
sc II 113c-115d
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II,
237a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 86e
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 39a / Pense
383238b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II,
SECT 48 190c-d; SECT 53 191d-192b;
193b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT
36, 465a-d [fn I]
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of
266b-c / Practical Reason, 318c-321
360d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 2, 32b-d; NU
46d-47a
43 MILL: Liberty, 276h-277a; 287b-e;
Representative Government, 410c-d /
ianism, 456a-457b
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 149b-c
484
Sa. The conditions of prudent choice: counsel,
deliberation, judgment
OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 1I:14; 12:15; 13:10,16;
14:18; 15:22 ; 19:20 ; 20:5,18; 24:6
ApOCRYPHA: Tobit, 4:18-(D) aT, Tobias, 4:19
/ Ecclesiasticus passim, esp 6:6, 8 :17, 25 :4-5,
32:18,34:9-11, 37:7-16--(D) aT, Ecclesiasti-
cus passim, esp 6:6, 8:20, 25:6-7, 32:22-23,
34 :9-12, 37 :7-20
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [333-523]
7c / Persians [739-786] 23a-c
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [633-767] 136c-137d
(4. The sphere of prttdence. 4a. The confinelnent
of prudence to the things within our power:
the relation ofprudence tofree will, choice,
anddeliberation.)
5 142c-144a; CH 10 148c-150a; CH 23
172d; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CHIO
187a; CH 18 192a-c; BK IV, CH I 213a-223d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 6 257c;
SECT 9 257d; SECT II 258a-b; SECT 16 259a;
BK v, SECT 19 272a; SECT 34 273c; BK VI,
SECT 16 275b-d; SECT 22 276a; BK VII, SECT
16 280d; BK VIII, SECT 16-17 286d; SECT 28
287c; SECT 48 289c; BK IX, SECT 7 292b; BK
X, SECT 34-35 301a-b; BK XII, SECT 3 307b-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I--II, Q 13,
AA 4-6 675a-677b; Q 14, AA 3-6 678c-681a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q57,
AA 4-6 38a-41a
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH XXV, 35a-b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 52c-53c; 100a-101c;
136b-139b; 393b-394a; 451d-452d; 514d-515a
30'BACON: Advancement of Learning, 76d-78a
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III 48b-51b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 48-54 190c-192c passim; SECT 57 193b-c
42 KANT: Fund. Prine Metaphysic of Morals,
266c-267d / Practical Reason, 318c-321b esp
320c-321b; 357c-360d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 199b-201b
4b. The restriction of prudence to the consid-
eration of means rather than ends
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics,BK V, CH 9 [1137
a
5-26]
385b-c; BKVI, CH 5 389a-c; CH 9 [1142bI 7-34]
391d-392b; CH 12 [I I44a6-37] 393d-394a; CH 13
[II44b30-1145a6] 394c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 9
[1366b2o-22] 609a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 14,
A 2 678b-c; Q 15, A 3 682c-683b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57,
A 5, ANS 39a-40a; Q 58, A 4, ANS 44a-d; A 5,
REP I 44d-45c
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic ofMorals, 266b-
267d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 796a-b
5. The nature of a prudent judgment
THE GREAT IDEf\S
487
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 214
7la-c; par 222-223 73b-d; par 22S-229 73d-
75b; ADDITIONS, 134 138b-c
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 292a-295a
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Kara111azov, BK XII
348b,d-401d passim
CHAPTER 73:
ADDITIONAL READINGS
I.
II.
INE. On the Morals of the Catholic Church,
XXIV
s. SU1nmaTheologica, PART II-II, QQ 47-56,
56
N. "Of Counsel," in Essays
H. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, PART
CT I
Lectures on Ethics
ILL. A System of Logic, BK VI, CH 12
isted below are works notinx:luded in Great Books ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
aea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. vVorks by authors not represented in this collection.
or the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
he Bibliography of Additional Readings which follo\vs the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
MOLIERE. L'ecole des femmes (The School for
Wives)
SHAFTESBURY. Characteristics of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times, TREATISE IV
J. BUTLER. Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature
CHESTERFIELD. Letters to l-lis Son
S. JOHNSON. History of Rasselas
BENTHAM. An Introduction to tlu!Principles ofMorals
and Legislation
EMERSON. The Conduct of Life
The Conscience
HODGSON. The Theory of Practice
H. SIDGWICK. The AJethods of Ethics, BK n
SPENCER. The Principles of Ethics, PART I, CH I, 13
L. STEPHEN. The Science of Ethics, CH 6 (4), 9 (S)
BONAR. The Intellectual Virtues
DEWEY. The Study of Ethics, CH S-6
LECKY. The Map of Life, CH 6,8-9, I I
SANTAYANA. Reason in COlnmon Sense, CH 9
ADLER. Art and Prudence, PART III, CH 12
Epistles
s. The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Con-
e
NY MORALES. The Art of Worldly Wisd01n
SON. De Obligatione Conscientiae (On the
tions of Conscience)
OR. Ductor Dubitantium
S-REFERENCES
he distinction between prudence and wisdom, or betvveen practical and speculative vvisdom,
see KNOWLEDGE 6e(I); lv1IND 9a; PHILOSOPHY 2a; WISDOM lb.
,he relation of prudence to the other intellectual virtues, see .Lt\RT I; HABIT Sd; KNOWLEDGE
6e(2), 8b(3); LAW 4a; SCIENCE Ia( I); VIRTUE AND VICE 2a(2); WISDOM 2a.
he relation of prudence to the moral virtues, see COURAGE 4; KNOWLEDGE 8b( I); PRINCIPLE
4
a
; TEMPERANCE Ib; TRUTH 2C; VIRTUE AND VICE IC, 3b, Sb.
he relevance of freedoln and of the distinction between means andends to the operations of
prudence, see GOOD AND EVIL sc; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY sa(I)-sa(2}; WILL 2C(I)-
2C(3), Sb(2).
he elements which enter into the making of a prudent judgment; see EXPERIENCE 6a;
JUDGMENT 3; OPINION 6b; REASONING se(3); "VVILL 2c(3), Sb(2).
onsiderations of the prudence of the statesman or citizen, and of the legislator or jurist,
see CITIZEN S; GOVERNMENT 3d ; LAW Sci, Sg; MONARCHY 3a ; STATE 8d.
GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 244d-245b; 343b-c
GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 75d-78b
:KANT: Pure Reason, 60a-c I Science of Right,
397a-b; 399c-400d
FEDERALIST: NUMBER 65 198a-200c passim;
NtJMBER 78, 231c-232a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 5, 37d;NU
96b; NUMBER 31, 105bc; NUMBER
132a; NUMBER 62, 190d-19la; NU
222b-d
43 MILL: Representg,tive Government, 334
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 255a-256a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III
92a; ADDITIONS, I66l45b-c / Philosoph
tory, PART II, 271d-272a; PART IV, 36
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 315b-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 9c-l0d.
65d-66d; BK X, 421c-426a; 440c-442c"
461d; BK XIII, 570a-b; 584c-585c '
6b. Jurisprudence: prudence in the dete
tion of laws and the adjudication
5 AESCHYLUS: Eumenides [397-777] SSe
5 ARISTOPHANES: Wasps 507a-525d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 32b-c; .. B
95d-96b
7 PLATO: Apology 200a-212a,c / Republic,
337b-338a I Theaetetus, 544a-c / Sta
599c-603a / Laws, BK IX, 744b-c;
782a-b; 784a-b; BK XII, 792a-c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 10 385c
BK VI, CH 8 [II4Ib23-33] 390d-391a /
BK II, CH 8 464c; BK II
[I282
b
I-I 4] 480b-c; CH IS [128
484b-c; CH 16 [I287a24-28] 485d; [1287
486a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH I [1354
a
593c-d
14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 70d-71b
15 Annals, BK III, 6lc-62a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH
515a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-I
A 3, REP 3 209d-210c; Q 94, A 4, AN
224d; A 5, 224d-225d; Q 95, A I, R
226c-227c; AA 2-3 227c-229b; Q 96, A
2 230d-231c; A 6 235a-d; Q .97, AA I...
237b; A 4 238b-239b; Q 105, A2, ANS
7-8309d-316a
22 CHAUCER: Tale ofMelibeus, par II 40
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58b; 78b-
II, l23b-d; 134a-136b; 136d; PARTUI,
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel,
85c-92c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 283a; 5l6c-5l7a
26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice,
sc I 425c-430b
27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure,
sc I-II 178d-184a
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II,
333b; 340d-343a; 353b-356d; 360d-3
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 94
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 27a-62a;9
102a-117b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 152h-154a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK
35c; 39b; 42c-d; BK XXVI, 214b,d-2
XXIX, 262a-b
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 43
(6. Prudence in relation to the common good oj the
co111munity. 6a. Political prudence: the
prudence of the prince or statesman, of the
subject or citizen.)
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 43a-b I Men0 , 174d-176a
I Statesman, 604c-608d I Laws, BK III, 669b-
670c; BK IX, 754a-b; BK XII, 785d-786b I
Seventh Letter, 806d-807b; 813d-814d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 5 [II40b4-II]
389b; CH 8 [II4Ib23-II42aI2] 390d-391a; BK
x, CH 9 434a-436a,c I Politics, BK III, CH 4
473c-475a; CH II 479b-480c; BK IV, CUI4
498b-499c; BK V, CH 8-11 509d-518c; BK VII,
CH 2-3 528a-530a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, C;H 7 182b-184a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 5 261a;
BK IV, SECT 4 264a; BK V, SECT 16 27lc-d; BK
VII, SECT 5 280a-b; BK IX, SECT 23 293c; BK x,
SECT 6 297a-b; BK XI, SECT 8 303a-b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK XI [296-444] 336a-340a
14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 129a-14la,c I Alcibiades,
l67c-16?a / Alexander 540b,d-576d passim
/ Phocion, 604b,d-605d I Caius and Tiberius
Gracchus-Agis and Cleomenes 689b,d-69la,c /
Demetrius, 736c-737b / Dion, 781b,d I Brutus-
Dion 824b,d-826a,c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK IV, 72b-73a; BK XVI,
l76b-d / Histories, BK I, 193d; 2l1c-212b; BK
III, 247a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I; Q 22, A
I, ANS l27d-128d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVII [55-136]
40a-4lb; PARADISE, XIn [88-111] 126b-c
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince la-37d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60d-6la; 67d-68a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 51a-55d; 38la-388c;
45ld-452d;488b-489b.; 490d-49ld
26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry IV, ACT III, SC II
[29-84] 453b-d I 2nd Henry IV, ACT I, SC III
472d-474a I Julius Caesar, ACT II, SC I [154-
191] 576a-c; ACT IV, sc I 587a-c
27 SHAKESPEARE: Antony and Cleopatra, ACT II,
SC II [1-27] 318c-d I Coriolanus 35la-392a,c
esp ACT II, SC III [S3-I60] 366c-367c, ACT III,
sc II [28-92] 373d-374c
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 33la-
333b; 340d-343a; 353b-356d; 361a-d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 4c-6c; 20d-
26a; 74b-c; 81d-82a; 94b-95b
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH XIII, SECT 156-
I5861a-62b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART I, 7b-8a; 28b-29b;
PART III, 112a-115b
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 39b
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 368h-c; 373c-
374a I Social Contract, BK III, 409d
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 109d-l10d;
BK II, 126a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, lb-2a passim; 50a;
331b-332d; 609d-6l0a; 645a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 168c
486