Sense

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 84: SENSE

707
THE FOREGOING THEORY, reducing sensation to
bodily motioH, seems to draw its cogency from
the fact that only bodies are sensible, that
sense-organs are bodily parts, and that sense-
organs must be activated by some sort ofphysi-
cal contact for sensations to occur. Some
writers, like Descartes, accept. the theory. for
animals, but reject it formen; at:' they distin-
guish, in the case of men, between thought and
sensation. They regard sensation, with its sub-
sidiary functions of memory and. imagination,
as reducible to corporeal motions, but refuse to
grant, that external sense-impr,essiqnsor in-
terior fancy can produce knowledge without
the activity of an immaterial soul.
To animals, Descartes declares, "we can
ascribe ... no knowledge at all, but only fancy
of a purely corporeal kind." In contrast, "that
power by which,we are said to know. is
purely spiritual,and notless distinct from every
part of the body than blood from bone, or hand
from eye." In men as well as animals, the ex-
ternal senses, "in, so far as they are part ofthe
body ... perceive in virtue of passiv,ityaJone,
just in the way that wax receives an :impression
from a seal." Fancy or imagination.isalso "a
genuine part of the body"; "memory, at
least thatwhich is corporeal and similar to that
of the brutes, is in no respect distinct from
imagination. "
These corporeal faculties are, according to
Descartes, of use to the 'understanding or the
mind only when .it "proposes to examine some-
thing that can be referred to the body"; but if
it "deal with matters in which there is nothing
corporeal or similar to the corporeal, it cannot
be helped by those facuIties." Hence, for Des-
cartes, the "mind can act independently of the
brain; for certainly the brain can be of no use
in pure thought; its only, use is for imagining
and perceiving."
For others, like William Jalnes, the distinc-
tion between sensation and thought" so far as
their relation to matter is concerned, seems
quite untenable. He objects to those who look
upon sensational consciousness as "soluething
quasi-material, hardly cognitive, \vhich one
need not much wonder about," while they re-
gard rational consciousness as "quite there-
verse, and the mystery of it [as] unspeakable."
We can correlate consciousness with the brain's
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
, he says, "by the common motions of the
1I0" - body and soul-that. "sensarion is kin-
led and fanned throughout our flesh." Sensa-
.on.occurs when the particles of body and soul
ogether are set in motion by the impact of
external bodies upon the organs of sense.
the pupil of the eye receives in itself a
rtain kind of blow, it is, said to perceive white
lor, and another again when it perceives
black." Similarly, "every. kind. of sound and
N"oice is heard when they have found their way
. to the ears and struck upon .."the sense: with
eir body; for that voice, too, and sound are
lily since they can. strike
,the senses.
Ei ther the external body. itself, asio t()uch,
rikesthe sense and sets up those bodily mo""
nons in the animal which are sensation; or, ac-
cording to Lucretius, minute replicas or il1)ages
-composed of atoms, as all things are-:-flyoff
the surface of distant bodies and enter
through the pores of our sense-organs to awaken
in us vision, hearing, or smelL In either case,
sensation is a bodily reaction; and,forLucretius,
imagination and memory, even thought,are
consequent motions in the atoms of the mind
-further bodily reverberations, as it were, of
sensation.
"The cause of sense," writes Hobbes, "is the
external body or object, which presses the
organ proper to each sense, either immediately,
sin taste andtouch, or mediately, as.in seeing,
and smelling; which pressure, by the
mediation of nerves, and other strings and
of the body, continues inwards to
the brain and heart, causes there a resistance or
unter-pressure, or endeavor of the heart, to
eliver itself; which endeavor, because outward,
ems to be some matter without. And this
eeming or fancy is that which men call sense."
The object seems to be colored or hot or
sweet when it causes certain sensations in us
which are projected outward upon it, in re'"
onse or counter-action to the inward motions
itsets up. But, says Hobbes, thesesensiblequali-
ties are, in the object, nothing but "so many
several motions of the matter by which it
'presses our organs diversely. Neither in us that
pressed, are they anything else but diverse
otions (for motion produces nothing but
otion)."
tion between the., senses and facul-
ties of reason or intellect. The chapter on
MEMORY AND IMAGINATION deals with these
two functions in their relation to sense'ana
sense-perception; and the contrast between
sensible and intelligible reality is discussed. in
the chapters on BEING, FORM, IDEA, and MAT-
TER. Some of these topics necessarily recuf
here, especially as they bear on what for
chapter are the primary problems-the nature
of sensation, the analysis of the power ofseuse,
and the character of the knowledge which is
afforded by the senses.
As WE HAVE ALREADY observed,. no difficulty
seems to arise at first concerning the natureOE
sensation. It is supposed by many inquirers
early and late in the tradition, that matter .
sensitive as well as sensible. Animals have
sense-organs which react to physical
tion. Bodies either act directly upon the sense-
organs, as in the case of touch and taste; or, asin
the case of vision, hearing, and smell, they ex-
ert their influence through an intervening me-
dium, yet in a manner which seems to be no less
the action and reaction of bodies.
Those who distinguish between living or-
ganisms and inanimate bodies tend to regard
sensitivity as a property of living matter, but
it does not follow for all who make this distinc..
tion that other than n1aterial factors are needed
to explain sensation. On the cantrary, some
wri ters seem to think that the motions of mat..
ter account for sensation as readily as the laws
of mechanics account for all the sensible changes
we are able to perceive.
Lucretius, for example, holds that living
things consist of body and soul, and that the
soul (or Inind) differs from the body only in
the size, the fineness of texture, and the mohilit
of the material particles ,vhich compose it. It
706
T
HE nature of sensation seems at first to be
. as obvious as its existence. In the tradition
of the great books there may be controversy
concerning the. existence of sense in plants as
\vell as in animals, and there may be contro-
versy over the existence in man of facul ties
higher than sense. Butno one disputes thatmen
and other animals are endowed with a power
of sense.
The extent of this power may be questioned,
but not the fact that animals and men, when
awake, experience sensations or perceive
through their senses. Sleep, according to Aris-
totle, can occur only in those living things
which have the power of sense-perception. "If
there be an animal not endowed \vi th sense-
perception, it is impossible that this should
either sleep or wake, since both these are affec-
tions of the activity of the primary faculty 'of
sense-perception.' ,
The existence of the sensible-ofan external
something which causes sensation and can be
sensed-also seems to escape denial or dispute.
The existence of a purely intelligible reality-
of a world of immaterial things incapable of be-
ing sensed-is subject to debate in all periods
of western thought. The sensible world is some-
times regarded as the only reality; sometimes it
is regarded as mere seelning, or appearance, in
comparison \vith the reality of purely intelli-
gible being. Men may also differ on the ques-
tion whether things possess sensible qualities
when they are not being sensed. But \vith few
exceptions, notably Berkeley and Hume, the
existence of a sensible world of material things
is not denied or seriously doubted.
The controversies and issues indicated ahave
are, for the most part, discussed elsewhere. The
chapter on considers the sensitivitv of
plants. There also, as well as in the on
MAN, IDEA, and MIND, is considered the distinc-
THE GREAT ID.EAS
CHAPTER84: SENSE
708
workings only in an empirical fashion, James
thinks, and \ve ought- to confess that "no glim-
mer of explanation of it is yet in sight. That
brains should give rise to a knowing conscious-
ness at all, this is the one mystery which re-
turns, no matter of what sort the consciousness
or of what sort the kno\vledgemay be. Sen-
sations, aware of mere qualities, involve the
mystery as much as thoughts, aware of com-
plex systems, involve it."
Still others, like Plotinus and Aristotle,
think that the mystery of conscious matter is
not essentially different from the mystery of
living matter, for if there is anything Inysteri-
ous about nutrition and growth, or sensation
and imagination, it consists in the same thing-
the union of material and immaterial principles,
of body and soul.
"If the soul were a corporeal entity," Plo-
tinus writes; "there could be no sense-percep-
tion, no mental act, no knowledge.... If the
sentient be a material entity (as we are invited
to believe), sensation could only be of the order
of seal-impressions struck by a ring on wax."
Perception is not a passively received impres-
sion. Itis, according to Plotinus, an act of
awareness "determined by the nature and char-
acter of the living being in which it occurs....
In any perception we attain by sight, the object
is grasped there where it lies in the direct line
of vision. . . . The mi,nd looks outward; this is
ample proof that it has taken and takes no inner
imprint, and does not see in virtue of some
mark made upon it, like that of the ring on the
wax; it need not look outward at all if, even as
it looked, it already held the image of the ob-
ject, seeing by virtue of an impression made
upon itself."
According to Aristotle, "two characteristic
marks have above all others been recognized as
distinguishing that which has soul in it from
that which has not-self-movement and sensa-
tion." By self-movement he appears to mean
such things as the nutrition and growth \vhich
is found in plants, as well as the addi tional ani-
Inal faculty of local motion. Both self-move-
ment and sensation require soul as well as body.
"Nothing grows or decays naturally," he
writes, "except what feeds itself, and nothing
feeds itself except what has a share of soul in
it." So, too, "nothing except what has soul in
it is capable of sensation." But "the exercise
of sense-perception does not belong to soul Or
body exclusively." Sensation "is not an affec:"
tion of the soul" by itself, nor has a soulless
body "the potentiality ot'perception."
BUT, ARISTOTLE ASKS, are all affections of the
soul "affections of the con1plex of body and
soul, or is there anyone among them peculiar
to the soul by itself? ... If we consider the
majority of them, there seems to be no case in
\vhich the soul can act or be acted upon without
involving the body; e.g., anger, courage, ap"
petite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems
to be the most probable exception; but if this
too proves to be a form of imagination, or to be
impossible without imagination, it too requires
a body as a condition of its existence.!'
Aquinas tries to answer the question Aris-
totle asks, \vith a threefold distinction which
places sensation and imagination midway be-
tween the vegetative functions and rational
thought. The power of thought, or "the intel-
lectual power," Aquinas says, "does not belong
to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is
the act of the eye; for understanding is an act
which cannot be performed by a corporeal- or..
gan, like the act of seeing."
At the other extreme from this "operation of
the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal na-
ture that it is not even perfonned by any cor-
poreal organ," are those "operations of the soul
... perforn1.ed by a corporeal organ and by virtue
of a corporeal quality." Because it is a kind of
self-movement, digestion requires soul as well
as body, but it is a corporeal action in the way
in which, according to Aquinas, it involves
"the action of heat." Bet\veen these extremes,
Aquinas places sensation and imagination, op-
erations "performed through a corporeal or-
gan, but not through a corporeal quality."
He explains this further by means of a dis"
tinction between natural and spiritual irnlnuta"
tion-physical and psychic change. "Natural
immutation takes place by the form of tHe
thing which causes the immutation being re"
ceived, according to its natural existence, into
the thing in which the immutation is effecte
as heat is received into the heated thing
Vegetative activities, while remaining psychi
in the sense of occurring only in living or 0
souled matter, involve only natural immuta-
tions in the vital organs involved.
In contrast, "spiritual immutation takes
place by the form of the thing causing the im-
mutation being received, according to a spirit-
ual mode of existence, into the thing in which
the immutation is effected, as the form of color
is received into the eye, which does not thereby
become colored." Though some sensations
may require a natural immutation of the sense-
organ, as hot and cold do, all sensations neces-
sarily involve a spiritual immutation, which
enables the sense-organ to perform its proper
act of knowing, as the eye knows color without
oecoming colored. "Otherwise," Aquinas says,
"if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the
sense's action, all natural bodies would feel
when they undergo al teration. "
tHESE DIVERSE VIEWS of the nature of sensa-
tion seem to be paralleled by diverse views of
tHe sensitive faculty. That the function of the
senses is somehow to apprehend or know does
not SeelTI to be disputed. But whether the
senses-including memory and imagination-
are the only faculty of kno\ving is an issue to
wHich the great books seem to give a variety
or ans",rers.
The opposite answers appear to be correlated,
not only with conflicting positions in respect
to body and soul, but also with opposing theo-
ries of the distinction between men and other
animals. Those who hold that the motions of
matter are adequate to explain the phenomena
or knowing and thinking, tend to make sense-
perception the primary function of the mind
and to treat not only memory and imagination,
but also reasoning or thought as subsequent
activities of the same general faculty which
receives impressions from external sources in
the first instance. Since other animals possess
senses and give evidence that perception in
has consequences for memory and imag-
Ination, those who hold this view also tend to
attribute thought to animals and to regard man
as differing from them only in degree.
Those who take the contrary view that
knowing involves immaterial principle or
cause-a soul as well as a to dis-
tinguish the various functions of sense from the
activities of thought-such as conception,
709
judgment, and reasoning. They also take the
position that man, \vhile sharing sense-percep-
tion, memory, and imagination with other ani-
mals, alone possesses the higher faculty. The
difference between men and brutes is thus con-
ceived as one of kind, not of degree, when the
difference between the senses and the reason in
man is also conceived as a difference in kind.
Afunctional relationship between sensation and
thought is not thereby denied, but a distinct
facul ty is affirmed to be necessary for going
beyond the apprehension of particulars to
knowledge of the universal, or for rising above
the imagination to abstract thought.
The distinction between sense and reason
as faculties of knowing is sometimes stated in
terms of a difference in their objects-the par-
ticular versus the universal, becoming versus
being, the material versus the immaterial.
SOlnetimes it is stated in terms of the difference
between a corporeal- power requiring a bodily
organ and a spiritual power which belongs ex-
clusively to the soul. Sometimes it is stated in
terms of the contrast between sense as intuitive
and reason as discursive, the one beholding its
objects immediately, the other forming con-
cepts, judgments, or conclusions about objects
which are either beheld by the senses or cannot
be intuitively apprehended at all.
The exceptions to the foregoing summary are
alrnost as numerous as the exenlplifications of
the points mentioned. Nothing less than this
intricate pattern of agreements and differences
will serve, however, to represent the conlplex-
ity of the discussion and the way in which di-
verse theories of sense imply different views of
nature and man, of mind and knowledge. The
situation can be illustrated by taking certain
doctrines which seem to be opposite on most
points, and then considering other theories
which seem to agree, on this point or that, with
both extremes.
WE HAVE ALREADY observed the opposition be-
tween Hobbes and Aquinas with regard to mat-
ter and spirit in relation to the activity of the
senses. Hobbes, like Lucretius, not only treats
all mental phenomena as manifestations of bod-
ily motion, but also reduces thought to thetrain
or sequence of images. Images are in turn re"
ducible to the sensations from which they derive.
TI-IE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
710
"As we have no imagination," Hobbes
writes, "whereof we have not formerly had
sense, in whole or in parts; so we have no transi-
tion from one imagination to another,i whereof
we never had the like before in our senses."
Using the word "thoughts" to stand for the
images derived from sense, Hobbes;goes onto
say that "besides sense, and thoughts, and the
train of thoughts, the mind' of man has. no
other motion; though by.the help of speech and
method, the same faculties may beimproved to
such a height as to distinguish men from all
other living creatures."
Only man's use of words makes
ence in the exercise of the imagination "that
we generally call understanding," and which,
according to Hobbes, "is common to man and
beast." Similarly, it is only the' fact that com-
mon names have general .... significance which
gives human discourse. the appearance' of
stract thought, for Hobbes denies abstract
Thoughts or images are no less particular
than sensations, ."there .being nothing .in
i
the
world universal but
Berkeley "and Hume seem to ... agree with
Hobbes that man has no abstract ideas or
universal concepts; that all the operations of
thought are merely elaborations of the original
impressions of sense; and that no special power,
but only the use of language, distinguishes men
from other animals.
Berkeley uses the :word "idea" to stand for
sense-impressions-"ideas actually imprinted
on the senses"-and for whatever is "perceived
by attending to the passions and operations of
the mind." To these two he adds a third: "ideas
formed by the help of memory and imagina-
tion, either compounding or dividing, or barely
representing those originally perceived in the
aforesaid ways."Theonlydifference between the
first and the third is that "the ideas of sense are
more strong, lively, and distinct than those of
the imagination." But our ideas of sense and
imagination do not cover all the objects of
which we can think. He admits, therefore, the
possibility of our having notions, whereby we
understand the meaning of a word like "spirit"
or "soul" which refers to a substance of which
we can form no idea.
Hume divides "all the perceptions of the
mind into two classes or species, \"hich are dis-
tinguished by their different' degrees
and vivacity. less forciblecind
commonly denominated thoughts or ideas.
other he calls "impressions," meaning
"all our more lively
are the source of all other ideas,
po\"er of the mind consistingin "no
the faculty of compounding,
menting, or diminishing the materials
us by the senses" and every simple idea
"copied from a similar impression."
Yet, though Berkeley and Hume
agree with Hobbes in reducing all
primary sense-perceptions and derived
ries or imaginations, Hume does not
explain thought by the motions of
Berkeley differs even Inoreradically.
nies that matter or bodies exist, and so
gards sense-perception, like all the
thought, as purely.' spiritua!. The soul
ly receives its original impressions
from God and actively forms the
able to derive from these impressions.
NORDO ALL THOSE who somehow r-nt"lr-e:of"TA
as composed of both body and soul agree
the function of sense in relation to the
thought. Locke, for example, uses undlerstan
ing" to cover all sorts of mental
tal activity begins with the passive
of the simple ideas of sense-the
produced in us ,,,hen "the bodies that
us do diversely affect our
simple ideas of reflection
awareness of our own mental ,.... ....... e:o ..."'f-fr"nC'
mental activitv also includes
complex ideas -' by the compounding of
ones, and even the act whereby we
stract ideas, in doing which man, in
opinion, is distinguished from brutes.
All these activities require soul as
body. All are somehow nothing more
working of the original sensations n .... c'C'1'rpl'"
ceived. In this last respect,
cords with that of Hobbes,
Hume, though he differs from them
spect to abstract ideas and in his
and soul. On the very point which
common with Hobbes, Berkeley, and
Locke seems to disagree with ..... ...
Thinking, for Descartes, is the
spiritual substance-the rational soul-
to the dual nature of man; whereas
and imagination, common to men
brutes, are purely corporeal functions. In
the soul or thinking substance may form
of its ideas, those relative to bodies,
the influence of sense or fancy; but with
to other ideas, such as those we have of
'-I .. ............ figures, Descartes says he cannot
that they "have at any time entered our
through the senses." He objects to .the
word "idea" for images, or ,,,hat he
"pictures in the corporeal imagination,
some part of the brain." He criticizes
.+.nrl........ vv "never raise their minds above the
of sense," so accustomed are they "to
nothing except by imagining it," with
that whatever "is not capable of
imagined appears to them not to be in-
at alL"
the maxim which Locke, no less than
or Berkeley, would
is nothing in the understanding which
first of all been in the senses"
offers the ideas of God and of the soul as
contrary examples, ideas clearly in the
which have no origin in sensation or fancy.
who desire to make use of their imagi-
to understand these ideas," he adds, "act
same way as if, to hear sounds or smell
they should wish to make use of their
making a sharp distinction between the
of sense and understanding or reason,
seems to share the position of Plato,
Aquinas, Spinoza, and Kant. Yet for
as for PIato, the inteHect '. in its own
of objects is like the senses in theirs,
each is able to behold its proper objects
1"1111-1'UI=I,r' whereas for Kant as for Aristotle,
alone is a faculty of intuition. The ideas
we apprehend intelligible
to Plato, Descartes, and Spinoza,
from sensations or images. Ac..
to Aristotle and Aquinas, on the other
intellect abstracts all its ideas, or
concepts, from the particulars of
respect Aristotle and Aquinas seem to
a,gr'eernel1t with Locke, even though that
must be qualified by the observa"
711
tion that Locke sees no need for a special facul..
ty to obtain abstract ideas. On the other hand,
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes all seem
to agree in holding that understanding is as
immaterial as its objects. Unlike sense, which
requires bodily organs, rational thought is, ac"
cording to them, an activity peculiar either to
the soul itself or to a power of the soul which
is not embodied in an organ, as the power of
vision is embodied in the eye or the powers of
memory and imagination are embodied in the
brain.
William James denies this. He holds the view
that all forms of consciousness are somehow
functions of the brain. Yet he also insists that
percept and concept are radically distinct forms
of consciousness. To this extent, James makes
as sharp a separation as the authors above men"
tioned between the sensory and the rational
phases of thought. He places sensation, percep"
tion, memory and imagination on one side, and
conception, judgment, and reasoning on the
other. But this is for him not a distinction of
faculties or powers, but only of different func-
tions which one and the same mind is able to
perform.
CERTAIN POINTS OR problems in the traditional
discussion of sense are unaffected by the basic
issues just considered. For example, most writ..
ers tend to make some distinction between the
special exterior senses, such as vision and hear-
ing, touch and taste, and the several interior
senses, which Aquinas enumerates as the com-
mon sense, memory, imagination, and the esti..
mative or cogitative powers. Yet not all who
consider memory and imagination as activities
consequent upon sense-perception call them
"interiar senses. " Not all recognize a distinct
estimative or cogitative power even when they
recognize a kind of thinking about particulars
done by animals and men with sensory materi-
als. Nor do all who discuss discrimination or
comparison, and the collation or combining of
the impressions received from the special
senses, attribute these functions to the special
faculty which Aristotle first calls "the common
" sense.
Frequently the same analytical point is made
in different ways. As indicated in the chapter
on QUALITY, the distinction which Aristotle
THE GREAT IDE1\S
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
713
our o\vn existence intuitively, and God's ex-
istence den10nstratively, but "the knowledge
of the existence of any other thing \ve can have
only by sensation." And though, he adds, "the
notice ,ve have by our senses of the existing of
things ,vithout us . . . be not altogether so cer-
tain as our intuitive knowledge or the deduc-
tions of our reason ... yet it is an assurance that
deserves the name of knowledge."
Against such views, the most fundamental
skepticisin goes further than doubting the
veracity of the senses because of the illusions
and hallucinations they cause us to suffer. "By
,vhat arguments," Hume asks, "can it be
proved that the perceptions of the mind must
be caused by external objects ... and could not
arise either from the energy of the mind itself
or from the suggestion of some visible or un-
known spirit?"
"It is a question of fact," he adds, "whether
the perception of the senses be produced by
external objects, resembling them. How shall
this question be determined? By experience
surely; as all other questions of a like nature.
But here experience is, and must be, entirely
silent. The mind has never anything present
to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly
reach any experience of their connexion with
objects. The supposition of such a connexion
is, therefore, without any foundation in rea-
soning."
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
PAGB
I. The nature of sense 7I 5
la. The power of sense as distinct from the power of understanding or reason
lb. Sense and intellect in relation to becoming and being, particulars and universals
Ie. The distinction between perception or intuition and judgment or reasoning: the
transcendental forms of intuition 716
Id. Sense-perception as a primary function of the mind or understanding: sensations
as received impressions; the distinction bet\veen sensation and reflection,
ideas and notions, percepts and concepts
2. Sensitivity in relation to the grades of life
2a. The differentiation of animals from plants in terms of sensitivity
2b. The degrees of sensitivity in the animal kingdom: the genetic order of the
several senses 717
2C. Con1parisons of hUJ11an and anitnal sensitivity
it restricts its attention accurately to the object
presented to it. . .. Thus if a man suffering
from jaundice persuades himself that the things
he sees are yellow, this thought of his \vill be
composite, consisting partly of what his imagi-
nation presents to him, and partly of \vhat he
assumes on his o\vn account, namely, that the
color looks yello\v, not o,ving to the defect in
his eye, but because the things he sees really
are yellow... \Ve can go ,vrong only when the
things \ve believe are in some way compounded
by ourselves." Descartes holds that "no falsity
can reside" in sensations themselves, but only
in those judgrnents which, on the basis of sensa-
tions, \ve are "accustomed to pass about things
external to us."
THE :MOST FUNDAMENTAL judgment which men
make on the basis of sensation is that an ex-
ternal world exists-a reality not of our own
making. Descartes argues from the evidence of
the senses to the independent existence of a
world of bodies. Berkeley argues, on
the contrary, that bodies do not exist except as
objects of perception, he attributes the sense-
impressions, over which we seem to have no
control, to the action of an external cause-to
God, who uses them as signs for instructing us.
Locke defines sensitive knowledge as that
which informs us of "the existence of things
actually present to our senses." We may know
ery time a present sign suggests an absent real-
ity to our Inind, ,ve make an inference, and it'
every time we make an inference \ve reason;
then," James admits, "perception is indubita-
bly reasoning. Only no room in it for
any unconscious part." No inference is con-
sciously made in perception; and James thinks
that "to call perception unconscious reasoning
is either a useless metaphor, or a positively mis-
leadingconfusion between t,vodifferentthings."
In his opinion, "perception differs from sensa-
tion [simply] by the consciousness of further
facts associated \vith the object of sensation."
For hiln, "perception and reasoning are
dinate varieties of that deeper sort of process
known psychologically as the association of
ideas."
What James treats as the objectof sensation,
Aristotle refers to as a quality sensed by one or
more of the special senses, either a proper or a
common sensible. 'Vhat James treats as the ob-
ject of perception, Aristotle calls an "accidental
object of sense," because it is strictly not sen-
sible at all by any of the exterior senses, singly
or in combination. When we call "the white
object we see" the son of Diares or a man, we
have an example of an accidental sensible or an
object incidentally perceived, because" 'being
the son of Diares';is' incidental to the directly
visible white patch" we see with our eyes.
This distinction between sensation and per-
ception seems to have a bearing on the prob-
lem of the fallibility of the senses. Again the
same point seems to be differently'made. Aris-
totle, for exalnple, holds that whereas each at
the senses is normally infallible in the appre-
hension of its proper object or appropriate
quality, error is possible in the perception at
the complex thing which is not strictly an ob-
ject of the special senses. "While the perception
that there is ,vhite before us cannot be false,"
he "Trites, "the perception that \vhat is ,:vhite
is this or that may be false."
Lucretius like\vise insists that the sens
themselves are never deceived, but that a
the errors attributed to the senses are the res
of a false inference or judgment \vhich reas
makes on the basis of the evidence present
by the senses. That also seems to be the opini
of Descartes, ,vho thinks that "no direct
perience can ever deceive the understandin
and Aquinas make bet\veen. proper and com-
mon sensibles, according as the quality, such
as color and odor, belongs to a single sense, or,
like shape and motion, can be perceived by
two or more senses, seems to parallel the dis-
tinction between what Locke calls "secondary"
and "primary" qualities. But ,vhere Locke and
others treat the so-called "secondary qualities"
as entirely subjective, occurring only in the
experience of the sentient organisn1 and having
no reality in the sensible thing, Aristotle takes
a contrary vie\v.
When it is not actually seen or smelled, the
sensible thing, according to Aristotle, is po-
tentially colorful or odoriferous; just as when
it is not actually seeing or sinelling, the sense
of VIsion or smell is also in a state of potenti-
ality \vith respect to these qualities. But when
the sensible thing is actually sensed, then,
Aristotle says, "the actuality of the sensible
object and of the sensitive faculty is one actu-
ality." The thing is actually colored when it is
actually seen, though it is only potentially
colored \vhen it is merely able to be so seen.
"Earlier students of nature," he ,vrites, "were
mistaken in their view that without sight there
was no white or black, without taste no savor.
This statement of theirs is partly' true, partly
false: 'sense' and 'the sensible object' are am-
biguous terms, i.e., they may denote either po-
tentialities or actualities. The statement is true
of the latter, false of the former."
Another example of the same analytical
point (\vhich is made differently by different
writers) concerns the distinction between sen-
sation and perception. According to William
James, "perception involves sensation as a por-
tion of itself, and sensation in turn never takes
place in adult life without perception also being
there." T'he difference between them is that
the func tion of sensation is "that of mere ac-
quaintance with a fact," whereas "perception's
function ... is knowledge about a fact, and this
kno,vledge admits of numberless degrees of
cornplication. " Hearing a sound is having a
sensation, but perception occurs when, as
James points out, we "hear a sound, and say 'a
horse-car.' "
But James does not agree that, when percep-
tion is so described, it is, as other psychologists
have suggested, a species of reasoning. "If, ev-
712
6.. The role of sense in the perception of beauty: the beautiful and the pleasing to sense;
sensible and intelligible beauty
S. The contribution of the senses to scientific or philosophical knowledge
sa. Sensation as the source or occasion of ideas:, the role of memory or reminiscence;
the construction of complex ideas; the abstraction of universal concepts
Sb. Sense-experience as the origin of inductions
sc. The dependence of understanding or reason upon sensefor knowledge of particu-
lars: verification by appeal to the senses
4. The character of sensitive knowledge
4a. Comparison of sensitive with otherforms of knowledge
4b. The object of sense-perception: the evident particular fact; judgments of per-
ception and judgments of experience
4C. The relation of sense and the sensible: thesubj!ectivity or objectivity of sense-
qualities
4d. The limit, accuracy, and reliability of sensitive knowledge: the fallibility of the
senses
(1) The erroneous ofsense-data: the problem of judgments based
on sensation
(2) Error in sense-perception: illusions and hallucinations
715
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-c; 23a-24a; 37b-3ge;
98c; 101d-l02a; 112d-113b; 115b-c I Fund.
Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 282b-c; Intro.
Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-c I Judgement,
570c-571c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 158b-159a; 450a-451b;
469a-b; 628b-631a
lb. Sense and intellect in relation to becoming
and being, particulars and universals
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 126b-d / Symposium, 167R-d
; Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231b-232b I Republic,
BK VI-VII, 383d-398c I Timaeus, 447b-d;
457b-458a I Theaetetus, 534d-'536a I Sophist,
56Sa-569a esp 568a-569a
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2
[7Ib3.3-72a6] 98b-c; CH 18 Illb-c; CH 31
120a-c; BK II, CH 19 [IOO
a
I6-
b
I] 136dl Topics,
BK II, CH 7 [II3
a2
3-32 ] 158d; BKVI, CI-i 4
[I4Ib2-14] 194d-195a; BK VIII, cn I [I56a4-6]
211d-212a I Physics, BK I, CH 5 [I89
a
S- 8]
264b-e I Metaphysics, BK I, CH I [980a28-
98Ib13] 499a-SOOa; CH 6 [987a29-bI81505b-:d;
EK III, CH 4 [999a24-b4] 518a-b; BK VIl,CH 10
[I035b34-I036aI2] 559b-c/ Soul, BK Il, CH 5
[4I7bI7-28] 648b-c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI,CH8 [II42aJ2-31]
391b-c; BK VII, CH 397c,-d
11 N1COMACHUS:. Arithntetic, BKI, 811e-d
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of thepassages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in53 JAMES :Psychology, 116a-119b,thepassage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, theletters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lo\ver half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a \vork (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II. [265--28.3] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA;'
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional inforrriation concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
la.. The power of sense as distinct from the
power of understanding or reason
'7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a I Repub-
lic, BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII, 392c-393c I
Theaetetus, 534d-536a
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, 'CH 31
120a-c I Metaphysics, BK III, CH 4 [999
bl
-4]
5l8b I Soul, BK II, CH 5 647b-648d; BK III,
cn 4 [429
a2
9-
b
4] 661c-d; CH 8 664b-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK IX, CH 9 [II7oaI6-18]
423d-424a
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4a I
Fourth Ennead, TR VI, CH 1-2 189b-190b I
Fifth Ennead, TR III,Cf! 2-3 216b-217b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-20
74b-76e I City of God, BK VII, CH 23, 256b-c;
BK VIII, CH 6, 269b; BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a
19 AQUINAS: Suntma Theologica, PART I, Q 12,
A3 52c-53b; Q 14, A2, ANS and REP I 76d-77d;
Q 75, A3, ANS and REP 2 38De-381b; Q78, A I
407b-409a; AA J-4 410a-413d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50,
A3 8b-9a; Q 56, A5 33c-34b; PART III SUPPL,
Q 70, A 2 896a-897d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, VIII, 13a; XII 18b-25a I
Meditations, VI, 98d:"99c I Objections and
Replies, 218c-d; 229d:"230c '
THE GREAT IDE.AS
3. The analysis of the power of sense: its organs and activities
3a. The anatomy and physiology of the senses: the special sense-organs, nerves, brain
3b. The distinction between the exterior and interior senses
(1) Enumeration of the exterior senses: their relation and order
(2) Enumeration of the interior senses: their dependence on the exterior senses
3C. The activity of the exterior senses
(r) The functions of the exterior senses: the nature and origin of sensations
(2) The attributes of sensation: intensity, extensity, affective tone; the psycho-
physical law
(3) The classification of sensations or sense-qualities: proper and common sensi-
bIes; primary and secondary quali ties
(4) The distinction between sensation and perception: the accidental sensible;
complex ideas of substance
(s) Sensation and attention: pre-perception and apperception; the transcenden-
tal unity of apperception
3d. The activity of the interior senses
(1) The functions of the common sense: discrimination, comparison, association,
collation or perception
(2) Memory and imagination as interior powers of sense
(3) The estimative or cogitative power: instinctive recognition of the harmful
and beneficial
3e. The relation of sense to emotion, will, and movement: the conception of a
sensitive appetite
714
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
716
(1. The 11ature of sense. lh. Sense and intellect in
relation to becoming and being, particulars
and universals.)
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR VI, CH 1-2 189b..
190b / Fifth Ennead, TR v, CH I 228b-229c;
TR IX, CH 5 248a-249a / Sixth Ennead, TR I,
Cll 27-28 266c-267c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 23
50b-c
19 .AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
II 84c-85c; Q 18, A2, ANS 105c-106b; A3, ANS
106b-107c;Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 57, A I, REP 2
295a-d; A 2 295d-297a; Q 75, A 5, ANS 382a..
383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4388c-391a; Q86,A I,
ANS and REP 4 461c-462a; A .3 463b-d; PART
I--n, Q I, A2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 2, A 6, ANS
619d-620d; Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP I,] 748b-
749a
28 HARVEY: On Aninlal Generation, 332a-333b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII 18b-25a; XIV 28a-33b
passim / Discourse, PART IV, 53b / lvfedita-
tions, II, 79a-81d esp BId; VI, 96b-d / Objec-
tions and Replies, 130a-b; 136d-137a; 218c-d;
219b-c; 229d-230c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d-342a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445d-446a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 307a-311a esp 309a, 311b-
312b [fn I]
Ie. The distinction between perception or in-
tuition and judgment or reasoning: the
transcendental forms of intuition
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-41c esp 23a-24a,
34a-c, 38c-41c; 42a; 45d-46a; 47c-4Ba; 53b-
54b; 58a-64a esp 61a-64a; 66a-d; 98c; 109d-
110a; 112d-113b; 115b-c; 199b-c / Fund. Prine
Metaphysic of Morals, 282b-c / Practical
Reason, 307d-308b; 329b-c / Judgelnent, 461a-
475d esp 461a-462d, 464c-467a, 474b-475d;
482d-483d; 492c-d; 570b-572c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 629a-631a
Id. Sense-perception as a primary function of
the mind or understanding: sensations
as received im.pressions; the distinction
between sensation and reflection, ideas
and notions, percepts and concepts
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [231- 251]
33a-b; BK IV [26-41] 44b-d; [722-817] 53d-
54d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 52b-c; 54a;
PART IV, 258b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 14-18 380c..
382b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I,
SECT 15 98d-99a; BK II, CH I-II 121a-128c esp
Cll I, SECT 1-8 121a-123a, SECT 20-25 126d-
127d; CH III, SECT I, 128d; Cll VIII, SECT I
133b-c; SECT 8 134b-c; CH IX 138b-141a pas-
sim, esp SECT I 138b-c, SECT 15 141a; Cll XI,
SECT I7'-CH XII, SECT I, 147a-b; CH XIX, SECT
I, 175b; CH XX, SECT I 176b-c; ell XXI, Sf:
4 178d-179c; SECT 74-75, 200a-d; CH Xx
SECT 2, 201a; CH XXIII, SECT I 204a-b; SECT
5 205a-b; SECT 15 208c-d; SECT 29 2110-
212a; SECT 32 212cA; BK III, CH IV, SECT
II 261d-262b; CH V, SECT 2 263d-264a; Bl(
IV, CH II, SECT II 311c-312a; CH IV, SECT 4
324c
35 BERKELEY: HUlnan Knotvledge, SECT r
413a-b; SECT 25--33 417d-419a passim; SECT
3,6 419c-d; SECT 135-142 440a-441c pas-
SIm, esp SECT 139-14 440d441a, SECT 14
2
441c '
35 HUME : Huntan Understanding, SECT II 4550-
457b passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 115b-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 144a-145a; 160a; 3130-
314a; 452a-457a esp 453a-454a, 455a-456a'
593a '
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Drearns, 352d
2. Sensitivity in relation the grades of life
2a. The differentiation of animals from plant
in terms of sensitivity
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 469d-470a
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BKI, CH 5 [4IObI6-4IIR2
BK II, CH 2 [413R.3I--b4] 643c; CH
[4I4R28'-33] 644c; [4I4b32-4ISa3] 64Sa-b;
12 [424R32--b4] 656b-c / Sense and the Sensib
CH I [4.36b8-12] 673c / Sleep, ClI I [454aI2-1
696c-d; [454b2.3-455R2] 697b-c / Youth, Li
and Breathing, ClI I [467b23-25] 714b
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Anilnals, BK VIII, CH
[588b4-589aI] 114d-115b / Parts of Anima
BK II, CH 10 [655b3.3-6S6a4] 182a; BK IV, CH
[686
b
23-687aI] 218b-c / Gait of Animals, C
4 [705a26-bI3] 244a-b / Generation ofAnima
BK I, cn 23 [73Ia24-b8] BK II, CH
[7.32aI2-I4] 272c; CH .3 276d
277b; CH 4 [740b25]-CH S [74
IR
30] 281d-282b
BK III, CH 7 [757bI4-30] 298c-d; BK V, CH
[778b30--779
a
4] 321a-b / Ethics, BK I, CH
[I097b33-1098a2] 343b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH
167a-b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VIII, SECT 7 286
BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VII, CH 2
256b-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I
A2, ANS and REP I A3, ANS 106
107c; Q 69, A 2, REP 1 361c-362c; Q 78, A
ANS 407b-409a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 368a-
369d-370b; 372b; 397c-398c; 457c-d
35 LOCKE: }lun1an Understanding, BK II, CH
SECT 11-15 140b-141a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 114b-115c
115a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 8a
54 FREUD: Unconscious, 429c-d
h.The degrees of sensitivity in the animal
kingdom: the genetic order of the sev-
eral senses
8 ARISTOTLE:,Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413b4-IO] 643c;
[4148r-.3] 644a; BK III, CH I I [433b3I-434a4]
666d; CH 12-13 667a-668d / Sense and the
Sensible, eH I [436bI2-4.37aI7] 673c-674a
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH .3
t+89RI7-I9] lOb; eH 9 [49Ib26-34] 13c; CH II
[492a27-30] 14a-b; BK II, CH 12 [504aI9-23]
26c; CH 13 [50S
a
32-:-34] 27d-28a; BK IV, Cll 7
[5.32aS-7] 58d; CH 8 59d-62a; BK v, CH 16
[548bIO-I5] 75b-c; BK VIII, Cll I [588bI7-3I]
115a-b / Parts ofAni1nals, BK II, CH 8 [653b22--
29] 17gb; CH 10-17 181d-188a,c passim; BK III,
CH 4 [66789-141 195b; BK IV, CH 5 [68IbI4-17]
212b; CH I I. [69obI7-69IR28] 222d-223c / Gait
ofAnimals, CH 4 [705
b
9-I3] 244b / Generation
of ..4..llitnals, BK I, CH 23 [73Ia24-b8] 271c-d;
BK v, CH 1 [778b20]-CH 2 [78Ib29] 321a-324a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [633-721]
52c-53d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A
3, ANS 106b-107c;Q 78, A 3, ANS 410a-411d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse,PART V, 59a-c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKII, CH IX,
SECT II-IS 140b-141a
49 DAR\VIN: Descent of Man, 261c-262a; 366c;
397d-398a; 402b-c; 406c; 432c-434c passim;
447b-448a passim; 456b-d; 474a-b; 480a-482b
passim; 529a-b; 553d-554b; 568d-569b; 595b-
596a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 27a-42b passin1, esp 40a,
41b
2c. Comparisons of human and animal sensi-
tivity
8 ARISTOTLE : Soul, BK II, CH 9 [42Ia6-16] 652c;
[42IRI9-26] 652d; [42Ib8-422a6] 653a-c /
Sense and the Sensible, CH I
673d-674a; Cll 4 [44ob28-44Ia3] 678b-c; CH S
[443bI7-44583I] 681c-683b
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Anilnals, BK I, Cll 15
[494bI7-I9] 16d / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH
16 [660
a
I3]-CH 17 [660
a
23] 187a / Generation
ofAnimals, BK V, CH 2 [78IbI7-23] 323d-324a
/ Ethics, BK III, CH 10 [III8aI7-b7] 364d-365a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [76--721]
53c-d
19 AQUINAS: Stannla Theologica, PART I, Q 81,
A3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 91, A3, REP
1,,3 486b-487d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2,
A2, REP 2 711d-712d
5 MONTAIGNE: Essavs, 286a-287b;
30 BACON: Novu1n Organum,' BK II, APH 40,
173c-d
81 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 156a-d;
229d-230c
85 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX,
SECT 12-15 140c'-141a
717
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLatvs, BK I, 1d-2a
42 KANT: Judgement, 479b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 25
121a
48 MELVILLE: l'vfoby Dick, 244a-245b
49 DAR\VIN:Descent of Alan, 259d-260a; 261c-
262a; 301c-302b; 366c; 568d-570a
53 JAMES: P:>ychology, 19b-42b passim, esp 41a-b
3. The analysis of the power of sense: its organs
and activities
3a. The anatomy and physiology of the senses:
the special sense-organs, nerves, brain
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 454b-455a
8 A.RISTOTLE: Soul, BK II, CH I [412bI8-24]
642d; CH 8 [420a2-I9] 651b-c; CH 9 [42IaI9-
26] 652d; [42Ib8-422a6] 653a-c; CH 10 [422bI-
9] 654a; Cll II [422bI7-424a9] 654b-655d; BK
II, CH 12 [4241124]-BK III, CH I [425aI31656a-
657a; BK III, CH 2 [426b8-17] 658d; CH 13
[4.35all-b.3] 668a-b / Sense and the Sensible,
ClI 2-5 674a-683b passim / Youth,Life, and
Breathing, CH 3 [468b28]-CH 4 [469b6] 715b..
716a
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH 4
[489
a2
4-2 7] 10c; Cll IS [494bII-I6] 16d; BK II,
CH 10 25b-c; CH 12 [S04RI9-23] 26c; Cll 13
[s05a.32-34] 27d-28a; BK IV, cn I [524833-b5]
50a; Cll 7 [53
2R
5-IO] 58d-59a; CH 8 59d-62a /
Parts ofAnimals, BK II, CH I [647aI-.34] 171a-c;
Cll 8 [653bI9-29] 179b; CH 10-17 181d-188a,c
esp Cll 10 [656RI4]-Cll 12 [657a24] 182b-183d,
Cll 16-'17 185d-188a,c; BK III, CH 4 [666
a
IO-
b
I]
193d-194b; CH 5 [667b22-32] 196a; BK IV, CH
5 [678b2-18] 208b-c; [68IbI5-682a9] 212b-d;
Cll I I [69obI8-69Ia28] 222d'-223c / Motion of
Animals, Cll 9 [702b22-'25] 238b / Generation
of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [743b25-744aI8]
285a-b; BK v, Cll I [779R27]-CH 2 [78Ib29]
321c-324a
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159c-160a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [136-160]
31d-32a; [231-251] 33a-b; [359-369] 34d;
[46-416] 3Sb-c; BK IV [237-253] 47b-c; [324-
352] 48c-d; [615-.629] 52bc
16 I(EPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 855a
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR lIlt CH 23 153d-
154b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 76,
A5, ANS and REP 2 394c-396a; Q77, A5, REP 3
403d-404c
23 I-IOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; SOb-51b;
PART III, 172c; PART IV, 258b-c
28 IIARVEY: Circulation ofthe Blood, 326b / On
Animal Generation, 455c; 456b-458a esp
457a-d; 494b
30 BACON: Not1urt1 Organuln, BK II, APH 27,
157b-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-20d / Objections
and Replies, 209c
THE GREAT
3c(3) The classification of sensations or sense-
qualities: proper and common sensibles;
primary and secondary qualities
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 462c-463d; 464b-465d
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [9a28-b8] 14b:c I
Generation and Corruption, BK II, -CH 1-3
3c(2) The a!tributes. of ..sensation: .intensity,
extensIty, affective tone; the psycho-
physical law
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 15 [I06
a
22-36]
150a-b; [I07b27-37] 152a I Physics,BK VII, CH
3 [246b20-247aI9] 330a-b I Soul, BK II, CH 8
[420a27-b4] CH 9 [42Ia6-I61652c; BK
III, cn 2 [426a27..."b8] 658c-d; cn 13 [435
b
4-I9]
668c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 4 [II74bI5-I175a
31429a-b .'
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [398-477J
20a-21a; [963-972] 27b; BK IV [.324-331] 48c;
[524-548] 51a-b ;[615-721]
17PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR VIII, CH I, 65a
I Fifth Ennead, TR VIII,. CH 1I, 245c.
19 AQUINAS: Sumnza Theologica, PART I-II, Q31,
AA 5-6 755c-757c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62b-c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK-JV, CH II,
SECT 11-13 311c-312b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 33 419a;
SECT 36 419c-d
35 HUME: flumanUnderstanding, SECT II, DIV
11-12 455b-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK XIV, 103a-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 69c-72c 11ntro. Meta-
physic of Morals, 385a-c I Judgement, 477b-
478a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 450a
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 569a-b
53 JAMES: fsychology, 275b-276b; 319b-321a;
348a-359a; 498a-501b passim; 526b-527a;
533a-:b; .S40a-547a; 552a-554b; 563a-566a;
651a-b; 829b-830a
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 367b-c;
384c-d I Narcissism, 403d-404a I Bevond the
Pleasure Principle, 639b-d; passim
I Ego and Id, 701a-b I Civilization and Its
Discontents, 773a
1) to 3c(3) CHAPTER 84: SENSE 719
tion, BK I, CH 8 [324b26-32] 423b; [326bII- 45 LAVOISIER: Ele1nents ofChemistry, PART I, 14a
21] 425c-d I Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 6 [I048b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 25
18-34] 574a-c I Soul,BK II, CH 5 647b-648d; 121a
BK III, CH 7 [43IaI- 8] 663c I Sense and the 50 MARX: Capital, 31c-d
Sensible 673a-689a,c passim 53 JAMES: Psychology, 98b-103b; 10?a-b; 149b-
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH I 151b esp 151a-b; 184h-185a; 193b-194a; 422a;
171a-b; CH 10 [656b26-657aI31 452a-457aesp 456b-457a; 470b-471a; 472b-
183a-c; BK IV,CH II I690b26-69IaI3] 222d- 479a; 520a-521a; 547a-627a esp 549a, 550a-b,
223b I Generation of Animals, BKV, CH I 553b-554b, . 562a-563a, 584b-589b, 593a,
[780bI3]-CH 2 [78Ib291322d-324a I Ethics,BK 595b-597b [fn 2], 596a-608b, 611b,613b-
II, cH I BK x, CH 4 [II74
b
616b; 856b-858a passim
I5-II75a3] 54 FREUD: Instincts, 412c-413a I Beyond the
l'E) HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159d Pleasure Principle" 647c-648a I Ego and/d,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, UK II [398-477] 701b-d
20a-21a; [865-990] BK III [231-257]
33a-b; [323-416] 34b-35c; BK IV [26-268]
44b-47d; [522-776] '51a-54b
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 6-7 3c-4a I
Second Ennead, TR 'VIII I Fourth
Ennead, TR III, CH23153d.:i54b; CH 25-26,
155c; TR IV,CH TR v, CH
I-TR VI, CH 2 183a-190b
A I, ANS 75d-76c; A 2, REP I 76d-77d; Q 75,
A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c-381b; ,Q 77, A 5,
REP 3 403d-404c; Q 78, A.3 410a-411d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, <PART III SUPPL,
Q 70, AA 1-2 g93d-897d; Q 82, AA 971a-
974c
3 HOBBES: Leviathan, PARTi, 49a-d; 62b;
PART III, 172b; PART IV, 258b-c.
8 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 456c-457d
passim, esp 457c-d
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 45,
176a-b
DESCARTES: Rules,. XII, '19a I Objections and
Replies, 163b; 228c-229c; 229d-230c
1 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, AXIOM 4 3.73d;
PROP 11-16 377b':"380d esp POSTULATE 3380b
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 428a-b; 434a-435a;
442a-443a; BK III, 518b.. 519b; 522a
3SLoCKE: rIuman ,Understanding,BKII, CH I,
.sEqr 3 121c-d; SECT 23 127b; CH III,SECT I
128d-129a; CH VIII, SECT 4 133d;'SE(JT 7-26
134b-138bpassim, esp SECTII-I3 134d-135b,
SECT 21 CHIX, SECT 1-4 1381;>.-d; CH
XIX, SECT I, 175b; CH XXIII, SECT 11-13 206d-
208b; CH XXIX, SECT 3. 234b-c; CH XXXI,
SECT 2 239b-d; BK III, CH IV, SECT 10 261b-d;
CH V, SECT 2 263d-264a; BK IV, CH II, SECT
11-13 311c-312b; CH III, SECT 28322a-c; CH
IV, SECT 4 324c
SEERKELEY: Human Knowledge" SECT 18-20
416b-417a; SECT 25-33 417d-419apassiln;
SECT 36 419c-d; SECT 44, 421a; SECT 56-57
423c-424a; SECT go 430c-d; SECT 146-149
442a-d
MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws,:B-I< XIV,
102b,d-103b
2 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 115b-c / Judge-
ment, 477b-d; 518a
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 202a
20 AQUINAS: SUl1zma Theologica, PART III su
Q 82, A 4 972d-974c; Q 91, A 4, REP I 102
1023d
28 HARVEY: On Ani1nal Generation, 457b-c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, 19a
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, Cll
SECT 3-CH III, SECT I 128b-129a; CH IX, SE
8-9, 139c-140a
35 BERKELEY: HU1nan Knowledge, SECT
413a-b; SECT 42-44 420c-421a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 62a-63a; 569b-570a; 65
651a
3b(2) Enumeration of the intelior senses: th
dependence on the exterior senses
8 ARISTOTLE : Posterior Analytics; BK II, Cll
[99b36-IOOa6] 136b-c I Metaphysics, BK I, C
[g80
a
22-
b
24] 499a I Soul, BK III, CH 3 [4
IO-429a9] 660d-661b; CH II [433
b
3I-434
666d I Me/nory and Re111iniscence, CHI 69
692b
9 ARISTOTLE: Alotion of Anirnals,cH 8 [7
19-20] 237c I Rhetoric, BK I, eH II {I37oa2
31] 613c
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH
157b-d; TR IV, cn 8, 161d-162b; TR VI 1'8
191c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par" 12
74b-75b
19 AQUINAS: SU11zma Theologica, PART I; Q
A 4 411d-413d; Q 84, A 7, REP 2 449b-45
Q III, A 3, REP I 570b-571b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, x
[13-18] 7ac
23 I-IOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, SOa-c; 521:>
54b-c; PART IV, 262a-c
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 334c-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-20d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 38
382b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding,' BK I, CH
SECT 21 118b-119a; BK II, CH II, SECT
128a-c; CH X 141b-143d esp SECT 7 142c
CH XI, SECT 143d-145b; CH XII, SEC
147b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT II,DIV
455d-456b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-42b; 54b-55a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a; 391a; 480a
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-c
3co The activity of the exterior senses
3c( 1) The functions of the exterior senses,:
nature and origin of sensations
7 PLATO: Meno, 177b-d I Republic, UK VI,
386c I Timaeus, 453b-454a; 454c-455a;
465d I Theaetetus, 518b-522b; 533b"-53
Philebus, 621a-c
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [9a28:...b8114
Topics, BK I, CH 14 [I05b 149b; B
CH 5 [I25bI5-I8] 174d / Generation and GO
718
(3. The analysis of the power of sense.' its organs
and activities, 3a. The anatomy and
physiology of the senses: the special sense-
organs, nerves, brain.)
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 384b"-385b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, cn III,
SECT I 128d-129a; CIl VIII,SECT 12 135a; CH
XXIX, SECT .3 234b-c
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 270a-271b
38 MONTESQUIEU: .. Spirit of Laws, BK XIV,
102b,d-103b
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 244a-245b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 85d-87c;
Descent of Man, 259c-261c; 397d-398a; 595d-
596a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 8a-52b esp 27a-42b;
151a-b; 453a; 456b-457a; 497a-501b esp SOOa-
501b; 533a-538b passim, esp 533a-534a, 536a,
538a-b; 546b-547b [fn I]; 562b-563a esp
562b-563b [fn I]; 575b-584a; 768b;787a
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351b-352b;
I Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 647a-
648a
3b. The distinction between the exterior and
interior senses
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19
[99b36-IOOa3] 136b-c I Soul, BK III, CH 2
657d-659c; CH 3 [428a5-16] 660b;CH 7
[43IaI4-b2] 663d-664a I Sleep, CH 2 [455
a
3-
b
I3
] 697c-698b
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH29157b-d
19 AQUINAS: Sumn'la Theologica, PART I, Q 78,
A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3,
REP 3 430c-431d;PART I-II, Q 35, A 2,REP 2
773b-d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50a-c; 52b-c;
PART IV, 258b"-c
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 457b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-20a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 24a-b; 26b-29d I Intro,
Metaphysic of Morals, 386d-387a,c
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 367b-c;
384c-385b
3b(1) Enumeration of the exterior senses: their
relation and order
8 ARISTOTLE: Generaton and Corruption, BK II,
CH 2 [.32gb6-I7] 429c I Soul, BK II,CH 7-11
649b-656a; BK III, CH 1--2 656b,d-659c I Sense
and the Sensible 673a-689a,c
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Ani1nals, BK IV, CH 8
59d-62a I Parts of Animals, BKIl, CH 10
[656a24]-CH II [657aI8] 182c-183c
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [434-443]
20c; [680-687] 23c-d; BK IV [478-499] 50b-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QI8,
A3, ANS 106b-107c; Q76, A5, ANS394c-396a;
Q 78, A 3 410a-411d; Q 91, A 3" REP I 486b-
487d; PART I-II, Q 31, A 6 756d-757c
3e. The relation of sense to emotion, will, and
movement: the conception of a sensitive
appetite
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 128a-129c / Republic, BK IV,
350b-353d esp 352c-d; BK IX, 421a-b /
Timaeus, 466a-467b / LawJ, BK VI, 712b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VIl, CH 3 [246b20-
247aI9] 330a-b / Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413bI7-24]
643d; CH .3 [414a28-bI6] 644c-d / Dreams, CH
2 [460a34-b27] 704b-d
9 ARISTOTLE : Motion ofAnimals, CH 6 [700b4]-
CH 8 [702a22] 235d-237c / Ethics, BK III, CH 10
[III8
a
I-
b
7] 364c-365a; BK VI, CH 2 [II.39aI6-
21] 387d; BK VH, CH 3 [II47a25-b6] 397c-d;
CH 4 [II4
8a
4-22] 398b-c; CH 6 [I I 49a23-b3]
399d-400a
55d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH23, 170a-171a
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 28
156d-157b; TR IV, CH 20 167d-168b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 1-2 9a-b;
par 10 l1a-b; BK III, par I 13b-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,Q 6, A
I, REP 2 28h-d; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q
78, A I 407b-409a; Q 81 428d-431d; Q 82, A 2,
REP .3 432d-433c; PART I-II, Q I, A 2, REP 3
610b-611b; Q 2, A 6, REP 2 619d-620d; Q 17,
A 7 690d-692a; QQ 22-48 720b,d-826a,c pas-
situ, esp Q 22, A 3 722d-723b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART 1--11, Q 56,
AA 4-5 32b-34b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI
[85--102] 77d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-d; 62b-c;
64a-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 288a-290b
27 SHAKESPEARE: I-lamlet, ACT III, SC IV [65781]
55b-c
30 BACON: Advance1nent of Learning, 55b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 9 399b-c
42 KANT: Pure Retlson, 164b-c; 235c-d / Fund.
Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 259a-c; 265b,d
[fn I]; 270c-d; 284d-285a / Practical Reason,
298d-300a; 341c-342a / Intro. Metaphysic of
Morals, 385c-386d / Judgement, 477b-c;
586a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a-15a; 51a-b; 521a-522a;
694a-699a; 738a-759a esp 743a-745b, 754b-
75Sb, 757b-759a; 767b-794a esp 768a-771a,
790a-794a; 808b-810b; 812a-813a; 827b-835a
esp 827b-828a, 830b-831b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351c-353b
esp 351d-352a; 363c-364b / Instincts, 412c-
413d; 419a-420c esp 420a / Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, 648b-c / Ego and Id, 701b
(3) to 3e CHAPTER 84: SENSE 721
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 28-32 / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640d-641a I
156d-159a; TR VI 189b-191c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-
18 AUGUSTINE: ConfessionJ, BK x, par 12-17 721c esp 720c-d; 737b-d; 751a-752b / New
74b-75d Introductory Lectures, 845a-846a
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q 55, A
2, REP 2 289d-290d; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 3
411d-413d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50,
A .3, REP 3 8b-9a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan,PART I, 50a-52b esp
SOa-d; PART IV, 258b-c; 262a-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55b-c
31 .DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19d; 20b-d / Objec-
tions and Replies, 208d-209a; 218c; 219b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17-18 380d-
382b; PART III, POSTULATE 2 396a
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CH X,
SECT 1-2141b-c; SECT 7 142c-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-42b; 54b-64a /
Judgement, 493c-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 219d-
220a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a-15a esp 13a; 145a;
421b-431b passim, esp 424b-425a; 480a-501b
esp 480a-b, 497a-501b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-d
The estimative or cogitative power: in-
stinctive recognition of the harmful and
beneficial
6 HERODOTUS : History, BK II, 63b-c
9 ARISTOTLE: History ofAnimals, BK VIII, CH 12
[S96b20-28] 122d; BK IX, CH 5-6 136d-138b
passim
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 20
167d-168b
A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c-
396a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 4-5 411d-413d;
Q 81, A2, REP 2 429c-430c; A3, ANS and REP 2
430c-431d; Q 83, A I, ANS 436d-438a; Q 96,
A I, ANS and REP 4 510b-511b; PART I-H, Q29,
A 6, ANS 748b-749a
22 CHAUCER: Nun's Priest's Tale [15,279--287]
457b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 286d-287b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 456d-457a
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, VI, 100a-d
HtlmanUnder:standing, BK I,CH II,
SECT 3 104b-d; BKII, CH X, SECT 3 141c-d;
CH XI, SECT 5 144d-145a; SECT II 145d-146a
ROUSSEAU: Inequality,
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 144a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 121a; 122c /
Descent of Man, 287d-288a; 290c-291a;
292b-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a; 708a-709a; 720b-
725a passim; 729b
4: FREUD: General Introduction, 607d-609c esp
607d-608c; 612c-614a esp 613d-614a; 623b-c
3d(2) Memory and imagination as
powers of sense
7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 523d-524a /
621a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH
[99b20-IOOa9] 136a-c / Metaphysics, c
[980a28-b24] 499a / Memory and Remtntse
690a-695d ... b
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion ofAni1?lals, CH 7 [701 I
CH 8 [702a2I] 237a-c I Rhetoric, BK I, eH
[I37oa28-3I] 613c
3d(1) The functions of the comnlon sense:
discrimination, comparison, association,
collation or perception
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CII I [42SaI4-bro]
657b-d; CH 2 [426b8-427aI4] 658d-659c 1
Sleep, CH 2 [455a3-bI.3] 697c-698b
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, I59c-d
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 855a
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, cn 3 143b-c;
TR VII, CH 6-7 194b-195b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q78,A
4, ANS and REP 1-2 411d-413d; Q 87, A 3, REP
.3 467b-468a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52a-b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 457b-458
esp 457b-c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19c-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding,
SECT 1-7 143d-145b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a; 5Ic-d; 54b-64a 1
Judgement, 493c-d; 528c-529b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 185a-b; 3t'3b-341a es
313b-319a, 322b-326a, 336a-340a; 344b-346
360a-399b esp 378a-380a, 396a-397a, 399a-
411a-420b esp 414a-416b [fn I], 415a-41
502b-504b; 506a-507a; 525a-526b; 54
552a esp 547a-b, 551b-552a; 561a-575a
561a, 570a-573a; 584a-589b esp 584a-b; 86
868b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 367b
384c-385c
3c(4) The distinction between and
perception: the accidental senslble; com-
plex ideas of substance
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XIII, CH 10 [108il.
18--21] 619c / Soul, BK II, CH 6 [4I8a20-26]
649a / Sense and the Sensible, CH I [437
a
3-I7]
673d-674a; CH 6 [446bI8-27] 685a-b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
Q 92, A 2, ANS 1032b-1034b
35 LOCKE: HU1?1an Understanding, BK II, CH IX,
SECT 8-10 139b-140b; CH XXIII, SECT I
204a-b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT I
413a-b; SECT 42-44 420c-421a; SECT 148
442b-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 115b-c
53 JAMES: PJychology, 452a-453a; 502a-505b;
526b-527a
720 TI-IE GREAT IDEl\S 3c(4) to 3ile
(3c. The activity of the exterior senses. 3c(3) .T.he 3c(5) Sensation and attention: pre-perception
classification of sensations or sense-qualtttes: and apperception; the transcendental
proper and C0111mon sensibles; prinlary and unity of apperception
secondary qualities.) 8 .ARISTOTLE: Sense alld the
428b,d-431a / Soul, BK II, CH 6 685c-689a,c
648d-649a; CH 9 [42Ia27-b2] 652d; CH 10 21 DANTE: Divine CoInedy, PURGATORY,
[422bIO]-CH II [422b33l654b-c; BK III, CH I 18] 57c
[425aI4-29] 657b-c; [425b4-IO] 657c-d / 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 14a-15c,
Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [437a3-IO] 673d- 23a-33d, 41c-42b, 48d-59b, 66d-93c
674a; CH 3-5 676a-683b; CH 6 [44Sb4-446a20] 48 MELVILLE: J.\1oby Dick, 244a-245a
683b-684c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xlv,605c-d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 6, 169c-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 184b-185a; 232b-235a;
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK 11[398-521] 262a-291a esp 262b-268a, 275b-276b, 282a-
20a-21c; [73
0
- 864] 24b-26a 288a; 295b-297a; 328a-329a; 469a-b; 522b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 525a; 562a-b; 620b-621a
3 esp REP 2 410a-411d; A4, REP 1-2 411d-413d 3d. The activity of the interior senses
Q 92, A 2, ANS 1032b-1034b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49b-d; PART III,
172b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-c /Objections and
Replies, 163b; 228c-229c; 231a-b
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULE III 270b-
271a / Optics, BK I, 428a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH III,
SECT 1 128d-129a; CH V 131b; CH VII, SECT 1
131c; CH VIII, SECT 7-26 134b-138b; CH IX,
SECT 8-9, 139c-140a; CH XXI, SECT 3 178d;
SECT 75 20Gb-d; CH XXIII, SECT 7-13 205d-
208b; SECT 37, 214a-b; CH XXX, SECT 2
238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; BK III, CH
IV, SECT 16 263b-c; BK IV, CH III, SECT 11-14
315d-316d; SECT 28 322a-c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-15
414d-416a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 73
427b-c; SECT 102 432d-433a
35 HUME: Human UnderJtanding, SECT XII, DIV
122505c-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 29d-33d esp 30d-
31a, 31d-32a, 32d-33b [fn I]
53 JAMES: Psychology, 185a-b; 502b-503b; 569b-
570a; 572a-b; 627a-b; 650b-651a
THE' GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
722
4. The character of sensitive knowledge
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a / Re-
public, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Theaetetus,
5l7b-536a
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31
120a-c / Metaphysics, BK I, ClI I [980a20_b24]
499a; [98IbIO-I3] 499d-500a; BKIV CH 5
[
b '
1009 1-17] 528d-529a; [IOIO
b
l-IOll
a
2]
530a-c; BK XI, CH 6 [I062b34-I063a9]
591a-b
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I,CH 3-7 Id-4a /
Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 26, 155c; TR IV, CH
20 167d-168b; CH 23-25 169c-171b; TR V
183a-189b
18 AUGUSTINE: Conftssions, BK x, par 10-1I
73d-74b; BK XII, par' 5100a-b / Christian Doc-
trine, BK II, CH27 6S0a
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A
4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q14, A6, REP I BOa-
81c; Q 78, A 3, ANS 410a-411d; A 4, ANS and
REP 4-6 411d-413d
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation,
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-20a / Meditations,
VI 96b-l03d, / and Replies, 136d-
137a; 163b; 229d-230d
31SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 11-16 377b-
380d
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CH
XXIII, SECT 29 2lld-2l2a; BK IV, CH II, SECT
14 312b-d; GH III, SECT 2-5 313a-c; SECT 21
319c; CH XI 354c-358c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18,
416b; SECT 135-145 passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 30b-3la esp
30b-c; 34a-b; 54b-55a; 58a-59b
53 JAMES: Psychology, esp 158b-161a,
167b; 453a-479a esp 453a-454a, 456b-459b,
469a-b
4a. Comparison of sensitive with other forms
of knowledge
7 PLATO: Symposium, 167a-d / Phaedo, 224a-
225a; 231c-232a / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-
398c / Timaeus, 447b-d / Theaetetus, 534d-
536a
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH'3I
120a-c / Topics, BK II, CH 8 [II4aI7-26] 159d-
160a I Metaphysics,' BK1, CH I [980a20_b24]
499a / Soul, BK II, CH5647b-648d
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Ani1nals, BK I, CH
23 , [73
Ia
30-
b
5] 271c-d / Ethics, BK I,CH 4
[I09Sa3o,....bI2] 340c-d; BK VI, CH 8 [II42aI2-
31] 391b-c
17PLOTINu?:FifthEnnead, TR V,CH 228b-
230a / Szxth Ennead, TR III, CH 18, 291a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 10 15b-d;
BK XII, par 5 100a-b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A
4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q 13, A7, ANS 68d-
70d; Q 14, A 6, REP 1 BOa-81c; Q 54, A 2, ANS
285d-286c; Q 57, A I, REP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS
4 to
295d-297a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 4-64-'1
413d; Q 85, A 2, REP3 453d-455b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49d '
28 HARVEY: On Generation, 332a-333
31 DE.SCARTES: Dzscoztlfse, PART IV, 53b / Me
tatzons, III, 83d-84a; VI 96b-'103d / Objecti
and Replies, 136d-137a; 218c-d; 229d-230d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH
SECT 5 252b-c; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14 312b-
CH III, SECT 2-5 313a-c; SECT 21 319c; cg
SECT 13 357d-358a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, S
I 405a-b; SECT 18 416b-c; SECT 27 4l8a.
SECT 135-142 440a-441c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, Dl
41, 468a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-c; 22a,c; 23a-24
34a-c; 45d-46a; 199a-c / Judgement, 528c-
542b-543c; 570b-572b esp 571c-572a
53 JAMES: Psychology, l44a-145a; 167b; 3:1.
312b [fn I]; 450a-451b; 453a-459b esp 453a
456a
4b. The object of sense-perception: the; evid
particular fact; judgments of percepti
and judgments of experience
7 Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a ;'
publtc, BK VI, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 447
457d/. Theaetetus, 51?b-536a / Sophist, 5
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior' Analytics BK II CH
b b ,"
[99 20-100 5] 136a-d / Topics, BK II, CH
[II4aI8-26] 159d-160a / Physics, BK I eli
[
b , .' ,
188 26-189a9] 264b-c / Heavens, BKIII;
7 397b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, C
[981 10-13] 499d-500a; BK IV, CH 5 [100
17] 528d-529a; [IOIObI--IOI I
a
2] 530a-c; BK
CH 7 [I064
a
4-9] 592b / Soul BK II C
b ' . "
[417 18-28] 648b-c; BK III, CH II [434aI6-
667a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 7' [I098a34-
343d-344a; BK VI, CII 8 [II42R23-3I] 391b
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4
Fourth Ennead, TR VI, CH 1-2 189b-190b
18 AUGUSTINE: Conftssions, BK III, par 10 15
BK IV, par 15-17 23a-d
19 AQUINAS: Sun1.1na Theologica, PARTI, Q I
4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q 14, A II, ANS
REP 1-2 84c-85c; A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q17
102a-d; Q 18, A 2, ANS l05c-106b; Q 57,
REP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS 295d-297a; Q 59,
REP I 306c-307b; Q 75, A 5, ANS 382a-383
76, A2, REP 4388c-391a; Q77, A5, REP 34
404c; Q79, A 6,ANS 419b-420d; Q85, AI,
451c.-453c; A 6, ANS 458d-459c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART' I-I
50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; PART
172b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 53b /
tations, II, 80c-B1d; VI 96b-103d passi
Objections and Replies, 229d-230d
to 4d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 11-16377b-
380d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKH, CH IX,
SECT 8-10 139b-140b; BK IV,CH II, SECT
14 312b-d; CH III, SECT2 313a; SECT 5 313c;
SECT 14 316b-d; SECT 21 319c; CH XI 354c-
358c esp SECT'I3 357d-358a
35 BERKELEY: Human KnotJJledge, SECT 18

4ZKANT: Pure Reason, 16d-17d; 115b-c
43 MILL: Utilitarianis1n, 44Sd-446a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 150b-151h; 184b-185b;
363b-364a; 453a-457a; 502a-
S04a; 506a-S07a;564a-b; 569b-570a; 606b-
610b esp 608b-609a; 867a-868b esp 868a-b
54 FREUD: Unconscious, 430c / Ego and- ld,
702d-703a
4C. The relation of sense and the sensible:.the
subjectivity or objectivity of
ities
7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 517b-520b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [7b35..:..8aI2] 12d-
13a / Physics, BK VII, CH 2 [244bl-245aI2]
328b-d; CH 3 329a-330d /Metaphysics, BK IV,
CH 5 [IOIOb30-IOIla2] 530c / Soul, BK II, CH 5
647b-648d; cH II [423b27]-CH 12 [424a24]
6S5c-6S6a; BK III, CH 2657d-659c; CH 4
[429aIO-29] 661b-c; CH 8 664b-d / Sense and
the Sensible 673a-689a,c / Dreams, CH2 [459
a
23-46oa32] 703a-704b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Ani1nals, BK II, CH 2
[648bIS-I8] 173a / Ethics, BK X, CH 4 [II74bI5-
1I7s
a
3] 429a-b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, cH 2, 167d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature o..fThings, BK II [73-864]
24b-26a; [1002-1022] 27d-28a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PART I, Q 14,
A 2, ANS 76d-77d
Q82, A 3, ANS 971a-972d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 57b; 59d;
PART III, l72b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 285b-292d passim
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-c / Meditations,
VI, lOOa / Objections and Replies, ,162d-165a;
228c-229c; 231a-b
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 428a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VIII
133b-138b passim; CH XXI, SECT 3 178d; SECT
75 200b-d; CH XXIII, SECT 7-13 205d-208b;
SECT 37, 214a-b; CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH
XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CHXXXII, SECT 14-16
245c-246b; BK IV, CH II, SECTII-I4 311c-312d;
CH III, SECT 6, 314b; SECT 11-14 315d-316d;
SECT 28 322a-c; CH IV, SECT 4 324c; CH XI,
SECT 4-9 355b-357a
35 BERKELEY: Human Kno!v/edge, SECT 1-91
413a-431a esp SECT3 413c-d, SECT 8-15 414c-
416a, SECT 48-49 422a-b, SECT 56-57 423c-
424a, SECT 73 427b-c, SECT 76-78 427d-428b,
SECT 86-91 429c-431a; SECT 102 432d-433a
723
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT DIV
117-123 S04a-506a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 29d-33d esp
30d-3la, 31d-32a, 32d-33b [fn ''I]; 88b-8gc;
101b-l02a; 115b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of1\1or-
als, 38Sa-c
50 MARX: Capital, 31c-d
53 JAMES: 98b-l05a; 150a-
ISla; 176b-177a; 459a-479a esp 459a-b, 471b-
473a, 479a; 851b;.852a; 860a-b
4d.The limit, accuracy, and reliability of
sensitive knowledge: fallibility of
the senses
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a /Re-
public, BK VI-VII, 386d-398c / Theaetetus,
534d-535c / Stateslnan, 594d-595c
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I,CH 31
120a-c! Topics, BK V, cn 3 [I3IbI9-36] 182b-c
/ Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 3 [3I8b
19-24] 415c I'Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 51IoIob
15-29] 530b-c I SQul, BK H, CII 6 [418a6-18]
648d-649a; BK III, CH 3 [427b6-I4] 659d-660a
/ Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [44
2b
4-9] '680a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation ofAnimals, BK I, CH 23
[73Ia3o-b5] 271c-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [693-700]
9c; BK IV [324-521] 48c-51a esp [469-521] SOb-
51a
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR VIII 64c-65c /
Fifth Ennead, TR V,CH I 228b-229c
18 AUGUSTINE: CityofGod, BK XIX,CH 18 523a-b
19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17,
A2 102a-d; Q85, A6, ANS 458d-459c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, II [46-"'57]
108b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays,
28 HARVEY: Circulation ofthe Blood, 320b; 322d-
323d; 324c-d / On Animal Generation, 332a-
333c
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 51c-d; 57d-
58b / Novu1nOrganum, BK I, APH 10 l07d;
APH 14-17 107d-108a; APH 41 109c-d; APR 50
11tb; BK II, APH 6 139b-:c; APH 39-40 169d-
173d; APH 44, 17Sd
31 DESCARTES: Rules, VIII, 13a-b; XII, l8c; 22c-
23a / Discourse, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, I
75a-77c; III, 83d-84a; VI 96b-103d esp 103a-d
/ Objections and Replies, POSTULATE I 130d;
206c-207a; 229d-230d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 16, COROL 2
380d; PROP 24-28 PROP 29, COROL
384d-385a; PROP 40, SCHOL 2-PROP 41 388a-c
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V[544-576] 187a-b;
BK VIII [114-13] 234b-235a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 9 173b; 83 188b-189a
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII,
SECT 11-13 206d-208b; CH xxx, SECT 2
238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CH XXXII,
SECT 14-16 245c-246b; BK IV, CHII, SECT 14
312b-d; CH IV, SECT 4 324c; CH XI, SECT 3-9
355a-357a
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
724
(4. The character of sensitive knowledge. 4d. The
limit, accuracy, and reliability of sensitive
knowledge: the fallibility oj the senses.)
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT I
40Sa-b; SECT 14-15
SECT 40 420b; SECT 86-88 42ge-430b; SECT
101 432e-d; SECT 135-142 440a-441e passim
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 29
461a-d; SECT XII, DIV 117-123 S04a-S06a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 27b-33d esp 29d-30e;
108a-desp108d [fn I] / Practical Reason,337a-e
/ Judgement, 603b-d
49 DARWIN: Origin ofSpecies, 96e
53 JAMES: Psychology, 12Sa-126a; 400a-40Sa;
460a-471a esp 469a-b; S08a; S44a-545b; 589b-
625a esp 589b-590a, 593a-595a, 606b-610b,
625a
54 FREUD: Interpretation ofDreams, 383b-e
4d(1) The erroneous interpretation of sense-
data: the problem of judgments based on
sensation
7 PLATO: Republic, BK X, 431e-d / Theaetetus,
538d-541a
8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK I,
CH 3 [318bI9-3I] 415e-d / Metaphysics, BK IV,
CH 5 [I009bI-17] 528d-S29a; BK XI, CH 6
[I062b34-I063a9] 591a-b / Soul, BK II, CH 6
[4I8aI4-I8] 648d-649a; BK III, CH I [425a30-
b
3
] 657e; CH 3 [428bI8-24] 661a / Sense and the
Sensible, CH 4 [44
2b
4'-9] 680a-b
48e-SOb; [1149-117] 59a-b
A2 102a-d; Q85, A6, ANS 458d-45ge
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 50b-52d
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 58b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 22e-23a / Meditations,
III, 83d-84a / Objections and Replies, 229d-
230d
35 LOCKE: I-Iuman Understanding, BKII, CH XXXII,
SECT 19-26 247a-248b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
II7,504b-e
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 108a-d
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13e-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, lIla; 460a-469a esp 462b-
463b, 468b-469a; 508a; 568b-570a;589b-S95a
esp 589b-S90a, 593a-595a; 617a..(j:2Sa esp
618b-620a
4d(2) Error in sense-perception: illusions and
hallucinations
7 PLATO: Theaetetus, S20e-S22b
8 ARISTOTLE: Drea1ns 702a-706d
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 2
[648bI5-18] 173a
48c; [722-748] 53d-54a
14 PLUTARCH: A1arcus Brutus, 816d-817e
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR VIII 64e-65e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17
A 2, ANS 102a-d; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c:
Q III, A4, ANS 571b-d '
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPt
Q82, A3, ANS 971a-972d '
23 HOBBES: Leviatha'fz, PART It 50d-52b; PARl'
III, 172b-d; 174b; 189d-190a; PART IV, 249<1-
2S8b-d; 261a '
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 50b-52d
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 50 111by
New Atlantis, 213d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 22e-23a / Meditations
I, 75e-d; VI, 101d-102d '
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 384b-385b; 434a-435a'
443a t
35 LOCKE: lluman Understandng, BK II, CH XXIX.
SECT 3 234b-e . t
35 BERKELEY: !iuman Knowledge, SECT 14,4150
36 STERNE: Tnstram Shandy, 234b-236b
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13e-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 132a-139a; 248b-249b-
264b-269a;462b-469a esp 462b-46Sa,
469a; 475a-477b; S08a-520a esp SOBa; S21a-
522a; S27a-538b; 545a-b; 565a-b; 60Ia-606a'
610b-625a; 662a-663a [fn I]; 747b [fn 3];
785a; 786a-787b [fn I]; 842b-847b
54 FREUD: Origin and peveloplnent of Psycho-
Analysts, 3a-d / Hysterza, 31b-38d passim, esp
31b-d, 36b-d; 102a-106e esp l04d-10Sd 0
Interpretation of Dreams, 148d-149a; 149d-
150d; 337a-d; 353d-3S6b esp 354e-355b
3S6a- b / General Introduction, 472a-e /
and Id, 700e
5. The contribution of the senses to scientifi
or philosophical knowledge
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228a-230e / Re
public, BK VI-VII, 383d-398e / Timaeus, 4550
/ Theaetetus, 534d536b / Seventh Letter, 80ge
B10d
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 30 [46RI8
28] 64a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, Cli I
[78b3I'-79al6] 108b-e; CH 18 111b-e; CH
120a-e; BK II, ClI 19 136a-137a,e / Physics,
I, CH I 259a-b; CH 8 [I9Ia24'-34] 267a-o
Heavens, BK III, CH 7 [306a6-I8] 397b-e
Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [3I6a
14] 411e-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH I [980R2
982RI ] 499a-SOOb; BK XI, CH 7 [I064
R
4
592b / Soul, BK I, CH I [402bII-403a2] 631
632a / Sense and the Sensible, CH I [436bI
4.37aI7] 673e-674a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts 0..( Animals, BK III, CH
[666R7-IO] 193d / Generation of .Animals,
III, CH 10 [760b28-32] 301d-302a / Ethics,
II, CH 2 [II04RI4-IS] 34ge
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient lvfedicine, par 1-8 1
3b / Aphorisn1s, SECT I, par I 131a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A
ANS 8d-9c; Q 84, AA 6-8 447e-451b; Q87, A
ANS 46Sa-466e; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-478
Q 91, A 3, REP 1-3 486b-487d; Q 96, A
to 5a
REP 3 510b-511b; PART I-II, Q 3, A 3, ANS
624b-625a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologca, PART I-II, Q 50,
A3, REP 3 8b-9a; PARTIII, Q9, A4766b-767b;
Q12, A3, REP 2 778b-779a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, S4b-e; 60a-b;
PART II, 129a; PART IV, 267a-b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 260e-261e; 285e-288a;
291b-292d
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, 1a-b;BK I, 6a-7a;
BK II, 27b-c
28 GALILEO: Two Netv Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131a-
138b passim
28 I-IARVEY: !vIotion of the Heart, 267b,d-268d;
280e / Circulation of the Blood, 322d-323d;
324e-d / On Animal Generation, 331b-335e;
411e-d
30 BACON: ... 4..dz,
l
ancement of Learning, Sb-c; 16a;
34b; 44e; SOc-SId; 57b-d / Novum Organum
lOSa-195d esp BK I, APH 64 114b, APH 95-13
126b-128a, BK II, APH 38-43 16ge-17Se
31 DESCARTES: Rules, II, 2d-3a; VII, 10e-12a;
XII, 22c-23a; 24a-b; XIV, 28d-33b / Discourse,
PART IV, 53b; PART VI, 61d-62e I Meditations,
I, 75b-76c; VI, 97a-103d / Objections and Re-
plies, 128d-129a; 215b-c; 217e-d; 229d-230d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2
388a-b
34 NE\VTON: Principles, BK III, RULE III-IV 270b-
27lh / Optics, BK III, 543a-b
34 HUYGENS: Light, CH I, 553a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH I,
SECT 24 CH XXIII, SECT 3 204e-d;
SECT 6-7 205b-206a; SECT 28-29 211b-212a;
SECT 32-37 212e-214b; BK III, CH XI, SECT
21-23 304d-30Sb; BK IV, CHIli, SECT 14
316b-d; SECT 16 317a-e; SECT 25-29 321a-323a
passim; CH VI, SECT 13 335e-d; CH XII, SECT
9-13 360d-362d; CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-371a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SF.CT30 418e;
SECT 58-59 424a-b; SECT 104 433a-b; SECT
107433d-434a
35 HUME: liulnan Understanding, SECT IV, DIV
20-SECT V, DIV 38 4S8a-466e passim; SECT
VII, DIV 48, 471b-e; DIV 60 477a-e; SECT VIII,
DIV65,479b-e;SECT XI, DIV 111-113 501b-s62d
esp DIV 112 SOle-502a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d; 14a-e; 15e-16e;
31b-d; 46a-b; 58a-b; 66d-67b; 68a-6ge; 85a-
b; 86d-87b; 94b-95a; 211e-218d / Fund_ Prin.
Metaphysic of Alorals, 2S3a-254d esp 2S3a-e,
254b-e; 263b-e; 273a-b / Practical Reason,
29Sb-d; 312c-d; 329d-330e; 331a-332d / Intro.
Metaphysic ofMorals, 387a-b
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-447a passim;
47Sb,d [fn I]
45 LAVOISIER: Elements 0..( Chelnistry, PREF, le-
2b; 6d-7a,e; PART III, 87b-c
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 774d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 3,
IOa-Ila / Philosophy of Ilist01)', INTRO, 156e-
190b
725
51 TOLSTOY: rVar and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 684a
53 JAMES: P.!>)'chology, 38Sa-b;647b-648b; 677h;
851a-884b esp 860b-861a, 862a-865a, 867a,
884b
54 FREUD: Narcissism,400d-401a/ Instincts, 412a-
b / General Introduction, 545b-d I Egoand Id,
701d / New Introductory Lectures, 81Sa; 87ge
5a. Sensation as the source or occasion of
ideas: the role of memory or reminis-
cence; the construction of complex ideas;
the abstraction of universal concepts
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228a-230d I Republic, BKVII,
392b-393b I Timaeus, 45Sa-e / Theaetetus,
538d-541a
8 ARISTOTLE : Posterior Analytics,BK I, CH 31
120a-c; BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,e/ Metaphys-
ics, BK I, CH I [980a20-98IaI3] 499a-e I Soul,
BK I, CH I [403a2-15] 632a.:.b; BK III, CH 7
[43IaI4]-CH8 [432aI4] 663d:..664d /Memory
and Reminiscence, eH 'I [449b30-45oa25] 690e-
691a
A 2, REP 2 289d-290d; Q 75, A 2, REP 3 37ge-
380e; A 3, REP 2 380e-381b; Q 79, AA 3-5
416a-419b; Q 8'h A 2, REP I 442b-443e; A 6
447e-449a; Q85, A I 4S1e-4S3e; PART I-II, Q2,
A 6, REP 2 619d-620d;Q 29, A 6, ANS 748b-
749a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 12,
A2, ANS 777b-778b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [28--48]
lIla
23 HOBBES: Let'iathan, PART I, 49a; S2b-e; 54a-e;
PART IV, 262a-b
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK V, lOSe
28 HARVEY: Circulation ofthe Blood, 30Sa / On
Animal Generation, 332a-335c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, VIII, 13a; 14b; XII, 18b-e /
Discourse, PART II, 47e-d; PART IV, S3b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I,
SECT 15 98d-99a; BK II, CH I-III 121a-129b esp
CH I, SECT 1-8 121a-123a, SECT 20--25 126d-
127d, CH II, SECT 2 128a-b; CH VII, SECT 10
133a-b; CH IX, SECT 15 141a; CH XI, SECT 4-9
144d-145e; CH XI, SECT I5-CH XII, SECT 2
146d-147d; CH XII, SECT 8 148e-d; CH XIII,
SECT 2149a; SECT 4-6149b-d; SECT 271S4e-d;
CH XIV, SECT 27 160d-161a; SECT .3-31 161e-
162a; ClI XVI, SECT 1-2 165c-d; SECT 5 166b-e;
CH XVII, SECT .3 168b; SECT 5 168d-169a; CH
XVII, SECT 22-CH XVIII, SECT I 173d-174a;
CH XVIII, SECT 6 174e-d; CH XXII, SECT 2
201a-b; SECT 9 202e-203a; CH XXIII, SECT I
204a-b; SECT 3 SECT 9 206b-e; SECT
15 208e-d; SECT 29 211d-212a; SECT 32-37
212e-214b; CH XXV, SECT 9 216d; SECT II
217a; CH XXX, SECT 3 238e-d; CH XXXII, SECT
6-8 244b.-d; SECT 12 245b-e; BK III, CH I,
SECT 5 252b-e; CH II, SECT 3 2S3e; CH III, SECT
6-9 255e-256e; CH IV, SECT 12-14 262b-263a;
CH VI, SECT 9 270d-27Ia; SECT 28-47 276a-
727
180, A 2, REP 3 608e-60ge; PART III SUPPL,
Q82, AI, REP S 968a-970c; Q91, AA
l023d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxx [19-
36] 152a
27 SHAKESPEARE: Sonnets, LIV 594e; LXIX 596d;
XCIIl'-XCV 600b-d
28 GALILEO: Two NetfJ Sciences, FIRST DAY,
176e
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 381d-382a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23d [fn I] I ]udgelnent,
476a-479d; 482b-483d; 492b-495a,c; 501b-
502d; 506a-511a esp 508b-e; 537a-539d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART I, 220b-e;
PART II, 266a-267a; PART III, 304a; PART IV,
346d-347a
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [11,288-33] 274b-
275a
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 307b-308b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 95a-d esp 95d I
Descent ofMan, 301e-302a; 451 b; 568d-569b;
577b; 595d-596a
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK III, 53e-
54b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 157a; 755a-758a esp 755b
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 775b-c
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
The role of sense in the perception of
beauty: the beautiful and the pleasing to
sense; sensible and intelligible beauty
7 PLATO: Symposium, 167a-d /Republic, BK V,
370d-373e; BK VI, 385e-386c I Theaetetus,
513a-b; 535e
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts ofAnimals, BK I, CH 5 [64S
a
4-26] 168d-169a / Ethics, BK III, CH 10 [III8
a
I-
b
7
J 364c-365a; BK x, CH 4 [II74bI5-I17Sa3]
429a-b; CH S 429d-430d / Rhetoric, BKIII, CH
2 [1405bI7-20] 656a / Poetics, CH 7 [I4s
ob
34-
I4SIa6] 685b-c
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK IV, CH I I 240d-
242d
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VI 21a-26a / Fifth
Ennead, TR VIII 239b-246e I Sixth Ennead,
TR VII, CH 30-34 336b-338d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 38 81a /
City of God, BK VIII, CH 7 26ge-d; BK XXII,
CH 19, 605b I Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 4
625b-c
19 AQUINAS: SU111ma Theologica, PART I, Q 5,
A 4, REP I 25d-26e; Q 91, A 3, REP 3
487d; PART I-II, Q27, A I, REP 3 737b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q
7.{OSS-REFERENCES
llor: Discussions relevant to the controversy over _the distinction between sense and reason or
intellect, and the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, see BEING 7e, 8a-8b;
EXPERIENCE 4a; IDEA Ib-IC, 2C-2g; KNOWLEDGE 6a(I), 6a(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION
la, Sb, 6C(I), 6d; MIND la, Id, Ig; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4d; and for the related
sue concerning the difference between animal and human faculties, see ANIMAL IC(2);
EVOLUTION 7b(3); MAN la-Ic; SOUL 2C(2)-2C(3).
The intuitive character of sense-perception as contrasted with the discursive nature of judg-
ment and reasoning, see INDUCTION la; KNOWLEDGE 6b(4), 6c(I); 2b(I);
REASONING I b; and for the theory of space and time as transcendental forms of intui tion,
see FORM IC; MATHEMATICS IC; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6C(2); MIND Ie(I), 4d(3);
SPACE 4a; TIME 6c.
The differentiation of plant, animal, and human life with respect to sensitivity, see ANIMAL
Ia(I), Ib, IC(I); LIFE AND DEATH 3a-3b; MAN 4b; SOUL 2C(I)-2C(2).
The discussion of the nervous system, see ANIMAL Sg.
The theory of memory and imagination as interior powers of sense and as dependent on the
exterior senses, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION la, IC; and for another consideration of the
estimative power, see HABIT 3b.
The pleasantness and unpleasantness of sensations, see PLEASURE AND PAIN 4b, 4e; and for the
variation of sense-qualities in degree or intensity, see QUALITY 3C; SAME AND OTHER 3c.
The distinction between proper and common sensibles, or between primary and secondary
qualities, see QUALITY 2b; and for theissue concerning the objectivity or subjectivity of
these qualities, see QUALITY 6c.
The distinction between sensation and perception, and the problem of our sensitive knowl-
edge of substances as opposed to qualities, see BEING 8c; IDEA 2f; KNOWLEDGE 6b(I);
MEMORY AND Il\1AGINATION Ia; PRINCIPLE 2a( I); and for the doctrine of the transcenden-
tal unity of apperception, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6C(2); ONE AND MANY 4b.
5c.The dependence of understanding or reasb
upon sense for knowledge of particular
verification by ap)'eal to the senses
7 PLATO: Republic, BK IX, 421a-422b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, Cll 8 [I9Ia24-,3
267a-b; BK VII, CH 3 [247
bI
-7] 330b / Heaven
BK I, CH 3 [27obI-I3] 361c-d; BK III, Ca
[306aI-I8] 397b-e / Generation and Corruptio
BK I, CH 2 [316aS-I4] 411e-d I Soul, BKI, OR
[402bII-403a2] 631d-632a; BK III,CH 8 [432ft2
9] 664e
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion ofAnimals, CH I [698ftIO
IS] 233a I Generation ofAnimals, BKIII, CH
[760b28-32] 301d-302a / Ethics, BK II, CR
[II07a27-32] 352d-353a; CH 9 [II09b20"'72
355e; BK X, CH I [r 17Za34-,b71 426b; CR
[I I79aI7-22] 433d-434a I Politics, BK VII, ClI
[I 323a33;-b7] 527b
10 Gt\LEN: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 2, 19
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [418-44
6b-c; BK IV [469-S21] 50b-5
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK VIJI, cn 7269c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PART" I, Q I
All 84e-85c; Q 32, ,A I, REP 217Sd-178a; Q:5
A2 295d-297a; Q 84, AA 7-8 449b-451b; Q 8
,A I 461c-462a
23 I-IOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 85d; PART I
165a; PART IV, 249b-250a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 260c-261c; 285e;.2&6
287b; 291b-292d
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences,
200a-b
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268d; 273
286b-e; 295d-296a / Circulation ofthe ,Bloo
322d-323d; / On Animal Generatio
331b-335e; 357b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 57d-580
Novum Organum, BK I, APH 50 ,11lb; APR
l16b-117a; BK II 137a-195d passim
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART VI, 61d""6
66a-b / Meditatons, I 75a-77c I Objections a
Replies, 229d-230d
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULE III-IV 270
271b
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CR'. I
SECT 6 131a; BK IV, CH XII, SECT 13
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT X, DIV
488d-489b; SECT XI, DIV 110 50la-b; SECTX
DIV 132 509a-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 85d-93c; l14d-115a; 14
149d; 153a-c; 231b-c I Practical Reason, 337
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 46le-d; 463c-d
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 129a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 774d-77
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 684
53 JAMES: Psychology, 307a; 456a; 647b-648b
648b [fn I]; 655a; 863a-865a; 881a-b
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 819d;..82
87ge
THE:GREAT IDEAS
53 JAMES: Psychology, 862a-865a
54 FREUD: Instincts, 412a
Sb. Sense-experience as the originofinductions
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 30 [46aI8-
28],64a / P()sterior Analytics, BKI, CH I8111b-e;
BK II, CH 2 [90a24-30] 123b-c; CH 19 l36a-
137a,e I Physics, BK I, CH 8 [I9Ia24-34] 267a-b
I Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316aS-
14] 411e-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH I 499a-500b
/ Soul, BK I, CH I [402bII-403a2] 631d-632a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH ,7 [I098a34-b8]
343d-344a; BK VI, CH 8 [II42aI2-3I] 391b-e;
CH II [II43R2S-bS] 392d-393a
20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51,
AI, ANS l2b-13c
28 HARVEY: Motion ofthe Heart, 273e-d / Circu-
lation of the Blood, 322d-323d; 324e-d / On
Animal Generation, 332a-335e esp334e-d;
473a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, l6a; 34b;
43d-44c I Novum Organum, BK I, APH 11-17
l07d-108a; APH 19 108b; APH 22 l08e; BK II,
APR 38-43 16ge-175e
31 DESCARTES: Rules, VII, 10c-12a; XIV, 28a-b /
Discourse, PART VI, 61d-62e I Objections and
Replies, 167e-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1-2
387b-388b
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULE III-IV 270b-
271h
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 107
433d-434a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT III, DIV
I9,458a
38 ROUSsEAu:Jnequality, 341e-342b
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electriczty, 659a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofIIistory, PART IV, 361a-b
(5. The contribution of, the' senses to scientificor
philosophical kn?wledge. Sa. Sensation 'as
the source or occasion of ideas: the role of
m,emory or reminiscence; the construction of
complex ideas;, the abstraction '" of 'universal
concepts.)
282b esp SECT 46-47 281d-282b; CH XI, SECT
21-23 304d-30Sb;BKIV, eN IV, SE<::TII-12
326b-d
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge,INTRo, SECT
6-16 405d-409dpassim; SECT I 4l3a-b
35 HUME: Human Understanding,sEcT.Ir 455b-
457b esp DIVI3-14 455d:456b; SECT VH, DIV
4947le-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 45b-46a I'Fund.
Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 281e-282c
45 LAVOISIER: Elements ofChemistry, PREF, le-2a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 171b-175a;302b; 327a-
331b;405b-4Q7a;. ,455a-b;480a-484a; 540a-
635a esp, 547a-550b, 551b-552a, 561a-b,
584a-b, 593a-595a, 626a-628a, 630b-:-631a,
632b-635a; 787a
54 FREUD: 1nterpretation (JfDrea1ns, 353d-354a;
,367e / Unconscious, 442b-443d / Egoand Id,
700a-70ld
726
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed be1o\v are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western lVorld, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These 'works are divided into t\VO groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. \Vorks by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the 'works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
729
"Appearing and Appearance," "A Natural-
IStiC Theory of "Perception
OrganiC ActIon, In Plulosophy and
zatton
PRICE. Perception
BORING. The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness,
CH 2-8
HARTSH<:>RNE. The Philosophy and Psychology of
Sensatton
KOFFKA. Principles of Gestalt-Psycholoay
STRAUS. Vom Sinn der Sinne b
BLANSHARD. The Nature of Thought, CH 1-6
CHAPTER 84: SENSE
BROAD. Scientific Thought, PART II
PARSONS. An Introduction to the Theory ofPerception
B. RUSSELL. Our Knowledge ofthe External World,
III-IV
......--. Mysticism and Logic, CH 8
......--. The Analysis of Mind, LECT 7-8
......--. The Analysis of Matter, CH 15-26
ADRIAN. The Basis of Sensation
Gestalt Psychology, CH 5
HITEHEAD. Process and Reality, PART III
LOVEJOY. The Revolt Against Dualism
],JOWYs. In Defence of Sensuality
T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, II
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL
SUP, cn 1-4
BROWN. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Humatl
Mind, VOL I, pp 4I7-548; VOL II, pp 90-152
J. MILL. Analysis of the Phenomena of the IIuman
Mind, CH I
W. HAMILTON. Lectures on lvfetaphysics and Logic,
VOL I (21-28)
BAIN. The Senses and the Intellect
FECHNER. Elemente der Psychophysik
WHEWELL. On the Philosophy ofDiscovery, CH 19-2
HELMHOLTZ. Treatise on Physiologica{ Optics
--. On the Sensation of Tone as a Physiologic
Basis for the TheolY of Music
--. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, VI
I-IERSCHEL. Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjec
IX
E. HARTMANN. Philosophy of the Unconscious, (
VIII
LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2
GALTON. Inquiries into I-ltunan Faculty and
Development (Sensitivity, Sequence of T
vVeights, Whistles for Audibility of Shrill Not
Appendices c, D, E)
MACH. The Analysis of Sensations
BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK I, CH 1,5
BERGSON. lv/atter and Me1nory, CH 4
\VUNDT. Principles ofPhysiological Psychology, PAR
--. Outlines of Psychology, (6, 8-1 I)
WOODWORTH. Psychological Issues, CH 5
McTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 35
MOORE. Philosophical Studies, CH 2, 5, 7
BROAD. Perception, Physics, and Reality, ClI 4
--. The Mind and Its Place in lVature, ClI 4
THE GREAT IDEAS 728
For: The relation of sense to emotion and will, and for the distinction betvveen the sensitive an
the rational appetite, see DESIRE 3b(r); EMOTION I; GOOD AND EVIL'4a; :NfEMORY ANn
IMAGINATION Id; WILL 2b(2). '
The comparison of sensitive with other forms of kno\vledge, see KNOWLEDGE 6b( I)-6b(3);
and for the problem of truth and falsity in sensation and see MEMORY
AND IMAGINATION 2e(4), .5c; PRINCIPLE 2b( r); TRUTH 3a( I)-3a(2).
The contribution of sense to thought, and for the role of sense in theories of reminiscence
induction, and abstraction, see EXPERIENCE 3b, 4b; IDEA 2b, 2f-2g; INDUCTION 2; J\1E110R;
AND IMAGINATION 3a, 3c, 6c-6d; MIND Ia(2); REASONING IC; UNIVERSAl.. AND PARTICU-
LAR 4c.
The role of sense in the perception of beauty, see BEAUTY 4-5; PLEASURE AND PAIN 4C(I).
1.
AUGUSTINE. Answer to Skeptics
AQUINAS. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Aninza, A 13
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I,
45-46,' 48, 66,0; PART II, 3; PART IV, 189-198
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART IV, CH 25,29
BERKELEY. An ESJay Towards a New Theory of
Vision
--. Three Dialogues BettlJeen Hylas and Philonous
HUME. A Treatise ofHuman Nature, BK I, PART III,
SECT V-VII
KANT. De Mundi Sensibilis (Inaugural Dissertation)
HEGEL. The Phen01nenology of Mind, I-III
w. JAMES. Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 4-6
II.
THEOPHRASTUS. On the Senses
EPICURUS. Letter to Herodotus
CICERO. Acade1nics
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Outlines of Pyrrhonism
ALBERTUS MAGNUS. De Sensu et Sensato
R. BACON. Opus Majus, PART V
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus
misticus, Philosophia Naturals, PART IV, QQ 4-8
MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la verite, BK I,
CH 5-9, 10 (2, 4-6), 12-15, 17-20
--. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, IV-V
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning lIuman
standing, BK II, CH 2- 9
--. MOl1adology, par 10-18
CONDILLAC. Treatise on the Sensations
VOLTAIRE. "Sensation," in A Philosophical
tionary
T. REID. An Inquiry into the HU1Jzan Alind

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Chapter 84: SENSE

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