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Presupposing redefinitions

Definitions in argumentation Words, and in particular ethical or emotive terms (Stevenson 1937: 18-19), are e tremel! po"er#ul instruments$ %he! can &e used to modi#! our &elie#s, our 'no"led(e and our perspective on realit!, &ut also to conceal #acts and )ualities$ *t the same time, "ords can descri&e and hide realit! (Schiappa +,,3) to in#luence our -ud(ments and decisions$ .or this reason, "ords can &e the most innocent and mischievous tools o# persuasion and deceit$ Words can &e used to purposel! select in#ormation in order to omit characteristics o# a state o# a##airs that can &e relevant and crucial #or the -ud(ment or the decision to &e made$ /o"ever, sometimes the! are not simpl! used to select, &ut to distort realit!$ 0assacres and human tra(edies are called 1paci#ications23 dictatorships are -usti#ied &ecause the! are 1democracies2 (4r"ell 1956)$ Wars are praised as 1acts o# #reedom2 (7o!le 8 Sam&anis +,,6: 1)3 drone &om&in(s are ne(lected i# called 1non-hostile operations2$ %he su&tle di##erence &et"een selectin( and distortin(, persuadin( and manipulatin( lies in the essential #eature o# "ords, their meanin($ 9! chan(in( the meanin( o# a "ord it is possi&le to modi#! the "a! realit! is perceived &! our interlocutor, creatin( an am&i(uit! that is e ploited to redirect his values and alter his -ud(ments$ :are#s'! (1998) and Schiappa (+,,3: 111-11+3 13,) pointed out the implicit dimension o# this act o# namin( realit!, "hich the! call ar(ument &! de#inition$ ;nstead o# puttin( #or"ard a classi#ication and support it &! a de#initional reason, the spea'er simpl! names realit!, leavin( the de#inition une pressed$ ;nstead o# statin( or advancin( a de#inition, he simpl! ta'es it #or (ranted, considerin( it as part o# the interlocutors< common (round$ /o"ever, this move is not a simple de#initional act$ %he spea'er is not de#inin( in the sense that he is not proposin( or stipulatin( a de#inition$ /e is actuall! doin( much more$ /e is presupposin( a rede#inition, he is ta'in( #or (ranted a ne" meanin($ %he #irst dimension o# the pro&lem o# implicit rede#inition corresponds to one o# the most controversial issues in philosoph!, de#inition$ Since *ristotle, de#inition has &een re(arded as a #undamental instrument o# classi#ication, representin( the relationship o# identit! &et"een a predicate (the definiendum) and other predicates (the definiens), "hich can &e used to e plain its meanin(, classi#! states o# a##airs, or dra" #urther conclusions #rom a cate(ori=ation$ *#ter the re-ection o# an idea o# an essential, immuta&le de#inition (Sa(er +,,,: +173 Walton +,,>: 169-173) the distinction &et"een essential and unessential characteristics &ecame more and more controversial (Sa(er +,,,: +16-+17), and led to relativistic approaches to de#inition (Schiappa +,,3)$ 4n this vie", the impossi&ilit! o# determinin( an immuta&le meanin(, or an essence, amounts to the impossi&ilit! o# veri#!in( an! de#initor! discourse, and there#ore to the e)uivalence &et"een an! de#inition$ %he second dimension o# the strate(! o# implicit rede#inition is strictl! connected to the possi&ilit! and #reedom o# de#inin($ ?ven thou(h the &oundaries o# "hat is commonl! considered to &e @"ar< or @hostilit!<, @democrac!< or @peace< are &lurred and indistinct (Aallie 19>63 Sorensen 1991), and even thou(h there is nothin( inherentl! "ron( in proposin( to alter a de#inition, ho" is it possi&le to treat a ne" meanin(, 'no"n to &e not shared, as commonl! acceptedB Cede#initions are essential #or descri&in( ne" uses o# a term or introducin( ne" concepts$ /o"ever, -ust li'e an!

potentiall! controversial standpoint, the! need to &e supported &! reasons, or at least need to leave to the interlocutor the possi&ilit! o# critici=in( them$ Dresupposin( a rede#inition means presumin( that the interlocutor 'no"s and accepts a meanin( that has never &een a(reed upon$, %he purpose o# this paper is to sho" ho" the structure o# the act o# presupposin( can help understand the #orce and the dan(ers o# implicit rede#initions, and can provide an instrument to assess their reasona&leness$ The persuasive dimensions of words %he po"er o# de#initions and rede#initions consists in the conclusion that the definiendum tri((ers or is used to support$ .or instance, concepts such as war or terrorism are usuall! -ud(ed ne(ativel! and can &e used to arouse ne(ative emotions or elicit ne(ative -ud(ments concernin( the state o# a##airs the! are used to re#er to$ .or this reason, namin( can &e considered a #orm o# condensed ar(ument composed o# t"o aspects, classi#ication o# realit! and value -ud(ment$ %he distinction &et"een the t"o dimensions o# the persuasive #orce o# "ords "as dra"n &! Stevenson in his anal!sis o# ethical "ords$ 4n his vie", ethical or emotive "ords "ere descri&ed as "ords havin( the po"er o# directin( attitudes, such as @peace< or @"ar<, @democrac!< or @terrorism<$ Stevenson noted that such "ords are not simpl! used to descri&e and there#ore alter the co(nitive reaction o# the interlocutor$ %he! can evo'e a di##erent t!pe o# reaction, emotive in nature$ Stevenson called these t"o reactions descriptive meanin( and emotive meanin(, de#inin( meanin( as a sta&le correlation &et"een the si(n, a stimulus, and a ps!cholo(ical reaction o# the addressee (Stevenson 1955: >5)$ ?thical "ords have the po"er o# directin( attitudes, arousin( emotions and su((estin(, or rather recommendin(, courses o# actions$ (Stevenson 1937: 18-19):
;nstead o# merel! descri&in( peopleEs interests, the! chan(e or intensi#! them$ %he! recommend an interest in an o&-ect, rather than state that the interest alread! e ists

%hese "ords have the tendenc! to encoura(e #uture actions (Stevenson 1938&: 59->,), to lead the hearer to"ards a decision &! a##ectin( his s!stem o# interests (Stevenson 1955: +1,)$ ;n this sense, the! are used d!namicall!$ 7escriptive and emotive meanin(s can &e interrelated or independent to each other$ Some terms (#or instance @peace< or @hostilit!<) have a positive or ne(ative emotional meanin( &ecause their descriptive meanin( re#ers to a state o# a##airs usuall! positivel! or ne(ativel! assessed &! the communit! o# spea'ers (Stevenson 1955: 7+)$ ;n other "ords, such as @cur< and @do(<, or @elderl! maiden< or @old spinster<, the t"o meanin(s are independent #rom each other, and the di##erence &et"een one term and the other simpl! consists in the emotive reaction that the! arouse (Stevenson 1937: +33 Stevenson, 1938a: 335-33>)$ %he po"er o# ethical or emotive "ords "as underscored &! Stevenson, "ho pointed out the strict relation &et"een de#inition and persuasion (Stevenson 1955: +1,):
?thical de#initions involve a "eddin( o# descriptive and emotive meanin(, and accordin(l! have a #re)uent use in redirectin( and intensi#!in( attitudes$ %o choose a de#inition is to plead a cause, so lon( as the "ord de#ined is stron(l! emotive $

Stevenson noticed that, contrar! to the descriptive meanin(, the emotive meanin( o# a "ord cannot &e de#ined &ut it can &e modi#ied &! t"o po"er#ul tactics, )uasi-de#initions and persuasive de#initions$ ;n the #irst case, the descriptive meanin( is maintained,

"hile the emotive one is altered$ 4n this perspective, there can &e t"o t!pes o# )uaside#initions: the emotive description o# the term or the re-namin( o# the re#erent$ ;n the #irst case, the meanin( o# the "ord is not descri&ed, &ut simpl! )uali#ied in order to arouse contrar! or di##erent emotions$ .or instance "e can consider the don Fuan<s de#inition o# 1#idelit!2 as 1&ein( trapped #orever in the same relationship and as (ood as dead #rom !outh on"ards to the other prett! #aces that mi(ht catch our e!eG2 (0oliHre +,,,: 98) or the #ollo"in( de#inition o# @peace< (9ierce +,,,: 179): Deace$ ;n international a##airs, a period o# cheatin( &et"een t"o periods o# #i(htin( ;n these cases, the spea'er descri&es "hat the "ords is commonl! used to re#er to, and )uali#ies it usin( epithets or metaphors elicitin( ne(ative instead o# positive evaluations$ /o"ever, &! )uasi-de#inin( a name it is possi&le to lead the interlocutor to a ver! speci#ic -ud(ment, such as in the #ollo"in( )uasi-de#inition o# @"ar on terror< used &! Santorum to -usti#! the necessit! o# continuin( the militar! operations1:
When "e (ot en(a(ed in this "ar, a lot o# us "ere tal'in( a&out somethin( called the lon( "ar I that this "ould not &e a simple "ar &ecause "e "ere not #i(htin( an! particular countr!$

Dersuasive de#initions are much more po"er#ul and dan(erous tactics$ %he! consists in modi#!in( the e tension o# a term, so that it can &e used to re#er to a di##erent #ra(ment o# realit!, maintainin( its emotive meanin( unaltered$ .or instance, "e can consider the #ollo"in( rede#inition o# @peace<, or rather, @true peace< (9arac' 4&ama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address Oslo, Jor"a! 7ecem&er 1,, +,,9):
Deace is not merel! the a&sence o# visi&le con#lict$ 4nl! a -ust peace &ased on the inherent ri(hts and di(nit! o# ever! individual can trul! &e lastin($ Deace is unsta&le "here citi=ens are denied the ri(ht to spea' #reel! or "orship as the! please3 choose their o"n leaders or assem&le "ithout #ear$ * -ust peace includes not onl! civil and political ri(hts -- it must encompass economic securit! and opportunit!$ .or true peace is not -ust #reedom #rom #ear, &ut #reedom #rom "ant$

/ere the emotive meanin( o# @peace< is maintained, &ut its descriptive meanin( is modi#ied to include "ar operations$ * last tactic can &e considered as the com&ination o# the t"o methods descri&ed &! Stevenson$ * "ord is simpl! renamed, so that its emotive meanin( is altered &! e ploitin( the descriptive meanin( o# the ne" signifiant$ .or instance, in order to avoid the ne(ative value -ud(ments tri((ered &! the 1"ar on terror2, under the 4&ama administration it "as simpl! renamed, as it reads #rom this report+:
%his *dministration pre#ers to avoid usin( the term Kon( War or Alo&al War on %error LAW4%M$ Dlease use 4verseas Nontin(enc! 4peration$

%he descriptive meanin( o# an 1operation2 is di##erent #rom the one o# 1"ar2, and there#ore the value -ud(ments associated "ith the t"o concepts are di##erent$ 9!
1 +

http:OO"""$io"apolitics$comOinde $imlB*rticleP+>3963 *l Qamen, %he ?nd o# the Alo&al War on %error$ The Washington Post +5 0arch +,,9, retrieved #rom http:OOvoices$"ashin(tonpost$comO55O+,,9O,3O+3OtheRendRo#RtheR(lo&alR"arRonRt$html (accessed on 18 0arch +,1+)$

renamin( 1"ar on terror2 as an operation, the 4&ama administration used a di##erent concept, havin( a di##erent emotive and descriptive meanin( to re#er to the same state o# a##airs$ %he concept "as not onl! rede#ined, &ut also renamed$ Arguments in words Stevenson<s account o# emotive and descriptive meanin( can &e anal!=ed #rom an ar(umentative perspective as a t"o#old dimension o# reasonin($ 4n this vie", Stevenson<s meanin(, or rather the propensit! o# a "ord to elicit certain attitudes, can &e thou(ht o# as a process o# reasonin( tri((ered or presupposed &! the use o# the "ord$ %he emotive and the descriptive meanin( can &e represented &! t"o di##erent patterns o# ar(ument, ar(ument #rom values and ar(ument #rom classi#ication$ The reasoning of describing reality Stevenson<s descriptive meanin( can &e in)uired into &! ta'in( into consideration the process o# namin( realit!, or rather the reasonin( underl!in( the attri&ution o# a predicate to a su&-ect$ %he most (eneric #orm o# reasonin( descri&in( this mechanism has &een introduced &! /astin(s (1963) and developed &! Walton (1996: >5), "ho provided an a&stract structure o# ar(ument representin( the com&ination o# the rhetorical predicate o# classi#ication (Nrothers 19793 /o&&s 1979: 683 /o&&s 198>) and the lo(ical rule o# modus ponens$ ;n the #ollo"in( scheme the rhetoric, or rather semantic, relation is stated in a (eneric #ashion, not speci#!in( on "hich (rounds the predicate is attri&uted to the entit!:
0*F4C DC?0;S?: .or all x, i# has propert! F, then x can &e classi#ied as havin( propert! G$ 0;J4C DC?0;S?: a has propert! F$ N4JNKSS;4J: a has propert! G$

/o"ever, the (eneralit! o# the semantic principle ris's leadin( to #orms o# in#erence o# the 'ind is &lue, there#ore is a man$ .or this reason it needs to &e speci#ied ta'in( into consideration the ancient ma ims o# in#erence (Stump 19893 Areen-Dedersen 1985)$ %he passa(e #rom the propert! stated in the antecedent to the propert! attri&uted in the conse)uent needs to &e (rounded on the semantic de#initor! relation (Walton 8 0aca(no +,,8), namel! the relation concernin( the identit! and di##erence &et"een t"o predicates (*ristotle Topics 1,+a, >-9)$ %his t!pe o# ar(ument can &e represented as #ollo"s (Walton 8 0aca(no +,1,: 39):
0*F4C DC?0;S?: For all x, if x fits definition D, and D is the definition of G, then x can be classified as G. 0;J4C DC?0;S?: a fits definition D N4JNKSS;4J: a has propert! G$

/o"ever, as pointed out &! *ristotle, the concept o# de#inition can include di##erent t!pes o# e)uivalences, the most #amous and controversial o# "hich is the de#inition &! (enus and di##erence$ %he same concept can &e de#ined in di##erent #ashions, accordin( to the t!pe o# de#inition chosen$ .or instance, @man< can &e de#ined &! (enus and di##erence as the @reasona&le animate &ein(<, &! propert! as the @&ein( "ho can learn (rammar<, &! ph!sical parts as the @&ein( "ho has a head, t"o arms, t"o le(s, etc$< 4n this perspective, the process o# classi#ication can &e conceived as a t!pe o# reasonin( proceedin( #rom de#inition (man is a reasona&le animal3 man is a &iped "ithout

#eathers), other de#initional propositions (descriptions, operative de#initions), or heuristic processes esta&lishin( an identit! (classi#ication &! contraries, analo(!, etc$)$ 0oreover, di##erent de#initional sentences tri((er di##erent t!pes o# reasonin($ %he de#inition &! (enus and di##erence leads to a classi#icator! (a##irmative) conclusion &! means o# a deductive modus ponens$ /o"ever, de#initions &! contrar! can onl! classi#! an entit! &! den!in( "hat the definiendum is not, proceedin( &! modus tollens or modus ponendo tollens$ 4ther de#initions "arrant a classi#ication a&ductivel! (parts are si(ns o# the entit! in de#initions &! parts3 a cause is the e planation o# an e##ect in an operative de#inition) or &! means o# analo(!$ %he (eneric reasonin( pattern named classi#ication can &e there#ore anal!=ed distin(uishin( &et"een the di##erent t!pes o# semantic principles #allin( under the la&el o# de#initional principle and the t!pes o# reasonin( that each o# them tri((er to support a classi#icator! conclusion$ 9elo" the most important t!pes o# de#initor! premises and the related principle o# in#erence leadin( to an a##irmative conclusion are represented:

Figure 1: The reasoning and semantic dimensions of argument from classification

*r(ument #rom classi#ication and the di##erent t!pes o# de#initions that can &e used #or di##erent purposes can provide an e planation #rom an ar(umentative perspective to the phenomenon o# descriptive meanin($ %he other dimension o# meanin(, the emotive one, can &e accounted #or considerin( the ar(umentation #rom values$ Argumentation from alues Stevenson descri&ed the emotive meanin( as a propensit! to encoura(e actions$ %he relationship &et"een the use o# a "ord, its meanin( and the values (or rather hierarchies o# values, Derelman 8 4l&rechts-%!teca 19>1), can provide an e planation, #rom a rhetorical perspective, o# the reason "h! "ords can lead to value -ud(ments and decisions$ 4n this vie", values can &e thou(ht o# as the reasons #or classi#!in( somethin( as desira&le or not$ Talues can &e used in ar(umentation to encoura(e action$ 9! pointin( out the )ualities o# a course o# action, an event or an o&-ect that the interlocutor considers as valua&le (desira&le), the spea'er can provide him "ith a reason to act in a speci#ic #ashion$ %his process o# reasonin( can &e descri&ed as #ollo"s: x (an action, an o&-ect, or a vie"point) can &e -ud(ed positivel! or ne(ativel! accordin( to a value (or rather a hierarch! o# values) !3 accordin( to the desira&ilit! o# x, x can &ecome an action "orth! #or the a(ent or not$ Talues represent the criterion #or esta&lishin( the desira&ilit! o# a course o# action, and the (eneric #orm o# reasonin( &ased on them can &e represented as #ollo"s (Walton, Ceed and 0aca(no +,,8: 3+1):
DC?0;S? 1: DC?0;S? +: Talue T is positive (ne(ative) as -ud(ed &! a(ent * (-ud(ment value)$ %he #act that value T is positive (ne(ative) a##ects the interpretation and there#ore the evaluation o# (oal A o# a(ent * (;# value T is (ood (&ad), it supports (does not support) commitment to (oal A)$ N4JNKSS;4J: T is a reason #or retainin( commitment to (oal A$

%his pattern o# ar(ument can &e #urther speci#ied considerin( the t"o passa(es underl!in( it, the process o# evaluation and the reasonin( o# decision-ma'in($ %he #irst step consists in evaluatin( an action or a state o# a##airs is desira&le or not accordin( to our s!stem o# values$ .or instance, securit!, -ustice or richness can &e evaluated as pre#era&le to peace and human li#e &! someone, "hile others can consider these latter values as the most important$ %he classi#ication o# an action as @an act o# "ar< can &e evaluated di##erentl! accordin( to the hierarchies o# values o# the audience$ %he di##erent reasons underl!in( this value -ud(ment "ere outlined in *ristotle<s "hetoric and Topics$ %hese topics can &e conceived as possi&le di##erent "a!s o# de#inin( "hat is @(ood< accordin( to possi&le situations and points o# vie"$ Since the meanin( o# @(ood< is partiall! determined &! the o&-ect o# its predication (Tendler 1965), these topics are use#ul to determine prediction$ .or instance, some o# these topics can &e reported as #ollo"s ("hetoric 1363& 13-16):
Jo" "e call @(ood< "hat is desira&le #or its o"n sa'e and not #or the sa'e o# somethin( else3 that at "hich all thin(s aim3 "hat the! "ould choose i# the! could ac)uire understandin( and practical "isdom3 and "hich tends to produce or preserve such (oods, or is al"a!s accompanied &! them3

What 1is to &e chosen #or its o"n sa'e2 can &e esta&lished on the &asis o# a personEs e periences or culture$ 4n this perspective, hierarchies o# values are #orms o# relativistic de#initions o# "hat is desira&le$

%he second component o# reasonin( #rom values is the reasonin( passa(e #rom moral -ud(ment to action$ %he relationship &et"een "ill, and desire, and action is underscored in *ristotle<s Nicomachean #thics$ What is (ood, or appear as such, is maintained to &e the (oal o# a decision to act (Nicomachean #thics ;;;, 5, 1113a1>), as 1ever!thin( aims at the (ood2 (Topics ;;;, 1, 116a 18)$ .or instance, an act o# "ar can &e -ud(ed ne(ativel!, and #or this reason &e a reason #or critici=in( a militar! intervention or votin( a(ainst a part! supportin( it$ %he decision-ma'in( process can &e thou(ht o# as a pattern o# reasonin( connectin( an action, or rather a 1declaration o# intention2 or commitment (von Wri(ht 197+: 51) "ith its (rounds (*nscom&e 1998: 11)$ Such an ar(ument is &ased on the Qantian principle that "ho "ills the ends "ills (so #ar as reason has decisive in#luence on his actions) also the means "hich are indispensa&l! necessar! and in his po"er (von Wri(ht 197+: 5>)$ /o"ever, dependin( on "hether the spea'er is assessin( a speci#ic course o# action or considerin( a (oal, the t!pe o# reasonin( can have di##erent #orms$ %he #irst and simpler #orm o# ar(ument is the ar(ument #rom conse)uences (Walton, Ceed 8 0aca(no +,,8: 33+)
DC?0;S? 1: ;# A is &rou(ht a&out, (ood (&ad) conse)uences "ill plausi&l! occur$ DC?0;S? +: What leads to (ood (&ad) conse)uences shall &e (not) &rou(ht a&out$ N4JNKSS;4J: %here#ore A should &e &rou(ht a&out$

.or instance, classi#!in( an operation as an 1act o# peace2 or as a 1paci#ication2 can tri((er a reasonin( #rom positive conse)uences: since the operation leads to peace, and peace is desira&le, the operation shall &e supported$ %he other #orm o# reasonin(, called practical reasonin(, proceeds #rom a value to the means that can possi&l! &rin( it a&out (Walton, Ceed 8 0aca(no +,,8: 3+3):
DC?0;S? 1: ; (an a(ent) have a (oal A$ DC?0;S? +: Narr!in( out this action * is a means to reali=e A$ N4JNKSS;4J: %here#ore, ; ou(ht to (practicall! spea'in() carr! out this action *$

.or instance, #reein( people #rom "ant and need in countries (overned &! dictators can &e re(arded as hi(hl! desira&le, and can -usti#! some #orms o# intervention presented as the onl! means to achieve such a (oal$ #motions and definitions Stevenson pointed out ho" "ords can &e used to a##ect the interlocutor<s decisions$ %he distinction &et"een the di##erent t!pes o# reasonin( tri((ered &! the use o# a "ord can sho" ho" rede#initions can a##ect the evaluation o# the state o# a##airs re#erred to$ 9! modi#!in( the de#inition o# a "ord, the spea'er can (round the implicit evaluative reasonin( o# the interlocutor on di##erent premises$ %his move is e tremel! po"er#ul and dan(erous$ /o"ever, at the same time rede#inition is not onl! a s common move, &ut is o#ten necessar! to clari#! concepts or hi(hli(ht ne" perspectives on them$ /o" is it possi&le to dra" a distinction &et"een "hat is persuasive and "hat is deceit#ul or unreasona&leB ;n order to anal!=e the limits o# rede#initions it is necessar! to in)uire into their pra(matic nature, and investi(ate the characteristics and the &oundaries o# presupposition$ Presupposing definitions

*s seen a&ove, de#initions can &e considered as the premises o# classi#icator! reasonin(, "hich are o#ten ta'en #or (ranted &ecause the! are part o# the common (round$ /o"ever, "hen a ne" de#inition is advanced, it &ecomes a standpoint that needs to &e supported &! reasons i# not accepted &! the interlocutor$ * de#inition, or a rede#inition, is an implicit claim in #avour o# a ne" use o# an e istin( "ord (Schiappa +,,3), and needs to &e open to challen(e$ We can conceive a rede#inition as a standpoint con#lictin( "ith the shared opinion on a "ord use and #or this reason it is presumed not to &e accepted$ %here is nothin( "ron( "ith rede#inin( a "ord3 the crucial pro&lem is ho" a rede#inition is introduced$ .or instance, "e can consider ho" 4&ama rede#ined the concept o# @hostilit!< to classi#! *merican airstri'es in Ki&!a$ ;n order to avoid Non(ress authori=ation to continue the hostilities, 4&ama adapted the meanin( o# such "ord to e clude &om&in(s and operations conducted &! unmanned aircra#ts (Obama Administration letter to $ongress %ustifying &ibya engagement, Fune 1>th, +,11, p$ +>):
Implicit redefinition: Hostilities %he Dresident is o# the vie" that the current S$S$ militar! operations in Ki&!a are consistent "ith the War Do"ers Cesolution and do not under that la" re)uire #urther con(ressional authori=ation, &ecause S$S$ militar! operations are distinct #rom the 'ind o# hostilities contemplated &! the Cesolution<s 6, da! termination provision$ LUM S$S$ operations do not involve sustained #i(htin( or active e chan(es o# #ire "ith hostile #orces, nor do the! involve the presence o# S$S$ (round troops, S$S$ casualties or a serious threat thereo#, or an! si(ni#icant chance o# escalation into a con#lict characteri=ed &! those #actors$

;nstead o# e plicitl! ar(uin( #or a ne" de#inition, or rather a speci#ication, o# the concept, 4&ama ta'es it #or (ranted$ /e does not re-ect the shared one, or attac's it &ased on its va(ueness$ /e does not even su((est that it should &e &etter clari#ied$ ;nstead, he supports the claim that the SS is not en(a(ed in an! hostilities in Ki&!a (and there#ore he does not need the Non(ress authori=ation) &ased on the #act that (round troops have not &een deplo!ed, nor have (round &attles &een #ou(ht$ /e ta'es #or (ranted that @hostilit!< means only active #i(htin( &! (round troops, "hich does not correspond to an! accepted de#inition o# the term under the SS la"s or militar! dictionaries$ %his move su((ests a crucial )uestion: /o" is it possi&le to ta'e #or (ranted a proposition, and "hat are the &oundaries o# this implicit (non)act o# discourseB %he notions o# pra(matic presupposition and act o# presupposin( can provide a possi&le e planation$ Pragmatic presuppositions Dresuppositions are considered as properties o# the use o# sentences, or rather statements (Stra"son, 19>,3 19>+3 Qarttunen, 19733 Qempson, 197>3 Wilson, 197>3 Qeenan, 1971)$ %his pra(matic vie" e tends the notion o# presupposition to several phenomena o# meanin(#ulness constraints (*ustin 196+: 353 >1), such as selectional restrictions, coherence relations and #elicit! conditions$ Several phenomena are la&eled as presuppositions, includin( the controversial semantic presuppositions and the "ider class o# #elicit! conditions o# speech acts and coherence relations$ %he common characteristic o# all these phenomena is that a proposition p is presupposed "hen it is ta'en #or (ranted in per#ormin( a speech act, "hose #elicit! depends on the interlocutor<s acceptance o# p$ %o presuppose a proposition is to ta'e its truth #or (ranted, and to assume that others involved in the conte t do the same (Stalna'er, 197,: +79)$ %his ta'in( a proposition #or (ranted has &een anal!=ed as Stalna'er as a

propositional attitude, "hich can &e interpreted as an action o# a 'ind (Stalna'er, +,,+: 7,1)$ *s Qempson put it (197>: 19,), presupposin( amounts to treatin( a proposition as part o# the common (round:
%he spea'er &elieves that the hearer 'no"s (and 'no"s that the spea'er 'no"s) a certain &od! o# propositions (i$e$ there is a Dra(matic Sniverse o# 7iscourse) and in ma'in( a certain utterance @V'p< he &elieves that the hearer, 'no"in( the conventions o# the lan(ua(e and hence the conditions #or the truth o# the proposition in )uestion, "ill reco(nise a su&set o# those conditions as &ein( part o# that Dra(matic Sniverse o# 7iscourse and hence neither asserti&le, denia&le or )ueria&le LUM

;n particular #or the purpose o# this paper a speci#ic t!pe o# pra(matic presupposition needs to &e in)uired into, the presupposition o# de#initional sentences$ .or this reason, it is necessar! to investi(ate ho" de#initions can &e presupposed in discourse, or rather ho" the! can &e tri((ered$ Presuppositions of discourse relations 7e#initions, &ein( the implicit premises o# a classi#icator! ar(ument, need to &e in)uired into ta'in( into consideration the lin(uistic structure o# discourse relations, or rather connectives$ Qarttunen (1973: 176) descri&ed ho" presuppositions can &e tri((ered &! predicates o# hi(her level, the connectives, "hose lin(uistic ar(uments are discourse se)uences$ Nonnectives lin' se)uences and presuppose speci#ic relations &et"een them$ .or instance, "e can consider the #ollo"in( #amous case (Ka'o##, 1971: 133): 1$ Fohn is tall, &ut he is no (ood at &as'et&all$ Ka'o## notices that (1) is composed o# an assertion (Fohn is tall, and he is no (ood at &as'et&all) and a presupposition (;# someone is tall, then one "ould e pect him to &e (ood at &as'et&all)$ %he e##ect is a denial o# e pectation, "hich "as descri&ed &! 7ucrot as the contradiction &! the second con-unct o# a presupposed conclusion (in this case, Fohn is (ood at &as'et&all) (7ucrot, 1978)$ Similarl!, the connective @and< presupposes a common relevance or topic (Ka'o## 1971: 1+83 Qempson 197>: >8)$ .or instance, "e can consider the #ollo"in( cases (Qempson 197>: >63 61): +$ %he Kone Can(er rode o## into the sunset and mounted his horse$ 3$ Dope Fohn is d!in( and the cat is in the &ath$ 9oth sentences are unsound &ecause a relationship &et"een the t"o con-uncts seems to &e missin(, or rather is unavaila&le to the interlocutors in normal conditions$ ;n (+) the con-unction presupposes a temporal se)uence that is commonl! perceived as impossi&le, "hile in (3) the (causal) relationship cannot &e even retrieved$ Su&ordinate connective, such as @there#ore< speci#! more precisel! the t!pe o# relationship &et"een the se)uences$ .or instance, the predicate @there#ore< presupposes that the #irst se)uence is a reason supportin( the second one (see also Arice 197>: 55)$ 9oth in case o# coordination and su&ordination, te t se)uences are connected in s similar #ashion$ ;n su&ordination the predicate is e plicit and imposes a set o# speci#ic coherence conditions, or pra(matic presuppositions (Tanderve'en +,,+: 573 9ach +,,3: 163), on its ar(uments (Arimes, 197>: 16+)$ ;n coordination, an e plicit or implicit predicate hides a deeper relationship (9allard, Nonrad 8 Kon(acre, 1971) that needs to &e reconstructed in order to understand the role and the conditions o# the discourse

se(ments or se)uences$ .or instance, coordination can e press temporal, causal, e planation relations, imposin( speci#ic re)uirements on their se)uences, such as a causal or temporal order o# the se)uences$ ;n all cases, ho"ever, a hi(h level notion (/o&&s 198>) connects the propositions e pressed &! the clause3 such a notion, or predicate, can &e e pressed or not, and speci#ied or not$ ;n all cases, the sentences or clauses are connected &! an a&stract, hi(h level and (eneric semantic relation that imposes speci#ic re)uirements on its ar(uments$ %here can &e several hi(h-level relations: e planation, narration, contrast, etc$ (see /o&&s, 198>3 Kascarides 8 *sher, 1993)3 ho"ever, "e "ill consider one o# such relations, motivation or support$ We can anal!se the #ollo"in( interpretation and reconstruction o# the a#orementioned ar(ument used &! 4&ama to classi#! the airstri'es in Ki&!a: (*) 4ur operations do not involve the presence o# S$S$ (round troops$ (9) (therefore) 4ur operations are not @hostilities<$ ;n this case, a hi(her level predicate connectin( the discourse moves, "hich Arimes re#erred to as a rhetorical predicate (Arimes, 197>: +,9##), later named lo(icalsemantic connective (Nrothers, 1979, Ci(otti, +,,>) or coherence relation (/o&&s, 1979: 683 /o&&s, 198>), needs to &e reconstructed$ We can represent it lin(uisticall! as the connective @there#ore<, e pressin( a relation o# motivation (Ci(otti 8 Cocci, +,,6), &ut it needs to &e #urther speci#ied$ %he relation o# motivation needs to support the attri&ution o# a predicate (to &e a case o# hostilit!) in ( to the same su&-ect o# the previous se)uence (A)$ %he attri&ution o# a predicate on the &asis o# actions or )ualities attri&uted to the same su&-ect can &e usuall! presumed to &e a classi#ication$ 4&viousl!, the speci#ication o# the relation depends on several #actors, such as the t!pe o# propert! attri&uted$ %his relation re)uires that the )ualit! or event e pressed in the #irst sentence represents a classi#icator!, or de#initional, principle #or the attri&ution o# the )ualit! in the second sentence (Qempson, 197>: 1,9-11,)$ ;n this speci#ic case, the #act, event or )ualit! need to instantiate a de#inition, or de#initional principle, o# to &e a case o# hostilit!$ We can represent the structure o# the presuppositions as #ollo"s:

Figure : Presuppositions of !therefore"

%he a&stract relation o# coherence (/o&&s 1979, *sher 8 Kascarides +,,3, chap$ 7), in this case motivation, is #urther speci#ied accordin( to the three levels o# anal!sis o# the sentences$ %he last step is the speci#ication o# the presupposition, "hich in this case corresponds to a de#initional principle o# @hostilit!<$ The act of presupposing *s seen a&ove, #rom a lin(uistic perspective the presuppositions o# connectives are re)uirements #or the coherence o# a te t or discourse$ %he use o# such re)uirements leads us to the other crucial perspective, the pra(matic one$ Presupposition as an implicit act .rom a pra(matic perspective, to presuppose a proposition p is a #orm o# action (Stalna'er, +,,+: 7,1) consistin( in ta'in( its truth #or (ranted, and assumin( that others involved in the conte t do the same (Stalna'er 197,: +79)$ /o"ever, the spea'er can presuppose a proposition p &ecause he assumes or &elieves (Qempson 197>: 19,) that the interlocutor &elieves that p is true and reco(ni=es that the spea'er is ma'in( this assumption (Stalna'er, 1975: +,,)$ .rom this account o# pra(matic presupposition, t"o crucial elements emer(e: 1$ Dresupposition can &e considered as a decision to treat a

proposition as shared3 +$ Dresuppositions are cruciall! related to the spea'er and hearer<s &elie#s and 'no"led(e (Sch"art= 1977: +58)$ /o"ever, the de#inition o# a lin(uistic phenomenon in terms o# &elie#s or assumptions ris's con#oundin( the phenomenon "ith its accidental e##ects or possi&le e planations$ /o" can a spea'er &elieve or assume that a proposition is shared &! the hearerB /o" "ould it &e possi&le to presuppose propositions that are 'no"n not to &e shared, "ithout the sentence &ein( meanin(lessB * possi&le e planation consists in anal!=in( the pra(matic presuppositions as an act consistin( in treatin( a proposition as shared, and investi(atin( its conditions and essential re)uirements$ 7ucrot pointed out the strict relationship &et"een a speech act and its conditions$ /e noticed that the per#ormance o# a speech act amounts to implicitl! per#ormin( a hidden, or rather implicit, act, presupposin( (7ucrot, 1968: 87):
Nomme le -oueur d<Wchecs doit accepter le champ de possi&ilitWs )ue crWe pour lui la manXuvre de son adversaire, le participant d<un dialo(ue doit reprendre Y son compte certains au moins des prWsupposWs introduits par les phrases au )uelles il rWpond $

.or instance, &! assertin( that, 1We are #reein( the people o# *#(hanistan #rom need2 the spea'er is deplo!in( a dialo(ical "orld in "hich people in *#(hanistan are in need, and need is a #orm o# &urden$ 4nl! in such a "orld his statement is #elicitous$ 4n 7ucrot<s vie", &! presupposin( the spea'er modi#ies the dialo(ical situation, and set the &oundaries o# the interlocutor<s #uture actions (7ucrot, 197+)3, or rather the conditions #or the continuation o# the #uture dialo(ue (ame (7ucrot, 1991: 91)$ Jot acceptin( a presupposition amounts to endin( the dialo(ue, somethin( li'e 'noc'in( over the chess&oard$ %his perspective ta'es into account solel! the structure o# the dialo(ue move, and not its possi&ilit!$ * speech act o# the 'ind 9o&<s &rother is #eelin( &ad toda! "ould #ail to #ul#il the purpose o# in#ormin( the hearer i# the latter 'no"s that 9o& is an onl! child, or i# he does not 'no" 9o& at all$ ;n order to account #or the e##ect o# a move, and there#ore its possi&ilit! conditions and #allacious uses, it is necessar! to ta'e into consideration the relationship &et"een the spea'er and the hearer<s 'no"led(e$ %his relation can &e e amined startin( #rom a case studied &! 7ucrot (1966: 5+)$ /e considered an ima(inar! conversation &et"een the enemies o# Nesar or Japoleon durin( the Coman consulate or the .rench Cepu&lic$ ;n this conversation, the! tal' a&out 1the ma(ni#icence, or the richness or the "isdom o# the Qin(2$ ;n this case the spea'ers presuppose #alse or unshared propositions (Nesar or Japoleon are 'in(s)$ /o"ever, their assertions, #ar #rom &ein( void, mi(ht have caused them serious trou&les #or their meanin($ %his case illustrates a crucial pro&lem o# presuppositions, the possi&ilit! o# treatin( as shared an unshared proposition, rel!in( on the hearer<s capacit! o# reconstructin(, or rather 1accommodatin(2 it (Ke"is 19793 Ton .intel +,,8)$ .rom the anal!sis o# the limits o# such a process o# reconstruction it is possi&le to understand the conditions characteri=in( the speech act o# presupposition$ The limits of presupposing Dresuppositions on 7ucrot<s vie" need to &e accepted in order #or the dialo(ue to &e possi&le$ /o"ever, at the same time presuppositions need to &e 'no"n &! the
3

4n 7ucrot<s vie", the communicative (ame resem&les a chess (ame, in "hich the possi&ilities are set &! means o# presuppositions: dans ce com&at simulW Z)ui su&stitue au possi&ilitWs rWelles, dues Y la #orce, les possi&ilitWs morales dues au conventions- les rH(les permettent au -oueurs de se contraindre mutuellement Y certaines actions, et de s<en interdire certaines autres (7ucrot 1968: 833 197+: +7)$

interlocutor$ .rom a pra(matic perspective, the possi&ilit! o# presupposin( in#ormation not shared, or not 'no"n to &e shared, needs to &e accounted #or$ 4n Ke"isE perspective (Ke"is 1979), the hearer reconstructs the presupposed and not shared propositions in order to avoid communicative #ailure (Ton .intel +,,8)3 in other "ords, he accommodates the missin( and necessar! in#ormation (Ke"is 1979: 35,):
;# at time t somethin( is said that re)uires presupposition P to &e accepta&le and i# P is not presupposed -ust &e#ore t, then Z ceteris paribus and "ithin certain limits Z presupposition P comes into e istence at t$

%he crucial pro&lem o# this vie" is to determine ho" a presupposition can come into e istence, and &e added to the shared propositions$ 4n Soames< vie", accommodation is possi&le "hen no o&-ections are raised, namel! the interlocutor has alread! accepted the proposition (it is part o# the common (round) or it is not con#lictin( "ith it (Soames, 198+: 586):
Stterance Dresupposition *n utterance S presupposes D (at t) i## one can reasona&l! in#er #rom S that the spea'er S accepts D and re(ards it as uncontroversial, either &ecause a$ S thin's that it is alread! part o# the conversational conte t at t, or &ecause &$ S thin's that the audience is prepared to add it, "ithout o&-ection, to the conte t a(ainst "hich S is evaluated$

Soames e plains the phenomenon o# accommodation in terms o# the spea'er<s &elie#s re(ardin( the interlocutor<s common 'no"led(e$ /o"ever, ho" is it possi&le to evaluate a &elie#B ;s presupposition dependent on personal &elie#sB Stalna'er (1998) e plains the relationship &et"een spea'er<s and hearer<s 'no"led(e in the process o# accommodation as a presumption o# the spea'er that the presupposed in#ormation is a ailable to his or her audience (Stalna'er 1998: 8)$ %he spea'er acts holdin( the conclusion o# his or her presumptive reasonin( as true until contrar! evidence is provided$ .or instance "e can consider the #ollo"in( variants o# the statement made &! 4&ama &e#ore the Non(ress and anal!sed in #i(ure 1 a&ove: *$ 4ur intervention cannot &e considered as hostilities$ We have not used "eapons or the militar!$ 9$ 4ur intervention is not a [at\]ma$ %he! have not intervened$ N$ 4ur intervention cannot &e considered as hostilities$ ;t is #ast and "ell done$ 7$ 4ur intervention cannot &e considered as hostilities$ ;t does not involve coo'in( o# potatoes$ ?$ 4ur intervention cannot &e considered as hostilities$ Around troops have not intervened$ %hese #ive cases di##er #or di##erent reasons$ ;n *, the spea'er (rounds his presupposition on the #act that people (and con(ressmen) usuall! 'no" "hat an @hostile act< is, and that @usin( "eapons or the militar!< is a possi&le criterion #or classi#!in( an action as hostilities$ ;n ? the presupposed de#inition resem&les to the commonl! accepted one, &ut sets a su##icient condition as a necessar! one$ ;n 9, ho"ever, it is impossi&le to reconstruct and accept the presupposition, as an essential re)uirement clearl! #ails #or t"o reasons$ %he spea'er cannot presume that Jorth *merican con(ressmen 'no" the meanin( o# a %ur'ish "ord, [at\]ma$ 0oreover, since no in#ormation has &een provided on the entit! to "hich 1the!2 re#ers$ Such

presuppositions (the de#inition o# [at\]ma and the re#erent o# 1the!2) cannot &e accommodated, cannot &e reconstructed, as the! are not rhetoricall! &ound to the conte t (*sher 8 Kascarides 1998: +77), nor the! are related to propositions presumed to &e 'no"n$ ;n this case, the process o# reconstruction sho"n in #i(ure + can #ail at level 1 or +, as the spea'er ma! not understand the meanin( o# the se)uences connected and there#ore retrieve their relationship, or he can understand their relationship &ut cannot reconstruct the de#initor! statement$ Ceconstruction is not the onl! process "hich needs to &e considered #or anal!sin( presuppositions, as (9) does not represent the onl! case in "hich the speech act is in#elicitous &ecause o# presuppositional #ailure$ ;n N and 7 the hearer can understand the nature o# the proposition ta'en #or (ranted (a de#initor! statement) and connect it "ith his or her &ac'(round 'no"led(e$ /o"ever, in N the hearer cannot accept that the propert! o# 1&ein( nice and "ell done2 is a de#inition o# an action (hostilities)$ ;n this case, the process o# presupposition reconstruction represented in #i(ure + a&ove #ails at level +$ ;n 7, the presupposition can &e reconstructed and its nature o# de#initor! statement accepted$ /o"ever, no con(ressmen and presuma&l! no ?n(lish spea'er can accept that 1coo'in( o# potatoes2 is a de#inition o# @hostilit!<$ %he conclusion o# the process o# reconstruction outlined in #i(ure + a&ove cannot &e accepted and #ails at level 3$ %he possibility o# presupposin( needs there#ore to &e distin(uished #rom the acceptability o# a proposition ta'en #or (ranted$ 9! distin(uishin( the t"o dimensions o# accommodation it is possi&le to distin(uish &et"een #our di##erent cases: i) the presupposition can &e reconstructed and accepted as a &ac'(round assumption (case *)3 ii) the presupposition cannot &e reconstructed (case 9)3 iii) the presupposition can &e reconstructed &ut its #unction (nature, structure) cannot &e accepted (case N)3 iv) the presupposition can &e reconstructed &ut its content cannot &e accepted (case 7 and ?)$ %hese possi&ilities allo" us to outline the possi&le #elicit! conditions o# the implicit speech act o# presupposin(, &uildin( on *ustin<s and Searle and Tanderve'en<s accounts o# speech act conditions (*ustin 196+: 15-1>3 Searle 8 Tanderve'en 198>: 13-193 /ol(raves +,,8: 13):
#ssential $ondition: Propositional $ondition: Preparatory $ondition: )incerity $ondition: Spea'er ()) sets the presupposed proposition (pp) as a condition o# the #elicit! o# his speech act ()A)3 i# /earer (*) does not accept pp, )A "ill &e void$ pp is a proposition that can &e reconstructed &! *$ ) can presume that * can reconstruct and accept pp$ ) &elieves that pp3 ) &elieves that * can reconstruct and 'no" or accept pp$

%his speech act has a direction o# #it #rom World (o# the /earer) to Words (o# the Spea'er), and its (oal is to set the propositions that the hearer needs to accept #or the dialo(ue to continue$ %he possi&ilit! o# reconstructin( the presupposition is indicated as a propositional condition: * needs to &e a&le to dra" pp #rom the lin(uistic and pra(matic elements provided$ %he accepta&ilit! o# the presupposition is (overned &! &oth the preparator! and the sincerit! condition$ %he sincerit! condition e presses the conditions that the tradition on pra(matic presupposition considered as essential, "hile the preparator! condition, #ramed as a presumption, is aimed at &rid(in( the (ap

&et"een the spea'er<s and hearer<s mind #rom an epistemic and ar(umentative perspective, "ithout resortin( to the ps!cholo(ical notion o# &elie#$ %his treatment o# presupposition as a 'ind o# implicit speech act can e plain also the particular t!pes o# moves in "hich the spea'er ta'es #or (ranted a proposition 'no"n to &e #alse or un'no"n &! the hearer, such as the cases o# Japoleon and Naesar mentioned a&ove$ /ere the spea'er can presume and &elieves that the hearer can reconstruct the presupposition 1Naesar (or Japoleon) is a 'in(2, &ut at the same time he presumes and &elieves that he does not accept it, as it is #alse$ 7ucrot descri&ed this phenomenon as a #orm o# connotation, in "hich the utterance &ecomes a si(n aimed at communicatin( the conditions o# its use (7ucrot 1968: 55)$ ;n a speech act perspective, this particular use o# presupposition can &e re(arded as an indirect speech act, "here the act settin( out the conditions o# a move needs to &e interpreted as a t!pe o# assertive (/ic'e! 1993: 1,7)$ Presuppositions as presumptive reasoning %he most important aspect o# the speech act o# presupposition is the preparator! condition, statin( that the spea'er can presume that the hearer can reconstruct and accept (or in a stron(er sense, 'no") the proposition to &e presupposed$ %his condition sets out the (rounds o# the reasonableness o# spea'er<s presupposition, and tries to provide a possi&le ans"er to the #ollo"in( crucial )uestion: Wh! and ho" can a spea'er presuppose a propositionB %he concepts o# spea'er<s 1&elie#2 or 1thin'in(2 mentioned in the theories on pra(matic presupposition ascri&e the phenomenon o# presupposition to internal co(nitive processes$ /o"ever, such e planations cannot provide criteria #or distin(uishin( &et"een reasona&le uses o# presupposition #rom a&surd or manipulative ones$ ;# "e e amine presupposition in terms o# a presumptive reasonin(, "e can anal!=e its reasona&leness &! assessin( the reasons supportin( its #undamental re)uirement, the #act that the presupposed proposition can &e shared$ %his concept, partiall! hinted at &! Stra"son<s presumption o# 'no"led(e (Stra"son, 1971: >8->93 Qempson, 197>: 166167), shi#ts the traditional ps!cholo(ical e planation onto an epistemic level$ Presumpti e reasoning Dresuppositions can &e conceived as the conclusion o# presumptive reasonin($ %he spea'er cannot 'no" the other mind, &ut onl! advance a tentative and de#easi&le conclusion &ased on a #orm o# reasonin( in lac' o# evidence$ /e or she dra"s speci#ic conclusions on the other<s mind &ased on (eneral principles such as @Spea'ers &elon(in( to a speci#ic speech communit! usuall! 'no" the meanin( o# the most important "ords o# the lan(ua(e used therein<$ *s Cescher put it, presumptions are #orms o# reasonin( in lac' o# evidence (Cescher, 1977: 1):
%o presume in the presentl! relevant sense o# the term is to accept somethin( in the a&sence o# the #urther relevant in#ormation that "ould ordinaril! &e deemed necessar! to esta&lish it$ %he term derives #rom the Katin praesumere: to ta'e &e#ore or to ta'e #or (ranted$

Dresumptions cannot prove a conclusion3 the! intervene "hen it is not possible to demonstrate a conclusion (9lac'stone 1769: 371)$ %his t!pe o# reasonin( is re&utta&le and de#easi&le (/art 1961: 1,), as its characteristic consists in supportin( a conclusion until contrar! evidence is produced$ /o"ever, its inherent de#easi&ilit! has a #undamental e##ect on the dialo(ical settin(, the shi#tin( o# the &urden o# producin(

evidence, or provin( a proposition, onto the other part!$ .or instance, the #undamental le(al presumption is the innocence o# the de#endant$ %his does not mean that the de#endant is innocent, &ut simpl! that he is considered as such until he is proved (uilt! (&e!ond a speci#ic standard o# proo#)$ %he other part!, the prosecution (or in civil cases the plainti##) has to provide evidence to re&ut this presumptive conclusion$ %he le(al #rame"or' provides a (eneral idea o# the structure o# this reasonin( in ever!da! ar(umentation$ Dresumptions "or' to move the dialo(ue #urther "hen 'no"led(e is lac'in($ %heir role is to shi#t the &urden o# proo# onto the other part!, "ho can re-ect the proposition onl! &! providin( contrar! ar(uments or positive #acts leadin( to a contrar! conclusion$ ;# not re&utted, the spea'er can consider it as tentativel! proved, and move the dialo(ue #urther$ Cescher outlined the structure o# this t!pe o# in#erence as #ollo"s (Cescher +,,6: 33):
DC?0;S? 1: P (the proposition representin( the presumption) o&tains "henever the condition $ o&tains unless and until the standard de#ault proviso + (to the e##ect that countervailin( evidence is at hand) o&tains ( "ule)$ DC?0;S? +: Nondition $ o&tains (Fact)$ DC?0;S? 3: Droviso + does not o&tain (#xception)$ N4JNKSS;4J: P o&tains$

%he "ule o# presumption lin's the accepta&ilit! o# a proposition P (#or instance, the de#endant is innocent) to a condition $ (#or instance, he denies the crime he is char(ed "ith) until a speci#ic de#ault proviso + o&tains (#or instance, he is #ound (uilt! &e!ond reasona&le dou&t)$ ;# he denies the char(e and is not #ound (uilt! &e!ond reasona&le dou&t, he is to &e #ound innocent$ %his t!pe o# reasonin( can &e applied to the anal!sis o# the conditions o# presuppositions to assess "hen and "hether the spea'er can reasona&l! ta'e a proposition #or (ranted$ %his pattern o# reasonin( outlines the structure o# the reasonin( underl!in( his 1&elie#2 or 1thin'in(2 that the interlocutor accepts or 'no"s the presupposed proposition$ Presumptions and redefinitions %he structure o# presumptive reasonin( mentioned a&ove can &e applied to the cases o# rede#inition cited, and in particular the persuasive de#initions o# 1hostilities2 and 1peace2$ ;n the #irst case, 4&ama too' advanta(e o# the a&sence o# an e plicit de#inition in the War Do"ers Cesolution$ /o"ever, the a&sence o# an e plicit de#inition cannot result in the accepta&ilit! o# an! de#inition$ We can reconstruct 4&ama<s reasonin( as #ollo"s:
Accepted meaning: a((ressive or threatenin( &ehavior directed to"ards another

person or state5
Premise 1: The congressmen should ,now -be committed to. the meaning of /hostilities0(D) "henever such a word is used with its commonly accepted meaning1 or when the spea,er redefined it supporting it by reasons (N) (unless the interlocutor does not master the language1 belongs to a different culture or community1 etc2 ) (7) (Cule)$ Premise : %he commonl! accepted de#inition o# hostilities is overt act o# "ar#areU (N)(.act)$ Premise #: ;t is not the case that the audience does not 'no" the lan(ua(e or &elon(s to a di##erent communit! o# spea'er (or culture) (non-7) (? ception)$
5

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$onclusion: The audience should ,now that /hostilities0 means /presence of land troops and sustained fighting0 (D)$

;n this case, the crucial pro&lem "as not the a&sence o# a de#inition o# @hostilities<, &ut its contrar!, the presupposition, &! 4&ama, o# its e istence and sharedness$ 7oes not onl! 4&ama ta'e #or (ranted that a speci#ic de#inition e ists, &ut also that a de#inition con#lictin( "ith the common 'no"led(e is accepted &! ever!&od!$ %he e##ect o# a presumption o# meanin( is much (reater "hen a concept is 1essentiall! contested2 (Aallie 19>6)$ Noncepts such as @art<, @#reedom<, @peace< or @democrac!< are va(ue and controversial, and admit o# &orderline cases that cannot &e clearl! classi#ied$ .or these reasons, there can &e di##erent de#initions #or the same concept$ @Deace< &elon(s to this cate(or! o# controversial and contested concepts$ /o"ever, usuall! all de#initions (et!molo(ical, &! description, &! )ualitative parts) share one #undamental (eneric #eature, a&sence o# con#lict$ ;# "e anal!=e 4&ama<s rede#inition o# peace in his Jo&el Dri=e address, "e can notice that presupposes a rede#inition &! means o# a t"o#old move$ .irst, he introduces a di##erence o# the commonl! accepted (enus a&sence o# visi&le con#lict, statin( that it shall 1&e &ased on inherent ri(hts and di(nit! LUM economic securit! and opportunit!2$ %hen, he implicitl! replaces the (enus, "ithout providin( an! reason, claimin( that 1true peace is not %ust freedom from fear, &ut #reedom #rom "ant2$ /e presupposes that the second se)uence replaces the accepted meanin(3 ho"ever, the ver! de#inition he is ar(uin( a(ainst presupposes a ne" (enus #or peace, @#reedom<, instead o# @a&sence o# con#lict<$ the underl!in( presumptive reasonin( proceeds as #ollo"s:
Accepted meaning: a&sence o# con#lict Premise 1: The interlocutor should ,now -be committed to. the meaning of 3peace4 (D) "henever such a word is used with its commonly accepted meaning1 or when the spea,er redefined it supporting it by reasons (N) (unless the interlocutor does not master the language1 belongs to a different culture or community1 etc2 ) (7) (Cule)$ Premise : %he commonl! accepted de#inition o# @peace< is @a&sence o# con#lict<3 the conte tuall! accepted one is its partial rede#inition &! the spea'er: @a&sence o# con#lict &ased ri(hts and opportunities (&ased on #reedom #rom "ant)U< (N)(.act)$ Premise #: ;t is not the case that the audience does not 'no" the lan(ua(e or &elon(s to a di##erent communit! o# spea'er (or culture) (non-7) (? ception)$ $onclusion: The audience should ,now that 3peace4 means 3a ,ind of freedom4 (D)$

%he conclusion o# the presumptive reasonin( does not #ollo" #rom the premises$ ;n #act, it actuall! contradicts them$ %he anal!sis o# presupposition as presumptive meanin( sho"s the &oundaries o# implicit rede#inition (or rather persuasive de#inition) in terms o# reasona&leness o# the presumptive reasonin( on "hich their implicit dimension is &ased$ 0oreover, the description o# presuppositions as presumptions underscores another crucial e##ect o# implicit rede#initions, the dialectical e##ect o# shi#tin( the &urden o# proo#$ .ollo"in( Walton and Qra&&e<s dialectical models (199>), "e can represent a ver&al e chan(e as an alteration o# the a(ents< commitment store, "hich contains all the statements that the participant has conceded or accepted durin( the course o# the dialo(ue$ ;n a dialo(ue not all the commitments are e plicit$ %he interlocutors can interact &ecause the! share the de#initions o# the "ords used, the rules o# the dialo(ue, procedures and enc!clopedic 'no"led(e re(ardin( the place "here the! are$ Some o# these 1dar'-side2 commitments (Walton 8 Qra&&e 199>: 11) are the outcome o# previous dialo(ues, and represent the propositions that the interlocutors have accepted or stated$ ;n a dialo(ue,

presuppositions are implicit activations o# dar' side commitments (see Nor&lin, +,,+): the! re#er to propositions alread! accepted &! the parties to move the commitments #urther$ Dresupposin( unshared propositions is a t"o#old dialectical strate(!$ 4n the one hand, presuppositions are commitments: presupposin( an unshared proposition means committin( the hearer to a vie" that he or she never accepted, and that has to &e denied in order to &e deleted #rom the commitment store$ 4n the other hand, presuppositions are the conclusions o# implicit presumptive reasonin(, and there#ore their denial needs to &e supported &! an ar(ument that re&uts the presumption$ $onclusion ;mplicit rede#initions can &e crucial and dan(erous instruments o# persuasion and manipulation$ Stevenson underscored ho" the! can &e used to redirect emotions and a##ect -ud(ments and decisions$ 9! modi#!in( the meanin( o# a "ord that tri((ers positive or ne(ative -ud(ments, the spea'er can in#luence the hearer<s perception and evaluation o# a state o# a##airs, and alter his course o# action$ /o"ever, on the one hand rede#initions are not inherentl! deceptive or #allacious3 on the contrar!, since the! are o#ten necessar!$ 4n the other hand, since there are no uni)ue, immuta&le and universall! shared de#initions, the ris's o# de#initional relativism and complete #reedom o# rede#inin( and manipulatin( concepts seem inevita&le$ ;n this paper the pro&lem o# rede#inition is investi(ated #rom an ar(umentative and pra(matic perspective$ Cede#initions are anal!=ed as condensed ar(uments advanced &! e plicit and implicit speech acts$ Ki'e an! other vie"point or premise in an ar(ument, it needs to &e open to criticism i# not shared$ ;mplicit rede#initions can &e considered as strate(ies to ta'e a controversial proposition #or (ranted, treatin( a de#inition that cannot &e a(reed upon as shared$ Dresupposition has &een investi(ated as a #orm o# speech act (rounded on the #undamental conditions that the presupposed proposition needs to &e possi&l! reconstructed &! and accepta&le to the hearer$ /o"ever, ho" is it possi&le to 'no" the other<s mindB /o" is it possi&le to 'no" that the interlocutor can retrieve and accept a propositionB %he possi&le ans"er su((ested in this paper is &ased on presumptive reasonin($ %he spea'er acts on the &asis o# a reasonin( in lac' o# evidence, &ased on "hat is commonl! considered to &e the case$ ;nterpretin( presuppositions as #orms o# presumptions, "e can dra" a line &et"een reasona&le and mischievous uses o# implicit de#initions$ %he act o# presupposin( a rede#inition amounts to (round the discourse move on a pra(matic contradiction: a ne" and unshared de#inition is presented and treated as commonl! accepted$ %his move shi#ts the &urden o# proo# onto the hearer, "ho needs to re&ut a vie"point that has never &een supported &! ar(uments$ &eferences *nscom&e, A$ ?$ 0$ (1998)$ Dractical ;n#erence$ ;n C$ /ursthouse, A$ Ka"rence, and W$ ^uinn (eds$), Tirtues and Ceasons (pp$ 1-35), 4 #ord: Nlarendon Dress$ *ristotle (1969)$ %opica$ ;n W$ 7$ Coss (ed$) %he Wor's o# *ristotle$ 4 #ord: 4 #ord Sniversit! Dress$ *ristotle (1985)$ Chetorica$ %ranslated &! W$ Ch!s Co&erts$ ;n F$ 9arnes (ed$), %he Wor's o# *ristotle, Drinceton: Drinceton Sniversit! Dress$ *ristotle (199>)$ Jicomachean ?thics$ ;n Fonathan 9arnes (ed$), %he complete "or's o# *ristotle, vol$ ;;, Drinceton: Drinceton Sniversit! Dress$ *sher, J$ 8 Kascarides, *$ (1998)$ %he Semantics and Dra(matics o# Dresupposition$ Fournal o# Semantics, 1>, +39-+99$

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