Examine and assess Platos arguments in the Theaetetus against the claim the knowledge is sense-perception, concentrating either

on the indirect argument (151-83 or the direct argument (18!-8" #

$n the Theaetetus %ocrates is concerned with the &uestion 'what is knowledge( )a*ing dismissed the possi+ilit, that the &uestion could +e answered +, example on the grounds that a genuine answer should -designate the man, .orms o. knowledge +, one de.inition/1, %ocrates is o..ered a more unitar, explanation +, the ,oung Theaetetus0 -The wa, it looks to me at the moment is that knowledge is nothing +ut sense perception#/1 2ow there is nothing particularl, radical in mentioning knowledge and sensor, perception in the same +reath0 as .ar as sources o. knowledge go, the senses seem to +e one o. the most o+*ious and plausi+le candidates# )owe*er, the manner in which Theaetetus expresses his position is somewhat no*el# 2ote that Theaetetus does not suggest that knowledge relies on perception or that knowledge claims must +e *eri.ied +, perception# 3ather Theaetetus claims that knowledge is 'nothing +ut sense perception# This is a more radical claim and on the .ace o. it looks something like a claim o. identit,0 knowledge 4 sense perception# 2ow gi*en that identit, is a s,mmetrical relation it .ollows .rom this de.inition that we cannot ha*e knowledge which is not perceptual and cannot ha*e perceptions which are not knowledge, i#e# which are erroneous# 2ow some philosophers ha*e argued that to interpret Theaetetus as holding this position is incorrect due to the .act that earlier in the dialogue Theaetetus o..ers examples o. knowledge which are clearl, not perceptual in nature#3 )owe*er, $ +elie*e in light o. what .ollows within the dialogue, i#e# Platos swi.t mo*e .rom Theaetetus de.inition to the topic o. Protagorean relati*ism, it makes sense to take the claim that knowledge is 'nothing +ut sense perception to +e a claim that knowledge and perception are identical# 5r at least it makes sense to take it that %ocrates understands Theaetetus claim in this wa,#
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Plato, Theaetetus, 1!8d6-", 7ohn 8c9owell (trans# , (1:"3, 5x.ord; 5x.ord <ni*ersit, Press # $+id, 151e1-3# 3 8i-=,oung >ee, The Secret Doctrine in Platos Theaetetus, 1??5, 5x.ord %cholarship online#

$n the Theaetetus %ocrates o..ers two arguments against the position that knowledge is sense perception0 one direct and one indirect# This essa, will .ocus on the indirect argument# %ocrates constructs this argument +, .irst relating the thesis o. Theaetetus to )eracleitus .lux doctrine, *ia Protagorean relati*ism, +e.ore pro*iding an argument against the )eracleitean position in an attempt to re.ute indirectl, the thesis that knowledge is sense perception# Thus, in terms o. anal,sis, we ha*e two &uestions to ask o. the indirect argument, namel,0 'does Plato success.ull, demonstrate the relationship +etween the doctrines o. Theaetetus, Protagoras and )eracleitus( and 'does Plato succeed in re.uting )eracleitus .lux doctrine( This paper there.ore, will .ocus on these two points# The .irst hal. o. the paper will explore the relationship +etween Theaetetus position and those o. Protagoras and )eracleitus, while also considering how our conception o. said relationship ma, +e a..ected +, taking re*isionist or unitarian readings o. the dialogue# $ will argue that +oth the positions o. Protagoras and )eracleitus are necessar, .or the de.ence o. Theaetetus position and there.ore, that this section o. Platos argument is *alid# $n the second hal. o. the paper $ will consider %ocrates re.utation o. )eracleitus, consider criticisms and comparisons with @ittgensteins discussion o. pri*ate language, and ultimatel, deem the criticism cogent and the o*erall argument e..ecti*e# @hen Theaetetus .irst suggests that knowledge is nothing +ut sense perception %ocrates, rather than attempt to anal,se Theaetetus claim in and o. itsel., immediatel, makes an association with Protagoras so called measure doctrine0 -Ait looks as though what ,ou*e said a+out knowledge is no ordinar, theor, +ut one that Protagoras, too, used to stateABecause he sa,s, ,ou remem+er, that a man is the measure o. all things; o. those which are, that the, are, and o. those which are not, that the, are not#/ ! %ocrates elucidates this position +, stating that what Protagoras means is that -e*er,thing is, .or me, the wa, it appears to me, and is .or ,ou, the wa, it appears to ,ou#/ 5 Thus what is the case, or what is true, +ecomes relati*e to a gi*en person# This means that in a
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Plato, Theaetetus, 151e:-151a1-!, 7ohn 8c9owell (trans# , (1:"3, 5x.ord; 5x.ord <ni*ersit, Press # $+id, 151a"-8#

situation where ,ou and $ +oth ha*e contradictor, appearances, leading us to make contradictor, claims such as 'this wind is cold and 'this wind is not cold, no actual contradiction takes place as ,our claim is true .or ,ou and ,our appearances and m, claim is true .or me and m, appearances# 2ow as we ha*e alread, indicated, this relati*e approach to truth seems to +e necessar, i. we take %ocrates as understanding the claim 'knowledge is sense perception as a claim which tries to esta+lish a relation o. identit, +etween knowledge and perception# $. all perception is to +e deemed knowledge then we must make allowance .or the .act that m, perceptions and ,our perceptions can contradict one another, and the onl, wa, to achie*e this is to a+andon the o+Cecti*it, o. our knowledge claims and em+race Protagorean relati*ism# 2ow while a+andoning the o+Cecti*it, o. knowledge seems a radical step, that such a mo*e is re&uired in order to de.end the thesis that knowledge is the same as sense perception is less o+Cectiona+le# $n terms o. cogenc, o. reasoning there.ore, it seems like this .irst mo*e o. Platos is a sound one# Di*en Theaetetus de.inition as a starting point, and assuming that we do not o+Cect to %ocrates assumption that appearance and perception are interchangea+le, it is sa.e to conclude that it .ollows that -perception is alwa,s o. what is, and .ree .rom .alsehood, as i. its knowledge#/6 Platos next step howe*er, is considera+l, less predicta+le# Plato claims that there is another doctrine which has an intimate relationship with Protagoras measure doctrine# %ocrates sa,s -The .act is that, as a result o. mo*ement, change, and mixture with one another, all the things which we sa, are E which is not the right wa, to speak o. them E are coming to +e#/" $t is claimed +, %ocrates that this doctrine o. .lux, which he attri+utes to )eracleitus and his .ollowers, is also secretl, held +, Protagoras# 2ow it is generall, understood that this claim is not to +e taken literall,, Plato isnt actuall, attri+uting the .lux doctrine to the historical Protagoras# 8 )owe*er, there is clearl, a reason .or the doctrines introduction into the dialogue and this reason is not &uite as o+*ious as the earlier introduction o. Protagoras measure doctrine#
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$+id, 151c5-6# $+id, 151d6-151e1# 8 8,les Burn,eat, The Theaetetus of Plato, (1::?, $ndianapolis; )ackett Pu+lishing #

This particular point is a use.ul one .or highlighting how wide the di*ergence can +e within Plato scholarship with regard to how certain passages, and as a conse&uence entire dialogues, are to +e understood# For instance, Gorn.ord accounts .or the introduction o. )eracleitus +, claiming that -PlatoHs intention is to accept .rom )eracleitus the doctrine that all sensi+le o+Cects are perpetuall, changingIa .undamental principle o. his own philosoph,#/: This approach ma, seem somewhat unusual gi*en that later in the dialogue, Plato will attempt to re.ute 'knowledge is sense perception +, arguing that on this )eracleitean picture one cannot secure a re.erent .or knowledge claims# But .or Gorn.ord, who takes what is re.erred to as a 'unitarian 1? reading o. Platos dialogues, this is unpro+lematic as Platos o*erall strateg, is to show that true knowledge is not o. the perpetuall, changing sensi+le world +ut o. the unchanging world o. the '.orms# 2ow this de+ate, which on the other side in*ol*es more re*isionist readings that take dialogues such as Theaetetus to a+andon or re*ise doctrines .rom earlier works, is complex and clearl, goes .ar +e,ond the scope o. the current essa,# Jet, in spite o. this we must still decide upon a strateg, .or making sense o. the introduction o. )eracleitus .lux doctrine into the Theaetetus# Gan we simpl, accept Gorn.ords suggestion( $s Plato simpl, introducing +elie.s that he himsel. holds( $ +elie*e that in taking the Theaetetus in and o. itsel., this claim cannot +e Custi.ied# Plato does not gi*e us an, indication that +ehind all o. the critical passages o. the Theaetetus there lies a positi*e epistemological doctrine and as such, to a*oid undertaking a maCor digression at this point we must seek to account .or the presence o. the )eracleitean doctrine on the +asis o. what Plato does sa, in the Theaetetus# K starting point in this regard is to note the somewhat a+rupt manner in which Plato introduces )eracleitus into the dialogue# %ocrates does not ponder or tease out some speci.ic &uestion to which )eracleitus doctrine is o..ered as an answer# 3ather, much like the earlier introduction o. Protagoras, )eracleitus is dropped in as i. his doctrine is somehow entailed +,, or a conse&uence o. Protagoras measure doctrine# 2ow we ha*e
:

Francis 8c9onald Gorn.ord, Platos Theaetetus, (1:5", $ndianapolis; Bo++s-8errill Gompan, , pp# 36# Ghappell, Timoth,, LPlato on =nowledge in the TheaetetusL, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward 2# Malta (ed# , <3> 4 Nhttp;OOplato#stan.ord#eduOarchi*esOwin1?11OentriesOplato-theaetetusOP#
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alread, ruled out the idea that Plato is simpl, taking this opportunit, to work in some o. his own philosoph,, so we must take seriousl, the idea that the thesis that -all the things which we sa, areAare coming to +e,/11 is somehow necessar, i. we are to make sense o. Protagorean relati*ism# 5ne wa, o. making sense o. this mo*e is to consider the metaph,sical implications o. the Protagorean doctrine# $n order to ensure that all perception constitutes knowledge we ha*e relati*ised truth to each indi*idual, making it impossi+le .or the claims o. two or more indi*iduals to +e in contradiction with one another# 3ecall the case o. the wind which was cold .or me and not cold .or ,ou0 our claims in this case are not contradictor, +ecause $ am speaking o. how the wind appears to me and ,ou are speaking o. how the wind appears to ,ou# From a logical point o. *iew this case is entirel, unpro+lematic as the claims which initiall, look contradictor,, actuall, turn out to +e a+out di..erent things0 our respecti*e perceptions# 2ow there are two metaph,sical explanations .or how such relati*ism could hold true0 either there is a common o+Cect, e#g# the wind, to which we are +oth uni&uel, related and our Cudgements re.er to this relation# 5r, there is no common o+Cect at all, there is simpl, the wind .or me and the wind .or ,ou and +oth are distinct# 11 The most important point here is that either wa, the idea o. a shared world which is 'out there to +e experienced, spoken o. etc# is o.. the ta+le as e*en i. there is a common o+Cect, our Cudgements do not re.er to it +ut rather to the wa, in which it is related to our sel*es# The same pro+lem seems to arise when we consider the person who is ha*ing the perception, the percei*er# Protagoras position, when spelled out in Platos terms, limits our knowledge to appearances and perceptions making the &uestion o. who is ha*ing these appearances and perceptions &uite m,sterious# -There is thus a per.ectl, good moti*e .or attempting to reconstrue the situation, and to remo*e the apparent re.erence to the percei*er and the percei*ed o+Cect .rom the content o. a Cudgement o. perception#/13

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Plato, Theaetetus, 151d6-151e1, 7ohn 8c9owell (trans# , (1:"3, 5x.ord; 5x.ord <ni*ersit, Press # 9a*id Bostock, Platos Theaetetus, (1:88, 5x.ord; 5x.ord <ni*ersit, Press # 13 $+id, pp# 6:#

%o to recap0 i. knowledge is perception, then our perceptions must +e in.alli+le# $n order .or this to hold good, truth must me made relati*e to each person i. contradictions which arise .rom di..ering perceptions are to +e a*oided# But in order .or truth to +e relati*ised we must make it impossi+le .or ,our Cudgements and m, Cudgements to +e a+outOre.er to the same thing0 we must make ,our Cudgements re.er to the thing as it appears to ,ou and m, Cudgements re.er to the thing as it appears to me# 5ur Cudgements there.ore, cannot +e a+out the world as such +ut must +e a+out our appearances or perceptions# 2ow what are perceptions( @ell the, are not o+Cects, the, are not sta+le o*er time, the, are in .act .leeting e*ents which are constantl, changing# $s this what Plato means when he sa,s -the uni*erse is change and nothing else/(1! 9oes he mean that realit, is Cust perception( The theor, which Plato spells out seems to +e considera+l, more complex than this0 he descri+es su+Cect and o+Cect as particular t,pes o. motion which come together to produce perceptions, which presuma+l, are the re.erents o. all o. our Cudgements# This means that not onl, can no two people talk a+out the same thing, and there.ore disagree, +ut also that $ cannot disagree with m,sel. at two di..erent times as this metaph,sics entails that there is no identit, in either su+Cect, o+Cect or propert, across time# 2ow we can see wh, this doctrine o. )eracleitus has +een introduced +, Plato0 while the measure doctrine ma, make sense when we simpl, consider Cudgements that ,ou and $ ma, make, as soon as we consider what could possi+l, +e the su+CectOre.erence o. these Cudgements we are led to a metaph,sics which must a*oid all constanc, in order to two or more Cudgements to +e a+out the same thing and preser*e the in.alli+ilit, o. all perceptions# The .inal step in Platos indirect argument attempts to re.ute this )eracleitean metaph,sics on the grounds that i. it were true, it would +e impossi+le to .ix the re.erence o. words and thus use our language in an, meaning.ul wa,# To +egin with, in 181d %ocrates identi.ies two t,pes o. change0 change in spatial location and alteration across time# )e concludes with Theodorus that in order .or the .lux doctrine to +e *alid e*er,thing must +e perpetuall, changing in +oth respects# This makes sense i. we recall that in order to retain our relati*istic conception o. truth there must +e no sta+le .acts o*er
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Plato, Theaetetus, 156a5-6, 7ohn 8c9owell (trans# , (1:"3, 5x.ord; 5x.ord <ni*ersit, Press #

which ,ou and $ ma, +e in disagreement# Plato uses colour +, wa, o. an example# )e asks us to imagine a perception o. whiteness and then raises the point that i. whiteness (he could ha*e used an, sensi+le propert,15 is to +e in a state o. .lux, like e*er,thing must +e on this *iew, then it cannot sta, white .or *er, long0 -so theres .lux o. that *er, thing, whiteness, and change into another colour, in order not to +e con*icted o. sta,ing constant in that respect#/16 %ocrates then raises the &uestion that i. e*en simple sensi+le properties are in such perpetual .lux, how can we e*er re.er to them correctl, using language( To this Theodorus replies0 -$ndeed how could it +e possi+le with an, other thing o. that kind i. its alwa,s slipping awa, while one is speaking(/1" The point here seems to +e that i. $ make a Cudgement, +, the time $ utter it or think it, its re.erent will ha*e changed and the Cudgement will no longer +e true# 3ealit, it seems, on this )eracleitean *iew is simpl, too slipper, to +e trul, spoken o., leading Plato to conclude that we might as well sa, o. an,thing that it is thus and not thus as each is e&uall, true# 2ow it has +een argued that this mo*e +, Plato is .allacious# This criticism hinges on the point that i. e*er,thing is perpetuall, changing we could still make true Cudgements so long as the, were indexed to the particular time at which the, were made 180 we could think o. these Cudgements as snapshots o. realit,, e#g# '$ saw the whiteness at t1# Knother point which has +een raised is that while m, Cudgements ma, no longer +e correct +, the time $ express them, the, ma, still +e more accurate than other Cudgements0 .or example i. the whiteness turns to pale gre, m, calling it white is more accurate than ,our calling it green#1: 2ow this second point, $ .eel is mistaken, at least in the context o. the Theaetetus, as the measure doctrine didnt aim to secure that all o. our
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@e must use the word propert, here tentati*el, and .or want o. a more ade&uate term0 i. the )eracleitean doctrine were true, we would ha*e to adopt a whole new *oca+ular, .or talking a+out the world as *irtuall, all o. our terminolog, (su+Cect, o+Cect, propert, etc# presuppose some le*el o. sta+ilit,# This point is noted +, Plato at 151d# 16 Plato, Theaetetus, 151d3-5, 7ohn 8c9owell (trans# , (1:"3, 5x.ord; 5x.ord <ni*ersit, Press # 1" $+id, 181d6-"# 18 Ghappell, Timoth,, LPlato on =nowledge in the TheaetetusL, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward 2# Malta (ed# , <3> 4 Nhttp;OOplato#stan.ord#eduOarchi*esOwin1?11OentriesOplato-theaetetusOP# 1: 8atthew Gol*in, )eraclitean Flux and <nit, o. 5pposites in PlatoHs LTheaetetusL and LGrat,lusL, The Classic Quarterly !"(2) "5:-"6:#

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knowledge claims would approximate the truth0 it aimed to secure that all o. our knowledge claims would +e true# Being close to the truth in this instance there.ore, is insu..icient# The .irst criticism howe*er, does seem to +e more power.ul# $. we had the capacit, to index all o. our Cudgements to a time, could we accuratel, speak o. a world in constant .lux( @ell ma,+e we could, i. we assume that we alread, ha*e a pre-existing language with which we can work# But one pro+lem .or this approach is0 i. the world is in such radical perpetual .lux, how could we esta+lish a language in the .irst place( $t is in this regard that this section o. the Theaetetus is sometimes related to @ittgensteins discussion on the possi+ilit, o. a pri*ate language#1? @hile @ittgensteins discussion itsel. is characteristicall, enigmatic, his general point seems to +e that i. we were to attempt to produce a pri*ate language .or talking a+out our inner sensations, which in turn are necessaril, pri*ate, then we would lack an, o+Cecti*e means o. esta+lishing how a 'sign or word is used correctl,# $n a )eracleitean world, nothing would +e shared +etween ,ou and $, so how could we esta+lish a language, i#e# a shared set o. s,m+ols, .or talking a+out it# @ittgenstein +rings out this point when he notes that i. e*er,one -had a +ox with something in it; we call it a L+eetleL# 2o one can look into an,one elseHs +ox, and e*er,one sa,s he knows what a +eetle is onl, +, looking at his +eetle#I)ere it would +e &uite possi+le .or e*er,one to ha*e something di..erent in his +ox# 5ne might e*en imagine such a thing constantl, changing#/ 11 2ow this point might not +e articulated in Cust this wa, +, Plato, +ut i. sound, which $ +elie*e it is, this point secures the last stage in Platos length, reduction ad a+surdum that is the indirect argument# @e ha*e thus shown that Platos indirect argument is a sound one0 Theaetetus de.inition needed Protagorean relati*ism to make it *ia+le, which in turn needed )eracleitean .lux theor,, and .lux theor, has led us to a situation which would seem to impl, that the esta+lishment o. language simpl, couldnt happen# The thesis that knowledge is sense perception there.ore, has +een re.uted#
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>udwig @ittgenstein, Philosophical #n$esti%ations, D#E#8# Knscom+e (trans# , (1:58, 5x.ord; Basil Blackwell # 11 $+id, pp#1??#

3e.erences Ghappell, Timoth,, LPlato on =nowledge in the TheaetetusL, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward 2# Malta (ed# , <3> 4 Nhttp;OOplato#stan.ord#eduOarchi*esOwin1?11OentriesOplato-theaetetusOP#

9a*id Bostock, Platos Theaetetus, (1:88, 5x.ord; 5x.ord <ni*ersit, Press # Francis 8c9onald Gorn.ord, Platos Theaetetus, (1:5", $ndianapolis; Bo++s-8errill Gompan, # >udwig @ittgenstein, Philosophical #n$esti%ations, D#E#8# Knscom+e (trans# , (1:58, 5x.ord; Basil Blackwell # 8atthew Gol*in, )eraclitean Flux and <nit, o. 5pposites in PlatoHs LTheaetetusL and LGrat,lusL, The Classic Quarterly !"(2) "5:-"6:# 8i-=,oung >ee, The Secret Doctrine in Platos Theaetetus, 1??5, 5x.ord %cholarship online# Qhttp;OOwww#ox.ordscholarship#comO*iewO1?#1?:3O?1::161115#??1#???1Oacpro.:"8?1::16111:-chapter-5, Kccessed on 1"O1O13# 8,les Burn,eat, The Theaetetus of Plato, (1::?, $ndianapolis; )ackett Pu+lishing # Plato, Theaetetus, 7ohn 8c9owell (trans# , (1:"3, 5x.ord; 5x.ord <ni*ersit, Press #

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