doi:10.

1093/tcbh/hwm006

N. C. FLEMING Cardiff University ............................................

The First Government of Northern Ireland, Education Reform and the Failure of Anti-populist Unionism, 19211925*
Abstract
This article examines education reform under the first government of Northern Ireland (19211925). This embryonic period offered the Ulster Unionist leadership a chance to construct a more inclusive society, one that might diminish sectarian animosities, and thereby secure the fledgling state through cooperation rather than coercion. Such aspirations were severely tested by the ruling partys need to secure the state against insurgency, and more lastingly, to assuage the concerns of its historic constituency. The former led to a draconian security policy, the latter to a dependency on populist strategies and rhetoric. It is argued here, however, that this dependency was not absolute until July 1925. Before that, the Belfast government withstood growing pressure from populist agitators to reverse controversial aspects of its education reforms, only relenting when Protestant disaffection threatened the unity of the governing party and the existence of the state.

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The violence, political upheaval and constitutional uncertainty that accompanied the birth and early years of Northern Ireland had a significant impact on its political culture and development. For the Catholic minority, it deepened its sense of grievance, confirmed its political marginalization, and heightened its sense of self-reliance. For the Protestant majority, the apparent unreliability of British politicians and treachery of Irish Nationalists emphasized the need
* A version of this article was presented as a paper to the Ulster Society for Irish Historical Studies, Queens University, Belfast, 25 November 2004, and to the Seminar in Contemporary Irish History, Trinity College, Dublin, 2 November 2005.
Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2007, pp. 146169 2007 Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

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for Unionist solidarity. This made them suspicious of those Unionists who cooperated too closely with London, and who advocated better relations with the Catholic minority. This siege mentality greatly influenced the character of the Unionist government, making it difficult to enact legislation or implement policies that appeared to endanger or undermine the interests of Ulster Protestants.1 It did not, however, totally preclude such attempts, particularly if the government felt that such concerns were misguided or self-defeating. This was, until 1925, the prevailing attitude within the first government of Northern Ireland (19211925) about opposition to controversial aspects of its education reforms. This article therefore draws on original research to examine the governments handling of education reform, illuminating the political divisions within unionism, and analysing how these determined government policy. Divisions within Unionism Unionism in all its manifestations, Irish, Ulster and British, has always contained competing definitions of how best to secure the Union, and the interests of those that constituted the movement. This is especially the case with unionism in the northeast of Ireland, for it was deliberately designed and redesigned to contain and represent a variety of social, economic, denominational and geographic interests.2 Identifying various strains of unionism has nevertheless remained difficult, not least because there is a paucity of Unionist intellectuals, and those few who have put pen to paper have never developed coherent theories, aims or strategies. Like British Conservatism, the political thought of Ulster unionism is gleaned from speeches, pamphlets, biographies, autobiographies, novels and sermons. But if these sources make it difficult to frame and categorize unionism, they also serve to illustrate that it is more than a mere political allegiance to Britain. According to Jennifer Todd: There was a community-based culture, with central concepts and ideals, ways of understanding political authority, and selfperceptions of its own political interests and responsibilities. The thrust towards a more coherent world view was there, given in shared meanings, concepts and reference points. Ideas of liberty, rights, modernity and prosperity fed into a British patriotism. In unionism, the contractual and the national, the instrumental and
A.T.Q. Stewart, The Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster, 16091969 (rep. edn, Belfast, 1999), 478. 2 See, Alvin Jackson, The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 18841911 (Oxford, 1989).
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the principled, the liberal and the conservative images of society were merged.3 Recognizing this, scholars have tended to find two strains of political thought co-existing within unionism. In their pioneering study of the Unionist governments of Northern Ireland (19211972), first published in 1979, Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson identify two predominant approaches to managing the movement and administering the province: populist and anti-populist.4 Populism, they argue, was adopted to maintain Unionist unity, and was therefore the dominant approach. In practice, it meant addressing the concerns of working-class Protestants, anxieties that were a product of and contributor to the viscerally sectarian political culture of Belfast. Anti-populism, on the other hand, according to Bew et al., served as a check on the excesses of populism. Immoderate rhetoric and policies, anti-populists argued, risked making the government too reliant on populists, thereby alienating moderate Unionists, unsettling British public opinion, and hindering constructive relations with the Catholic and Nationalist minority.5 Jennifer Todd has found a similar fault-line within unionism. Applying the language of ethno-national theory, Todd argues that unionism contains both Ulster loyalists and British Unionists.6 Ulster loyalists claim an ethnic identification with other Unionists and, by implication, the territory of Northern Ireland. Unionist leaders are, therefore, expected to protect their ethnic and territorial interests, and to avoid making concessions to their political enemies: northern Catholics and the Dublin government. Not surprisingly, Ulster loyalists are wary of British Unionists, those who reject or downplay the priorities of ethnic politics, and who advocate conciliation between Catholics and Protestants on the basis of equal citizenship within a larger multi-national United Kingdom. Echoing the assumptions of Bew et al. and Todd, the historian Andrew Gailey has focused his research on the strain of unionism identified by them as anti-populist or British Unionist. Extending the original application of the term constructive unionismthe Irish
Jennifer Todd, Unionist Political Thought, 192072, in D. George Boyce, Robert Eccleshall and Vincent Geoghegan (eds), Political Thought in Ireland since the Seventeenth Century (London, 1993), 191. 4 See 2002 edition, Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, Northern Ireland 1921/ 2001: Political Forces and Social Classes (London, 2002), 60. 5 Analysis of Catholic attitudes to Northern Ireland is outside the scope of this article, see Mary Harris, The Catholic Church and the Foundation of the Northern Irish State (Cork, 1993); Marianne Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster: A History (London, 2000), ch. 11. 6 Jennifer Todd, Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture, Irish Political Studies, 2 (1987), 126.
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policy of successive Conservative governments from 1895 to 1905to compare and contrast the impact of progressive unionism in the 1960s with its earlier, turn-of-the-century manifestation, Gailey concludes that a tradition of constructive unionism existed from the outset of the Union, and that except for the two periods of his analysis it was the voice of a sidelined minority.7 Only in the favourable political and economic circumstances of the 1890s and 1960s, Gailey argues, was constructive unionism able to flourish initially, only to be undermined in each instance by its unintentional heightening of Nationalist expectations and Unionist opposition. These attempts to create models to explain unionism are instructive, but such dichotomies do not easily apply to individual Unionist politicians, particularly ministers in the government of Northern Ireland. The leadership, after all, had to balance several constituencies; speeches and strategies could therefore be inconsistent and contradictory, especially when under considerable pressure from one or more of these interests. This article, therefore, uses the populist/anti-populist dichotomy, although it draws on the others where they are relevant. This allows the analysis to focus on different approaches to leadership, to highlight if these differed from privately held views, and to reveal how the outward behaviour of key figures responded to shifting expectations. Appeasing the Populists Many senior figures in the Ulster Unionist party, sometimes in spite of their own aspirations, feared that without an emphasis on populist unionism, working class supporters might come under the influence of socialist parties, and thereby break-up the class alliance that had been cultivated since the 1880s. It was feared that this would lead to the end of the Union with Great Britain, for its retention in the six north-eastern counties was designed to satisfy the claims of a broadly based mass movement, not a party divested of significant working class support, or one shorn of enough votes to give opposition parties a majority in the region. Such concern was particularly acute in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of October 1917, a crisis amplified by the ongoing First World War. Institutionally, it contributed to the establishment of the Ulster Unionist Labour Association in June 1918.8
7 Andrew Gailey, The Destructiveness of Constructive Unionism: Theories and Practice, 1890s1960s, in D. George Boyce and Alan ODay (eds), Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801 (London, 2001), 22746. 8 Austen Morgan, Labour and Partition: The Belfast Working Class, 190523 (London, 1991), 21519; Henry Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism: The Protestant Working Class and the Belfast Labour Movement 18681920 (Belfast, 1980), 93.

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Ideologically, it compelled the leadership to place a premium on populist unionism, this time without the restraining baggage of southern Irish- and British-unionism. This shift in the relationship between the leadership and their proletarian followers did not necessarily preclude anti-populist unionism, but the success of such strategies and forms of expression were hindered by the need for unity, especially at times of crisis. According to Todd: Northern Ireland . . . was founded on an exclusivist legitimating principle, which was impervious to more generalized and universalistic pleas for justice and democracy if these were to conflict with unionists basic interest in the survival of the state and the union.9 Anti-populist unionism could therefore only succeed at times of relative stability, or when the issue through which it manifested itself was not regarded as being in conflict with what Todd refers to as the Unionists basic interest. This was clearly demonstrated by the first governments attempt to reform elementary education. In response to these reforms, Protestant clerical agitators utilized familiar populist rhetoric and strategies to attract mass support, claiming that the Unionist government was jeopardizing Protestantism. Their eventual success was due in part to the widespread assumption that the new state had been created to satisfy Unionists, just as the Irish Free State had been created for Nationalists. Like other similar movements after the First World War, Ulster unionism had developed from what Don Handelman refers to as an ethnic associationin which members of the group develop common interests and political organizationsinto an ethnic community, possessing a permanent, physically bounded territory over and above its political organizations.10 And like other ethnic communities, the newly acquired state was guarded jealously, both from territorial incursions and anything that might undermine the dominant cultural identity.11 The inevitable victims of these developments, across Europe, were internal minorities. But political marginalization only heightened their sense of ethnic identity, diminishing the possibility of internal reconciliation and contributing instead to the almost universal chauvinism of the period. This was particularly the case if the internal
Todd, Unionist Political Thought, 192072, 197. Don Handelman, cited in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), Ethnicity (Oxford, 1996), 6; Michael Hechter and Margaret Levi, Ethno-Regional Movements in the West, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), 1845. 11 Gerard Delanty and Patrick OMahony, Nationalism and Social Theory: Modernity and the Recalcitrance of the Nation (London, 2002), 1089.
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minority was cut off from states in which their ethnic group constituted the ruling majority. Northern Ireland, thereforelike many other new states in Europe after the First World Wardemonstrated what Eric Hobsbawm has referred to as the impracticability of the Wilsonian principle to make state frontiers coincide with the frontiers of nationality.12
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Identifying Anti-populists If it is difficult to define the aims of anti-populist or constructive unionism, then it is easier to identify its leading advocates, a reflection of the small number of people who governed Northern Ireland. Only 12 men served in the cabinet in the interwar period, and there were few outside this group with the ability to challenge populist excesses. Among this small number can be counted the eighth Viscount Charlemont, cabinet minister in the 1930s; James Milne Barbour, linen baron and also a cabinet minister in the thirties; senior civil servants such as Sir Wilfred Spender and Charles Hendriks; and establishment figures like Major-General Hugh Montgomery and the third Marquess of Dufferin and Ava. It is generally acknowledged by historians that the most significant anti-populist figure in this period was the seventh Marquess of Londonderry, the Belfast governments first Minister of Education.13 It is also recognized that the cabinet contained other relatively moderate voices, including Hugh Pollock, the Minister for Finance, and to a lesser extent, John Andrews, Minister for Labour.14 Even Sir James Craigfirst Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and Ulster Unionist leader from February 1921is viewed by some as having initially exhibited a degree of moderation, especially in his dealings with the Dublin government in 1922.15 But Londonderrys particular approach to unionism was more noticeable than that of his colleagues,
12 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1990), 1323. 13 Lord Londonderry (18781949), Conservative MP for Maidstone, 19061915, Undersecretary of State for Air, 19201921 (UK), Minister of Education and Leader of the Senate (NI), 19211926, First Commissioner of Works (UK), 19281929, and 1931, Secretary of State for Air, 19311935, and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords, 1935. 14 H.M. Pollock (18521937), Minister of Finance (NI), 19211937; J.M. Andrews (18711956), Minister of Labour (NI), 19211937, Minister of Finance (NI), 19371940, and Prime Minister, 19401943. 15 J. Craig (18711940), Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions (UK), 1919, Secretary to the Admiralty, 19201921 (UK), Prime Minister (NI), 19211940, created Viscount Craigavon, 1937. See Dennis Kennedy, The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State, 191949 (Belfast, 1988), passim.

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a consequence of both his political background and the education portfolio with which he was charged. As he informed a correspondent in December 1922: It is very difficult to know at this stage of Irish history, how far magnanimous concessions and the broad minded view are really operative. Some will say that anything in the nature of a conciliation is merely taken as a sign of cowardice and ineptitude. However . . . I have always got my eye on doing anything I can to remove the bitterness of feeling which exists at the present moment . . . .16 Like Craig, Londonderry had a taste of ministerial experience at Westminster before joining the new government at Belfast. This gave both an appreciation of broader national and imperial perspectives, and yet each mans unionism had been forged on different anvils. Like R. Dawson Batescontroversial Minister of Home Affairs and longtime party secretaryCraig was shaped by early Edwardian loyalism, and was therefore obsessed with the need for Ulster Unionist unity.17 In contrast, Londonderrys aristocratic upbringing and lifestyle, and his decade as the Conservative MP for Maidstone, endowed him with characteristics that Gailey identifies as common to all constructive Unionists. These include a strong connection to Britain, a rejection of the polarization of Irish society, a patriotic and somewhat romantic attachment to the island of Ireland, and crucially, a belief in the union with Britain as the only guarantor of continued social and economic progress. Craig was well aware of Londonderrys reputation as a moderate Unionist when he offered him in May 1921 both the Ministry of Education and Leadership of the Senate, the upper house of the Belfast parliament. Three years previously Londonderry had aroused the ire of some Unionists for his handling of their case at the Irish Convention of 19171918.18 More recently, and more publicly, he informed the Unionist Belfast News-Letter in December 1920 that: The setting up of two Parliaments . . . gives the best chance of ultimate unity . . . acute points of difference may disappear in the discharge of duties common to the whole of Ireland.19 Months later he informed the Observer that once in power, the Ulster Unionists must take a very tolerant attitude
16 Londonderry to Strachey, 31 December 1922, London, House of Lords Record Office (HLRO) Strachey papers, STR/9/15/9. 17 R.D. Bates (18761949), Minister for Home Affairs, 19211943, made baronet, 1937. 18 N.C. Fleming, Old and New Unionism: The Seventh Marquess of Londonderry, 190621, in D. George Boyce and Alan ODay (eds), Ireland in Transition, 18671921 (London, 2004), 22340. 19 Belfast News-Letter, 24 December 1920.

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towards the minority.20 This reputation for moderation inevitably restricted Londonderrys input to policy making outside of Education, but Craig initially viewed it as an asset for a minister requiring practical cooperation from both Unionists and Nationalists. It also helped the Prime Minister to project the image of a cross-class and inclusive administration, to both supporters at home and officials at London. It is instructive, therefore, to note the position of Unionist leaders on security and intergovernmental relations, before turning to the governments most ambitious reform in its first term: the Education Act (Northern Ireland) 1923.

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Violence After the formal opening of the Belfast parliament on 22 June 1921, the first six months of the new state were marred by political uncertainty and ongoing difficulties in maintaining law and order. For Ulster Unionists, the instability made unity and solidarity essential. A united front was adopted to assure insurgents and the British government alike of the Unionists resolve to maintain Northern Ireland against all threats. After seeing off the first major political threat to the new statethe AngloIrish treaty negotiations at the end of 1921the Unionist government had to contend in early 1922 with increasing security problems. Although police powers had by this stage been transferred to Belfast, concerns over the makeup and role of the police and its auxiliaries, the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), created divisions within the Unionist cabinet, and between it and its key security advisors. Before his election as the Westminster MP for North Down, Sir Henry Wilsonrecently retired Chief of the Imperial General Staffhad been recruited by Craig to advise him on security matters. Wilsons unionism was far from anti-populist, but he did recognize the inherent danger of the innately loyalist USC fomenting further sectarian strife. In this vein he recommended replacing Dawson Bates at Home Affairs with Londonderry, on the grounds that the latter had relevant military experience, and would help smooth relations with London.21 The suggestion came only weeks after Londonderry became the first Belfast minister to publicly condemn loyalist violence.22 But the reasons
The Observer, 20 February 1921. Wilson to Craig, 19 April 1922, Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), Craigavon papers, T/3775/17/2; Londonderry to Churchill, 2 April 1922, Durham County Record Office (DCRO), D/Lo/C/242(16); see also Wilson diary entry, 14 January 1922, C.E. Callwell (ed.) Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London, 1927), 320. 22 Hansard N.I. (Senate), 2, 10 (14 March 1922).
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Wilson cited for appointing Londonderry were the very same reasons Craig could not appoint him. The perception of Bates as a tough-talking populist was crucial to Craigs broader strategy: Bates was needed at Home Affairs as much as Londonderry was at Education. The Field Marshals recommendation would have risked upsetting the equilibrium Craig had striven to maintain for over 15 years. The Irish Republican Armys assassination of Wilson on 22 June 1922, contrary to its expectations, heralded the end of any significant internal check on Ulsters notoriously excessive security policy. The Prime Ministers public show of solidarity with populists on the crucial issue of security did not, therefore, blind him to the need for a degree of moderation in other areas of policy, in particular, intergovernmental relations between London, Dublin and Belfast. Following at least one aspect of Wilsons advice, Craig used Londonderry during the Belfast governments ultimately successful negotiations in May 1922 with his cousin, Winston Churchill, who as Colonial Secretary controlled the subsidy that maintained the USC.23 Craig had already used Londonderry for talks at the Colonial Office earlier in the year, to negotiate the ultimately ill-fated CraigCollins pacts of January and March. They had been attacked from within their own party for these negotiations, but Craig and Londonderry were nevertheless able to exploit this in negotiations with officials at London. Partly for this reason, and also because of Londons reluctance to assume responsibility for Northern Ireland, the Colonial Office ignored pressure for a judicial enquiry into Belfasts security policy, choosing instead to have a preliminary investigation conducted by one of their own officials, Stephen Tallents. He found, quite correctly, that Ministers are too close to their community and cannot treat their supporters as from a distance, and that if the premier were to be forced to resign, his replacement would prove even more intransigent.24 If Craigs position was reluctantly understood, then the editor of the Spectator, John St Loe Strachey, failed to understand why Londonderry remained at Belfast.25 It is evident from their correspondence that the latter was assured by Craig that the populist approach to governing Northern Ireland would not extend to all areas of government. On 11 September 1922 he informed Strachey: I have always been criticised in Ulster and I always will be, because I am sometimes half a length in front of local ideas and this makes me suspect . . . Somebody has got to tell the truth instead of agreeing
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Cabinet conclusions, 23 May 1922, PRONI, CAB/4/44; The Times, 14 July 1922. Tallents report, June 1922, PRO, Public Record Office papers, PRO/CO/906/24. Strachey to Londonderry, 10 April 1922, HLRO, STR/9/15/8.

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with everybody, and I fancy it is a duty of mine. I confess Belfast has always disappointed me a little . . . Craig is so splendid about raising the whole thing out of the slough of parochialism, and I see so many agents doing their best to drag it down again.26 Around the same time he informed his parliamentary secretary that: The narrow and selfish Belfast spirit which appears in various ways is in my judgement fundamentally destructive, and I find myself always up against it. So much so that I feel I have a mission, and the moment that mission is in my judgement fulfilled, I shall return to where I came from and leave Belfast to run the Six Counties . . . I made considerable sacrifice to come in and help, which I do not grudge . . . My family is Ulster but I maintain my home out of English money.27 That feeling of sacrifice was heightened following the collapse of the coalition government on 19 October, when the new Prime Minister, Andrew Bonar Law, offered Londonderry the post of Secretary of State for Air. Declining reluctantly, Londonderry claimed that he was pledged to help Craig, and revealingly, that others at Belfast shared his outlook.28
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Uncertainty It is argued here that education reform was the one major area of policy that eschewed populist unionism, at least until the summer of 1925. Its eventual demise owed much to the sectarian hostility arising out of the violent beginnings of the new state, and the uncertainty surrounding its political and territorial viability. As violence in the north and south of Ireland gave way to a semblance of stability, attention focused on the establishment of a boundary commission to adjust the border, a product of the constitutional compromise reached in and the British government in 1921. The possibility between Sinn Fe of being transferred to the Irish Free State gave hope to many northern Nationalists that their districts might be transferred to Dublin and that the Unionist rump left behind would be too small to survive. This expectation, to their lasting misfortune, justified the Nationalist boycott of committees established by the Belfast government to examine institutional reform in the six counties. For Unionists, the boundary
Londonderry to Robert McKeown, 11 September 1922, PRONI, D/3099/2/7/77. Londonderry to McKeown, 9 September 1922, PRONI, D/3099/2/7/76. 28 Londonderry to Law, 24 October 1922, HLRO, Bonar Law papers, BL/109/2/27a; Londonderry to Lady Desborough, 25 October 1922, PRONI, T/3201/33.
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commission represented nothing less than a threat to their new state as dangerous as that posed by the insurgency that preceded it. Craigs handling of the boundary crisis, from the start of 1924 to the end of 1925, put his skills at balancing Unionist consensus with British opinion to a severe and prolonged test. His pledge that not an inch would be transferred from north to south won him unanimous support from Unionists, but it was a tough pledge to keep, especially as it risked provoking the British governmentfrom 22 January 1924 a Labour governmentinto taking action regardless of Unionist demands. This in turn risked the electoral future of the Conservative party, with Tory die-hards threatening to utilize the House of Lords in support of Belfast.29 If Unionist supporters were wary of Craigs handling of the crisis, then they had little faith in Londonderry, who often accompanied the Prime Minister at meetings to discuss the matter, and who on occasion deputized for him. Craig had promised publicly that Belfast would refuse to appoint its commissioner to the three-man boundary commission, thereby preventing its establishment, a promise Londonderry repeated in the Senate and on political platforms throughout Ulster.30 But all this failed to convince rank and file Unionists of Londonderrys steadfastness. Deputizing for Craig at an intergovernmental meeting in August 1924, Londonderry was obliged to meet a delegation of Westminster Unionist MPs, many of whom sat with the die-hards on the Tory benches, and to inform the press afterwards that he was keeping Craig informed of developments.31 As Thomas Jones, Assistant Secretary to the British cabinet, had earlier noted, Londonderry was the only reasonable negotiator, but too weak to bring along the rest of his party.32 The humiliation led Londonderry on 9 August to admit privately to the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, that the best way to govern Ireland was through ordinary local administration under the British Parliament.33 Unable as he was to do anything to avert the crisis publicly, Londonderry worked successfully behind the scenes with the fourth Marquess of Salisbury to prevent Tory die-hards using the House of Lords to block a bill allowing London to appoint Belfasts boundary commissioner.34
29 See, Kevin Matthews, Fatal Influence: The Impact of Ireland on British Politics, 19201925 (Dublin, 2004). 30 Hansard N.I. (Senate), 4, 117 (13 May 1924); The Times, 2, 12 May, 12 June 1924. 31 The Times, 5, 8 August 1924. 32 Jones, diary, 2 February 1924, Keith Middlemas (ed.), Thomas Jones Whitehall Diary: Ireland, 19181925, 3 vols. (London, 1971), III, 226. 33 Londonderry to MacDonald, 9 August 1924, PRONI, D/3099/2/7/93. 34 Londonderry to Stanley Baldwin, 27 August 1924, Cambridge, Cambridge University Library (CUL), Baldwin papers, 99, ff 1289.

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In the end, the bill and the Boundary Commission did little to jeopardize Unionist demands, for it was a Conservative government that came to appoint Belfasts commissioner, and the commissions modest findings were ignored following an agreement between London, Dublin and Belfast. But before this rare moment of intergovernmental unity in November 1925, the boundary crisis had already contributed much to the demise of anti-populism in the one area of policy in which it was allowed to breathe, education reform.

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Reforming Education In examining education reform in the 1920s it is important to understand both the contemporary and historic contexts.35 The National Schools system, established by Dublin Castle in 1831, was originally intended to educate all Irish children together, except for religious instruction which would be catered for separately according to denomination. This high-minded ambition was subsequently undermined in the years that followed as a result of government attempts to satisfy denominational interests in the hope of cooperation. One of the earliest and most significant of these agreements occurred before the system was even a decade old, when the Presbyterian church consented to turn its schools into National Schools in return for allowing them to retain the power to exclude visiting clerics from other denominations. It was a concession other churches were not slow to exploit for themselves. Catholic participation in the system only increased the hierarchys desire for greater control of education. In stark contrast, the accommodation of Protestant intereststhe Church of Ireland began affiliating many of its schools to the National system after the Great Faminewas so successful that by the early 20th century Protestant politicians could confidently call for what amounted to a return to the founding ethos: the provision of mixed secular education and separate denominational instruction. This desire was in part motivated by the poor condition of Protestant schools in Belfast, a situation that by the Edwardian period had evolved into a major financial crisis. Unionist MPs demanded that Westminster address the crisis, suggesting a consolidation of schooling through state control and secularization, a message that attracted the support of Belfast socialists and significant numbers of teachers, Protestant and Catholic. But the Catholic hierarchy and the Nationalist party were implacably opposed to such calls,
35 See, Sean Farren, The Politics of Irish Education, 19201965 (Belfast, 1995), ch. 1; Frank Wright, Two Lands on One Soil: Ulster Politics before Home Rule (Dublin, 1996).

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not only because they believed it was a specifically Protestant problemCatholic National Schools received greater voluntary supportbut because they disagreed with mixed classes, secular education and greater state control.36 Nationalists successfully delayed attempts to address the crisis in Belfast until after the First World War, and after that the Catholic Church utilized the highly charged atmosphere of 1920 to mount opposition to government legislation intended to reform the system. Locally and nationally, therefore, the reform of education became a major issue for both Nationalists and Ulster Unionists, one that could only be addressed to the satisfaction of each following the establishment of parliaments at Dublin and Belfast. If Protestant advocates of reform had articulated qualified approval of secular education before Partition, then there was no guarantee that they would continue to do so afterwards. They might, after all, demand that their political representativesnow the ruling party of Northern Irelandtarget government largess on Protestant schools. To safeguard against this, Section 5 of the Better Government of Ireland Act 1920, the de facto constitution of the six counties, prohibited the new parliament from passing any law that directly or indirectly endowed, preferred or prejudiced any religion or religious group. This was interpreted by the government to mean that schools not under the control of the state could no longer receive full funding. It was hoped by the government that this would both satisfy Protestant demands for increased funding and end the management of schools by clerics. Given these aims, it was inevitable that the government would face opposition from the Catholic church. To meet this challenge Craig handed the education portfolio to Lord Londonderry. Like the Prime Ministers decision to keep Bates at Home Affairsbased on their shared views on securityCraig, according to his biographer, hoped that Londonderry would enact reforms to end clerical control.37 Regardless of his colleagues motivations, the Minister of Education did not regard his task as an explicit attack on Catholic schools, but as an intrinsic part of his selfdeclared mission to build an inclusive Northern Ireland. In this spirit, Londonderry made a heartfelt appeal to all educational interests on 23 June 1921, shortly after his appointment: There are naturally difficulties . . . but I do feel that with co-operation and with sympathy we will be able to evolve a system which will be the admiration of all other countries.38
36 37 38

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See, Harris, The Catholic Church, ch. 6. St John Ervine, Craigavon: Ulsterman (London, 1949), 119. Hansard N.I. (Senate), 1, 24 (23 June 1921).

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Despite these high-minded intentions, the Education Ministry could not extricate itself and its plans from the series of crises that attended the establishment of Northern Ireland. And like the Belfast government in general, it suffered from delays in the transfer of powers and staff from London and Dublin. Had Londonderry not possessed previous ministerial experience, or had he not been able to influence the appointment of civil servants and officials to manage his department, his ambitions would have been seriously hindered from the outset.39 Key personnel included his parliamentary secretary, Robert McKeown MPa like-minded Unionist who answered education questions in the House of CommonsCharles Hendriks, the permanent secretary at Education, and Lewis McQuibban, Londonderrys private secretary.40 Atypically for the Northern Ireland civil service, the ministry also contained a Catholic senior civil servant, the well-regarded and highly experienced Andrew Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse, its permanent secretary by the end of the decade. In September 1921, Londonderry established a committee to examine education reform under the chairmanship of Robert Lynn.41 Alongside other interested parties, Londonderry hoped that the committee would contain Catholic members, or at least that it might receive submissions from Catholics. But having written personally to request the cooperation of the Catholic primate, Cardinal Michael Logue, the Minister was disappointed to learn that the cardinal viewed the committee as the pretext for an attack on Catholic schools.42 Such a view was not surprising given the churchs long-held antipathy to state interference, and the appointment of Lynn to chair the committee could only increase Logues concern; he edited the Unionist Northern Whig, and had a history of attacking Catholic educational interests. But the Cardinals attitude also reflected his broader determination that, where practicable, the Catholic minority avoid cooperating with the Belfast government. In an attempt to work round this difficulty, the Education Minister wrote to Lord Fitz-Alan, the first Catholic and last Viceroy of Ireland, assuring him that the Lynn committee could present both a majority report and a minority report.43

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39 Bryan A. Follis, A State Under Siege: The Establishment of Northern Ireland, 19201925 (Oxford, 1995), 33. 40 Cabinet conclusions, 13 March 1923, PRONI, CAB/4/74/20. 41 Londonderry to Lynn, 30 August 1921, PRONI, Lynn papers, D/3480/59/42. 42 Londonderry to Logue, 29 August 1921, PRONI, CAB/4/18/1; Logue to Londonderry, 2 September 1921, PRONI, D/3099/2/7/61. 43 Londonderry to Fitz-Alan, 4 September 1921, PRONI, CAB/4/18/13.

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Nothing happened, and Londonderrys cabinet colleagues decided that no further action should be taken.44 Lynns committee prepared an interim report for June 1922, the structural recommendations of which found their way into the 1923 bill. The report contained the means by which elementary schools could be transferred to state control; the matter of control resting in the appointment of school managers. In those schools fully transferred to the state, the local education authority would appoint school managers and the school receive full funding. Schools that wished to remain independent were to receive minimal structural funding and retain their own managers. A third class of school would act as a bridge for those hesitant about full transfer. Known as four-and-two schools, the education authorities would appoint two managers and the school, usually under the influence of an affiliated church, would retain power of appointment over the remaining four. It was hoped that under this system denominational schools could be persuaded to transfer totally, or partially, to state control. Although the committee had recommended a programme of simple Bible instruction as part of the curriculuma reflection of unchecked Protestant clerical involvementLondonderry omitted it from the 1923 bill. The bill also forbade a denominational test for the appointment of teachers. It was on these two issues, Bible instruction and appointments, that Protestant opposition focussed. Initial opposition, however, came from the Catholic hierarchy, for it refused to relinquish any control over its schools. This initial opposition had profound if not immediately apparent consequences. For without Catholic cooperation Londonderrys act came to be seen by Protestant agitators as an attack on those who cooperated with the reforms. They could, of course, have emulated the Catholic churchs refusal to transfer schools, but this would have meant giving up the full funding they so desperately required. Protestant agitators therefore ignored this option, preferring to view sections of the act as an attack on Protestant identity and authority by a government elected to protect Protestant interests. These agitators argued that Catholic schools retained powers that loyal Protestants were being denied. Similarly, Londonderrys relatively good relations with the hierarchy, despite their refusal to transfer schools and however necessary in his role as Education Ministercould only help agitators exploit his reputation for moderation. So when some 200 Catholics did cooperate with the ministry by accepting places at its training college, the refusal of the Catholic hierarchy to employ them
44 Cabinet conference conclusions, 9 September 1921, PRONI, CAB/4/18/21; Londonderry to Logue, 10 September 1921, PRONI, CAB/4/18/19.

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at Catholic schools allowed Protestant agitators to claim that the state sector would be staffed by Catholics and communists.45 Faced with this mounting crisis, the Education Ministers determination to refuse any amendments only added fuel to the fire. In place of the Lynn committees recommendation on Bible instruction, the 1923 education bill permitted religious instruction outside of school hours and with the consent of parents. The bill also ensured that teachers could not be compelled to give these classes. In contrast to later cabinet divisions, Londonderry received the full backing of his colleagues during the bills drafting stages in 1922. And in light of later events, it is worth noting that John Andrews appeared more positive about reform than Pollock, the latter agreeing with Bates about the need for assurances of a right of entry for clergy and the withdrawal of funding for schools unwilling to take part.46 It was hoped that this would allay Protestant fears about reform, especially as the transfer of Catholic schools appeared increasingly unlikely. The bill subsequently passed into law on 2 June 1923. If later agitation against the act is well-known, then almost nothing is known of the first potentially serious attack on the bill, or how Londonderry successfully dealt with it. In a furiously critical appraisal of the proposed legislation, dated 19 February 1923, Robert Lynn informed Londonderry that his scheme is so bad, both educationally and financially, that I wish to protest at the earliest possible moment, and at the same time give you notice that I intend to carry that protest into every corner of Northern Ireland.47 By the following month, however, Londonderry had talked Lynn out of his campaign, to the extent that Lynn became a leading champion of the bill and of Londonderrys political career. As Lynn informed a member of the Senate on 16 March: Lord Londonderrys speech on the Education Question was not only brilliant and eloquent, but, what is far more important from the point of view of the rising generation of Ulster, that it is truly statesmanlike.48 Although the explanation for this conversion is not certain, it is clear that the Education Minister provided financial aid to Lynns election expenses the following year.49
Hansard N.I. (Commons), 3, 356 (17 April 1923). Cabinet conference conclusions, 15 December 1922, PRONI, CAB/4/61/12; Bates to Londonderry, 28 November 1922, PRONI, D/3099/5/5. 47 Lynn to Londonderry, 19 February 1923, PRONI, Robert Lynn papers, D/3480/ 59/44. 48 Lynn to Senator Sam Cunningham, 16 March 1923, PRONI, D/3099/2/4/19B. 49 Lynn to Londonderry, 21 February 1924, PRONI, D/3099/2/11/1.
46 45

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Londonderrys success in winning over Lynn only bolstered his confidence. He believed the public would back his reforms even if some clerics were reluctant, that they would be won over by the acts provisions for local accountability: the keystone of the arch of our new system of education.50 The lack of public clamour against the proposals appeared to confirm his judgement. Even Orangemen meeting in the staunchly loyalist Sandy Row district of Belfast praised the education bill.51 For Londonderry, it appeared that the only obstacles to reform were the Catholic hierarchy and a number of harmless Protestant clerics.52 Londonderrys confidence was premature, but not surprising. After all, those who opposed the measures, from whatever denomination, did not have to transfer their schools. But as Tallents had noted with regard to security policy, the Belfast government was too close to its supporters. Any substantial reforms would have to satisfy their expectations of the new state. This was borne out on 2 January 1923 when Craig advised Londonderry that although he was satisfied that sticking to the strict letter of the law always pays in the end . . . it is better to have trouble with enemies rather than with friends.53 The following month he asked in cabinet whether any particular denomination could, in [the ministrys] opinion, with justice assert that it had been penalized. Hendriks, attending the cabinet, side-stepped the intention of Craigs question by arguing that the voluntary sector would feel penalised due to reduced funding. Despite it being implied that Catholic schools would feel disadvantaged, the cabinet concluded by agreeing that the proposals of the Bill are impartial in their dealings with the denominations.54 The first indication that this attitude might actually affect the education bill came only months later. On 16 April 1923 Craig suggested in cabinet that the bill be altered to place the responsibility for religious instruction on local authorities and not the government, an obvious attempt to distance his government from any potential clash with Protestant agitators. He also suggested that religious instruction be provided within school hours, albeit with parental approval. Londonderry admitted that he had been under pressure from Protestant clergymen to adopt such a scheme, but that his own opinion
50 Address by Londonderry to Ulster Reform Club, Belfast, 9 November 1923, PRONI, CAB/9D/1/4. 51 Belfast Evening Telegraph, 24 November 1922. 52 The Times, 6 December 1922; see also Teachers World, no. 1 (10 January 1923). 53 Craig to Londonderry, 2 January 1923, PRONI, D/3099/2/10/2. 54 Cabinet conclusions, 28 February 1923, PRONI, CAB/4/72/16.

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was unchanged, and that the bill allowed for moral instruction of a non-denominational character within school hours. With the backing of Andrews and McKeown, the education minister was able to persuade the cabinet to defer Craigs proposed alterations until the course of debate made it clear that further concession was demanded.55 On 27 September 1923, three months after the bill became law, Craig again suggested in cabinet that an amendment be made to appease Protestant critics: that the government lift the bar on transferred schools from employing a religious test for teacher appointments.56 Londonderry, who was absent at this meeting, attended the next cabinet on 2 October, and once again defended his act. He did so by arguing that the proposed amendment was unconstitutional, that it was a policy reversal, and that it went against the general principle of a Secular Education Bill. He also assured his colleagues that opposition to the act was unrepresentative, that although it was of a serious character, it was largely manufactured by certain interested ecclesiastics.57 Londonderry concluded by assuring the cabinet, somewhat disingenuously, that he would review the question further if it became necessary. Throughout 1924, Londonderry received deputations of concerned Protestant clergymen and letters asking for amendments to the 1923 act. In stark contrast to Craigs openness to such pressure, the Education Minister reacted defensively, commenting publicly in April 1924 that the government had not endangered the religious upbringing of children by entrusting it to the people.58 Londonderry still believed that popular opinion would support him. It was a notion Protestant critics were therefore keen to prove incorrect, or at least challenge through agitation. With this intent they formed the United Education Committee (UEC) in December 1924; a coalition of Anglicans, Methodists and Presbyterians, the last being the most prominent. In the months that followed the establishment of the UEC, the Education Ministry felt increasingly isolated from the cabinet. It was not that senior Unionists did not agree with the 1923 act, but they feared the damage it might do to Unionist unity. This had always troubled the leadership, but it felt more pressing in 1925, with the boundary commission yet to finish its tour of border areas. The Anglican primate, Charles DArcywho from their correspondence appeared sympathetic to Londonderrys positiontherefore suggested
55 56 57 58

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Cabinet conclusions, 16 April 1923, PRONI, CAB/4/77/15. Ibid., 27 September 1923, PRONI, CAB/4/86. Ibid., 2 October 1923, PRONI, CAB/4/88. The Times, 2 April 1924.

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privately that the minister make a gesture, that he pass an amendment that restated in a different way what the 1923 act had already laid down.59 Like the archbishop, other leading Protestant figures were dismayed by the agitation. When Edward Archdale, Londonderrys cabinet colleague, heard about a resolution by the Grand Orange Lodge of Belfast condemning the 1923 act, the recently appointed head of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland dismissed the malcontents as riff-raff.60 This view of Orange participation in the agitation was echoed soon after when Hendriks met the secretary of the Belfast grand lodge, who claimed that both he and the Belfast grand master, Sir Joseph Davidson, had the greatest difficulty in restraining the hot-heads amongst the Orangemen, who are being persuaded by the clergy that the Bible is in danger.61 Rather than take this as a warning, or follow DArcys advice and make a gesture, Londonderry chose instead to confidently inform a visiting delegation from the Belfast grand lodge on 23 February 1925 that their opposition to the act was too late.62

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Meeting Opposition It was clear to all that Londonderry not only dismissed the need for a more populist approach, but that he was actively anti-populist. The UEC, therefore, held a demonstration on 5 March at Belfasts Presbyterian Assembly Hall, to raise money and present a show of strength. Not only did this call into question Londonderrys contention that their cause was unrepresentative, it emphasized that popular feeling was on the side of the UEC. With the boundary crisis rumbling on and a related snap general election scheduled for 3 April, Craig agreed to meet with UEC leaders the day after their demonstration. With Londonderry absent, bedridden with illness in England, Craig informed the UEC that there would indeed be an amendment act to satisfy their grievances.63 It might not have appeared so at the time, but this method of government consultation became a defining characteristic of Craigs 19-year premiership.
59 DArcy to Londonderry, 9 March 1925, PRONI, D/3099/5/14/2; DArcy to Londonderry, 10 March 1925, PRONI, D/3099/5/14/2. 60 Secretary of Grand Orange Lodge of Belfast to Londonderry, 4 February 1925, PRONI, D/3099/5/9; Hendriks to Londonderry, 3 February 1925, PRONI, D/3099/5/9. 61 Hendriks to Londonderry, 4 February 1925, PRONI, D/3099/5/9. 62 Minutes of meeting between Education Minister and delegation from the Grand Orange Lodge of Belfast, 23 February 1925, PRONI, D/3099/5/9. 63 See cabinet conclusions, 7 March 1925, PRONI, CAB/4/137/10).

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Despite the Prime Ministers stated intention, the 1923 act was not altogether compromised. For although the amendment act claimed to have removed prohibitions on Bible instruction and teacher selection, its application was open to interpretation. Londonderry, with the support of Craig, chose to interpret it ungenerously.64 The UEC replied by demanding that sections granting school managers an advisory role be interpreted to allow them to appoint teachers on the basis of denomination, and that teachers be compelled to give religious instruction. In response, Londonderry revealed that the amendment had changed nothing as the constitutional prohibition had to be adhered to by the local education authorities. Not surprisingly, the UEC was incensed by their apparent hoodwinking, and demanded a meeting with Londonderry on 2 April, the day before the general election. At this the minister refused their calls for a further amendment and threatened to resign if they persisted: He pointed out that circumstances had radically changed with self-government in Ulster, that the decentralisation in education under the Education Act was a necessary corollary to the new position, and that the Churches must be prepared to surrender their privileged position in education.65 In reply, the clerics said they would surrender the teaching of religious instruction if teachers were compelled to take it. Londonderrys negative response to this was probably too late to effect either way the general election result although the Unionist party lost eight seatsbut it meant the UEC would continue its campaign. Londonderry had never attempted to construct a popular campaign in favour of his reforms, nor indeed was there any indication that one might easily be cultivated. But he did hope the teaching profession would support him. Therefore, on 17 April, a fortnight after his meeting with the UEC, Londonderry addressed the annual congress of the Irish National Teachers Organization on their freedom not to teach religious instruction, and their right to work in any state school regardless of their denomination.66 But if this speech motivated anyone into action, it was his opponents. By the end of April the UEC re-launched its agitation, which now included a legal challenge of the governments interpretation of Section 5 of the 1920 Better Government of Ireland Act.

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Craig to Londonderry, 25 June 1925, PRONI, CAB/9D/1/5. Minutes of meeting of Protestant church leaders and Education, 2 April 1925, PRONI, D/3099/5/9. 66 The Times, 18 April 1925.
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In the face of this renewed opposition the government stood precariously with the Education Minister. At cabinet on 4 June, the attorney-general, Richard Bestwho on security policy took an unequivocally populist lineconfirmed that Londonderrys interpretation of Section 5 was indeed correct. In response, Craig suggested seeking clarification from the judicial committee of the privy council. But Londonderry, still determined to avoid a policy reversal, successfully countered this by arguing that it would create an awkward situation if the House of Lords ruled against the government.67 On 12 June the Presbyterian general assembly passed a resolution demanding further amendments and called on local councillors to withdraw levies to the Education Ministry. In response, on 15 June, Londonderry reminded the UEC, and untested public opinion, that the clergys right of entry allowed for voluntary denominational education. But this and his other defence, that the state could not endow denominational institutions, were undermined when he admitted that this would remain the case even if it could be legally proved that there was no constitutional prohibition.68 In effect, Londonderry had admitted that the driving force of education reform was no longer the constitutional prohibition, but his self-declared mission to raise Ulster out of the slough of parochialism. In the immediate aftermath of Londonderrys admission Craig backed his Education Minister, no doubt keen to keep alive his hopes of a cabinet that represented all strains of unionism. But within weeks general cabinet support was crumbling as other ministers added their voices to the general alarm.69 Andrews, an erstwhile supporter of the 1923 act, complained of being subjected at church to pulpit harangues about Protestant rights, and worried that the upcoming annual Twelfth of July Orange demonstrations would be used as platforms to attack the government.70 With even relative moderates demanding that something be done, Londonderry was politically stranded. After some exhaustive conversations between Craig and Londonderry in the third week of June, the latter agreed to meet again with the UEC leaders on the 23rd.71 At this ill-tempered meeting no compromise was reached on teacher appointments, but Londonderry
Cabinet conclusions, 4 June 1925, PRONI, CAB/4/145/15. The Times, 12 June 1915. 69 Craig to Londonderry, 13 June 1925, PRONI, CAB/9D/1/5; R. Lynn to Londonderry, 25 June 1925, PRONI, D/3099/2/11/7. 70 Andrews to Craig, 17 June 1925, PRONI, CAB/9D/1/5. 71 See, Craig to Wilfred Spender, 19 June 1925, PRONI, CAB/9D/1/5.
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did offer to allow local authorities powers to permit what was referred to as non-denominational Bible instruction. He also agreed to meet with teachers representatives to consult them about the UECs demand that schools be allowed to compel teachers to give religious instruction. He informed Craig privately that if the teachers refused he would resign rather than force them to comply. Londonderry was clearly exhausted with the crisis, he admitted to Craig that he had handled all this controversy very badly . . . I never have understood Orangemen and Presbyterians and it is always difficult to know under the shouting and the threats what the people really want and what is best for them to have.72 Craig replied sympathetically and asked Londonderry not to resign, informing his partys chief whip afterwards that the Education Minister had very cleverly handled the Education question.73 On 24 June Londonderry met with the teachers representatives and secured their agreement on compulsory religious instruction. With that the row was fully resolved. Londonderry attempted to console himself with the view that his retreat reflected the demands of popular opinion, after all, even the teaching profession had capitulated. But not even his modest success earlier in the year of engaging in dialogue with the Catholic hierarchy could offer comfort, for their ongoing refusal to transfer schools only confirmed the failure of his 1923 act. As the Irish Statesman lamented in January 1926, following news of Londonderrys resignation: . . . if the principle underlying the Act had been carried into effect, it would have done more to destroy sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland than anything which has been said or done for the last century. Lord Londonderry must have read with a wry smile Sir James Craigs assurance in his valedictory letter of the gratitude of the people of Ulster for all that their late Minister of Education has done for them. For while the Protestant Ministers were destroying his work, and largely succeeding in their object, the laity either followed their lead or did nothing to support him.74

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Conclusion Stephen Tallents reported to the Colonial Office in 1922 that Craig and his ministers were too close to their community.75
Londonderry to Craig, 23 June 1925, PRONI, CAB/9D/1/5. Craig to Londonderry, 25 June 1925, PRONI, CAB/9D/1/5; Craig to Herbert Dixon, 26 June 1925, PRONI, CAB/9D/1/5. 74 The Irish Statesman, 16 January 1926. 75 Tallents report to British cabinet and diary, June 1922, PRO, PRO/CO/906/24.
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Similarly, Londonderry later noted that his colleagues only gained support by coming forward as the champion of some sort of ascendancy.76 But for the subjects of these complaints, the unity of the Unionist movement was crucial to the survival of Northern Ireland. The series of crises that attended the founding of the state therefore hindered those who sought to build an inclusive society. It meant that only in education would there be any serious attempt made by the government to consistently treat with the Catholic minority. It was an unfortunate issue on which to rest hopes of Nationalist cooperation with the state, not only because of the polarizing inter-communal violence of 19211922, but also because the Catholic church, across the world, prized its influence in education. The failure of anti-populism in this one area of policy had a profound impact on civil society in Northern Ireland. The governments concession in 1925 was not merely a one-off victory for populist unionism and its methods; rather, it established a lasting precedent, albeit one heavily predicated by historic factors. More than ever before, the Unionist leadership had to respond to the ebbs and flows of grassroots opinion, especially if agitators cultivated a support base that sought to check the leadership. One result of this was that further amendment acts in later years increased clerical control, ensuring that for generations most children were schooled according to their parents denominational affiliation. The first government of Northern Ireland was to a large extent responsible for this outcome, but it had not been its original intention. In security policy, the government without hesitation took a populist line. But as the emergency shifted from violence to politics, and on to intergovernmental relations, Craig and his colleagues were careful not to allow populist excess to ruin beneficial relations with London and Dublin. And just as security demanded a populist strategy, so education demanded a more considered approach; in this the cabinet were largely agreed, albeit with continued uneasiness, until June 1925. By that stage populist agitators were demanding that local councils refuse to pay government levies, and it was feared by ministers that the 12 July 1925 would be used as a platform by Protestants to attack the government. Craig had modest success earlier in the year when he appeared to appease the agitators with an amendment act. But it was a sleight of hand, and was quickly exposed as such by his Education Minister. Londonderry had never been convinced of the need to make such gestures, and his desire for a less truculent unionism allowed his reforms to be portrayed by the agitators as an attack on Protestants,
76

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Londonderry to Lynn, 9 January 1928, PRONI, D/3480/59/68.

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by a Unionist state they assumed was designed to protect their interests. Londonderrys failure reflected and underscored a move from Unionist attempts to build an inclusive state, albeit on their terms, to a state that only responded to Unionist interests. This move towards the almost total use of the populist strategy was largely complete by 1925; the year the government made the 12 July an annual holiday after previously declining to do so.77 Of course, the Unionist government might have reversed this trend at any point in the years that followed, but a precedent had been set, and with no major crisis to upset it until the Second World War, no effort was made to challenge it. Instead, Craigs initial hope, on 23 June 1921, that he and his colleagues would be at the disposal of the people of Northern Ireland, was by 24 April 1934 narrowed to a revealing admission that reflected a chauvinist attitude prevalent in interwar Europe: They still boast of Southern Ireland being a Catholic State. All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State.78

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77

Brian Walker, Past and Present: History, Identity and Politics in Ireland (Belfast, 2000),

801. Cited in Patrick Buckland, Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 19211939 (Dublin, 1979), 1; Hansard N.I. (Commons), 24 April 1934, 16, 1095.
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