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Law Enforcement Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

"E¥~t1 lcFBI New York Field Office JTTF Agent) Interview

Type,,?(~vent: Interview
Date: 's,~~t~~ber 4, 2003
Special AccessIssues: None
Prepared by: \~,aitc,~ Cole
Team Number: '6\, ,
Location: FBI New ..; O~'.~ity Field Office
Participants - Non-Co~~isSi?n: FBI Attorney Kim Brunnel
Participants - Commission: Lance Cole and Peter Rundlet

Personal Backgroun~':'1 lis an investigator with the New York

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State Police ("NYSP"). He is currently assigned to the FBI's New York City Field
Office Joint Terrorism Task Force ("JTTF"»I lis 51 years old and has worked
in law enforcement for 31 years. He started with the Port Authority of New York Police
Department in 1971, moved to the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 1974,
and then, after being laid off by the NYPD, he joined the NYSP in 1977. From 1977
until 1982 he was a uniformed State Trooper for the NYSP. In 1982 he was promoted to
Criminal Investigator. As a criminal investigator he worked on background
investigations, homicide investigations, and running down leads on a variety of criminal
investigations. In the late 1980s he was promoted to supervisor of a major case squad,
where he supervised 15 officers.

Work on the JTTF. In May 1993, after the first World Trade Center bombing,
I---..,Iwas
.... assigned to be the NYSP representative on the FBI's New York JTTF.
At that time the JTIF had approximately 100 people. Since then the size of the JTTF has
fluctuated, growing larger after major terrorist events, such as the 9111 attacks, and then
diminishing in size as time passes after an event. The JTTF is not as large now as it was

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at its peak shortly after the 9/11 attacks .
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i':~:~e~"---"'Uoined the JITF in 1993 he was the only person at the NYSP

wh·~"~~·~~c~ri.~y clearance, so he was not able to share classified information with his
'. >:--.. supervi~~rs .. N(j~:~th~rs at NYSP have security clearances, and he can share information

<:>vith them ifnecess~~Y:l.. tlrst case as a JTTF member was the "blind sheik"
prosecution. He worked on that case for two years, and has since worked on "off-shoots"
.:. fr~~"'¢at case, includi~g·a.~.hreat aga~~~t·a.(~deral judge .

.,·f .., Iwas the cas·e'.!I~ent for theTai1z~ian embassy bombing case, working
\.:-
....with agents. from the FBI's Washington Field Office. ·He-.'Wasin Tanzania three times, for
jhree months..two months, and six weeks.working on that ~;;;;e:1 Iwas just
~'t:lishing up anovernight shift, and was at hisdesk doing paperwork, when the 9111
aha,cks occurred.·····'!ie ran directly to the scene and"':VQl;~neof the first agents there. He
communicated with ·F.BI Headquarters and helped set up'the on-site command center,
whi~~, had to be moved'.t?ack twice as the scope of the dam~g'e'it:lcreased.
.... \.,..."1 ~oted\~at there are about 4,100 NYSP office~~~"alJ:?about half of

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\them ~ere in New York Ci~Y'.afterthe 9/11 attacks to help with the cas·~:'I.. ......
~orked"\:m PENTBOMB lead~"'~nd worked on the investigation of the suspects with box
cutters ~ho took a train to Texa~"'immediately after the 9-11 attacks. They were
cd:nvicted\qf credit card offenses, served their sentences, and have since been deported.
:\ Post~9/11 Reforms. After th~\l:te 9/11 attacks the JTTF squads were reorganized,
an~ "\ lis now on IT-2, the al )Q~e,~a squad. Some things have not changed
significantly ~ipce 9111. It still takes six ~61)ths to get a National Security Letter to
obtain informa~l.pn - something that in a cri~ih~l case could be done in a matter of hours.
Also you now have to notify "fifteen different p~0ple in [FBI] Headquarters" when a new
case is opened. I~ Iview, instead ofthin~ getting better since 9111, it is now
more difficult to get things done. For example, there h~~e been instances in which
\. people at Headquarters were unaware that investigative ~.idelines had been changed.
I Ithinks that although things are changing, there is.no training in how to do'
things after the changes, and as a result the changes have caused confusion. People
haven't had adequate training, and they don't want to go to headq.~arters and get training

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because they will have to give up their overtime pay if they do thad.. _

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\ .
.\·.~xplained the importance of overtime to JTTF personnel, for whom it is a major
: .... \, \, \, component of their compensation.
\ \\ ::: ::: '·1 ~elieves that there are too may NYPD people assigned to the JTTF.
:, ':. ..They-have their own chain of command at the lTTF, which is inefficient. They also
".
"'~~a'v~th~~,~own agenda"
", ",

and as a result the JITF is not the same kind of organization

that it"t),~ce"~,~.
-. ~,~ther,problem is that the FBI trains people to hold information on a "need to
know';.·,~asi'S.,~ndtrq,~,share it. As a result there is no information sharing between the
squads at...Zhea~~nt lev:.~l. There may be sharing at the SSA level, but "that is not where
the importa~,t infcrmation ...~s." For example, both the IT-I and IT-2 squads do al'Qaeda
work, and It::.}, may.,~e work~~g and a case at the same time that IT-2 is working on
\. something related, bur-they don,~,ttalk and share information at the agent level. Part of the
\...problem is that tB~ two '~'quads a;ci-'indifferent buildings; although they were supposed to
'~e together in one '&l:lilding~...they arenot, Overall, it is much more difficult to share

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ihfonnation now th~\jt was '~re-9/11. \,\

\ Access to FBI riJform~i~n. Whe~1 koined the JTTF, the non-FBI

members did not have access to th~'.FBI's ACS information system. About two and a
hal~years ago the FBI beg~l1,giving 'rio,n-FBI JTTF members limited access to ACS.
\ Onl~: certain information on t'~ system\)~n be accessed by the non-FBI members.
'. : on the system about cases he is working;
Icannot get full acce~'s"to inforci~,tion
he needs the assistance of an FBI '~gent to obia~n that information. One reason for the
limited\.~ccess may be that FBI pers6l,1I1eltake polygraph examinations, but non-FBI
JTTF m~mbers do not. The NYPD h~s"a policy t~'a.~their officers cannot be polygraphed.
I~.formation Sharing With Ot~'er Agencie~~'1 ~aid he has "worked all
the big ca~.es" that have come through the ·J'TTF. He worked FISA surveillance cases pre-
PA TRlOT\l\.ct "

Hcl.characterized the changes that ha~'t: been made since the 9/11 attacks ..asva
lot ofwindo~ dressing" because in his view the '~ame amount of infonna~ion'ls' b~ing
passed back ~d forth now. When he has a reques~"'for informat~9n'fro'~'the CIA, it is

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routed through) I(sp?), an FBI Intell~~~~.ce·R~~~arCh Specialist ("IRS"),

who coordinates JTTF information requests .~?.the·CIA:'·1 thinks more direct

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• , access might be helPful,1

I
Source Development and Agent Turnover ....I..
one is pursuing the criminal activity that finances terrorism,
..... ts concerned that no
Development of sources is
essential in this area, and it is important to pay and develop sources over time, but very
little of that is being done. I~I ~ie~"t/money must be available to pay sources,
and "you have to pay some .p'~oPle for being inplace, not what they give you." It takes
years to gain the experien~:¢ that is necess~ to develop sources, and the young FBI
agents do not have enough experience in ~his area .
.II-. lcurr~ritly has four sources he is working. In the past he spent more
....

time rut talking to peo,p'le and devel~p,ing sources, but now he doesn't have the time to do
as m~ch of that work::/The people ~ho had the experience to develop sources are gone
now! and the NYPD/people on th~lJTTF don't want to develop sources. They are
skeptical of the va~ie ofsource,~/~d "take everything with a grain of salt." It also is FBI

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policy that only ~,BI agents c,ri be the "main handler" of a source. Therefore the agents
ha~e to do all th1 paperwo~~~ get funds for payment of sources, and take care of the
adrinistrative work. ://
! Many,:pfthe m~.re experienced agents have left the FBI because "things have
changed." Managementand the heavy case loads tend to "burn people out" and there are
"no rewardsfor work, work, work.'-~,I Ihas received the Director's Award for
~is counteAerrori~tri work, but h~rithe agents who received it with him have since left
~d gone/over t9/~he crimina~:side because they have a lighter caseload th~~e;l... ...
pelieveithat t~ri years agq,ihe FBI agents on the JTTF had an aver~Ee'oi~ver 15 years of
," :' :'. .,' ",.,

!experi¢nce, but now it js' probably closer to five years. Thereisa need for more senior

I agents to l"~in the ~e~ agen~s~ ~elievesJhat';direction and focus" are not
! present and the rTTF is 90~ "always putting.ou(flres." People are getting very frustrated
. as:~ r~s~lt. ',' ..

. ....//:/ Thl~~be~rp~ople" at the"FB'i are not becoming managers. There is not much

! .financialincentive ~d05~.and "they don't need the head~~~~s,"1 \believes

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! ....
:""yi~~,b~irig
a~..SSj(is the hardest job in ~~~.f.BI;--in"prufb~cause they have to deal with

~{<•.••••..••...
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"PO.F.~~.cal
pressu~e from ASACs." ''No one wants those jobs, and I don't blame them."
Overall-the -,~ulture at the FBI has changed a lot.
LeadScreenlng. The [JTTF?] call center is run by the NYPD. Most leads that
appear unlikely to he'i~~ortant are checked out by the NYPD Intelligence Squad and the
precincts, rather than by tb:e)!TF. The HIDTA [High Intensity Drug Traffic Area] Task
Force is "an information dissemlha~~~n agency" and does not "do actual investigations."
HIDTA does name checks and is an informational agency, not an investigative agency.
Recommendations for Improvementj Ihad prepared a written list of
recommendations for improvement to the FBI and the JTTF. He identified three problem
areas as (1) lack of communications among squads, (2) older, more experienced agents
leaving, and (3) not enough development of sources in the counterterrorism area. He then
\\ ·\....
described the items on his "wish list" for improving the current system. He would pefer
~ t.~at senior agents were running things, not the SSAs, with "team leaders" running the
" irt\,estigations. The FBI also needs a salary structure that rewards management positions

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\ mOfe - the difference between GS-12, Grade 10 and OS-14, Grade 1 is minimal and not
\~no~"gh of an incentive to take management position. He noted that primary and
secondary support positions for the SSAs are open because no one wants those jobs.
\, ··I.. ...... lbelieves there is a need for more training and more coordination and
co~munication among field offices. It does not work to route all communications
thr6fgh Headquarters. Instead, there should be an emphasis on bringing together the
peop'~e who are actually doing the field work. There also is a need to focus more on rural
and suburban areas - all of the terrorists are not in the big cities.
:1 ~aid it should not take six month to get an NSL. "Everything we do
on terrorism takes an act of Congress." The agents need easier access to investigative
tools. They can get things in a matter of hours in crimina1 cases that takes weeks or
months to get in terrorism cases. The FBI also needs more information sharing with the
CIA on overseas activities. "When we [FBI] are overseas, they [CIA] are the bosses."
The FBI cannot get access to the CIA's information on overseas activities. I

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Overall! I.~xpressedconsiderable dissatisfaction with the current
situation and clearly was of the view that the post-9fll changes have not improved
things.
LA W\ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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