G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner, vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents. Facts: The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions 1 covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution. The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the 2 Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of 4 P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match 5 the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . which respondent GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national 6 patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the 7 term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided 8 that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which 9 business may be done." Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimonyof the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State. Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding. Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very

well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place. Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner. We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has 10 been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights 11 must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain 12 fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its 13 terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the 14 legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than nonself-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion

to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely 15 meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens? THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?". MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens? MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents) MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style. MR. NOLLEDO Yes,
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Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is nonself-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does

not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the 17 constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the 18 tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and 19 patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine 20 21 Amusements and Gaming Corporation speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, the sanctity of 22 23 24 family life, the vital role of the youth in nation-building the promotion of social justice, and the values of 25 26 education. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and 27 28 29 human rights and on education. Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato cites provisions on the promotion of 30 31 32 general welfare, the sanctity of family life, the vital role of the youth in nation-building and the promotion 33 of total human liberation and development. A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur. Issue: WON , Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII is self-executory Ruling: YES On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
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The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to 36 dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign 50 investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the 51 shaping of a country. This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel and all that it stands for is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
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explains

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity." Brief Historical Background To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement. After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body the World Trade Organization with the signing of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its 1 members. Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . . , (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of) more investments into the country." Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines and this is of special interest to the legal profession will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage. The Petition in Brief

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997 WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

Facts: The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the

WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods." Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994. The Facts On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity). By signing the Final Act, Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed: (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the 3 President of the Philippines, stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution." On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the 4 Philippines likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution." On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 5 Organization."
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On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of 6 the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows: ANNEX 1 Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Agriculture Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement on Textiles and Clothing Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection Agreement on Rules of Origin Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures Agreement on Safeguards Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ANNEX 2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ANNEX 3 Trade Policy Review Mechanism

On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed the Instrument of Ratification, declaring: NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof. To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof." On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the 8 Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows: The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement. The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service. On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter 9 referred to as "Bautista Paper," for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements. During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed: (a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and (b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from

Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible. After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997. The Issues In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows: A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable. B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity of the concurrence. C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is "vested in the Congress of the Philippines"; E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power. F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several issues raised by 10 petitioners into the following": 1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress. 3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence. 4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization" implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act. By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus: (1) The "political question" issue being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue; (2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and (3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General. During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on 11 and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters.

To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are: (1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION? (2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION? (3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS? (4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE? (5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES? The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy? In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that 12 the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the 13 Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 15 Constitution, as follows:
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raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in 16 17 our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter

on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature." As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition andmandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation. We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes. Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition. Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows: Article II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES xxx xxx xxx
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Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. xxx xxx xxx Article XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY xxx xxx xxx Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive. Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions 19 quoted in their memorandum: a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity): Article 2 National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions. 1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article II or Article XI of GATT 1994. 2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied).

The Annex referred to reads as follows: ANNEX Illustrative List 1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: (a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or (b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local products that it exports. 2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict: (a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports; (b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or (c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis supplied). The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows: The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no

less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied). (b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity): Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. . . (par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied) (c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services: National Treatment 1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. 2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. 3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis supplied).

It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed 20 agreements. Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization. We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments. Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of 21 this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente 22 Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement 23 through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated 24 vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation." In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor to implement the, thus:
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were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2). The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion 26 inOposa vs. Factoran, Jr., explained these reasons as follows: My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment grating all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss. It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: Sec. 1. . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments

On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not selfexecuting, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles. In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be selfexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They

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When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene. Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read: Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . . xxx xxx xxx Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows: 1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;

2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and 3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national 27 economy and patrimony" and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) 28 by mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to 29 "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of 30 equality ad reciprocity"; and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices." It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are. ISSUE: there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.- YES All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade 32 practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will
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resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 64 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member. The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance where "the East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
65

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999 JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor. DAVIDE, JR., CJ.: Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1 1998 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the 2 Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO's motion for reconsideration. The antecedents are not disputed.1wphi1.nt On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the 3 election. On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations, private respondents presented the following evidence: 1. Annex "A" the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman of the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of birth as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the constituency where he seeks election for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in item 10, that he is registered voter of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani; 2. Annex "B" Voter's Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating respondent's registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;

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3. Annex "C" Respondent's Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January 15, 1997; 4. Annex "D" Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial & Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr. Conrado G. Butil, which reads: In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox copy of the triplicate copy of COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino. Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to Carlito Engcong on September 5, 1997, while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan Domino but was cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997. 5. Annex "E" The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino dated September 5, 1997; 6. Annex "F" Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2, 1998 addressed to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which states: For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of Community Tax Certificate containing Nos. 11132201C11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid under Official Receipt No. 7854744. Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian. 7. Annex "G" Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3rd District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the Regional Election Director, National Capital Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election" as 3 years and 5 months; and, in item 9, that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City; 8. Annex "H" a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent

dated August 30, 1997 addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating among others, that "[T]he undersigned's previous residence is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he is a registered voter" and "that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned has transferred and conducts his business and reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this application;" 9. Annex "I" Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR OF CANCELLATION OF THE VOTER'S [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer 4 Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani. For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit: 1. Annex "1" Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Johnny P. Landero; 2. Annex "2" Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of sale executed by and between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on November 4, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario; 3. Annex "3" True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725 captioned as "In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of Precinct No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino, Petitioners, -versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City, Respondents." The dispositive portion of which reads: 1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara, in District III Quezon City as completely erroneous as petitioners

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were no longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel, Sarangani where they have been residing since December 1996; 2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done in good faith due to an honest mistake caused by circumstances beyond their control and without any fault of petitioners; 3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precint No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and 4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the election/voter's registration records of the petitioners in Quezon City to the Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other Comelec Offices of Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously qualified to excercise their respective rights of suffrage. 4. Annex "4" Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August 30, 1997. 5. Annex "5" Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of applications for registration approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20, 1997, showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and 112 both under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as transferees without VRR numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and September 30, 1997, respectively. 6. Annex "6" same as Annex "5" 7. Annex "6-a" Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex "I", Petition); 8. Annex "7" Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504 dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;

9. Annex "7-a" Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer IV, District III, Quezon City, which reads: This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered voters of District III, Quezon City. Their registration records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the possession of the Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani. This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO. 10. Annex "8" Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the circumstances and incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance with respondent. 11. Annexes "8-a", "8-b", "8-c" and "8-d" Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying their alleged personal knowledge of respondent's residency in Alabel, Sarangani; 12. Annex "8-e" A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of fifty-five (55) residents of Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and certifying under oath that they personally know the respondent as a permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to present; 13. Annexes "9", "9-a" and "9-b" Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year 1997, BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent; and, 14. Annex "10" The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and circumstances leading to his relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani, appending Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "D-1", "E", "F", "G" with sub-markings "G-1" and "G-2" and "H" his CTC No. 111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes "1", "2", "4", "5", "6-a", "3", "7", "9" with sub-markings "9-a" and "9-b" except Annex 5 "H". On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following findings:

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What militates against respondent's claim that he has met the residency requirement for the position sought is his own Voter's Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex "B", Petition] and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence, standing alone, negates all his protestations that he established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same position in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office sought. Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. All told, petitioner's evidence conspire to attest to respondent's lack of residence in the constituency where he seeks election and while it may be conceded that he is a registered voter as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the 6 position of Congressman for the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani. On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering 7 that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory. The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of 8 Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani. On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement. On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed 9 the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant petition. On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the second 10 highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene. INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to 11 Intervene and in her Comment in Intervention is asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections. Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit: Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar

a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections. b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition 12 a quo for the disqualification of petitioner. The first issue. The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained. The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate. The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement. The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature 13 of res judicata. In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning 14 the subject passed upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter 15 in any other election.
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we ruled that:

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. . . It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has become final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an important and intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellant's petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would still have been left open to question. Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 17 12 of R.A. No. 8189. The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter 18 place the record in the inactive file. Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action are indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINDO himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the Voter's List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against DOMINO for alleged false representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and the 19 second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action. In the present 20 case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval v. Guray, et al., the Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue ruled that: The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the election list of Luna, isres judicata, so as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us. The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.

The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said municipality. The present proceeding of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165) In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present que warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter. In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist therefore, identity of causes of action. In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the petition for excluision and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata. The Second Issue. Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his certificate of candidacy? We hold in the negative. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such 21 intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, 22 or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a

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residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a 23 man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos 24 Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani. A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is 25 established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the 26 purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of 27 residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality. While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to 28 make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does 29 not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of 30 domicile. Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.

Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his 31 residence. The fact that a party continously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to 32 determine the status of his domicile. His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which he had no control cannot be sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998 elections was 33 scheduled for two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22. While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon City 34 on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason 35 of change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution. In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one 36 intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. Domino's failure to do 37 so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void. The Third Issue. DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit. As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate 38 facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes and provided further that the 39 winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a 40 member of the House of Representatives. The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the 41 winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives. In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of

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the election ordering the suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position. Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the 42 COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate. Issue raised by INTERVENOR. After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the province of Sarangani, may INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate? It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be 43 proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one 44 can be declared elected in his place. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they 45 do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially 46 changed. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or 47 plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that 48 the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of 49 votes and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In 50 such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of 51 democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice.

INTERVENOR's plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be sustained. 52 INTERVENOR's reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case to wit: if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected, is misplaced. Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any 53 intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161872

April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same

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under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired. In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for theCertificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of government. First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved. Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of 2 Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right 3 but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give 4 rise to any cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not selfexecutory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden 6 opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:
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I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, 7 I change the word "broaden." (emphasis supplied) Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric 8 appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. 9 Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the 10 Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel aCertificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to be accorded due weight. Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater

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the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held: [T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the 11 democratic [process]. The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the COMELECs Comment: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00). xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent 12 campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim. The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers 13 14 in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral 15 contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election. Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."

The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of 16 elections and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the 17 promotion of free, orderly and honest elections. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona 18 fide candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The determination of bona fidecandidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code. Now, the needed factual premises. However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions. Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process. As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch.

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SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168081

October 17, 2008

On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 2 3, 1989. On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained. DECISION On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous 3 weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads: Dear Sir: I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989. From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal weight is achieved. Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set for my weight check. Respectfully Yours, F/S Armando Yrasuegui
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ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

REYES, R.T., J.: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined. After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character. The Facts Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58") with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and 1 Crew Administration Manual of PAL. The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the companys weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985. After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioners weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks. Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that 5 his grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards. Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.

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On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be 6 dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates. Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo 7 weight checks. When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds. From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992. On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his 8 answer and submit controverting evidence. On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated." On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a 10 weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight. On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five 11 (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately." His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL. Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the complainants dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him: a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 at P651,000.00; b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
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SO ORDERED.

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The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of 15 petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight 16 did not hamper the performance of his duties. Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to other 17 positions where his weight would not be a negative factor. Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. 18 Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined. Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
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On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner 20 without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution of PAL. On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC. On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment in the following tenor: WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning complainants entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainants entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainants reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of 25 respondent thus, are DISMISSEDfor utter lack of merit. According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food 26 intake, is a disease in itself." As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by 27 petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight. Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight 28 standards of PAL. PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail. Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a 30 petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
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By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
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WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED; IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONERS CLAIMS 43 FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC. (Underscoring supplied) Our Ruling I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e)
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The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it "looked at wrong and 33 irrelevant considerations" in evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight 34 standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employees position. The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor 35 Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest. Said the CA, "the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on 36 whether the dismissal is legally proper." In other words, "the relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify 37 under this standard." Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, 39 petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his 40 dismissal for being overweight. On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of violation, 42 "justifies an employees separation from the service." Issues In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE"; III.
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of the Labor Code.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA: x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employees position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the "other causes analogous to the foregoing." By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer 45 "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a "physical abnormality 46 47 and/or illness." Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., he says his dismissal is illegal: Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is a cause analogous to them. Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination."

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It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Naduras illness could be considered as "analogous" to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was 48 contracted through his own voluntary act. The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case at bar.First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787.Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, inNadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL. In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the 49 answer is yes. I can do it now." True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses." However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of 51 PAL. He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness. Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and 52 Hospitals, decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her performance met the Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time, "she stood 52" tall and weighed over 320 pounds." Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at greater risk of serious diseases. Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was 53 in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.
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The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook based on "perceived" disability. The evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological appetite suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that "mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing from a given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration." Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight. In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered 54 voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)." II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The 55 qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the 56 normal operation of a business or enterprise. Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for 57 58 it. Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal. Both arguments must fail. First, the Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ. Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government 63 and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it 64 adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must 65 establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and
59 60 61 62

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(3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate 66 work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons 67 meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid 69 "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance." In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., the Court did not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protection of the interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures. Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the 71 72 73 Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary 74 diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the 75 circumstances. The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier. The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees. In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable. The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
70 68

On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that "*w+hether the airlines flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting passengers to their destination"; and that the weight standards "has nothing to do with airworthiness of respondents airlines," must fail. The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area. In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize 77 without introduction of evidence. It would also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner. The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote. Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to him 78 prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan. Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and body frame for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL. III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL. Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against 79 him. We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape
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the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the 80 private respondents failure to comply." It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative 81 allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees. Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment 82 by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet." We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are 83 accorded respect, even finality. The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within 84 their specific and specialized jurisdiction. But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside 85 when they fail the test of arbitrariness. Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be 87 invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private 88 89 individuals. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield 90 against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot 91 violate the equal protection guarantee. IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot. As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the time that 92 the NLRC was reversed by the CA. At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
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In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ 93 of execution, the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun" to frustrate his "immediate 94 return to his previous position," there is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially 95 equivalent position in accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter. In fact, petitioner duly received the 96 return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his signature. Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case that "[t]he unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the 98 employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution" and ""even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate 99 and pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court." He failed to prove that he complied with the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of his full backwages. In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the 100 Court ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the impossible. V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay. Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner. Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule. Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act "social justice," or based on 102 "equity." In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does 103 not reflect on the moral character of the employee.
101 97

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Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service. It 105 should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving. We are not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service, which should include his regular allowances. SO ORDERED.

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PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 197280 ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 197282 ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 197392 LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 197454

G.R. No. 196271

February 28, 2012

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners, vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 196305 BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner, vs. SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 197221 REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, vs.

JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

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RESOLUTION BRION, J.: We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective. These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presi dents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. The Motions for Reconsideration The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their motion: I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT. III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE LAWS. IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE CONSTITUTION. V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.] The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that: I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON
1

SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs. II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY. III. THE PRESIDENTS APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING ELECTIVE POSITIONS. IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS. V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC ACTS. VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW. VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION. IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND THE ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS CAUSE 2 WARRANTING COMELECS HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS. (italics supplied) The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that: I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE. THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.

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IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE SAME TO ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THEFOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. xxxx

B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION. C.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED PRECISELY TO AMEND RA 9054. xxxx III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3 VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. xxxx IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT. xxxx

THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054. D. WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE 4 UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS. Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that: a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM elections;

V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. xxxx VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT OF 3 OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE. (italics and underscoring supplied) The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that: A. ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN "INTERIM MEASURE".

b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican democracy which, by constitutional mandate, guides the governance of the Republic; c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be ratified in a plebiscite; d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold their offices even after their terms are over and non-elective individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the better choice; e) the President only has the power of supervision over autonomous regions, which does not include the power to appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials; and f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from the national and local elections as this will make it easier for the authorities to implement election laws. In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:

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(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections? (b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements? (c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional? (d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM? (e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices? (f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the Presidents supervisory powers over autonomous regions? The Courts Ruling We deny the motions for lack of merit. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state: Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years. xxxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the discussions of the Constitutional Commission: MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992." This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized. MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992." I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years. So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and another six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?

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MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized. MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you. During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved the first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election every three years. So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every three years which was already approved by the body. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. xxxx MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and VicePresident in 1992. MR. DAVIDE. Yes. MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials with the election of the President? MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992. MR. GUINGONA. Yes. MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the 5 municipal officials. (emphases and underscoring ours) The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the

framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. We came to the same conclusion in Osmea v. Commission on Elections, where we unequivocally stated that 7 "the Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local elections." Despite the length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to convince us to deviate from this established ruling. Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners contention that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to 8 stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article, which provides: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading "Local Government" indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments. That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local governments," and does not make a distinction between the "local government" and the "regional government," is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
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The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local elections. In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are 9 employed." Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition. To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non 10 distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054 The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054. We cannot agree with their position. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054. We reiterate our previous observations: This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history. To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
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The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite. From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites 12 embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054. (emphases supplied) The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards the date of the subsequent ARMM elections. In his estimation, it can be implied from the provisions of RA No. 9054 that the succeeding elections are to be held three years after the date of the first ARMM regional elections. We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied 13 however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had 14 been called to the omission. Providing for lapses within the law falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning, have no authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space. Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054. Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already established that the 15 supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike 16 down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade: A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts

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passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours] Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, 17 provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding 18 upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated: "Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the 19 Constitution." Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad Similarly, we struck down the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]" We interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which 21 Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation. The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the people. While we agree with the petitioners underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, we disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results hampering the ARMMs progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.
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Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving the President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic structure of the government, and thus requires compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054. Again, we disagree. The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads: Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to "perform the functions pertaining to the said offices." Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity. The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours] On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides: Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their

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offices. We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One significant 22 difference between the present case and these past cases is that while these past cases all refer to electivebarangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express 23 or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization. COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an 24 election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of the following provisions: Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and underscoring ours] As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881. More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date. Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three years. Presidents authority to appoint OICs The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the Presidents power to appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus: Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
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the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours] The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides: (3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis ours] The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments, as made evident in the following exchange: MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after "captain" and x x x delete "and all" and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY. MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear 26 that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to 27 appoint." The second sentence acts as the "catch-all provision" for the Presidents appointment power, in 28 recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the Presidents power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment. Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the Presidents appointment power should be strictly 29 construed and must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. Given that the President derives his power to

appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis. The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in 30 elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, which merely grants the President the power of supervision over autonomous regions. This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the Presidents appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform 31 their functions in accordance with law." This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and 32 to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people. Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision states: Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real. RA No. 10153 as an interim measure We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those elected in

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August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013. In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address the problem created by synchronization (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option. In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for 33 Congress to make?" We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure is comparable to the interim measures traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President appoints officials holding elective offices upon the creation of new local government units. The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly 34 (then called the Sangguniang Pampook). Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated December 21, 2011, question the propriety of the appointment by the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon as acting Vice Governor of the ARMM. They argue that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7, and given the numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the President, in recognition of the principle of judicial courtesy, should have refrained from implementing our decision until we have ruled with finality on this case.

We find the petitioners reasoning specious. Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be 35 proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical considerations. In other words, the principle of "judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or 36 court of origin. Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole system of government is founded upon. Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the 37 case, a decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the 38 voting, "the probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be granted." Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective. He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October 18, 2011 decision 39 pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not outright insolence" to this Court. In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC, where the Court held that while it had already issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and executory, and can also be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in 41 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that the Court had not yet 42 lifted the TRO previously issued. We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject of a motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision. It does not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective until after we have issued a final and executory decision, especially considering the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18, 2011 decision, which states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order 43 we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs. (emphases ours) In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and the present case. While it may be true that Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing the challenged laws
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were dismissed by the Court, an examination of the dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the Court did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case, we expressly lifted the TRO issued on September 13, 2011.1wphi1 There is, therefore, no legal impediment to prevent the President from exercising his authority to appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in RA No. 10153. Conclusion As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has virtually given the President the power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that the elections of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled. We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering. This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections and shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than three years. Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal proscription which prevents these specific government officials from continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on. For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners motions for reconsideration. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. SO ORDERED.

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