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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of FBI Supervisory Special Agents Kevin Kline and John Turkington

Type of event: Interview

Dates: November 6, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Raj De

Team Number: lA

Location: FBI, Newark Field Office

Participants - Non-Commission: FBI Supervisory Special Agent Hank Allison

Participants - Commission: Michael Jacobson, Raj De

Kline's first day in the Newark Field Division was September 11,2001. He had
come from Headquarters to take over a drug squad. Turkington is from the Paterson, NJ
RA office. He was drafted by Newark on 9/11 and stayed for seven months. Kline and
Turkington oversaw the post-9/11 investigation out of the Newark Field Division. [Note:
Kline did most of the talking during the interview, and Turkington generally agreed with
what he said. Therefore, unless otherwise specifically noted, the information contained
herein is attributable primarily to Kline.]

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, investigation out of the Newark
Field Division was divided into two main parts: (1) follow-up regarding potential leads,
information, and any suspicious activity that may have been related to the 9/11 attacks;
and (2) investigation relating to United Airlines Flight #93, which had departed from
Newark airport on the morning of 9/11.

With respect to the first part of the investigation, there was significant work to be
done out of Newark because 15 of the 19 hijackers had some association or another with
New Jersey. Specifically, several of the 9/11 hijackers had spent considerable time in the
area during the summer of 200 1. The Newark Field Division prepared timelines for each
of those hijackers who had lived in the area, collecting residential, communications, and
financial information for these individuals. These timelines were subsequently forwarded
to the Penttbom team in Washington, DC.

The goal of this part of the investigation was to determine if any individuals in the
area were associated with the 9/11 hijackers. Several of the hijackers had been part of the
local community, but nobody with whom they came into contact in the area was a part of

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• the conspiracy. In fact, no "cooperators" have provided any contrary information to

either the U.S. or foreign governments (an apparent reference to detainees).

Everything that was developed was sent to the Penttbom team in Washinton, DC.
Although no co-conspirators were found, any subjects who may have associated with the
9/11 hijackers or their associates in the area were either deported or arrested on criminal
charges if possible. Every lead was run down. Initially oyer 1000 agents were involved.
Ultimately about 750 agents were divided into investigation teams. These teams looked
into the finances, communications, and general background of each subject that emerged
during the investigation. : :

The second part of the investigation out of the Newark Field Division concerned
United Airlines Flight #93, which had departed Newark Airport at 8:42 am on September
11,2001. Newark prepared timelines and charts relating tq
every phone cal1 made that
morning. The FBI, after all, had to establish that the night was in fact hijacked and did
not just crash as a result of mechanical failure. Agents from the Newark Field Division
worked extensively with victims' families as well. Fqr instance, in April 2002, Newark
conducted a review of the flight recorder from Flight :"193With the families.

A number of the subjects that emerged from the 25,QOO+ leads that were run out
of Newark had extremely strong associations with several of the 9111 hi' ackers. The two

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individuals that particularly stand out are Eyad Rababah an Although
these individuals may have supported some of the 9lj 1 hijac ers, ey a no nowledge
of the conspiracy. Another example isl I
. The hijackers got their newspapers
and groceries from his store nearly every day when they lived in the area - agents viewed
every video security tape from the store - but there is nothing more to indicate his witting
assistance.

The Newark Field Division did a lot of work relating to Zacarias Moussaoui as
well. Agents in Newark conducted telephone investigation and analysis until this work
was transferred to headquarters. Information developed by the Newark Field Division
was ultimately used in the Moussaoui indictment.

Every lead related to the 9/11 attacks was fol1owed through. No leads remain.
Most leads have been explained. No investigation of any subjects related to the 9/11
attacks (including those on OUf list) is still open. Most subjects who arose during the
investigation were either incarcerated or deported. Newark looked for a network that
may have assisted the hijackers. Paterson is a close-knit Arab community. The 9111
hijackers took advantage of this close-knit community.

Kline and Turkington have never been prouder of the FBI than since 9111. Today,
a lot of counter-terrorism work is conducted out of Newark. For example, the Newark
Field Division is involved with the Danny Pearl murder investigation and the Lakhani
(attempted stinger missile sale) case.

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", ... =. "" " The first two weeks after the 9/11 attacks were very reactive in view of the large
• ',',',:-, volume ofinfonnation and leads that needed to be processed. For example, by the night
\:::., of 9jll;'ag~nts had gone through the dumpsters at tbe hotels where the 9/11 hijackers had
\"\ stayed. "After-that initial two week period, the agents were able to specialize by focusing
"<:p,nspecificinvestigations, This latter process wasreferred to internally as the "adopt a
terrorist" program because individual agents canvassed everything about specific subjects
tbaiarose during the course of the investigation. Tqconfirm, no individuals connected to
the 9i:l..I attacks remain, under.open investigation out of Newark.

o..)~i!iallY. investi~a~i·ono;·~iiin!lividual subjects even potentially related to 9/11

was conducted under Penttbom.v.Someof'the investigations were eventually broken out
into separatC::I:.ase~.if warranted (?In:!iC~lar!Y~h~D thiD:stj;a~Qr did not relate directly
to any of the l~',~1Jackers). The investigation 0 _ l..-r _~ _ r _for one example, was
separated. ThePenttborn team did not allow Newar, 0 a op a "macro view". That role
\...was reserved forthe "almighty" Penttbom team. Penttbom retained control over the big
"""picture. In fact, atone point the Penttbom team-demanded that all 9/11 leads be passed
by them. In practice'; ..this was simply unworkable."!
\, In addition to t~e·iu"jects on the list provide~to··th~ Newark Field Division. there
are three individuals that kJ'"· ' some significance during the initial
investigation, The first was \.. : tayed ontbe same floor as the 9/11
hijackers at the Mariott prior to t, e attac s. e was :also captured 'on, the security video
:.. from.the hotel lobby (during the same time frame, but not with the hijackers). He flew to
\ New Jersey from Florida, and therewas some thought that he might be idet:l:t~th a
• I \ Ia subject 'of San Diego ip.vestigation. Post 9111 ~L-Jvas
taken into custody "overseas." He is Australian. H¢ was determined not to have been
connected to the 9/11 attacks. Kline was··not sure, bot did not believe he was identifiable
with the I Ifrom San Diego. SAl .....\ ~as involved with this investigation.

The second and third subjects
Asmuth and Ayub Ali Khan, the two
the day after 9111 with box cutters in
these individuals and the 9/11 attacks
credit card fraud.
of interestwho were not on our list are Mohammed
individualspulled off a train headed toward Texas
their possession. Although any connection between
ultimately washed out, they were both charged with
"

The investigation of Mohammed el-Atriss was blown way out of proportion. The
9/11 hijackers did not get fake IDs from Atriss. Rather, the '9(11 hijackers used their real
names to obtain valid international drivers' licenses, which is 'what Atriss did for a living.
Atriss was very cooperative. ....,

Of all the subjects investigated, Kline and Turkington Uneqli'ivt:j that

none of them had any foreknowledge of the conspiracy. Rababah an' he two
most significant subjects, were all about money not extremism, Admiffe y, t elf contact
with the hijackers was "very strange." However, the 9/11 conspiracy was a very "simple

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plan."

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The Montclair and Union Street apartments pop up over and over because they
are common places to stay for recent immigrants in the Paterson area community. The
Islamic Center of Passaic County is a politically active religious center. Mezain was the
former imam there. The mosque is radical, but nobody at the mosque overtly supported
the hijackers.