Hurricane Sandy Response

After Action Report DRAFT

July 1, 2013









Prepared by
The National Center for Security & Preparedness on behalf of
The New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 3

Executive Summary 4

Overview of Hurricane Sandy 5

Hurricane Sandy Response & Recovery 7

Methodology 8

Areas of Study

Personnel 9

Technology & Facilities 12

Procedures & Plans 17

Concluding Recommendations 22

Appendix 1 AAR Development Team 23

Appendix 2 Acronyms Used in this Report 24

Appendix 3 Hurricane Sandy Chronology 27

Appendix 4 Executive Orders Issued During Hurricane Sandy 31

Appendix 5 Persons Interviewed for this Report 35







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FOREWORD

July 1, 2013

As the recovery operations began following Hurricane Sandy, Commissioner Jerome
Hauer of the New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (the
Division) reached out to the National Center for Security & Preparedness (NCSP) to develop
a comprehensive After Action Report (AAR) assessing the Division's response to the disaster.
The NCSP previously developed a limited scope AAR on the response to Hurricane Irene and
Tropical Storm Lee. Subsequently, the NCSP conducted a confidential functional exercise to
help the Division assess processes and procedures during a simulated Level 1 activation of
the State's Emergency Operations Center. These efforts are part of the NCSP's wider
strategic partnership with the Division and provided a strong foundation for the Hurricane
Sandy AAR process.

AAR development can vary in terms of scope, focus, methodology, and purpose. The
Commissioner emphasized this AAR's essential role in New York State's continuing
emergency management efforts. He asked that the report be accurate, comprehensive, and
clear in its findings and conclusions. It is equally important to note that the Commissioner did
not provide any guidance as to which subject matter experts to use, approach to take, or how
to accomplish the mission. In other words, we were not only allowed but entrusted to
complete the project objectively.

I selected the subject matter experts (SMEs) based on their experience, expertise, and
in most cases, my personal knowledge of their capabilities. The AAR Development Team
produced a report keeping with the guidance provided to us. We have confidence that this
report will guide the Division's continuing efforts to serve the citizens of New York State.

Respectfully submitted,


Rick C. Mathews
Director

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hurricane Sandy sorely tested the New York State Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Services Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which was still in the process
of implementing changes and improvements prompted by the response to 2011's Hurricane
Irene and Tropical Storm Lee. Although a relatively weak storm in terms of wind speed,
Sandy was extraordinarily large in size and impeccable in her timing, striking the New York
and New Jersey coastlines at high tide. The resulting storm surge caused unprecedented
damage: it smashed coastal communities in both states, flooded large areas of New York
City, and disrupted transportation, energy, and communications for millions of residents.

The storm killed 48 persons in New York State, and another 24 in neighboring states.
Property damage exceeded $72 billion (second only to Katrina). Despite efforts by City,
County, State, and Federal emergency agency personnel that can only be described as
heroic, Hurricane Sandy for a time simply overwhelmed every plan and contingency. The
scale of the event was larger and the needs of the victims greater than most communities
had anticipated.

OEM was and continues to be centrally involved in the Hurricane Sandy response and
recovery effort. The agency's staff has worked endless hours and days to meet the needs of
the people of New York State. For the most part, OEM's performance can be considered
successful despite confusion, delays, and missteps along the way. In the words of many who
were involved in the process and interviewed for this report, it could have been worse. But is
that outcome acceptable? Moreover, would that level of marginally acceptable performance
be replicable in the face of a Category 2 or 3 hurricane along Sandy's path?

Many of the problems OEM encountered in mounting operations for Sandy were predictable,
and echoed gaps and shortfalls called out after the Irene and Lee responses the previous
year. Staffing, technology, and doctrine were issues in 2011 and they remained issues in
2012, and the challenging circumstances of the Sandy response certainly exacerbated those
problems. Many of these pre-existing conditions were being addressed, albeit slowly, when
Sandy appeared on the horizon and forced the question.

The lessons learned from the Hurricane Sandy response are clear because many of the
findings are not new. The herculean efforts to meet the "superstorm's impacts
notwithstanding, the State of New York and OEM need to move forward quickly on all fronts
to ensure the citizens of the Empire State have the response capability they not only deserve
but, based on recent events, need.






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OVERVIEW OF HURRICANE SANDY

On October 22, 2012, Tropical Depression Sandy developed 320 miles south of the Jamaican
Islands, and the National Weather Service forecasted possible extreme weather for the Mid-
Atlantic and Northeastern United States. Hurricane Sandy made landfall on the evening of
October 29, 2012, with an effective diameter of 485 miles and sustained winds of 75 mph.
The storm caused extensive flood and wind damage, compounded by wide spread power
outages, fires, and fuel shortages. On October 30, 2012, a major federal disaster declaration
was signed by President Obama.

Three days prior to landfall, the New York State (NYS) Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Services (DHSES) Office of Emergency Management (OEM) activated the State
Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in preparation for the landfall of Hurricane Sandy.
That same day, Governor Cuomo issued an emergency declaration for NYS to expedite pre-
landfall emergency response operations. Two days later, President Obama signed
Emergency Declaration 3351 for NYS and mandatory evacuations were ordered for NYC
"Zone A as well as the Rockaways, City sland, and Hamilton Beach. By that evening, all
major bridges and tunnels, air and sea terminals, and rail lines into the NYC Metropolitan area
were shut down.

Damage estimates from Sandy exceed $72 billion, with 24 states impacted by the storm.
Sandy was so large that tropical storm force winds extended over an area about 1,000 miles
in diameter. Sandy caused water levels to rise along the entire East Coast of the United
States from Florida northward to Maine. The highest storm surges and greatest inundation,
which reached record levels, occurred in New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and especially
in and around the New York City area. In many of these locations especially along the
coasts of central and northern New Jersey, Staten Island, and southward-facing shores of
Long Island the surge was accompanied by powerful damaging waves. Storm surge caused
flooding that exceeded 8 feet above ground level in some locations. Power outages from the
combined effects of wind and surge left some coastal communities without power for months.





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The National Hurricane Center (NHC) Tropical Cyclone Report estimated the death count
from Sandy at 147 direct deaths. In the United
States, the storm was associated with 72 direct
deaths in eight states: 48 in New York, 12 in New
Jersey, 5 in Connecticut, 2 each in Virginia and
Pennsylvania, and 1 each in New Hampshire,
West Virginia, and Maryland. The storm also
resulted in at least 75 indirect deaths (i.e., related
to unsafe or unhealthy conditions that existed
during the evacuation phase, occurrence of the
hurricane, or during the post-hurricane/clean-up
phase). These numbers make Sandy the
deadliest hurricane to hit the U.S. mainland since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, as well as the
deadliest hurricane/post-tropical cyclone to hit the U.S. East Coast since Hurricane Agnes in
1972.




NASA
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HURRICANE SANDY RESPONSE & RECOVERY
(Current as of 5/2013)

Hurricane Sandy required the largest emergency response in the NYC area since the 9/11
terror attacks with support from more than 4,650 personnel deployed from 42 federal
agencies and volunteer organizations and
Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC) support from 29 states
across the nation. Throughout response
operations, over 5500 State Police and
National Guard members were deployed
and 14 swift water rescue teams executed
161 reported missions. Additionally, 9
functional branches and personnel from
over 35 state agencies operated in the
SEOC, and 124 shelters were stood up to
house approximately 8,000 displaced
citizens.

The storm resulted in nearly 400,000 evacuations and extensive flood and wind damage to
critical infrastructure, including 2.1 million power outages and flooding in major NYC tunnels
and subway lines. Furthermore, significant fuel shortages ensued with 2 of 6 major petroleum
refineries shut down and 4 operating at reduced rates. Additionally, over 149.7 million gallons
of water were pumped from NYC infrastructure, the Defense Logistics Agency delivered 2.3
million gallons of fuel, and over 5.7 million cubic yards of debris were removed from impacted
regions.

In order to facilitate recovery operations, mobile Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) were
opened in Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island on November 1
st
, and a total of 65 Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) DRCs were operational throughout the response.
Recovery efforts were complicated by the arrival of a strong coast storm system (Nor'easter)
on November 7, 2012, which brought strong winds, storm surge, and freezing temperatures to
the NYC region. Despite the inclement weather, the ports of New York and New Jersey re-
opened the same day, with most subways and the Queens-Midtown Tunnel returning to
operations two days later.

The New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) began demobilization on
November 12, 2012. Deactivation of the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) from a Level I
to Level II came on November 16, 2012. On January 29, 2013, Congress passed the "Sandy
Recovery mprovement Act of 2013 allocating 100% reimbursement to states through federal
assistance. By May of 2013, $6.6 billion in total FEMA assistance was awarded to New York
State.
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METHODOLOGY

The National Center for Security & Preparedness (NCSP) at the University at Albany, State
University of New York was asked by the New York State Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Services to develop the Hurricane Sandy After Action Report (AAR). To this end,
the NCSP assembled a team of subject matter experts to prepare the AAR (the roster of
SMEs is provided in Appendix A of this document). The subject matter experts were charged
with conducting interviews of key local, state, and federal personnel, as well as individuals in
the private sector and non-governmental organizations, who had first-hand perspectives on
OEM's operations and performance in the days leading up to and during the Sandy
response. These interviews, conducted on a strictly not-for-attribution basis, included
numerous OEM staff, other New York State agency officials, emergency management
personnel from Nassau, Suffolk and Greenwich counties and New York City, FEMA officials,
and other leaders in the affected areas.

Interviewers used baseline questions to establish information on their subjects' backgrounds,
where they were during the response, and the nature of their responsibilities, but were free to
follow topics raised in conversations. Results were shared among the AAR Development
Team and discussed prior to development of the draft report. On the basis of those
discussions, key themes were defined and areas for further investigation developed.

The resulting data was accumulated and integrated into the draft After Action Report, which
was then provided to the NCSP for review and final editing.




AP

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AREAS OF STUDY
PERSONNEL


STRENGTHS


An organization succeeds or fails on the quality and commitment of its personnel. While OEM
has a number of significant personnel issues, including staffing, the overall performance of its
staff prior to, during, and after Sandy was remarkable. OEM staff worked long hours
supporting a mission that was dynamic, challenging, and often frustrating. The dedication
reflected throughout extended operations ultimately made an important difference between
success and failure.

The men and women of OEM were asked to work12-hour shifts under difficult conditions for
extended days. For some, due to additional tasks and understaffing, that translated into 16+
hour days, which they accepted as a necessary part of getting the job accomplished. The
dedication of OEM staff in Albany and in the field was critical to the success of the response
over a series of seemingly never-ending days. The experience of a small number of long-
serving professionals in past events helped compensate for too many vacant positions in the
organization, allowing OEM to mount a response that met the majority of the unprecedented
needs of the citizens of New York State in a timely and effective manner.


Strong sense of commitment by most staff to the mission.
Demonstrated expertise delivering emergency management services.
Succeeded in the face of unprecedented challenges.
Effective collaboration with volunteers from other agencies in EOC
operations.

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A number of OEM personnel forfeited vacation time to stay at their posts. Others labored to
the point of exhaustion, staying at their position despite the physical and emotional stress
born of a long-term round-the-clock activation. Moreover, OEM staff members were
leveraged to provide needed expertise and leadership to EOC volunteers from other State
agencies.

OEM personnel deserve recognition for their contributions to public safety during and after
Sandy's landfall. As a group they have been asked to do too much, with too little, for too long.
It is a testimonial to these public employees that they have largely found ways to succeed in
that pursuit.


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AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Staffing

Staffing within OEM is down 50% over the past two years, from the 2011 level of 125 to
approximately 65 (post-Sandy). New York State OEM has roughly the same number of staff
as agencies in states with 80% fewer residents. During routine operations, OEM staffers are
carrying out a broad range of tasks, including the development of plans, conduct of exercises
and delivery of training. They are also tasked with managing the disbursement and use of
hundreds of millions of dollars of Federal grant funds and payments, including monies for
victims of past disasters. The shortage of trained personnel delays getting funds into the
hands of citizens and emergency agencies across New York.

During Sandy, the lack of seasoned personnel forced many OEM employees to work beyond
their 12 hour shifts for days on end. Many assignments and requests were delayed due to
the lack of knowledgeable personnel positioned to fulfill orders and respond to calls for
information.

The lack of trained staff also adversely impacted the integration into the EOC of untrained
volunteers from other State agencies. Upon arrival, several representatives had almost no
experience, and received training (EEOC, 300, and 400 classes) from OEM staff.

Loss of Experienced Staff

OEM needs to recruit and retain more qualified staff, preferably with operational experience.
In the past, there were opportunities to train and partner with replacements; that cycle is not
currently working.

There is a need to address differences among positions to ensure both the slot and
incumbent match OEM requirements. Cross-training among key staff can help to support
retention of staff and institutional knowledge. Moreover, there is a need for a clearly defined
and meaningful professional development/career path for OEM personnel.

Staff Sustainment

The sustainability of OEM staff at all levels does not appear to be a sufficiently high
priority. There is no specific office or individual assigned the broad responsibility for the
maintenance of staff well-being. Even prior to landfall, several individuals had been working
14-to-16 hour days. Many in the EOC were already tired and underperforming before the full
activation was ordered. Professional development, staff sustainment, and succession
planning have not received a sustained commitment. The consequence impacts staff
knowledge, professionalism, and retention.


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TECHNOLOGY & FACILITIES


STRENGTHS

New York State OEM has access to the full range of technology necessary to support
emergency operations across the state. As evidenced throughout the Sandy response, there
were no meaningful barriers to data, voice and visual communications between the EOC in
Albany and personnel operating in County-level operations centers or at the State's offices in
New York City.


DLAN reflects the requirements of OEM.
EOC technology base is first class.
GIS is being employed to support EOC operations and decision making.

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Although there has been substantial criticism of DisasterLAN (DLAN), the State's incident
management support system, it should be noted that OEM personnel familiar with and trained
in the use of DLAN feel it is an effective tool for supporting EOC operations. Over the past
decade it has been customized to meet the needs of OEM and has a proven track record with
many of the EOC staff. Contractor staff (on-site at the EOC) is highly knowledgeable of OEM
operations and is responsive to requests to prepare reports and provide assistance to new
users.

OEM employs Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to present information on a wide range
of subjects of importance to emergency managers and response agencies. OEM's GS staff
is experienced and eager to employ a wide range of tools in support of the Office and its
mission.


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AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

DLAN

The principal tool used by OEM to obtain
and manage requests for assistance from
counties across the State is DisasterLAN.
Although the State has invested
substantially over the past decade in
making DLAN the electronic backbone for
OEM incident management, it is not
widely embraced by emergency
managers at the local level. Local
jurisdictions in New York have invested in
other systems that are unable to
communicate with DLAN.

Since DLAN is felt to be too hard to use, it is not used on a daily basis by most OEM staff nor
by local-level responders, which means most personnel are not familiar with its operation.

Tracking the status of specific entered requests is difficult, making management and planning
for those resources and assignments challenging.

DLAN does not readily allow users to generate custom reports the DLAN contractor at the
EOC must develop these for users.

DLAN is not compatible with WebEOC and eTeam, the systems in use in most counties and
major cities in the State, including New York City, which means data must be entered twice
and that the databases downstate and in Albany cannot speak to each other.


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Asset Tracking

The volume of material flowing into and out of staging areas, most prominently Citi Field, was
staggering. A modern asset tracking system, tied to DLAN (or some other incident
management support software package) and to the State's procurement system, would
streamline the acquisition and delivery of requested resources to the parties that need them,
help assure positive control during the operation, and facilitate recovery and return of rented,
purchased and borrowed items.



OEM should conduct both internal and external software requirements reviews to ensure that
whatever system the state will be using meets the operational and recovery needs of the state
and stakeholders. There are a number of commercial off the shelf systems (COTS) that
provide the functionality the interviewees described as a need.

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New York State Emergency Operations Center

Although the communications capabilities of the EOC are completely up to date, the process
of communications within the EOC is a challenging one. Modern, functional EOCs around the
world are wide-open and well-lit, with signage and information screens that can be seen from
anywhere in the room. The State's current facility does not afford OEM staff and participants
from other agencies with the operational environment, including meeting space, to carry out
their missions. The EOC should be assessed for further updates and improvements;
alternate space should be considered.




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PROCEDURES & PLANS



STRENGTHS


Relocating Staff to New York City and the ROC

The unprecedented scope of the storm damage and corresponding response effort
challenged "business as usual for OEM, prompting a lean-forward, operational posture on
the part of OEM leadership. While still playing its traditional role of supporting resource
requests from county and city governments, OEM personnel (both staff and consultant) were
engaged in hands-on roles across the region, working in city and county EOCs, staffing
logistics staging areas, performing field inspections and damage assessments, and
augmenting other agency staff.


Relocating key staff to the New York City area was hugely successful from
local jurisdiction perspectives.
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) personnel were
invaluable to sustaining EOC operations, but need to be effectively managed.
The State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) provided a
solid basis for operations.


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The decision to put personnel on the scene was characterized by local officials in New York
City and other affected communities as a new, best practice for OEM. It allowed OEM to
effectively follow-up on commitments made by the Governor's Office, coordinating those
requests with the EOC staff in Albany. New York City emergency management officials went
so far as to describe the forward deployment of OEM personnel as a game changer and a
180 shift from their experience with the State in past disasters. In their opinion, the presence
of OEM staff on the scene after Sandy resulted in better communication and coordination,
more prompt fulfillment of requests, and a stronger sense of collaboration.

EMAC

EMAC assistance was requested early
in the activation timeline, although the
first "loaned staff didn't step into the
EOC until several days after Sandy's
landfall. EMAC personnel were used to
augment logistics and finance, and
assisted in planning and operations,
while OEM staff filled most of the core
ICS positions. Even though the EMAC
deployed staff were not fully conversant
with New York's specific plans and
procedures, they knew emergency
management, and most were willing and
able to adapt to their roles "filling holes.
By one estimate, 29 staff positions were filled by EMAC.

CEMP

The State's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan reflects many years of OEM work,
analysis, and institutional lessons-learned. The CEMP remains the "bible for OEM
operations; the plans and procedures embodied within the CEMP were the basis for actions
taken in the field and at the EOC throughout the activation.

As with any plan, maintenance is critical. The CEMP clearly needs to be revised to reflect
changes in the operational and decision-making environments (e.g., the more active role
played by the Governor's Office).



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AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT


Regional Operations Center

Establishing a so-called Regional Operations Center, or "ROC, at the State offices in
Midtown Manhattan was seen by the Commissioner as a straightforward task to ensure the
Governor and his key staff had access to the same information they could receive in the NY
State EOC in Albany. To this end, he had OEM personnel go to New York City to assemble
the systems necessary to convert a conference room into a viable Regional Operations
Center. While the equipment, including video screens and computers, was purchased for this
purpose and much of it was employed in another command and control facility, the ROC was
never assembled as envisioned. The transfer of senior personnel from Albany also severely
stretched OEM's staff resources.

If OEM is going to continue to support a forward leaning posture in major events, including the
utilization of assets in the field in the manner displayed during Sandy, it must:
Incorporate the ROC concept into the CEMP;
Strengthen its available staff resources, both at the headquarters level and in
the State Regions (see discussion under Personnel, above) and;
Clarify and define, train and exercise OEM support roles to Executive
Leadership.



The decision to establish the so-called ROC was not understood nor
supported by OEM rank and file.
The OEM leadership team must be bolstered.
The change in procurement rules installed for OEM during the Sandy
response is inconsistent with effective emergency operations.
OEM must do a better job of building and sustaining its staff.
OEM and Executive Leadership expectations need to be better defined and
integrated into planning and operations.
Planning needs to be strengthened across the board.

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EMAC

OEM would benefit from
refining their EMAC request
procedure to ensure that the
requirements for detailees are
specified in greater detail. In
addition, the request should be
initiated earlier in the activation
to help ensure personnel are in
place when needed and most
helpful.

To make their integration into
EOC operations easier, the
CEMP should be updated with
quick reference guides, job action sheets, and the forms and other tools to perform each
function in the EOC. This will help greatly when augmenting staff with EMAC and other
personnel who are unfamiliar with New York State EOC operations.

CEMP

There is a need to promote greater understanding of the CEMP and supporting procedures
among senior officials in the State, their roles and resonsibilities during a disaster, and to
establish the working rules of engagement between the Executive Leadership and the
agencies charged with coordinating emergency response. This will enhance the
effectiveness of senior-level decisions within context of the larger response.


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OEM Leadership Team

Due to the retirement or voluntary transfers of key staff over the past two years, OEM entered
the Sandy response with a seriously depleted leadership cadre.

Effective emergency management is frequently a function of strong hands-on leadership and
pre-existing personal relationships. In this case, the absence of a deep bench of experienced
emergency managers within the office was felt almost immediately. The Commissioner and
then Director clearly recognized this problem and had taken steps to address gaps in the
organization, but this process was in its very early stages when the storm hit in October.

Use of experienced consultants allowed OEM to actively engage on a variety of issues that
would have probably been outside the range of available State personnel. This should not,
however, be seen as a substitute for recruiting, training, and retaining experienced
management staff.

OEM and Executive Leadership Expectations

OEM needs to modify its current organizational structure, procedures, and culture to
accommodate the new model of proactive senior leadership demonstrated by the Governor and
his senior staff. This will require close coordination with the State's executive leadership to
define expectations and evolve standard operating procedures, addressing "breaks" with pre-
Sandy processes.

At the same time, the Governor and senior leadership need to better understand how OEM
functions and can support them during a disaster. This will require executive reinforcement of
cabinet and interagency roles and support in preparedness, participation, and response so that
the overall state response is stronger.




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CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS

The New York State Office of Emergency Management was in poor condition on October 28,
2012. Too few experienced staff members, a system based in part on tools that the users in
the field didn't understand or use, and a leadership that was trying to build a team while
fighting too many fires around the State. All of these vulnerabilities were exposed when
Sandy made landfall on October 29.

While the core strength of OEM its staff includes many dedicated professionals, there are
too many others that lack the experience to effectively meet the needs of New York's citizens.
The technology backbone of the State EOC is solid, but undercut by an incident management
software system that is not accepted by the local communities that need to use it and a
physical plant that is not conducive to efficient operations. It is also operating in a dynamic
government environment in which its plans and SOPs are being overtaken by new demands
and requirements. These challenges must be seen as an opportunity.

The Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services should initiate a ground up
review of each position and the personnel filling those roles. This bench review should
assess the position's role and the capabilities and experience of the staff filling that role.
Personnel should be reassigned to maximize strengths, replaced if necessary. Staff
members should also be shown a career path and an opportunity for professional growth
commensurate with their efforts and sacrifices.

OEM must review the viability of its continued use of DLAN. If DLAN is to be retained, it must
allow more system flexibility and greater integration with other systems in the State. The
EOC needs to be reconfigured to create more flexible and dedicated space for use by
planners, working groups, and other personnel during activations.

The new paradigm of leading from the front, demonstrated by the Governor during Sandy and
likely to be replayed in future disasters, demands OEM adopt a fresh approach to supporting
the State's executive leadership while still fulfilling its core responsibilities to the counties,
cities, and citizens of the Empire State. To this end, the CEMP needs a thorough review and
revision specifically addressing responses to "all in scenarios. The resulting roadmap for
OEM operations must then be effectively communicated to New York's local jurisdictions and
to its senior officials, ensuring coordination and efficient use of resources.

New York State's Office of Emergency Management has been a standard for the world. It
should be again.

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APPENDIX 1: AAR DEVELOPMENT TEAM

The development of this document was led by Rick C. Mathews, Director, National Center for
Security & Preparedness, University at Albany, State University of New York.

NCSP Staff & Subject Matter Experts

Andrew Vitek, Research Assistant
Carlos H. Millan, Project Analyst
Jeffrey Knaack, Project Coordinator
Derek T. Morrison, Senior Analyst
Steve Sin, Senior Research Associate
Cyndi Mellen, Senior Project Coordinator
Brandon J. Kennedy, Senior Project Coordinator
Jayson L. Kratoville, Chief of Staff
Rick C. Mathews, Director

The Olson Group, LLC, supported the NCSP staff and subject matter experts in the
organization, layout, and editing of the After Action Report.

Primary Subject Matter Expert Team

Thomas J. Lockwood
William Nagle
Kyle Olson
Dorothy Lowry
Adam Montella
Glenn Epler

Secondary Subject Matter Expert Team

The development team consulted was a team of secondary subject matter experts embedded
within the DHSES during the Hurricane Sandy Response. This team provided direct
information, comments, and recommendations.

Donald Hiett
James Ellson
Patrick Bahnken
Howard Murphy
William Savarese
Randall Duncan


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APPENDIX 2: ACRONYMS USED IN THIS REPORT

ACE: Army Corps of Engineers
AG & MKTS: Department of Agriculture and Markets
APB: Animal Protection Branch
ARC: American Red Cross
CEMP: Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
CIKR: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
COTS: Commercial off the Shelf Systems
DCJS: Division of Criminal Justice Services
DEC: Department of Environmental Conservation
DFS: Department of Financial Services
DHS: US Department of Homeland Security
DMNA: Division of Military and Naval Affairs
DOCCS: Department of Corrections and Community Services
DOH: Department of Health
DOL: Department of Labor
DOS: Department of State
DOT: Department of Transportation
DPC: Disaster Planning Commission
DRC: Disaster Recovery Center
DSP: Division of State Police
EMAC: Emergency Management Action Compact
EOC/SEOC: New York State Emergency Operations Center
ESB: Emergency Services Branch
ESD: Empire State Development
ESF: Emergency Support Functions
FB: Functional Branch
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency

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GP: General Population
HCF: Health Care Facility
HCR: Homes and Community Renewal
HSB: Human Services Branch
IMT: Incident Management Team
IOF: Initial Operating Facility
IOGS: Interstate Oil and Gas Commission
JFO: Joint Field Office
JIC: Joint Information Center
JOC: Joint Operations Center
LESB: Law Enforcement and Security Branch
LIRR: Long Island Rail Railroad
LOC: Logistics Operation Center
MTA: Metropolitan Transit Authority
NCSP: National Center for Security & Preparedness
NLT: No Later Than
NRCC: National Resource Coordinating Center
NRF: National Response Framework
NWS: National Weather Service
NYSDHSES: New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services
NYSDOT: New York State Department of Transportation
NYSE: New York Stock Exchange
NYSERDA: New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
NYSOEM: New York State Office of Emergency Management
NYSTWA: New York State Thruway Authority
OCFS: Office of Children and Family Services
OEIC: Office of Interoperable and Emergency Communications
OFA: Office of the Aging
OFPC: Office of Fire Prevention and Control

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OFT: Office for Technology
OGS: Office of General Services
OMH: Office of Mental Health
OPRHP: Office of Parks, Recreation and Historical Preservation
OPWDD: Office for People with Developmental Disabilities
OTA: Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance
PA NY/NJ: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
PHB: Public Health Branch
POTUS: President of the United States
PSC: Public Service Commission
ROC: Regional Operational Center
RRCC: Regional Resource Coordinating Center
SED: State Education Department
SOE: State of Emergency
SUNY: State University of New York
SWC: State Watch Center
TIG: Transportation Infrastructure Group


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APPENDIX 3: HURRICANE SANDY CHRONOLOGY

Time/Date Event

1100 22 OCT
Tropical Depression Sandy 320 miles SSW of Jamaica; forecast
possible extreme weather in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast regions.

2300 24 OCT
NWS Advisory 11: Hurricane Sandy 85 miles SW of Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
0800 25 OCT
SITREP 10-25:
New York City (NYC) Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
Situation Room Activated.
1030 25 OCT Principals: Downstate Conference Call.
1130 25 OCT Principals: Conference Call NWS.
1300 25 OCT Hurricane Strategic Planning Meeting Director Kuhr's Office.
1400 25 OCT Principals Meeting.
2300 25 OCT
NWS Advisory 15: Hurricane Sandy 15 miles NNE of Eleuthera
Island, Bahamas.
0800 26 OCT
SITREP 10-25:
NYS Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Level 3 Activation.
26 OCT (DAY)
SITREP 10-26:
Gov. Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency for New York State.
26 OCT (DAY)
FEMA Liaisons Arrive at the New York State Emergency Operations
Center.
26 OCT (DAY)
SITREP 10-26:
NYC OEM Begins 24 Hour Operations.
26 OCT (DAY) Nassau and Suffolk Counties' EOCs Activated from 0900-1700.
1200 26 OCT NYC OEM Coastal Storm Steering Committee Conference Call.
2300 26 OCT NWS Advisory 19: Hurricane Sandy 395 mile SSE of Charleston SC.
0800 27 OCT
SITREP 10-26:
DMNA Joint Operations Center Level 3 Activation.
0800 27 OCT
SITREP 10-27:
SEOC Level 1 Activation with 9 Functional Branches operational.

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0700 28 OCT
SITREP 10-28:
JOC Level 1 Activation.
28 OCT (DAY)
SITREP 10-28 #2
President Obama (POTUS) Issues Presidential Emergency
Declaration #3351 for New York State.
28 OCT (DAY)
New Jersey Evacuations in Atlantic City, Sandy Hook South to Cape
May, and the Barrier Islands.
28 OCT (EVE)
SITREP 10-28 #2:
Select medical facilities/nursing homes in zone A/B begin voluntary
evacuation.
28 OCT (EVE)
SITREP 10-28 #2:
Nassau and Suffolk Counties' EOCs Begin 24 Hour Operations.
1400 28 OCT
NYC Zone A evacuation as well as the Rockaways, City Island and
Hamilton Beach.
1500 28 OCT
SITREP 10-27:
New York State Fire Mobilization and Mutual Aid Plan Activated.
1900 28 OCT Suspension of Subway Service.
2100 28 OCT All NYC Mass-Transit Suspended.
29 OCT (EVE) ***Hurricane Sandy Impact NY***
29 OCT (EVE)
SITREP 10-29 #2:
New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) reports
numerous closures throughout the Hudson Valley, NYC and Long
Island.
Major closures include: Tappan Zee Bridge, Holland Tunnel, and
the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. There are travel restrictions on a
number of other bridges due to high wind. NYSDOT has banned
oversized and overweight travel on and south of I-84.
2030 29 OCT Queens Breezy Point Fire.
30 OCT (DAY)
SITREP 10-30:
Major Federal Disaster Declaration for Public Assistance and
Individual Assistance.
30 OCT (DAY)
SITREP 10-30 #2:
Of the six refiners located in the Mid-Atlantic area that supply
petroleum fuels to the New York market, two are shut down and the
remaining four are operating at reduced rates.

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30 OCT (DAY)
SITREP 10-30 #2:
Human Services Branch Tasked with Establishing Disaster Recovery
Centers(DRCs) Starting 1 Nov.
31 OCT (DAY)
SITREP 10-31:
NYSE Reopens.
1 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-1:
Mobile DRC For the City of New York opened in Queens, Brooklyn
and Staten Island.
2 NOV NYC Marathon Cancelled.
0800 2 NOV
SITREP 11-2:
Emergency Services Functional Branch Demobilized.
3 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-3:
Significant Fuel Shortages Acknowledged.
3 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-3:
New York State Regional Operation Center Begins Operations.
3 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-3 #2:
EMAC IMT Assistance Arrived to Support NYC OEM operations.
3 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-3 #2:
FEMA Footprint in the NYC EOC triples in size to support Disaster
Resolution 4805.
FEMA Initial Operating Facility (IOF) established in the NYC OEM
EOC.
FEMA Branch II Includes the Five Boroughs of New York City.
FEMA Joint Field Office (JFO) was established in Queens.
4 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-4:
NYC OEM Establishes Two Command Posts in Impacted areas; one
in Staten Island and one in the Rockaways.
5 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-4 #2:
FEMA requests a List of Facilities that can Accept a Delivery of 24
million Gallons of Gasoline Being Brought Into Regions 1 & 2.
5 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-5:
Branch Members Begin Staffing Fuel Task Force to prioritize Federal
Fuel.
6 NOV (DAY) Presidential Election.



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7 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-7 #2:
Nor'easter: Strong Coastal System mpacts Areas of Southeastern
New York.
Forecast: Storm Surges of 3-5 feet, Strong Winds with Gusts up to 60
mph, Snow with 3-6" of Accumulation in the Catskills and Hudson
Valley,1-3" in the New York City Metro area, Temperatures Cold with
wind chills in the 20s possible in areas affected by Sandy.
7 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-7 #2:
Port of New York and New Jersey is open to all Traffic.
8 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-8 #2:
New York City Subways Operating Normally on Most Lines with Some
Weather Related Delays.
9 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-8 #2:
NYC, Suffolk, and Nassau County Gas Rationing Begins.
9 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-9:
The Queens Midtown Tunnel reopened.
2000 12 NOV
SITREP 11-12 #2:
SEOC begins demobilizing several state agencies from being present
in the EOC overnight from the hours of 8:00 p.m. 8:00 a.m.
2000 12 NOV
SITREP 11-12 #2:
Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), Department of Financial
Services (DFS), Office for Technology (OFT), Air Operations Branch,
Animal Protection Branch and Emergency Services Branch Dully
Demobilized.
15 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-15
Power Restored to All Areas Other than those that Cannot be
Restored Due to Flooding.
16 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-16 #2:
The Division of Military and Naval Affairs (DMNA) reduces activation
level and operating hours of the Joint Force Headquarters Joint
Operations Center to Level II (no night shift).
16 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-17:
EOC Reduced to Level II Activation.
18 NOV (DAY)
SITREP 11-18:
State Fire Mobilization and Mutual Aid plan deactivated.
10 DEC (DAY)
SITREP 12-7:
Brooklyn Battery Tunnel fully reopened.
14 DEC (DAY) LAST SITREP

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APPENDIX 4: EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED DURING
HURRICANE SANDY

Number Executive Order
47 Governor Cuomo Declares A Disaster In The Following Counties
48
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Authority Of Police
Officers Employed By New York State Agencies
49
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Transportation For The
State Disaster Emergency
50
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Transportation For The
State Disaster Emergency
51
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Residences And
Businesses Affected By The State Disaster Emergency
52
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions
Establishing Time Limitations On Actions And Time In Which To Take An
Appeal
53
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions
Establishing Time Limitations For Holding A Defendant In Custody Pending
Disposition Of A Felony Complaint
54
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Motor Fuel Distribution
And Transportation For The State Disaster Emergency
55
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Repair Of State Facilities
For The State Disaster Emergency

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56
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulatory Provisions Of The
State Office For The Aging During The State Disaster Emergency
57
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Education Law Provisions
Regarding Dialysis Services During The State Disaster Emergency
58
Temporary Suspension Regarding The Certification Of Donated Water
During The State Disaster Emergency
59
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Limitations On Motor And
Home Heating Fuel
60
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Relating
To The Powers Of Certain Security Guards
61
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions
Establishing Time Limitations For Holding A Defendant In Custody Pending
Disposition Of A Felony Complaint
62 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To The Election Law
63
Declaring Certain Conditions Caused By Hurricane Sandy In And Around
Federally Declared Counties To Be Public Nuisances Impacting Public
Health And Ordering The Removal Of Those Conditions
64
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulatory Provisions
Regarding Home Health Care During The State Disaster Emergency
65
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Relating
To The Transportation Of School Children In The City Of New York
66
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Emergency Shelter Statutes
And Regulations

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67
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulations Related To The
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
68
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutes And Regulations To
Expand Access To Tetanus Immunizations During The State Disaster
Emergency
69
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Relating
To Payment Of Fees For Duplicate State-Issued Documents And Extension
Of Expiration Dates
70
Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain School
Districts Within The Counties Of Nassau And Orange
71
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutes And Regulations
Regarding Services Provided To Individuals With Developmental
Disabilities, Mental Illnesses And Alcohol And Substance Abuse Disorders
During The State Disaster Emergency
72
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Health Statutes And
Regulations During The State Disaster Emergency
73 Designation Pursuant To Section 6 Of The Executive Law
74
Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain School
Districts Within The Counties Of Nassau And Rockland
75
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Contracts To Conduct
Surveys Of Electrical Systems In Residences And Buildings On Long Island
76 Designation Pursuant To Section 6 Of The Executive Law
77
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Provisions Of The Insurance
Law

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78
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Related To Child And Family Welfare,
Child Day Care, Juvenile Justice, Runaway And Homeless Youth, Adult
Protective Services, And Residential And Non-Residential Care For Victims
Of Domestic Violence
79
Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To State Contracts And For
The Repair Of State Facilities For The State Disaster Emergency
80
Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain School
Districts Within The County Of Nassau
81 Continuing The Suspension Of Certain Provisions Of Law
82
Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Provisions Of The Insurance
Law
83
Temporary Modification Of Provisions Related To The New York City
Juvenile Justice Services Close To Home Initiative
85
Continuing The Suspension Or Modification Of Certain Statutory Provisions
Relating To Payment Of Fees For Duplicate State-Issued Documents And
Extension Of Expiration Dates
86
Temporary Suspension Of Real Property Actions And Proceedings Law
During The State Disaster Emergency
87
Continuing The Suspension Or Modification Of Certain Provisions Of Law
And Regulations



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APPENDIX 5: PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THIS REPORT

These names and titles reflect those positions held during Hurricane Sandy response as
reported to the AAR Development Team.

DHSES Executive Team
Jerome Hauer, Commissioner
Steven Kuhr, Executive Deputy Commissioner (Through November 4, 2012)
James Sherry, Deputy Commissioner for Downstate Operations
Andrew Feeney, Deputy Commissioner for Special Projects
Jeff Bender, Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Finance
Thomas McCarren, Chief Counsel
James Clark, Deputy Counsel

New York State Office of Emergency Management

Executive Team
Steven Kuhr, Director (Through November 4, 2012)
Gregory Brunelle, First Deputy Director (Through October 15, 2012); Acting Director,
(Through 3/2012)
Anthony Sutton, Deputy Director for Field Operations (As of August 13, 2012)

Operations
Brian Head, Operations Section Chief (includes NYS Watch Center)
Shaun Bertok, Deputy Operations Chief
William Campbell, Section Chief IMT
William Bowen, Logistics Section Chief (Through November 9, 2012)
Dan Connor, Operations Section
Vince Fargione, Operations Section
Amy Benequista, Watch Center

Regional Directors
Gene Lucchese, Region 1 NYC
David Zatlin, Region 1 Long Island
Jim Soto, Region 2 East of Hudson
Shannon Green, Region 3 Capital District
Bruce Jordan, Region 3 Northern NY
Mike Sprague, Region 4 Central NY
Tom McCartney, Region 4 Southern Tier
William Correa, Region 5 Finger Lakes
Doug Winner, Region 5 Western NY

Planning and Preparedness
David DeMatteo, Section Chief, Planning
Theodore Fisch, Section Chief, Radiological Preparation
Dan O'Brien, Section Chief, GIS
Richard French, Section Chief, Training and Exercises

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Recovery and Mitigation
Susan Mutch, Deputy Director for Recovery and Mitigation
Kim Panting, Section Chief, Disaster Finance
William Dugan, Section Chief IA & Human Services

NYSOEM Staff
Town hall meeting was conducted with NYSOEM EOC staff.

State Agency Representatives & Liaisons
Robert Limoges, Department of Transportation
Radworth Anderson, Office of General Services
Kelly Nilsson, Department of Agriculture and Markets
Dorothy Wheeler, Department of Health and Human Services
Mike Primeau, Department of Health
Robert Mitchell, Division of Military and Naval Affairs

American Red Cross
Steve Taylor
Sharon Adler

Office of Fire Prevention and Control
Bryant Stevens, Commissioner
William Davis, Deputy Commissioner

Office of Interoperable and Emergency Communications
Robert Barbato, Director

Office of Cyber Security
William Johnson, Deputy Director

Office of Information Technology
Chris Murray, ITS OEM

Office of Counter Terrorism
F. David Sheppard, Deputy Director for Federal Grants
Jamie Daley (Formerly Jamie Ian), Deputy Director for Intelligence & Analysis
Brian Wright, Deputy Director for CIKR
James Horton, Deputy Director for Public Safety

New York City Office of Emergency Management
Joseph Bruno, Commissioner

County Emergency Management
Craig Craft, Commissioner Nassau County Emergency Management
Joseph Williams, Commissioner Suffolk County Emergency Management
Jennifer Wacha, Deputy Commissioner Westchester County Emergency Management



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New York Hospital Association
Susan Waltman, Senior VP & General Counsel

Others Interviewed
Elizabeth Davis & EAD Associates, NCSP SMEs
Patrick Bahnken, NCSP SME
Randall Duncan, NCSP SME
Howard Murphy, NCSP SME
Donald Hiett, NCSP SME
William Savarese, NCSP SME
Ed Beban, NCSP SME